the Volta Rlver Project (VRP) bes of~en been described

as Nttrumaht s nbab,n md b1$ ttllv1ng areemtt.l. l~ ~es e pro3ect

vG'ry dellt' to his beart ena he ntrugglet rand tougb~ bel-a w1~ M,l vigour and messlen1c zeal to establ.1Gh 1t. In Nln'umeh's

m1nd~ the projeO't hel.d trententiouES prospec'ts tor his country. It . would be a pl'oJeet, whicb by way of generating power uould belp

in the development ·of 1erge deposits of GheneiSl bSlD1te to

elum1tt1u.m.. 'lhe aluminium prOducea ,gould be a greet so\U'ce of

tore1p. exchmse ~S1'1'I1ng9 to~ b1s country. Furthert &Krumm

believed tbat the elect.!'10 power bela the k.ey to the progress Sld

prosperi;, of e country eD4 theretore, tbe poor oountr1es~8t

have el,ectne1 '1 1%1 ebWl4Eil1ce tG enUe1pate any large scEae

industrial. e.dvence.2 :Che Vol.ta R1 ve% ProJ eat, 1~ was exPected,

t40tdd generate a regia process of tn4u,Btr1el.Uatlcn Cl'.et~i

African morkets foit Ghana's prqcitlcts. rtds .wo~4 41VOl's1f)r

Ghellot s eeoDClQJ 'Which was eo stron817 depen4en~ CD OIlO a1ngle

croP. Cocos. whose price tJ.tlctuatea dH31'p1.7· aRer Wol"1.ci We II.

IE

- 20-

Furtber, it was Nkrwneh t shope tbet if the projeet ever got

underweyt it would bring about other benefits to his country

like the development ot re11wsy mel reed network, 1nlgtJtlon,

fisheries, and 101ana trenaportet1on. In short, it ,~ou1d tren~

torm Chene from e predom1Dentl.~ cgr1eul.turel cou,llt.rl to 8 blghly

1ndtls~r1e11zed state. Nkrumeb t s enthusiasm for th1s venture ""as

retlecteCJ 1n tbe election meD1feotoeo of his Convent1cu People's

PQtJtl (CPP >. lhc cpp brol.lgh~ the VRP issue lnto limel.lgb~ 111

the elections ot 1.951.3 .AReI' eom1na to POW81', Nlu'waeh* s

Gove~_ell't explored po·sa1b111't1es of h6l'lleso1ag Volts. s power

EoI' large seele 1ndu~r1al1z~lon mel el.WD1n1wn smel.~g.

the VBP h~d e, VtfJrll long hJ.stor¥.4 It wes f1re$ eon­

ceived by Slr Albert E. Kitson of the Gold Coast GeOl.og1cel.

*'

THESIS 327.730667 M6911Un

III II I 11111 111111111111 ilill G33269

, ')."'!' .:) ~ .Jt-,

G

survey DEJper-tment In 1.914 whUe Wldertek1ng a geolo.g1ee]. EUrV87 of the Volte bea1n en4 the aiJo1n1ng areas. K1tson oane scross

hllge ae9osl~s of bsud.te 1.n the rcg1oD.. ;the discovery cane at 0

t1me t'Jhen el.uud,n1um ves in verI .o~; suPP1.3 111 the sterUng Ares.

111 19l.5 Utson 4rew tbe et~entJ.o1l of hls Government tQ tbe poten.

tlGl1t1es of the Vo1.te 1'1 ver as e OOUl'ce of h)rdroeleotrJ.c power.

He pointec1 ou.t that Bleb pCl:crt coupl.ed ~lth the rich baaxlte

rOSO\1rce s of the COUll'r1, beld gre et prom1 se for tbe aevel.opment

of m el.umln1W!1 Inaustry tll tbe Gold COG~ .. 5 WoJtldng on Utsont e

p1Em, the 001<1 Cosst Government ctrew up proposels as early as

1924 f~ the eonetl'lletlcll of e dan em the Voltt! river et A3ena

111 the Akwepim H1l1e for geaer~1n8 power tor the prOduction of

e-l.um1n1um. Progress on the propossls was etall.ed dUe to leek of

t;f.nmcee.6

It was onl." 1n 1.938 that interest 1n the pro3ect &lain

rev1 vEd. rhat .,(Jar two south African mg1neel's, Dulloen C. BOS8

end CbrJ.8to,her John aud, o~1Ed out pre11m1nary lnves~18etlona

£n ~be 0014 Coast end dre\.J the attention of the mining \>Iorld and

of the British Government to an aluminium scheme in the Gold

5. Republ1.c of Ghan.a, ljo.t.a RU~~~DSlaiiI ~M li'Hai ~ D!. _ (ACCra, .1962 t P. 1, Gee el 8. !!.tJlfJll.!·~d (LondOll. .1968). P. 392.

Geot~e1 BlDg, e Br1tish socialist was 1nv1teci by itwsme Nlawzlab, Le~er of Government Q\ls1ness ot the G014 Coset Government, to act sa his -»ereona1.D4nser. B1ng he14 key ott1.cle1.poslts'ons under Nltrumeb Wl~U "the l.atter wes over-tbrown b7 & military cOl,\p 1D 1966. 1\ great epo:logtet or NkrwDeb. s po}.s,cies. Bi.D8 wes ecti.vel.y ~socle1tea w.1th the poUcy-mak!Dg unaer NkrUmeb.

6. see n epubl1G ot Ghme, n. S, P. 1.

Coast. ~he Second World war Snte.rvened ana 0.0 ftlrther laork could

be underteltetl for the dUJl~1on. rhe South lt~lCeDa, however.

ecQu.1l'a'i cel'taill batldte concess1ons 10 the countr1 dUring the

war. Itt the enci of tbe vet- Sn 1946 DWiCal'l Rose took the leecl 1ft

the formation of the t'iest ~t.r1cen Alum1nium L1mited (WJ\FftL) 1D

the Gold Coast to carry f01'Wa'd the proposel.s tor bll1ldl1'1S En

aL\lm1n1wn 1na\l~I.? since tbe ena of the second \vorld War the British

Government Qld the British Alwn1n1um Company (BJ.C) bec2me 1ncrea..

s:1ngl.1 concerned ove~ the 1lapol'G81ce of deve1op1J1g a 4epencialae

source of elWldUum ~Pl.1 in tbe sterling Area. rhe AlwzaiJJ1.W!l

l!ldustr1 Coune1l. represent1ng VanOllS secUens of the el.umSn1wa

lndustrl 1n Brlte1n es't1mste4 thet reqt11rement of alwa1nlum _

the U%l1ted K1ng4om wOUld mOrease at en e'Wl\lal. average rate o~

ft.ve pel' oen~. It was pl'o~ec~ea th~ tbe tJn1tecl lUngdom would

nee4 1n 19'16 thrice as much alQtQ1n1um 1t COAswne4 1n 1.9&. ~e

ppobl.em tbat B1'1te1n faced vao that; iii 'Was able to obte1J1 001.7

one-fifth of vi1'gin el.um1n1um neede6 by 1t ~om sterl.1ng sources.

the ~emE4Il1ng four.flttbs osma from dOUBt' soul'ces. fhe Br1t1dl

authoritles carefUl).1 esmn1ne() "mOllS poss.1.bl.e sotU'ees 1n tho

sterllng Area end eeme to the conclusion thE;t the Vol.ta tl1vG1t

slte 'Wss the most prorn1s1Dg.8

In 1947 mother E\lam1Dium 81snt of the worl.d e\Lumin1.um

1na'lstry. tbe 4wn1nium Ccmpen~ of CSlede (~CAN) en~erea the

7. 1bJ.d.

8. Report of 'the Preparator1 Comm1se1on, !Wi iO~~" 8lye; eroJs;) (London, 1956), vol. 2. ~ppeDdlx l.t P. 3.

Go1<1 coast scene prol)abl), e~ tbe behest of the »1\C. J1LCAN

~cceede4 10 obt~4 lerSe b~te concessions. ruo years

later, A~CJJf ecqu1re4 m 1Dt.~es~ in l-SAFN.. Reflec1;1ng ~he

tntel'o,!)ts of the el.Wldn1wn c~en.tes 6lti of tbe DrS-Usb GoV8l'll ...

men~, the Gol.a Coast Governmca' eppo1Dtec3 S11' w1111em Hal.crow

tmd parmer 111 London to. ~a¥ the eontrlbu~10D thn~ the Vol.ta

River DSil caula make to the Go].a Coast. In its re!)ort; Sllbmitted

1n Atlgllst 196~ tbe liel.crow ~p e4vocated the development of

hydroelectric power ~or the pl'ociuct1on of &lum1n1wza. l<1mod

si.multUleously the Br1tldl Government bed el.so mcoareged PLCAN

ena liJAC to e.ssn1ne in cteteU tbe prospeots ot e1um1nlum prodllctlon

in tbe Gold Coast. fhe report of the cc.mpsn1es sabnt1t~ea m Jant1GrY 1.954 WQ(J elao tavourable.9

MeenwbSle fast movSag po11tleel. events 111 the Gold Coast

hm lEld to the Vietol'J of Kweme Nkrumeh's Convention People" 8

Party 1ft the election he1d 111 146J7 1951. Bel.eeseCl t'rO!l) pr1S011,

Nk.rumeh WGS 1nVlte4 ~o becC)JJle the Leeder of Goverlltrlent Business

andel' the colCZl1a1. governmerlt. Co_en\Sllg on ~A1'W'4eh1s polltlee1

career end success 1n Go14 Coss';, ~he l!!I 1.0 1& lame, cher~.~i:r:ed b1m as fl~est A£r1oat s G8.nah1- end _ressed ~e hOPG thd he

coul.~ evelltueU), become Wle l.eaie» of ell. AMes. ~he pspel'

stressed the~ NKrumebt s poUtlc~~ 1nf'l\lellce hed trmsgresoe4

the territory of his country enCi bed sprea1 over to adjo1n1ng

X'l.tge1'1e, wbich wes \lBla111 ~ealous ot Gold Coss1;. rbere, tbe

•

pti)er note6 t tfiU'WDdl was even pol.1tJ.cEll.l.y more 1mpor~en't then the

1ndom1ta~e N~ger1an :Leeder, !lbsnU Az1kwe (Zilt) • .1.0

lbese developments clearly fOl'ed1Gdowe4 ~e possl~1Uty

that 1. t liould not be long before the count .. , ~oula emerg~ from

ito col.on1Ea. stetus 1Jlto lttaepeudence as in 'he case of la41o.

