Proximate Cause

Proximate CauseDe Bataclan vs MedinaFacts: Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by Mariano Medina from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus was driving fastand when he applied the brakes it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some passengers were able to free themselves from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires of the bus were old.ISSUE:Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.HELD:No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the negligence of the driver because he was speeding and also he was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source oflighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to provide warning about said fact to the villagers.WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als.

Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the house pf his brother-in-law. Whilw making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.

Ruling: Decision of the CA reversed.

Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occassion.Calalas v CA (Torts)

FACTS:At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:1. RTC Dumaguete rendered judgment against Salva holding that the driver of the Isuzu truck was responsible It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.2. CA reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage since the cause of action was based on such and not quasi delict. Hence, current petition for review on certiorari.ISSUE:Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply?

RULING:No.The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.Quasi-delict / culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual1. Has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor2. negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action3. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable(device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party, obligation is created by law itself)

Breach of contract / culpa contractual1. premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation2. action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor (here, the common carrier) failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination3. not available; it is the parties themselves who create the obligation and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus createdIn case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.

Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise utmost diligence.1. Jeepney was not properly parked;2. Overloading of passengers.Fernando vs CAFACTS: November 7, 1975:Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao whereinBascon won November 22, 1975:bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from"asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen supply in the body andintake of toxic gas November 26, 1975: Basconsigned the purchase order RTC: Dismissed the case CA: Reversed -law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and theindigentISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can be liable for damagesHELD: NO. CA affirmed. test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?If not, then he isguiltyof negligencestandard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreetpater familiasof the Roman law Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist Distinction must be made betweenthe accidentand the injury Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisancesper seas defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitaryrequirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of thoserequirements accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind ofservice, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause ofthe accident. proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence.Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public respondent.Emergency RuleValenzuela vs CAFACTS: June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue towards the direction of Manila,Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights and seeked help She was with her companionCecilia Ramon While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she was suddenly hit by anotherMitsubishi Lancerdriven by Richard Li who was intoxicated and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the ground She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated and was replaced with an artificial one. Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000 (aritificial leg)] RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligenceand liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180P41,840 actual damages,P37,500unrealized profitsbecause of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Congarestaurant3weeks afterthe accidenton June 24, 1990,P20,000 a monthas unrealized profits ofBistro La Congarestaurant, from August, 1990 untilthe dateof this judgment,P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons,P1,000,000 in moral damages,P50,000, as exemplary damages,P60,000, as reasonable attorneys fees and costs. CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved Li's employer Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene ofthe accident:Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain)ISSUE:1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO2. W/NValenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO3. W/NAlexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision1. NO If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided hitting theValenzuelaby the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper time and distance it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car sincethere is plenty of space for both cars, sinceValenzuelacar was running at the right lane going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao2. NO. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection emergency rule an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligenceShe is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a darkStreetor alley where she would likely find no one to help herShe stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if neededshe parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car

3. YES. Not theprinciple of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise thediligenceof a good father of the family in theselectionand supervision of his employees Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the latters assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives. Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on the night ofthe accidentbecause he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Paraaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court below.It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his officemates place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work related strategies. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care anddiligenceof a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li4. YES. As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Courts discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lis grossly negligent driving of hisMitsubishi Lancerin the early morning hours ofthe accident. the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.George Mckee and Araceli Koh Mckee vs. IAC , Jaime Tayag and RosalindaFACTS Between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning of January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by Tayag and Manalo, driven by Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh, resulting in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando When the Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. But before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge As a result of the accident, 2 civil cases were filed for damages for the death and physical injuries sustained by the victims boarding the Ford Escort; as well as a criminal case against Galang During the trial, evidence were presented showing that the driver of the Truck was speeding resulting in the skid marks it caused in the scene of the accident The lower court found Galang guilty in the criminal case, but the civil cases were dismissed On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Galang, and reversed the decision in the civil cases, ordering the payment of damages for the death and physical injuries of the McKee family On MR, the CA reversed its previous decision and ruled in favor of the owners of the truckISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the owner and driver of the Truck were responsible for the collision HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION WAS THE OVER SPEEDING OF THE TRUCK SHOWING ITS NEGLIGENCE The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence" Considering the sudden intrusion of the 2 boys into the lane of the car, the Court finds that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Galang's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, Tayag and Manalo are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage, which they failed to doPetition GRANTED. Resolution SET ASIDE and previous DECISION REINSTATED.Hedy Gan y Yu vs CA

Facts: In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There were two vehicles parked on one side of the road, one following the other. As the car driven by Gan approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane of the car driven by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence, hit an old man who was about to cross the street, pinning him against the rear of one of the parked vehicles. The force of the impact caused the parked vehicle to move forward hitting the other parked vehicle in front of it. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two parked vehicle suffered damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. On appeal, CA modified the trial court's decision convicting Gan of Homicide thru simple imprudence.

