protection at the doe nuclear weapons complex 3 m

Cleanup WorkerProtection at

the DOE NuclearWeapons Complex 3

M ore than 3 years have passed since the Department ofEnergy began a concerted, publicly declared cam-paign to chart a “new course” toward full account-ability in the areas of environment, safety, and

health.1 Yet evidence of DOE leadership and substantive accom-plishments in furthering worker health and safety remain sparse.The “new culture” pursued by the Secretary of Energy, a culturethat honors protection of the environment, health, and safety asfundamental organizational values, has not been translated intoofficial policies and programs-or even been wholly accepted—by DOE and its contractors.

The new culture has not taken hold largely because of threeflaws in DOE’s approach to worker protection:

1.

2.

3.

Not all DOE employees, contractor managers, and work-ers are convinced that worker health and safety truly takesprecedence over other goals.Within DOE, organizational responsibility for occupation-al health and safety is dispersed among different program The “new culture”offices. This has caused staff with occupational safety andhealth (OSH) experience to be thinly spread throughout at DOE hasDOE line organizations. Within the DOE Office of Envi-ronmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM), not yet beenthere are insufficient numbers of OSH professionals to de-velop program-specific policies or ensure implementation translated intoand enforcement of such policies by EM contractors.Internal oversight of DOE and contractors’ implementa- official policiestion and enforcement of OSH programs is weak. The DOEOffice of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) does not and programshave enough qualified field staff to monitor contractor op-erations. Furthermore, EH has no direct authority to en-

49

50 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

force OSH orders or regulations. EH in-fluence on DOE line organizations restschiefly on the capacity to embarrass linemanagers into complying with OSH ordersand regulations. There are no meaningfulrewards or penalties for occupationalhealth and safety performance levied onDOE or its contractors.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of1970 established that those Federal agencies thatexercise statutory authority to prescribe or en-force occupational safety and health standards,or regulations affecting those conditions, werenot subject to the authority of the OccupationalSafety and Health Administration (OSHA) underSection 4(b) 1 of the Act.2 DOE is the only Feder-al agency that claims such an exemption. DOEand its contractors derive authority to determinetheir own occupational safety and health stan-dards from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.3

There is thus no external oversight or regulationof DOE’s or its contractors’ performance in OSHmatters.

When OSHA released its comprehensive De-cember 1990 report on occupational safety andhealth programs at DOE facilities, it recom-mended that DOE institute a number of major or-ganizational changes to ensure adequate workersafety and health protection.4 DOE reactedpromptly to the OSHA review by reasserting linemanagement responsibility for contractor safetyand health programs5 and by directing the rele-vant DOE program offices to present the Secre-tary with ways of responding to the OSHA find-ings. 6-8

Several important reforms resulted from theseefforts, including the establishment of an Officeof Occupational Safety within EH9 and the addi-tion of many health and safety professionals,among them former OSHA employees, to DOEheadquarters staff. In addition, both EH and EMhave established advisory boards consisting ofoutside experts to augment in-house expertiseand provide an independent perspective on DOE

activities. 10 DOE also ordered its program of-

fices to include specific crosscuts in the fiscalyear 1993 budget to identify and summarize alloccupational health and safety activities in a sin-gle document “to make visible and facilitate ac-tion on OSH activities.” Future budget submis-sions will be subjected to comprehensive OSHreporting and will be used to support an OSHFive-Year Plan that is under development.l 1

In August 1992, DOE and OSHA signed aMemorandum of Understanding that providesDOE with access to OSHA’s technical expertiseand formalizes arrangements for joint trainingprograms. The agreement acknowledges thatDOE retains authority to develop, implement,and enforce OSH policies for its contractor em-ployees, whereas OSHA has the right to conductunannounced inspections at DOE facilities toprotect Federal (i.e., DOE) employees.12-14

These are positive steps, but it is unclear ifsuch efforts can overcome fundamental organiza-tional obstacles that underlie DOE’s approach toworker protection. DOE’s problematic organiza-tional OSH framework, coupled with the enor-mous scope and complex nature of the pollutionat Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) will likelyreflect and magnify worker protection problemsalready encountered at non-Federal Superfundsites. Success in addressing cleanup workerhealth and safety at the NWC will depend to alarge extent on achieving substantial changes inthe organizational format of DOE’s approach toworker protection. The next section discusses or-ganizational problems pertinent to OSH mattersat DOE. Subsequent sections of the chapter ad-dress particular OSH issues encountered at non-Federal hazardous waste sites that are likely to betroublesome during cleanup of the NWC.

MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT TOOCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ANDHEALTH PRIORITIES

Skepticism about the vigor and persistence ofDOE’s commitment to occupational safety and

Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 51

health continues to haunt the Department. In thecourse of OSHA’s 1990 audit of DOE workerhealth and safety programs—carried out atDOE’s request—OSHA inspectors noted that“pressures to get the job done often overrulesafety and health concerns.”15 OSHA found thatresource allocation decisions and planning byDOE managers and contractors did not indicateworker health or safety to be of paramount con-cern. OSHA reported that some top managers inDOE’s contractor organizations failed to demon-strate a strong commitment to worker health andsafety:

One top manager stated that occupationalsafety and health was not a fundamental organi-zational value . , . [and] saw the emphasis onsafety and health as a hindrance to the facility’smission. 16

Assertions that DOE management is aggres-sively pursuing staunch worker protection poli-cies are weakened by failure to correct inade-quate OSH practices documented by TigerTeams; 17 18 by long delays in official adoption of

proposed OSH orders;19-21 by the failure of DOE

managers to impose penalties on contractors whodo not enforce sound worker protectionpolicies; 22 23 and by reports that DOE facility op-erations were resumed or allowed to continue be-fore appropriate safety training and procedureshad been completed. 24-27

Workers, too, appear skeptical of the depthand staying power of DOE’s commitment to thenew culture. In November 1991 the Secretary’sAdvisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safetyfound that the new philosophy of valuing healthand safety over weapons production is “not un-derstood, accepted or believed” by workers atRocky Flats,28 where public controversy oversafety has been intense. The committee (referredto as the Ahearne committee after its Chair, JohnAhearne) reported that DOE’s response to high-profile safety issues has been characterized by

[an] . . . insistence on rapid response without ad-equate understanding [that] has produced pre-mature action plans and decisions, with resul-tant frequent schedule revisions, organizationalchanges, and unclear explanations of the needand bases for the actions and decisions. Work-ers may be left with no alternative but to consid-er production in fact as the continuing, domi-nant priority, and safety as simply a passingfancy of the current Secretary .29

OSHA noted that union representatives werenot routinely included in health and safety com-mittees, and that employees were not routinelyasked to participate in safety and health inspec-

Although attion activities at weapons sites.30

most weapons sites, joint labor-managementcommittees have been formed to facilitate com-munication about health and safety issues andother matters,31 32 workers have not been active-ly enlisted in efforts to enhance occupationalsafety and health at DOE facilities. 33

OSHA also noted that investigations of work-ers’ complaints of health and safety problemshad in some instances resulted in DOE field of-fices referring the problem back to the employeragainst whom the complaint was raised. In somecases, OSHA found that allegations of reprisalsagainst employees who had initiated health andsafety complaints had not been investigatedproperly by DOE.34

Reports of workers being harassed for raisinghealth and safety concerns continue to surface.For example, the DOE Inspector General report-ed in September 1991 that a DOE contractor anda former contractor at Hanford had acquiredwiretapping and eavesdropping equipment de-signed for covert surveillance, in violation ofDOE orders and Federal acquisition require-ments. Security forces at the Idaho National En-gineering Laboratory and at Savannah Riverwere discovered to have similar equipment. 35

The Inspector General reviewed 14 instances ofcovert video surveillance conducted by securityforces at Hanford, but found no evidence to sub-


stantiate allegations by Hanford workers thatthey had been subjected to illegal surveillanceafter complaining about health and safety prob-lems. 36

In February 1992 the Department of Laborfound that a worker at the Oak Ridge NationalLaboratory had been isolated, assigned to menialjobs, and forced to work in hazardous areas afterraising concerns about safety issues.37 38 TheDOE contractor involved is appealing this ruling.

In April 1992, DOE published its proposedWhistleblower Rule in the Federal Register.39

The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy has taken thelead in developing complaint procedures forDOE contractor employees, but these procedureshave not been finalized.40 EH reviews of employ-ee concerns programs indicate that some DOEfield offices have neglected to establish adequateemployee concerns programs in spite of long-standing directives to do so.41

LINE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITYFOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETYAND HEALTH

Occupational health and safety programswithin DOE and its contractor corps are based ontwo organizational “pillars”: line responsibilityfor safety and health, and independent over-sight.

42 (See figure 3-1,) A directive from the

Secretary of Energy explicitly charged DOE lineorganizations with responsibility for occupation-al health and safety matters within theirpurview. 43 Each program office (e.g., Environ-

mental Restoration and Waste Management, De-fense Programs, Nuclear Energy) is expected todevelop health and safety policy relevant to itsmission, to issue guidance in worker safety andhealth matters, and to assess contractors’ OSHperformance.

Responsibility for worker safety and healthmay be an appropriately decentralized functionin a large organization. However, EM, the DOEprogram office examined by the Office of Tech-nology Assessment, lacks adequate numbers of

qualified staff to develop occupational health andsafety programs suited to EM line operations andhas little capacity to assess contractors’ perfor-mance in health and safety matters. As of late1992, the DOE Office of Environment, Safety,and Health, had not initiated serious consulta-tions with EM or other line organizations to de-termine the top priorities of the line programs orto assist managers in formulating effective OSHpolicies.

EM headquarters staff handling worker safetyand health matters are overwhelmed with theconstant need to react to the latest crisis, and areunable to devote the time and resources needed todevelop coherent cleanup worker protection poli-cies. 44 EM's office of Oversight and Self-As-

sessment is responsible for producing health andsafety policy, implementation guidance, andtechnical advice on EM related OSH matters, andfor assessing the adequacy of EM and its contrac-tors’ occupational safety and health perform-ance.45 EM has a single staff person with training

in occupational health and safety, and two em-ployees with nuclear safety expertise.46 47 TheEM program office responsible for environment-al remediation has no staff trained in occupation-al safety or health, and is planning to rely entire-ly on contractors to meet its OSH needs. Oneconsequence of such staffing patterns is that byAugust 1992, EM headquarters staff had not re-viewed a single cleanup site health and safetyplan (HASP).48

When the DOE Office of Environmental Res-toration and Waste Management was establishedin 1989, its leaders confronted pressing responsi-bilities. Undertaking cleanup of the WeaponsComplex required EM to create and staff a newprogram office; to initiate more productive rela-tionships between DOE and its contractors andbetween DOE and a skeptical, alarmed public; todemonstrate progress and justify proposed clean-up budgets to Congress; to comply with environ-mental regulations, and to meet schedule dead-lines in Interagency Agreements. Amidst thesediverse and urgent efforts, EM neglected the de-

-------------------

EOffice of Scientific

and Engineering Recruitment,Training and Development r

Office of IntelligenceF

I

Office of Policy,Planning and Analysis

I

Figure 3-l-The Department of

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .r===Deputy SecretaryUnder Secretary

1

4 Office of Special Projects

-1 I

Office of Public Affairs

I 1A Office of Nuclear Safety

Assistant Secretary,Congressional and General Counsel

InspectorIntergovernmental General

I 1 I

Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary,Assistant Secretary,

Nuclear Energy Fossil EnergyConservation and

Renewable Energy

Adminis::n.JEEconomic Regulatory

——

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, 1992.

I

Assistant Secretary,Ertvironmental

Restoration and WasteManagement

,

Energy

J Office of Security Affairs I

OffIce of Scheduling .and Logistics

OffIce of MinorityEconomic Impact —

1 1

Office of the Secretary ofEnergy Advisory Board

-

d Board ofContract Appeals

IOffice of Procurement I I -.. I I Office of IAssistance, and Officc

Program Ma! of Financial Administration andnagement Human Resource

I Mana~ement II and Controller Management

~— —

Office of CivilianRadioactive Waste

Management

-——-—_-L–

office ofEnergy Research

-. 1

office ofNew Production

Reactors


velopment of rigorous or high-profile policies re-lated to cleanup worker safety and health.

It maybe that EM will evolve a more purpose-ful and aggressive approach to occupational safe-~ and health as the organization becomes estab-lished, as cleanup gets underway, and as thecleanup workforce increases in size. Currently,however, there is little evidence of leadership inOSH matters at EM headquarters, and few indi-cations that decision makers have recognized theneed to urgently address cleanup worker protec-tion issues.

