profile of orangi pilot project

Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 7, No. 2, October 1995 227

NGO Profile

Orangi Pilot Project

The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) has become one of the best known NGO projects in the provision of sanitation.In the 16 years since its inception, the Project has directly and indirectly assisted about one million people inOrangi (Karachi) to improved sanitation. Their intervention has been developed through research intohousehold resources and aspirations in Orangi. From the beginning, OPP staff have sought to minimiseexternal support in order to assist households to achieve their objectives for local development. From theirfirst activities, their work has been extended in two directions. The Project has started to work with the peopleof Orangi and the surrounding area in the provision of a number of additional services including housing,health, credit for entrepreneurs, education and rural development. More recently, staff have been assistingboth government and non-government agencies to initiate a number of new projects in other cities in Pakistandrawing on the experience of the Orangi Pilot Project.

I. INTRODUCTION

THE OPP HAS been working in Orangi, a low-income settlement on the periphery ofKarachi, since April 1980. During this timeit has developed programmes in several ar-eas including sanitation, health, housingtechnology, education support services,credit and income generation, social forestryand a rural project.

Since 1988, following the success of themodels that it initially developed, the OPP hasexpanded into four autonomous institutions.The OPP Society is responsible for allocatingcore funds to the three other institutions andmeets once every three months to undertakethis task. The Secretary of the Society is DrHameed Khan, the founder of the Orangi Pi-lot Project. There are three implementinginstitutions, each with an independent board.First, the OPP Research and Training Insti-tute manages the sanitation, housing andsocial forestry programmes in Orangi, plusthe replication and associated training for allprogrammes. Secondly, the Orangi Charita-ble Trust which manages the credit pro-grammes. Finally, the Karachi Health andSocial Development Association which man-ages the health programme.

OPP considers itself to be a research insti-tution whose objective is to analyze outstand-ing research problems within Orangi andthen, through prolonged action research andextension education, discover viable solu-tions. In recognition of the fact that NGOscannot solve problems on the scale required,it does not construct sewerage lines or set-up clinics or schools itself. Rather, its strat-egy is to promote community organization

and self-management. By providing socialand technical guidance, it encourages themobilization of local managerial and finan-cial resources and the practice of coopera-tive action. To date, the OPP has developedthe following “model” programmes:

1. A low-cost sanitation programme whichenables low-income households to constructand maintain modern sanitation (pour-flushlatrines in their own homes and undergroundsewerage pipelines in the lanes) with theirown funds and under their own management.

2. A low-cost housing programme whichupgrades the thalla (block-makers yards) byintroducing stronger machine-made concreteblocks, and battens and tile roofing which ischeaper than reinforced concrete. The pro-gramme also upgrades the skills of localmasons by introducing proper constructiontechniques and by educating house-ownerson planning, orientation and low-cost tech-nology.

3. A basic health and family-planning pro-gramme for segregated and illiterate or semi-literate low-income women which teaches thecauses and methods of preventing commondiseases, the importance of birth control andthe importance of growing vegetables, andwhich provides immunization and familyplanning services.

4. Credit for small family enterprises.5. A schools programme which assists in

the upgrading of physical and academicstandards in private schools.

6. A women’s work centre programmewhich organizes stitchers and other garmentworkers into family units dealing directly withexporters and wholesalers. The programme

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Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 7, No. 2, October 1995

also covers managerial skills and coopera-tive action.

7. A rural development programme whichprovides credit and technical guidance tosupport entrepreneurs develop their aridholdings into woodlots and orchards, and togrow forage for milk cattle.

II. THE BEGINNING OF THEORANGI PILOT PROJECT

ORANGI IS THE largest katchi abadi or un-planned settlement in Karachi. People be-gan living in the area in 1965 and, after 1972,it grew rapidly. At the last estimate in No-vember 1989, there were about 94,000houses located there with an estimated popu-lation of about 800,000. The population isdrawn from a wide range of immigrant groupsfrom India, Bangladesh, the Punjab, thenorthern areas of Pakistan, and local peo-ple. Most find employment as labourers,skilled workers, artisans, shopkeepers orclerks.