Issue: WON CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for Homicide thru simple imprudence.

Ruling: SC reversed CA's decision, acquitting petitioner.Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly fonds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act w/o tme to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.Applying the above test to the case at bar, the SC finds the petitioner not guilty of the crime of simple imprudence resulting in Homicide.Delsan Transport vs C&A ConstructionFacts:

C & A construction, construct a deflector wall at the Vitas reclamation Area in Tondo, Manila it was not formally turnover to National Housing Authority though it was completed in 1994. On 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994 Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express receive a report that that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after eight (8) hours. At 8:35 a.m. he tried to seek shelter but it was already congested. At 10:00 a.m. Capt. Jusep drop the anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet. The ship was dragged by the wind toward the Napocor power barge Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel to avoid the collision but when the engine was re-started, it hit the deflector wall constructed by the respondent. P456,198.24 was the damaged cause by the incident. C & A construction demanded payment of the damages from Capt. Jusep but the latter refused to pay due to the cause of the incident was by a fortuitous event. The trial court ruled that Captain Jusep was not guilty of negligence in applying the emergency rule because it had taken necessary precautions to avoid accident. The Court of Appeals reversed & set aside the decision of the trial court. Captain Jusep was found guilty of negligence in transferring the vessel only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21,1994 and held liable for damages in waiting until 8:35 a.m. before transfering the vessel to sought shelter.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent.

(2) Whether or not the petitioner is solidarily liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code for Quasi-Delict.

Held:

(1) The court finds Captain Jusep is guilty of negligence, the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances, despite the knowledge that there is typhoon but he waited for the lapse of eight (8) hours instead. Captain Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same situation. The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule because the danger where Captain Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence.

(2) The court finds the petitioner liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage to another, it instantly arise a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the care and diligence of supervision of his employee. In Fabre ,jr. v Court of Appeals held that due diligence requires consistent compliance of rules & regulation for the guidance and actual implementation of rules. But the petitioner fails to give any evidence that its rule are strictly implemented and monitored in compliance therewith petitioner is therefore liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. The amount of P 456, 198.27 due earn 6% interest per annum from October 3, 1995 until the finality of the decision.

Res Ipsa LoquitorAfrica vs CaltexIn March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from thegasoline stationand the fire spread and burned several houses including the house of Spouses Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was being transferred which caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to prove this theory and no other explanation can be had as to the real reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.

ISSUE:Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.

HELD:Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself) which states: where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendants want of care. Thegasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.

Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is the exception because the burden of proof is shifted to the party charged of negligence as the latter is the one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused the injury complained of.

F.F. Cruz vs. CA| CortesG.R. No. L-52732 August 29, 1988 |SCRAFACTSo The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz in Caloocan City was situated adjacent to the residence of the Mables.o Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and Mables residence. The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears.o In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in Cruzs shop. Cruzs employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to the Mables house. Both the shop and the house were razed to the ground.o The Mables collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the contents thereof.o The Mables filed an action for damages against the Cruzs.o The TC ruled in favor of the Mables. CA affirmed but reduced the award ofdamages.ISSUES & ARGUMENTSW/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case.HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDIYes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case. The CA, therefore, had basis to find Cruz liable for the loss sustained by the Mables.o The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may be stated as follows:o Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]o The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.o It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed.o Cruz failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of the Mables as required by a city ordinanceo that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigaretteo that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; ando that workers sometimes smoked inside the shopo Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Cruz's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence.o Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. Defendant's negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.o In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.]Layugan vs IACFacts:Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized where he incurred and will incur more expenses as he recuperates from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was amputated and that because of said injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime income.To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver] averred that he knows his responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it was the negligence of plaintiff that was the proximate cause of the accident. They alleged that plaintiff parked his truck in a manner which occupied a part of the highway and he did not even put a warning sign.

