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Introduction1.1 Background:There had been great international “conflict and violence” in the 20 th century.

Approximately sixty million people lost their lives in two World Wars. No sooner WWII

had ended than the new conflict, the cold war, engulfed the globe. During the cold war

years, millions died in proxy wars from Greece and Korea to Vietnam, Afghanistan, and

Nicaragua, and everywhere. The cold war ended with the disintegration of the USSR in

1991. The world was left unipolar with the US as the sole superpower. During 1990s, the

tragic events in Kuwait, Bosnia, Rwanda, and at many other places on the globe, conflict

and war continued in the post-cold war period. Though the Soviet threat had disappeared

with the end of the cold war, yet the US kept approximately “hundred thousand military

forces” in Europe and about the same size in Northeast Asia.1

The US kept such a large number of military forces abroad along with hundreds

of military bases on the globe. The US did so because with the passage of the time the

dangerous rivalries among states, particularly between the major powers, were bound to

emerge. In this era of unipolarity, the US political and military dominance almost had

become unchallengeable. No power in history had ever dominated world political and

military system in the past as did the US in the post-cold war era. Such an international

environment existed when 9/11 occurred, argued Stephen Zunes.2

After disintegration of the USSR in 1991 the US approximately maintained

250,000 military personnel in over one hundred countries of the world. Even after

collapse of the USSR the US also maintained hundreds of military bases around the

globe. The US was in possession of large number of nuclear weapons as well. The US

1 John J. Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (WW Norton & Company, 2001), xi-xii

2 Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch, (Eds.). The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 26

15

remained the only country around the globe with a global power projection capability

along with the most sophisticated military weapons. The US military forces also had been

enforcing the “no-fly zones” in Iraq since 1991.3

Then came 9/11 and the US foreign policy agenda was transformed with the

launching of war on terror. Within 18 months, the US President George W. Bush invaded

Iraq unilaterally in March 2003 ignoring UN and the world public opinion. Iraq became

the first victim of President George Bush’s newly pronounced offensive doctrine of pre-

emption. The US embarked upon a “neo-imperial” course to dominate the world.4 G.

John Ikenberry argued about the National Security Strategy of President Bush that the

“fundamental commitment” initiated by NSS was to “maintain a unipolar world”. The US

wanted a world different from the older one, where the US would be without “peer

competitor.”5

“The US-Iraq Policy 2001 to 2008: An Application of Offensive Realism”

constituted the topic of this dissertation. The objective of the dissertation had been to

make an analytical study of the US policy towards Iraq under George Bush from 2001 to

2008. With the end of the Cold War, the “centre of gravity” of world politics had shifted

from Europe to the Middle East as Gen. (Retd.) Keane had quoted.6 Iraq could be

regarded as the litmus test case for the US policy toward the region. The contours of Iraqi

policies and Iraq’s position vis-à-vis global and regional politics had been a major pretext

in setting the pace of the events in the region.

America had become an empire.7 Michael Ignatieff, director of the Carr Centre at

the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard argued that America had become an

“empire… a world hegemon.”8 The Bush Administration had been contemplating the US

invasion of Iraq even before 9/11 happened.9 September 11, provided the US

3 Stephan M. Walt. Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 34-35

4 John Gaddis. “Grand Strategy in the Second Term”, Foreign Affairs (2005): 2-155 John Ikenberry. “America's Imperial Ambition”, Foreign Affairs (2002): 44-606 Bob Woodward. The War Within (UK: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 392-3937 Tom Clancy, Gen Tony Zinni (Retd.), and Tony Koltz. Battle Ready (New York, G.P.Putnam’s

Sons, 2004), 4318 Michael Ignatieff. “The Burden” New York Times Magazine, January 5, 20039 Richard A. Clarke. Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror. (New York: Free

Press, 2004), 30, 265

16

administration with a big opportunity to invade Iraq “under false pretenses.”10 The neo-

conservatives sitting in the Bush Administration pushed their agenda that predated 9/11

tragedy ensuring “American global supremacy.”11 They believed in the aggressive use of

US “military forces” for ensuring “global hegemony.”12

The President George W. Bush decided to invade Iraq for multiple reasons.

Michael Ignatieff while writing in September 2003 after the US invasion of Iraq argued

“New rules for intervention, proposed by the US… would end the canard that the US, not

its enemies, is the rogue state.”13 Samuel Huntington, author of “The Clash of

Civilizations” while arguing on President Bill Clinton’s policies, well before 9/11, argued

that major part of the world regards the US as a “rogue superpower” and for those people

the US was the single greatest external threat to their societies.14

1.2 Statement of Problem:After end of the Cold War the US emerged as the sole dominant power in the post-Cold

War world15. Unipolarity emerged as the defining feature of this period. During the Cold

War years, Europe was the “global center of gravity”. Security and dominance of Europe

were the “vital US interests” in the 20th century.16

Historically, Middle East, owing to its geostrategic, economic and political

importance had been one of the major battlefields of great power’s struggle. With the

discovery of oil as a strategic asset in the Middle East, rivalry among the imperial

European powers for the dominance of the region intensified in the 20th century. Owing

to the dynamics of the Cold War, the US involvement in the region increased since

1950’s. Writing in mid 1990s, Richard Nixon, the former US President, wrote that

10 Ron Suskind. The Way of The World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism (London: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 37311 George Soros. The Bubble of American Supremacy: Correcting the Misuse of American Power (London: Widenfield and Nicholson, 2004), 3-4

12 Noam Chomsky. American Power and the New Mandarins (India: Penguin Books, 2003), 2-313 Michael Ignatieff. “Why Are We in Iraq? (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?)” New York Times

Magazine, September 7, 2003

14 Samuel P. Huntington. “The Lonely Superpower”. Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2, (1999): 3515 Soros, Buble of American Supremacy, 3

16 Bob Woodward. The War Within (UK: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 392-393

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America had two basic interests in the Middle East – “Oil and Israel”. America must

“protect” them at any cost.17

Iraq possessed the second largest known oil reserves in the region after Saudi

Arabia. Iraq was also bordered by three of the five largest oil producers in the world.

Dominating Iraq would provide the US with large leverage not only by controlling the oil

of the country but also establishing a permanent military presence in the heart of the

region.18

The September 11, 2001 initiated a shift in the US foreign policy. President

George W. Bush launched war on terror against Osama bin Laden, his organization al-

Qaeda based in Afghanistan, and his protector Taliban regime.19 President George W.

Bush held al-Qaeda responsible for 9/11 tragedy. As had already been written that in the

post-Cold War era, the world “centre of gravity” had been shifted from Europe to the

Middle East owing to its economic and geostrategic importance.

