Purpose of Writ

PNB v. RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corp. (September 27, 2006)

Main action: Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by RJ Ventures Realty & Dev’t Corporation (RJVRD) and Rajah Broadcasting Network (RBN)

RJRVD is the assignee of the rights to a deed of sale between First Women’s Credit Corporation (FWCC) and PNB involving the Buendia Property. To finance the payment of the balance of the purchase price (Php 3.64B), an arrangement was agreed upon where PNB would lend an amount equivalent to 10% of the purchase price to RBN, the latter being an affiliate company of RJVRD, which amount will be available for relending to RJVRD.

To secure the loan, RBN assigned in favor of PNB all its rights and interest over radio and television frequencies issued by the Nat’l Telecommunications Commission. RBN and RJVVRD failed to fulfil their respective obligations in the contract of loan and of sale, respectively, despite demands from PNB.

As a consequence, the Buendia property was extrajudicially sold at public auction for the amont of Php2.8B. Meanwhile, RBN received a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale from PNB, specifying therein that its radio facilities in Baguio will be foreclosed and taken over by PNB.

In support of its Application for the Issuance of a TRO and a WPI, respondents allege that RJVRD and RNB would suffer great and irreparable injury by the extrajudicial foreclosure of the property and the take over of RBN’s radio facilities in Baguio.

On 27 May 99, the WPI was granted by the RTC. It was later lifted on 28 July 99, and rectified on 29 July 99.

Issue: Whether or not RJVRD and RBN are entitled to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Held:

As to purpose of the writ: The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits can be heard . A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.

Requisites: For a WPI to issue, the ff requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary estimation and the prevention of multiplicity of suits.

Merits of the case: Respondents were able to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the subject collaterals. As owner of the subject collaterals that stand to be extrajudicially foreclosed, respondents are entitled to the possession and protection thereof.

Further, there is an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious damage. The term irreparable injury has a definite meaning in law. It does not have reference to the amount of damages that may be caused but rather to the difficulty of measuring the damages inflicted. The direct and inevitable result would be the stoppage of the operations of respondents’ radio stations, consequently, losing its listenership, and tarnishing the image that it has built over time. It does not stretch one’s imagination to see that the cost of a destroyed image is significantly the loss of its good name and reputation. The value of a radio station’s image and reputation are not quantifiable in terms of monetary value.

Status quo ante

First Global Realty & Dev’t. Corp. v. Agustin (February 19, 2002)

Main action: Rescission of Sale, Annulment of Dacion en Pago and cancellation of title and issuance of a new title with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of injunction filed by respondent against petitioner.

The subject matter is a parcel of land, including a house built thereon, covered by a TCT issued in the name of respondent’s mother, Lilian San Agustin, who, together with his parents, brothers and sisters have been in possession of the same since 1967 up to the resolution of the instant case.

Respondent intended to sell the subject property to the Camacho spouses for Php2.5M. The couple initially paid Php 100K, with the agreement that the balance would be paid when they would have secured a loan using the property as collateral. To facilitate their procurement of a loan, the title of the property was transferred to them.

Using the property as collateral, the Camachos were able to obtain a loan of Php1.19M from petitioner. Upon the former’s failure to pay the loan, petitioner sought to foreclose the mortgage. Before foreclosure, the parties agreed on a dacion en pago, in which the spouses ceded ownership of the property in favor of petitioner in consideration of the payment of the loan.

Petitioner then demanded the payment of rentals from respondent, whose family was still in possession of the property. Because respondents did not heed the demand of petitioner, the latter filed a motion for issuance of a writ of possession before Branch 143 Makati. Respondent filed the instant action (Branch 141) to enjoin petitioner from taking possession of the subject property. The RTC denied the application, but the CCA reversed and granted the same on 28 April 2000.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to the possession of the property while the main case for rescission is pending in the RTC.

Held: On status quo ante: A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. It is issued to preserve the status quo ante – the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that preceded the actual controversy. Injunction is an extraordinary remedy calculated to preserve the status quo of things and to prevent actual or threatened acts violative of the rules of equity and good conscience as would consequently afford an injured party a cause of action resulting from the failure of the law to provide for an adequate or complete relief. Its sole purpose is not to correct a wrong of the part, in the sense of redress for injury already sustained, but to prevent further injury.

Merits: Respondent was able to show a prima facie right to the relief demanded. The Camachos’ non-payment of the purchase price agreed upon and the irregularities surrounding the dacion en pago are serious enough to allow him to possess the property pendent lite. To allow petitioner to take immediate possession of the property would result in grave injustice. Respondent has been in possession of the premises during all this time – prior to and during the institution of the complaint. He and his family have long owned, possessed and occupied it as their family home since 1967. To dispossess him of it now would definitely alter the status quo to their detriment.

Section 1

Department of Health, et. al. v. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (March 13, 2007)

Main action: Injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO filed by respondent against DOH.

Respondent participated in a bid conducted by the DOH for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G. In accordance with A.O. No. 10 of DOH, which provides that only products accredited by the bids and awards committee shall be allowed to be procured by the DOH, respondent submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products including the antibiotic Penicillin G.

Despite the lack of response from DOH, respondent still submitted its bid for the Penicillin G contract. Only two companies participated, with respondent submitting the lower bid (Php82.24 per unit), compared to YSS Laboratories (Php95.00). in view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondent’s Penicillin G product, the contract was awarded to YSS. Hence, the present action.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss contending immunity from suit. RTC and CA denied the motion.

Issue: Whether or not DOH is entitled to immunity from suit.

Held: Definition: The defense of immunity from suit will not avail petitioner DOH since the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State.

Levi Strauss & Co., v. Clinton Apparelle (September 20, 2005)

Main Action: Complaint for Trademark Infringement, Injunction and Damages with prayer for TRO and WPI filed by petitioner against respondent.

LS & Co. is the owner by prior adoption and use since 1986 of the internationally famous “Dockers and Design” trademark. The same was first used in the Philippines in 1988 and registered for use on pants, shirts, blouses, skirts, shorts, sweatshirts, and jackets.

LS & Co. discovered the presence in the local market of jeans under the brand name “Paddocks” using a device which is substantially, if not exactly similar to the “Dockers and Design” trademark. Hence, the instant action seeking to enjoin respondent from manufacturing, distributing, selling, etc. jeans the design of which is similar to petitioner’s trademark.

On 4 June 1988, the trial court granted the WPI. Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the same, but said motion was denied. The CA granted the Petition for certiorari filed by respondent and held that the issuance of the WPI is questionable since petitioners failed to sufficiently establish its material and substantial right to have the writ issued. In addition, the CA strongly believed that the implementation of the questioned writ would effectively shut down respondent’s business, which should not be sanctioned.

Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the WPI.

Held: Definitions: (1) Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency, or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. (2) Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity. (3) An extraordinary remedy, injunction is designed to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be heard. (4) It may be resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. (5) it is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid

injurious consequences, which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.

Requisites (right in esse):  A clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.

Kinds: There are generally two kinds of preliminary injunction: (1) a prohibitory injunction which commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act; and (2) a mandatory injunction which commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.

Merits: There was scant justification for the issuance of the WPI. Attention should be given to the fact that petitioners’ registered trademark consists of two elements: (1) the word mark “Dockers” and (2) the wing-shaped design or logo. Notably, there is only one registration for both features of the trademark giving the impression that the two should be considered as a single unit. Given the single registration of the trademark “Dockers and Design” and considering that respondent only uses the assailed device but a different word mark, the right to prevent the latter from using the challenged “Paddocks” device is far from clear. Stated otherwise, it is not evident whether the single registration of the trademark “Dockers and Design” confers on the owner the right to prevent the use of a fraction thereof in the course of trade. It is also unclear whether the use without the owner’s consent of a portion of a trademark registered in its entirety constitutes material or substantial invasion of the owner’s right.  

From the above discussion, petitioners’ right to injunctive relief has not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated. The right has yet to be determined. Petitioners also failed to show proof that there is material and substantial invasion of their right to warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ. Neither were petitioners able to show

any urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

Monetary Compensation: The damages the petitioners had suffered or continue to suffer may be compensated in terms of monetary consideration. A writ of injunction should never have been issued when an action for damages would adequately compensate the injuries caused. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction rests in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary estimation and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.

Tantamount to trial on the merits: The issued injunctive writ, if allowed, would dispose of the case on the merits as it would effectively enjoin the use of the “Paddocks” device without proof that there is basis for such action. The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction that would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. There would be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which petitioners are inceptively bound to prove.

Section 2 (Doctrine of Non-jurisdiction)

Gomos v. Judge Adiong (Branch 8, Marawi City)

Main Action: Special Civil Action for mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction filed by Saripada Ali Pacasum against FAPE

Pacasum alleged that FAPE was required by law to pay subsidy to Pacasum College, Inc. (PCI) under the Educational Service Program of DECS in the amount of Php 1,845, 040.00.

On 26 Feb 2001, respondent judge granted the application of preliminary mandatory injunction. On 28 Feb 2001, respondent judge issued an Order directing the president of FAPE to prepare and issue a check for the stated amount representing payment to PCI. On the same day, the sheriff of Branch 8 Marawi served upon FAPE, through its president, summons and a copy of the petition.

FAPE filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA alleging that the RTC of Marawi City has no jurisdiction to enforce the writs of mandamus and preliminary injunction to FAPE, in its principal office in Makati City, since the place is outside the 12th judicial region where it belongs.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge had authority to enforce a preliminary injunction in Makati City, where the principal office of FAPE was located.

Held: On Jurisdiction: Respondent judge’s failure to comply with procedural due process is aggravated by his total inattention to the parameters of his jurisdiction. As the presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, he should have known that Makati City was way beyond the boundaries of his territorial jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction is concerned. Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. The rationale, as explained in Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, is that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin acts

being performed or about to be performed outside its territorial jurisdiction.

On prior notice and hearing: Respondent judge granted Saripada Ali Pacasums application for preliminary mandatory injunction on the very same day the Special Civil Action was filed. Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is very explicit that the writ of preliminary injuction may issue only after prior notice and hearing upon the adverse party. In issuing the subject writ on the very same day the application was filed and considering that the person against whom the same was to be served was located in Makati, summons could not have been served upon them or a hearing conducted in evident disregard of the due process requirements of the Rules of Court.

Dela Paz v. Judge Adiong

Main Action: Pasacum College, Inc. (PCI) represented by Saripada Ali Pasacum, filed with the RTC, a petition for mandamus with application for a preliminary mandatory injunction against FAPE.

On 4 March 2002, respondent judge issued an order granting the Writ of Preliminary mandatory injunction. On 5 March 2002, respondent judge issued another order directing the appropriate sheriffs of Makati and Mandaluyong to serve the attached Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction upon FAPE.

FAPE filed a motion to set aside the mentioned orders claiming that the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which was intended to be enforced in Makati is outside the jurisdiction of the 12th judicial region of RTC Marawi City. Section 21 of BP 129 provides that the RTC has jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction which may be enforced in any part of its respective regions.

On 6 May 2002, respondent issued another order directing the sheriff of Makati to take custody of the funds of FAPE in favor of PCI thru garnishment proceedings at the BPI Makati branch and/or Landbank Ortigas Center branch. Said notices were issued by the sheriff on 8 May 2002.

Gabriel Dela Paz, by way of a letter-complaint, charged respondent judge of gross ignorance off the law and/or abuse of authority.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge had the authority to issue and enforce a preliminary injunction in Makati City.