The head of DOE’s Environmental Restora-tion and Waste Management program explicitlyreaffirmed the Secretary of Energy’s commitm-ent to protecting worker health and safety asthe “highest programmatic priority” in a July1991 memo to all EM and contractor per-sonnel. 49 The memo goes on to list actions andprograms needed to accomplish EM’s OSHgoals:

●

●

●

●

establishment of firm OSH priorities and re-sponsibilities,development and implementation of quan-titlable OSH performance standards to en-sure programmatic accountability,

planning and budgeting for necessary OSHresources to ensure availability, andformulation and application of improvedchannels of communication.50

Little progress has been made in implement-ing these programs. Some of EM’s OSH goalscould be accomplished by adopting the proposedDOE Order 5483, XX, “Occupational Safety andHealth Program for DOE Employees;’ whichwas designed by EH and has been under reviewby DOE program offices for months. Adoption ofthis order would be a constructive response to therecommendation repeated over the years by mul-tiple expert advisory bodies—including the Na-tional Academy of Sciences,51 OSHA,52 the Ad-visory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety,53

and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

(DNFSB)54—that DOE develop clear health andsafety policies at the national level and establishexplicit, measurable goals that its operations of-fices and contractors should achieve to imple-ment these policies.

In the absence of a comprehensive OSH orderor policy directed at cleanup work, DOE contrac-tors must rely on existing DOE orders. Numerousexpert reviewers55-57 have Cemented that many

DOE OSH orders lack specificity and adequateimplementation guidance. This lack of precisionallows DOE contractors great leeway in deter-mining what constitutes satisfactory compliancewith Occupational Health and Safety orders.Also, DOE’s existing OSH orders and policies donot address some worker protection issues specif-ic to the DOE cleanup, such as the content ofhealth and safety training programs or medicalsurveillance for hazardous waste workers.

Recent DOE policy changes designed to re-duce risks to off-site populations, but developedin the absence of comprehensive occupationalhealth and safety policies or a clear focus onworker protection needs, may have heightenedcleanup worker health and safety threats. For ex-ample, the Final Safety Analysis for Rocky Flatsconcentrated principally on off-site radiologicalrisks from plant operations. The Secretary’s Ad-visory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety ex-pressed concern that changes in plant operationsmade on the basis of this safety analysis mightactually increase risks to workers.58 In addition,the committee worried that concerns about envi-ronmental threats might prompt managers to re-place carbon tetrachloride, a liver toxin used inlarge quantities at Rocky Flats, with less toxic—but more flammable-solvents. Because fire haz-ards are among the most serious threats at theplant, a narrow analysis that focuses on healthhazards but ignores potential worker safety riskscould be disastrous.59

The Ahearne committee also expressed con-cern that ongoing activity may jeopardize work-ers at the Hanford tank farms, where potentially


flammable high-level radioactive waste is stored.The committee noted that DOE and its contractormanagers “have shown little appreciation of thesafety of workers working on top of Tank 101-SY,’ which is suspected to have an appreciablechance of exploding. The committee went on:

At Hanford, as elsewhere in the DOE, thereis a tendency to concentrate on risk to the gener-al public and give much less attention to work-ers. At such an isolated site as Hanford, this canmake conditions seem much better than theyreally are.60

There is a pressing need to establish the prima-cy of orders, standards, and regulations applica-ble to cleanup worker protection at DOE facili-ties. Throughout DOE and its contractor corps,compliance with environmental laws is seen ashaving a higher priority than compliance with oc-cupational health and safety regulations. The for-mer are statutory requirements, and violation isunderstood by DOE and its contractors to carry athreat of great embarrassment and possible friesagainst DOE. Some fear that criminal sanctionsmight be levied against the employees responsi-ble.

Occupational health and safety regulations, onthe other hand, have the status “merely” of DOEorders, which many mangers consider “policy”rather than explicit, legally enforceable com-mands. Although the Secretary of Energy specif-ically instructed managers to comply with all ap-plicable OSHA standards and regulations,61

DOE and its contractors appear to regard this di-rective as 1ess compelling or of lower prioritythan compliance with environmental statutes.This attitude is understandable, if regrettable,given the absence of effective mechanisms forenforcing OSH orders at DOE facilities and thelack of significant or visible penalties imposedfor failure to implement sound worker protectionpolicies.

A litany of problems at the Hanford tank farmssuggests that DOE’s ability to monitor contractorOSH practices or induce contractors to follow ad-

equate worker health and safety practices is ex-tremely limited.62-65 DOE regards Hanford’s sin-gle-shell tanks as its top safety concern becauseof the potential for tank contents to undergo achemical explosion and spew radionuclidesacross the surrounding countryside. Yet at least16 different “events” resulting in worker expo-sure to tank vapors occurred between 1987 and1992, before a DOE investigation revealed the se-riousness of the problem and the lack of adequatemanagement response,66

Several of these exposures caused workers tobe hospitalized; at least one worker suffered per-manent loss of lung function. In January 1992 aninvestigation by the DOE Richland Field Officeconcluded that the causes of the recurring expo-sures were inadequate “implementation of man-agement systems,” lack of a properly developedindustrial hygiene program, and “failure to prop-erly characterize the work environment and de-velop appropriate engineering controls.”67 It isnotable that the Richland Field Office Safety Pro-gram had no staff whatsoever from August 1991until April 1992.68 From 1980 through August1991 the Richland Field Office had only one-halfof one full-time-equivalent (FTE) staff person forindustrial hygiene functions .69

A former Assistant Secretary of Labor for Oc-cupational Safety and Health, who reviewedDOE’s internal report investigating the tank farmexposures70 at OTA’s request, commented:

The failure of those in responsible manage-ment charge to assign resources to this problemin the presence of repeated violations would,without any doubt, have been viewed by OSHAas willful violations of the [Occupational Safetyand Health] Act and subject to possible criminalpenalties. This conclusion would probably havebeen reached by the end of 1987 when three[worker exposure] episodes had occurred, butcertainly by 1989 when the episodes reoccurred.The absence of high priority for solving thisproblem in 1990, with attendant lack of profes-sional staff and resources could well put some-one on trial for criminal behavior [had the oc-


currences been subject to OSHA enforcementand penalties]. Also, in 1989 with the reoccur-rence of the episode, [an OSHA finding of] “im-minent danger” and a series of restrictive proce-dures akin to closure of a manufacturing facilityprobably would have been invoked.’l

A DOE internal memo on the subject of thetank farm vapor exposures noted that if Hanfordwere subject to OSHA citations and penalties,fines up to $70,000 per day might be expected.72

Nonetheless, despite these and other failures inoccupational health and safety performance, theDOE contractor at Hanford was granted an awardfee of almost $5 million in 1991.73

OVERSIGHT OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETYAND HEALTH PRACTICES

DOE’s Office of Environment, Safety, andHealth makes up the second pillar of the Depart-ment’s approach to worker health and safety pro-tection: independent oversight. EH is responsiblefor providing DOE line management programswith internal review of DOE and contractor OSHprograms. EH also provides line organizationswith technical advice, develops and maintainsDOE orders, and conducts Technical Safety Ap-praisals and Tiger Team Assessments.74

EH has 11 site representatives or “residents”stationed at 5 weapons facilities. These 11 indi-viduals are responsible for monitoring contractorOSH performance throughout the NWC,75 cover-ing a total work force of more than 100,000.76

EH site representatives have been directed toshift their evaluation of DOE facilities from com-pliance-oriented inspections to “programmatic assessment” of DOE line management OSH per-formance and to identify root causes of deficien-cies.77 The results of these assessments are sentdirectly to DOE Program Secretarial Officials(PSOs) such as the Assistant Secretary for EM.78

Formerly, EM field resident reports were re-viewed at the DOE field office level. The changein reporting structure was made to increase thevisibility of OSH performance79 and to respond

to OSHA’s complaint that DOE field offices wereembroiled in a “major conflict of interest” be-cause they were responsible both for ensuringcontractor compliance with DOE health and safe-ty policies and for reporting back to programoffices at DOE headquarters on their own effec-tiveness as overseers and enforcers of such com-pliance. 80

The EH site representative reports indicatethat significant progress must be made if DOEline managers are to exercise meaningful over-sight of contractor OSH activities. For example,EH site residents found that the Oak Ridge FieldOffice had not assessed the adequacy of the siteconstruction contractor’s work control programand could not guarantee that “adequate work con-trols will be established and implemented to en-sure worker safety during construction activi-ties.” 81 This report also documented that theconstruction management contractor had not en-sured that the personnel who assessed the site forthe presence of possible worker safety hazardswere properly trained to perform this task.82 Inaddition to these findings of inadequate DOEoversight of OSH matters, the EH representativefound that “work controls specifying safety re-quirements are not effectively and consistentlyimplemented and followed by construction per-sonnel and their management at work sites.”83

DOE Chain of Command andAccountability for OccupationalSafety and Health

Other monthly reports of EH site representa-tives provide additional evidence that DOE linemanagement is not effectively overseeing con-tractor occupational health and safety per-formance. One impediment to effective DOEoversight of contractors is the complex and over-lapping jurisdictions of its different line organi-zations at weapons facilities.

According to an EH report on Idaho NationalEngineering Laboratory (INEL) for example,DOE managers failed to independently assess or

_—

Chapter 3-Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 57

verify contractors’ freeze protection initiatives.(Such winterization precautions are essential toensure functioning fire protection systems atINEL.) 84 This failure was largely due to confu-sion about the jurisdictional overlaps betweendifferent line management organizations at DOE.A memo from the DOE Office of Defense Pro-grams (DP) detailing department policy on freezeprotection was interpreted by the prime contrac-tor as being applicable to DP facilities only. Con-sequently, the contractors did not address INELoperations controlled by EM in its response tothe Idaho Field Office questionnaire. DOE fieldoffice staff failed to realize that the contractorhad not considered all aspects of INEL opera-tions. 85

Another instance of inadequate DOE oversightof contractor activities was documented by EHrepresentatives at Hanford, who found that con-struction contractor safety programs were quitegood, but that the Richland Field Office exercisedonly “weak” oversight over contractor construc-tion safety programs and had failed to assign any-one the responsibility of identifying emergingregulations, requirements, or safety trainingneeds in construction. The representatives deter-mined that “contractor [IOSH] performance is dueto the contractor’s efforts rather than directionfrom the line organization.”86 The report notedthat DOE field office staff “did not programmati-cally review any of the contractor’s safety pro-grams and that the contractor could revise exist-ing safety programs without [the field office’s]knowledge. Therefore there is no assurance thatthe apparently acceptable performance of a con-tractor will remain acceptable.”87

The lack of strong, centralized control overDOE contractor organizations will hinder effortsto ensure consistent and comprehensive imple-mentation of OSHA’s Hazardous Waste Oper-ation and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER)standard and other health and safety standardsduring the NWC cleanup. DOE headquarters iscurrently unable to determine the roster of work-

88 Ascertainingers at a given weapons facility.

that all contractor and subcontractor employeeshave undergone legally mandated health andsafety training, are enrolled in required medicalsurveillance programs, and so forth, will be diffi-cult under these circumstances. Currently, mostweapons facilities lack administrative mecha-nisms to ensure that workers transferring to newjobs at a facility undergo initial fitness examsprior to beginning new duties or are subsequentlyenrolled in appropriate medical surveillance pro-grams. Overseeing the quality and comprehen-siveness of cleanup worker health and safety pro-grams administered by hundreds of DOEsubcontractors engaged in the cleanup will be amonumental task.

DOE Tiger Teams and OSHA noted thathealth and safety personnel at DOE facilities hada poor grasp of OSHA inspection and hazard as-sessment methods.89 Recent guidance from EHheadquarters to its site representatives on howDOE and contractor OSH performance should beassessed is an important step forward, but with-out a significant infusion of staff and resources,such guidance cannot overcome current staffinglimitations within DOE.

OSHA and DOE have negotiated a Memo-randum of Understanding (MOU) that establish-es a formalized working relationship and allows“where practical” for “mutually beneficial” OSHtraining, technical assistance and information ex-

90 Although thechange, and program evaluations.MOU does not specifically mention cleanupworker issues, DOE EH has already arranged ac-cess to computerized files of OSHA’s “HAZ-WOPER Interpretative Quips” and has plans toaccess much of OSHA’s technical information aswell.91

The interactions made possible by the MOUmight be very helpful to DOE staff, who are try-ing in effect to reproduce OSHA policies andprograms. The content of the MOU is vague,however; it contains no promises of specific in-teractions and proposes collaboration only “tothe extent priorities and resources permit.”Specific arrangements for reimbursing OSHA


will be worked out in future interagency agree-ments.92

EH has initiated major revisions of two DOEorders that are fundamental to worker protectionat the Weapons Complex. The OccupationalSafety and Health Program for DOE ContractorEmployees (DOE Order 5483. XX)93 is a com-prehensive reformulation of DOE OSH ordersthat would codify the hierarchy of DOE-devel-oped OSH standards, DOE-adopted OSHA stan-dards, DOE-adopted consensus standards, etc.,that managers should follow in implementingworker protection programs at DOE facilities. Inaddition, the proposed Order 5483.XX establish-es DOE OSH program requirements; sets forthrules for procedures, schedules, and employeeparticipation in DOE and contractor OSH self-assessments; prescribes reporting procedures forwork-related illnesses and injuries; and describesa risk assessment methodology for determiningthe priority of abatement procedures .94

This proposed DOE order would also establisha formal process for hazard abatement and wouldrequire approval of any significant delays in cor-recting identified hazards.95 OSHA found that atone facility, more than 5,000 hazards had goneuncorrected for over a year because managers didnot recognize these items as a priority. At anotherfacility, OSHA identified inadequate ventilationand electrical conditions that had been uncorrect-ed for 6 years.