President Bush while addressing the cadets at West Point Military Academy in

June 2002, announced the Bush Doctrine. The doctrine asked for “preemptive use of

military” against the US enemies.20 The rationale of invasion provided by the Bush

Administration was that Iraq was a rogue state pursuing WMD threatening the US and

world security, Saddam Hussain had links with al-Qaeda and, was a co-plotter in 9/11,

and liberation of Iraq and promoting democracy, as a post- hoc rationale in the region

starting from Iraq.21

Iraq had “second highest known oil reserves” in the world. Israel factor also was

in place. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a classic case of conflation of causes. It

would help containing Iran. Security of the “Gulf oil” was also an important reason.22

The “neocons” in the Bush Administration, powerful “Israel lobby” in America

believed that removing Saddam Hussain from power would “immensely benefit” 17 Richard M. Nixon. Seize the Moment: America’s Challenge in a One-Superpower World

(Random House Value Publishing, 1992), 196

18 Fawn and Hinnebusch (Eds), Iraq War, 2919 B. W. Jentleson. American Foreign Policy: the Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century. (WW

Norton, 2007), 36020 Bob Woodward. Plan of Attack. (London: Pocket Books, 2004), 131-13221 John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephan Walt. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Farrar,

Straus and Giroux, 2007), 229-23222 Noam Chomsky. Power and Terror: Post-9/11 Talks and Interviews. (New York: Seven Stories

Press, 2004), 131

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America and Israel alike improving their “strategic position” in the Middle East.23

Installing a U.S. friendly government in Baghdad would get recognition for Israel from

Iraq. It would also “deprive” Palestinians from their big Arab source of support. The

move was also a part of Bush Administration’s “corporate globalization” policy as a step

toward realizing global agenda.24 President George W. Bush’s policy toward Iraq from

2001-2008 was of great importance. It had serious repercussions not only for the world

political system and the UN but also for the “US security” itself and its world role. It

seriously affected the Middle Eastern political and strategic environment as well.

Several scholars have investigated only one of the multiple and complex aspects

of President Gorge W. Bush’s Iraq policy. Yet no comprehensive study has been carried

out on this topic. I found no previous work which approached US-Iraq policy from this

perspective. There is a serious lack of comprehensive or detailed analysis of American

policy toward Iraq during 2001 to 2008, and, also, the necessity to discover US

operational objectives behind that policy. This study is an attempt to provide a

comprehensive analysis of US- Iraq policy and fill the gap. Its operational objectives and

implications in the wider context have been examined in depth. This study has

investigated US-Iraq policy from 2001 to 2008 making offensive realist model as a

standard.

1.3 Central Questions:President George W. Bush invaded Iraq in March 2003. The presence of WMD in Iraq,

regime’s links with Al Qaeda, and promotion of democracy in Iraq as the post- hoc

rationale were among the stated objectives of the US-Iraq policy. For the President

“regime change” in Iraq remained the only viable strategy to fulfill these declared

objectives. However, the operational policy in Iraq did not conform to the stated goals.

There had been a contradiction between stated objectives of invasion and operational

policy. The real objectives of the war could be found in the strategic, economic, and

23 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 23024 Mark Levine. Why They Don’t Hate Us: Lifting the Veil on the Axis of Evil (Oneworld

Publications, 2005), 240, 282-283

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political US interests in the Persian Gulf region in accordance with the assumptions of

offensive realism in general, and in Iraq in particular. The central questions of the

dissertation revolve around the same reality. The central questions addressed in the

dissertation are as followed:

1. How did the US-Iraq policy during 2001-2008 closely fit the assumptions of

offensive realism?

2. Why did the Bush Administration exploit the opportunity provided by 9/11 to

pursue its Iraq agenda and invade Iraq in 2003 not before?

3. Why did the Bush Administration use the issue of Saddam Hussain’s WMD to

invade Iraq?

4. Why did the Bush Administration fail to materialize its objective of promoting

democracy and reconstruct Iraq?

1.4 The Main Argument:The main argument of the dissertation is that the US-Iraq policy under President George

W. Bush Administration from 2001 to 2008 constituted an excellent case study of the

application of offensive realism particularly in the context of US preemptive and

unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003. The second argument is that there has been a

contradiction in the stated objectives of the war and US operational policy in Iraq. The

case of post-hoc rationale of promotion of democracy in Iraq mainly remained rhetoric.

The hypothesis: In the aftermath of 9/11 the Bush Administration pursued offensive

realist model in the conduct of US war on terror particularly in its preemptive and

unilateral invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The US-Iraq policy constituted the

independent variable and the outcome of the invasion the dependent variable.

1.5 Significance of the Study:Historically, Iraq has been an important player in the Middle East. This dissertation is an

effort to understand the Iraq war and its ramifications. The US policy under President

George W. Bush has been a crucial and most critical factor in molding of the region’s

present situation. The dissertation would focus the US policy during 2001 to 2008.This

study constitutes a new perspective. After studying the existing literature at length a gap

has been identified in it. The US invasion of Iraq presented an excellent case study of

offensive realist model. No research work, based on this theme, has been found. This

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work would fill this gap. This work would also be a new addition in the existing

literature.

1.6 Theoretical Framework:Since 1939 onward, leading theorists and policy-makers continued to see world politics

through the conceptual lenses of realism. The realist prescriptions particularly augured

well to the US rise to the status of “predominant global power”. Realism offered a

manual for maximization of US power in a hostile and anarchic environment. The basic

reason for the continuity of dominant position of realism in international political system

is that it is the embodiment of “universal laws of world politics” which remained true

across “time and space.”25

International political security is the broad field in which this study is being

conducted. Theory of realism, particularly its latest variant, deals with international

political security. While invading Iraq in March 2003, President George W. Bush

invoked the logic wedded in “power politics” paradigm, the dominant paradigm of

international politics. The theory of offensive realism given by John J. Mearsheimer

constitutes the theoretical framework of this study. The President’s Iraq policy

represented great power conduct in international politics and his drive for “US global

dominance”. The neoconservatives who occupied positions of power in the

administration 2001-2008, believed that the US should “remain engaged” in world

politics and the US, as predominant world power, carried special obligations in the realm

of international security.26

The preeminent goal of a state in international politics is its survival. It is the first

and foremost responsibility of a leader and no leader could “ever compromise” on it.27 In

international politics there has been absence of a higher authority to defend a state against

the use of force. Security of a state, therefore, could only be guaranteed through self-help.

Historically, the principle of “balance of power” operated as the mechanism by which

“security” of a great power could be protected. All strands of realism do not view balance

25 Timothy Dunne. “Realism”, in The Globalization of World Politics, edited by Baylis and Smith, (Oxford/N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1997), 11026 Francis Fukuyama. America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 48-4927 Kissinger, Henry. American Foreign Policy. (W.W. Norton & Company, 1977), 204

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of power as a stable condition. Traditionally, the balance of power has been broken by

two ways either through war or peaceful change.28

The story of realism began with Thucydides and his famous “Melian Dialogue”.

During this dialogue the logic of power politics was asserted. The dialogue asserted the

realist iron law that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept

what they have to accept”. Later realists confirmed that the logic of “power politics” had

universal applicability. For Athens and Melos, we could substitute Nazi Germany and

Czechoslovakia in 1939, the USSR and Hungary in 1956.29 The same logic of power

politics also held good in case of the US war on Iraq in 2003.

E. H. Carr, a modern British realist, argued in 1939 that there were profound

conflicts of interest among states and people alike. International relations were but about

the “struggle between clashing national interests.”30 For Morgenthau, human nature was

at the root cause of conflict in anarchic international relations as human beings were self-

interested and power-seekers. Resultantly, international politics was a “struggle for power

among states” and the immediate goal of international politics was accumulation of more

power.31

Realism stressed the recurrence of continuity and repetition of war as instrument

of state-craft. Power politics would continue as long as states remained preeminent

players in international relations. States could not ignore needs of their security. They had

no choice but to prepare for war as the ultimate eventuality. Modern realists, Carr and

Morgenthau, combined two things. They combined pessimistic view of “human nature”

with a concept of “power politics” among states in an anarchic world. There were no

chances for qualitative change in international politics.32 By the same logic, it could be

argued that powerful states would always continue to prey on weaker ones. The US

invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a case in reference.