Subsequently,a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his insurer, the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff [Isidro], without admitting his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-party defendant [Travellers] is liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by virtue of their insurance contract which covers the insurer's liability for damages arising from death, bodily injuries and damage to property. The Insurance company argued that it is only liable for the amount agreed in the policy and the complaint was premature since no claim was made to it.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision, stating that it is the petitioners who were negligent since they did notexercise caution by putting warning signs that their truck is park on the shoulder of the highway.

Issue:Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.

Ruling:Yes!

The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was proven that the petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from their truck in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp.The existence of this warning sings was corroborated by Serrano, respondent's driver, and further stated that when he saw a parked truck, he kept on stepping on the brake pedal but it did not function. Thus despite this warning signs, the truck recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by Respondent Isidro bumped the truck of petitioner.

The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such presumption isjuris tantumand notjuris et de jureand consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has already been adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving.

We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent used to intruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial. The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.Cebu Shipyard v William G.R. No. 132607. May 5, 1999Facts:Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. repaired marine vessels while the Prudential is in the non-lifeinsurancebusiness. William Lines, Inc., the owner of M/V Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo vessel, which caught fire and sank. At the time of the incident, subject vessel was insured with Prudential for P45M for hull and machinery. CSEW was insured for only Php 10 million for the shiprepairers liability policy. They entered into a contract where negligence was the only factor that could make CSEW liable for damages. Moreover, liability of CSEW was limited to only Php 1million for damages. The Hull Policy included an AdditionalPerils (INCHMAREE) Clause covering loss of or damage to the vessel through the negligence of, among others, ship repairmen.William brought Manila City to the dry dock of CSEW for repairs. The officers and cabin crew stayed at the ship while it was being repaired. After the vessel was transferred to the dockingquay, it caught fire and sank, resulting to its total loss.William brought suit against CSEW alleging that it was through the latters negligence that the ship caught fire and sank. Prudential was impleaded as co-plaintiff after it had paid the value of insured items. It was subrogated to 45 million, or the value it claimed to indemnify.The trial court brought judgment against CSEW 45 million for the ship indemnity, 65 million for loss of income, and more than 13 million in other damages. The CA affirmed the TC decision.CSEW contended that the cause of the fire was due to Williams hotworks on the said portion of the ship which they didnt ask CSEWpermissionfor.Prudential, on the other hand, blamed the negligence of the CSEW workers in the instance when they didnt mind rubber insulation wire coming out of the air-conditioning unit that was already burning.Hence this MFR.Issue:1. WON CSEW had management and supervisory control of the ship at the time the fire broke out2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies against the crew3. WON Prudential has the right of subrogation against its own insured4. WON the provisions limiting CSEWs liability for negligence to a maximum of Php 1 million are valid

