Salas v Jarencio

Facts:

Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requiring the Pres. to consider the feasibility of declaring an area to be a patrimonial property of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants. RA 4118 was passed declaring the area as an alienable/disposable land of the State, to be placed under the Land Tenure Administration(Land Authority). Gov. Yap of Land Authority wrote letter to Mayor of Manila for the proposed subdivision plan of w/c Manila accepted. But due to unknown reasons, Manila decided to go against their “agreement” and prayed that RA 4118 be not implemented and that it is unconstitutional.

Respondent Judge Jarencio declared that RA 4118 is unconstitutional and invalid, thus the petition for review.

Issue:

1.Is RA 4118 valid?

2.Whether the aforementioned land is a private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

Held:

1.VALID! Manila has not shown any evidence that it acquired said land as private or patrimonial property. Further, RA 4118 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the “Land for the Landless” program. The RA was never intended to expropriate the property involved but confirmed its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the Nat’l Gov’t through the Land Authority.

(STATCON PRINCIPLE: PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES)

Presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of the law. To declare a law as unconstitutional, the repugnancy must be clear and unequivocal. To strike down a law, there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.

2. The land is public property.

As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of the land in the possession of municipality, excepting those which it acquired in its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. The legal situation is the same if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use.

When it comes to property of municipality which it did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its own funds (the land was originally given to City by Spain), the legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of the people.

The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. The land was part of the territory of City of Manila granted by sovereign in its creation. Furthermore, City expressly recognised the paramount title of the State over its land when it

requested the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the lot as patrimonial property for selling.

There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. But since the City did not actually use said land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own private or patrimonial property.

Tan Queto v. CA [G.R. No. L-35648. February 27, 1987.]

Facts:

Restituta Tagalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot (Lot 304-B of the Cadastre Survey of the Municipality of Centro, Misamis Occidental) either as a purported donation or by way of purchase on 11 February 1927 for P50.00 as the alleged consideration thereof. The transaction took place during her mother’s lifetime (her father having predeceased the mother) and consummated while Restituta was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena. On 22 January 1935, Juan filed an application of Torrens title over the land for himself and his supposed co-owner Restituta. On 22 November 1938, a decision was promulgated (GLRC 1638, Cadastral Case 12) pronouncing Juan (married to Restituto) as the owner of the land. On 22 September 1949 a contract of lease over the lot was entered into between Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta (with the consent of her husband) for a period of 10 years.

Meanwhile, On 27 December 1960 Restituta sued Tan Queto for unlawful detainer (the lease contract having expired) before the Municipal Court of Ozamis City.

On 22 April 1962, as a consequence of the cadastral case, an OCT was issued in Juan’s name. On 10 October 1962, Tan Queto and Juan entered into a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto became the owner of the disputed lot, and the spouses in turn became the owners of a parcel of land with the house constructed thereon previously owned (that is, before the barter) by Tan Queto. Thereafter, Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a concrete building, without any objection on the part of Restituta.

The Municipal court ruled in favor of the spouses in the unlawful detainer case; but on appeal in the CFI, the entire case was dismissed because of an understanding (barter) entered into by Juan and Tan Queto.

Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages. The CFI and the Court of Appeals found the disputed lot as paraphernal and that Tan Queto was a builder in bad faith. These findings were regarded by the Supreme Court as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive upon the Court. Tan Queto filed for a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court decision dated 16 May 1983.

The Supreme Court set aside its decision promulgated on 16 May 1983, and rendered a new one declaring the questioned lot together with the building thereon, as Tan Queto’s exclusive property; without costs.

1. Findings of the lower courts ordinary conclusive upon the Court; exception, if erroneous

The findings of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals were regarded by the Supreme Court as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive upon the Court. Assuming they are factual findings, still if they are erroneous inferences from certain facts, they cannot bind the Court.

ISSUE:

In having constructed the building on the lot, should TAN QUETO be regarded as a builder in good faith?

HELD:

Tan Queto nursed the belief that the lot was actually RESTITUTA's (making him in bad faith), still RESTITUTA's failure to prohibit him from building despite her knowledge that construction was actually being done, makes her also in bad faith. The net resultant of mutual bad faith would entitle TAN QUETO to the rights of a builder in good faith (Art. 448, Civil Code), ergo, reimbursement should be given him if RESTITUTA decides to appropriate the building for herself (Art. 448, Civil Code).

However, TAN QUETO having bartered his own lot and small house with the questioned lot with JUAN (who has been adverted to by a court decision and by the OCT a conjugal owner) may be said to be the OWNER-POSSESSOR of the lot. Certainly he is not merely a possessor or builder in good faith(this phrase presupposes ownership in another); much less is he a builder in bad faith. He is a builder-possessor jus possidendi because he is the OWNER himself. The Chapter on Possession (jus possesionis, not jus possidendi) in the Civil Code refers to a possessor other than the owner. Further, that the difference between a builder (or possessor) in good faith and one in bad faith is that the former is NOT AWARE of the defect or flaw in his title or mode of acquisition while the latter is AWARE of such defect or flaw (Art. 526, Civil Code). But in either case there is a flaw or defect. In the case of TAN QUETO there is no such flaw or defect because it is he himself (not somebody else) who is the owner of the property.

SARMIENTO v. AGANA

FACTS:

Before Ernesto Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo wed, Rebecca’s mother offered a lot in Paranaque that they could build their house on. In 1967, they finally built their home which cost about PhP8,000-10,000, thinking that someday, the lot would be transferred to them in their name. It turns out, though, that the lot was owned by the Spouses Santos who , in turn, sold the same to Leonila Sarmiento in 1974. A year later, Sarmiento ordered the Valentinos to vacate their lot, then eventually filed and Ejection Suit against them.