Held: On Jurisdiction: Respondent’s court is in Marawi City which falls within the twelfth judicial region. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent requiring FAPE, which is holding office in Makati City, and its officials who have their residences in Metro Manila, to issue a check in the amount of P4,000,000.00 payable to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum, is outside the territorial jurisdiction of respondents court. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the respondent is void considering that his authority to issue an injunction is limited only to and operative only within his respective provinces or districts.

Consequently, the Order dated March 5, 2002 directing the sheriff of Makati and Mandaluyong to serve the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to FAPE, et al. is a jurisdictional faux pas as the respondent can only enforce his orders within the territorial jurisdiction of his court.

Notice and Hearing: The rule on injunction as found under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that the same can only be granted upon a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded and upon the filing of a bond executed to the party or person enjoined. It is also provided that no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined unless shown that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice; that a temporary restraining order may be issued effective for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party sought to be enjoined.

A perusal of the Order dated March 4, 2002 failed to show that respondent conducted a hearing before the injunction was granted or that complainant was given prior notice thereof. In fact, complainant stressed that FAPE was not at all served with summons before the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued.

Bond: It was not also shown whether the applicant posted a bond and the same was approved before the order granting the preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. A bond is required unless exempted

by the court. The Order merely stated that the petition was sufficient in form and substance without even stating the facts which would support the granting of the injunction. This is a clear violation of the rule.

Mangahas v. Paredes (February 14, 2007)

Main Action: Petition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With Prayer For Provisional Remedy

Private respondent Avelino Banaag filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners claiming the he is the registered owner of the disputed property as evidenced by a TCT. He further averred that petitioners constructed houses on the property without his knowledge and consent, and demands to vacate fell on deaf ears.

Petitioners, in their defense, claimed that they have resided in the subject lot with the knowledge and conformity of the true owner thereof, Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO), as evidenced by a Certificate of Occupancy signed by PIADECO’s president in their favor.

On 10 July 1997, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on the WPI issued by the RTC of Quezon City Br. 85 enjoining the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan from ordering the eviction and demolition of all occupants of the Tala Estate, which the subject property forms part of. They posited that the injunction issued by the Quezon   City RTC is enforceable in   Caloocan City   because both cities are situated within the NCR.

The MeTC denied said motion holding that the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC has binding effect only within the territorial boundaries of the said court and since Caloocan is not within the territorial area of same, the injunction it issued is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the WPI issued by the Quezon City RTC is limited only to its territorial area.

Held: On Jurisdiction: The petitioners postulate that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated November 10, 1997 which emanated from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City should have prompted the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to suspend the ejectment

proceedings then pending before it. It was the petitioners contention that the injunction writ issued in Quezon City is enforceable also in Caloocan City inasmuch [as] both cities are situated within the National Capital Region.

Under Sec. 17 of B.P. 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and their judges is basically regional in scope, but under Sec. 18, it may be limited to the territorial area of the branch in which the judges sits.

Law of the Case: It must be remembered that the issue on the enforceability of the injunction order originating from the Quezon City RTC had already been litigated and finally decided when the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC.Said Decision had become final and executory per Entry of Judgment dated 25 April 2002.

Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC became the law of the case between the parties. Petitioners are therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the injunction issued by the QuezonCity RTC has no binding effect to the courts of Caloocan City as this issue had already been passed upon with finality.

Section 2 (Exceptions)

Decano v. Edu (99 SCRA 410)

On September 12, 1962, the then Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications issued to Federico Decano, a temporary appointment to the position of janitor in the Motor Vehicles Office,

After four years in service he received a telegram from respondent-appellant Romeo F. Edu, in his then capacity as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission (LTC), terminating his (Decano's) services effective as of the close of business on that day

Decano filed before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a petition for "Mandamus and Injunction"

Ground: LTC acted without power and in excess of authority in removing him from the service,

Prayer: declare as null and void the order for his removalo declare him entitled to the position, o compel his reinstatement and payment of his regular

salary, o enjoin, preliminary, and then permanently,

respondents from disturbing, molesting or otherwise ousting him from his position as janitor.

Petition granted. Writ of Injunction issued by Trial Court. Removal null and void under the law.

Instant case

Issue: W/N courts of general juristdiction (CFIs) have the power of judicial review of the administrative decisions of national officials is confined to courts of first instance of Metropolitan Manila where their offices are maintained to the exclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where the aggrieved parties reside and the questioned decisions are sought to be enforced.

Ruling: As held by the Court in the 1965 case of Gayacao vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, where the issue is the correctness of a national official's decision, the provincial courts of first instance have equal jurisdiction with the Manila courts to review decisions of

national officials, as otherwise litigants of ted means would practically be denied access to the courts of the localities where they reside and where the questioned acts are sought to be enforced.

Thus, Justice J.B.L. Reyes stressed on behalf of the Court that —

"we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be confined to the courts of first instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned decisions are being enforced".

It is easy to see that if the contested ruling of the court below is sustained, the same would result not only in hardship to litigants of limited means, practically amounting to denial of access to the courts, but would also unnecessarily encumber the Manila courts whose dockets are already over — burdened. Actually, since Ortua vs. Singson, 59 Phil. 440, the power of provincial courts of first instance to review administrative decisions of national officials has been consistently recognized.

Dagupan Electric Co. vs Paño (95 SCRA 693)

Dagupan Electric Corporation (DECORP), by contract supplied electric power service on the MC Adore International Palace Hotel owned by MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc.

acting in the belief that the June 1978 bill in the amount of 1'25,380.70 was erroneous, the petitioner DECORP recalled the same and a corrected bill in the amount of P80,243.62 was sent to the private respondent

MC ADORE failed and refused to pay the aforesaid bill; DECORP disconnected the power from the premises of the

hotel; MC ADORE filed a complaint with a prayer for preliminary

mandatory injunction CFI Rizal judge granted the issuance of a preliminary

mandatory injunction commanding the petitioner DECORP and its agents to "restore immediately not later than 5:00 P.M., December 7, 1978, the electrical power of the McAdore International Palace Hotel.

MFR denied, Instant case

Issue: W/N the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City has no jurisdiction over the case because the act of disconnecting the power to the hotel of the MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. took place in Dagupan City, outside the Province of Rizal and Quezon City.

Ruling: The Dagupan Electric Corporation has its principal office in Quezon City where the business of the corporation is managed by the Board of Directors. Decisions of the said corporation are made in Quezon City. The employees of the Dagupan Electric Corporation in Dagupan City merely carry out the orders issued by the officials of said corporation in Quezon City. Hence the acts sought to be restrained are being committed in Quezon City.

On the question of jurisdiction, both parties are residents of Quezon City, as they have their principal offices in Quezon City. The disconnection order was initiated and had its life and source in Quezon City. The mandatory injunction is addressed to the corporation in Quezon City. The Dagupan plant acts only upon order of its officers in Quezon City.

Here we have a case of the interference of plaintiff's property rights, with situs in Quezon City by a corporation situs with situs in Quezon City. The exercise of will by defendant had its origin in Quezon City.

This Court can grant relief when that exercise of will causes irreparable prejudice as in the instant case.

Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie Phils vs. Metrobank (February 10, 2006)

Asiansian Appraisal Holdings, Inc. (AAHI) obtained a loan amounting to P442,500,000 from Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank).

As security, a real estate mortgage was executed covering 2 plots of land with a condominium built and other improvements including parking lots.

AAHI then entered into a contract to sell with petitioner ALLGEMEINE-BAU-CHEMIE PHILS., INC., for 2 units of the abovementioned condominium with rith to exclusive use of certain parking lots.

AAHI defaulted in its loan agreement, and Metrobank, where Solidbanks operation were integrated iled before the Muntinlupa RTC a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage.

AAHI filed a complaint against Solidbank, for Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.

On October 31, 2000, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to the highest bidder, Metrobank, to which a Certificate of Sale was issued. The Certificate of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City and annotated on the individual CTCs on April 4, 2001

Metrobank filed and was granted an ex parte writ of possession on Jan 2002

AAHI's complaint was denied prompting it to file before the appellate court a petition for a writ of preliminary injunction.

On April 9, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for intervention, to which it attached a complaint-in-intervention (AAHI’s complaint against Solidbank for Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction) with prayer for the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale, delivery of title, and damages and for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Metrobank to consolidate its title and to take possession of its properties.

Petitioner also filed a separate petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction with the appellate court,26 also to enjoin the implementation of the writ of possession issued by the Muntinlupa RTC. In its petition, petitioner alleged that its complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 00-196 pending in Branch 256 is its principal action but as the said court could not enjoin Branch 276 from implementing the writ of possession, both courts being of equal jurisdiction, it had no choice but to file the petition with the appellate court.

The CA granted the temporary restraining order but denied, the petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for failure to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the subject properties.

MFR denied, instant case

Issue: W/N the Court of Appeals can issue a writ of preliminary injunction in its original jurisdiction

Ruling: Clearly, what petitioner filed with the appellate court was an original action for preliminary injunction which is a provisional and extra-ordinary remedy calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.

An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, however. Under B.P. 129, the appellate court has original jurisdiction only over actions for annulment of judgments of the RTCs and has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not they are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

The appellate court’s jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is limited to actions or proceedings pending before it, as Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules clearly provides:

SECTION 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted by the court where the action or proceeding is pending. x x x (Emphasis supplied),

or in a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus under Section 7 of Rule 65, thus:

SECTION 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.

In the case at bar, petitioner’s complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 00-196 was pending before Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC, not with the appellate court. Petitioner’s petition before the appellate court does not show, nay allege, that in issuing the writ of possession, the Muntinlupa RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or

with grave abuse of discretion for it to be treated as either one for certiorari36 or prohibition.37

Thus, for want of jurisdiction, the petition before the appellate court should have been dismissed outright.

At all events, it is well-settled that an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction is not appealable.

Civil Service Commission vs CA (November 17, 2005)

On December 22, 1995, a Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension and Disarming was filed by the stockholders and board members of United Workers Transport Corp. (UWTC) against SPO1 Rimando Gannapao [respondent] before the Philippine National Police, Inspectorate Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City.

A Summary Hearing was conducted by the Office of the Legal Service of the National Headquarters PNP against [respondent] for the alleged moonlighting.

PNP Chief Recaredo A. Sarmiento II rendered a Decision imposing three (3) months suspension of [respondent].

[Respondent] appealed the PNP Resolution to the National Appellate Board (NAB), National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Dismissed.

[Respondent] then filed a Petition for Appeal with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Denied.

Thereafter, [respondent] appealed to the Civil Service Commission praying the setting aside of the penalty of three (3) months suspension and/or for the Commission to conduct a hearing or a reinvestigation alleging lack of due process.Dismissed

Thereafter, [respondent] appealed to the Civil Service Commission praying the setting aside of the penalty of three (3) months suspension and/or for the Commission to conduct a hearing or a reinvestigation alleging lack of due process.

[Respondent] filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals assailing the Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. The Court of Appeals granted Gannapao’s motion

for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining, restraining and prohibiting CSC from dismissing [respondent].

The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting Gannapao’s motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining, restraining and prohibiting the CSC from implementing its resolutoion dismissing [respondent].

CSC appealed (Instant Case)

Issue: W/N Courts can grant injunctive relief without violating the Administrative Code and the CSC rules stating that administrative disciplinary penalties shall be immediately executory, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal.