96 A 1992 EH review of occupa-

tional safety and health programs at the Ports-mouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant revealed morethan 500 violations of DOE OSH orders, most ofwhich were classified as “serious.” Many of theseviolations had been previously identified, but hadnot been corrected.97 Situations such as the fail-ure to abate—or even fully investigate—thevapor exposure hazards at the Hanford tankfarms would hopefully become less likely withthe adoption and implementation of the proposedorder.

Another OSH order under development by EHis the Construction Safety Program,98 whichwould replace the current construction safety and

health program (DOE Order 5480.9) adopted in1980. The new order would establish program re-quirements for DOE line management and con-tractors involved in all construction activities, in-cluding environmental restoration, and mightprovide some of the ingredients needed to createsound health and safety plans for cleanup work.

EH has tried to instill sound occupationalhealth and safety principles into line manage-ment programs through the provision of technicalsupport. EH has begun an effort to assist contrac-tors with the development of model worker pro-tection projects. Managers will have the option ofusing EH seed funds to pilot worker health andsafety initiatives that will be published and re-viewed in a DOE on-line clearinghouse.99 Thisproject was a response to OSHA’s complaint thatthe historically insular nature of DOE operationshad led it to repeatedly reinvent the wheel andhad hindered consistency in OSH practices. lOO

EH has also undertaken a significant upgradingof DOE’s documentation of work-related injuriesand illnesses in an effort to remedy serious inac-curacies noted by OSHA in current record-keep-ing procedures. 101

The impact of recommendations and policyproposals from EH is tempered by the relativelyweak authority it exerts over DOE line manage-ment. EH acts in an “advisory capacity” to DOEprogram offices; its policy products are subject tocomment and review by these program offices.(The proposed “Occupational Health and SafetyOrder, 5480.XX’ garnered 1,300 comments fromwithin DOE.102) EH maintains that after suchintra-agency review, it makes independent deter-minations on final policies to be submitted to theSecretary for approval. The Assistant Secretaryfor EH has the option of bringing EH proposalsto the Secretary for approval that do not have theconcurrence of other DOE program offices.103

104

In practice, the process of gaining official ap-proval of EH recommendations is one of compro-mise and accommodation.

105 EH has tried, with

some success, to “leverage” its sparse resources


and authority by conducting “special assess-ments” of high-profile problem areas or opera-tions. These reviews are used essentially to em-barrass managers into more vigorous OSHefforts.

DOE’s limited capacity to enforce workerhealth and safety policies and orders among con-tractors has been documented by OSHA and byEH site residents reports,106-109 This failure wasgrimly illustrated by the death of a Hanford con-tractor employee, who was killed in April 1992after falling through the roof of an abandoned re-actor building known to be in danger of collapse.The fatality demonstrated that written safety pro-cedures are not always followed, even whenworkers and supervisors are aware of their exis-tence. 110

DOE and contractor management participa-tion in many EH initiatives is voluntary; the prin-cipal EH approach to oversight of line manage-ment OSH activities remains reactive responsesto problems that might have been avoided hadstrong programs been implemented. CriticalOSH orders proposed by EH have yet to be ap-proved.

Nonetheless, progress in occupational healthand safety at DOE should be measured againstthe pervasive and serious deficiencies in workerprotection that characterized operations before1989, with consideration for the difficulties of se-curing management and worker commitment tonew DOE missions and priorities. In this light,EH efforts over the past year represent positivesteps toward a programmatic approach to a “newculture” honoring environment, safety, and healthat DOE.

The organizationally segmented structure ofoccupational safety and health activities at DOEdemands extensive staff and resources that arenot now in place. Further progress in institution-alizing rigorous worker protection throughout theWeapons Complex requires a significant increasein trained occupational health and safety profes-sionals in DOE line organizations and in EH. Inaddition, serious and sustained consultation be-

tween EH and EM will be required to developand implement OSH programs most urgentlyneeded for cleanup. EH initiatives and policies—no matter how valid---are meaningless unlessline management and field staff have the will andresources to implement them.

Finally, oversight and enforcement of contrac-tor occupational health and safety activities byboth line management and EH must be augment-ed. DOE must demonstrate its commitment toworker health and safety by making the formula-tion and implementation of clear and coordinatedOSH policies an urgent priority. Otherwise, aswill be discussed in the next section of this back-ground paper, management attention will contin-ue to focus on other goals, such as schedules forachieving environmental compliance and con-tract costs, at the expense of worker protection is-sues. The risks of such a course include the po-tential endangerment of thousands of employeesand further erosion of DOE’s credibility as a re-sponsible and competent protector of environ-ment, safety and health.

WORKER PROTECTION COMPETESWITH OTHER CLEANUP PRIORITIES

DOE and contractor managers involved incleanup of the NWC must contend with all of theissues that clamor for attention and resources atnon-Federal hazardous waste sites. If anything,the competing pressures and priorities are morediverse and intense at DOE weapons facilities.Communities neighboring weapons sites aregreatly concerned about possible health and envi-ronmental impacts of the pollution—and haveexpressed this concern via Congressional hear-ings, the national media and in successful andpending lawsuits against DOE. lll -113 The pres-sure on EM and on DOE contractors to demon-strate progress while holding down costs is unre-lenting, and occurs in a context of technicalcomplexities unmatched at most non-Federalwaste sites.


In addition to the need to comply with applic-able environmental regulations, particularly Su-perfund and the Resource Conservation and Re-covery Act (RCRA), the DOE cleanup is beingdriven by priorities and schedule “milestones”established in Interagency Agreements (IAGs)negotiated among DOE, EPA, and individualStates. The milestones and deadlines set forth inIAGs were typically agreed to before reliablecharacterization data was available and in the ab-sence of health-based cleanup priorities or analy-ses of potential occupational hazards associatedwith proposed cleanup work.114 The need to re-spond to regulatory demands and IAG scheduleshas preoccupied much of the management talentin EM. Available evidence, including staffingpatterns and resource allocation, indicates thatDOE line management has paid relatively littleattention to OSH issues associated with thecleanup.

DOE has convened the Tripartite Commissionto discuss occupational health and safety mattersrelated to its operations. This high-level workinggroup consists of DOE senior managers, contrac-tor managers, and representatives of nationallabor organizations with members employed atfacilities in the NWC. The group has discussedDOE initiatives in medical surveillance, healthand safety training, and other matters pertinent toDOE workers generally; it is not designed tofocus solely on cleanup issues. Much of thegroup’s discussion has reportedly been directedat the fate of DOE production workers whoseoriginal job titles will be eliminated as weaponsproduction activities end and some facilities are

115 The Tripartiteconverted into cleanup sites.Commission does not address the level of techni-cal detail that is the major focus of the EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force,116 117 nordoes it include representatives from EPA, the Na-tional Institute of Occupational Safety andHealth (NIOSH), OSHA, or other Federal agen-cies whose missions and expertise are pertinentto the NWC cleanup.

Many contentious questions are involved in in-terpreting and implementing HAZWOPER, co-ordinating policies among Federal agencies, andcommunicating effectively with those who actu-ally do the work of cleaning up. DOE might moreefficiently resolve some of these issues by con-vening a multidisciplinary, interagency taskforce—perhaps even broader in membership thanEPA’s—including for example, staff from the Na-tional Institute of Environmental Health Sciences(NIEHS) and the Agency for Toxic Substancesand Disease Registry (ATSDR), as well as healthand safety experts from relevant unions. Healthand safety staff from DOE’s EM and EH mightalso benefit from sitting in on sessions of theEPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force.

DOE SITE CHARACTERIZATION DATABoth the scale and the complexity of contami-

nation at the Nuclear Weapons Complex distin-guish the DOE cleanup from most other hazard-ous waste operations.

118 These factors increase

the uncertainties involved in mapping environ-mental pathways or determining pollutionboundaries, and in turn heighten the difficultiesassociated with identifying site hazards, recog-nizing potential worker health and safety risks,and designing and implementing work practicesthat effectively limit such risks.

Characterizing the nature, extent, and futurecourse of environmental contamination is atime-consuming and technically difficult job inany case, but it will be especially challengingthroughout the NWC. Records documenting pastreleases of contaminants from DOE weapons fa-cilities are scant. The exact content and locationof past releases are frequently unknown, and theenvironmental pathways followed by contamin-ants released years or decades earlier are oftendifficult to track. **9

In many cases, the volume of contaminants re-leased to the environment at DOE facilitiesdwarfs the amount of hazardous material found atmore typical waste sites. Groundwater contami-


nation has been confirmed at all NWC facilities.All nonarid sites are believed to have surfacewater contamination.

120 The volume of soil and

sediment contaminated with radionuclides, haz-ardous chemicals, or both is estimated to totalbillions of cubic meters.

121 Thousands of solid

waste management units have been identifiedthroughout the Weapons Complex, many ofwhich require remedial action. Hundreds ofbuildings and other structures will eventually re-quire decontamination and decommissioning.

The sheer magnitude of characterization ef-forts at the NWC will pose great challenges to at-tempts to link environmental data with potentialworker health and safety threats. Currently, DOEenvironmental cleanup requires the analysis oftwo to three million samples per year. DOE hasestimated that by 1995, at least 10 million analy-ses of environmental samples conducted in off-site laboratories will be required annually.122 Thepossible presence of radionuclides in DOE sam-ples will magnify the costs and logistical prob-lems typically associated with characterizingcomplex pollution scenarios-including long de-lays in obtaining sample results—because fewlaboratories are equipped to handle such analy-ses.

Very few DOE or DOE contractor employeesinvolved in characterization of the nuclear weap-ons sites are trained in any health discipline.Trained industrial hygienists qualified to assessthe adequacy of available characterization dataand review the quality of contractors’ HASPS arein short supply at DOE. The few industrial hy-gienists who are available still appear to be con-centrating on reviewing exposure hazards andestablishing industrial hygiene protocols forweapons production activities.123 OTA was un-able to identify anyone at DOE headquarters, ineither EM or EH, who is attempting to establishguidance or policies that DOE contractors orfield staff could use to assess the adequacy ofcharacterization data used in formulating HASPSfor cleanup worker protection.

DOE has not directed contractors to factor po-tential cleanup worker health threats into charac-terization strategies or remediation plans. TheLos Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) re-cently proposed to assist the EH Office of HealthPhysics and Industrial Hygiene by developingtechnical documents in support of draft programrequirements for a “Health and Safety Standardfor Hazardous Waste Operations and EmergencyResponse” and an “Industrial Hygiene TechnicalManual for Health and Safety During HazardousWaste Operations and Emergency Response.’’ 124

The former document is to follow OSHA’s HAZ-WOPER standard, whereas the latter “will besimilar in depth and scope” to existing NIOSHand OSHA manuals.

125 It is unclear to what ex-

tent this proposed project might develop new ma-terial specific to the nuclear weapons sites clean-up. DOE has noted that this proposal “will berevised to include EM,’’ 126 but the draft docu-ments appear to be aimed at worker protection ef-forts that commence only after site characteriza-tion is well under way or completed.

DOE lacks the field staff needed to determineif contractors have done a good job analyzing thetype and extent of pollution, or to assess whetheravailable characterization data adequately delin-eate the health and safety hazards that cleanupworkers might encounter. Thus, DOE managerswill have little substantive basis for evaluatingcontractors’ proposed site-specific HASPS.

Prime contractors at some weapons facilitiesare attempting to reduce the time and costs re-quired to complete characterization efforts byintegrating Remedial Investigations with Feas-ibility Studies. Westinghouse Hanford is plan-ning to use the “observational approach” in as-sessing pollution in Hanford old plutoniumreactor areas for example.

127 T h i s a p p r o a c h h a s

been used wi th success a t some non-Federa l

waste sites and incorporates the idea that charac-

terization studies should be conducted for a spe-

cific purpose, not merely to satisfy regulatory

checklists (see ch, 1).

62 Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

A focal point of environmental studies used tosupport the observational approach to site charac-terization should be the identification of possiblerisks to cleanup workers. It is not evident, howev-er, that either DOE or EPA has instructed con-tractors to make potential threats to cleanupworker health an important “purpose” of sitecharacterization. In the absence of such policy,eagerness to reduce characterization costs mayalso reduce the availability of environmental datavital to site hazard identification and worker pro-tection.

DOE has not issued any orders or guidance toensure that contractors use approved or consis-tent methods in collecting and analyzing environ-mental samples throughout the Weapons Comp-lex so that pollution scenarios at different sitescan be compared. Indeed, DOE has no compre-hensive plan for consistently gathering and ana-lyzing environmental monitoring data within oracross weapons sites, and no strategy and littletechnical capacity for relating such data to poten-tial adverse health effects among workers or off-site populations who may be exposed to pollu-tants. 128 Consequently, DOE has no means ofdetermining which of the many thousands of pol-luted areas within the NWC require more urgentor more rigorous characterization and cleanupbecause of their potential health risks. Nor willDOE be able to weigh potential risks to cleanupworkers against possible benefits of proposed en-vironmental remedies.