Held: Yes. Yes. Yes. No. Petition denied.Ratio:1. The that factual findings by the CA are conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. They are entitled to great weight and respect when the CA affirmed the factual findings arrived at by the trial court.The CA and the Cebu RTC are agreed that the fire which caused the total loss of subject M/V Manila City was due to the negligence of the employees and workers of CSEW.Furthermore, in petitions forreviewon certiorari, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained.2. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the followingconditionsmust concur: (1)the accidentwas of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence.The facts and evidence reveal the presence of theseconditions. First, the fire would not have happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care anddiligencehad been exercised.Second, the agency charged with negligence, as found by the trial court and the CA and as shown by the records, is CSEW, which had control over subject vessel when it was docked for annual repairs.What is more, in the present case the trial court found direct evidence to prove that the workers didnt exercise duediligencein the care of subject vessel. The direct evidence substantiates the conclusion that CSEW was really negligent even without applying such doctrine.3. Petitioner contends that Prudential is not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of William Lines, Inc., theorizing that (1) the fire which gutted M/V Manila City was an excluded risk and (2) it is a co-assured under the Marine HullInsurancePolicy. This was wrong. The one who caused the fire has already been adjudicated by the courts as CSEW.Upon proof of payment by Prudential to William Lines, Inc., the former was subrogated to the right of the latter to indemnification from CSEW. As aptly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the law says:Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from theinsurancecompany for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, theinsurancecompany shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by theinsurancecompany does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.When Prudential paid the latter the total amount covered by itsinsurancepolicy, it was subrogated to the right of the latter to recover the insured loss from the liable party, CSEW.Petitioner theorizes further that there can be no right of subrogation as it is deemed a co-assured under the subjectinsurancepolicy with reliance on Clause 20 of the Work Order which states:20. Theinsuranceon the vessel should be maintained by the customer and/or owner of the vessel during the period the contract is in effect.Clause 20 of the Work Order in question is clear in the sense that it requires William Lines to maintaininsuranceon the vessel during the period of dry-docking or repair. However, the fact that CSEW benefits from the said stipulation does not automatically make it as a co-assured of William Lines. The intention of the parties to make each other a co-assured under aninsurancepolicy is to be read from theinsurancecontract or policy itself and not from any other contract or agreement because theinsurancepolicy denominates the beneficiaries of theinsurance. The hull and machineryinsuranceprocured by William Lines, Inc. from Prudential named only William Lines, Inc. as the assured. There was no manifestation of any intention of William Lines, Inc. to constitute CSEW as a co-assured under subject policy. The claim of CSEW that it is a co-assured is unfounded.Then too, in theAdditionalPerils Clause of the same MarineInsurancePolicy, it is provided that thisinsurancealso covers loss of or damage to vessel directly caused by the negligence of charterers and repairers who are not assured.As correctly pointed out by respondent Prudential, if CSEW were deemed a co-assured under the policy, it would nullify any claim of William Lines, Inc. from Prudential for any loss or damage caused by the negligence of CSEW. Certainly, no shipowner would agree to make a shiprepairer a co-assured under suchinsurancepolicy; otherwise, any claim for loss or damage under the policy would be invalidated.4. Although in this jurisdiction, contracts of adhesion have been consistently upheld as valid per se; as binding as an ordinary contract, the Court recognizes instances when reliance on such contracts cannot be favored especially where the facts and circumstances warrant that subject stipulations be disregarded. Thus, in ruling on the validity and applicability of the stipulation limiting the liability of CSEW for negligence to P1M only, the facts and circumstances vis-a-vis the nature of the provision sought to be enforced should be considered, bearing in mind the principles of equity and fair play.It is worthy to note that M/V Manila City was insured with Prudential for P45M. Upon thorough investigation by its hull surveyor, M/V Manila City was found to be beyond economical salvage and repair. The evaluation of the average adjuster also reported a constructive total loss. The said claim of William Lines, Inc., was then found to be valid and compensable such that Prudential paid the latter the total value of itsinsuranceclaim. Furthermore, it was ascertained that the replacement cost of the vessel, amounts to P55M.Considering the circumstances, it would unfair to limit the liability of petitioner to One Million Pesos only. To allow CSEW to limit its liability to P1M notwithstanding the fact that the total loss suffered by the assured and paid for by Prudential amounted to P45M would sanction the exercise of a degree of diligence short of what is ordinarily required because, then, it would not be difficult for petitioner to escape liability by the simple expedient of paying an amount very much lower than the actual damage suffered by William.Attractive NuisanceHIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN, et al.- Attractive Nuisance Doctrine

Attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial (e.g. water tanks) as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.FACTS:Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didnt have any barricade or fence. One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver, having died of asphyxia secondary to drowning. The lower decided in the favor of the parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance.ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?RULING: NO.The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Marios death.Ylarde vs. AquinoFACTS:Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan. Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. During that time, the school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World War II. Defendant decided to help clear the area so he gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them to dig beside a one ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone can be buried. It was left unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18 students including the Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation. Defendant left the children to level the loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key to the school workroom where he can get some rope. It was alleged that before leaving, he told the children not to touch the stone. After he left, the children playfully jumped into the pit when suddenly the concrete block slide down. Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned to the wall causing serious physical injuries which as a consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter. The parents of the victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano.ISSUE:WON both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages.HELD: As held in Amadora vs CA, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, this is the general rule. However, in casea of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and he did not give any instruction regarding the digging.A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his tudents should make sure that the children are protected from all harm. The excavation instructed clearly exposed the students to risk and should not be placed under the category of Work Education such as school gardening, planting trees etc. Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence where instead of availing himself of adult manual laborers he instead utilized his students. Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient to cast away all serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to the excavation would present to the children. He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the petitioners.Last Clear ChanceGeorge Mckee and Araceli Koh Mckee vs. IAC , Jaime Tayag and RosalindaFACTS Between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning of January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by Tayag and Manalo, driven by Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh, resulting in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando When the Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. But before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge As a result of the accident, 2 civil cases were filed for damages for the death and physical injuries sustained by the victims boarding the Ford Escort; as well as a criminal case against Galang During the trial, evidence were presented showing that the driver of the Truck was speeding resulting in the skid marks it caused in the scene of the accident The lower court found Galang guilty in the criminal case, but the civil cases were dismissed On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Galang, and reversed the decision in the civil cases, ordering the payment of damages for the death and physical injuries of the McKee family On MR, the CA reversed its previous decision and ruled in favor of the owners of the truckISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the owner and driver of the Truck were responsible for the collision HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION WAS THE OVER SPEEDING OF THE TRUCK SHOWING ITS NEGLIGENCE The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence" Considering the sudden intrusion of the 2 boys into the lane of the car, the Court finds that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Galang's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, Tayag and Manalo are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage, which they failed to doPetition GRANTED. Resolution SET ASIDE and previous DECISION REINSTATED.LADECO vs. ANGALAFACTS:On May 4, 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with plate no. PEC-93 was driven by Apolonio Deocampo bumped into a 1958 Chevy pick-up with plate no. MAM-475 owned by Michael Raymond Angala and driven by Bernulfo Borres. Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the crewcab which was assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez. Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City. The left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.Respondent Angala filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorneys fees against LADECO, its administrative officer Henry Berenguel and Deocampo. Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the impact. Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at the speedometer when the accident took place. Respondent testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed a blinking light while looking at the speedometer.Respondent sent a demand letter to LADEDO for the payment of the damages he incurred because of the accident but he did not receive any reply. Thus, respondent filed the case against LADECO, Berenguel, and Deocampo.