'tbe British Government wes understmc1eb1.y mx10us tbe't wb11e

eond1t1cDs were tG91oursbJ..e f'ltom lits point of view, some def1n1te

ccmm1tments shoul.d be uorked out with the co1oni~ regime 1n

regerd to the ~um1nlWD project. t>11th bis profou1lCl fe1th in the

rOle of the VRP as 0 cata11st for bls eountr,' s economic develop..

ment, Nkt'UZll1Eh too was pl'Obsb1, l'eed1 to proceed with ~.he dlo­

el1sslcns with the Brl~1sh Government ia OraGr to aseertc¢ll for

hitusel.f the extent or S1pport that; coul.4 be ob'te11\e(i f'rom the'

Explors.torl dl GCusalous took place 1n J,ondon in gotober­

November 1.954 a'l4 in London end AcCra 1:1 May-June 49$2 1n tb.1a

re&eJl4between l'eprescnte~lvc8 of the trtt Government. the 0014

COSDt Government eD4 the Bite to cons:16e:o conditions un4el' 'Wh1cb

they might pert1eipote jo1nt111n a scheme feSt eltam2n1um pl'OdQc ....

't1on in the Gold coest.U In April 1962, ~ "stet~ment OIl the

Vol.te RS,ver Project end Belated Macters" was pu'b1.1sbea bl the

Gold coast Governm.en~. ~h1s statement att1pu).ated the~ the B1"1t1ab

ana the Caru:41en 1nte~est;s \Ih1ch eontroll«!B nine', per cmt of the

sa d

1.0. l1.!l! XOllt ~1me~ 3 June 1.961~ P. 26.

U. R q,ort of tbe Pre~61'ator, Commission, ft. a. P. 12.

26

shares of equ1 ty cepl'~ tIlould assume respons1b1l1 tl' for the

operation of en elum1n1um anelter. It was end seget! thet the

British GoverDmerlt ~1oul.a baUd the bydroel.ectr10 project 1QhUe

the Gold Coast Govel'Dmeat \-1Ould 'eke oharge for tbe constr'llct101'ls

of the !lew harbour end the raSl.roaas.12

In November 1952, a \b1~e Paper on the Volta River

~um1D1.WD scheme was presenfled bl the British Government to tbe

Parllanent. It ol1tl1ned a scheme under wh1cb the two Governments

end the Canadien ad the .asr1t1sb el.um1n1wn 1nte1'8sts would 00-

opGZtate 111 the development of el.um1Il1.um prociuct1on 111 the Go1d

Coast. It ~as est1met~ that the 1n1~1~1. capital EOq)el'lditue

would be £~OO mUUOll. 1'1slng u1t1oaetel.1 to £144 mU1.1OD. fbe

~enciltl1l'f) wen to be sbe:rea bl va%'lous parties. :l!he B1ccess1\11

compl.etlon of the scheme. according to the ~h1te peper, rtwou1d

gu._en'ee tbe muted K1ngdom Sdd1t1one1 steJ'llng Area Sllpp118s of

aluminium at com,petit1ve prices to meet replC111 grov1ng require­

mm ts tor t1b1cb it t4culd be UJ'l'tdse to rell on other sot#ces.· The

White pttper stated that 111 view of tbe megn1tl1c1e of tbe projeet

it sbould not be embt4'kECi uPon ttw1 tbout every practical. essurmce

thGt it Cal be carried througb to s success1\&1. conc1us1onn• It.

Sl1ggested the setting up of a Prep~ator)' Commission "to repor1;

wl'h EiI.1 praeUcable speEXiu so tbat tt~nal. decisions coul4 be taken. 13

On 23 Febrllery .1.953 the Go14 Coast Le81s'L~1ve Aasembly

eclop~e(l a resolution we1eomlDg these proposals for ftlarse see1.e

1naust~lel end egi'1eultul'el." developments. No Smmedlate action

wes, however, ertV1sege4. rhe proposa1.s did not ofter Us clear­

cut SCheme" no~ bea any firm agreement been ree.chect between tale

two Governments end the al.uminium eompen1e s.14

In June 1952 ell the parties bed egreecl to the esteb­

l1GbJnent ot e Pl'eperetOl'l Comm1ss1oD to stll<Jy all aspec's rela..

t1ng to tbe andertclWlg of the project. ~6 It is not quite c1esr

whet lectors were ~espons1ble tor the slowing of the tempo of

Br1t1Sb Snterest An the matt.er. Probably the Brlt1ab were

reesonebl, conft.dent thet thel m1gh~ no1; te.ee 811 seriou.s ext.~e),....

espec1ell.1' IGer1~m--coQD,er-proposal.o thet might cotDgllcste

m.att.ers fo~ 'hem 1Jl thE) Gol.ct Coast. III v1.ew of the heSVI clltl.al

of 1nvestment the.' the m.assive 91'03$01- vasUkel.1 t.o iIlvolve. the

Br11;ldl were probab1), ~ous to un4erteke a ver~ thorough stuA,

of ell. poss1b1.e espec's,. Further. the Bn ~1sh probsbl., caLculated

the~ Sleb a stuav, even 2.f 1t me6t1t e deley or a £ew ,esrG, mlgbt

Id

.\3. t!Jb1te p~~ on the Vol's /Il.um1n1um Scheme as cited Sal Report or the PrepC1'atol'~ Commlss1oll, D. 8, P. a.

14. see Report of the Preparatory Comm1saloll, D. 8 t p. ~9.

~5. Ibid. t p. lB.

have en eCluoationel. 1llfl.uence on Nkrwneb end ~e Gbm1&1enst dad

woul.d make them OOllse1011s of the immense e:xtel'uel. asslstmce the.1t

~a$ 1nvol vea md to 1I1duce them eventllelly to accept con1iJtsctue1

obligstions thet "Guld be tG'lO~eble from the Brittsh point of

w.ew. Obte1n1Dg set1stec,017 safeguards ege1nst netlonal.1zat1oD

might elso heve f1gut'ed in British celcQl.fJt1ons.

Oft '47 Februer7 19S5, Commender Robert A. J ackSOtl. an

Pustl'el.lat1 eng.1neer ~ho baa done ou'stSlting 30b m venous

1tlternatlolSe1 enterprises 1ft the M.iddle Bast sree dllt-1ng tbe 11'_, ~e.s appolnted as the specle). Comm1ss1oner of tbe pl'ep~atorl

C01mO.S.ss1on end the Comm.1ss1on ~attted fWlctlOl11Dg f1tom .I. l461 1953.

Fo!' over two aears the comm.ssS.on cerrlecl on 1~9 studies end 1~9

eJ.a.bore.te report lisa pu'bllahed a1mt1l~6I1GOl1sl.1 SA tbe 0014 Cos8\

ana J.n Gl'~at »r1~e1D in November 4955. ~e lts 1nves'1gs1flons

were jn progress en au'1ous Skrumeh mEde clear 1118 Government- s

interest 10 we~c:Ot41ng foreign SuvaSWlent.

In a ~otell1e1l~ to 1;he L~glsls.lve Aseemlay on 1. MUolt

~954, *rwneb 6cclared that Ms Governmen' would en~enheec1ODl

to traast~r td.tbout restriction proflts arising fttOCl non-l'es14.' . cepl tel investment'. ma to l'ep~'r1ate fot'e1gn <!ep1tel. ~vestea .1n the cOWlt~y. He pl.so sought to 41~ fears conoel"n1ng nat.1onlO.l-

13etlOll pol.1.c1es. fbE) preBe:nl1 Government. be cSecl.ered. 'ths8 ftO-

pl.e-ns tor natlone11zlDg inc1Qstrlest beyond the extent to ~ch

the pub11c utUj,tles are el.ree4l1 l1etion81.1zea rand it aoes not

Envlsege en, su.oh proposals arls1ng out of 1t. t1 Hi s s1ia~ement

Glso me(ic cl.esr that 1f filly wcceseor Goverl1lZlent should decide ~ not1ol1eJ.1.ze a p6rUcal.ar J.n<jhlstr~ .in the neUonaL 1Dterest,

ttthel'e should be GI11ta))J.e means of guat'entee1ng t£4~ COJ2U)EnS&.

t1.on". Nkrumab went 011 to pt-el!l1se tbet his Government would

1'efiUeat tbe Bntlsb oovernment to incorporate 1n the constitution

to be prepared tor the Gold coast. appropr1ete prov! sions for

the payment of compensation "following the precedents 1ll the

Cons"t1tut1ons o~ the Ul'l1~e4 stE.$GS S'1d India". ";rbere should be

no doubt l.en 1n the mind of foreign enterp1'1se thet the Go1a

Coast 1.9 pJ"epered to enooIaege tbe entl'V ena 1n-gestmcmt of

fore1gn cap1te]. ella to sateglle.t."d tbe interest of the cep11;el,"

NUumeb <lecl.6l'ea.l6

these sign1t1c61t a8&U1'el1ees "ere atbsequentl.,y lDeor­

poretEd 1n the Gold Coest (Constitution) (~enamen1;) Order-in­

C0l11101l, 1965. seotion 36(.4\)(1).1? It is note-worthy that the

publ1ca't1011 of the Preperetory Comm1aat.on' s R epo~t followed tbese

importent developments. ~e Brit! sh und4n"stQdebl.y 1'9serded tbem

esessent1al. prellm1ner7 stepa.

:Cbe Preparatory Commlss1cn reported thet the VRP waS

teChnically sound end was ·eoonomlcal:ly teeslb1e .. 18 It conceived

the projec~ as ell _al.ae.m~l011 or thl'eecomponen~ UJl1~s.