The lower court ruled in Sarmiento’s favor and ordered her to pay 20,000 as the value of the house. But the case was then elevated to the CFI of Pasay (w/ Agana as Judge), and pursuant to Art.448 of the CC (March 1979), the Court ordered Sarmiento to exercise the option in 60 days to pay Ernesto 40,000 as the value of the house or to let them purchase the land for 25,000. Sarmiento was not able to exercise this option, and the CFI allowed Ernesto to deposit the 25,000 purchase price with the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land owner is compelled to exercise either option: to buy the building or to sell the land?

HELD:

Ernesto and his wife (BPS) were clearly in good faith as they believed that Rebecca’s mother has the capacity to eventually transfer the title of the land to them. In line with this, Sarmiento (LO) was required to exercise only 2 options: To purchase the house or to sell the land to them, in this case, based on the value decided by the courts. Since Sarmiento failed to exercise the option within the allotted period, and based on Art. 448, the LO is compelled by law to exercise either option. Not choosing either is a violation of the law.

ALEJANDRO QUEMUEL and RUPERTA SOLIS v.ANGEL S. OLAES and JULIANA PRUDENTEG.R. No. L-11084 April 29, 1961Nature

Facts

The Olaes spouses sued in the CFI of Cavite the Quemel spouses for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. The Quemel spouses admitted plaintiffs’ ownership but contended that their occupation was gratuitous. In 1954, the trial court ordered the Quemel spouses to return the possession of the land to the Olaes spouses and to pay the latter Php20.00 a month from January 1954, until they shall have vacated the premises. The Quemel, to forestall execution of the judgment, filed a complaint against the Olaes spouses seeking to reduce the monthly rental and to compel theOlaes spouses to sell to them the portion of the lot. But the trial court granted the motion to dismiss filed by Olaes spouses, to which the Quemel spouses appealed from, and as certified by the appellate court the appeal went to the Supreme Court.

Issue

Can the Quemel spouses invoke as their basis of cause of action Article 448 inconnection with Article 546 of the Civil Code?

Held

No. The decision appealed from is affirmed.

Ratio

A cursory reading of these provisions, however, will show that they are not applicable to plaintiffs' case. Under Article 448, the 1) right to appropriate the works or improvements or 2) to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land belongs to the owner of the land.

The only right given to the builder in good faith is the right to reimbursement for the improvements; the builder, cannot compel the owner of the land to sell such land to the former. This is assuming that the plaintiffs are builders in good faith.

But the plaintiffs are not builders in good faith. From the pleadings and the documentary evidence submitted, it is indisputable that the land in question originally belonged to the government as part of the Friar Lands Estate and the title thereto was in the name of the government, until it was

purchased by Agapita Solis who applied, thru the Bureau of Lands, to purchase the land by instalments. The corresponding Sale Certificate No. 531,

effective July 1, 1909 was executed. In defendants' complaint before the CFI, they alleged that they are the owners of lot and that plaintiffs, have been occupying south eastern half portion thereof, without any right thereto, except the tolerance of defendants, which were admitted expressly and under oath, in the answer of plaintiffs herein. It would, therefore, appear that plaintiffs herein were not unaware of the flaw in their title, if any, and

that their true relation with the herein defendants was that of tenant and landlord , and that their rights are governed by Article 1573 in relation to article487 of the old Civil Code.*It can clearly be inferred that plaintiffs cannot compel the defendants to pay for the improvements the former made on the property or to sell the latter's land. Plaintiffs' only right, is to remove improvements, if it is possible to do so, without damage to the land.

DEL CAMPO V. ABESIA

FACTS:

The case involves two friendly parties who are co-owners of a corner lot at Flores and Cavan Streets in Cebu City. Plaintiff owns 2/3 of the lot and Defendant owns 1/3 of the same. The total size of the lot is 45 square meters (which is about the size of a typical Starbux café)

Later on, the two parties decided to divide the co-owned property into two lots. 30 square meters went to the plaintiffs and 15 square meters went to the defendants. From the sketch plan, both parties discovered that the house of the defendants occupied a portion of the plaintiff’s adjacent lot, eating 5 sqm of it. The parties then requested the trial court to adjudicate who should take possession of the encroached 5 sqm.

The trial court ruled that Art 448 does not apply. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. Since art 448 does not apply, the Plaintiff cannot be obliged to pay for the portion of defendant’s house that entered into the 30 sqm lot, AND Defendant cannot be obliged to pay for the price of the 5 sqm their house occupied. Why? The RTC believed the rules of co-ownership should govern, and not that of accession.

RTC then assigned the full 30sqm to Plaintiff and ordered Defendants to demolish the 5sqm part of their house encroaching the 30sqm lot of the Plaintiffs. Defendants where aghast at having to axe the family home, hence they appealed.

CA affirmed the decision. So we have the SC coming to the rescue.

ISSUE:

w/n the rules of accession applies (and not coownership) on property that used to be co-owned, but was subdivided.

HELD:

The rule of accession applies because co-ownership was terminated upon the partitioning of the lot. Art 448 therefore governs. The house of Defendant overlapped that of Plaintiff, but this was built on good faith. Hence, the plaintiffs have the right to choose one of two options

> Appropriate the 5sqm portion of the house of Defendants after indemnifying the Defendants; or> Obliging the Defendants to pay a portion of the land on which their home rested. ( or they can rent it)