Another problem confronting identification ofpotential cleanup worker health and safety threatsis the lack of coordination or consistent manage-ment of characterization data across DOE facili-ties. Subcontractors engaged in cleanup efforts atDOE facilities have complained to OTA that it issometimes difficult to get access to characteriza-tion data pertinent to worker health and safety.129

130 The varying organizational structures associ-

ated with different DOE contractors are such thatthere is no consistency among sites in the titles ofindividuals assigned to data collection and analy -

sis or in the procedures required for subcontrac-tors to obtain these data.

Such inconsistencies in the structure of DOEcontractor organizations add another layer ofcomplexity to efforts to link characterization datato potential cleanup worker health threats. Thelack of standard procedures for collecting, ana-lyzing, and recording site characterization dataand ongoing environmental monitoring data willalso impede efforts to fashion efficient, effective,and consistent medical surveillance programs orhealth and safety training programs for the clean-up.

IMPACTS OF DOECONTRACTING PRACTICES

DOE and its predecessor agencies were notconceived as organizations subject to strong cen-tralized direction and control. The ManhattanProject was a loose consortium of private corpo-rations who agreed to participate in building theatomic bomb for reasons of national security.

The companies that contributed their skills andexpertise to managing and operating govern-ment-owned nuclear weapons facilities duringthe Cold War (the M&Os) did so in an era whenthe risks of nuclear technology and other poten-tially hazardous processes used in weapons pro-duction were not fully known. These considera-tions, and the pressure to augment the nucleararsenal, induced the government to indemnifyM&Os against nuclear and other losses, includ-ing workers’ compensation costs. 131

Over the years, a special “partnership” devel-oped between DOE and its M&O’s that hasgreatly complicated DOE’s oversight of its con-tractors.132 About 90 percent of DOE’S total bud-get is spent on contractors, primarily those whomanage the NWC. This amounted to $17.6 bil-lion in fiscal year 1990.133

Beginning in the 1980’s, revelations about theseriousness of environmental contaminationthroughout the NWC, and a succession of weap-ons facility shutdowns prompted by safety con-


cerns raised questions about DOE’s ability to ef-fectively monitor contractor operations. Suchevents also prompted questions about the appro-priate limits of contractor indemnification in theface of regulatory noncompliance.134

Environmental Restoration ManagementContractors (ERMCS)

Environmental cleanup will be a significant

activity at all sites run by M&O contractors, in-

cluding those facilities that continue to have re-

sponsibilities for weapons production, testing,and dismantlement. DOE has determined that atfacilities where environmental restoration is theonly or major mission, Environmental Restora-tion Management Contractors (ERMCs) will re-place or augment M&Os.

ERMCs will be responsible for conductingSuperfund Remedial Investigation/FeasibilityStudies, RCRA Remedial Field Investigations,and associated “base program” activities. Sub-contractors supervised by the ERMC will actual-ly carry out the characterization studies and willdesign and implement remedial actions. TheERMC Will be responsible for procuring andm a n a g i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n s u b c o n t r a c t o r s .

1 3 5 T h e

DOE Office of Environmental Restoration andWaste Management is the program office incharge of all environmental restoration and wastemanagement act iv i ties, whether they occur atERMC sites or at facilities run by M&O contrac-tors. 136

The ERMC concept was designed to help re-store public confidence in the DOE cleanup ef-fort by making a clear distinction between clean-

up contractors and those who had generated thecontamination, ERMCs also reflect DOE’s desireto expand its contractor corps to include firmswith environmental expertise and to inject morecompetition into bids for its cleanup contracts.

DOE claims that contractor accountability is1 3 7

S o m e c r i t i c sincreased under the ERMC rules.

have. however, dubbed the ERMC approach “an�� It is possible that theaccountability disaster.”138

large number of subcontractors and the multiplelayers of managerial responsibility characteristicof ERMC cleanup operations will dilute and con-fuse responsibility and authority for workerhealth and safety issues.

DOE has tried to build provisions into ERMCagreements that enhance its authority over con-tractors. For example, ERMCs will not be “bank-rolled” in advance by the government for cleanupcosts. Instead, they will have to invest their owncapital, and DOE will reimburse costs after bud-getary review.

139 This approach may f o r c e

ERMCs to pursue more responsible and prudentcost-accounting practices than have always beenfollowed by M&Os, but it might also encouragecontractors to scrimp on outlays for occupationalsafety and health, unless DOE imposes and en-forces explicit OSH performance criteria.

Two ERMCs are currently planned. The Fluor-Daniel Co. has been selected as the ERMC atFernald, DOE estimates that up to $5 billioncould be spent on the Fernald cleanup over thenext 5 years; the ERMC could earn as much as$125 million annually during this period.140 Bid-ding for the Hanford ERMC is under way. TheHanford ERMC will manage all environmentalrestoration and defense decontamination and de-commissioning projects. Waste management ac-tivities at Hanford, including characterizationand retrieval of materials stored in high-levelwaste tanks, will remain the responsibility of thecurrent M&O contractor, Westinghouse HanfordCorporation. (WHC).141

Cost-Plus Award Fee ProcessContractors at all DOE weapons facilities

(M&Os and ERMCs) are now subject to a newcontracting process, the cost-plus award fee(CPAF) policy. DOE established the CPAF to en-courage attention to environment, health, and

1 4 2 U n d e r t h e n e w p o l i c y , c o n t r a c -safety issues,

tors are paid a “base fee” for reimbursement ofcosts, plus a variable “award fee,’” 51 percent ofwhich is determined by DOE on the basis of con-


tractor performance in environment, safety, andhealth. 143 If the contractor fails any one of thesecategories, the entire award fee would be atrisk. 144

The record suggests that the award feecontracting provisions are not functioning asplanned. Reports by the General Accounting Of-fice (GAO) *45 and the DOE Inspector Genera1146

have called into question DOE’s willingness orability to use the CPAF to hold contractors ac-countable for performance. OSHA noted thatM&Os have avoided penalties for deficiencies inhealth and safety by negotiating larger basefees.147 For example, the M&O contractor at OakRidge increased its “award fee” in 1992 com-pared to 1991, even though its performance in en-vironment, health, and safety-areas that suppos-edly determine 51 percent of the award-haddeclined. The contractor accomplished this bynegotiating a higher base fee in 1992,148

GAO reported that under the new cost-plusaward fee system, DOE failed to reduce contrac-tor awards even when serious deficiencies hadbeen found in contractor performance.149 150 AtHanford, for example, multiple managementerrors in safety performance,151 152 and short-comings in hazard analysis and worker protectionat the high-level radioactive waste tank farms, *53 154did not prevent WHC from receiving an apprecia-ble award fee in fiscal year 1991.155

At the Nevada Test Site, the contractor’s per-formance in environment, safety, and health in1990 was rated “average.” According to DOEpolicy, this should result in lower award fees. TheDOE Inspector General found, however, thatDOE field personnel adjusted the maximumaward fees to allow their contractor to earn feesequal to earlier amounts-without increasing itsperformance score.156

The M&O contractor at Rocky Flats wasgranted an award fee of $1.7 million for 1991,even though the performance review board foundthat the contractor did not deserve the award. De-fense Programs, the DOE office responsible forRocky Flats, decided to overrule the board with

the concurrence of the DOE field office manag-er.157 DOE's EM and EH offices reviewed the.award fee in an advisory role: EM supported theaward; EH did not. EH opposition was basedlargely on 29 significant deficiencies in environ-ment, safety, and health cited by the board. In re-viewing this decision, GAO was unable to deter-mine the weight accorded environment, safety,and health in the final award decision. GAO alsorecalled earlier undeserved awards to previousRocky Flats contractors who tolerated serious en-vironment, safety, and health problems, andnoted that “some of the same problems we identi-fied [in 1989] still exist.’’ 158

In practice, DOE contractor compliance withenvironmental regulations appears to receivemore emphasis than occupational health andsafety issues when award fees are assigned. TheCPAF process does not establish what, if any,portion of the award is based on occupationalsafety and health performance. As discussed ear-lier in this background paper, the priorities andprocesses that guide Superfund and RCRAcleanups accentuate the importance of environ-mental cleanup schedules, costs, and possibleoff-site impacts of pollution, downplaying poten-tial health and safety threats to on-site workers.DOE appears to be reasserting these priorities inits contractor awards. Contractor performance inenvironmental areas— measured by meetingschedule deadlines and milestones set forth inIAGs-appears to weigh more heavily than per-formance in occupational health and safety.

APPLICATION OF HAZWOPERTO DOE CLEANUP

Policy Guidance on ImplementationThe DOE Office of Environmental Restoration

and Waste Management has line responsibilitiesfor the cleanup of weapons facilities. EM hasmade it clear that all environmental restorationand waste management activities are subject toexisting DOE orders and must comply with


HAZWOPER, OSHA’s construction standard (29CFR 1926), and other relevant OSHA regula-tions. 159

In December 1991, responding to earlier fin-dings by the DOE Inspector General that failure tocomply with HAZWOPER training provisionswas widespread at NWC facilities,160 the Officeof the Environment within EH issued guidanceon “OSHA Training Requirements for HazardousWaste Operations.’’161 EH recently completed adraft of a document outlining HAZWOPER,162

which essentially reiterates the requirements ofOSHA’s standard,163 albeit in a more readableformat. It also provides some important ancillaryreferences that might be helpful in implementingthe regulation and includes a sample outline of asite-specific HASP.

The effort proposed by LANL in October1992 to develop a draft “Health and Safety Stan-dard for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emer-gency Response” on behalf of the EH Office ofHealth Physics and Industrial Hygiene164 willpresumably focus more specifically on the pro-grammatic requirements of identifying and con-trolling cleanup worker exposures to health andsafety hazards, although available documents donot make clear how the EH HAZWOPER draftdiffers from the proposed LANL project. It isalso unclear that either effort will significantlyalter or augment the existing OSHA standard.

Full implementation of the OSHA HAZWOP-ER standard at DOE facilities will require con-siderable effort and cooperation on the part ofDOE line managers and contractors. A robust im-plementation of the standard-for example, aprogram that takes into account private sectorcriticisms of deficiencies in OSHA’s proposedhealth and safety training program accreditationprocess, includes reporting requirements andqualification criteria for physicians designingmedical surveillance programs, and imposesmore rigorous standards for emergency respon-der training—cannot occur unless DOE linemanagers and EH staff make such goals a priori-

It is also probable that cooperative cross-orga-nization efforts among health and safety staff atEM and in different divisions of EH will be nec-essary to create workable and rigorous OSH poli-cies for the cleanup. The EPA-Labor Task Forceon Health and Safety has demonstrated that regu-lar discussion among experienced health andsafety practitioners from multiple disciplines andagencies can produce valuable insights and helpresolve some of the more ambiguous and prob-lematic questions surrounding HAZWOPER im-plementation. DOE’s efforts to interpret and im-plement HAZWOPER effectively might alsobenefit from consultation with health and safetyexperts from academia and the private sector, aswell as different branches of the governmentsuch as NIOSH, NIEHS, ATSDR, and the ArmyCorps of Engineers (ACE), who are familiar withsome of the issues involved. DOE has not yet ini-tiated any such outreach.

DOE and its contractors are not moving ag-gressively to ensure that the minimal require-ments of HAZWOPER are met at DOE facilities.EM has not issued policies or guidance explain-ing how DOE field offices and contractors shouldinterpret and implement HAZWOPER. The EHHAZWOPER draft, even if promptly finalized,will not address interpretive issues associatedwith HAZWOPER that were discussed in earliersections of this background paper.

In the absence of clear DOE policies andguidance, implementation of HAZWOPER bydifferent contractors at different facilities is cer-tain to be of variable quality. Furthermore, com-pliance with some aspects of the HAZWOPERstandard developing emergency response plansand meeting worker training requirements, forexample-requires contractors to make prepara-tions well in advance of initiating site cleanup ac-tivities. However, DOE has not yet carried out as-sessments of the resources and programs thatmust be established to ensure compliance withHAZWOPER. The next section of this back-ground paper addresses the implication forDOE’s complex cleanup of specific elements of


HAZWOPER that have proved contentious atnon-Federal cleanup sites.

Health and Safety PlansThe site Health and Safety Plan is a corne-

rstone of HAZWOPER’s approach to cleanupworker protection. Experience with Superfundand RCRA cleanups has shown that the designand implementation of HASPS encompass manyof the most frequently encountered disputes asso-ciated with HAZWOPER.165 166 EPA explicitlystates that “there can be only one HASP persite .’’167 Many of the DOE sites, however, arehuge. The Idaho National Engineering Labora-tory is larger than the State of Rhode Island. Han-ford is nearly as big. Even relatively small sites,such as Fernald and Rocky Flats, harbor multipleand complicated pollution sources. 168 At a giventime, dozens of subcontractors may be operatingon-site and potentially be exposed to differentSolid Waste Management Units (SWMUS)169 170

encompassing many different contaminants e n -vironmental transport pathways, and wastestreams.