In its March 3, 1995 Decision, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15 ruled in favor of defendant and ordered LADECO and Deocampo to solidarily pay the damages. The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of the crewcab. LADECO and Deocampo filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on June 13, 1995.Petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed in toto the trial courts decision. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its March 11, 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition was filed before the Supreme Court.ISSUE:Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies in the case at bar.RULING:Yes.Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance appliesThe doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who has the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.Pantranco vs BaesaFACTS: Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses While they were proceeding towards Malalam Riverat a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it. As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughterMaricar Baesa, as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. CA upheld RTC: favor of BaesaISSUE: W/Nthe last clear chance applies thereby making David Icowho hadthe chance to avoid the collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competenceHELD: NO. Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending dangerWhen he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the opposite directionEven assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discoveredConsolidated bank vs CAFacts: Private respondent L.C. Diaz instructed his employee, Calapre, to deposit in his savings account in petitioner bank. Calapre left the passbook of L.C. Diaz to the teller of the petitioner bank because it was taking time to accomplish the transaction and he had to go to another bank. When he returned, the teller told him that somebody got it. The following day, an impostor succeeded in withdrawing P300,000.00 by using said passbook and a falsified withdrawal slip. Private respondent sued the bank for the amount withdrawn by the impostor. The trial court dismissed the complaint but the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held the bank liable. Issue: Whether or not petitioner bank is liable solely for the amount withdrawn by the impostor. Held: No. The bank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence or culpa contractual. The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan. Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. The bank is liable to its depositor for breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence or culpa contractual. The bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship (Simex International vs. CA). The tellers know, or should know, that the rules on savings account provide that any person in possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook to the wrong person, they would be clothing that person presumptive ownership of the passbook, facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that person. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. This doctrine is not applicable to the present case. The contributory negligence of the private respondent or his last clear chance to avoid the loss would not exonerate the petitioner from liability. However, it serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the private respondent. Under Article 1172, the liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. In this case, respondent L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of petitioner bank should be reduced. In PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE VS. CA, the Supreme Court allocated the damages between the depositor who is guilty of contributory negligence and the bank on a 40-60 ratio. The same ruling was applied to this case. Petitioner bank must pay only 60% of the actual damages.Contributory NegligenceValenzuela vs CAFACTS: June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue towards the direction of Manila,Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights and seeked help She was with her companionCecilia Ramon While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she was suddenly hit by anotherMitsubishi Lancerdriven by Richard Li who was intoxicated and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the ground She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated and was replaced with an artificial one. Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000 (aritificial leg)] RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligenceand liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180P41,840 actual damages,P37,500unrealized profitsbecause of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Congarestaurant3weeks afterthe accidenton June 24, 1990,P20,000 a monthas unrealized profits ofBistro La Congarestaurant, from August, 1990 untilthe dateof this judgment,P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons,P1,000,000 in moral damages,P50,000, as exemplary damages,P60,000, as reasonable attorneys fees and costs. CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved Li's employer Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene ofthe accident:Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain)ISSUE: W/NValenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NOHELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decisionNO. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection emergency rule an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligenceShe is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a darkStreetor alley where she would likely find no one to help herShe stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if neededshe parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona CarIsaac vs A.L. AmmenFACTS: May 31, 1951: Cesar IsaacboardedBus No. 31from Ligao, Albay bound for Pili, Camarines Sur andseated himself on the left side resting his left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow outside the window Before reaching his destination, apick-up caratfull speedand was running outside of its proper lanecame from the opposite directionThe driver of the bus swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road until its front and rear wheels have gone over the pile of stones or gravel situated on the rampart of the road.The bus could not bus farther right and run over a greater portion of thepile of gravel, the peak of which was about 3 feet high, without endangering the safety of his passengers.Despite efforts, the rear left side of the bus was hit by the pick-up car He was rushed to a hospital in Iriga, Camarines Sur where he was givenbloodtransfusion to save his life After 4 days, he was transferred to another hospital in Tabaco, Albay, where he under went treatment for 3 months Later, he was moved to the Orthopedic Hospital where he was operated on and stayed for another 2 months. He incurred expenses of P623.40, excluding medical fees which were paid by A.L. Ammen Trans. Co. Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint - collision occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the pick-up carISSUE: W/Nif there is no negligence on the part of the common carrier but that the accident resulting in injuries is due to causes which are inevitable and which could not have been avoided or anticipated notwithstanding the exercise of that high degree of care and skill which the carrier is bound to exercise for the safety of his passengers neither the common carrier nor the driver is liable therefor