The official agencies have provided a fewfacilities including main roads, water linesand electricity plus a few schools, hospitalsand banks but these have been supple-mented by a wide range of private services.This was the situation when the BCCI firstinvited Dr Akter Hammed Khan to work inOrangi in 1980. The first focus was on thesanitation and sewerage problems. Withoutsanitary latrines and underground seweragelines, both the health and property of theresidents was being endangered. However,the households could not afford the currentcost of conventional sanitation systems. Thefirst OPP researchers rejected solutionsbased on foreign aid because the local resi-dents could not afford to repay the loans ormaintain the systems, and the donors them-selves could not afford the large costs in-volved given the scale of necessary invest-ments.

In 1980, bucket latrines or soakpits werethe main means of disposal for human ex-creta and open sewers for the disposal ofwaste water. The result was poor health withtyphoid, malaria, diarrhoea, dysentery andscabies being common. Poor drainage re-sulted in waterlogging and reduced propertyvalues. Initial enquiries showed that resi-

dents were aware of both the sanitation anddrainage problems and knew of the conse-quences for their health and property. How-ever, they took no action for four reasons:

1. Psychological barrier: the residents be-lieved that it was the duty of official agenciesto build sewerage lines to local residents freeof charge.

2. Economic barrier: the cost of conven-tional sanitary latrines and undergroundsewerage could not be afforded by house-holds.

3. Technical barrier: although the peoplecould build their own houses, neither theynor the local builders possessed the techni-cal skills required for the construction ofunderground sewerage lines.

4. Sociological barrier: the constructionof the underground lines required a high levelof community organization for collective ac-tion and this did not exist.

Further analysis of the sanitation problemidentified four levels of infrastructure: insidethe house, in the lane, secondary or collec-tor drains, and the main drains and treat-ment plant. Further research showed thatthe house-owners were willing to be respon-sible for the first three levels. Drawing onexperience in rural research and extensionprogrammes, the OPP planned their strategy.The research consisted of simplifying designsso that they were affordable and technicallyimplementable locally. The extension in-volved identifying activists, training in com-munity organization and technical details,and further guidance and supervision.

III. LOW-COST SANITATION

RESEARCH INTO AN affordable system tookabout a year. Through simplifying the de-sign and developing steel moulds for sani-tary latrines and manholes, the cost was re-duced to one-quarter that of contractor rates.The elimination of contractors’ profiteeringreduced labour rates by a further one-quar-ter. The cost of the final proposed system (atcurrent prices) was about Rs. 1,000 (US$31)of which about half was for the investmentinside the house and the remainder for thelane sanitation.


NGO Profile

Once the economic barrier had been over-come, the extension workers of the OPP be-gan to talk to households to convince themto stop believing in government provision ofservices. Once households realized that theycould address both health problems anddamage to property for such a small invest-ment, the psychological barrier also beganto be overcome.

OPP employed technicians to help surveythe lanes and prepare the plans and esti-mates for each lane. The social organizersworked at the level of the lane to show howthey needed to work together to ensure thatthe lane investment was effective. Withineach lane, a lane manager needed to be iden-tified to manage the process, including col-lecting individual contributions, resolvingdisputes and supervising the work. Fromthe beginning, OPP staff refused to under-take this work. Whilst they could assist in

technical advice and support social organi-zation, only those living in the lane could beresponsible for managing the finances andcontracting the lane sanitation. Together,staff members addressed the technical andsociological barriers.