The scope and complexity of contaminationthroughout the NWC will probably accentuatethe problems experienced at other waste sites inlinking characterization data to potential cleanupworker health and safety risks. Characterizationof the NWC will continue for years, and in somecases, will overlap with remediation activitiesand efforts to prevent contamination fromspreading. It will be necessary to have systems inplace that allow existing HASPs to efficiently in-tegrate new site information, including environ-mental monitoring data, plans for altered or addi-tional work tasks, and associated workerprotection strategies.

Crafting HASPS that accurately delineateweapons site hazards will require a major efforton the part of DOE and its contractors. The EHDraft Hazardous Waste Operations and Emer-gency Response document stipulates that DOEcontractors must designate a Company Health

and Safety Supervisor who has “overall responsi-bility for development and implementation of theHASP.’’ 171 The proposed guidance also requiresthat a health and safety officer be on-site duringall level A,B, or high-hazard level C field opera-tions, and during all invasive/evacuation worksuch as well drilling. Site OSH officers wouldhave stop-work authorization. These provisions,if implemented, might mitigate some of the prob-lems with accountability and chain of commandthat have been troublesome at non-Federal clean-up sites.

Organizing and updating the paperwork need-ed to document site characterization studies,work plans, and environmental monitoring re-sults, and the challenges of linking appropriateworker protection strategies to particular cleanupjobs throughout the NWC, will be formidable.Paper reviews of written HASPs-let alone fieldassessments of the adequacy of implementedhealth and safety programs-will be dauntingtasks. Thus far, the press of competing demandsand limited staffing have prevented the EM head-quarters Office of Oversight from reviewing asingle HASP from any weapons facility.172 NoFederal or State agency currently reviews HASPSfor the DOE cleanup. *73

OTA has reviewed site-wide HASPS written tosupport cleanup activities at some DOE facilities,but has not reviewed a sufficient number to drawgeneralizable conclusions. The few documentsreviewed by OTA focused on weapons produc-tion activities—not cleanup operations-and em-phasized hazards from radionuclide contaminat-ion. Health threats associated with potentialworker exposure to hazardous chemicals did notreceive much consideration, even though charac-terization data demonstrated the presence ofthese materials on-site. Potential safety threatswere also given minimal attention.

The tendency of DOE and its prime contrac-tors to focus on radionuclides and neglect nonra-dioactive chemical hazards has been noted by theNational Academy of Sciences174 and by DOETiger Teams auditing environment, safety, and


health programs at NWC facilities. This empha-sis also reflects DOE staffing patterns and the im-portance accorded radioactive materials in DOEorders.

The focus on radioactive hazards that has tra-ditionally characterized DOE contractor OSHpractices need not be a Liability as DOE attemptsto forge HASPS suitable for cleanup of environ-m e n t s contaminated with a wide variety of toxicmaterials, Although the Advisory Committee onNuclear Facilities Safety 175 and the Defense Fa-

176 have stronglycilities Nuclear Safety Boardcriticized the poor quality and dispersed organi-zation of DOE radiation protection programs,DOE clearly has significant, if insufficient, ex-pertise in this area. Radiation protection, whichwill be a critical component of worker health andsafety programs during many cleanup operationsat the NWC, is not an area in which many healthand safety professionals outside DOE have ex-tensive experience. If DOE “borrowed” expertisein nonradiologic hazard assessment and controlfrom other agencies or sources of expertise, itcould focus greater efforts on upgrading and ap-plying its own capabilities in radiation protec-tion.

The Nuclear Weapons Complex contains someenvironmental contaminants and mixtures of pol-lutants that may never be encountered at moretypical hazardous waste operations, High-levelradioactive waste and mixed waste (containingboth radionuclides and hazardous chemicals) arein this category. For some contaminants and con-tamination scenarios, there are no published stan-dards or guidelines setting forth appropriate ac-tion levels and permissible exposure limits. Forexample, no Federal agency has established al-lowable worker exposure levels for soil contami-nated with radionuclides.177

Attempts by DOE to independently establishallowable worker exposure levels are likely to en-counter strong opposition because its credibilityin the field of occupational health and safety hasbeen called into question as a result of past prac-tices. 178-181 The need for such worker exposure

levels and action levels is too pressing to wait the3 years or longer that are usually required forOSHA to complete new rule making under theAdministrative Procedures Act, EPA is workingon the development of allowable soil standardsfor radionuclides,

182 but denies having juris-

dictional authority over workers. A consensusapproach that draws on expertise from EPA,NIOSH, OSHA, and other knowledgeable agen-cies and individuals might usefully address issuessuch as appropriate environmental monitoringstrategies and methods, and the development ofaction levels and other worker exposure stan-dards.

Medical SurveillanceIn 1990 the Secretarial Panel for Evaluation of

Epidemiologic Research Activities at DOE(SPEERA) strongly criticized DOE’s past effortsto conduct medical surveillance among weaponsproduction workers. In particular, SPEERAnoted that epidemiologic studies and health sur-veillance programs were uncoordinated andlacked the capacity to monitor workplace expo-sure, to evaluate such exposure in terms of work-ers health, or to prescribe the corrective actionsrequired. *83

DOE and its contractors still have very limitedability to monitor worker exposure to toxic mate-rials. This is true even for weapons productionworkers, whose exposures are technically and ad-ministratively much less difficult to track thanthose of cleanup workers. Medical staff at manyDOE facilities do not have access to informationdocumenting potential production worker expo-sures and are not informed of job transfers thatmight result in worker exposure to hazardous ma-terials. 184-190 Thus, some NWC facility medicaldepartments are unable to verify that workerswho are potentially exposed to hazardous materi-als are receiving appropriate medical surveil-lance.191

Efforts to establish a viable system of medicalsurveillance for workers engaged in the DOE


cleanup facilities must overcome several obsta-cles. The initial problem is that worker job titlesand tasks, management procedures, and the or-ganizational structure of occupational medicinedepartments are different at each weapons facil-ity. 192 This makes it difficult to craft and imple-

ment DOE-wide procedures that would identify

individual workers who potentially face hazard-

ous exposures, are at greatest risk of acquiring

work-related illnesses, and are required by DOE

orders or OSHA standards to be offered inclusion

in medical surveillance programs.

The task of ident i fy ing individual c leanup

workers at high risk for exposure to potentially

toxic contaminants and in need of medical sur-

veillance is further complicated by the panoply of

employers engaged at a given site, and by the

lack of any coherent analysis of characterization

data from the perspective of potential worker ex-

posures. Medical directors at DOE facilities are

not informed when subcontractors are working

on-site, do not assess the potential hazards t h a tsubcontractor employees might encounter, and

do not review subcontractors’ medical surveil-

lance programs.

Another problem impeding efforts to develop

DOE medical surveillance programs that comply

with HAZWOPER is the lack of influence and

authority of the EH Office of Occupational Med-i c i n e . 1 9 3

-

1 9 5

which would presumably be the

source of policies related to cleanup worker med-

ical surveillance.

When DOE established the Office of Health

within EH in May 1990, separate offices were as-

signed responsibility for industrial hygiene and

health physics, epidemiology and health surveil-

lance , and occupat ional medic ine196 (see f igure

3-2). This reorganization of health activities was

a direct response to SPEERA recommendations

and accomplished the important goal of collect-

ing previously disparate health-related programs

under a single Deputy Assistant Secretary. It is

not clear, however, that this reorganization has

effectively signaled the importance of occupa-

tional medicine to DOE and its contractor man-

agers, or improved the visibility and status of oc-cupational health and safety professionals atD O E .

The separate Offices of Environment, Safety,

and Health within EH and the different divisions

in the Office of Health appear to remain indepen-

dent domains with their own agendas. OTA foundlittle evidence of coordination or communicationamong the Offices of Health Physics and Indus-trial Hygiene, Occupational Medicine, and Epi-demiology and Health Surveillance, and no indi-cations of regular contact between EH staff andhealth and safety professionals working in DOEline organizations.

The DOE Office of Occupational Medicinecontinues to exert little influence within DOE oramong its contractors. Neither the newly createdOffice of Occupational Medicine, nor the Officeof Epidemiology and Health Surveillance, hadacquired its full complement of staff when a hir-ing freeze was imposed across all EH divisions.Consequently, as of late 1992, both of these of-fices remain wel l be low projected s ize .197 198

In June 1992, DOE Order 5480.8A, whichprescribes minimal occupational medicineprogram requirements for DOE contractors,199

was updated for the first time in more than adecade. 200 The new order has the potential toplace occupational medicine in a more proactiverole at DOE facilities. For example, under thenew order, managers must ensure that site occu-pational medicine physicians are informed of

201 On paper, the new Contrac-worker exposures.tor Occupational Medicine Order is a significantimprovement; the speed and thoroughness withwhich the order is actually implemented will beimportant indicators of managers’ readiness toembrace a strong health and safety presence atthe operations level.

EH had to make important concessions toDOE program offices to win approval of the Oc-cupational Medicine Order, however. To achievethe “consensus” among DOE Program Secretari-al Officers that is a prerequisite for adoption ofmost EH policy recommendations, EH dropped

Chapter 3-Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex

1I

I

1- 11

r--

I ——

I

J 1 J——muu


language requiring that contractor medical direc-tors report directly to the site manager and in-stead allowed the option of medical directors re-porting to “another management level withsufficient authority to ensure program effective-ness.” 202 203 The importance of t .his concession is

reflected in comments by the National Academyof Sciences,

204 S P E E R A ,205 a n d O S H A ,2 0 6

These expert reviewers observed that occupation-al medical input to decisions at DOE facilitieswas “negligible” and “inadequate”; that medicaldepartments were relegated to a reactive role atDOE facilities; and that these roles were mirroredat DOE headquarters.

In 1991 and 1992, EH conducted audits of oc-cupational medicine programs throughout theWeapons Complex. These studies documentedthat as of 1992, occupational physicians at manyweapons facilities remain uninformed of work-ers’ potential exposure to hazardous materials,that physicians continue to experience problemsin getting the attention of decision makers, andthat every occupational medicine program in theWeapons Complex has fewer staff than called forby DOE orders .207-213

The weakness of contractor occupational med-icine programs has important implications for thecleanup. As matters now stand, there is no entityin DOE or its contractor corps capable of design-ing, conducting, or overseeing the medical sur-veillance of cleanup workers required underHAZWOPER. In the absence of guidance fromDOE, contractors and subcontractors are free topursue any notion of adequate medical surveil-lance that a licensed physician is willing to en-dorse. Under these conditions, the quality andcomprehensiveness of cleanup worker medicalsurveillance are destined to be uneven. The costsof this service are also likely to vary considerablybecause DOE has no means of competently as-sessing the scope or effectiveness of proposedsurveillance activities.

The development, implementation, and analy-sis of useful medical surveillance data necessari-ly represent a multidisciplinary task requiring thecooperation of health experts from many disci-plines including medicine, industrial hygiene,health physics, biostatistics, and epidemiology.OTA found little indication that the institutionalcapacity for such cooperative efforts exists atDOE.

In its approach to medical surveillance for theNWC cleanup, DOE is repeating some of themistakes critics have accused it of making instudying the health outcomes of radiation-ex-posed workers.

214215 DOE is not reaching b e -

yond its own organization to gather expertisefrom other government agencies or the privatesector. The failure to institute an effective qualityassurance program for medical surveillance datacollection and analysis will compromise anyfindings the data might suggest. The absence ofany system for following individual workers’ cu-mulative exposures to hazardous materials willalso limit what lessons can be learned from med-ical surveillance efforts. The data documentingsurveillance activities will differ not only fromsite to site but also among subcontractors. Therewill be little chance of pooling data from differ-ent vendors in ways that support sound science,and the opportunity to learn what kinds of sur-veillance are useful, which are a waste of timeand money, and what types of cleanup task or ex-posures are problematic, will be lost.

Finally, it is very important that DOE make astrong effort to guarantee workers that the con-tents of individual medical records will be treatedconfidentially, that pooled information used forresearch purposes or made available to the publicwill not permit identification of individuals, andthat the contracts and affiliations of persons con-ducting medical surveillance will be disclosed ifrequested. These steps are necessary both to en-courage extensive worker participation in surveil-lance projects and to comply with standard ethi-cal medical practices.

. - -. —


Health and Safety TrainingA December 1990 DOE Inspector General’s

report documented that contractors at sevenM&O facilities and three field offices were notcomplying with AZWOPER health and safetytraining requirements. The report noted that theroot causes of noncompliance were “acceptanceof non-compliance conditions and a lack of cor-porate and DOE ownership of problems;’ as wellas failure of DOE field offices to issue site-spe-cific guidance to M&O contractors or to monitorcontractor training efforts.216

In response to these findings, EH staff pre-pared guidance on “OSHA Training Require-ments for Hazardous Waste Operations.’’ 217 Al-though this guidance does spell out proceduresfor documenting training at DOE sites, it is littlemore than a near-verbatim reiteration of the sec-tions of the OSHA regulation that deal withworker training, stapled to a copy of EPA’s “FactSheet on Establishing Work Zones at Uncon-trolled Hazardous Waste Sites.”218 T h e g u i d a n c e

document does not indicate what the content oftraining curricula for DOE cleanup projectsshould be (beyond reproducing OSHA’s suggest-ed HAZWOPER course content checklist), nordoes it incorporate the training course accredita-tion criteria proposed in OSHA’s 1910.121 regu-lation 219 or indicate that DOE will evaluate theadequacy of cleanup worker health and safetytraining programs.