HELD: YES. Appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extra ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case.Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756 Ooom.

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. principlesgoverning the liability of a common carrier:1. the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. There is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all circumstances of each case2. a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances3. a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence4. the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel where a carrier's employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation must be taken into account, and he is held to the some degree of care that he would otherwise be required to exercise in theabsenceof such emergency but must exercise only such care as any ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances andconditions, and the failure on his part to exercise the best judgment the case renders possible does not establish lack of care and skill on his part Considering all the circumstances, we are persuaded to conclude that the driver of the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the collision It is true that Isaac's contributory negligence cannot relieve A.L. Ammen of its liability but will only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article 1762, new Civil Code), but this is a circumstance which further militates against thepositiontaken by IsaacCusi v. PNR| Guerrero J.FACTS Spouses Cusi attended a birthday party in Paranaque, Rizal. After the party which broke up at about 11 o'clock that evening, the spouses proceeded home in their Vauxhall car with Victorino Cusi at the wheel. Upon reaching the railroad tracks, finding that the level crossing bar was raised and seeing that there was no flashing red light, and hearing no whistle from any coming train, Cusi merely slack ened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks. At the same time, a train bound for Lucena traversed the crossing, resulting in a collision between the two. This accident caused the spouses to suffer deformities and to lose the earnings they used to enjoy as successful career people. The defense is centered on the proposition that the gross negligence of Victorino Cusi was the proximate cause of the collision; that had he made a full stop before traversing the crossing as required by section 56(a) of Act 3992 (Motor Vehicle Law), he could have seen and heard the approach of the train, and thus, there would have been no collision.ISSUES & ARGUMENTSW/N Victorino Cusi was negligent and such was the proximate cause of the collisionHOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINo. Negligence has been defined by Judge Cooley in his work on Torts as "the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." All that the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a person to use that care and diligence expected of reasonable men under similar circumstances. Undisputably, the warning devices installed at the railroad crossing were manually operated; there were only 2 shifts of guards provided for the operation thereof one, the 7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P. M. shift, and the other, the 3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. shift. On the night of the accident, the train for Lucena was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00 P.M. During that precise hour, the warning devices were not operating for no one attended to them. Also, as observed by the lower court, the locomotive driver did not blow his whistle, thus: "... he simply sped on without taking an extra precaution of blowing his whistle. That the train was running at full speed is attested to by the fact that notwithstanding the application of the emergency brakes, the train did not stop until it reached a distance of around 100 meters." Victorino Cusi had exercised all the necessary precautions required of him as to avoid injury to -himself and to others. We find no need for him to have made a full stop; relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, Victorino Cusi had no reason to anticipate the impending danger The record shows that the spouses Cusi previously knew of the existence of the railroad crossing, having stopped at the guardhouse to ask for directions before proceeding to the party. At the crossing, they found the level bar raised, no warning lights flashing nor warning bells ringing, nor whistle from an oncoming train. They safely traversed the crossing. On their return home, the situation at the crossing did not in the least change, except for the absence of the guard or flagman. Hence, on the same impression that the crossing was safe for passage as before, plaintiff-appellee Victorino Cusi merely slackened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks, driving at the proper rate of speed for going over railroad crossingsTABACALERA vs. NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES

FACTS:Petitioners are insurers of a shipment of sacks of corn grains consigned to Republic Flour Mills Corporation in Manila. The cargo was shipped by North Front Shipping Services, Inc. The consignee was advised of its arrival but the unloading was delayed for six days for unknown reason, and the merchandise was already moldy, rancid and deteriorating.