28 Dunne, Realism, 117-11829 Ibid, 110-11130 Robert Jackson, and George Sørensen. Introduction to International Relations. (N.Y.: Oxford

University Press, 1999), 4131 Hans Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York:

McGraw-Hill Publishers, 1960), 29

32 Jackson and Sørensen, International Relations, 44

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Anarchy had remained the “ordering principle” of international political system.

Systemic forces “homogenized” the functional aspect of all states. States were

“socialized” into an environment characterized by mutual distrust, self-reliance and the

pursuit of security. States continuously strive for increasing their power. Functionally all

states were similar, however, they differ in their capabilities. Waltz further argued that

great powers were the agents of change in the “structure” of international political

system.33 The US invasion of Iraq was an attempt on the part of a great power to

restructure the political map of the Middle East.

There had been an oft repeated realist claim about the “recurrence of wars” in

international politics. Wars were interrupted by “periods of peace” as the interval for the

preparation for next showdown. This had remained true over the last twenty-five

centuries. There remained little doubt for thinking that realism would be the predominant

philosophy during the twenty-first century. Today Europe remained “divided by

interests” rather than “united” by a common goal. In the post-Cold War era the axis of

world politics had shifted from Europe to Asia-Pacific region. Realism would guide the

world leaders in their policy making.34 The theory of offensive realism constituted the

theoretical framework of this dissertation. The theme of the theory has been explained by

John J. Mearsheimer in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics as followed.

There would be continuity of the cycle of “conflicts and wars” long into the new

millennium. The establishment of peace in international politics would not be possible.

The reasons being, the great powers that shaped world political system “feared” each

other. They competed for power, resultantly. Great power’s “ultimate goal” was to attain

a position of “dominance” over the rival powers. For dominance remained the best way

to ensure one’s own survival. For “strength ensures safety and the greatest strength is the

greatest insurance of safety”. States under such a scenario were “fated to clash” because

they competed for comparative advantage at the cost of others. This had been a tragedy

but there was no escape to this reality. “So conflict and war are bound to continue as

large and enduring features of world politics.”35

33 Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Relations. (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Publishers, 1979), 93-97

34 Dunne, Realism, 119-12235 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers, xi-xii

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Great powers have always been “power maximizers”. Their predominant aim has

been to maximize “their share of world power” at the cost of other states. Their final

objective has been to become “hegemon” within the international political system-the

only great power in the system.36 Great powers are never “status quo powers” and they

were rarely satisfied with the current disposition of power in the international political

system. They have been constantly engaged to change the distribution of power in their

favor in the system. In fact, they always cherished “revisionist” intentions. They would

use force to change the balance of power in their favor, particularly, if possible, at some

acceptable cost.37 However, sometimes the costs and risks of revisionist moves are too

high. They wait for “favorable” circumstances to come. But endless wishes for

accumulation of more power never wither away, unless they achieve their ultimate aim.

Since none of the great powers is likely to gain “global hegemony” however, the world is

condemned to permanent great power competition in the system.38

In that endless pursuit of power great powers are constantly “looking for

opportunities” to exploit them to change the current disposition of power in their favor in

the system. They would immediately seize upon these opportunities. In other words,

“great powers are primed for offense”. Great powers would also try to prevent rival

powers to gain power at their expense.39 Theory of offensive realism, however, would be

discussed in detail in the next chapter, titled theoretical framework. Theory of offensive

realism is the most relevant and compelling theoretical explanation of the US-Iraq policy

from 2001 to 2008. The war hawks in the Bush Administration played important role in

making US-Iraq policy culminating into the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The

neoconservative’s agenda constituted only a peripheral and contributory role in

reinforcing the theory of offensive realism as theoretical framework of this dissertation.

The 9/11 events provided war hawks in the Bush Administration with a big

opportunity to materialize their world agenda. By 9/11, the war hawks seemed well

prepared to exploit the opportunity.40 The happenings of 9/11 created a “new context” for

36 Ibid, 237 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers, 238 Ibid, 239 Ibid, 340 Stefan Halper, and Jonathan Clarke. America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global

Order. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 33

24

US foreign policy. The plans for the invasion of Iraq had “already been made” under

President Bush (senior) Administration by Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz.41 President

George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS), September 2002, was really an

offensive realist document based on two domineering documents- DPG and PNAC. 42 It

fulfilled all the ambitions of the US Administration. The National Security Strategy of

September 2002 provided the US with a big opportunity to exploit the circumstances to

implement its global pursuit of interests.43

The neoconservatives in the Bush Administration wanted US “dominance”

beyond challenges.44 They supported American forces to develop unipolarity in the

international political system. The US must be willing to “use its military forces

unilaterally” to protect US security.45 In contemporary era, the US power is the dominant

reality. It has taken an “aggressive” turn.46

The Bush Administration exploited the opportunity provided by 9/11 in war on

terror to benefit from the “unipolar” moment.47 The unilateral pursuit of US global

interests adopted a new approach known as preemptive action.48 The war hawks in the

Bush Administration viewed the world only through the prism of national interest.49 The

war hawks in the administration believed in the “use of military” might to counter the

challenges to the US supremacy. For them, the main challenge was international

terrorism. They adopted “preemptive strategy” for the of use military forces.50

The war hawks already had made a plan for the invasion of Iraq in DPG in the

decade of 1990s. For them the absolutist Saddam regime was the challenge to the US

41 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 3342 Max Boot. “Neocons”. Foreign Policy, (2004), 20-2843 Gaddis, Grand Strategy, 2-1544 Gary Dorrien. Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana. (N.Y.:

Routledge, 2004), 16-1745 Demitri K. Simes. “America’s Imperial Dilemma”. Foreign Affairs 82, no 6, (2003)46 Fareed Zakaria. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. (WW

Norton and company, 2004), 4847 Melvin Gurtov. “American Crusades: Unilateralism, Past and Present”. In Confronting the Bush

Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific. Edited by Mel Gurtov and Peter Van Ness, (N.Y.: Routledge, 2005), 2

48 Gaddis, Grand Strategy, 2-1549 Jean A.Garrison.  Making China Policy: From Nixon to GW Bush. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 55-56

50 Gaddis, Grand Strategy, 2-15

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supremacy in the Middle East. The geostrategic environment in the Middle East justified

the military invasion51. Several high dignitaries of the Bush Administration like

Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and Richard Perle were Jews and strongly supported Iraq war.

They wanted to make “Israel safe.”52

The Bush Administration believed that rogue states such as Iran, Iraq and North

Korea were a challenge to “US global interests and hegemony”. These regimes must be

eliminated.53 There were two big dangers to US interests. They were coming from these

rogue states and their WMD. For war hawks, it was quite possible that these rogue states

“secretly” handed over WMD to terrorists.54 The theory of offensive realism constituted

the theoretical framework of this dissertation. The theory, however, did not explain all the

aspects of the US-Iraq policy from 2001 to 2008. The Neoconservative agenda, as a

circumstantial factor, reinforced theory of offensive realism and explained some aspects

of the US-Iraq policy during the period. There had been a close fit between offensive

realist model and the US-Iraq policy 2001- 2008. Offensive realism provided the best

theoretical explanation of the policy for the period under study.