A year after EH released the guidance onHAZWOPER training, the Colorado Health De-partment found violations of RCRA training re-quirements among DOE contractor personnel atthe Rocky Flats Plant.

220 In May 1992, the DOE

Hanford contractor denied State inspectors fromthe Washington State Department of Ecology ac-cess to personnel training records. The State citedthe contractor for “failure to properly identifypersonnel in the training plan,” a violation thatcould include penalties up to $6,000 per day.DOE has admitted that under the terms of theDOE-Westinghouse contract, it would be com-

pelled to reimburse Westinghouse for thesefines.221

The National Defense Authorization Act forfiscal years 1992 and 1993 authorized DOE toaward training grants to workers engaged in haz-ardous substance response or emergency re-sponse at nuclear weapons facilities.222 DOE andNIEHS have begun collaborative efforts in thisarea. 223 224

.

A provision in an earlier Defense Authoriza-tion Act had required DOE to evaluate the suit-ability of NIEHS Training Grants for workersinvolved in hazardous waste operations andemergency response at DOE facilities.225 In thecourse of its assessment of NIEHS training pro-grams, DOE found that about half of the DOEcontractors had trained all or most employees tar-geted for 24- and 40-hour health and safetycourses. DOE also discovered that its contractorswere “taking various approaches” to definingpopulations of employees who require trainingunder HAZWOPER. At some DOE facilities, de-cisions about worker training were left to subcon-tractors who conducted cleanup operations.226

The survey revealed that the confusion evident atnon-Federal waste sites about which workersshould receive 24 hours of training and whichshould undergo 40-hour training sessions wasalso bothering DOE contractors.227 DOE facili-ties were relying on an assortment of vendors todeliver training, at costs of $1,000 to $1,200 pertrainee for a 40-hour course.228

The report also noted a number of barriers toutilization of NIEHS training programs. It wassuggested that NIEHS grant programs might bemore attractive to DOE contractors if DOE head-quarters guidance and standards “were to specifyas a minimum criterion for all training that itmeet the requirements of the [proposed 29 CFR1910.121] OSHA rule on training program ac-creditation . . .“.229 DOE has not promulgatedsuch guidance, however. Although EH plans todevelop curricula for all worker health and train-ing courses to be implemented by DOE line orga-nizations, there is no program to develop mini-


mum criteria or course content for the cleanup onan urgent basis. DOE contractors continue tocomply with HAZWOPER’s worker training re-quirements without any guidance from DOEheadquarters on course content, type or extent ofhands-on training, or site-specific training needs.

The International Association of Firefighters(IAFF) has expressed concern that NIEHS grantmonies set aside for DOE workers will not be di-rected toward the special training needs of fire-fighters. The IAFF contends that firefighters whomight be called on during emergencies related toDOE cleanup activities—including personnelemployed at on-site fire brigades and members ofmunicipal fire departments located near weaponssites—are in urgent need of extensive training inhazardous materials incidents. 230 The IAFFmaintains that most NIEHS programs do not pro-vide adequate training for emergency response(ER) professionals,231 and argues that firefightersrequire more substantive training courses thanthose that merely satisfy the minimal number ofhours stipulated by HAZWOPER.232 IAFF be-lieves that providing adequate training for ERprofessionals should be a top priority in workerhealth and safety efforts at all hazardous wasteoperations, including DOE weapons facilities.233

The IAFF conducted an informal survey ofhazardous materials training among emergencyresponders employed in fire brigades at DOE fa-cilities and at fire departments located in commu-nities near nuclear weapons facilities.234 All re-sponders reported having had some emergencyresponse training, but most had received only“awareness/operational level” instruction. Train-ing was provided by a variety of vendors includ-ing in-house instructors (Hanford); State-certi-fied instructors (Savannah River, Oak RidgeNational Laboratory, and Hanford); communitycollege- or university-based training programs(Pantex, Rocky Flats); and instructors from a na-tional chemical manufacturing concern (Han-ford). There is presently no way of evaluating thecontent or quality of these courses.

Emergency ResponseDOE weapons facilities have written emergen-

cy response or disaster plans addressing emer-gencies that might arise from regular (weaponsproduction) operations at each facility.235 AllDOE facilities have on-site fire brigades and arerequired to establish liaisons with local fire de-partments and medical facilities.

236 DOE Tiger

Team audits of environment, safety, and healthperformance at weapons facilities have docu-mented deficiencies in emergency preparednessat DOE facilities, although these assessmentspresumed continued weapons production opera-tions and did not usually address risks from envi-ronmental cleanup activities.

The Ahearne committee report noted that Han-ford does not have plans to handle an emergencyat high-level waste tanks.237 The committee alsoconcluded that at Rocky Flats, the potential re-lease of toxic chemicals, “which could be cata-strophic to the on-site population,” had been in-adequately assessed,238 and that Rocky Flats “hasnot had much success in demonstrating its emer-gency preparedness and response capabilities,even in exercises” carried out as late as May1991. 239 The Ahearne committee found fire de-tection and suppression systems at Rocky Flats tobe “antiquated” This finding is of particular con-cern because, historically, fires have been thegreatest safety hazard at that location. Recent de-cisions to cease production operations may re-duce the possibility of accidents and emergencysituations at this facility.

Many emergency scenarios that could plausi-bly arise during the DOE cleanup would requirethe involvement of off-site fire departments andemergency medical teams. At Pantex, where as-sembly, dismantlement, and testing of conven-tional explosive components of nuclear warheadstake place, the Tiger Team found off-site medicalfacilities to be inadequate and noted no evidencethat DOE had ever audited the real status of med-ical response there or compared actual capabili-ties to the commitment made by the local hospi-

—


tal in written contracts.240 DOE has taken steps to ated with weapons production activities. Some

remedy these deficiencies. exceptional situations covered by the environ-It is difficult to assess the ER capabilities mental restoration and waste management pro-

available at DOE facilities with respect to clean- gram-such as the potential for fire or explosion

up tasks, in part because neither DOE nor its con- at the Hanford tank farm where residues of high-tractors have surveyed the possible emergency level radioactive waste are stored, fire in a radia-response needs specifically associated with envi- tion-contaminated building at Rocky Flats, or anronmental restoration and waste management op- emergency involving vitrification of high-levelerations. Most emergencies that might plausibly radioactive waste-could potentially jeopardizearise from environmental restoration or waste large numbers of workers or pose significantmanagement functions are likely to be less risks to off-site populations.calamitous than the worst-case scenarios associ-

CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES] U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notice, “Set-

ting the New DOE Course,” SEN-1 1-89, Sept. 5, 1989,239 U,S.C. 651-678 west 1985 and Supp. 1992).342 U.S.C. Section 2201(f).4 Occupational Safety and Health Adrninistratio~ U.S. Depart-

ment of Labor, Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Oc-cupational Safety and Health Program for Its Government-OwnedContractor-Operated Facilities, December 1990.

5 Jmes Wati, Secretw, U.S. Department of Energy, memo-

randum, “Strengthening Line Management and Accountability inDOE Contractor Worker Safety and Health Programs,” Mar. 20,1991.

6 Jmes Wati, Secre-, U.S. Department of Energy, ‘mem-

orandum, “Strengthening Office of Environment, Safety and HealthIndependent Oversight of DOE Line Management of Worker Safe-ty and Health Programs,” Mar. 20, 1991.

7 James Watkins, Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, memo-randum, “Developing A Strategy for Assigning Rewards and Peml-ties for Compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-tration (OSHA) Regulations and DOE Orders,” Mar. 20, 1991.

8 James Watkins, Secretaxy, U.S. Department of Energy, memo-randum, “Reevaluation of the DOE’s Pending WhistleblowerRule,” Mar. 20, 1991.

9 petm Bms~ Ac~g Assistant Secretary, Environment, SafetY

and Healti U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to the Secre-tary of Energy, “Implementation Plan for the Office of Health,”May 18, 1990.

10 U S Dep~ent Of Ener~, OffiCe Of he Ress Secre@?. .

“Secretary of Energy Appoints Environment, Safety and HealthCommittee,” Mar. 30, 1992.

11 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, memorandum to all Depart-

mental Elements, “Supplementary Request for Occupational Safetyand Health Data Required for the FY 1993 Internal Review BudgetProcess,” May 14, 1991.

12 Occupatioti Heal~ and Safety Reporter, “OSHA Jfisdic-

tion Over DOE-Owned Plants Outlined in Memorandum of Under-standing, ” (Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.) vol.13, Aug. 26, 1992, p. 422.

13 U.S. Dep~ent of Labor and U.S. Department of Energy,Memorandum of Understanding, July 1992.

14 Executive Order No. 12196, Feb. 26! 1980.15 occupatio~ safe~ ~d He~~ Administration, Evaluation

of U.S. Department of Energy ..., op. cit.‘6 Ibid.1 7 weapon5 Complex Monitor, “Hanford Shows Lack of

Progress on ES&H Issues, DOE Report Says” (Washingto~ DC:Exchange Pubs.), Aug. 10, 1992, pp. 19-20.

18 us. Dep@ment of Energy, Office of Environment Safety

and Healti Environment, Safety and Health Compliance Assess-ment of the Portsmouth Gaseous Difision Plant (Springfield, VA:National Technical Information Service, April 1990).

19 Roy Gibbs, Ac~g D~~tor, OffIce of Occupational Safety,

Office of Environment Safety, and Healti U.S. Department of En-ergy, presentation to OTA staff, Oct. 8, 1992.

m w Gr=ndyke, M~~ Director (re~ed), Los ~amos ‘a-

tional Laboratory, personal communication to T. O’Toole, Office ofTechnology Assessment, Mar, 4, 1991,

21 U,S. ConHess, offke of Technology Assessment Worhhop

on Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the DOE Nuclear Weap-ons Complex, Washington DC, May 15, 1991.

22 U.S. Conwss, General Accounting Ofilce, Increased Rafing

Results in Award Fee to Rocky Flats Contractor, GAO/RCED-92-162 (March 1992).

23 Weawm Complex Monitor, “Despite Lower PerformanceRating, Martin Marietta Award Fees Higher” (WashingtorL DC:Exchange Pubs.), June 22, 1992, pp. 11-12.

24 Stif ad Wfie RW~s, “Audit of Unused Buildings at Han-

ford Finds Hazards,” The Spokesma?+Review, Nov. 13, 1992.u Rictimd Field Office, U.S. Department of Energy, “T~ B

Investigation of Hanford Tank Farm’s Vapor Exposures,” April1992.

26 Job TX%, ~~a, ~gh-~vel Tanks Task Force, Office of

Environmental Restomtion and Waste Management, U.S. Depart-ment of Energy, memorandum to Ronald Gerton, DOE RichlandField Office, “Investigation of Persomel Exposure to Noxious Va-pors of Tank 103-C,” WHC Internal Memo #76314-91 -KEM-040,Jan. 14, 1992.


27 U.S. Dep@ent of Energy, OffIce of Envir0nmen4 Safe&

and Herdth, “Site Representative ProgranL Rocky Flats RegionalOffIce Monthly Report for March 1992,” RF-92-03, June 5, 1992.

~ Advisov Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety to the Secre+tary of Energy, “Finat Report on DOE Nuclear Facilities,” Novem-ber 1991, p. 20.

m Ibid.w Occupation s~e~ ~d Health Administration, Evaluation

of the Department of Energy ..., op. cit.31 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, “Report-Evaluation of tie Suit-

ability of the Training Program Developed by the National Instituteof Environmental Health Sciences for Trainin g Workers Involvedin Environmental and Waste Management Activities of the U.S.Department of Energy,” May 1991, p. 3-16.

32 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.33 Ibid.34 Occupatioti Safety ~d Health Administration, Evaluation

of U.S. Department of Energy . . ., op. cit.35 U,S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Inspector General,

“Report on Inspection of Surveillance Equipment and Activities atDOE Field Office, Richland,” DOIYIG-0299, September 1991.

36 K. Scheider, “Inquiry Finds Illegal Surveillance Of Workersin Nuclear Plants,” New York Times, Aug. 1, 1991, p. A18.

37 Weapons Complex Monitor, “Labor Sides with whistle-blower,” (Washington DC: Exchange Pubs.), Feb. 10, 1992, p. 20.

38 M. wald, “wh.istlebloWer at National Laboratory Was Disci-plined, Labor Department Rutes,’’New York Times, Feb. 5, 1992, p.A16.

3910 CFR 708.40 Roy Gibbs, oP. cit.

41 J. FiQger~d, Jr., U.S. Department of Energ, Depum Assis-

tant Secretary, Safety and Quality Assurance, memorandum to P.Ziemer, Assistant Secretary of Environment, Safety and Health,“EH-30 Site Representative, September Monthly Reports,” Oct. 29,1991.