Ruling:

Neither the Administrative Code nor the CSC rules deprive courts of their power to grant restraining orders or preliminary injunctions to stay the execution of CSC decisions pending appeal. Moreover, a court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction, when proper, is expressly authorized by Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

Furthermore, Section 82 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 19-9912 recognizes the authority of the CA and the Supreme Court to issue restraining orders or injunctions, as follows:

"Section 82. Effect of Pendency of Petition for Review/Certiorari with the Court. -- The filing and pendency of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals or certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the final decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a restraining order or an injunction. (Emphasis provided.)

Having appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CSC, the CA clearly has the discretion to issue an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction to secure the rights of private respondent pending appeal of his dismissal. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the exercise of judgment by the courts in injunctive matters should not be interfered with.

City Government of Baguio City vs Masweng (February 4, 2009)

3 demolition orders were issued by the City Mayor of Baguio Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas

(hereinafter private respondents) filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City the City Building and Architecture Office, the Anti-Squatting Task Force, and the Public Order and Safety Division, among others, (collectively called petitioners) before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR), Regional Hearing Office.

Respondents claimed that the lands where their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands, hence demolition must be restrained.

The NCIP [through ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional Officer-NCIP-CAR] issued the two (2) assailed temporary restraining orders (TRO) directing the petitioners and all persons acting for and in their behalf to refrain from enforcing Demolition Advice.

Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution dated November 10, 2006 granting the private respondents application for preliminary injunction subject to the posting of an injunctive bond each in the amount of P10,000.00

Petitioners filed petition for certiorari to the CA.Dismissed. Instant case filed assailing the decision of the CA

Issue: W/N the NCIP has jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions for injunction as it only has authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction as auxiliary remedies to cases pending before it.

Ruling: The NCIP may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction. The power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties to a dispute over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which may cause them grave or irreparable damage or injury.

In this case, the Regional Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect and preserve the rights of private respondents who are undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.

The IPRA endows the NCIP with the power to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction.

Sec. 69(d) thereof states:

Sec. 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.The NCIP shall have the power and authority:

d) To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending before it which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social or economic activity. [Emphasis supplied]

NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 echoes the above-quoted provision in Sec. 82, Rule XV, which provides:

Sec. 82. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.A writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Sections 59 and 69 of R.A. [No.] 8371 when it is established, on the basis of sworn allegations in a petition, that the acts complained of involving or arising from any case, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties, or seriously affect social or economic activity. This power may also be exercised by RHOs in cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties.

Reyes vs Demetria en banc (January 14, 2003)

Respondent Demetria was found guilty of gross *misconduct: (a) by issuing a temporary restraining order with the signature of only two out of three Justices of the Court ofAppeals (among others)

This case is a Motion for Reconsideration of the above SC decision and that he be absolved of all administrative charges leveled against him.

Issue: W/N respondent justice is guilty of gross misconduct issuing a temporary restraining order with the signature of only two out of three justices of the Court of Appeals.

Ruling:

One (1) member of the Court of Appeals may issue a temporary restraining order as provided in Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

“Section 5. xxx xxx xxx

"A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further orders.”

and Sections 9 and 10, Rule 3 of the then prevailing Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals which provide:

“Section 9. Action by a Justice. – The following may be considered and acted upon by the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report:

“b. Motion or petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,

restraining order, and other auxiliary writs;

“Section 10. Absence of the Justice Assigned to the Study and Report. When the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report is absent, the motions and incidents enumerated in the proceeding section may be acted upon by the Chairman or by the other member of the Division to which that Justice

belongs. If the members of the division are all absent, any motion for the issuance of a restraining order shall be referred to the Presiding Justice for appropriate action.

(However, the justice was still adjudged guilty for gross misconduct in

enforcing the decision of the Court of Appeals despite knowledge of the

designation of the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court and in causing

the designation of a special sheriff despite utter lack of authority to do so

thereby showing unusual interest therein.)

Section 3

Requisites: Manila International Airport Authority v. CA (Feb 14, 2003)

Herrera: The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer of a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it.

Primary action: Petition for Prohibition with a writ of Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary restraining order.

K Services began providing porters for the domestic passenger terminal of the Manila International Airport under a provisional permit for the period from January 1, 1976 to April 30, 1976. MIAA and K Services subsequently executed a contract effective from May 1976 to April 30, 1977 that was renewed yearly until December 1984.

Although the parties did not renew their contract for the succeeding year, K Services continued as porterage contractor from January 1985 until February 1987.

Sometime in February 1987, however, MIAA gave notice that the services of K Services would be terminated on February 20, 1987.

K Services filed a petition for injunction on February 26, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 4692-P.

The court ruled that MIAA can terminate the contract with K services.

However, the general manager of MIAA gave a letter to K services telling them to continue the porterage operation because management cannot take over due to some administrative problems. That K services are to continue operation until further notice.

The letter also contains “Please understand however that in continuing the operation of the porterage service, you will be charged the monthly Concession Privilege Fee in the amount of P45,000.00 for each Terminal or a total of P90,000.00 per month; further, you will also abide by the terms and conditions of your expired contract.”

On December 1, 1992 the MIAA decided to take over the porterage operation, which prompted K Services to file the writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not K services is entitled to the writ of Preliminary Injunction?

Held: The requisites necessary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it.

In the instant case, however, the trial court’s order of January 20, 1993 was, on its face, bereft of basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. There were no findings of fact or law in the assailed order indicating that any of the elements essential for the grant of a preliminary injunction existed. The trial court alluded to hearings during which the parties marked their respective exhibits and the trial court heard the oral arguments of opposing counsels. However, it cannot be ascertained what evidence was formally offered and presented by the parties and given weight and credence by the trial court. The basis for the trial court’s conclusion that K Services was entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction is unclear.

In its order of August 5, 1993, the trial court stated that it issued the injunction to prevent irreparable loss that might be caused to K Services. Once more, however, the trial court neglected to mention what right in esse of K Services, if any, was in danger of being violated and required the protection of a preliminary injunction. The trial court stated merely that K Services was servicing MIAA as a porterage contractor and that a notice of termination was sent to K Services. Absent a preliminary finding by the trial court that K Services possessed the right to continue as MIAA’s concessionaire, MIAA’s termination of K Services’ was not sufficient in itself to establish that there was an invasion of K Services’ right.

Considering the far-reaching effects of a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court should have exercised more prudence and judiciousness in its issuance of the injunction order. We remind trial courts that while generally the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion. The discretion of the court a quo to grant an injunctive writ must be exercised based on the grounds and in the manner provided by law. Thus, the Court declared in Garcia v. Burgos:

“It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.

Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.”

The records before the Court do not reveal a clear and unmistakable right on the part of K Services that would entitle the latter to the protection of an injunctive writ.

Section 3

What is a right in esse?

Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque City vs. Ebio(G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010)

Respondents filed an action for injunction with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the local government of Parañaque City from proceeding with the construction of an access road that will traverse through a parcel of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

They assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot (an alluvial deposit of the Cut-cut creek) as early as 1930.

In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local government of Parañaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot.

In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes.

Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of Parañaque. The trial court denied their petition, reasoning that respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right to the property. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court rendered a decision in favor of respondents.

HELD: The character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the contested land entitles them to the avails of the action.

A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she

possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise.

From the findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.

Orocio vs. Anguluan (G.R. No. 179892-93 January 30, 2009)

The National Power Corporation Welfare Fund was created for the purpose of granting monthly welfare allowance to all Napocor's employees.

In 2001, Congress enacted EPIRA (Electric Power Industry Reform Act). EPIRA directed the restructuring of the power industry which includes the reorganization of Napocor. Following the directive of EPIRA, the Napocor Welfare Fund, among other departments, was abolished, and dissolving it upon effectivity of EPIRA in June 2001. Consequently, some of the employees in the Welfare Fund and in other departments (who were also members of the Welfare Fund) resigned, retired, or separated from service.

Thereafter, the Napocor Welfare Fund Board of Trustees authorized the release of P184 million for distribution to the Welfare Fund members who resigned, retrired or separated upon the effectivity of EPIRA on June 2001. This prompted the non-EPIRA separated members (those were also members of the Welfare Fund who have resigned, retired or separated prior to the effectivity of EPIRA), to demand their equal shares in the remaining assets of the Welfare Fund.

They then filed an action for mandamus with the RTC, employing the services of petitioner Atty. Orocio. Under their legal retainer agreement, it was agreed that Orocio is entitled to a Contingency Fee of 15% of whatever amounts are

recovered. In 2006, the parties in the mandamus case, executed

Compromise Agreement, which contained a stipulation that a 15% attorneys fees shall be deducted from the earnings differentials of those non-EPIRA separated members in accordance with the legal retainer agreement. The compromise agreement was approved by the trial court.

Petitioner Orocio then filed a motion for approval of charging attorney's lien. This was granted by the trial court.

Petitioner Orocio then moved for a writ of execution. This was opposed by respondents (who are officers of Napocor and likewise defendants in the mandamus case). Acting on the motion, the trial court ruled in favor of Orocio. Consequently, a writ of execution was granted.

This prompted respondents to file a petition for certiorari before the CA, with prayer for TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.

The CA granted respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction. In resolving the merits of the case, the CA rendered a decision annulling and setting aside the order of the trial court and the corresponding writ of execution and notice of garnishment.

Hence this recourse, where one of the assignment of errors imputed by petitioner Orocio is the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

HELD: It should be made clear that petitioner is the counsel for the non-EPIRA separated members in the latter’s quest to claim their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Petitioner was never hired or employed by respondents as their counsel in the cases at bar. Respondents themselves do not claim or allege that they are clients of petitioner. In fact, petitioner is representing the non-EPIRA separated members, the opposing party to the respondents in the present cases.

Further, the amount of attorney’s fees being claimed by petitioner is chargeable to the corrected earnings differential of his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members. Respondents have actually partially distributed such amount to some non-EPIRA separated members pursuant to the Compromise Agreement. In other words, the non-EPIRA separated members are the lawful owners/beneficiaries of the amount from which petitioner’s attorney’s fees had been and shall be taken.

Hence, if anyone would be injured by petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees, it would be his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members, and not respondents. It appears, however, that none of the non-EPIRA separated members has questioned or complained about petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit, as well as a preservative remedy issued to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the applicant is tasked to establish and convincingly show the following: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

A clear legal right means one clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. The existence of a right violated is a prerequisite to the granting of a writ of preliminary injunction. A writ of preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise. It may be issued only if the applicant has clearly shown an actual existing right that should be protected during the pendency of the principal action. In the absence of a clear legal right, or when the applicant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, preliminary injunction is not proper.

It is evident from the foregoing that respondents do not have a clear right or right in esse to pay only a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to the petitioner because such right belongs solely to petitioner’s clients, the non-EPIRA separated members. There can be no violation of a right which does not exist in the first place. Also, there was no necessity for the writ of preliminary injunction since the non-EPIRA separated members do not claim any damage or injury caused by the execution of the RTC Order. Even assuming that respondents would probably suffer damages as administrators or custodians of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund if the writ of preliminary injunction was not granted, our ruling would still be the same. We have held that the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of

an actual existing right is not a ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Given these considerations, we hold that the issuance by the Court of Appeals of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondents was improper.

Overseas Workers Welfare Administration vs. Chavez(G.R. No. 169802 June 8, 2007)

By 2004, there was yet no formal OWWA structure duly approved by the DBM and CSC. Due to this fact, the OWWA Board of Trustees passed a resolution approving the structure of the OWWA depicting the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA.