(1) A 4an md & pow. _e~lon e; Ajena

(2) ftle (ievelopaent of baur1tie mSDest Gl aLum1ne p1en~ Old the alwn1Dium smel.ter

(3) fhe eonf$ro.etlon o£ a l'eUvSJ', roecis, end a tow- sb1p to b£-ek up the proJ eet

.1.6. Statement em CepJ.'el. Investment 111 the Pr1me Min1stcn- or the Gold Coast on .1. l~e!'eb .19M as o1teet 1.0. Repor~ of the Preparatory Comml salen, n. 8, PP. 433-4.

1.7. see neport of' the Preparfl'OX-~ COmmissiOn, n. 8, P. m • . ' lB. Ibid.. p. a.

30

the ~tel olltl.s7 was pro3ecte4 to the tune of

£309.000, 000 ~'b1cb ~as to be sb61'ed 1>1 ~he Governmen~s of Greet

Brite1n and the Gol<1 Coast end the two aluminium companies -­

JlLCln SIld tbe &C.1.9

The report re1tereCed the epprelsaL contained ~n the

White P£pe~ th&t worl.4 (lemmcJ tor e1um1n1um woul.d eoJl~~e to

rise. tbe table presented 1n the report Snd1eete6 the rise <lur1ng

the deoade 1945-1965.20

UJ?l., wor1<J Production of Aluminium

Yee fotel ........ -1..94S 636 31 2 20 76'1 .1.-94.6 63J 92 31 3 S 669

194'I 77? US :B 3 4 em U2

1948 886 ~69 30 3 14 l.tCJ98 lo43 l.949 869 usa 30 4 23 -l,-1.C8 146

1950 9N 213 29 4 as 1,266 1.68

19S1. 1,166 32l f!1 4 36 1.,654 20a

1.952 1,233 :S6 ~ 4 43 1.144 2::8

1963 1.605 4U 31 4 4B 2.009 274

1.964 .1.801 466 31 4 fJ1 2,362 3Q3

.\,955 1.920 soo a4 8 73 a, 626 329 • a l I . I •

.-

1,9. Xb1d •• p. ~

20. 1bJ.4., P. 99.

31

As tllo l'epon noted e ftspectsculG1''' lucreaae bed tflken

pl.ece 1n elwn1n1um prodUcUon dttr1nc the previous aecedo. e

greeter part of wh1ch vms Sn Nortb Americe sDcJ Europe. The report

quoted with approye1 tbe reference of the Pres1dent of the

Alwn1n1um Lim! tea ~o "what eppGG.1"S to be en unrelentmg 4_md

tor tncre&.81ng ql1mt1Ues of primer1. alum1n1wn".21

the l'aport; also offered the draft of e. ItUes1;er AgreemenO.

a Power contrac" end othe:. con~l'actllel. 4oeWDea~en to be slgned by

the pQrtles ~~ wel'e expec,ed 1;0 eo-Op61'e.'te 1n 1mp1eznent1ng the

Vol.ta River Pro~ect. file Me.s1;er A81'eement spel1ea out Sn detsU

S1'1'Ellpments fOr finSlc1Dg the p~olectt the terms Oll "bleb 1.0eQS

u0Ul4 be e2$e1<le4 bl the Governmen.ts end the mortgages prov1a1ag

the creditor government'S 14th se01rlt1es fol' thelr loans. It

sougbt to Cief1ne the mo4al.ltles of the Sa,e ot taum1nlwn to tho

gaited Kingaom, priem8 orrengemen~G en6 e tomula for .-ene1.

o~ price under epeelt1ed e1rcwnstenees. 'rhe Go14 Coaot GoVern-

ment ~as to agree to tlSsodate the B~ltleb Governme.tt 1n the

exercise of certain speclfteCt tullctlono re.leting to the Volta

Rlver ~llthor1'y (VBA). Aeceptmce ot th1s prov1~on. the r.epo~

se14 t "would refleot tbe 1mJ)ortent. tlnenclel c011trlblttlC1l by the

trn1te4 Klngdom GOvernment ls1 cClltinUe4 8980011$1011 of the /luth~

1'1 ty so long as en.v P6l't of tbe l.oan 11188 01.ltsta141D8~. the .. ClOd

"Gpec1a1. obl.1a~1on. that the 001.4 CoeJJt Govunment 11168 to acoept;

was to be nau Ul1der~sld.ng ea&1ns~ 4erogEl~1= by ).eg1a1.at1011 01'

gove1"'Dmenuel. SO'Clozs tl from the <iocwneftts setUDg QP the pro3ect •

... . .<>

32

A third tt special. obl1ge.t1ontt ~as to be an unclerteldng to P91 ta1r

compensation in the event o£ nat1onal.lz($loD of the smelter

compel11.22

lhe report ~oc1nc~ ~Ed up the implication of

$1cceas or teUure of the project. Addresa1D& itself to the £1rst

potnt it declared.

'fhe as.ae etta complO21ty of tbe pr03 eot must be kept 1D m1Da eonstentl.~ ~hell asseastng its ehences ot alccessfUl. development. Not oD1l! would ~, Sllvolve the phys1CliI1. eonS'tl'l1ctloD of seve~el. mE\1or 'Wor:! bnt it would also represent a I'EnUill'kabl.e e¥ e ot co-opel'etlon 1n s less developed coun ry, et a time of very rsp14 pol.lt1cal. trma1-tlOD, between tbe public ente~prise of t160 GOVGl'n­mcn~s ena the "nvete en~1'1ae of two el.um1nlum ocmpm1es sltuated 1n alfferent parts of the wo~1d. Very large sums of money ... 11l 6011&1'. aterl.ing ana Gold Coast evrenc1ea.-wou1d be 1nvOl.vecS sn the scheme. ~he results of mob a great unaerta!.d.ng would not cnly_bave m~or end cU.rect consequences ~r the parues to the projeot themselves] they could !aso beve En 1D<U.reot e~fect on the w1ll1D~eSG of other Gove~nmen~8 end pri,'fa~e 1ll'terede ~o make large Snveatmenta In schemes of SSmSl at' aegn1tucle now Ull4.~ cona14etta'lon SJ) other par~s ot the w()rl.d.

A S'aCCtlssM outcome of ~e Vol-,s. ProJec~ would have benefj.c1~ results for aU. COJ1CftDe4 with it. Zo the t4undnlum compSl1es 1\ Would me. that m eaaiUon.el GOtll'ce of insot wo\l1c1 be-t. ~en brought into pro4tlot1on at 6 COJQpetlUve p.n ~cc. SUch 8 deve10pment wOU1d eppe~ to t1 to. Sn-~1tb the geherel. polic, of e2q)eDdOD wb1ch bes che.rsfSterUed the ope~&tlon of V~10118 alund.n1um eompS'11ea.-p£4'Ueularla the Al.um1nlwa L1m1tea a1nce the eDd or the t>1or~d Wer II.

ro the BritiSh Govel'DmeJlt as em.phsslaea 1n the Wb1te Pepert the SI1ccessfUl. ope1'etloll or the sCheme WO~ make e9eileble at competitive prices, 8 further Sterling Area supply of e1lladnium fer ttl eseess of the Areoi s present prodact1oJl. It would

33

el.so edvmce the GoVernment's p-ol101 of el1coureging the development of re8OU~ces of the Commonweel.t1l. rbe sc})eme. if Sllccess~) eoad seve the sterling J.ree ebout one hundred mu.l.lon dOllars ermlla1J.y 141_ 6~ fnl1 proCl\tctlon.

~he 001a Coast Government would stGftc1 to ga1n marked eaVellteges from the effective aev.el.opmEllt ot tbe project. New sua vert lC!'ge cap1t~ assets vould be cHete(} 1n the Gold Coast. Opponun1ties for empl9YlDent end trei,rU.ng in new professions &14 skll1e 1i1oul.4 be provided. 'lhe present <!OlgeroUB aepenaence of the national. economy on 8 s1ng1.e e~rt. Cocoa. wou1<1 be mbstat1e1.11 redl1ee(J. 23

~l1at lrlould be the imp11eat10ll 1f the Project were to

te117 thE) report llotec1 that the consequences of foll.ure would

be se1'1ou$ tor the e1UIll1n1um eontpSl1es ena fibey voul.4 be very

reluctant to invest 111 cOUll~r1es 1.1~ the ~Cl Coast. Also the

ability of ~he britlsh Government to .e1se funds for big schemes

1%1 developing ~OUJlt1'1es ~ulc1 be ser1ouGl1 effeetec1. n:the ~ekeB

~e tbl1S vtl~1 blgb", the l'epor~ em,phas1Z~a.M

It is 1ntereat1n8 to no~e here tbat acoOl'ding to J emes

Mo%OD, the British would have been wUUng to 1nvest £30 mUl101l

!ll this PrQj ect &.t this point. 25 ~ben the q\1eaUoll arisea 88 to

23. Ibla., P. 123.

a4. Ib16.

25. Janes l-1oXOll, JiUe .. Hant a prse,e!) flak' (New York. 1.969). P.82.

Moxon, an EnglJ.sbmen 80"04 W14er the OOld Cosst GoverlUZlellt as the Dl.atrlct Comm1sa1ol1el' of the Volta River d~str1ct ald after l.ge joined the Gold Cost$ lnfoJ.'m&tion Service. Be ke»1; b1s 1Dterest elS.ve for fUrther1fts ~e _1ementa.t~cm ot- the Volta Rlver Proj cct. subsequent1-y, he ves mSCle 8 member of the Volta River l~or1t)'.