42 ~cupatio~ Stiety and Health Administration, Evaluation

of U.S. Department of Energy ..., op. cit.43 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notice 6,

SEN-6-89, “Departmental Organization and Management Arrange-ments,” May 19, 1989.

44 OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.45 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notiw, “De-

partmental Organ&a tion and Management Arrangements,” SEN-6E-92, Feb. 21, 1992.

46 OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, oP. cit.47 J Serocki, Office of oversight and Health Assessment ‘a-

partment of Energy, Office of Environmental Restoration andWaste Management, personal communication to T. O’Toole, OTA,July 11, 1992.

4S ScrW~, J., Offlce of oversight and Health Assessment, ME

Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management per-sonal communication to T. O’Toole, OTA, July 11, 1992.

49 Leo D~fy, Director, Office of Environmental Restoration

and Waste Management U.S. Department of Energy, memorandumto EM DOE and Contractor Persomel, “EM Policy and Commitm-ent Regarding Occupational Health and Safety,” July 11, 1991.

w Ibid.

51 NatiO~ A~demy of Sciences, The Nuclear WCMpOnS Com-pltz-Managementfor Health, Safety, and the Environment (Wash-ington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989).

52 ~upatio~ Safev and Health Administration, Evaluationof U.S. Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

53 Advisov Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, Op. tit.54 J Conway, ~, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Bo~7

“Recommendation to the Secretary of Energy, pursuant to 42U.S.C. 2286a(5) Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,” Dec.19, 1991.

55 Natio~ A&emy of Sciencw, The Nuclear weUpOnS Com-

plex. . . . op. cit.M Mitre Corp., “COrnp@Ve Review of Safety Standards for

DOE Defense Nuclear Facilities,” (no date), Executive Summary,vol. 1. Contract Report for the Defense Nuclear Facilities SafetyBoard.

57 ~upatio~ s~e~ and Health Administration, Evaluationof U.S. Department of Energy . . ., op. cit.

58 Advisov committee on Nuclear Facility safety, op. cit.

59 Ibid.m Ibid.61 U.S. Depar~ent of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notice,

SEN-6-89, “Departmental Organimtion and Management Ammge-ments,” May 19, 1989, Sept. 5, 1989.

62 us, Dep~ent of Energy, EnvkOnmenC Safety ‘d ‘d@

Technical Safety Appraisals of the Hanford Tank Farm Facility(Springfield, VA: National Technical Infomnation Service, May1989).

63 Advisow Committm on Nuclear Facility Safety, oP. Citoa Rictid Field Mice, oP. cit,

65 WeaPm Complex Monitor, “State Issues Violations at Han-ford as Tank Monitors Found Inoperable” (Washington DC: Ex-change Pubs.), May 25, 1992, p. 1.

66 Ricwd Field Office, op. Cit.67 Ibid.a Ibid.@ Offlce of Ihvironment, Safety and Heal@ U.S. Depment

of Energy, Report on the EH Special review of Occupational Safetyand Health Programs for the Hanford High-Level Waste Tanks, Oc-tober 1992.

m Mcwd Field Office, oP. cit-71 Moflon Com ~of~sor ~d Director, Division of Environ-

mental Health Engineering, The Johns Hopkins University, Schoolof Hygiene and Public Health, letter to T. O’Toole, OTA, July 27,1992.

n Jo~ TseW, Ma, H@-hvel Tanks Task Force, Office of

Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, U.S. Depart-ment of Energy, memorandum to Ronald Gerton, DOE RichlandField Office, “Investigation of Persomel Exposure to Noxious Va-pors of Tank 103-C,” WC Internal Memo #76314-91 -KEM-040,Jan. 14, 1992.

73 J Wagoner, -ger, Richland Field OffIce, U.S. Dep~-

ment of Energy, letter to T. Anderson, President, WestinghouseHanford Corp., July 2, 1992.

74 Occupation s~e~ and Health Administration, Evaluationof US. Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

75 Roy Gibbs, op. cit.

—


76 u s Conwess, offim of Technology ~~ssmenti C~mP1ex. .cleanup, 1991, op. cit.

77 p. Zlemer, Assistant Secretary, Environment, Stiety adHealti U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to R. ClaytoLAssistant Secretary, Defense Programs, William Young, AssistantSaretary, Nuclw Safety, L. Duffy, Assistant Secretary, Environ-mental Restoration and Waste Management, “EH Site Representa-tive Assessment of Occupational Safety and Health Issue Manage-men~” Sept. 6, 1991.

78 Roy Gibbs, op. cit.79 us. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment+ Stiety

and Heal@ “Briefing on Draft Revision to DOE Order 5480.9Construction Project Safety and Health Management” no date.

w Occupation s~e~ and Healti Administration, ~VUh@fiO~

of U.S. Department of Energy . . .% op. cit.s 1 p. Zlemer, Assistant Secretary Environment, Safety ad

Healti U.S. Department of Energy, memo to William Young, Of-fice of Nuclear Energy, “EH Site Representative Monthly Reports,”Dec. 26, 1991.

82 Ibid.‘3 Ibid.u Ibid.85 Ibid.86 J. Fitzger~d, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Stiety ASSW-

ance and Quality, U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to LeoDuffy, EM-1, “EH Site Representative Monthty Report,” Jan. 14,1992,

87 Ibid.88 R, Goldsmi~ Director, Office of Epidemiology ad H~~

Surveillance, U.S. Department of Energy, personal communicationto T.O’Toole, OTA, July 21, 1992.

69 Occupation s~e~ ~d He~~ Administration, Evaluationof the Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

~ U.S. Dep~ent of Labor and U.S. Department of Energy,MOU, op. cit.

91 Roy Gibbs, op. clt”

92 u s. Depment of ~~r and U.S . Dep~ent of ‘nergy’

MOU, op. cit.93 Office of Environment, Safety and Heal@ Office of s~etY,

U.S. Department of Energy, “Briefing on DOE 5483.XX Occupa-tional Health and Safety Program for DOE Contractor Employ-ees—Draft,” Apr. 14, 1992.

% Ibid.95 Roy Gibbs, Op. cit.% occupatio~ s~e~ md He~th Administration, Evaluation

of U.S. Department of Energ y. ., op. cit.97 u s Dep@ent of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Envtion-. .

ment, Safety and Health, Report on the Department of Energy Oc-cupational Safety and Health Program Review of the PortsmouthGaseous Difision Plant, October 1992.

98 u.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment Stietyand Health, “Briefing on Draft Revision to DOE Order 5480.9-Construction Project Safety and Health Managemen~” no date.

99 Roy Gibbs, op. cit.

100 Occupatioti Sdety and He~th Administration+ Evaluationof US. Department of Energy ., op. cit.

’01 Ibid.

102 Roy Gibbs, op. Cit.loq p. Ziemer, Assistant Secretary for Environment+ Safety ~d

Heal@ U.S. Department of Energy, letter to T. O’Toole, OTA, Oct.14, 1992.

104 Offlce if tie SwretW, U.S. Department of Energ’y, Smre-tary of Energy Notice, “Departmental Organizational and Manage-ment Arrangements,” SEN-6E-92, Feb. 21, 1992.

105 OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.106 Occupation s~e~ and Health Adrninistratio~ Evaluation

of U.S. Department of Energy ..., op. cit.tOT J. Fitzger~d, maorandum to L . Duffy, J~. 14, 1992, oP.

cit.1o13 p. Ziemer, Assistant Secretary, Environment, Safety and

Healm U.S. Department of Energy memorandum to R. ClaytoLAssistant Secretary for Defense Programs, “EH Site Representativeand March Monthly Report,” June 5, 1992.

l@ p. Ziemer, Assistant Secretary, Environment, Stiety adHealti U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to R. Clayton,Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, “EH Site RepresentativeMonthly Report,” July 2, 1992.

110 Ricmd Field office, U.S. Department of Energy, RictiandField Office, “DOE Investigation Board Report on Fall-Related Fa-tality of a Construction Worker at Hanford Site 105-F Building onApril 7, 1992” May 1992.

I I 1 Office of TKhnology Assessment, Complex cleanup, 1991,op. cit.

11’2 W~Pm Complex Monitor, “DOE to Pay Fernald Citizens

$73 Miltion in Three Installments,” (Washington, DC: ExchangePubs.) Feb. 19, 1990, p. 3.

113 W=wm Comp]ex Monitor, “At Oak Ridge OPS . . . Citizen

Files Wrongfut Death Suit Against DOE,” (Washington, DC: Ex-change Pubs.) June 27, 1990, p. 12.

114 Office of TwhnoIo= Assessment, Complex Cleanup, 1991,op. cit.

I IS D E1isburg, formerIy Director, Occupational Healti Foun-

dation personal communication to OffIce of Technology Assess-ment staff, Mar. 19, 1991.

116 OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, oP. cit.I 17 D Elisburg, perso~ communicatio~ Mar. 19, 1991, op. cit.116 &ce of TwhnoIogy Assessmen~ Complex Cleanup, 1991,

op. cit.119 ~ld.

*M Ibid.121 fiid.

122 Rewfl on Defense plant wastes) “DOE Sampling, AnalysisRequirements to Increase in Coming Decade” (Silver Spring, MD:Business Publishing), May 22, 1992.

123 DOE Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, OP. cit.lx U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Los Ahmos Natiod ~bOrato-

ry, “Draft Health and Safety Standard for Hazardous Waste Opera-tions and Emergency Response—Statement of Work, October1992.”

125 Ibid.126 R c Fleting, Regulatory compliance Divisiom Office of. .

Program Support, Environmental Restoration, U.S. Department ofEnergy, informal note to T, O’Toole, OTA, Oct. 9, 1992.


127 Rqofi on Defense pklt wwest “New Cleanup StrategyCould Save Millions on Cleanup of DOE’s Hanford Site,” (SilverSpring, MD: Business Publishing) July 3, 1992, p. 111.

128 ~lce of TwhnoIogy Assessmen~ Complex Cleanup, 1991,op. cit.

129 OTA Worwop on Cleanup Worker Health and Safety, op.

cit.130 Office of Technology Assessment, Hazardous waste Action

Contractors (HWAC) Workshop, Washington DC, Sept. 17, 1991.131 Occupatioti s~e~ and Health Adrninistratiow Eva~uafi~n

of the Department of Energy. . . . op. cit.132 mid.

133 Wapons Complex Monitor, “In the GAO” (Washington,DC: Exchange Pubs.) June 18, 1992, pp. 24-25.

134 offIce of TechnoIo~ Assessment, Complex cleanup, op.cit.

135 Weapom complex Monitor, “DOE Issues Long-AWtitedRequest for Proposals for Fernald ERMC” (Washington, DC: Ex-change Pubs.), Jan. 13, 1992, p. 2.

136 U.S. ~pm~ent of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notice,“Departmental Organizational and Management Arrangements,”SEN 6E-92, Feb. 21, 1992.

1sI’ weapons Complex Monitor (Washington, DC: Exc@WePubs.), Jan. 13, 1992 op. cit.

138 mid.139 mid.la weapom Complex Monitor, “Fernald ERMC Mkion post-

poned, On-Site Target Now End of Year” (Washington DC: Ex-change Pubs.), Mar. 30, 1992, p. 1.

141 WWPIIS Complex Monitor, “DOE Requests proPosals for

Hanford Cleanup Contractor”, (Washington DC: Exchange Pubs.)Apr. 20, 1992, pp. 1-4.

142 H-s Befo~ tie subcommittee On H~& ~ Stiety ‘f

the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives,“Oversight Hearings on Health and Safety of Workers at Depart-ment of Energy Owned Nuclear Facilities Operated by Private Con-tractors,” Serial No. 101-32, May 10& 17, 1984.

143 u.s, Dep~ent of Energy, Secre@ry of Energy Notice,

“Setting the New DOE Course,” SEN-11-89, Sept. 5, 1989,144 U.S. ~p~ent of ~r=, Environmental Restoration ~d

Waste Management, Five-Year Plan Fiscal Years 1992-1996,DOE/S-0078P (Spriq@eld, VA: National Technical InformationServices), June 1990).

145 U.S. COngreSS, General Accounting ~lce, Vuherability ofDOE’s Contracting to Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Mismanagement(May 1991).

146 W=pons CoWlex Monitor, 1’IG Report Criticizes Field Of-

fice Management” (Washington, DC: Exchange Pubs.) June 22,1992.

147 Occupation s~e~ and Health Adrninistratio~ Evaluationof the Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

148 Weapons complex Monitor, (w=h@tOn, DC: ‘ic%e

Pubs.), op. cit.149 Rewfl on Defense p~t Wastes, “GAO F~ds Con@cting

Practices Prone to Abuse” (Silver Spring, MD: Business Publishers,hlC.), my 22, 1992.

MO Us. cow,, Gmd Accouq Office, Vuznerabilify of

DOE’s Contracting to Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and MismanagementGAO/RCED-92-101 (my 1992).

151 Weapom Complex Monitor, “DOE gives WestinghouseHartford ‘Satisfactory’ Rating” (Washington, DC: ExchangePubs.), Jan. 13, 1992.