1.7 Research Methodology:This study is analytical based on interpretative methodology to investigate the problem in

a scientific way. In interpretivism social reality is not given. Rather we come to know

about it through interpretation of meanings of actor’s actions, policies, and statements.

This research is qualitative because it is based on interpretivism. The data collection

methods and data analysis methods are also qualitative. The qualitative data collection

methods involve four things. It is related to the analysis of relevant books, articles, and of

official statements. It is also related to the analysis of official / policy documents. They

are analyzed and interpreted accordingly. I have also conducted interviews of scholars as

a primary data. The reasoning used in this study is inductive. Both primary and secondary

sources have been used to write this dissertation. Primary sources included speeches and

presentations of the Bush Administration before the US Congress, reports of the

Commissions and autobiographies of the principals of the Bush Administration.

51 Simes, America’s Imperial Dilemma, 200352 Fukuyama. America at the Crossroads, 1253 Boot, Neocons, 20-2854 Ibid

26

Moreover, the interviews of scholars, Dr. Tahir Amin, Dr. Muhammad Islam, Dr. Noman

Omar Sattar, Dr. M. Riaz Shad, Dr. R. B. Raees and Dr. Riffat Hussain Syed, have been

conducted. Secondary sources included scholarly works, international journals,

journalistic works, websites and newspapers.

1.8 Literature Review:Since 9/11 there has been extensive literature on US War on Terror. However, an attempt

has been made to discuss all the major academic and journalistic works on the US-Iraq

policy. Without any exaggeration, Bob Woodward, has written most extensively on the

topic especially US unilateral military invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. He has written

four books on it. As a reporter of The Washington Post, he had developed intimate

relationship with the entire Bush Administration personnel. He interviewed President

Bush six times from the happenings of 9/11 to May 2008. In addition, he conducted

hundreds of multiple–time interviews from the President’s national security team, senior

deputies and other key players who were responsible, in any way, for US military

invasion of Iraq in 2003. These people had first hand knowledge of documents, meetings

and events which ultimately led to the war. They rather constituted primary sources. The

White House declassified dozens of documents in the process. He had access to many a

secret and classified documents. Most interviews were conducted on “background”. It

meant that the information provided could be used without disclosing the sources.

Bob Woodward, Bush at War (2002): The first one in his series of four books.

The book under reference was a step by step story of the President’s decision to go to war

against international terrorism after 9/11. The book mainly dealt with the US war on

terror in the context of Afghanistan. The writer argued that President Bush did not want

an open ended discussion on the topic. Bush had no alternatives in his mind except going

to war. Bob Woodward argued that Bush was a “gut player” and he proceeded on the

principle of certainty. The book carried little relevance to Iraq war except laying down

President Bush’s broader principles and his philosophy of war on terror. The major goals,

said Bush, in his interview with the author in December, 2001, that the US would root out

terrorism from the world and would also achieve world peace and unity at home.

Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (2004): Much like the first book told a story of the

US unilateral military invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. The book unveiled the secret

27

developments in Washington leading to the Iraq war. Though the President had been

continuously denying at different forums that he was poised to go for Iraq invasion, yet

he was secretly preparing for the same. He had included Iraq in the “axis of evil” in his

State of the Union address in January, 2002. In a subsequent speech in June 2002 at West

Point, New York, President Bush announced what was called “The Bush Doctrine”. He

invoked the US right for “preemptive action” against “rogue states” that could threaten

US security and her international interests. WMD were used as a major pretext for Iraq

war. It was repeatedly claimed by the principals of Bush administration that Saddam

Hussain possessed WMD and had close links with al-Qaeda.

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), in October and December 2002 argued

inter-alia that Saddam retained a small stockpile of chemical and biological weapons. In

October 2002, the US Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President to use

military forces in Iraq. Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, addressed the UN on the

issue of Iraq as a “rogue state pursuing WMD” and it seemed as a declaration of war

against Iraq. Three major powers, France, Russia and Germany tried to dissuade the

President not to take an invasion of Iraq but all in vain. President Bush attacked Iraq

despite great opposition worldwide.

The above cited book also recounted the developments from November 2001 to

the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. There were many meetings between Donald

Rumsfeld, General Tommy Franks and the President discussing detailed plan of invasion.

The President did not seek, the author writes, recommendations from anybody including

former President George H.W. Bush, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and George Tenet.

It was a brilliant account telling the story of US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The

book unveiled behind– the– scenes narration of the causes and consequences of Iraq War.

It was based on the “background” interviews of 75 participants of the key decision

makers about the war in Washington.

Bob Woodward, State of Denial (2006): The third important book by the same

writer on the US war on terror. The US went to war against Iraq on the pretext of a rogue

state relentlessly pursuing WMD which was a threat to the US security and international

interests. But after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, no WMD were found in Iraq

whatsoever. The author was of the view that fall of Saddam Hussein created power

28

vacuum in Iraq. Paul Bremer, the first civil US administrator of Iraq, did two sinister

things–“de-Baathification of Iraq and disbanding” the Iraqi army. Post-Saddam Iraq was

suddenly caught into an ever increasing upward spiral of violence. In post-Saddam Iraq,

the main issue was the security.

The author was of the opinion that the main sources of violence were former

Baathists, Saddamists, al-Qaeda under the leadership of Zarqawi, and sectarianism. But

the more dreadful thing about Iraq was its sudden drift toward “civil war” between

Sunnis and Shias. The delay in the “transfer of sovereignty” to the Iraqis also created

doubts in the minds of Iraqis about the US motives. Iraq slowly degenerated into a

quagmire. The situation on the ground in Iraq became worse with every passing day and

it seemed as if it was spinning out of control. Bush Administration was under great stress.

But for the last three years from 2003 to 2006 the Bush Administration had not been

telling the American people the truth about the complex security situation in Iraq. The

Bush Administration consistently followed the “strategy of denial”. Woodward gave a

glaring dissection of the conduct of war in Iraq. The incompetence and arrogance of Bush

Administration was stunning during 2003 – 2006 years.

Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006 – 2008

(2008): The book unveiled the most important secret developments going on in the White

House about the Iraq War. During these years Iraq had been degenerated into a hell of

violence. The bulk of Iraq insurgency was coming from Sunnis who were main

beneficiaries of Saddam regime. Former Baathists and Saddamists, different militias in

Iraq, al-Qaeda activities and interference from Iran and Syria were adding fuel to the fire.

For all practical reasons Iraq was in the pains of civil war. America had been spending

about $2 billion a week to quell insurgency but all in vain. The Iraq study Group had

recommended withdrawal of combat troops by 2008. But President Bush and General

David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq, insisted that leaving Iraq would be a total

disaster. Ultimately, a new strategy of troop surge to Iraq in 2008 was adopted which led

to a timely steep decrease in the level of violence and insurgency in Iraq. The book under

reference threw in- depth light on the secret wrangling going on in Washington D.C., on

Iraq War during 2006–2008.

