project ideas - courses.engr.illinois.edu
TRANSCRIPT
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Project Ideas
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Project IdeasLecture 13
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Categories
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Categories
Implementations
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Categories
Implementations
Formalizing security of applied-crypto works
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Categories
Implementations
Formalizing security of applied-crypto works
Conceiving new applications
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Categories
Implementations
Formalizing security of applied-crypto works
Conceiving new applications
Surveys
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Categories
Implementations
Formalizing security of applied-crypto works
Conceiving new applications
Surveys
Theoretical research, cryptanalysis, ...
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Implementations
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ImplementationsSecurity first: don’t worry about efficiency
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ImplementationsSecurity first: don’t worry about efficiency
Build from scratch: no legacy concerns
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ImplementationsSecurity first: don’t worry about efficiency
Build from scratch: no legacy concerns
Base security on simple intractability assumptions
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ImplementationsSecurity first: don’t worry about efficiency
Build from scratch: no legacy concerns
Base security on simple intractability assumptions
Will have a security parameter
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ImplementationsSecurity first: don’t worry about efficiency
Build from scratch: no legacy concerns
Base security on simple intractability assumptions
Will have a security parameter
Modular: plug-and-play, with interfaces conforming to standard abstract notions (OWP, PRG, PRF, ...)
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ImplementationsSecurity first: don’t worry about efficiency
Build from scratch: no legacy concerns
Base security on simple intractability assumptions
Will have a security parameter
Modular: plug-and-play, with interfaces conforming to standard abstract notions (OWP, PRG, PRF, ...)
IVORY-CRYPT
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ImplementationsSecurity first: don’t worry about efficiency
Build from scratch: no legacy concerns
Base security on simple intractability assumptions
Will have a security parameter
Modular: plug-and-play, with interfaces conforming to standard abstract notions (OWP, PRG, PRF, ...)
IVORY-CRYPT
Cryptography from the ivory towers :-)
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Ivory-Crypt
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Ivory-CryptPRF
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Ivory-CryptPRF
Based on arbitrary PRG [Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali]
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Ivory-CryptPRF
Based on arbitrary PRG [Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali]
In turn based on arbitrary OWP [Yao,Goldreich-Levin]
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Ivory-CryptPRF
Based on arbitrary PRG [Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali]
In turn based on arbitrary OWP [Yao,Goldreich-Levin]
Or based on DDH assumption [Naor-Reingold]
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Ivory-CryptPRF
Based on arbitrary PRG [Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali]
In turn based on arbitrary OWP [Yao,Goldreich-Levin]
Or based on DDH assumption [Naor-Reingold]
Use it for shared-key secure communication channels
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Ivory-CryptPRF
Based on arbitrary PRG [Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali]
In turn based on arbitrary OWP [Yao,Goldreich-Levin]
Or based on DDH assumption [Naor-Reingold]
Use it for shared-key secure communication channels
First, implement authenticated communication streams
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Ivory-CryptPRF
Based on arbitrary PRG [Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali]
In turn based on arbitrary OWP [Yao,Goldreich-Levin]
Or based on DDH assumption [Naor-Reingold]
Use it for shared-key secure communication channels
First, implement authenticated communication streams
Implement (CPA secure) encryption for each stream
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Ivory-CryptPRF
Based on arbitrary PRG [Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali]
In turn based on arbitrary OWP [Yao,Goldreich-Levin]
Or based on DDH assumption [Naor-Reingold]
Use it for shared-key secure communication channels
First, implement authenticated communication streams
Implement (CPA secure) encryption for each stream
Sketch formal security guarantees and proofs
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Ivory-Crypt
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Ivory-CryptPublic-Key Secure communication
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Ivory-CryptPublic-Key Secure communication
Most useful setting: Only server has public-key
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Ivory-CryptPublic-Key Secure communication
Most useful setting: Only server has public-key
Design/analyze and build all components
5
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Ivory-CryptPublic-Key Secure communication
Most useful setting: Only server has public-key
Design/analyze and build all components
Digital signatures and authenticated channel (using say OWF, and Discrete Log-based CRHF, or OWP-based UOWHF)
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Ivory-CryptPublic-Key Secure communication
Most useful setting: Only server has public-key
Design/analyze and build all components
Digital signatures and authenticated channel (using say OWF, and Discrete Log-based CRHF, or OWP-based UOWHF)Key-agreement/PKE
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Ivory-CryptPublic-Key Secure communication
Most useful setting: Only server has public-key
Design/analyze and build all components
Digital signatures and authenticated channel (using say OWF, and Discrete Log-based CRHF, or OWP-based UOWHF)Key-agreement/PKESecure communication given a shared key and authenticated channel (may use a shared-key secure communication channel module: could be implemented as a separate project)