152 U.S. Dep~ent Of Energy, 0ffk42 of Environment, s~etyand Heal@ “EH-30 Site Representative Office Monthly Report forAugust-September 1991,” Jan. 14, 1992.

1S3 M-d Field office, Op. Cit.1~ U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, office of Environment, s~ety

and Healm “Technical Safety Appraisal of the Hanford Tank FarmFacility,” DOE/EH-0088, my 1989.

155 J~. w%oner, _gm, WCW Field OffIce, U.S. Depart-ment of Energy, letter to T.M. Andersoq President, WestinghouseHanford Co., July 2, 1992.

156 W=pm Complex Mo~tor, “IG Report Criticizes Field Of-

fice hfanagemen~” (Washington DC: Exchange Pubs.), June 22,1992.

157 WeaPm Complex Monitor, “GAO Says Awmd Fee for

EG&G at Rocky Flats Unjusti.tied,” (Washington DC: ExchangePubs.), Apr. 13, 1992.

158 US, ~ner~ ACCO- OffIce, Vulnerability of DOE Con-tracting ..., op. cit.

159 M ~, Dir~tor, C)ffke of Environmental Restoration

and Waste Management, memorandum, “Safety and Health Reviewfor Startup/Restart of All Operations,” Feb. 6, 1991.

km U.S. ~pmat of EtItigy, OffIce of ~ ~P@or G-*

“Environmental Training at the Department of Energy,” DOE/IG-0294, Dec. 21, 1990.

161 U.S. Dq~ent of Energy, OffIce of Environment Stiety

and Heal~ “OSHA Training Requirements for Hazardous WasteOperations,” DOE/EH-0227P, December 1991.

162 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment s~etyand Healt.tL “Draft-Hazardous Waste Operations and EmergencyResponse (HAZWOPER),” no date.

16329 ~ 191o.12o.164 Los -OS NatioA Laboratory, “Draft-Health ~d S~e-

ty Standard for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Re-sponse: Statement of WO*” October 1992.

165 Dam from ~patio~ Safety ~d HAth A(hhktdoQ

U.S. Department of Labor, “Federal and 18(B) Source Inspectionsof Hazardous Waste Activity,” Mar. 1, 1990 through Dec. 6, 1991.

166 ~vkowenti Mtition Agency-Labor H~~ ~ ‘tie~

Task Force, notes of meeting, Mar. 5, 1991.167 U.S. Environmen~ protection Agency, Office Of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, Hazardous Waste Operations andEmergency Response: Uncontrolled Waste Sites andRCRA Correc-tive Actions, 9285 .2-08FS. (April 1991).

168 Offiw of Twhnology Assessmen~ Complex Cleanup, 1991op. cit.

169 EPA defies ms- as “any unit at a facility from which

hazardous constituents might migrate, irrespective of whether theunits were intended for the management of solid and/or hazardouswastes.” Thus an SWMU could be a unit such as a landfdl, wastepile, surface impoundment container, @or incinerator.


ITO U.S. Offlm of Technology Assessment complex cleanup,1991, op. cit.

171 us. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment, Stiety

and Health, “Draft-Hazardous Waste Operation and EmergencyResponse- HAZWOPER,” op. cit.

172 J. Semcki, July 11, 1992, op. cit.173 J. CW~iS, Cocm, EPA-Labor Health and Safety Tmk

Force, personal communication to T.O’Toole, OffIce of Technolo-gy Assessmen6 Aug. 19, 1992.

174 Natio~ Actierny of Sciences, The Nuclear weapons Com-plex Management for Health, Safety, and Environment (Washing-ton DC: National Academy Press, 1989).

ITS Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, op. cit.176 Defeme Facfities Board, “Recommendations tO tie Secre-

tary of Energy Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286a(5). Atomic EnergyAct of 1954, as amended,” Dec. 19, 1991.

177 U.S. Conwess, Office of Technology Assessment, Compl~Cleanup, op. cit.

178 Natio~ Academy of sciences, Improving Risk COmni-

cation (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1989) p. 120.179 B. Mere, “Nuclem weapo~ Facilities Face Attacks from

Environmentalists, Government Agencies,” Journal of the Amer-ican Medical Association, Aug. 4, 1989, p. 604.

180 Physlcims for smi~ Responsibility, Dead Reckoning: A

Critical Review of the Department of Energy’s Epidemiologic Re-search (Washington, DC: Physicians for Social Responsibility,

1992).181 Seaew Pmel for the Evaluation of Epidemiologic Re-

search Activities for the U.S. Department of Energy, (SPEERA)“Report to the Secretary,” March 1990.

182 Weapm Complex Monitor, “EPA Better ‘Get Off It’s Duff’

on Rad Standards, Glem Warns” (Washington, DC: ExchangePubs.), Apr. 13, 1992.

183 Seaeti pmel for the Evaluation of Epidemiologic Re-

search ..., op. cit.184 U.S. Dep~@ of Energy, Office of Occupational Medi-

cine, “Occupational Medical Program Appraisal Nevada Test Site,”Mar, 2-6, 1992.

ls~ U,S. Dep~ent of Energy, OffIce of Occupational Medi-cine, “Occupational Medical Program Appraisal at Fernald Envi-ronmental Management ProJecL” June 1992.

186 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Ofllce of Occupatioti Mfi-cine, “Appraisal of the Occupational Medical Program at theOakridge K-25 Site,” Nov. 12-22 and Dec. 2-10, 1991.

187 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of OCcupathid Medi-cine, “Occupational Medical Program at Mason & Hanger (PantexPlant),” Sept. 30, 1991.

188 us. Dep~ent of ~ergy, Office Of Occupational ‘eti-

cine, “Occupational Medical Program Hanford EnvironmentalHealth Foundation Richkmd, WA,” June 24-26, 1991.

189 u-s, Dep~@ of Energy, Ofllce of Occupational Medi-cine, “Occupational Medical Appraisal Lawrence Livermore Na-tional Laboratory,” Apr. 27-May 1, 1992.

190 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of occupatio~ M~-cine, “Occupational Medical program Review,” Los Alamos, NM,Sept. 22-Oct. 25, 1991.

191 OTA wor~hop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

‘w Ibid.193 w. Greend yk e, M. SW@ D, Minner, D. Comad, L. Cle-

venger, J. Hightower, L. Kreisler, J. Spickhard, P. Mossman, Med-ical Directors DOE Facilities, letter to J. Watkins, Secretary of En-ergy, Aug. 7, 1989.

194 Willim Greendyke, Chair, DOE Medical professional

Committee, letter to J. Watkins, Secretasy of Energy, Mar. 5, 1990.195 Natio~ Ac~emy of Sciences, The Nuclear weapons COm-

ple-x. . . . op. cit.196 H.J. pe~gill, Dep~ent of Energy, Acting Deputy Assis-

tant Secretary for Healthj memorandum to the Secretary of Energy,“Implementation Plan for Office of Heal@” May 18, 1992.

197 R. Gol~@ Dkector, OffIce of Epidemiology and He~th

Surveillance, U.S. Department of Energy, personal communicationto T.O’Toole, July 21, 1992.

198 G. Gebus, Di~tor, Office of Occupational Medicbe, U.S.

Department of Energy, personal communication to T.O’Toole, July21, 1992.

199 u s Dep~tment of Energy, Environment, Stlfety and. .Healti “Contractor Occupational Medical Prograrq” DOE Order5480.8, June 26, 1992.

~ WT. Greendyke, formerly Chair, DOE Medicrd professio~

Committee, Medical Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory (retired), personal communication to T. O’Toole, Aug. 24, 1992.

201 us Dep~ent Of fiergy, Assistant Secretary for Environ-. ,men~ Safety and Heal@ “Contractor Occupational Medical Pro-graQ” Order 5480.8A

‘2 Ibid.203 w. Grmdyke, Op. cit.

204 pJatio~ Academy of Sciences, The Nuclear weaPon cOm-

plex. . . . op. cit.20S S=eti pael for Evaluation of Epidemiologic RtiWch

Activities at the U.S. DOE, op. cit.206 ~cupatio~ s~e~ ~d H4t.h Administration Evaluation

of the Department of Energy ..., op. cit.207 US, Dep~ent of Energy, Oflice of OCcupatioMl M*5

icine, “Occupational Medical Appraisal Nevada Test Site,”Mar. 2-6, 1992.

2f18 u-s- Dep~@ of fiergy, ~lce of Occupatioti ‘d-

icine, “Occupational Medical Program Appraisal at Fernald Envi-ronmental Management Projecg” June 1992.

209 us. Dep~ent Of EIIergy, OffIce Of occupatio~ Med-icine, “Appraisal of the Occupational Medical Program at theOakridge K-25 Site,” Nov. 12-22 and Dec. 2-10, 1991.

210 U S Departm~t of fiergy, offlCe Of occupation Med-. .

icine, “Occupational Medical Program at Mason & Hanger (PantexPlant), Sept. 30, 1991.

21 I U.S. ~p~ent of Energy, Office of OccupatiOMl Med-

icine, “Occupational Medical program Hanford EnvironmentalHealth Foundation Richland, WA” June 24-26, 1991.

212 U*S. ~p~=t of EQmW, Offlce of Occupational Med-

icine, “OWupational Medical Appraisal Lawrence Livermore Na-tional Laboratory, Apr. 27-May 1, 1992.

213 I-J.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Occupational Medic-ine, “Occupational Medical Program Review, Los Alamos, mSept. 22-Oct. 25, 1991.”

214 ~ysicia for Socti R~ponsibility, oP. cit.


215 Seaeti pael for Evaluation of Epidemiologic ResearchActivities at the U.S. DOE, op. cit.

216 U.S. ~p~at of mm=, OffIce of the Inspector G~erdEnvironmental Training at the Department of Energy, DOE/IG-0294, Dec. 21, 1990.

217 u-s. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment, Safetyand Health, Environmental Guidance-OSHA Training Require-ments for Hazardous Waste Operations, DOE/EH-0227, December1991.

218 us. Env~onmen@l Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, “Establishing Work Zones at Un-controlled Hazardous Waste Sites,” 9285.2-06F6, April 1991.

21955, Federal Register (Jan. 26, 1990) 2776.220 Weqom Complex Monitor, “Rocky Flats Cited for 56 Vio-

lations,” (WashingtorL DC: Exchange Pubs.) June 19, 1992, p. 2.221 Weapom Complex Monitor, “State Denied AC~SS to Tr*-

ing Records,” (Washington, DC: Exchange Pubs.) May 25, 1992,pp. 2-3.

222 Natio~ Defense Authorization Act for FY 1992 ~d 1993,

Pub.L. 102-190, Dec. 5, 1991.223 p. Whi&leId, Deputy Assistant SaretiUy for Envkonmenti

Restoration U.S. Department of Energy, letter to K. Oldew Direc-tor, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, June 12,1992.

224 K. Olden, D~ector, Natlonat Institute of Environmental

Health Sciences, letter from to P. WhM3eld, Deputy Assistant Sec-retary of Environmental Restoratio~ U.S. Department of Energy,June 29, 1992.

225 Natio~ Defense Authori~tion Act for Fiscal Yem 1991?

Pub.L. No, 101-510.226 us. Dep~ent of Energy, Evaluation of the Suitabilio of

the Training Program Developed by the National Institute ofEnvironmental Health Sciences for Training Workers Involved inEnvironmental and Waste Management Activities of the Depar-tment of Energy, May 1991.

‘7 Ibid.‘a Ibid.29 Ibid.230 L. Mwhy, ~$~sis in the F~e SeNice,” Proceedings of First

EPA Design and Construction Issues at Hazardous Waste SitesConferences, Dallas, TX, EPA 540/8-91/012, May 1-3, 1991.

231 L. Mqhy, Dhector, H~dous ~teridS Trtig, ‘d ‘“

Corbett, Assistant Project Director, International Association ofFirefighters, personal communication to OTA, Nov. 20, 1991.

232 L, MWhy, ~~Tes~ony on Accreditation of Tr*g Pro-

grams for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Re-spons+omments of the International Association of Firefight-ers, ” Docket No. S-760-B, U.S. Department of Labor,Occupational Safety and Health Administration, May 26, 1992.

233 L. Mqhy, ~~o~ COIItXItUtticiltio~ Nov. 20, 1991, ‘p- Cit”~ ~te~o~ Association of Firefighters, “Phone fhuvey of

Hazardous Materials Training Among Municipal Firefighters bcated Near DOE Weapons Plants,” 1992.

235 U.S, Dep~ent of Energy Order 5481 .B.2315 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy Order 5480.7.237 Adviso~ Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, op. cit.‘8 Ibid.‘9 Ibid.zlo us. Dep~ent of Energy, “Tiger Team Assessment of tie

Pantex Plant Arnardl“ o Texas,” DOE/EH-0130, February 1990.Ml U.S. Congess, General Accounting Office, Marshall ~$-

IandHtatus of the Nuclear Claims Trust Fund, GAO/NSIAD-92-229 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September1992).

protection at the doe nuclear weapons complex 3 m

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