Shortly after the OPP started work, its areaof operation was reduced to half of Orangiand, from 1982 to 1989, the Project workedin this smaller area (see Box 1). After 1989,it was again allowed to operate throughoutthe settlement. By 1993, 97 per cent of thelanes in the area in which they had been ac-tive since 1982 had installed lane sanitation(3,285 lanes in all). In the area in which theyhad been working only since 1989, there waslane sanitation in 1,689 lanes, or 57 per centof the total number of lanes in this area.Between July 1981 and November 1993, 57.2million rupees had been invested by the lo-cal residents on improved sanitation and

Box 1: The Division of Orangi

Twenty-one months after the start of the Orangi Pilot Project, the BCCI Foundationreached an agreement with the United Nations Centre for Human Settlementsthat they would provide technical support to the Project. The UN consultantsstarted working with the Project staff but, after four months, they expressedtheir grave reservations about the direction and content of the project. Inparticular, they believed that the low-cost sanitation developed by Orangi staffwould be ineffective and they wished to replace it with more conventionaltechnology and delivery mechanisms involving local councillors and using externalcontractors and larger community organizations. The consultants believed that,if the OPP wished to develop and use lane organizations, then soak pits and leachpits would be a better technology.

OPP staff strongly disagreed with the advice of the UN consultants. They believedthat to work with local councillors and contractors would be disastrous at anearly stage before the project was established. The use of soak pits and leach pitswas not acceptable both because it could only be a temporary solution and becauseit would not lead to a (later) direct engagement with the municipality. Such anengagement was necessary in order to address the unequal relationship betweenmunicipal officials and local residents. This, the staff believed, was fundamentalto further development. The staff also did not accept the technical assessmentof their low-cost sanitation system and argued that the system would be effective.

These differences could not be resolved. The BCCI Foundation divided the areaup, allowing the Orangi Pilot Project to continue to work in one section andasking the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements to develop an alternativeproject in the other section.

In 1989, some seven years later and after an expenditure of US$ 625,000, it wasagreed that the alternative strategy of the United Nations was not successful andthe OPP were once again allowed to work throughout Orangi, working with thepeople to provide low-cost sanitation.

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drainage. During the same period, OPP hadspent some 3.8 million rupees on researchand extension, equal to about 7 per cent ofthe total invested by residents.

The demonstration effect of this activity isvisible everywhere. The intensive training ofmasons in the technology of sanitary engi-neering and the widespread training of lanemanagers has resulted in an increased levelof skill and a reduced dependence on OPPfor social and technical guidance. Residentsare increasingly willing to take on the costsand organizational challenge of secondarydrains. Moreover, further research hasshown that lane residents routinely maintainand repair their investments. The principleswhich have developed to guide this work areoutlined in box 2.

More recently, there has been further in-terest from a range of other agencies includ-ing local NGOs, bilateral and multilateraldevelopment assistance agencies, and stateinstitutions. Since 1983, community organi-zations, activists and NGOs from other katchiabadis and informal settlements in Karachi

Box 2: Working with Communities: OPP Principles and Methods

1. The community has the resources it needs for development: skills, finance andmanagerial capacity. But it needs support to fully use these resources, to identifyfurther skills that are required and to receive training in these skills.

2. A study is not needed to identify the projects in katchi abadis. But a study isrequired to understand the people, their process and relationships, and to identifythe solutions and methods that are appropriate.

3. The role of the NGO is to be a support organization and the technicians developthe advice. The social organizers who “extend” the advice into the settlementneed to be drawn from the local community.

4. The package of useful advice is developed through interaction with all levelsand groups within the community. There is a need for an attitude of mutual respectand learning.

5. The role of the activist is critical. Activists are community members who arealready aware of problems, think about them and try to resolve them. The programmeneeds to identify these activists.

6. The smaller the level of organization, the better it will function. In Orangi, alane of 20 to 40 people is the level of organization.

7. The initial process is slow but, after success has been demonstrated, progressrapidly accelerates. The concept and process should not be modified to obtainquick results.

8. The people and government are partners in development. Neither can solve allthe problems of development alone.

Source: Rahman, Perween and Anwar Rashid (1992), “Working with communities: some principlesand methods”, OPP-RTI, Karachi

and other cities of Pakistan have applied tothe OPP for help in replicating its Low-CostSanitation Programme. Since 1986, govern-ment and international agencies have alsotried to replicate the OPP experience by inte-grating it into the planning processes theyare sponsoring. To respond to this demand,OPP converted these programmes into a Re-search and Training Institute (RTI) for thedevelopment of katchi abadis. The Instituteis currently assisting initiatives in a numberof other areas in Pakistan that are seeking toreplicate the Orangi sanitation programme.In several cities, these are being undertakenwith young NGOs who are seeking to repli-cate the model of the OPP. One of these ini-tiatives, in the city of Sukkur, has been initi-ated by UNICEF and is discussed in Box 3.