~y llnt1eh chose the path of the lOQg-dr6WD.-Ollt process of the

Preparator, Comm1os1oll and vhether the British Government wee m 8 pos1tJ.on to eomm1t ltsel~ to the implementation of the Pl'o3ec'_

It t1Ou14 appear tha~ as the prosgect of concrete action. moved

neerer, second thOUgh~8 cl'ept m on whether Britt4D reau.,.

possessea cepabU1ty to undehrlte e~endltures of el'lorm0ll8 m.1-

tttdeSl4, 1f each were £eaa1b1.e. uhether Nla'tlmeht s Gbdla wes the

place to do it. ~he Br1tiSh Prime .tUnlR.er. MtbOl1Y Eden, hed

bls O~1lt l'eservet1011S ooneea1Dg Nkrumeh.26 fbe British probab1y

took note of tho strang cr1tlclans tb~ hed been leveUea 1n the

Gold Coast ltse1t egelnot NkrWIlsht· s moves r~a1;1Dg to the VRP

f1'om oppos1tlon el.em.ents l1ke Josepb B. Daftquda of the tJn1ted

Gold Const COllventlo11 Party (troCC) ElD4 Koft. A. Duals of the Ohms

Congress Pert,. ~ ~e all. the Volts moves l'eee1ve4 unen1molls

&uppOR from the 1'Ul1Dg CPP, the native chle~8 preteneti to reme1n Detttre1 ~en the issue was aebated uPoIl 111 the Leg1s1.e-

ture .• :S The Brit1eb elso probe~lg could Dot reme1n uninfluenoe4

by Nkrumeh· s statements <1ur1ng the~ perlocJ end atterwar4a con-

cern1ng his commitment -'0 tWJ.4 soeS-eli • .In Ghena mel his

~t1.t;ude tower4 the e1SmJ.O.stSon o~ col.01l1eU.em 1n the re$~ ot At'rlce. :fhere wsa probslQ.¥ a question merk in British mSDd ..

26. InthonJ' Bden. ~ ClWe: lbe !3S2ll st S£ 6nQUBl¥ .Y.S (LandoD, .\.960). p. 381..

r!I. see in this context those two speeches on t;be floor of ~be Legisl.~lve Assemlay on 23 Februer~ .1.953 as q\lotetl in David E.. Apter, 5ibee a 8rmRJJ;Joll (Pr1nceton. .\.912), 2114 reva. ean •• PP. 235-7.

29. see Apter. ibid., P. 237.

36

t.,hether the e.&s1.ren.oes the"t hed been obte1nElCS frum Gkrumeh con.­

cern1ag safeguards for Br1.t1eh 1J1vestmeot, trensfer of profits,

enQ compensation 1n the event of n~1onel1z~1o!1 would be

honoured 1n the tUtll1'G 1t NkrwDehf G bas1e ~t1tude toti1ard

Br11;e1n cane to be modified.

S1r Robert Jaeiitsotl \\Jbo bEd served as the Specie).

CommlsGloner of the Preparatory Comm1saiOl'l told tbe present

writer in en interview that during 1965-1956 It uss po11t1c~1)'

1nconoeivable fop the Br1t1dl to push through e scht"lne of the

magnitude of the yap. Be noted tbat. tll~ones of the finsco of

the renaenylka GPOtUlclnut Scbeme st1ll lingered 0ll.29 Britnints

own economic cQoolUon htd not been 1u good sbGpe slDee 1961.

lbla fector hed probebl.1 been respona1ble for Br1te1n t s m.lling­

ness to make the d1scllsa1on end exem1nGUoD of the VBP lOftg drE>\I1Il

out. l:be Uf;\l.ence of Payments poal t10n ecnt1nuea to be quite

unsat1stectory <NriDg .l961-1955. rbe .1ir1t1sb eathor1.t1es were

engaged 1n eontU1.l1ng efforts ~o maintain the value of sterl..1ng.

teckl.e the belenoe of payment s problem, increase reserves sad

retJu.ce UebiU.t1es. the Br1t1dl Government bEd to come to terms

$1 I t

29. Interview With S1r Robert Jt!Clt~.

Sir nobe'r~ .TeekSODi SD Austrel.ten b; zu~~2.onel1ty csme to Ghana as the CbelrmGEl of the Prepsrotory Comm1salon 1D 1,953 aDd eontSDue6 his assocle.Uon With the VRP 111 ell 1ts steges or its dGve1.opment. A Dumber of state Department personnel. mom the present vr1~er bea lntervtewea 111 cOlmectlon tdtb tbe present effort stated that JeckSOD wes the most wel1-ini'orme4 person on decls1on-mek1ng witb 1':a to tbe V01ta BJ.ver Pro~ eat. He ~aG 01000 to Nkrumsb reel by the Briti Gb end bigbll' l'espeota'i in tbe tJnllea states clrcl.es as a most slncere persoD de6i.eateci to the estab11abmen~ of the VRP.

36

w1tb theeppre1sel that an, maJor venturetnvolv1nlJ ancertatn end

Ullpredletabl.e tectors coUld be undertaken only If it were sette­

nea that Sllch 6 rol.e would be consistent 14th Brlte1n's reSOQ1'ces

ana responsibil1ties. It appears to the present writer that 1n

.1955 the British Government eoul.cS not set) 1ts way clear to take

en1 quick e.ctlca 111 pUl'Sl1el1ce ot tbe Plteparetorl COmmlss1on's

report.,

liUl'ther 1955-1956 vas s per10Ci ot finmc1al. str1ngenc)'

in Jl1'1te1n when interest rates on 1.0m8 mel the lengtbs of lOeB

repayments had beoome l.esa favourable. In edd1t1on, the world

dane%ld for elwntn1wn had temporer11.y not kept pace w1~

prO(itlct1cn capeclt.v. The e1umSnSwn companies showed l.essenea

enthusiasm ~or big, new cOmmitments es,pec1ell.¥ 111 areas that they

41d not l'eg~a es qai te seeQre pOl1tlCal17.30

~be BritiEih sources probebl., were not unaware o~ certd.n

moves thet Nkrumeb hai mate to explore the posatl>U1tl ot getting

some fmericen COl'pol'sti.ons 1nterestecl 10 tbe ventQr'e. these moves

mleh l41l1 be deacr1bea in Sllbsequent chegtel'o were no longer

VlewElCl with COl'lCern b7 the British. By now the Bnt1ah slde wes

epperently interested 111 f.tncUng e way ou~ to esoepe 001(1 Coset

pressure for earl¥ ectlon. lhe Br11;J.sb Qo.ernmen~' s at~1tude wes re1'leote4 in the

aCUODG of the Br1t1ah end Cen.ealm compm1es. rbel bGgGl1 to

ergue that the price ot power fJ.xed b1 ~he Preparatory Com1ss101l

-

for the alum1nlum s:aeltcr 1;0 be pu' up by tbEt:l wes too h1gh.3l

As JackSO.n to).d the present· writer it was pl'Obeb1y made cle~

to l\llUWZleh bl the llr1tJ.Sh Uh6~ further ttpaSn~ak1ng sui,yale.

would have to be unaerteken concerning au. 8spec~s of the pro­

~ec'. 32 ftle Qbena1en l.eEXier cou14 0D1.1 conclude ~hElt he might;

heve a long wG1't sheed If be were to depend sol-ely on Br1tldl

co-operation. 'Onder the c1rcwnsteueest the q\1E1otlon th~ he

heci to tsce urgently '199 bow be could proceecl in tbe d11'eotioD

of secur1ng CllPPOl't tor bis cherished pro3ee1; hom the mdte4

statGs Go'VerJlr.:lent end American Corporations.

The Brit-1m a~t1tude 1ntenstt1ea Nkrumeb. s desire to

ecblove complete iD(!epeDaellee of his country. He felt that suob

a step woula free Obdla from depe"44ence Q1l the Brltlsb and from

the ar1tlob elum1n1wn lnteresta thE!t sought to teke mvanteae

of Gbana's dependmce.

Prlor to Qbsna's attm.nment of U4epelldenc~ the united

states Government hed dlowed, DO greet 1ntere~ 111 ~e 4mp1_en­

tatS-on o£ ~e Vol-t.a Rlver .proJeo~. the reseou probab1, was ~hat

Gol.cl Coast was a .8rJ.Udl co).ony end j.'t was eons1c1el'ed the rea­

pcnslbU11iy of Brl~e1n to obtatn £in81c14 ruppol't tor the pro3ect. Be1Dg en ell.y 1n the eol.d war eonfl'ontat1ons ega1nst the SOvi.et

$ I. I f 1

31.. see MOxon. n. 26, P. 84-

32. Interview -e1tb J£~keo1l.

as

OBion, the l1n1tea states Governmen'C probebl.1 ci1(i not wlsh to

1ntRde 1nto the sphere of Br1t1d'l 1Dfl.\lenee. At the sane time

the Volte River project conte1ned features that lnterested

I·merleen polley-makers since the VRP was going to 1rlruguretc e

new SOlll'ce of elum1nlu.m in the \1orld, the control. over ~eh ~es

e~uelel. fol' Pmer1cen Snterests. Also, as the cold uer progressea,

the IDl1ted states Government sterted stoekpll1ag of essential sna cr1tical. materiels ~b1eh mcluded alwn1n1um.

O1.lr1Dg the 1nter"wer years, tbe cSemena for el.WD1n1wn

10 the uorld merke1; cont1nuetl to r1 se end 1t begm to ooe11Pl

the pos1~iot1 as a major nonferrous mete). in the world. F1ncUng

tb1s, Prestdent Ber1'1 S. frwnen appointed a COmm1ssiOl1

(Mat.er1els Polie1 Commlssion) in 1.949 to go into the questlon of

prospeetive demends for eltlmSnlum 1n the united states and the

nFJtee \4;01'1",.. In its report of June .1962 entitled, UBesourcee

for Freedoo". the Commlaslon estJmated tb~ the consumpt.1on of

elttmSUum in the tJn1.ted states ena the rest of the world in

1976 might be betveel1 fo~ to five times of the conswnpt1.011 111

1.950. It wee stipulated in the report tha't stnce el.um1D1um wes

111 the process of winning mley markets fttom other c0tIlPet1t1ve

msterlQ.st there 'Wel'e s1;111 further ch~eeG of 1ncreaslDg need

for el.wn1n1um.33 Al.um1nlum pr04ueers e.na tribr1cetol's in the

tnl1te6 states saw tremencious scope for eJ.um1D1um to subst1tute

steel ana wo04 end thereb1 enhanCing the use of alum1nium 1n

eng1neerinc, sM.p buUd1.ns, air cren, ~renGPon, el.ectr1.cEa

L d , I

33. R<lcommen(le.1#s'ons of the M~el'lel.s Pol1.cy Comm.1s~on as c1ted S.n B eport. of' tibe Preparatory Comm1saon, n. St PP. 1. ena 9.