29

The material presented by the author in his four investigative books was a good

example of great power conduct in international political system. It fitted the “power

politics paradigm” of which the US was operating in war on Iraq. The above books

showed how the opportunity provided by 9/11 events was exploited by the Bush

Administration. The administration wanted to increase its “share of world power and to

become a hegemon” in the system. The excellent material provided in the above books

had been supportive to my main argument i.e. how did the great power like America

exploit this opportunity and how did she replace rival power, the Saddam regime, which

could be problem in her way to attain “hegemony” in the system. The US Iraq policy

fitted the offensive realist model and the material presented by Woodward provided the

good supportive sources.

In the interviews with David Barsamian in Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on

the Post-9/11 World (2005): Noam Chomsky threw light on the new and crucial aspects

of US foreign policy. The interviews discussed American foreign policy in post-Cold war

era, an ever increasing unstable world. Noam Chomsky, a known orientalist, offered his

views with piercing insight on American invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, the

Bush doctrine of “preemption”, the rogue states, and the future of the Bush

administration. He warned the world community about the threats to world peace and

security posed by the “US global hegemonic” drive.

Noam Chomsky, Power and Terror (2004): Edited by John Junkerman and Takei

Masakazu. Since 9/11 there had been a great discussion in the world about the causes of

the tragedy. Noam Chomsky moved to the centre stage of the global discussion. He

possessed an encyclopedic knowledge of the history of American foreign policy. The

book under reference consisted of his post –9/11 talks and interviews on US foreign

policy and global politics. Chomsky believed that all countries irrespective of their size

and power should follow the same standard conduct in International Relations. On US

foreign policy toward the Middle East, he was of the opinion that it was “imperialist” in

nature; and the stated causes of the US invasion of Iraq were not real. For him, the real

cause was the “US oil interest” in the region. Iraq possessed the “second largest oil

reserves” in the Middle East. The book was a collection of his insight relevant to 9/11.

30

Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance

(2003): In this book, argued Chomsky, that 9/11 expedited the US drive for “global

hegemony” by invoking what was known as the Bush Doctrine of preemptive strikes

against the potential US enemies. The US war on terror was not new in its foreign policy

pursuits rather the doctrine had previously been invoked in cases like Cuba, Nicaragua,

Libya and Panama etc. The possession of “WMD” by Saddam Hussain was used as a

lame pretext to invade Iraq in 2003. The US drive for global dominance, included among

other things, to ignore international institutions, international treaties and its

militarization of space program. We must awaken ourselves to the deadly dangers ahead

before it was too late.

The main argument put forward by Chomsky was that the US had grown

“imperialist” and had been following the course of “global hegemony”. The US used 9/11

and the case of Iraq’s “WMD” as a lame pretext for invasion of Iraq. By doing this the

US posed a danger to the international security. It was not “Iraq” but the US that was a

danger to the international peace and security. The neoconservatives played important

role in shaping President George W. Bush’s Iraq policy. The argument and the material

strongly supported my main argument.

Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq (2006): Galbraith argued that how Bush

Administration’s incompetence pushed Iraq into an open – ended war. The author spent

twenty six years in Iraq, mostly working for the US government. This book was a product

of that “rich” experience. The book concentrated on post–Saddam era and the basic

argument of the Peter W. Galbraith was that the US policies immediately in the post-

Saddam period were flawed conceptually and wrong in implementation. The major

mistake on the part of Bush Administration had been its “failure” to see Iraq as it was.

Rather the Administration wished it might be Bush Administration’s this initial failure,

argued the author, led the US government to make further serious mistakes. Iraq was not

a voluntary creation of its people and had ever been held together by the repressive use of

brute force since its inception. The author suggested a course of action which, if

implemented upon truly, could pull the US out of this mess in Iraq. Peter Galbraith

presented a vivid and persuasive argument against the reconstruction and nation building

31

in Iraq. He provided an in-depth view of the “US occupation failure”. He contended that

“political disintegration of Iraq was inevitable”.

However, the empirical evidence contradicted Peter Galbraith’s argument that the

“nation building” in Iraq was the “only stated goal” of the US President. Nation building

in Iraq was not a “real US” goal. Therefore, it might also be disagreed with the author’s

central theme. Disintegration of Iraq unsuited to the objectives of the Bush

Administration as it would create further instability in the region that ran contrary to the

ultimate US regional goal.

Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bulent Gokay, The New American Imperialism: Bush’s

War on Terror and Blood for Oil (2005): the Cold War ended and Soviet Union suddenly

collapsed in 1991 giving rise to Bush senior’s New World Order in which America was

the only superpower. However, the organizing principles of new world order of 21st

century were not yet clear till the sad happening of 9/11. After 9/11, the cold war struggle

against communism was replaced by the US “War on Terror”. The neoconservative

ideologues were the main proponents of this “neo-imperialism” with its emphasis on

Eurasian oil. This was basically the “operationalization” of PNAC. America was not

liberating Afghanistan and Iraq as it did Germany and Japan after WWII. The US was not

reconstructing these countries as she did in Western Europe after WWII through Marshall

Plan. Instead, the authors argued, the US was trying to stretch her “imperial” tentacles on

the “natural resources” of the developing world. And the basic objective of the US “neo-

imperial vision” was to keep the rest of the developed world dependent on the US

management of the “global economic” system. The situation was untenable. Resultantly,

the US entered in uncertain waters of 21st century. The authors argued, the best thing for

the US was to withdraw her formidable power before it was too late to avoid impending

human and environmental tragedy.

It might bed disagreed to the authors to the extent that neoconservatives were the

main driving force behind the President in making Iraq policy. They constituted the

circumstantial factor only. It was a move on the part of US to extend her control over the

“natural resources” of the developing world. This was the main argument that great

powers always looked for “opportunity” to increase their “share of world power”.

32

Richard Crockatt, America Embattled: September 11, anti-Americanism and the

Global Order (2003): The book focused on the phenomenon of terrorism both in

historical as well as contemporary contexts. The work made a piercing analysis of the

“underlying causes” for such violent hatred on the “West” in general and America in

particular. The book particularly focused on the perceptions in the outside world about

American international role. The author tried to understand America, both state and

society, from within. The author’s second concern was the world political system, the

atmosphere where American foreign policy was conducted in the pursuit of its national

interests.

The main argument of the book, according to the author, was that the tragedy of

9/11 must be understood in the “context of America’s hegemonic role” after the end of

the Cold War, the origin and rise of phenomenon of political Islam particularly in the

Middle East and the complex phenomenon of globalization. In his final analysis, argued

the author, the real essence to understand 9/11 tragedy was the nature of interaction

between America and the world. The argument presented by the author was supportive to

the main argument of this dissertation that the US role could be understood only in its

“hegemonic” moves in the international political system.

General Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of

America’s Power and Purpose (2006): General Tony Zinni, the son of an Italian

immigrant to America had served in the battle fields of Vietnam and Middle East as a

soldier. His experience there provided a great understanding of the complex situation

there and America’s role in the world. General Zinni argued that America was an “empire

now” and there was a big resistance to its policies in the world. Bush Administration

invaded Iraq but had no plan of reconstruction. In the aftermath of the fall of Saddam

Hussein everything went against the wishes of the invaders. The problem was they (Bush

and his team) did not understand the multiple complexities of “Iraqi state and society”.