IV. LOW-COST HOUSE BUILDINGPROGRAMME

THE 94,000 HOUSES in Karachi have beenbuilt with different kinds of help from the


NGO Profile

informal sector. Dalals have undertaken thefunctions of the Karachi Development Au-thority by acquiring, developing, sub-divid-ing and allotting the land. They have alsoarranged the limited supply of resources thatexists. Thallas have undertaken the func-tions of the House Building Finance Corpo-ration through providing credit for buildingmaterials and supplying these materials.Masons have undertaken the functions ofarchitects, engineers and contractors. Stu-dents of architecture from the Dawood Col-lege in Karachi have undertaken a numberof studies into the sociology, economics andtechnology of housing in Orangi.

A survey of the houses showed that blocksmade at the thallas were sub-standard andthe work of the masons was faulty in anumber of aspects, resulting in over 40 percent of walls showing cracks. Many house-owners built incrementally and walls had tobe demolished when a second storey wasadded, thus wasting the initial investment.After the success of the sanitation pro-gramme, the OPP started a housing pro-gramme in 1986.

The research included the development ofa block-making machine to improve the qual-ity of the blocks. The machine was developedon a miniature scale suitable for manufac-

Box 3: The Urban Basic Services (UBS) Programme in Sukkur

In 1990, the Urban Basic Services Programme of UNICEF began to work in thetown of Sukkur on the banks of the River Indus about 450 kilometres north ofKarachi. Sukkur has a total population of about 500,000. The project areawithin which the first phase of the Urban Basic Services Programme is beingimplemented includes three katchi abadis with about 30,000 residents livingin 2,958 houses. Piped water supply was available but waste and foul waterpassed through the settlement in open drains to a large pond of 28 acres. Whenthe project began the pond was overflowing into the settlement, causingimmense physical and health hazards, especially for children.

A partnership between UNICEF, Sukkur Municipal Council, the Sindh KatchiAbadi Authority, OPP and the local community was formed to address thissituation. UNICEF part-financed the external development and financed thestrengthening of local institutions. It was also responsible for paying the OPPwho were consultants to the development. Sukkur Municipal Council part-financed the development and was responsible for implementing and maintainingthe external sanitation. It also paid the costs of two social organizers, onemale and one female, who linked the communities of Gol Tikri, Kaan and Bhusaand the municipality. The Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority was responsible forselling leases to the residents and, in so-doing, for raising the necessary capitalfor settlement infrastructure and service development. OPP’s role was to trainthe staff and local residents and give social and technical guidance for externaland internal sanitation, a health programme, documentation and monitoring.The community finances and manages the construction and maintenance ofinternal sanitation and participates in the decision-making for externalsanitation.

The external work at the Sukkur site involved building a pumping station andlaying a rising main from the pumping station at Gol Tikri, Kaan and Bhusa tothe river 8 kilometres away so that the pond could be emptied. In addition, atrunk sewer needed to be laid along the periphery of the pond to which peoplecould connect their internal sanitation. The work began in October 1991 anddraining of the pond was completed in January 1993.

Sewerage lines have now been laid in 20 lanes and sanitary latrines constructedin about 200 houses in Gol Tikri, Kaan and Bhusa. Work is in progress atvarious levels in other lanes. In addition, 13 health centres have been set up inactivists’ homes in the settlement.

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ture by the informal sector. The blocks werefour times stronger and only a little moreexpensive. The OPP passed on the researchresults to the thallas, offering them loans andsupervision to mechanize. Since the first fourmachines were sold with OPP provided loanfinance, a further 44 have been purchasedby OPP thallas without any further supportfrom OPP.