1ndUst~8, bu11d1ng end other fle1ds.34 rhus, ~e the BJtit1Et1

were tsk1.ng leGll slong with the Cenadlens 111 tm aluminium scheme

in Gold Coast, the tnlS.ted states Government kept ltsel.t abreast

ot the developments ecneern1ng the pro3ect.

~h1s ~ClS reflected 1ft the essil$ence tbat the Prepa­

ratory Commission rece! v eli from the united States Goverl'1met1t wltb respect to certain of its techlUce1 .1Dvest1gst1ons. Aeeord1Ds

to the Commission, the agencJ.es that e~enae4 assistance 'Were

the Dep&rtment of state, tbe onJ:ted states Pt1lalc Health service,

the Bureau. of ftecl.ane.t10l1t the tEmlessee Valle), Authority. the

Columbia Bastn Pro3 ec~t the lJollllev1Ue Power Autho~1tl't end the

mutea states Weather BtlretU.36

l'l!lOllg prominent /Genoane who extended ass1st8!lCe to

J ecltaon COmmisslOD 1n its invesUget10ns were J\rtbur E. M01'gatl

ana Gordon C1eppt ~ho bed served at dlfterenO times as Cbe1sen 36

of the TeDesaee Velley l~tbor1tl. ApperenU1 no t~e1'1CSl

tl.wn1n1utn comPe1l1 was sppl'08ched fo~ aavloe 1>1 the Commission.

l'be Comm1sfl!1011 apparentl), kept in elose tOllch with tbe British

J\lwdn1W1l end tbe ALC.AN.

Prime )l1n1,.er Nk1.'U.'.lSeh of Gold Coset Colony in the

meanwbUe hed continued bis d1t'l.ogu.~s with B1'1te1.n end the

Br1tleb ana Cenedlan elum1n1um compen1es tor the 1mplementeU011

34. ~b14., P .. 9.

35. see Report of the preperatory Comm1es1on, vo1 • .1, ll. 8. P. 1.26.

36. Ibtci. t PP. 1.26-8.

40

of the pr03eet. ".At the Beme timet however, he mtde conslstent

e.tf'Ol'ts to evoke f~r1cen pub1.1c interest 1n the developmcmt

proJ eet s thet were proj ected tor 111 S cOWlt1'1 1n the tUtUl'e.

After elx years of his departure fYom the mt1ted states, be got

m opportun1t1 to vis1t that eO\l1'1tr1 once age1n When bis old

friend, Horace Mrom Dolld. tbe prOlIl1nent ~leok eduoator and

Pres1deJ1~ of LincolJl IDl1vel'stty 1nvltecJ h1m to receive en honol'eJ'Y

degree of uooctor of Lawen from b10 unj.verSl~y. Dur1ng tb18 tl'ip

~ the tnlJ.ted SCates 1n .1961, he urged a bJ,eck eucUence in New

XOl'k that bl.aCk l'lIte1'1can ec5tlcators, technlc1enst scJ.ent1sts, mel

medical. men d10uld come ovel' to Qold Coast to estebUsb a

"cultural. brldge. between ~he AtnCe!1S end the Atro-/Qer1cens.

Further. he sald th~ he wes l.ock1ng fOl'~S1'a to the prospects of

vigorous econom1c devel.0pI4ent 111 G01a coast un4er the aegis ot e

Volte Project. on the mo(Jel of the tennessee Vel10y .Authority. S1

On his return to Gold Coe~ after the tour, Nknmeb out11nea &

645,000 k1I bl(}l'oel.ectr1c develop~ent p~o3eot on the Volta River

near ~jene.. He turtbo.tt speU.ed it out, that a pr1"ate e1umSn1um

company woUld be given respons.1b111ty for the extl'actiol1 or beux1te. eonstra.te~1on _a opere~1cn of SJl el.um101W1l process1Dg

plant 111 .001<1 Cosst. NkrlWeb em:lounced the' his Governmen"C woul.4

be opening centres in London m4 New Iork to aoquein~ 90ten~14

investors end ~e~c.1.ms on the rj.cb po~entj.el.s o£ Gola Coast. 31

l'he !!mi .J2I.!i eam,; 4eputea Jots 1'f)presen'e:~1VGt w1lUan

S. w'h1~e on a tout' of /.£1'1.00 eroWl4 tb.S.s ~1me which tncluded

~. H.D Jork UtAfRt .10 June 1951. p.. 3S.

38 .. lbla., 26 Algust 195.1t ,. 24.

Gola Coast. fhe reponer 4E1scr1lJed Gol.<i Coast as the R~eek

men- s brave new world" ena "an area ot Ught in the dark

cont1nmt". 1'be reporter 3Jl41cate4 that Nkl'wDab was reluctant

to force Br1~E4n for en eerly OXlt from b1s countr1 sS.nce be was

under' con stl'a1llts to 1nCiuce fOl'ej,gl1 capital. for e fennessee

vane, l<uthorit1 type of project on 1ihe Volta River costing

iJ150,OOO,OOO. 1'he mouey. according to t4dte. rml at come either

from tbe tJn1tetJ states 01' Br1te1n ald pl'obab1., from the Ull1tea

states.39 But knerleen pubt1c mone, or 1Dteredt as bes been

pointed out eer~1er ~e.s not tOl'tbcom1ng UXltll Br1te1n was en tho

seene an6 rUUng Gold Coset.

Wi tb regard to the evolution ot Amer1.C9J1 prl veta

interest 111 tbe pr03 ect, "t is not clear "lhetber dllr1ng the

1eel's le~1Dg up to the slecken1ng ot Britl til ettOl'ts 1n the

VRP after 1.956, eny major lGer10atl private interest bea sou.n4ed

NQumeh on the poss1bU1tl of en association ~'b the project.

It eppeal'B to the present writer tbe' the m~ol' /lm$1"icen

1nterests· mlgh' not have tsen ani' a1gn1t£cent 1Dlt1etlves in

the early md ad.d SOs 1.11 viall: of wha~ sppeerea to be B cl.e~

11nld.Jlg of t~rumah w1tb tbe Brl~1dl Government end the .Anglo-

CenCdlm el,ltm"niwu compen1es. :ebe one flnlerlcen effort tbst t4SS

mEl4e aurlng this period cane from a ver1 UllUeuel. source that baa

l1ttl.e or no contact ~a'soever with major Amerioan interests.

T'he BOl1ree was Horaco Metm Bond. Pres1dent 01" Lincoln mslvertd.ty,

Nkrumeb' 0 o1d h].me..Meter. 'rhe Ghen.eJ.a l.eeder haa pl'of0Ull4

l'espect tor Horace l~aml Bond. Bondt on his part, l'GgB1'4e4

NkrwDeb as e b1g hope fO'r the ttegen.ereUoll of Africa. lie

u&tched Nkrumeht s progress with ntfccUon t11d aam1raUon eaa hoped that the Line-olD elumnuG would be the lDstNment by \1b1ch

Ghene could energe 6S a mode). tor A*1ca end souroe of p1'Sde

tor the Jiaonoat Bl.acks. fbe u1lleel'e~ Sllstt4De4 Sla sometr1b.

aneteur1sh effort tba' Bona mecte to attl'BC~ /\mer1em capital. for

Gbenats 4eV6!opment are described in a eheptOl' in all Wlpubl1ahe4

monogreph ez1~1tJ.e4. ttIDll1ie4 stG~e$ en(i Ohms. 1951.-1.9GS- by

wJ.ns~on 1.. KSn_~. Ass1stm' Professor of B1stOl'V at the

I~pcleehlsn state on1versttl1Jl »Gone, North C6l'olJ.na. 40 the

present writer was unalae to ob~t4n accoss to tbe aonCl PepGl'S

that Klnsey had exan1l1ea. Jie cu.a, hOl2ever. have en oppotttwd.t)'

to discuss tbe tsste td.tb UDse7 6114 to peruse the materiel. tht'$

tbe latter vervgenerousl.y mEde evaUeble to b1m. ~b11e K1Booy

chronlcles tbe hectlc efforts Ulecie b1 Bona be ta11s to lIPPl'ase

C1'1tlceUl whether they really anounted to much in concrete tel'lDs.

fhe present writer reme1ns of the v1ew tbat the we11-tntcntiOJ1ed

effol'ts of BOlla Ci1d not represent snytbing Stlbstt:.l1t1al. that

eoul,4 beve eppeeleCl to Nkrumrb in tbe pl'e11mtnery period ending

1966. Nkrumoh. sbreWli sna worldl.y-w1set respcndea gretefUll.y to

Bema' G men, Oomtm11l1ca1;J.ons concern.1ng his effons ld.tbou1;,

however, p1ec1Dg fill' large hopes that these efforts might br1Dg

on stell 4ef1n1te proposals £rom wrtb~e ~er10E!l1 1nterests as

tl1ght enab).,e him ~ 41$Pense with the ef~rts th~ he hed beED

b, 1- "

meld.ng with the BrltlEtl. NkNmab was prepere4 to linEA to the

hlledce1l eal1ce.to~ a%ICl encotlrege6 him to continue his efforts,

but he was no~ disposed t.o give uP tbe British bi1'4 in ~he band

for tbe J.mer1cen bird 1n the bash that .Bond veguell' t&l~ea about.