The root causes of the turmoil in the world were not being addressed and America’s

aggressive policies were making the situation worse. The outcomes of these aggressive

policies were catastrophic for the safety of America itself. The goal was better and stable

world. America could promote a stable world but with its realistic and pragmatic policies

based on cooperation with the rest of the world.

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The author was right to say that America had grown “imperialist”. The US

“aggressive policies” were a root cause of the turmoil in the world. The reason being that

America was not an exception, great powers had always tried to manage the international

political system according to their interests. The argument and material presented was

supportive to the hypothesis of this dissertation.

James H. Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US

National Security Policy After 9/11 (2007): There was a widely held belief in America

that international terrorists and rogue states among other US enemies in the world could

not be deterred. The author, James Lebovic argued, that principles of deterrence strategy

in contravention of widely held view continue to apply. The author focused upon the

President Bush’s national security strategy along with its three basic pillars-missile

defense, preemption and homeland security. The author asserted that the “Bush doctrine

of preemption” was greater threat to the US security than the WMD in possession of

rogue states. The current US foreign policy had been “overstretched” notwithstanding the

resource constraints and unintended consequences. It might be disagreed with the author

that principles of deterrence strategy were applicable against terrorists. The terrorists

were non-state transnational actors.

Glenn Kessler, The Confidante: Condoleezza Rice and the Creation of the Legacy

(2007): Rice, an admirer and a teacher of the works of Hans J. Morgenthau, remained one

of the powerful and activist Secretaries of State in recent US history. Glenn Kessler, a

Washington Post diplomatic correspondent, provided a revealing view of Rice and

President George Bush’s controversial foreign policy particularly toward Iraq. She

exercised noticeable influence on President Bush. Glenn Kessler had written a sort of

biography of Rice. She played very important role in “shaping” President Bush’s foreign

policy. The author personally interviewed Rice multiple times and developed intimacy

with her, a very rare phenomenon. Kessler took the reader to the “secret meetings”. He

had great access to all the sources related to Rice. Most importantly, Kessler exposed her

“secret role particularly in making nuclear deal with India” and containing Israel –

Hezbollah war. The book was basically a primary source on George Bush’s years in

White House.

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Antonia Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: Invading the World, one Economy at a Time

(2006): The central idea floated by the book was that Bush Administration really

followed “corporate globalization” agenda. The administration’s leading policy makers

including Dick Cheney among others actually were long time proponents of this radical

agenda. The 9/11 tragedy provided them the ripe “opportunity” to aggressively

implement it. The author, Juhasz, exposed the “key role” of the US corporations like –

Halliburton, Bechtel, Lockheed Martin and Chevron in inventing this agenda and its

aggressive implementation through Iraq war (2003). The driving force, wrote Juhasz, in

invading Iraq (2003) was its “oil reserves” in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia. The

Bush administration’s corporate allies were reaping the advantages of Iraq war by making

big profits. The results of these “corporate globalization” policies, among others were

ever increasing violence and terrorism stretching in different regions of the globe. The

work the Bush Agenda, uncovered the harsh realities about the future. That where the

Bush administration and her corporate allies were leading the world to?

The main argument of the author presented was that leading policy making

figures in the Bush Administration were “long time proponents” of Iraq invasion. Their

real goal was US big corporation’s access to the “oil resources” of Iraq. The argument

was supportive to my hypothesis. The direct access to Iraq’s oil resources increased the

US share of world power.

Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy

(2005): Stephen M. Walt, the Kennedy School Professor, argued that America had grown

as the “most powerful empire” the human history had ever seen. Americans assumed that

their overwhelming dominant global role was benign. It’s a source of pride for them.

America’s powerful and dominant global position performed two functions. First, it

provided security to America and second, the America’s special position could be used to

restructure the world suitable to the US “interests and values”.

But there was another aspect of the situation that the US primacy was seen as a

source of political instability, resentment and fear in the rest of the world, both friends

and foes alike. The book basically gave the answer to the question why other countries

hated America’s current global role. Professor Stephen Walt argued that what strategies

the other countries follow to counter American power. These strategies, followed both by

35

friends and foes alike, threaten the US foreign policy goals and, in the end, might

irreversibly undermine the US dominant position. Finally, the author argued that the US

foreign policy making elite must adopt conciliatory foreign policy welcomed by other

countries. Rather confrontationist US foreign policy would reinforce the fear of American

military might. The core issue was how to maintain “US global leadership” without

generating global resistance?

It might be agreed with the author to the extent that great powers, like the US, use

their special position to restructure the international political system suitable to them

irrespective of the fallouts of such policies. The argument and material provided were

supportive to the argument of this dissertation that great powers “shape” the world

political system, making them “hegemon” in the system.

Jonathan Steele, Defeat: Why They Lost Iraq (2008): Jonathan Steele, one of the

best foreign correspondent working in Britain, presented a different thesis about Iraq war.

He rejected the common argument that the occupiers had no plan of reconstruction. The

author argued the “occupation was doomed to be failure” from the very beginning. When

the period of occupation was prolonged the suspicion grew within the people that the

occupier’s real aims were but “imperialistic”. The occupation immediately degenerated

into a disaster. The occupation of Iraq had no comparison with the occupation of Japan

and Germany on very fundamental reasons. The analogs were fit for explanation. The

Middle East repeatedly had been occupied and humiliated by the West in the last century.

Iraqis assumed that imperial objectives of occupation were the protection of Israel and

gaining control over the Middle Eastern oil.

The biggest mistake of the occupiers was their misunderstanding to see the

strength of Islamism in the region. The core argument presented here was that “Islamism”

opposed “hegemonic” position of the West in the Middle East region. Jonathan Steele, a

representative of the newspaper, Guardian, offered the view that Arab culture was

different from Western Culture. And occupiers could not understand this difference and

Iraq war degenerated into a human tragedy. The neoconservatives always wanted a

prolonged occupation of the country to fulfill their own agenda. None of the declared

goals democracy, security the occupiers could achieve.

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It might be disagreed with the author that the US policy makers did not

understand the strength of “Islamic forces” in the Middle East. They did. Still they went

ahead under “false pretexts”. Islamic forces came to the forefront to oppose American

“hegemony” in the Middle East. On the other hand the US Iraq policy was exactly

suitable to long term and big US presence in the region. The war hawks in the

administration wanted this. The work is supportive to my hypothesis.

Stephen Zunes, Tinderbox: U.S. Foreign policy and the Roots of Terrorism

(2003): The book provided an overview of the historical and current U.S. foreign policy

in the Middle East. The author pointed out that the historical U.S. foreign policy in the

region revolved around exploitation by U.S. oil companies, selfish use of the UN,

unstinting support for authoritarian regimes, absolute umbrella to Israel, and direct

military intervention. Such a US regional role backfired and created “anti-Americanism”

in the Middle East. This anti-Americanism culminated into 9/11’s sad happenings. The

author had raised some important moral and legal questions about the US Middle East

policy.

The US policy of “militarization” of the region basically was “self-defeating”

and engenders security threats to the US security itself. The US foreign policy was not

based on its values of “freedom, democracy and rule of law”. The central thread running

through the entire book was that the US historical and recent/current policy toward the

Middle East was “counterproductive” and had made Americans less safe. It might be

agreed with the author to the extent that there had been discrepancy between stated US

goals and operational policy in Iraq. The promotion of democracy was not “US goal” in

Iraq. The work supported the argument of this dissertation.