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Ivory-CryptPublic-Key Secure communication
Most useful setting: Only server has public-key
Design/analyze and build all components
Digital signatures and authenticated channel (using say OWF, and Discrete Log-based CRHF, or OWP-based UOWHF)Key-agreement/PKESecure communication given a shared key and authenticated channel (may use a shared-key secure communication channel module: could be implemented as a separate project)
SSH: a candidate app for not-so-efficient crypto
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Ivory-Crypt
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Ivory-CryptAn Achilles Heel
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Ivory-CryptAn Achilles Heel
Source of randomness
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Ivory-CryptAn Achilles Heel
Source of randomness
Randomness extractors
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Ivory-CryptAn Achilles Heel
Source of randomness
Randomness extractors
Purify a “weak” random source (or multiple sources)
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Ivory-CryptAn Achilles Heel
Source of randomness
Randomness extractors
Purify a “weak” random source (or multiple sources)
May need a small amount of “seed randomness” as catalyst
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Ivory-CryptAn Achilles Heel
Source of randomness
Randomness extractors
Purify a “weak” random source (or multiple sources)
May need a small amount of “seed randomness” as catalyst
Implement different ones from the literature and compare performance for reasonable parameters
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Ivory-CryptAn Achilles Heel
Source of randomness
Randomness extractors
Purify a “weak” random source (or multiple sources)
May need a small amount of “seed randomness” as catalyst
Implement different ones from the literature and compare performance for reasonable parameters
(Another Achilles Heel: Side-channels. Handled by “Leakage-resilient cryptography”)
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Ivory-Crypt
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Ivory-CryptSecure Multi-Party Computation (SMC, or MPC)
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Ivory-CryptSecure Multi-Party Computation (SMC, or MPC)
(Will see next week, and later)
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Ivory-CryptSecure Multi-Party Computation (SMC, or MPC)
(Will see next week, and later)
Honest-but-curious setting: a few implementations already out there (as also, an “in-house” implementation)
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Ivory-CryptSecure Multi-Party Computation (SMC, or MPC)
(Will see next week, and later)
Honest-but-curious setting: a few implementations already out there (as also, an “in-house” implementation)
Add to them/Enhance them
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Ivory-CryptSecure Multi-Party Computation (SMC, or MPC)
(Will see next week, and later)
Honest-but-curious setting: a few implementations already out there (as also, an “in-house” implementation)
Add to them/Enhance them
Honest-majority setting: No “crypto” -- i.e., information theoretic security (except secure communication channels)
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Ivory-CryptSecure Multi-Party Computation (SMC, or MPC)
(Will see next week, and later)
Honest-but-curious setting: a few implementations already out there (as also, an “in-house” implementation)
Add to them/Enhance them
Honest-majority setting: No “crypto” -- i.e., information theoretic security (except secure communication channels)
No honesty setting. (Will take too long to implement?)
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Ivory-CryptSecure Multi-Party Computation (SMC, or MPC)
(Will see next week, and later)
Honest-but-curious setting: a few implementations already out there (as also, an “in-house” implementation)
Add to them/Enhance them
Honest-majority setting: No “crypto” -- i.e., information theoretic security (except secure communication channels)
No honesty setting. (Will take too long to implement?)
Stand-alone, and Composable
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New Applications
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New ApplicationsApplying crypto tools
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New ApplicationsApplying crypto tools
Conceive and design (on paper) new systems which can use tools that we will see in the remainder of the course
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New ApplicationsApplying crypto tools
Conceive and design (on paper) new systems which can use tools that we will see in the remainder of the course
e.g. Homomorphic encryption schemes
8
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New ApplicationsApplying crypto tools
Conceive and design (on paper) new systems which can use tools that we will see in the remainder of the course
e.g. Homomorphic encryption schemes
Non-malleable homomorphic encryption schemes?
8
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New ApplicationsApplying crypto tools
Conceive and design (on paper) new systems which can use tools that we will see in the remainder of the course
e.g. Homomorphic encryption schemes
Non-malleable homomorphic encryption schemes?
e.g. SMC concepts, Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
8
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New ApplicationsApplying crypto tools
Conceive and design (on paper) new systems which can use tools that we will see in the remainder of the course
e.g. Homomorphic encryption schemes
Non-malleable homomorphic encryption schemes?
e.g. SMC concepts, Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
For e.g., “distributed secure storage” using SMC or PIR ideas
8
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New ApplicationsApplying crypto tools
Conceive and design (on paper) new systems which can use tools that we will see in the remainder of the course
e.g. Homomorphic encryption schemes
Non-malleable homomorphic encryption schemes?
e.g. SMC concepts, Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
For e.g., “distributed secure storage” using SMC or PIR ideas
Must give a security analysis (definition and proof)
8