:he reeGrd ~ t» sheua thau Nkrwafh 'MSS no~ w11Ung to "eke verI

seriousl.l grtmdlose prom1ses trom 61.1 .iAdlv1dllel. Aaler1CGB pro­

mo~~l' &1l4 ~es al.co quite umJ.1l1ing to l'espona if it seemed to

b1m that the Q!ler~or eODcerned might be 1ntereste4 1n SGCllJ.I1ng

tOl' b1mse1f en undue meSSL\re of contro~

Nltrwneh eppcors to have brosQ..v 1ndloated to Bend bis

negotiations with the British esci t.o have comple1nea about the

tough btn-ga1n1n6 of the British ~1um1nSum Comp~. He 1nd1ceted

to Bona tbet be uould not be unw11Ung to consider uorth·

~Ue propos01.e th~ might be offered b1 the lImer1ean Bl1o:S.ness

mterests.41 Bolld took up tho matter with tho utmost seriollSlless

--mucb more probebl.1 thM Nkrumeh had expected ..

fhe contact tbat J:50D.d tJss able to 11I1e up tor RkTumeb

~Jas one 1, .. l!icigar Detw1l.er. PJtes1den~ of Ell oU1;f11) known as the

New fork lIJorld Centro, lnc. As 111'ged by ~nci, Nkrumeh bas a

meet1ng with DCltw1l.er dllr1ng b1a v1s1t to the on1te4 states Sn

1961.. S11bse~uen~17 DettfUer orgSl1zetl a fum ceU.ed I~trlca

lJlterDa~1onel. COl'poret$.on. DettoJUer' s prescrlp~lon for epproe.

eM.ng 'the prob1en was attnpUC1t; 1tsel.f. All that wes needed

\ass to bring together s prestigiOUS 1sw ftl'm ulth pol.S:t1ce1

connectlollst an elumS,nJ.um interest. a potell~1eJ. t:l.nEAclol' end e

repQ1)etl eng1neer1ng 1'11'01. It tbO, would all agree to work

together, DetwJ.ler tel~ that it should be posslbl..e to obte1D

rdeq'c1e.te IGer1cen resources for the VRP. no fly 1n. the oint­

m~nt was of course that &ll. these powerful 1ntel'ests should went ~o wo-rk under e Detw1l.er. !he 01'1l., cora that DettJUer bed 11'1

bis band ~aB bis acquc1fltenee w1 tb Bond ~ho bed e Ulle to

Nkrumab. DetwUer approached the Law firm of Davies, R.1ohbers,

fg41ngs, Debe ma LUCie 1n t>ladltDgtOll, D.C., Bel'aheYt the well.­

known Chocolate compeD1. R01J1ol.d s Metols, the el.um1nlwn 00lDDElZly

itt Richmond, Virginia. and the AtlenUc l!ng111eers, Ine. His

efforts pro411ceci no results. Be1Jlol<1s Metals mlght have bed a

lottical. 4ntel'est 111 a scheme 1nvolv.1Dg alwnil'l.1wn. bllt ~ere

inhibited from tald.ng my initiative because of the 1ud1c~1on

~be.t l1krumeb \10ul.4 tEke no s~ep that might ptteJu<l1ce the nego.

UtltJ.on .under way with the Br1~lSb Government end the ~o­

qmtaalm elum1nium 1I1~el'es1;s. NkrWltah could not \fork uP lIlllch

enthuolasm for the Pl'Opose1s ~at be received from DetwU&r UieD.

tho latter, eocQrlpan1ed b, Bond. v1slte(l Accra 111 December ~952.

Dc~11eJ" now spoke of ,et mother firm tbat he hea helped .t.n

orgen121Dg, tile united Amer10au MSDagement Corpol'~lon, as e

su.bsldlary of tbe Mentt-CbepmaJl end Scof;t Corpol'eUon. ftle

Gheae1.m l.eaier mJd his pnttcj,pQ]. cfttc1al.s eoul.d not eppsrent1y

brizlg thEmse1veo to bel.leve tb~ that sort of en outfit was

l1ke1¥ to turn the dreem of tbe VBP .1nto l'G£Il.lty. In March 4953

Bona WOG back U Accra with the pel'a1s~ent Detwiler 1n tow.

45

Nkrunu,b t S offielel.s poll tel.y told them that 110 turther initiative

needed to be taken since there wottld be or1tlc1sn 1n tbe Gold

Coast Leglalet1ve Assemblr It en, publicity were to reSQ].t.42

!Unse, refers to the disgust ~poaeal)f felt by

DetuUer ell4 his (!Ollcl.uston that Nkrumeb vas under presS\1re to

eccept the BrltlSb 11110.43 lhlt art)' 1mpertlal. exem1r1atlon of the

state of tbe Brit1sh proposals 8t tbat time woul4 Slggest th6t

l~l'wneh acted· rather Gena1bl.)' end soberl., m decid1ng S8elnst

meld.ng tJIl1 besty eommiQaent to oet'wUer. As bas been mentioned

earlier. the Preparator, Comad.ssion wes at work at tha~ uime et24

l\krwndl oQDtlllllCa to hope tha~ progress co1114 be me4e w1.tb the

Brltldl. tJDl.ess 8 COUll~er.proposal. from en hnericm SOlU'ce cOuld

be show to be cleal-1r md UDm1stekelal.1 more edventegeous

t1nenc1ell., ma to have posslb1llt1es of qu2.ekeJ.t 1mplementstion.

there was no reason "G1h3 Nkrumeb S'houl4 be dlsposea to chenge

horses 'in m14.stresm. Furthert DetwU.el' was toolhera, enough to

tell. the Ghene1sn off1c1e1.s that in l'e~n for his 1mportdlt . efforts. all future 1Jl1tlatlves in regard to the Pro3e~ should be

1eft Sn his hat4s. Nkrumah was eerted.Dl.ll1ot prepared to give

my such po~er oven it the request had come from a ma30r ArIlericsn

entlt1 offel'1ns him attractive terms. As f~ as he was eoncerned,

such a dem.ena fr.om oewUer ~as not even t10rtb a seeond thought.

Xt is noteworth1 tb.at in his discussion o£ the proposeJ.s

of netwll.er, lUDsey 40es no~ attempt to make e cl'1.tlcal. appre1sel.

• 42. Xb:La.; .. PP. ~

43. Ibid., P. 342.

46

of De~IUer' s stanting end cre4ent1al8. the present wr.t~er takes

the vl~1 tbat. Detvll.er '''os GIl "opera~oIH. ~o t1'1eci to be a

little too smart. Nkrwneh ~as able 1;0 slze up this "operator"

better ~hen the uell. .. J.ntent1oneci educator bom 1.1neolD un!-versl ty. Kinsey' e probl.em arises becalse of his almost exclu-sive dependence on the Bond pspera. He was epp61'eB'ly 1Dfluen­

ce<i by the iUl.some exebel18e of letters between Det~er end

.Dend. Be d1a no~ ask. Sl11 hera q1le stiollS concerning DetwUert 0

capabilities 01' even bis sten<11ng 111 tbe bi.lsiness end finenc1el.

wo1'l.d.

It may be mE!1~lcJled in this COlUlcct1on that DetwUer

emerged a feu years later clelm1ng to be the heGS of yet mother

outfit know 69 the Congo Internetional. f.1enagement Corporation

with headquarters in New York. He ennoUJlc~ that he baa ECQuUea

from the Congol.ese Prime M1n1ster, Patr1ce M. Lwnumba, a fiR,

a-ear contract to develop the Congo's resources. t!lblle mGldng

the ennouneement, he elso e.sser~ea that he he4 1mpo1'1ant 1nterests

in Liberia ena Gu1nee. ss.g.n1f1cen~ll' 1~ was the GOG vh10h at

thet time publ1cly warned other AtrlCfJIl gOVGl'DQel1ts 1l0~ ~o enter

into EOl con~l'acttlel obligations w1tb untanS1 1er 1n41v1dllnla vitb

unknom Cl'et1.~1el.s. 44 Notb1ng cone out ot 'those DetwUer's

scbemes too.

I t

44. see BlJdnee b'~ (New York), 30 Jlll.y 1960. P. 88.

An Amer1cen Foreign service Officer posted 1n the congo during the perloa told ~be tllltbol' 111 en bltel'v1ew tba~

. Nkrwneb speelr1c~1 warnea LWD.UJnba about Oet~er t1hen the Ccngol.ese 1eeder 1nformed h1m about the proposed <leal with the /.m.encen "operator".

~nh ~es ree11stJ.c enough to Wlc3erstentJ that no \fort}).

~le PI'Oposel was likely to come frclD m~ol' Ame1'1cen eeonomlc

interests unless it vss clear to the latter tbat the bl.ess1Dgs

of the unltea ~otes Qo~ernment were assured. Neither BOM 110r

Detw11.er hGd g1ven the SUgbtest indication 1n the couse of

their efforts that they b~4 contacteCi eny sources 111 the Executive

Branch of tbe tJft1ted states Qovernmen1;. From the generaL attl.

tu.ie of tbe tJD1te4 states Government ana poss1bJ4r from bis own apPl'e1sal. after bA.s v1slt to the tJn1ted ste1:es 111 1951t Nkl'umeb coul.d noU derive -6 real. encouragemen~ 01' sigD.1f1cant American

9l.Pport. Be ':01114 UJl4erstflll4 tbE:~ as lODg as the 0014 Coast

l'emaned unde.r the Br1tldl colon.1el. nl.e. en, laencen Mmin1a.

tl'atlon was U~ to be l'el.uc1;(At. to atpport ~ venture m the

countr, that m1gb~ be l'eSer4ed as adverse to the BrJ.tlsh

1rl1;e!'fJs"s. That poslt1on chSlg6tJ on 6 MarCh 1.9S1 't!1hen Ohms

became 1ndepGJ1dent. NkrwnEh coul.<i nO\'] aer1oua1.¥ cons14el' the

pooslb1l.1tl of C)2Pl.onD8 fo~ en Amer10e1\ option tor the VRP.