Reshapping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. Policy Toward

Iran, Iraq and North Korea (2004), A Washington Quarterly Reader, (edited by)

Alexander. T.J. Lennon and Camille Eiss: In the seismic aftermath of 9/11, President

George W. Bush, in his second State of the Union address in January 2002 declared Iraq,

Iran and North Korea constituted an “axis of evil”. It was just rhetoric like President

Ronald Reagan’s “evil empire”. These rogue states, according to President Bush, were a

threat to the “world peace and security”. This was a new enemy. To defeat this new

37

enemy required new strategy. The new strategy to reshape rogue states consisted of dual

policy of newly invoked “The Bush Doctrine of preemption” and “Regime change”.

The central idea of this work was that under “special circumstances” the doctrine

of preemption and regime change might be justified. The test case for implementation the

“new strategy” was Iraq where America invaded unilaterally. The case of Iran and North

Korea had gone to the background at least for the time being. America was facing a new

Iraq different from the one they perceived at the time of invasion. Iraq became under the

grips of insurgency, political instability and turmoil. It might be disagreed with the

central argument of the authors that “special circumstances” justified doctrines of

preemption, unilateralism and regime change. They rather constituted great power

strategy to achieve ultimate goal of “hegemony” in the international political system.

Mel Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy (2003):

Mel Gurtov gave a harsh analysis of President Bush’s handling of foreign policy. An

opportunity to seize the “uni-polar moment” was lost in 1990s. Bush Administration did

not want to lose the second opportunity provided to it by 9/11. The administration seized

the opportunity to build the US Empire. The intellectual fodder of the Bush doctrine, a

combination of three interlinked themes unilateralism, preemption and regime change,

was provided by neoconservatives thinking. Iraq war was more a case of “political

failure” rather than intelligence failure. Gurtov contends that the real basis for “empire

building” was laid down by “NSC–68” in the year 1950.

Neocons were looking for an “opportunity” to aggressively implement their agenda and

9/11 came as a blessing for them and America speeded up its course of world domination.

The work was well researched. The real gem of the work remained its last chapter. Here

Gurtov made a heart breaking analysis in a very emotional manner that what and where

has gone wrong. America should have followed a different path. The author was “hyper

critical” of Bush administration’s foreign policy particularly Iraq war. It might be agreed

with Mel Gurtov that the Bush Doctrine and subsequent invasion of Iraq was a handy

work of neoconservatives. They wanted “US global hegemony” starting from the Middle

East. The author’s viewpoint supported the main argument of this dissertation.

Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of its

Enemies Since 9/11 (2006): Ron Suskind, an American journalist, uncovered the inside

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story of America’s relentless pursuit of terrorists in US war on terror. It was interesting to

note that in the very first meeting of NSC in January 2001. Rice, the NSC adviser to the

President Bush, put two things before the participants– how Saddam Hussein had been

destabilizing the region and how he could be removed from power. 9/11 provided them

with unprecedented “opportunity” to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The Cheney

Doctrine “The One Percent Doctrine” was to become the “guiding” principle of US war

on terror.

Although there was no convincing proof of al-Qaeda- Saddam Hussein link but

still a case was made slowly for the invasion of Iraq. In making case for Iraq invasion

Bush declared Iraq an “axis of evil” along with Iran and North Korea in his second State

of the Union address in January, 2001. Again the same reference was made by the

President in June 2002, at West Point, New York. Later on a British intelligence report

linked Iraq buying uranium from Niger, Africa. Ron Suskind uncovered this whole secret

story making a case for invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. The US war against terror

continued with all its attendant disaster. In the end, the author put a question, could the

US win this war against ingenious enemy?

It might be agreed with the author to the extent that the Bush Administration

slowly made a case for war on Iraq without any justifiable cause. However, it might be

disagreed with the author on the grounds that it was a “deliberate” policy and could be

understood only under the offensive realist model for great power conduct in

international political system. A great power’s ultimate aim was to become “hegemon” in

the system.

William Shawcross, Allies: The U.S., Britain, Europe and the War in Iraq (2003):

The work was not an Iraq war narrative. Rather it looked on the way the shocked

international community “confronted the new danger” of terrorism. Now the threat to

global peace and security was different. In order to confront this new menace Bush and

Blair were driven by their “neo-imperial” vision enshrined in The Bush Doctrine. The

neoconservatives got an “opportunity” to reconstruct the world according to their own

vision.

Another argument presented in the book was that how world community could

confront this problem of terrorism. For whatever reasons, Iraq had moved to the centre of

39

the war against terror. However, at the same time the Bush Doctrine with its three basic

elements “prevention, preemption, and expansion of military” capacity had created

tensions among the US allies worldwide. Shawcross concluded the “world community”

could not afford defeat in the hands of terrorists. The Iraq war had also demonstrated that

a new era of 21st century global politics had set in.

Tom Clancy with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and Tony Koltz, Battle Ready

(2004): In the aftermath of Gulf War First, Saddam Hussein agreed to a UN supervised

disarmament aimed at the destruction of WMD, if any, and the program related to their

production. The authors were of the “opinion” that it was “big lie” and Saddam never

intended to give up his pursuit of WMD. With the happenings of 9/11, American goal in

Iraq changed from WMD to “regime change”. It might be disagreed with the authors that

America went to Iraq unplanned without having plan for reconstruction. Rather it suited

well to the real goals of Bush Administration in Iraq as “democratic reconstruction” of

Iraq was not “operational” US goal. However, it might be agreed with the authors that

America was “imperialist”. This lasts argument fitted to the scheme of this dissertation.

America was an “empire” for all practical purposes. However, it was not an

empire in the traditional “military sense” rather it was an “empire of influence”. The

authors were of the opinion that they went to Iraq without any plan of “reconstruction”

and nation building. America was now in a mess in Iraq. They argued that Americans

were reluctant deliverers. Regional hegemons and rogue states would, as a response to

the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, develop their own capabilities to counter the US all

over the world and globalization was adding to this confusion. Iraq, Iran and North Korea

still remained major military problems for the US. America should update the capacity of

her military forces to perform its global role.

The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences eds. (2007): Rick Fawn and Raymond

Hinnebusch: Opinion, not only in America but worldwide, had been sharply divided on

the issue of US invasion of Iraq. The entire world supported, both physically and morally,

the US war on Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. The book under reference examined

in-depth the causes and the logic thereof, both declared and hidden, for the war and its far

reaching consequences on the region, the key players and the nature of the international

political system in future. There was a big shift in the conduct of the “global” hegemon.

40

The Iraq war had far reaching implications on the standard and paradigms governing

international relations since the end of World War II. One core objective of the book,

argued authors, was to “unveil the actualities” in the conduct of ruling elites in the US.

The US had grown as a “global hegemon”. The war carried serious implications on the

traditional theories of international relations discipline.

John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign

Policy (2007): Since 1960s the “US foreign policy” in the Middle East has been

revolving around a single principle: unflinching support for Israel. Professor

Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argued, this overwhelmingly “one dimensional” US

foreign policy, had been the handiwork of powerful “Israel lobby” in the US. The US had

been providing remarkable material, strategic and diplomatic support to Israel. The core

argument of these two professors was that this “exceptional level” of US support to Israel

could not be fully explained on either moral or strategic grounds. This was due largely to

the political influence of the Israel lobby in the US.