The organizational structure and staffing patten was then approved by the DBM. Thereafter, a placement committee was created by the DOLE Sectretary to evaluate qualifications of employees and recommend their appropriate placement in the new organizational chart, and staffing pattern.

Thereafter in 2004, herein respondents filed an action in the RTC for annulment of the organizational structure of the OWWA. They also filed an application for a writ of preliminary injunction against OWWA and its Board of Trustees. They sought injunction to restrain OWWA from implementing its organizational structure and from advertising and proceeding with the recruitment and placement of new employees under the new organizational structure.

The RTC granted the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. On petition for certiorari before the CA, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's order. It held that respondents possess a clear and legal right to the immediate issuance of the writ. It resolved that it was proper for the RTC to restrain, for the meantime, the implementation of OWWA's reorganization to prevent injury until after the main case is heard and decided. It found respondents allegations sufficient to prove the existence of a right that should be protected by a writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Do respondents possess a right in esse to be entitled to the injunctive writ? - NO

HELD: We do not find attendant the requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ. This Court is not convinced that respondents were able to show a clear and unmistakable legal right

to warrant their entitlement to the writ. A mere blanket allegation that they are all officers and employees of the OWWA without a showing of how they stand to be directly injured by the implementation of its questioned organizational structure does not suffice to prove a right in esse. As was aptly raised by the petitioner, respondents did not show that they were dismissed due to the challenged reorganization. There was no showing that they are the employees who are in grave danger of being displaced. Respondents were similarly wanting in proving that they are the consultants and contractual and casual employees, who will allegedly suffer by reason of the re-organization. This Court is consistently adamant in demanding that a clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be established. As has been reiterated, injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an action which did not give rise to a cause of action. In contrast, the rights of OWWA are accorded to it by law. The structuring of the OWWA will stabilize the internal organization and promote careerism among the employees, as well as ensure a more efficient and effective delivery of programs and services to member-OFWs. The question as to the validity of the OWWA reorganization remains the subject in the main case pending before the trial court.

Assuming arguendo that respondents stand to be in danger of being transferred due to the reorganization, under the law, any employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the CSC. Even then, administrative remedies must be exhausted before resort to the regular courts can be had.

A writ of preliminary injunction being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy, it must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. In the absence of the same, and where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.

No Right In Esse

Manila International Airport Authority v. CA (February 14, 2003)

See above digest.

Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas (July 10, 2003)

On 30 June 1997, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (“DENR”), issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate (“ECC”) in favor of respondent National Power Corporation (“NAPOCOR”). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.

Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera, sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. Director Principe, however, denied petitioners’ plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility.

On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents moved to dismiss the complaint. These respondents claimed that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint without cause of action. They also asserted that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the construction of the mooring facility in Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTC’s territorial jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction is proper

Held:

The jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial region. Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 (“PD No. 1818”) prohibited courts from issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects like the mooring facility in the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 (“RA No. 8975”), which took effect on 26 November 2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power to

issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its violation. Which reads as follows:

“Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmental official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.”

Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro RTC can issue an injunctive writ to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Only this Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and later under RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint considering that its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic.

Febtc v. Ca (April 1, 1996)

Primary action: Specific Performance

Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank under Monetary Board Resolution No. 699 dated July 5, 1985, and thereafter placed under liquidation.

On November 14, 1985, petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) submitted its formal offer to purchase all the assets of PBC. Subsequently, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was entered into by and among the petitioner as buyer, PBC through its liquidator as seller, and the Central Bank (CB).

On December 18, 1986, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31 of Manila where the liquidation proceeding was pending, approved the Purchase Agreement executed by and among the same parties pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) earlier entered into by them.

Alleging compliance with its obligations under the MOA and the Purchase Agreement, petitioner then requested PBCs liquidator to execute the proper deeds of sale involving PBCs fixed assets

PBCs liquidator consistently refused to execute said deeds of sale and proceeded to offer for bidding to third parties the subject fixed assets.

On July 5, 1993, FEBTC filed with the trial court a motion to direct PBCs liquidator to execute the deeds of sale with application for issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to prevent the liquidator from further offering to sell to third parties the subject fixed assets.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for?

Held:

The issue whether or not injunction in favor of the petitioner should issue hinges on the important question: Whether the disputed fixed assets were collateralized with the Central Bank?

In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals, found that the subject fixed assets were indeed submitted as collaterals with the Central Bank, and therefore were among the items not covered by the Purchase Agreement signed by the parties pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement. Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that petitioner never acquired ownership over these properties. The trial court observed, viz;

A cursory perusal of the MOA will immediately indicate that the PBC fixed assets were expressly excluded from (sic) the PBC for purchase of the FEBTC as they are collateralized assets with the Central Bank.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on Preliminary Injunction provides:

"SECTION 3 - Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted at any time after the

commencement of the action and before judgment, when it is established:

(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or

(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiffs rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual."

We find that the instant petition does not satisfy any of the grounds abovementioned.

Bayanihan Music vs. Bmg (March 7, 2005)

On July 16, 1973, private respondent Jose Mari Chan (Chan) entered into a contract with petitioner Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. (Bayanihan), whereunder the former assigned to the latter all his rights, interests and participation over his musical composition "Can We Just Stop and Talk A While". On March 11, 1976, the parties entered into a similar contract over Chan's other musical composition entitled "Afraid For Love To Fade".

Without the knowledge and consent of petitioner Bayanihan, Chan authorized his co-respondent BMG Records (Pilipinas) [BMG] to record and distribute the aforementioned musical compositions in a then recently released album of singer Lea Salonga.

Hence, on August 8, 2000, Bayanihan filed with the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City a complaint against Chan and BMG for violation of Section 216 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, with a prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent BMG from further recording and distributing the subject musical compositions in whatever form

of musical products, and Chan from further granting any authority to record and distribute the same musical compositions.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for?

Held:

Here, nothing is more evident than the trial court's abiding awareness of the extremely difficult balancing act it had to perform in dealing with petitioner's prayer for injunctive reliefs. Conscious, as evidently it is, of the fact that there is manifest abuse of discretion in the issuance of an injunctive writ if the following requisites provided for by law are not present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right, the trial court threaded the correct path in denying petitioner's prayer therefor. For, such a writ should only be granted if a party is clearly entitled thereto.

Of course, while a clear showing of the right to an injunctive writ is necessary albeit its existence need not be conclusively established, as the evidence required therefor need not be conclusive or complete, still, for an applicant, like petitioner Bayanihan, to be entitled to the writ, he is required to show that he has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint. Here, the trial court did not find ample justifications for the issuance of the writ prayed for by petitioner.

Unquestionably, respondent Chan, being undeniably the composer and author of the lyrics of the two (2) songs, is protected by the mere fact alone that he is the creator thereof, conformably with Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code, Section 172.2 of which reads:

172.2. Works are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or form of expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose.

An examination of petitioner's verified complaint in light of the two (2) contracts sued upon and the evidence it adduced during the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, yields not the existence of the requisite right protectable by the provisional relief

but rather a lingering doubt on whether there is or there is no such right. The two contracts between petitioner and Chan relative to the musical compositions subject of the suit contain the following identical stipulations:

7.       It is also hereby agreed to by the parties herein that in the event the PUBLISHER [petitioner herein] fails to use in any manner whatsoever within two (2) years any of the compositions covered by this contract, then such composition may be released in favor of the WRITER and excluded from this contract and the PUBLISHER shall execute the necessary release in writing in favor of the WRITER upon request of the WRITER;

xxx    xxx       xxx

9.       This contract may be renewed for a period of two-and-one-half (2 1/2) years at the option of the PUBLISHER. Renewal may be made by the PUBLISHER by advising the WRITER of such renewal in writing at least five (5) days before the expiration of this contract.

It would thus appear that the two (2) contracts expired on October 1, 1975 and March 11, 1978, respectively, there being neither an allegation, much less proof, that petitioner Bayanihan ever made use of the compositions within the two-year period agreed upon by the parties.

Anent the copyrights obtained by petitioner on the basis of the selfsame two (2) contracts, suffice it to say 'that such purported copyrights are not presumed to subsist in accordance with Section 218[a] and [b], of the Intellectual Property Code, because respondent Chan had put in issue the existence thereof.

It is noted that Chan revoked and terminated said contracts, along with others, on July 30, 1997, or almost two years before petitioner Bayanihan wrote its sort of complaint/demand letter dated December 7, 1999 regarding the recent "use/recording of the songs ‘Can We Just Stop and Talk A While' and ‘Afraid for Love to Fade,'" or almost three (3) years before petitioner filed its complaint on August 8, 2000, therein praying, inter alia, for injunctive relief. By then, it would appear that petitioner had no more right that is protectable by injunction.

Levi Strauss & Co., V. Clinton Aparelle (September 20, 2005)

Primary action: Complaint for trademark infringement

LS & Co., a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, U.S.A., and engaged in the apparel business, is the owner by prior adoption and use since 1986 of the internationally famous “Dockers and Design” trademark.

The “Dockers and Design” trademark was first used in the Philippines in or about May 1988, by LSPI, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of various products bearing trademarks owned by Petitioners.

Petitioners further alleged that they discovered the presence in the local market of jeans under the brand name “Paddocks” using a device which is substantially, if not exactly, similar to the “Dockers and Design” trademark owned by and registered in the name of LS & Co., without its consent. Clinton Apparelle manufactured and continues to manufacture such “Paddocks” jeans and other apparel.

This prompted Petitioners to file a complaint under Section 13, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper

Held:

Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.

There are generally two kinds of preliminary injunction: (1) a prohibitory injunction which commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act; and (2) a mandatory injunction which commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.

In the present case, we find that there was scant justification for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

         Petitioners anchor their legal right to “Dockers and Design” trademark on the Certificate of Registration issued in their favor by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer. According to Section 138 of Republic Act No. 8293, this Certificate of Registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, the registrant’s ownership of the mark and of the exclusive right to use the same in connection with the goods or services and those that are related thereto specified in the certificate. Section 147.1 of said law likewise grants the owner of the registered mark the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered if such use results in a likelihood of confusion.

However, attention should be given to the fact that petitioners’ registered trademark consists of two elements: (1) the word mark “Dockers” and (2) the wing-shaped design or logo. Notably, there is only one registration for both features of the trademark giving the impression that the two should be considered as a single unit. Clinton Apparelle’s trademark, on the other hand, uses the “Paddocks” word mark on top of a logo which according to petitioners is a slavish imitation of the “Dockers” design. The two trademarks apparently differ in their word marks (“Dockers” and “Paddocks”), but again according to petitioners, they employ similar or identical logos. It could thus be said that respondent only “appropriates” petitioners’ logo and not the word mark “Dockers”; it uses only a portion of the registered trademark and not the whole.

Given the single registration of the trademark “Dockers and Design” and considering that respondent only uses the assailed device but a different word mark, the right to prevent the latter from using the challenged “Paddocks” device is far from clear. Stated otherwise, it is not evident whether the single registration of the trademark “Dockers and Design” confers on the owner the right to prevent the use of a fraction thereof in the course of trade. It is also unclear whether the use without the owner’s consent of a portion of a trademark registered in its entirety constitutes material or substantial invasion of the owner’s right.

From the above discussion, we find that petitioners’ right to injunctive relief has not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated. The right has yet to be determined. Petitioners also failed to show proof that there is material and substantial invasion of their right to warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ. Neither were petitioners able to show any urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

We also believe that the issued injunctive writ, if allowed, would dispose of the case on the merits as it would effectively enjoin the use of the “Paddocks” device without proof that there is basis for such action. The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction that would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. There would be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which petitioners are inceptively bound to prove.