The spproech of in4epetl4enee 1D Ghma was wSCbed wl1;b

interest bV e m&3or Ameriosn t>lUttd.nlwa pl'oducer--the R01l10148

Met el. s, this Ggpessive COl'porat1011 bad obV1c\la1~ fo1.10wed with

cere the fate of tbe nGgoti. eUclls tha1i bat been goSng on laetwee1l

the Gold Coast end the Br1.~1 dl ena noted the el.acken1ng or Br2.t1ab "n~erest. in the venttl1"e. Re1Dolds 1Dterest was of ED

8)Cpl.ol'atorN nature end tho mell unde~eld.J1g the ~lol'atlo11 on

2.~s bebel.f was AcU.e1 stevenson, the de£ea~e4 Oenocret2.c cenctldate

1"01' the Prea:ldeno8 1n 4952 e.ud 1.956. :ate legal fum or ltal.o1

stevenson. baaca 1n Chlcago. l'epl'f;)sen'ed Re1Do14s. 1t(11el

stevenson haS m£de e eOllPle of trips to Gbana before its 11l4epen­

denee -end bed develope4 person~ con~ects w.1th Nkl'wneb end

GbedemEb. 1!hl'ougb Stevensan RelDOlds' interest ill e:emtnlOg

poss1bUltles 10 tbe Gol.a Coaa~ be<1 been communlca'e4 to NJawneh

elld GbeClemeb. S1mttl1;eneo~sl.y Be11101.4s e.l.so bGgen some cI1SCll-

as10ns l'11tb BIle md ILCAN reg~dlng 'Wor1U.ng arrengemmts tor

poss1'bl.e partiCipation 1n the srnel.tSI' proJec1t m the Go1d

ooaat.4S

Nlm1m6h epp~ent1y regarded tb1 s development as mucb

more slgnlf:lcent then en e1ternete PttOpo~ mbm1ttetl b1 bls 016

fttlend Horace Meml Bond. Bond btd 'beE)11 1Jldtea to Ohms's

1ndependenee eeremCllY. Despite his previous expel'1.en.ce 'W1th the

DetvUler e.tfe1r Nk1'Umeh mentlonoa to tbe visitor his Interests in ge"1ng eupport ft'o!!l ~J1ler1cm 1Qterests !'or the yap. It 18

poss1bl.e ~ha1; Nkrumeb migbt !lave l11dlce\ed the 1aportSlCle of

enUsUD8 the co-ope'rsUon of some reell1 'big Amencum under-.

taklng for e Gheneten vent!U'O. Once egain Bond tOQk .NkNmeh. 8

-request tor help with u~ter senousrtGoo. 110 t.r1ec1 to 1n~ereat

the MlaeollCla Cottpors.1.on Wb1cb ves & glent in copp~ btlt haa el.eo m1nor 1ot;el'est in el.WD101um. ~o seJlve 8.S en ""n'emea1Qr,­

between ~e Jl'leconde COl'po»eUon md thO GOG e. new firm wall 8et

up on Dona's 1UtS.et1ve 14tb the nEme Obmus Corpol'e.~1on. 46

Be.v1Da eatel>Udled some collta)te w1tb Be11101ds Metals, Nltrumdl ., 45. see lUnaa)' t D. 4<\ PP. 349-So.

46. lldd.. pp., MS.C.

was not wll.l1Dg to be <11stre.oted 1>, .Bonat s latest efforts. He

al~ meet privately wltb the representatives ot the Ghemta

Corporetlon in Cb1cego aur1Dg his official. Vlslt to the tJD11;ea

states 1n Jul., 1958. Nkrwneh wes quite non-eommitt&l. at the

meeting. Be merely asked the Corporation to toruard eny propose1

tbat the, might b£ve to him, after discussion with the Ghme1m

J,JDbessedor 1n tbe Ull1te4 states. ~ ~e Corporation did have these dlscusalons ana 111 the

proposel. tbey submitted they sought exclusive rights tor the ...

selves to carr" em negot1at10ns vltb the v61'1ous pGrtles thst

't1Oul<1 have to co-op.ate 1n the es1;ebllsbment of the proJec1t.48

fb1s wes the seme kin<i of SilagesUon that haa e~l.1e:r Emen&ted

from Dett9Uer snd bed be. rejectea bl Nkwmeh. iikrwneb could

have been herdl.y enthllsiestlc over the Gben&lS COl'pore.t.lont e

proposel.. B1s mo~ tlrgent protaon vas J10~ en agen~ with

exclua1ve rights kit C01lcrete propos~8 £Or qUlCk e.ctlOl1 be(tked

by edequate tineoc1al. SllPPOl'~ end the avo1dmce of Sly CltmSnld.­

t1cn of his Olin personal. power ena Ghma. s sovereign rights. Nkrumeh hal 110 happier ezpersence with vet another

/QeriC!eJl opere.tort one Fraser Le1th, tdlo early 1tl 1961 haa

spoken to the Gbena1en lee4er 1n grandlose terms about bis

abSl.lty to mob111ee J\merlcSl f\1nds for the VRP. The 000 went to

the extent of ginng Leith e nlnet1 dEWS' option to make go04 on

F I

41. Ib14., PP. 350-62.

48. Ibid •• 99,. 352-4.

so

h1s prom1.se.4.9 t>ilbell no spec1f1c p~oposel. mater1sl1zea. Ghms

ennoUl1ced tbat the option hed lepaeCl.60

Nkrwneh eould see st tbJ.s time that the Br1tlsb WGre

l1kely to be on the way out ss fer BS the VBP was cOllcettl1ed. file

discreet effOrts that be hed made through t:ell.J.ntent~onea

persons l1ke Horsee M.enD Bond b£4 proved f'ru1tl.ess. Assocd.ot1Ol1

w.t.th operators o~ the t.vpe of oetwUel' Sl4 LeJ.tb cl.eerly turned

out to be vorthl.eas. rhe eontec1is 14th the RelAo14s l4~e1a

were stUl. not l.ee4ln8 to mltb1q sianJ.f1cen\. fhere was

11tt1e 1ndicatlon that EIJl~Dg wol'thWbUe could be achieved

unlesS the Govel'DDtet1t of the tb1tecl states could be ~terestea

in the lulplementatlon of the Project.

SUcbt 1naeei t ues the view espl'Gssed to r~dl e

l1ttl.e eer11er by Robert JCCkSOll uhom l\kX'WDGb cOl1er1dereti es a

gocci frlena. J'eekson baa pointed out to him tbet the UJl1te4

states l'eme1aetJ the CDl.1 hope (is t~ as the VBP w~s 00110&l'Il66.

on'l, the tJn1~ea states had the resources tor heJ.p1Dg t11th tbe

ProJect. ~"hd was nee4e6 was a poUt1cel cJec1aS.on on /imenoata

Pan. a A' this po1nt there eppesret1 111;t).e prospect of

Nlu'umdl f s be1Dg alae to ~ce the SOv1e~ UldOll, with lfhom he

614 no1l have even 41plomstj.C) l'ela~lons to un4enr1te the

pro~ect. l~ becsme. there£Cre. ZleceSSe.%'1 £Or Bkrwneh \0 mdte

II

49. see PhU1P S1ekmfAt "EdSa- Ke1~' s Ganbl.e 111 Afl"J.ea". f2J59D! (New i"Ol'k), vol. 54, P. 430.

So. Pda.¥ $jIaMJs (Accra), 31 Ju1y 1987. P. ~.

5.1. Interview vJ.th 51r Robert Jaekscn.

e dUec~ bid to the united steties Government. It is in pUl'Sllel1Ce

of saob a 111'1e of thinking tbs1; Nkrunleh pl.aoe4 in tbe bends of

the Chief of the Unite" states Interns1;lonel. co-operatlOll

J.6m1n1stl'stion (ICA) M1ssS.on 111 Gbaua, Carl Flesher, complete

dOCWJ1ents relating to tbe Pl'Oposel.s received by his Government S2

~OID various parties Jlegara1ng tbe VRP.

1!he IDU.ted states Governznent was aware ot the prob1ems

thet N'krwneb confronted 6l<i ~he oppo~tunlt1es that the a1tuntlon

opClle4 tor an 1461'1cen 1n1~1aUve at 8 propitious timo when

pos~1bU1tv ot otfena1.ng tale British would not eda~. fhe

Departalent of Scate convened a meeting of the IIl.u.m1nlwu lZlcttlStir1

to disoase the develop1Dg s1t\l~lOll in respect. to Ohms. rhe

leA chief Sn Obelia hed teken the position the.t the aSGocla~lon

of en laerlcen elum'n1wo interes' woul(i be 1n the best 1ntere(Jt

of the united states foreign poUCl 1n Gbmo 1D pe'ttlCul.er,

end Africs 1ll ge:neJ!SJ.. 63

The meeting at the sta.~e DElP~ent was G»P8l'enUy of

fD e~lordOl'Y ne.t\1N. 1401)g tho_ Who ettende4 "sa Cb84 F~

ct4houll. e V1'CC.Pltest(}en~ of tbe Ka1seJl In&l8tl'1ea. S4 'lb.

Ke1aer poup bees subste!1Uel esper1en.ce 111 eJlg1neer1ng me!

cOllstruction of 1>lg h14roelectnc pro3 ects eput f.pom ita .

1Ut.ere8ts Sn el'llnSnlum. Ingredients thus existed tor tbe Keiser

• ...... d at • J It

sa. see Moxon. n. 26, p_ 89.

63. see S1EllmlSDt n. 49, pp. ao.S1. 54. Ibid .•

group to teke e keen 1nterest 1n unfolding developments. /Ul

1ne1dent of l'SOlel dloorlm1ne.tlon 1nvol ving OhSle1an Finenae

Mlnl ster K~a A. Gbedemdl bJ'ougbt fltCl'l~ page heedllnes to Gbaua

1n ;be Ame1'1C81 pttess. 6S P1'esl4en\ Eisenhower 1nv1ted Gbedemd'1

to the ~b1te HOllOO for breakfast ma in the course of d1scussion

1n41cated his W1UlJlgnGSS to exan1ne the poQ1tion about possJ.bl.e

l1D1er1cen help to Ohms. 66 l!he '1lI1e had obvlousl.9 CQm.e for aD.