A number of other improvements have alsobeen researched and re-designed. A newroofing system enables a second floor to beadded without new walls being built. Thedesign used batten and tiles or slabs at halfthe cost of reinforced concrete. A staircasewas designed using precast slabs. In orderto make best use of this technology, a train-ing course for masons has been designed withabout 100 masons having attended to date.More recent developments include steel re-inforced battens and clay tiles.

V. HEALTH AND FAMILYPLANNING PROGRAMME FORLOW-INCOME WOMEN

OPP STAFF FIRST undertook to introducemodern sanitation, and then teach thewomen the scientific causes and preventionof common Orangi diseases. In June 1984,the OPP started a pilot programme to impartbasic health education to low-income women.In January 1985, family planning educationwas included in the programme. The surveyresearch showed that there were more “medi-cal facilities” in Orangi that in other cities inPakistan if the informal health facilities wereincluded. A substantial proportion of theincome of 500 households was spent on “doc-tors”. While clinics and informal medical staffwere doing their best to cure diseases, littlewas done to address the basic causes.

Most of the people in Orangi were aware ofthe connection between the sanitary condi-tions and disease. Often, the wives were moreconcerned than the husbands because theyhad to bear the greatest burden of disease.On many occasions, it was the women whoforced their reluctant husbands to pay thesanitation contribution. Many of the low-in-come women of Orangi are traditional andsegregated. The new social and economicforces and urban pressures are disrupting

these traditional ways of life. During theperiod of transition, any programme whichseeks to promote new attitudes and practicesamong the tradition-bound segregatedwomen must find answers to two urgentquestions: first, how to gain access and sec-ond, how to create trust? A third question ishow to build an efficient and convenient sys-tem of delivery for the segregated house-wives?

The main problem for the external agent isaccess. Traditional welfare centres are inef-fective because they are responsible for alarge area and, therefore, do not maintainclose contact with the local women. The OPPintroduced mobile training teams and se-lected an activist family or contact lady for10 and 20 lanes with regular meetings attheir home and the formation of neighbour-hood groups by the activist. Each mobileteam includes a woman health visitor and asocial organizer. The teams are directed bya woman doctor. Family planning was or-ganized at separate meetings because somewomen objected but this division was aban-doned after six months and the services arenow integrated with other health care.

Since January 1985, OPP’s basic healthand family planning education and serviceswere confined to 3,000 families in order tofully test the approach and ascertain the re-sponse of segregated housewives. In the lightof these experiences, the model was revisedin 1991 to reach out to a larger number ofhouseholds. There is now a three-monthcourse which is, once more, organizedthrough family activists. Twenty are selectedevery three months and weekly meetings areheld. Immunization services are provided atthese meetings. The continuation of suppliesis ensured through the activists being re-cruited as agents. The provision of immuni-zation and family planning has resulted inan increase in demand and many private clin-ics now also provide these services.

In November 1993, a further change of pro-gramme was initiated. Instead of householdmeetings, the programme is to be managedby giving training on primary health andimmunization to women teachers in Orangi,managers of family enterprise units and pri-vate clinics. Mothers’ meetings will be heldin schools, work centres and clinics deliver-ing a package of advice similar to that previ-


NGO Profile

ously provided. These measures are intendedto facilitate the low-cost delivery widely andquickly.

VI. PROGRAMME OF WOMEN’SWORK CENTRES

THE PROGRAMME OF women’s work cen-tres was started in March 1984. After fiveyears of intensive efforts it became self-man-aged and self-financing. Research at thebeginning of this period showed that the tra-ditional pattern of exclusive dependence onmale earnings was already being broken bythe rising cost of living and uncertain em-ployment. Many of the women in Orangi wereworking in a range of occupations, the larg-est single occupation being stitchers and itwas this one that was chosen as the focus ofthe project. A trust was established to as-sume the functions of the contractors whowere exploiting the women workers. The trustprocured orders from exporters, distributedthe work, ensured quality, delivered the fi-nal product to the exporters and collectedpayments for wages.