After a careful consideration of the facts and arguments of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners did not adequately prove their entitlement to the injunctive writ. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the applicant, an order of the trial court granting the issuance of an injunctive writ will be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Conformably, the Court of Appeals was correct in setting aside the assailed orders of the trial court.

ELIDAD C. KHO, vs. CA

On December 20, 1991, petitioner Elidad C. Kho filed a complaint for injunction and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10926, against the respondents Summerville General Merchandising and Company (Summerville, for brevity) and Ang Tiam Chay.

The petitioner’s complaint alleges that petitioner, doing business under the name and style of KEC Cosmetics Laboratory, is the registered owner of the copyrights Chin Chun Su and Oval Facial Cream Container/Case, as shown by Certificates of Copyright Registration No. 0-1358 and No. 0-3678; that she also has patent rights on Chin Chun Su &

Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated cream after purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng, the registered owner thereof in the Supplemental Register of the Philippine Patent Office on February 7, 1980 under Registration Certificate No. 4529; that respondent Summerville advertised and sold petitioner’s cream products under the brand name Chin Chun Su, in similar containers that petitioner uses, thereby misleading the public, and resulting in the decline in the petitioner’s business sales and income; and, that the respondents should be enjoined from allegedly infringing on the copyrights and patents of the petitioner.

The respondents, on the other hand, alleged as their defense that Summerville is the exclusive and authorized importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun Su products manufactured by Shun Yi Factory of Taiwan; that the said Taiwanese manufacturing company authorized Summerville to register its trade name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with the Philippine Patent Office and other appropriate governmental agencies; that KEC Cosmetics Laboratory of the petitioner obtained the copyrights through misrepresentation and falsification; and, that the authority of Quintin Cheng, assignee of the patent registration certificate, to distribute and market Chin Chun Su products in the Philippines had already been terminated by the said Taiwanese Manufacturing Company.

After due hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, the trial court granted the same in an Order dated February 10, 1992,

Held:

Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is a proof that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. Thus, a preliminary injunction order may be granted only when the application for the issuance of the same shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded. This is the reason why we have ruled that it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable, and, that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

In the case at bar, the petitioner applied for the issuance of a preliminary injunctive order on the ground that she is entitled to the use of the trademark on Chin Chun Su and its container based on her copyright and patent over the same. We first find it appropriate to rule on whether the copyright and patent over the name and container of a beauty cream product would entitle the registrant to the use and ownership over the same to the exclusion of others.

Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. In relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying or distinguishing an enterprise. Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation. Patentable inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable.

Petitioner has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the subject trade name and its container. The name and container of a beauty cream product are proper subjects of a trademark inasmuch as the same falls squarely within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively use the same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the user must sufficiently prove that she registered or used it before anybody else did. The petitioner’s copyright and patent registration of the name and container would not guarantee her the right to the exclusive use of the same for the reason that they are not appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights. Consequently, a preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for the reason that the petitioner has not proven that she has a clear right over the said name and container to the exclusion of others, not having proven that she has registered a trademark thereto or used the same before anyone did.

Hernandez v. Napocor (Actual Violation of Right)

In 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through where petitioners’ homes are.

petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR. Harping on the hazardous effects of exposure to electromagnetic radiation to the health and safety to themselves and their families, petitioners sought for damages and the relocation of the transmission lines to Lawton Avenue, Fort Bonifacio.

On 13 March 2000, Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an order which temporarily restrained the respondent from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through the said project.

NAPOCOR sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack jurisdiction predicating its argument on Presidential Decree No. 1818 (1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government," particularly Sec. 1,

Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among other public utilities for transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.

On 3 April 2000, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against NAPOCOR on the ground of

possible health risk to the petitioners. CA reversed this decision.

ISSUE: w/n the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential Decree No. 1818.

HELD: YES

Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against government infrastructure projects. The prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction on the ground that the NAPOCOR Project impinged on their right to health as enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill consciousness among them.

Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction finds legal support in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the act complained of will probably violate his rights and tend to render the judgment ineffectual.

Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the project of NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and safety of the petitioners so as to justify the issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary injunction.

For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the

applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which is different from injunction as a main action where one needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction

In Phil. Ports Authority v. Cipres Stevedoring & Arrastre, Inc., the court held:

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.

At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."

What Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims to avert is the untimely frustration of government infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by

disrupting the pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic development effort of the nation. Presidential Decree No. 1818, however, was not meant to be a blanket prohibition so as to disregard the fundamental right to health, safety and well-being of a community guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land. In the present case, the far-reaching irreversible effects to human safety should be the primordial concerns over presumed economic benefits per se as alleged by the NAPOCOR.

Petition granted, CA reversed.

PNB v. RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corp. (September 27, 2006)

First Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) won the bid of the Buendia property (8000sqm at 455k per sqm) conducted by PNB on June 13, 1996. FWCC requested PNB to finance the entire balance of the purchase price. Pending action on its loan application, FWCC assigned all its rights, claims, interest, and title over the Buendia Property to RJVRD. The latter assumed the right to purchase the Buendia Property and the obligations of FWCC to PNB on the balance of the bid price.

PNB granted a loan agreement wherein PNB will finance the balance of the purchase price in the amount of P2,944,000,000.00 subject to conditions, inter alia, that after the transfer of the Buendia Property in the name of RJVRD, the same shall be mortgaged in favor of PNB and upon payment of 10% of the purchase price to PNB. On even date, RJVRD and PNB executed a Loan Agreement. A Deed of Sale and a Real Estate Mortgage dated 30 September 1996 were executed in favor of PNB over the subject property. To raise the additional amount, PNB proposed to lend RBN the required amount, the latter being an affiliate company of RJVRD. By way of security, RBN assigned in favor of PNB all its rights and interest over radio and television frequencies issued by the National Telecommunications Commission, located in Tuguegarao, Baguio, Manila, Cebu, Bacolod, Iloilo, including those in Cagayan de Oro (FM Stations), and Manila (AM Station and TV-UHF Station).

The parties then discussed restructuring the loan and during this time, the accounts of RJVRD and RBN became delinquent.

Upon failure of RJVD and RBN to fufill their obligations, PNB moved to foreclose the Buendia property and take over RBN’s radio facilitites. The respondents applied for Temporary

Restraining order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, contending that they would suffer great and irreparable injury by the extrajudicial foreclosure and planned take-over.

RTC denied, PNB proceeded with the foreclosure. Respondents filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction praying that a TRO be issued enjoining PNB or any persons acting under its instructions from foreclosing on any other collaterals pledged or mortgaged by respondents to PNB. RTC granted the Writ and TRO.

According to the court, the right of PNB to foreclose the chattel mortgages is still challenged by the respondents and therefore, is not yet clearly established. Hence, if PNB is allowed to foreclose the subject chattel mortgages, the determination of the right of PNB to foreclose the subject properties will become moot and academic.

On mfr, RTC lifted the writ, rationalized that RBN was considered to have effectively "defaulted" on its loan obligation. It held that the "cross-default provision" embodied in the Loan Agreement between the parties establishes against the grant of the injunction.

Before the CA, respondents argued that PNB was not able to allege "other grounds" for the lifting thereof as mandated by Section 6 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

Court of Appeals issued a Resolution, granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against PNB.

ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly reinstated the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

RULING:

YES. The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits can be heard. It is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party's substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.

The following requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an

urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

First, the respondents were able to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the subject collaterals. As owner of the subject collaterals that stand to be extrajudicially foreclosed, respondents are entitled to the possession and protection thereof.

Second, there is an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious damage. Indeed, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The direct and inevitable result would be the stoppage of the operations of respondents' radio stations, consequently, losing its listenership, and tarnishing the image that it has built over time. It does not stretch one's imagination to see that the cost of a destroyed image is significantly the loss of its good name and reputation.

Section 4

Gonzales v. State Properties Corporation (January 25, 2001)

First Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) won the bid of the Buendia property (8000sqm at 455k per sqm) conducted by PNB on June 13, 1996. FWCC requested PNB to finance the entire balance of the purchase price. Pending action on its loan application, FWCC assigned all its rights, claims, interest, and title over the Buendia Property to RJVRD. The latter assumed the right to purchase the Buendia Property and the obligations of FWCC to PNB on the balance of the bid price.

PNB granted a loan agreement wherein PNB will finance the balance of the purchase price in the amount of P2,944,000,000.00 subject to conditions, inter alia, that after the transfer of the Buendia Property in the name of RJVRD, the same shall be mortgaged in favor of PNB and upon payment of 10% of the purchase price to PNB. On even date, RJVRD and PNB executed a Loan Agreement. A Deed of Sale and a Real Estate Mortgage dated 30 September 1996 were executed in favor of PNB over the subject property. To raise the additional amount, PNB proposed to lend RBN the required amount, the latter being an affiliate company of RJVRD. By way of security, RBN assigned in favor of PNB all its rights and interest over radio and television frequencies issued by the National Telecommunications Commission, located in Tuguegarao, Baguio, Manila, Cebu, Bacolod, Iloilo, including those in Cagayan de Oro (FM Stations), and Manila (AM Station and TV-UHF Station).

The parties then discussed restructuring the loan and during this time, the accounts of RJVRD and RBN became delinquent.

Upon failure of RJVD and RBN to fufill their obligations, PNB moved to foreclose the Buendia property and take over RBN’s radio facilitites. The respondents applied for Temporary Restraining order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, contending that they would suffer great and irreparable injury by the extrajudicial foreclosure and planned take-over.

RTC denied, PNB proceeded with the foreclosure. Respondents filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction praying that a TRO be issued enjoining PNB or any persons acting under its instructions from foreclosing on any other collaterals pledged or mortgaged by respondents to PNB. RTC granted the Writ and TRO.

According to the court, the right of PNB to foreclose the chattel mortgages is still challenged by the respondents and therefore, is not yet clearly established. Hence, if PNB is allowed to foreclose the subject chattel mortgages, the determination of the right of PNB to foreclose the subject properties will become moot and academic.

On mfr, RTC lifted the writ, rationalized that RBN was considered to have effectively "defaulted" on its loan obligation. It held that the "cross-default provision" embodied in the Loan Agreement between the parties establishes against the grant of the injunction.

Before the CA, respondents argued that PNB was not able to allege "other grounds" for the lifting thereof as mandated by Section 6 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

Court of Appeals issued a Resolution, granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against PNB.

ISSUE: w/n the CA correctly reinstated the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

RULING:

YES. The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits can be heard. It is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party's substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.

The following requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

First, the respondents were able to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the subject collaterals. As owner of the subject collaterals that stand to be extrajudicially foreclosed, respondents are entitled to the possession and protection thereof.

Second, there is an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious damage. Indeed, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid

injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The direct and inevitable result would be the stoppage of the operations of respondents' radio stations, consequently, losing its listenership, and tarnishing the image that it has built over time. It does not stretch one's imagination to see that the cost of a destroyed image is significantly the loss of its good name and reputation.

Lago v. Abul (January 17, 2011)

Complainants were the defendants in a civil action for Preliminary Injunction, Easement of Road Right of Way, filed on July 2, 2009 by Christina M. Obico (Obico) before the RTC, Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental, arising from the alleged threats of complainants to close the access road leading to Obico’s property, where the latter’s milkfish (bangus) farm is located. Obico claimed that, if the access road leading to her property was closed, she would be prevented from harvesting her milkfish, causing massive fish kills, and leading to heavy financial losses on her part.