The moisture content and the wetting was due to contact with salt water but the mold growth was only incipient and not sufficient to make the corn grains toxic and unfit for consumption. In fact the mold growth could still be arrested by drying. However, Republic Flour rejected the entire cargo which therefore forced the petitioners to pay the former.

Now, as subrogees, they lodged a complaint for damages against respondents claiming that the loss was exclusively attributable to the fault and negligence of the carrier. The Marine Cargo Adjusters hired by the insurance companies conducted a survey and found cracks in the bodega of the barge and heavy concentration of molds on the tarpaulins and wooden boards. They did not notice any seals in the hatches. The tarpaulins were not brand new as there were patches on them, contrary to the claim of North Front Shipping Services, Inc., thus making it possible for water to seep in. They also discovered that the bulkhead of the barge was rusty.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled that the contract entered into between North Front Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills Corporation was a charter-party agreement. As such, only ordinary diligence in the care of goods was required. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that as a common carrier required to observe a higher degree of diligence North Front 777 satisfactorily complied with all the requirements hence was issued a Permit to Sail after proper inspection.

ISSUE:Whether or not a charter-party agreement between P and R requires extraordinary diligence.

HELD:Yes. The charter-party agreement between North Front Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills Corporation did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier.

x x xNorth Front Shipping Services, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the business of transporting cargo and offers its services indiscriminately to the public. It is without doubt a common carrier. As such it is required to observe extraordinary diligence in its vigilance over the goods it transports. When goods placed in its care are lost or damaged, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. North Front Shipping Services, Inc., therefore has the burden of proving that it observed extraordinary diligence in order to avoid responsibility for the lost cargo.