The trust established work centres forwomen, each one based within a family. OPPpaid no salaries for rent in order to ensurethe centres were financially viable from thebeginning. However, it was hard to ensurethat the programme did not become pater-nalistic. To upgrade the skills of the work-ers and ensure that they became competi-tive and able to get into the mainstream com-mercial market was difficult. The exportersmade things more difficult by seeking to ex-ploit the inexperience of the OPP. Whilst thewomen’s work centres were reasonably ef-fective in improving the living conditions ofsome of the lowest-income households, theexperience of this programme is that little canbe done to assist the women without a con-tinuing flow of work and payments. It wasfive years before the centres were able to bearall the costs themselves and be independentfrom the OPP. They now receive and repayloans.

VII. FAMILY ENTERPRISEECONOMIC PROGRAMME

IN 1987, THE Orangi Charitable Trust was

formed to help family enterprises obtaincredit at reasonable interest rates. The Trustborrowed money from banks at commercialrates and then lent (at the same rate) tohouseholds with little bureaucracy or collat-eral. Grants from donor agencies paid forthe administrative costs of the Trust. Theobjectives of the pilot project were as follows:

� discover efficient methods of management;� identify correct criteria for selection;� learn how to supervise family units and

recover loans;� create honest and loyal clients;� promote the formation of cooperatives.

The first year was difficult, with much baddebt but, by the third year, these problemshad been resolved. Experience has shownthat there are three main causes of bad debt:dishonesty, incompetence and misfortune.To date, some 2 per cent of the total amountloaned has been written off as bad debt. The

Box 4: Some Case Histories

Zohra Bibi opened a small store sellingdirectly to households in 1987. Shepurchased about Rs. 5,000 (US$ 160)worth of goods each month and earneda monthly income of about Rs. 900 (US$29). Zohra received her first loan inJanuary 1989, Rs. 5000 (US$ 160), tobe repaid in ten instalments of Rs. 500.After the successful repayment of thefirst loan, a second loan of Rs. 10,000was taken out in December 1990. Thesetwo loans have enabled Zohra toincrease her monthly income to Rs.2,000.

Iftikhar Ahmen has two sons who wereeach earning about Rs. 150 (US$ 5) aweek for working 12-hour days in anearby house which has an embroideryunit. Iftikhar received a loan of Rs.7,000 (US$ 224) in October 1980 whichwas used to add a further room to hishouse. This room is large enough totake the frame with the material to beembroidered. The two children are nowable to work at home and they receiveRs. 250 each for a working day of aboutnine hours.

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Institute has also established a nursery fromwhich a further 16,000 trees and other plantshave been sold.

X. EDUCATION PROJECT

ABOUT 90 PER cent of schools in Orangi areprivately owned and managed and these ca-ter for about two-thirds of Orangi pupils. Asurvey in 1989 showed that there were justunder 600 schools in Orangi, of which only13 per cent were public schools. The privatesector includes some 200 schools offeringpre-primary education, about 80 per cent ofthe 200 primary schools and 85 per cent ofthe 100 secondary schools. Some 45 per centof pupils in Orangi schools are girls. Three-quarters of the teachers are also women bothbecause they can be employed at relativelylow cost and because parents are reluctantfor girls to be taught by male teachers. Thehigh percentage of women teachers has re-sulted in a high level of female enrolment eventhough 80 per cent of the schools are co-edu-cational. Sixty per cent of state schools aresegregated, compared with only 13 per centof private schools.

The establishment of private schools inOrangi began 15 years ago when there werefew state schools but a high demand for edu-cation. As a response to the continuing lackof public investment in education, theirnumber grew rapidly. The schools are, ingeneral, responsive to the requirements ofparents and guardians because they are de-pendent on maintaining their patronage.They are also concerned that the studentspass exams and work hard to ensure theirsuccess and that high pass rates are main-tained. The owners and teachers of theschools live locally and are well-informedabout the educational concerns and inter-ests of parents. However, there is a generallack of investment, with the buildings beingsub-standard and lacking playgrounds.Many teachers are untrained and grosslyunderpaid and there are few other facilitiessuch as libraries and visual aids.