Complainants assert that the civil complaint was never raffled, and that no notice of raffle was ever served upon them, yet the case went directly to Branch 43, where respondent judge is the acting presiding judge.

On July 7, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order directing the issuance of a TRO "effective seventy two (72) hours from date of issue," without requiring Obico to put up a bond. Complainants allege that at that time, they were not yet in receipt of the summons and copy of the complaint, as well as Obico’s affidavit and bond. On July 14, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order extending the 72-hour TRO, which had already expired, "for another period provided that the total period should not exceed twenty days." Again, respondent judge failed to require Obico to put up a bond. Complainants claim that this is violative of Section 4(c) and (d) of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent judge ordered, among others, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction conditioned upon the application of a bond by Obico.

Complainants filed a motion for inhibition from further hearing the case, since they perceive that respondent judge was bereft of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, which was denied by respondent judge. Complainants then elevated this matter to the Supreme Court.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent judge to have been grossly and deliberately ignorant of the law and procedure for violation of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, due to the following acts: (1) when the civil complaint with prayer for the issuance of a TRO was filed on July 2, 2009, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction thereon and, without the mandated raffle and notification and service of summons to the adverse party, issued a 72-hour TRO on July 7, 2009; (2) when respondent judge set the case for summary hearing on July 14, 2009, purportedly to determine whether the TRO could be extended for another period, when the hearing should be set within 72 hours from the issuance of the TRO; (3) when he eventually granted an extension of an already expired TRO to a full 20-day period; and (4) when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Obico without prior notice to herein complainants and without the required hearing.

ISSUE: w/n preliminary injunction may be granted without the notice of raffle.

HELD:

NO. From the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended, it is clear that, on the matter of the issuance of an ex parte 72-hour TRO, an executive judge of a multiple-sala court (applicable to respondent judge), or the presiding judge of a single-sala court, is empowered to issue the same in matters of extreme emergency, in order to prevent grave injustice and irreparable injury to the applicant. However, it is also an unequivocal provision that, after the issuance of the 72-hour TRO, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court is bound to comply with Section 4(c) of the same rule with respect to the service of summons and the documents to be served therewith.

Respondent judge failed to cause the raffle since RTC, Gingoog City, is a multiple-sala court, or to cause the notification and service of summons to complainants after he issued the 72-hour TRO. Respondent judge’s July 7, 2009 Order was explicit when the civil case was set for summary hearing on July 14, 2009, purportedly to determine whether or not the TRO issued could be extended for another period. Thus, it is manifest that respondent judge had directly assumed jurisdiction over the civil action and all together disregarded the mandatory requirements of Section 4(c), Rule 58, relative to the raffle in the presence of the parties, and service of summons. This is gross error.

Even assuming that there was a valid raffle to RTC, Branch 43, Gingoog City, where respondent judge acts as the presiding magistrate, the supposed extreme urgency of the issuance of the 72-hour TRO was belied by his setting of the required summary hearing for the determination of the necessity of extending the 72-hour TRO to 20 days, one week after the issuance thereof. Indeed, Section 5, Rule 58 is explicit that such summary hearing must be conducted within the said 72-hour period. Respondent judge also extended the 72-hour TRO, which had already and obviously expired, into a full 20-day TRO. An already expired TRO can no longer be extended.

Moreover, respondent judge committed another blunder when he ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction without the required hearing and without prior notice to the complainants.

Rule 58 mandates a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, separate from the summary hearing for the extension of the 72-hour TRO. The requirement of a hearing is so fundamental that failure to comply with it not only amounts to gross ignorance of rules and procedure, but also to an outright denial of due process to the party denied such a hearing.

Section 5

EDITHA PALMA GIL, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO H. LOPEZ, JR., (April 29, 2003)

Complainant Editha Palma Gil charged respondent Judge Francisco H. Lopez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lupon, Davao Oriental, with Manifest Bias and Partiality, Undue Delay in the Disposition of Case and Ignorance of the Law

Complainant alleged that she is the defendant in Civil Case pending before the sala of respondent judge;

She further averred that the plaintiff in the said case filed a motion for temporary restraining order, which respondent Judge granted on the same day, despite procedural defects therein such as the lack of a verification, bond, and service of summons, all in violation of Rule 58, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Anent the alleged issuance of temporary restraining order, respondent claims that what he issued was a status quo order because complainant's men entered the land in dispute and attempted to prevent the harvesting of palay by plaintiff.

Ruling:

Respondent judge erred in issuing the temporary restraining order. (Rule 58, Section 4)

The records reveal that the motion for temporary restraining order was not verified

Respondent judge issued the Order on the same date when the motion was filed without prior notice to the complainant and without a hearing

The issuance of the assailed Order cannot be justified under Rule 58, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:

Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. - No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the person or party sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from the facts shown by the affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party of person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted and accordingly issued the corresponding order.

However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72) hours provided therein. (Emphasis and italics ours)

Aside from the lack of verification of the motion, no affidavits of the applicant and his witnesses were appended thereto.

Furthermore, the assailed Order did not specify the duration of the temporary restraining order.

The Court did not agree with respondent`s argument that considering that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1110 was verified and prayed for the issuance of a preliminary and prohibitory injunction, the verification of the motion for issuance of temporary restraining order may be dispensed with.

The Rule explicitly mandate that the application for injunction should be verified. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly administration of justice.

Lago v. Abul (January 17, 2011) see above digest

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE, COMPANY, INC., vs. JUDGE JIMMY H. F. LUCZON, JR. (November 30, 2006)

- Complainant had sought the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage executed in its favor by Maria Victoria Realty and Development Corporation ("MVRDC").

- On 8 October 2003, however, MVRDC filed a petition for annulment of real estate mortgage and accounting with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order ("petition") against complainant.

- On the same day, RTC-Tuguegarao Executive Judge Vilma T. Pauig issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining complainant and the deputy sheriff from holding a foreclosure sale of MVRDC’s real properties on 10 October 2003. The TRO was to be effective for 72 hours. The clerk of court sent a notice for the special raffle of the case on 13 October 2003.

- On 13 October 2003, MVRDC filed a motion for the extension of the TRO ("motion for extension"), with notice of hearing for 16 October 2003. On the latter date, after the raffle of the case to his sala, respondent Judge issued an Order extending the TRO for another 17 days.

- On 28 October 2003, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MVRDC.

- Respondent Judge had not yet conducted any hearing on the case. The injunction order cited rreparable injuries that may result should the sheriff pursue the foreclosure of the mortgage

- Complainant assailed the extension of the TRO and the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction "based purely on the unilateral allegations of MVRDC."

- Complainant argued that respondent Judge should not have issued the TRO or writ without a summary hearing, especially considering that MVRDC’s petition lacked an affidavit of merit.

- Complainant pointed out that under the law, MVRDC would have the right to redeem any of its foreclosed properties. Thus, there was no extreme urgency, grave injustice or irreparable injury which would justify the injunction in MVRDC’s favor.

- Respondent Judge claimed that he granted the motion for extension in view of the urgency of the case and to avoid irreparable injuries to MVRDC.

- Respondent Judge further claimed that complainant received a copy of the Motion to Set Hearing for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, as shown by a registry receipt posted on 17 October 2003.

Ruling:

- Complainant assails the supposed lack of an Affidavit of Merit. Viewed in the context of the actual petition for preliminary injunction, this contention cannot be countenanced. The absence of an Affidavit of Merit is not final where the petition itself, which is under oath, recites the circumstances or facts which constitute the grounds of the petition

- Complainant takes issue with the fact that it was not furnished a copy of the bond. Apparently, this contention is premised on Section 7 of Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which in effect allows the adverse party to "except to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon."

- Said contention cannot be sustained in light of the circumstances of the case at hand

- the summons, a copy of the petition, and raffle notification were actually received by the complainant on 10 October 2003.

- In Caluya v. Ramos, the failure of the defendants to furnish the adverse parties with copies of the bonds prior to their approval is not sufficient to invalidate the orders dissolving the preliminary injunction where the attorneys for the latter were notified of the filing of the first bond; where they ultimately received copies of

the bonds; and where they do not contend that said bonds are insufficient or that the sureties are not solvent.

- However, the absence of summary hearing cannot be excused.

- The conduct of a summary hearing is mandated under Section 5, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Procedure which provides that no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person

- The requirement of hearing is so basic and fundamental that an omission of [such] amounts to gross ignorance of rules and procedure and invites due sanction. In this case, respondent [Judge] twice ignored this elementary requisite.

- First, he extended the TRO. Then, after its expiration, he converted the same into a preliminary injunction. Both Orders were issued without conducting a summary hearing.

- It bears stressing that a writ of injunction is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy that should be dispensed with circumspection, and both sides should first be heard whenever possible.

- The Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 20-95 require the holding of a hearing where both parties can introduce evidence and present their side before the court may issue a TRO or an injunctive writ.

- the hearing of the motion for extension set on 16 October 2003 did not take place. All the same, respondent Judge granted the motion on that date, without mentioning the reason for the lack of hearing, or whether he intended to conduct one in the future on the prayer for the issuance of an injunction

- Further compounding his error, respondent Judge failed to conduct a hearing on the injunction within the 20-day life of the TRO, as prescribed by the Rules of Court. Yet he issued the assailed injunction order against complainant. The injunction order did not even explain why no hearings had taken place prior to its issuance.

ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS, FUND FOR ASSISTANCE TO PRIVATE EDUCATION (FAPE), vs. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG (October 22, 2004)

- In two verified complaints dated March 12, 2001 and March 22, 2001 filed with the Office the Court Administrator (OCA), Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum, in his capacity as President and Chairman of Pacasum College, Inc., Atty. Alfonso M. Gomos and Dr. Roberto T. Borromeo, as counsel and President of the Fund for Assistance to Private Education (FAPE) respectively, charged respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong of RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City with gross ignorance of law, abuse of authority and gross misconduct.

- On February 26, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum filed for mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction against FAPE

- On the same day the petition was filed, respondent judge granted the application for preliminary mandatory injunction upon the posting by the petitioner of a surety or property bond

- On February 28, 2001, the respondent judge issued another order directing the president of FAPE to prepare and issue a check for the payment to the Pacasum College, Inc.

- On the same day, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto served upon FAPE, throught its president, summons and a copy of the petition.

- On March 5, 2001, FAPE filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals, challenging the Orders

- It argued that a pending ownership dispute between Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum and Saripada Ali Pacasum over the shares of the Pacasum College before the Securities and Exchange Commission precludes the release of the remaining balance of the subsidy to Pacasum College under the ESC Program, which requires that any dispute must be settled first before the release could be made.

- the petition further stated that the RTC of Marawi City has no jurisdiction to enforce the writs of mandamus and preliminary injunction to FAPE, in its principal office in Makati City, since the place is outside the 12th judicial region where it belongs.

- FAPE also prayed for the issuance of a TRO against Saripada Ali Pacasum and his agents who have been harrassing its employees with hourly calls and threats of bodily harm.

- On March 9, 2001, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto and Saripada Ali Pacasum served an Order dated March 7, 2001, which was allegedly issued on a mere ex-parte motion by Saripada Ali

Pacasum, reiterating the Orders of February 26, 2001 with a warning that "failure to comply would be under pain of contempt of court."

- On March 13, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum together with a Makati policeman served warrant of arrest upon Dr. Borromeo.

- On March 14, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining the respondent judge from enforcing the orders of February 26, 2001.