.P.merlcc:ill 1nlt1l$1.ve md NJatwnEh l'et4 the signal c01'1'ec1;13. III

a pel'sonel 10"61' to Eisenhower. Nkrumeh reqUested the Pres14eut

to lena his good offlces to errmge ctcvel.opment 10m. ass1stmce

fer tbe VBP. S1 BeViDg l'eoel'leC1 the "",,peel from Nkrwneb blmcelt,

the Presldent HpUed in an encOUl'eg1l1g note. Nkrwntlb reported

to the Parllf!.!Ulel1t wltb entbua1ean about the letter from the

~.mer1een preo1aent. Be indicated 1n bls speech tbst there was

e pr~speet for l.mel'lcen assistance ana so tbere might no longe~

be en, need tor .tU".th~ alscllssion with BAC end lILeAN. The

protracted neaot1atiOl'1 ~th the Brit!$}} bed t.lDell.I proved

fttu1.tless. rhe untte4 states ties e~ena1ng e belping bena. sa1a Nkrl1Dlah. fB

NU'wr1eh did nO~t. howey_. glve us PerUanent. e h11

p1c1Jure or Eisenhowert s letter. the l.etteJt has so ter not been

publ.1sh04. ba~ the present; wr.lter wes abl.e to exem1ne G cop,

55. For <ie~eUs on the 1nc14ent; see Nfl? ~.~ 9 October 1.9S1. P. 20t ena 1.0 Ootober J.981 e~j.e1I;-p. 32.

56. 1'b16 •• .u Octobel' l.967, P. 20. f11. SOultcea S5eJ~ RmWmen!. 58. For £flm1mebt s speech to the ParUement; see K1nsel'. ll. 40,

P. 282.

provided b1 en UDimpcechabl.e S~a1;e Department source. l!he

Pres14ent SDolte of Vlee PI'8.c1en~ Mcherd M. Nixon's vlS11t at

tbe time of GhCAa1 s SnClepeD4E1D.ce 1n Mereb J.9S7 ella cited

GDPJ.'Ovin81y flU.xeDt G un tha~ Ghana wes eJIlel'glng as a 8tl'Oll8 end

powerf\&1. l.esder in Af1'1Ca. He GSSlJ'e4 NkrwllGb 'hd tbe l1n1tea

states endorseti the principle of sol.f-c.tetel'Dd.neUon ~th l'egerc1

to eOW1trles in ~tr1ea stUl. UDder colonl61. SllbJ11G~S.on.

Fisenhowel' raen~lonea thet the tnlltec1 states Goverumen' uoula ~l.ore pose1bUitles of 8ss1st1ng ObEDa Sn respect of the VRP

in so fer os ita resoarcee permitted. t.t tbe SaIlO t.1me be

ellPl.a1ne6 that; Ohallo vou1ii have to enll~ tbe EUpport of maJor

AmerlctaU private t1nene1el's £01' tbe VBP.69

fhe prcbl.em tbat Nkrumm confronted we.s similer to that

he had faced with tbe Br1t1ab. co-operat1on end sssS.stence of

~e Bn~1dl Government waa p~ealc~e4 on the erl'enSement ~6t.

he had to work 14th BrlU&h dl4 CenS41en comperaes.. EloeDhowel" a

PQta1t1cn was drtueU¥ the _.e. rhe question thUG before

Nkrumab vas \1b1ch t.merlcen group \1Ould b.e 'he 40-' aiven'eaeous

to 'WOo ana what the prlee the g~ mlght WSl~ ~o &e~ fttoaa

Ghene..

FoUol4nS the NkrWlleb-Uoenhowe~ correspondence,. the

Uh1ted stetes Governmellt oetl' to Gbma m leA teem heatea b7 Carl. Fl.edlel'. n<lshe,. bel1.eve6, 00 stiated earl-lett, that private

entol'pl'l GG sbou14 p1ey G kO)' ro1e in the foreign eJ.cl programae

L 1 d

ena that 1tbe VRP provldea en 1(1eal. opportuD1tl to put his

theory l11tO action. Fle.sb~t 8 appraisel, ss presented by a

writer 1n f9Dlm! ren as foUowsa ~be tJh1tG4 stutes Governmen. ~ul.a lend Obena mOlle, to buUd the dem and power station. ftle

pr1vate Investor, poss1bl.V With some governmelt belp. would put

up fJ!l alum1nlum ane1tel'. Baving thus a gQaranteed customer for

Volts Dem' G electl'le~ POWl', Gbana wol&ld l'ece1ve sUfficient 60 income to repay the tJn1te4 stat.es loOals.

~ere west however .• one SQ.. No el.um1n1wn compmy

.w1ncecJ r$eaJ.ness to go 18"0 the smelter project s1ngl.e banded],),.

Dl1ring ~be spr1Dg of 19S Flesher. theretore, uretiu.Eall" movea

to the view that e eonsort1wa sppl'oecb woul~ be the mswett. a un the Ghet1e.1..en &ldo, e. bas1e chEDge in the concept of

thepl'oJ ec~ hea tsiten pl.ace b3 this t1l10. PreYi.ouaLl, the ~hol.e

pJ'03 ect wes conce1 ve4 as e t.1Pe of partnerab1p o~ tldO Govern-

men's, ·the tTlt: 614 thO 0014 Coast end the two e1urdnJum cOQpen1es

nanel, BAC mel 1;j"eAJ~. ~e two Governments WOUld provide the

dan, the power house, rEdlw&1, barbotU' end to_ships. ~he two

compSllee would proVide 'the mine, m4 SI11elter en6 sen ingots

to the ~ Of the toteJ. &lJlOW'lt of money involved, the ITt< voul.d

provi<Je e consS.deralae sum on a 1CD8 term be.s1s in exchange £01'

the r1gb~ to bQ1 ingot at tbe worl.d price.

J:t WSG nov tieei.deB to m6k.e the projeet more menegesb1e

ma to 11m1t the eomm1tmen~s tnvo1vea. rberefore, the publ.lc

_ d i; 1 $Z

60... see sl.ekmm, n. 49, P. 134.

61. .. ~b14.

66

utility sector of the proj ec~ (the dan., power house t tl'SlsmS. ss10n

Unes md Sllb- stations, he&lth end resettl.ement DlCSSI1rGS) should

be f1ttmloed from public resources ~a tbet power tfloul.d be ao1d

at en economic rate rstber then at, coat prlee. on the other

bElla. e pr1'Vate enteJ'pl'ise venture should t1nence ma menage

the pur ell' commercial. operation of mlning baux1te, pl'ooessSng

it to alwn1De md smelting the alum1Da to alwnSn1um. without

e!l¥ eomm1tmen~ attached as to 1;be salo of the metal. lb1s cbmge

414 not seem to poso en1 SJ}eelel pro~ems as fer as the Okllted

state s ~es concerned.62

witb ILCM bow1na out JA March 19S Ghana was enabled to

1D1tlate conwl.tat1ons with the unj,~ed states Government 1ft

regard to 'eltemat1ve wG¥s ella mesus b~ ~b1cb the project could

be mnSe to ~ork. one of the "eys 'Was to get the eng1Deerirlg

es.pect of the ilro~ect up-to-date so that cost; of power eou1.d be

l'oeelcul.atoo. Ghana el.so requested tbe tllltea states Government

to eons1der '01hotbGl' ess1stmce t\-om the nevel.opment l.Oal Fund

(DLF) could be mec1e evGllable for the den end power p1ent.63

on 22 March 1958 l1senhower sen' a ~erm congratule.tor8

messege to Nkrumeh on the t'1r~ MD1versarl of Ghenat s Snc1epen-

dence tald invited h1m toeome over to tbe mt1teCI states Cll at

offlcleJ. v.ls.1t. Nkl'WllM p1'OmpUy lndl-anted bis acoeptance and

the v1s1~ 110,9 so1t for .Tw.y .1.9&5. rho sta~e Department by now

haa become qu11;e enll10us the~ some concre~e steps should 1:»e

- • . I

56

maie resay by the time of tfla'wnah' e vial1;. one of the persons

consulted by Cbs state Department in tb1s connection wee Sir

Roben Jackson 'Who hEd prepere6 the report of the preparatory

Cown1ss1on for the Br1~1sh Sl(i tbe 0014 Coast Governments. rh1s

indicates 1me carefUl. preparatJ.ons tibnl; ~ere Wl4erteken by the

Department. rhe present writer was glven to undel'stellci thet Sir

Robert J eckson strongly l'econmendec3 the assool ~J.on of Keiser

with the Pro3ect. Be do scribed Ke1ser as en &ggress1ve md

ro~ard.lootdng businessmen ~o bed s.ch1~ea s1gn1ftcalt stcoess

1D elum1n1wn Pl'OCitlctloD in Australia. 64 Kaser too epparent11

heel gcod friends Snside the state Department \tio 'Were .11Sng

to pl.eaa hts epeo1el qualifications tor being g1 ven some ke,

~espons1b11.1ty. these elements empbas1zeCi thet 111 ed<iltlon to

his work in ;'\lstrella, Keiser bed el.ao s1gnlftcmt experience

end saccass 111 UXl(ier-devel.ope4 countries md tbet he \,las w911-

ver sea 1n the techniquee of W1nn.1Dg friend s met mf1uenc1ng

Datives 10. the bieber echelons of those Governments conce1'llecl.

In essence these el.emmts took the position that the Katser

would be l~er1cat s "beat bet ... for the Ghme1an venture. 66

A quesUo1l1n6 note Wes sou:04ea bV the onder secl'e~sr8

of state. DoUglas DUl.on. Bis Dlem.oren4wn \100 mede 6v&1l.eble to

the present writer b1 a state DepSl'tment sotace. DUlon

ecktlow).edgea that tbe mu.te4 states coula. it it so deslre4.

n.na resources for the VRP. Silt tbE:! question was. according

64. l11tel'v1.ew, ste~e Department.

65. Sollree~ ,steese 92psWn5.

III

to Dill-oD, whether 11; wo\1l.d be eppropr1e,e to commit SIlcb huge

resoul,tces em a project 10 Africa a~ that pm1ealer point of

t1me.66

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