Together with the Aga Khan Foundation,the OPP developed a package of measures toimprove educational facilities and services.Support was given for physical improvementsto schools through a combination of loansfrom the Trust and technical advice from

trust has now extended activities into ruralareas and some of the other towns where thesanitation programme is being replicated,including Gujranwala and Lahore. The costsof administering this programme (from 1987to 1994) are equal to 7.8 per cent of the capi-tal loaned.

A considerable amount of loan finance hasalso been extended through the women’swork centres. Just under 400 women entre-preneurs have borrowed Rs. 5.5 million (US$175,000) to date.

VIII. RURAL PILOT PROJECT

IN 1990, A rural pilot project was introducedin the area around Karachi through the Na-tional Rural Support Programme, a govern-ment funded programme being implementedthrough a non-governmental agency estab-lished for this purpose. The objectives wereto identify small -scale commercial farmerswho own at least five acres of land and whohave between 20-50 cattle in order to increasetheir profitability. The market in Karachi anda good road network offer a good opportu-nity for the farmers in this area but, to ben-efit fully, they need access to technical ad-vice and credit. The project identifies localactivists to act as trainers to show how toconvert arid holdings into woodlots and or-chards and grow forage for their milk cattle.Through the Trust, Rs. 5.7 million (US$182,000) of loans have been given to 290units.

IX. SOCIAL FORESTRYPROGRAMME

THE HEALTH PROGRAMME encouragedwomen to plant kitchen gardens in order toimprove their nutrition. Later, in collabora-tion with IUCN, tree plantations were alsointroduced. In 1990, the programme wasextended into those villages being reachedby the rural pilot project. By the end of 1993,some 22,000 trees had been planted in sixvillages where activities are being monitored.Six schools in Orangi have established nurs-eries and they sell to local households andthe families of school children; about 6,000seedlings have been sold up to the end of1993. Finally, the Research and Training


NGO Profile

million (US$ 45,000) has been allocated tothe Society for their on-going expenditure.The largest items are capital expenditure (35per cent) and payments into the reserve fund(40 per cent). The expenditure of the Re-search and Training Institute is estimated atRs. 3.7 million (US$118,000) and it is fundedby a combination of development grants andconsultancies. The Orangi Trust is budg-eted to spend Rs. 0.55 million (US$ 17,600)on administrative costs in 1994-5 and a fur-ther Rs. 7.5 million (US$ 240,000) has beenallocated to its capital assets to be availablefor further loans. In addition, Rs. 12.5 mil-lion (US$ 400,000) has been borrowed oncommercial terms and conditions from statebanks in order to further supplement theasset base.

XII. LOOKING FORWARD

FOR MANY YEARS, the strategy of NGO in-tervention supported by OPP was one of a“model programme”. The original intentionof Dr Hameed Khan was to demonstrate, byexample and to the government of Pakistan,the strength of alternative models of devel-opment and the scale of people’s initiative andactivity. The OPP’s work was to develop amodel programme to identify and supportthese initiatives and activities; in order toachieve this, its focus was strongly on whatthe people were prioritizing and undertak-ing. Through research, the Project identi-fied needs and effective solutions. The ex-tension activities then implemented thesesolutions through minimal intervention in on-going local development. It was assumedthat, once the model programme had beenshown to be successful, government wouldadopt this model and OPP staff would changetheir role from implementors, independentof government, to being advisors to govern-ment.

Following the experience in Sukkur, theweaknesses associated with this model ofNGO activity and strategy in Pakistan are nowevident. There is little interest or understand-ing on the part of government with respectto the model and to any lessons emergingfrom any aspect of the project. Whilst indi-vidual government officials have been enthu-siastic about working with the OPP, they have

OPP’s sanitation and housing programme.Academic improvements were tackledthrough teacher training, provision of librar-ies and visual aids, and the publication ofmanuals and guides.

To date, 13 schools have joined the projectand both physical and academic improve-ments have been made. However, the pro-gramme has not expanded as fast as firstintended. In 1990, the Aga Khan withdrewfrom this project but the OPP have continuedto work to improve standards in the schools.