- Despite the TRO, respondent judge ordered the arrest of Dr. Borromeo and certain FAPE employees for failure to comply with his directive. Two of FAPE’s employees were subsequently arrested and detained.

- On March 22, 2001, a letter-complaint was filed by Atty. Jose Gomos on the ground that the respondent judge violated the hearing, notice and jurisdictional requirements of the Rules of Court in issuing the questioned orders of February 26 and 28, 2001.

Ruling:

- Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is very explicit that the writ of preliminary injuction may issue only after prior notice and hearing upon the adverse party.

- Respondent judge granted Saripada Ali Pacsasum’s application for preliminary mandatory injunction on the very same day the Special Civil Action was filed on February 26, 2001.

- In issuing the subject writ on the very same day the application was filed and considering that the person against whom the same was to be served was located in Makati, summons could not have been served upon them or a hearing conducted in evident disregard of the due process requirements of the Rules of Court.

- Respondent judge’s failure to comply with procedural due process is aggravated by his total inattention to the parameters of his jurisdiction

- Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. The rationale, as explained in Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, is "that the trial court has no jurisdiction

to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin acts being performed or about to be performed outside its territorial jurisdiction."

- In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is not a mere deficiency in prudence, or lapse of judgment on the part of respondent judge but a blatant disregard of basic rules constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.

JOSEFINA MERONTOS Vda. De SAYSON, vs. Judge OSCAR E. ZERNA,

- On June 7, 1996, respondent issued a Temporary Restraining Order in favor of the plaintiff, Napoleon Lee Sr.; and against the defendants – Francisco Lumayag, Jose Bravo and Ricardo Sayson – as well as their agents, heirs and representatives.

- The Order directed defendants to refrain from entering the parcel of land registered under the plaintiff's name in the Registry of Deeds of Lanao del Norte.

- On June 9, 1996, the TRO was served upon complainant by Deputy Sheriff Conrado Hingco Jr., who thereafter entered her two-hectare fishpond and harvested prawn and fish products from it.

- In her verified Letter-Complaint, complainant sought injunction and damages from respondent, whom she charged with bad faith in the issuance of the TRO without notice and hearing.

- She claims that the TRO was issued "with patent violation and disregard of the constitutional right of due process of the undersigned who is not even a party to the case," and that it was a "clear disregard and disobedience to Supreme Court Circular No. 20-95 prohibiting judges from issuing Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs) without the observance of the mandatory requirement of notice and summary hearing of the parties concerned."

- Respondent contended that the matter was of extreme urgency considering the perishable nature of the prawn and its ready buyer. This is also provided for in par. 3 of said Circ. No. 20-95 in that if the matter is of extreme urgency and that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the [e]xecutive [j]udge shall issue a Temporary Restraining Order effective only for 20 days from its issuance.

Ruling:

- The respondent was remiss in the performance of his duties. - He granted the TRO effective, not for seventy-two hours as

prescribed by law in cases of extreme urgency, but for the maximum of 20 days; and he did so without conducting beforehand a summary hearing, as required under Administrative Circular No. 20-95.

- Administrative Circular No. 20-95 requires that an application for a TRO shall be acted upon, only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing.

- The Circular aims to restrict the ex parte issuance of a TRO only to cases of extreme urgency, in order to avoid grave injustice and irreparable injury

- Such TRO shall be issued only by the executive judge and shall take effect only for seventy-two (72) hours from its issuance. Furthermore, within the said period, a summary hearing shall be conducted to determine whether the Order can be extended for another period until a hearing on the pending application for preliminary injunction can be conducted

- Untenable is respondent judge's contention that the Circular allows an executive judge, in case of extreme urgency, to issue an ex parte TRO effective for twenty days

- The Court finds bad faith and dishonesty on the part of respondent judge. He avers in his Comment that there was extreme urgency in the ex parte TRO because the prawns, which were subject to spoilage, were perishable; and the buyer was already waiting for the harvest. But Napoleon Lee's Complaint did not contain such allegations. Nowhere was there any mention of the immediate need of harvesting prawns or any produce from the disputed property.

IN THE MATTER OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST HON. ABESAMIS, et al.

- The case arose from a labor dispute between petitioners and their employer, Year Jan Industries, Phil., Inc. (Company, for brevity), for illegal dismissal.

- The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners, declaring their dismissal illegal and ordering them to be reinstated to their former position without loss of seniority rights and other

privileges, and with backwages, 13th month pay and sick and vacation leave.

- the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the aforesaid decision

- On August 30, 1999, an alias writ of execution was issued against the Company to collect the computed backwages, 13th month pay and sick and vacation leave pay of the petitioners.

- A notice of garnishment was issued against the Company’s account in the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC).

- On September 21, 1999, the Company filed a “Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction” to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and the order of garnishment, and if the same has already been implemented, to restrain RCBC from transferring the garnished amount to the NLRC Sheriff, or if the garnished amount has already been transferred, to enjoin the NLRC from releasing the same to the petitioners.

- On September 23, 1999, respondents issued a temporary restraining order.

- On February 29, 2000, the Company’s application for preliminary injunction was granted upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,437,992.02. The Company, however, failed to post the bond required.

- On March 20, 2000, the Company filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to modify the February 29, 2000 Resolution which was denied on August 10, 2000.

- On October 6, 2000, the Company filed another Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction, this time, to enjoin the Labor Arbiter from implementing the alias writ of execution dated September 19, 2000, for the collection of P8,401,103.36 representing additional backwages/salaries of the petitioners. This was granted by respondents per Resolution dated October 11, 2000.

- Petitioners contend that the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals deprived them of their right to be reinstated and to be paid their lost income.

- They also assert that the issuance of the TRO without requiring the posting of the required surety bond and without defining the period of its effectivity or duration transgresses Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and the Canon of Judicial Ethics.

- Respondents, upon the other hand maintain, viz: (1) that the TROs never enjoined nor restrained the reinstatement of the complainants; (2) that under Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the bond is posted only when required by court; (3) that the phrase “until further orders of this Court” did not make the period of the TROs indefinite; and (4) that the charges averred in the complaint have already been passed upon and considered by this Court in G.R. No. 147388.

Ruling:- The complaint should be dismissed.- The respondents, in issuing the assailed Resolution, acted within

the confines and limits of the law and their authority.- Petitioners, in their motion for writ of execution, moved only for

the execution of the money judgment. - In the restraining orders issued by respondents, what was

restrained and enjoined is the payment of the monetary claims adjudged by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and not the reinstatement of the petitioners to their former positions. Thus, with or without the restraining orders, the judgment of the NLRC reinstating the petitioners is immediately executory pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code.

- The failure of the respondents to require the Company to post a bond did not violate the Rules of Court. Paragraph (b) of Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the court discretion to require such bond.

- The court may, in proper cases, exempt the applicant from filing the bond normally required

- In issuing the October 11, 2000 Resolution, respondents were merely exercising a discretion granted them by law.

- However, respondents in their Resolution dated February 29, 2000, required the Company to post a bond for the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Unfortunately, the Company failed to comply, hence, the writ was never issued.

- The TRO dated October 11, 2000 was not issued for an indefinite time. Under Section 5, Paragraph 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary restraining aorder issued by the CA shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. It automatically terminates upon the expiration of the 60 day period without need of any judicial declaration to that effect.

- the effectivity of a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals is only for a period of 60 days

- the phrase “until further orders of this Court” embodied in said resolution should be understood in such manner that the Court of Appeals may, in the exercise of its discretion, shorten the lifespan of the TRO when circumstances so warrant. Applying the foregoing, we find petitioners’ allegation that the questioned resolution transgresses the pertinent rules erroneous.

Llamzon vs. LogronioG.R. No. 167745 June 26, 2007

Petitioner Miguel Llamzon is an officer at the Industrial Relations Unit of Bataan Economic Zone. He was administratively charged before the Philippine Economic Zone Authority Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation and Discipline.

While the investigation was pending, petitioner requested to allow the PNP Crime Lab to examine the written contracts of the billings for overtime fees, by which he was charged. He was however denied.

Aggrieved, he filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court issued a TRO for 20 days.

Respondents moved to lift the TRO on the ground of non-holding of a summary hearing and failure of petitioner to show extreme urgency. The trial however denied the motion.

Petitioner then filed a motion to maintain the status quo. The trial court granted the motion. Notably, the status quo order issued was effective “until further order from this court”.

On appeal before the CA, the appellate court held that the trial court failed to observe Section 5 of Rule 58 concerning applications for preliminary injunction and TRO. It held that the trial court granted a TRO for 20 days instead of only 72 hours, and he did not conduct a summary hearing within 72 hours to determine whether the TRO should be extended. The status quo order was issued also in violation of the aforementioned Rule, specifically the portion which provides that the TRO shall not exceed 20 days and is deemed vacated if the application for preliminary injunction is not resolved within the 20-day period and that no court has the authority to extend or renew the TRO on the same ground for which it was issued.

Now before the SC, petitioner argues that the TRO and the status quo order were properly issued. He claims that a 20-day TRO can be issued without prior notice or hearing if it is shown that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant. He justifies the status quo order by saying that it was issued on a ground different from that for which the earlier TRO was made.

[The propriety of the issuance of the TRO was actually a non-issue as it was not raised before the CA, but was extensively discussed in conjunction with the propriety of the issuance of the status quo order]

ISSUE: W/N the 20-day TRO and the subsequent status quo order were properly issued – NO

RULING: Section 5 of Rule 58 proscribes the grant of preliminary injunction without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. However, the rule authorizes the court to which an application for preliminary injunction is made to issue a TRO if it should appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by verified petition that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, but only for a limited 72-hour period.

The rule thus holds that before a TRO may be issued, all parties must be heard in a summary hearing first, after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The only instance when a TRO may be issued ex parte is when the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such circumstance, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective for 72 hours only. The Executive Judge shall then summon the parties to a conference during which the case should be raffled in their presence. Before the lapse of the 72 hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case was raffled shall then conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard, which period shall in no case exceed 20 days including the original 72 hours.

It thus becomes apparent that the trial court erred in issuing a TRO effective, not for 72 hours as prescribed by law in cases of extreme urgency, but for the maximum period of 20 days; and he did so without conducting beforehand a summary hearing, and without showing that it falls under the exceptional circumstances enumerated in Administrative Circular No. 20-95 (from which the present rule is derived) where a TRO may be issued by the Executive Judge before assignment by raffle to a judge without first conducting a summary hearing.

As to the status quo order, such was improperly issued by the trial court. It was, for all intents and purposes, a mere continuation of the 20-day TRO erroneously issued. Indeed, a status quo ante order has the nature of a temporary restraining order. A TRO shall be effective only for a period of 20 days from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. During the 20-day period, the judge must conduct a hearing to consider the propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the TRO would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.

In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued; in fact, as stated in the Order, the hearing on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is still pending, hence the TRO earlier issued, assuming arguendo that it was indeed validly issued, automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court. The status quo order was, for all intents and purposes, an indefinite extension of the first TRO, or a renewed or second temporary restraining order proscribed by the rule and extant jurisprudence.

The status quo order is in fact, worse than a second TRO since unlike an ordinary TRO which has a lifetime of only 20 days, the trial court directed the maintenance of the status quo for an indefinite period or until further order from this court. It was not a preliminary injunction, because, as previously mentioned, the hearing on the application for the writ is still pending. Besides, in the event of an injunctive writ, an injunction bond is required, unless exempted by the Court.