However, we cannot attribute the destruction, loss or deterioration of the cargo solely to the carrier. We find the consignee Republic Flour Mills Corporation guilty of contributory negligence. It was seasonably notified of the arrival of the barge but did not immediately start the unloading operations. No explanation was proffered by the consignee as to why there was a delay of six (6) days. Had the unloading been commenced immediately the loss could have been completely avoided or at least minimized. As testified to by the chemist who analyzed the corn samples, the mold growth was only at its incipient stage and could still be arrested by drying. The corn grains were not yet toxic or unfit for consumption.Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs Court of AppealsFACTS On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot. The claims for death and other benefits having been denied by the petitioner, the herein private respondent filed suit in the Regional Trial Court of Bago City. Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but deducted from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for the decedent's contributory negligence and the total pension of P41,367.60 private respondent and her children would be receiving from the SSS for the next five years The widow appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the ground that it was not negligent and therefore not liable at all. In its own decision, the Court of Appeals 2 sustained the rulings of the trial court except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased and disallowed the deductions protested by the private respondent.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the respondent court is at fault for finding the petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code and for disallowing the deductions made by the trial court.HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDITo say the least, the Court views with regret the adamant refusal of petitioner Ma-ao Sugar Central to recompense the private respondent for the death of Julio Famoso, their main source of support, who was killed in line of duty while in its employ. It is not only a matter of law but also of compassion on which we are called upon to rule today. We shall state at the outset that on both counts the petition must fail. Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had come loose because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates. Fish plates are described as strips of iron 8" to 12" long and 3 1/2" thick which are attached to the rails by 4 bolts, two on each side, to keep the rails aligned. Although they could be removed only with special equipment, the fish plates that should have kept the rails aligned could not be found at the scene of the accident. There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose inter alia of preventing derailments, was the responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged. According to Jose Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the control and supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment in the milling district were frequent and there were even times when such derailments were reported every hour. The petitioner should therefore have taken more prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its negligence. The argument that no one had been hurt before because of such derailments is of course not acceptable. And neither are we impressed by the claim that the brakemen and the conductors were required to report any defect in the condition of the railways and to fill out prescribed forms for the purpose. For what is important is that the petitioner should act on these reports and not merely receive and file them. The fact that it is not easy to detect if the fish plates are missing is no excuse either.Indeed, it should stress all the more the need for the responsible employees of the petitioner to make periodic checks and actually go down to the railroad tracks and see if the fish plates were in place. It is argued that the locomotive that was derailed was on its way back and that it had passed the same rails earlier without accident. The suggestion is that the rails were properly aligned then, but that does not necessarily mean they were still aligned afterwards. It is possible that the fish plates were loosened and detached during its first trip and the rails were as a result already mis-aligned during the return trip. But the Court feels that even this was unlikely, for, as earlier noted, the fish plates were supposed to have been bolted to the rails and could be removed only with special tools. The fact that the fish plates were not found later at the scene of the mishap may show they were never there at all to begin with or had been removed long before. At any rate, the absence of the fish plates whatever the cause or reason is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, thus:Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.Fuentes vs NLRCPetitioner Maria Linda Fuentes seeks to set aside the resolution dated November 28, 1985 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC for brevity) affirming the Labor Arbiter's dismissal of her complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent Philippine Banking Corporation (Philbanking for brevity).Petitioner was employed as a teller at the Philbanking's office at Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. On May 28, 1982, at about 10:30 a.m., petitioner, who was acting as an overnight teller, received a cash deposit of P200,000.00. She counted the money with the assistance of a co-teller, finishing the task at 10:40 a.m. or ten (10) minutes after her closing time. Before she could start balancing her transactions, the Chief Teller handed her several payroll checks for validation. Finding the checks to be incomplete, petitioner left her cage to get other checks, without, however, bothering to put the P200,000.00 cash on her counter inside her drawer. When she returned to her cubicle after three (3) to five (5) minutes, she found that the checks for validation were still lacking, so she went out of her cubicle again to get the rest of the checks. On her way to a co-teller's cubicle, she noticed that the P200,000.00 pile on her counter had been re-arranged. She thus returned to her cage, counted the money and discovered that one (1) big bundle worth P50,000.00 was missing therefrom. She immediately asked her co-teller about it and getting a negative reply, she reported the matter to the Chief Teller. A search for the P50,000.00 having proved unavailing, petitioner was asked to explain why she should not be held liable for the loss. She submitted her explanation on June 24, 1982.Subsequently, on June 3, 1983, petitioner was dismissed for gross negligence. On June 21, 1983, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with reinstatement and backwages.Private respondent bank seasonably filed an answer with counterclaim that petitioner be ordered to restitute the amount of P50,000.On January 31, 1984, Labor Arbiter Bienvenido Hermogenes rendered a decision dismissing the complaint as well as the counterclaim but without prejudice as to the latter.1Petitioner's appeal to the NLRC was dismissed for lack of merit2and her motion for reconsideration was denied.3Hence, this petition.The issue in this case is whether petitioner's dismissal on the ground of gross negligence was justified under Art. 282 of the Labor Code.Upon a thorough consideration of the facts of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason for reversing the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that petitioner was grossly negligent in the performance of her duties as a teller, which negligence resulted in the loss of P50,000.00.Applying the test of negligence, we ask: did the petitioner in doing the alleged negligent act use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, she is guilty of negligence.The circumstances surrounding the loss in question lend us no sympathy for the petitioner. It was established that petitioner simply left the pile of money within the easy reach of the crowd milling in front of her cage, instead of putting it in her drawer as required under the private respondent bank's General Memorandum No. 211 (Teller's Manual of Operations) which she was expected to know by heart.4Moreover, she left the P200,000.00 on two occasions.5Her irresponsibility is nowhere made apparent than in her response to the following question:Q Noong lumabas ka sa iyong cage para pumunta sa iyong Chief Teller, hindi ba ipinagbilin itong pera sa iyong kasamahan?A Hindi ko na ho ipinagbilin kasi masyadong maraming tao noon, at iyong aking teller's counter ay nilagyan ko ng sign na nakasulat ng 'next teller please' na ang ibig sabihin ay kung meron mang mga cliente doon sa akin ay doon muna sila maki-pagtransact ng negosyo sa kabilang teller o kung sino man ang bakante kasi busy ako.6As a teller, petitioner must realize that the amount of care demanded by reasonable conduct is that proportionate to the apparent risk. Since it was payday and depositors were milling around, petitioner should have been extra cautious. At no time than the occasion under consideration was the need to be extra careful more obvious. It was certainly not the