XI. FINANCES

WHEN THE OPP first started working withthe local residents in Orangi, they faced muchsuspicion. Some residents believed that theorganization was receiving foreign donor as-sistance to develop the sanitation system inOrangi. The residents suspected that insteadof using these donor funds, the Project waskeeping the money and encouraging the resi-dents to make the investment. Since theonset of the project, OPP staff have publisheda quarterly report which outlines income andexpenditure by individual project and donor.This quarterly report also includes updatesof the different activities within the OrangiPilot Project.

The OPP is fortunate, thanks both to theBCCI Foundation and other donors, in hav-ing the resources and autonomy it requiresfor innovative research, experiments, dem-onstration and extension. In 1992, the BCCIFoundation (which has now changed its nameto INFAQ) made a ten-year funding commit-ment to the OPP. Its major donors now alsoinclude European NGOs such as Cebemo,Misereor and WaterAid, plus consultancypayments from two multilateral organiza-tions, UNICEF and the World Bank. The bi-lateral aid programme of the Swiss govern-ment has also supported the Orangi Trust.In the 14 years since its inception, OPP hasspent Rs. 62.7 million (or about US$ 2 mil-lion) and has accumulated assets currentlyequal to Rs. 4 million (US$ 128,000).

In 1993-4, total expenditure on the threemain programmes’ institutions under theOPP Society was Rs. 12.2 million (US$390,000). In 1994-5 it is expected to be Rs.13.5 million (US$ 431,000). Some Rs. 1.4

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NGO Profile


been the exception rather than the rule.Where these individuals have tried to imple-ment some of the strategies of the OPPthrough their own work, they have met withopposition and scepticism from other govern-ment staff and agencies.

However, as a result of these experiences,a new model is now emerging within OPP.The OPP has now altered its position so thatit is once more supporting the activities oflocal residents and communities but this timewith little expectation that government willrespond positively. It is now putting moreemphasis on two strategies and, in both ofthese strategies, local residents have a cen-tral role. In the first strategy, OPP providesthe technical support to enable local com-munity organizations to take responsibilityfor some activities that should be the respon-sibility of local government. For example, inSukkur, it was the original intention that thegovernment would maintain the main drainincluding the pump whilst the communitywould be responsible for internal sewerage.However, in recent months, the communityhas planned to take over the direct mainte-nance of the pump because the local govern-ment has not undertaken the necessarywork. The second strategy is that, in addi-tion to taking over what were previously lo-cal government activities, the local residentsare being encouraged also to directly lobbyand otherwise pressurize officials into ac-knowledging and taking up their responsi-bilities. Where necessary, OPP staff providethem with the information they need to dothis work effectively.

While OPP continues to discuss and debatewith government officials, and to demonstrateto them the validity of the model that theyhave developed, there are now many fewerexpectations of the strength of demonstrablyeffective interventions. In their place, there

is more emphasis placed on supporting resi-dents to increase their bargaining power andskills within the local political context.

XIII. OPP PUBLICATIONS

THE OPP PRODUCE just under 100 publi-cations (including books and reports) includ-ing the following:

� Quarterly Progress Reports - dating fromApril 1980 right up to August 1995.

� Urdu Bulletin - dating from July 1985 toMarch 1995.

� Low-cost Sanitation reports - a very com-prehensive series of reports on the develop-ment of the low-cost sanitation programmein Orangi from its beginnings, including re-ports on its experiences and its effects.

� Low-cost Housing reports - including re-ports on house construction, a masons’ train-ing programme and on the manufacture ofbuilding components.

� Women’s Welfare Programme publications- including reports on primary health edu-cation, family planning and working women.

� Economic Programme publications - in-cluding reports on a women’s work centre,on family enterprise units and a micro-en-terprise credit programme.

� The Education Project publications - in-cluding reports on literacy and the educa-tion system in Orangi.

� General publications.

Orangi Pilot ProjectResearch and Training Institute

St-4 Sector 5AQasba TownshipManghapir Road

Karachi

profile of orangi pilot project

Documents