Tomawis vs. Tabao-CaudangG.R. No. 166547 September 12, 2007

In 1987, Caudang was appointed as the Regional Director of the Office of the Muslim Affairs for Region XII-B. By that time, the position was not yet classified as Career Executive Service (CES) Position. Hence, the CSC approved Tabao-Caudang’s appointment as permanent. In 1991, said position was classified as CES position, requiring CES eligibility.

In 1993, Caudang received notice that she was being replaced by petitioner Tomawis, the latter having been appointed by President Fidel Ramos.

Caudang then sought a ruling from the CSC regarding her status of appointment. Meanwhile, she filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC, but the same was dismissed on procedural grounds. The CSC then rendered a ruling upholding

the appointment of Caudang as permanent and declaring her as the lawful incumbent.

In 2001, the OMA Executive Director Hashim reinstated Caudang to the contested position. Tomawis, whose appointment was merely temporary as he did not possess the requisite eligibility, was ordered to vacate and to formally relinquish the position to Tabao-Caudang.

Aggrieved, Tomawis instituted an action for injunction and prohibition against Caudang and the Hashim. The trial court ruled in favor of Tomawis.

RULING: On the merit of the RTC decision, we agree with the CA that Tomawis had no clear legal right to institute his petition for injunction. Indeed, the Tomawis suit before the RTC was a thinly disguised petition for quo warranto, and not having any legal title to the position of Regional Director (his temporary appointment having been terminated), he did not possess proper personality to file the action.

Even if the initiatory pleading filed by Tomawis before the RTC is truly a special civil action for injunction and prohibition, our conclusion remains – he still had no clear legal right to institute the same.

Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. As a rule, to justify the injunctive relief prayed for, the movant must show: (1) the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) that the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. A "clear legal right" means one clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the acts sought to be enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.

The facts clearly show that Tomawis was appointed Regional Director. However, because he did not possess the requisite CES eligibility, pursuant to established rules and jurisprudence, his appointment was characterized merely as temporary. His appointment papers specifically provided that his appointment was merely temporary. As such, he had no security of tenure. Upon the

issuance of the order appointing Caudang to the position, Tomawis' right to the position ceased to exist. Thus, he should have vacated and relinquished the position and turned over the duties, funds and properties of the office to Caudang.

Accordingly, his petition for injunction should have been denied outright by the court. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Section 6

Spouses Yap v. International Exchange Bank (March 28, 2008)

Main Action: Annulment of sheriff’s auction sale proceedings and certificate of sale with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI

As a result of a collection suit filed by iBank against Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy Go, a Writ of execution was implemented against Looyuko, while the same writ was issued against Go. The sheriff of RTC 150 of Makati issued a notice of sale concerning real properties allegedly owned by Go, but public auction did not push through.

On 13 June 2000, petitioner spouses filed a complaint for Injunction with Prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction with RTC 158 of Pasig, alleging that the said properties subject of the notice of sheriff’s sale and about to be sold at public auction, are already owned by them by virtue of Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Jimmy Go in their favor; and that the sheriff disregarded their right over the properties despite their execution of an affidavit of adverse claim over the properties.

The RTC 158 denied the application for WPI. The public auction finally pushed through on 22 Aug 2000 wherein the subject properties were sold in favor of iBank, subject to third-party claims of petitioners.

Petitioners filed with RTC 264 of Pasig the instant complaint. On 18 July 2001, an Order was issued, after hearing, granting the said application. On 13 Aug 2001, the WPI was issued. Respondents challenged the said orders up to the SC, but to no avail. An entry of judgment was issued rendering as final the propriety of the issuance of the WPI.

Subsequently, respondents filed with RTC 264 of Pasig praying that the WPI previously issued be dissolved, emphasizing their willingness to file a counter-bond to cover whatever damages petitioners may suffer. In an Order dated 29 Apr 2006, the trial court recalled and dissolved the WPI, and ordered respondents to post a counter-bond amounting to Php10M.

As its basis, it explained that petitioners’ right or title to the property is doubtful or disputed, thus unclear, since the purported deed of sale in their favor was not duly notarized. Such legal right can only therefore be threshed out in a full blown trial. Moreover, consideration was taken of the fact that the respondents were willing to post a counter-bond.

Issue: As argued by petitioners, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the dissolution of the WPI, considering that the propriety of its issuance was affirmed by both the CA and the SC, thus final. May the trial court still order the dissolution of the preliminary injunction it previously issued?

Held: Non-effectivity of dissolution: At the outset, it must be said that the WPI dated 13 August 2001 has not yet been actually dissolved because respondents have not posted the required counter-bond in the amount of P10,000,000.00. The dissolution thereof is primed on the filing of the counter-bond.

The Order of the trial court to recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction is subject to the filing and approval of the counter-bond that it ordered. Failure to post the required counter-bond will necessarily lead to the non-dissolution of the preliminary injunction. The Order of Dissolution cannot be implemented until and unless the required counter-bond has been posted.

On the merits; Distinction between issuance and dissolution: The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its dissolution. Its issuance is governed by Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure while the grounds for its dissolution are contained in Section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As long as the party seeking the dissolution of the preliminary injunction can prove the presence of any of the grounds for its dissolution, same may be dissolved notwithstanding that this Court previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Under Section 6, two conditions must concur: first, the court in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second,

the defendant files a counter-bond. The Order of the trial court is based on this ground. It found that respondents duly showed that they would suffer great and irreparable injury if the injunction shall continue to exist. As to the second condition, the trial court likewise found that respondents were willing to post a counter-bond which could cover the damages that petitioners may suffer in case the judgment turns out to be adverse to them.

SECTION 7FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE, COMPANY, INC., vs. JUDGE JIMMY H. F. LUCZON, JR.

Facts:

- Complainant had sought the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage executed in its favor by Maria Victoria Realty and Development Corporation ("MVRDC").

- On 8 October 2003, however, MVRDC filed a petition for annulment of real estate mortgage and accounting with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order ("petition") against complainant.

- On the same day, RTC-Tuguegarao Executive Judge Vilma T. Pauig issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining complainant and the deputy sheriff from holding a foreclosure sale of MVRDC’s real properties on 10 October 2003. The TRO was to be effective for 72 hours. The clerk of court sent a notice for the special raffle of the case on 13 October 2003.

- On 13 October 2003, MVRDC filed a motion for the extension of the TRO ("motion for extension"), with notice of hearing for 16 October 2003. On the latter date, after the raffle of the case to his sala, respondent Judge issued an Order extending the TRO for another 17 days.

- On 28 October 2003, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MVRDC.

- Respondent Judge had not yet conducted any hearing on the case. The injunction order cited rreparable injuries that may result should the sheriff pursue the foreclosure of the mortgage

- Complainant assailed the extension of the TRO and the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction "based purely on the unilateral allegations of MVRDC."

- Complainant argued that respondent Judge should not have issued the TRO or writ without a summary hearing, especially considering that MVRDC’s petition lacked an affidavit of merit.

- Complainant pointed out that under the law, MVRDC would have the right to redeem any of its foreclosed properties. Thus, there

was no extreme urgency, grave injustice or irreparable injury which would justify the injunction in MVRDC’s favor.

- Respondent Judge claimed that he granted the motion for extension in view of the urgency of the case and to avoid irreparable injuries to MVRDC.

- Respondent Judge further claimed that complainant received a copy of the Motion to Set Hearing for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, as shown by a registry receipt posted on 17 October 2003.

Ruling:

- Complainant assails the supposed lack of an Affidavit of Merit. Viewed in the context of the actual petition for preliminary injunction, this contention cannot be countenanced. The absence of an Affidavit of Merit is not final where the petition itself, which is under oath, recites the circumstances or facts which constitute the grounds of the petition

- Complainant takes issue with the fact that it was not furnished a copy of the bond. Apparently, this contention is premised on Section 7 of Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which in effect allows the adverse party to "except to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon."

- Said contention cannot be sustained in light of the circumstances of the case at hand

- the summons, a copy of the petition, and raffle notification were actually received by the complainant on 10 October 2003.

- In Caluya v. Ramos, the failure of the defendants to furnish the adverse parties with copies of the bonds prior to their approval is not sufficient to invalidate the orders dissolving the preliminary injunction where the attorneys for the latter were notified of the filing of the first bond; where they ultimately received copies of the bonds; and where they do not contend that said bonds are insufficient or that the sureties are not solvent.

- However, the absence of summary hearing cannot be excused.

- The conduct of a summary hearing is mandated under Section 5, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Procedure which provides that no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person

- The requirement of hearing is so basic and fundamental that an omission of [such] amounts to gross ignorance of rules and procedure and invites due sanction. In this case, respondent [Judge] twice ignored this elementary requisite.

- First, he extended the TRO. Then, after its expiration, he converted the same into a preliminary injunction. Both Orders were issued without conducting a summary hearing.

- It bears stressing that a writ of injunction is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy that should be dispensed with circumspection, and both sides should first be heard whenever possible.

- The Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 20-95 require the holding of a hearing where both parties can introduce evidence and present their side before the court may issue a TRO or an injunctive writ.

- the hearing of the motion for extension set on 16 October 2003 did not take place. All the same, respondent Judge granted the motion on that date, without mentioning the reason for the lack of hearing, or whether he intended to conduct one in the future on the prayer for the issuance of an injunction

- Further compounding his error, respondent Judge failed to conduct a hearing on the injunction within the 20-day life of the TRO, as prescribed by the Rules of Court. Yet he issued the assailed injunction order against complainant. The injunction order did not even explain why no hearings had taken place prior to its issuance.

Section 9

Palma Gil v. Lopez (April 29, 2003)

Complainant Editha Palma Gil charged respondent Judge Francisco H. Lopez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lupon, Davao Oriental, with Manifest Bias and Partiality, Undue Delay in the Disposition of Case and Ignorance of the Law.

(Note: Respondent judge was charged for violating Rule 70, Section 11 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure, when he failed to render judgment therein within the thirty-day period required).

Complainant is the defendant in a case of Forcible Entry and Damages with Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction pending before the sala of respondent judge. She averred that on October 9, 2001, the plaintiff in the said case filed a motion for temporary restraining order, which respondent Judge granted on the same day, despite procedural defects therein such as the lack of a verification, bond, and service of summons, all in violation of Rule 58, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respondent claims that what he issued was a status quo order because complainant’s men entered the land in dispute and attempted to prevent the harvesting of palay by plaintiff. 

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent guilty of delay in the rendition of judgment in Civil Case No. 1110 and erred in issuing a temporary restraining order despite procedural defects.

ISSUE: w/n the judge validly issued the TRO.

HELD:

NO. Rule 58, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. – A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:

(a)     The application in the action or proceeding is verified and shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded; and

(b)     Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto.  Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.

(c)     When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court shall be raffled to only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined.  In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied by service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant’s affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines.

However, where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines, temporarily absent therefrom or is a nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply.

(d)     The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be acted upon only after all the parties are heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriff’s return of service and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle to which the records shall be transmitted immediately.

The records reveal that the motion for temporary restraining order was not verified.  Respondent judge issued the Order on the same date when the motion was filed without prior notice to the complainant and without a hearing.

The issuance of the assailed Order cannot be justified under Rule 58, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:

Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the person or party sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from the facts shown by the affidavits of by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided.

Respondent argues that considering that the complaint in prior case was verified and prayed for the issuance of a preliminary and prohibitory injunction, the verification of the motion for issuance of temporary restraining order may be dispensed with.  We do not agree.

The Rules as above-quoted explicitly mandate that the application for injunction should be verified.  While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly administration of justice.