The Israel lobby was behind the use of American power to “remake the political map” of

the Middle East. The Iraq war also was due largely to the activities of the lobby. The

professors contended that by so doing Israel lobby irreparably had damaged not only the

US “national and strategic interests” in the Middle East but had also damaged, in the long

terms, Israel’s own” security”. The US foreign policy toward the Middle East remained

one of the central challenges of today for the US foreign policy making elites. As the

region had been beset with numerous deadly problems and was going to be as such at

least for another generation.

The professors had given a piercing view of Israel lobby’s important role in

making US Middle East policy in general and Iraq policy in particular. However, it might

be disagreed with the professors that Israel factor had been the only determinant of US

Iraq policy. It was over simplification of the complex determinants of US policy towards

Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. The argument presented partially fitted to

the scheme of this dissertation.

Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous

path in the Middle East (2004): American unilateralism, under the cover of doctrine of

preemption to invade Iraq, was in fact a continuity of “Western imperialism” in the

41

Middle East at the footprints of Britain and France in early 20 th century. The Bush

administration’s decision to invade Iraq in March 2003 basically was shaped by the

“neoconservative” ideologues in the higher rungs of the administration. However, by so

doing Bush administration ignored lessons of history. Mr. Khalidi argued that the

subsequent violent insurgency was the result of “misconceived” ill-military adventure in

Iraq. The main cause of insurgency, contended Khalidi, was the US “occupation” of Iraq.

The insurgency was not going to end till occupation of Iraq continued. In the end, Khalidi

gave a solution to solve Iraqi problem by invoking the help of UN, other major powers

and its neighbors.

It might be partially agreed with Khalidi to the extent that neoconservatives

shaped President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. The argument fitted to the

scheme of this dissertation. But it might be disagreed with the author that it was

continuity of British and French imperialism in 21st Century. It was oversimplification of

a complex reality.

Robert J. Jackson and Philip Towle, Temptations of Power: The United States in

Global Politics After 9/11(2006): End of the Cold War and disintegration of USSR led to

the creation of uni-polar world where the US rose to the position of unrivaled “world

hegemon”. The 9/11 happenings provided the US with an “unprecedented opportunity” to

advance neoconservatives “global” agenda. For all practical purposes America had

become an “empire” and its war on Iraq in 2003 was a witness to American

“imperialism”. Whatever might be the causes of this war but it was nothing less than an

“imperial” drive to regulate the world on its own terms. It might be agreed to the writers

that it was an “imperial” drive. However, it might be disagreed with them that it was

imperialism in the historical and traditional sense. These arguments fitted to the scheme

of this dissertation.

Jeremy Black, Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony: The World Order

Since 1500 (2008): Jeremy Black started this work by giving reference and explaining

thereby Paul Kennedy’s work, Rise and Fall of Great Powers contending that Paul

Kennedy’s emphasis was on the dependent relationship between “economic strength and

great-power status”. Paul Kennedy also argued that “strategic overstretch” could weaken

the economic base of great powers. The author of the book gave plenty of examples from

42

history to substantiate his view from Roman Empire to USSR. While meditating on Paul

Kennedy, the author quoted Kennedy that more military expenditure could backfire and

could be counterproductive. The US had been running the same familiar risk of “imperial

overstretch”. The US global interests had grown too much to be defended.

In the post 9/11 focus, the US war on terror led to two regional wars –

Afghanistan and Iraq wars. The US military budget skyrocketed from $295 billion in

2000 to $441.3 billion in 2007. Regime change became necessary in Iraq to ensure peace

and stability. The Bush government seriously “misjudged” the negative effects of military

adventure in Iraq. Finally, the author was of the opinion that Paul Kennedy’s thesis as

such could not be applied on the US. However, he did not reject Paul Kennedy’s thesis

summarily. It might be agreed with the author that US ran the risk of ‘imperial

overstretch’. At the same time it might be disagreed with him that “regime change” in

Iraq was necessary for peace and stability in the region. However, it was not supported by

empirical evidence.

George Kassimeris (editor), The Barbarisation of Warfare (2006): The work was

a collection of essays on US wars. During the Cold War years America fought many

wars, both proxy and two direct wars – Korean War and Vietnam War. Marilyn Young,

the writer of an essay in the work cited Stephen Peter Rosen, a Harvard Professor giving

his opinion on US war on terror. Professor Rosen was of the view that in this era of “total

American dominance” the wars would not end and would remain constant. America was

an “empire” now. As with other empires in history, the US goal was not defeating the

enemy but maintaining the “imperial” position. Imperial wars might end but imperial

garrisons might remain at place to ensure stability.

President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy was based on professor Rosen’s

concept of imperial warfare. The war on terror was not going to end soon. The

neoconservatives supplied the intellectual fodder to this war as Charles Krauthammer, a

well known American conservator, puts it shortly before 9/11 tragedy. America was not

just a hegemon rather it’s a uniquely “benign imperium”. Christian Zionism along with

Neo-conservatism, supported this war. Christian Zionism in America vigorously

supported Israel and its policies in the Middle East. The theme of the work was that US

43

wars on terror– Afghanistan and Iraq were not going to “end soon” owing to the above

cited reasons.

It might be agreed with the main argument of the author that it was an era of US

dominance. The war on terror was an imperial war and would not end soon. The

neoconservatives and Christian Zionists in the US supported this war. The whole

argument supported the main scheme of this dissertation that the US invasion of Iraq was

the case of offensive realism.

Kees Van der Pijl, Global Rivalries: From the Cold War to Iraq (2006): The

argument given in the work was that Middle East historically had been the region of

“global rivalries” among great powers. Whatever had been the historical reasons but the

current reason of big power rivalry in the region mainly was driven by oil concerns. The

American war on Iraq, argued the author was driven by “energy security”. Definitely,

there had been Israel connection as well. The author put neoconservatism on the forefront

to convince President George Bush to go for invasion of Iraq in 2003. The region had

been greatly “militarized” as well by the West in general and America in particular.

The argument presented by the author was that the US war on Iraq was mainly

driven by “oil” concerns supported by neoconservatives. The argument exactly fitted to

the scheme of this dissertation that great powers were always “looking for opportunities”

to increase their “share” of world power.

Jeremy Jones, Negotiating Change: The New Politics of the Middle East (2007):

The author deeply dissected one of the most publicly cited goals of the US invasion of

Iraq in 2003 – promotion of democracy in Iraq and subsequently elsewhere in the Middle

East. The Bush Administration had no plan for reconstruction and democratic promotion

in post-Saddam Iraq. Consequently, owing to the flawed policies Iraq degenerated into

violent insurgency. The American variant of democracy could not be imposed in a

foreign land simply by going for regime change in a country where people had long

traditions of tribalism. The writer was of the opinion that the only solution to the Iraqi

situation or otherwise for the whole region was to recognize the new realities of the

region.

The only way out was “negotiations” with the people of the region. Somebody

like or not, Hamas, Hizbollah, Muslim Brotherhood, and Iranian government, were the

44

true representative of the “popular opinion” in the Arab world. The region was socially

and culturally complex and diverse. If Western governments wanted to play positive role

in the region they must had opted for negotiation and accepted the consequences of such

negotiations whatsoever. It might be agreed with the writer that US motive in invading

Iraq was not promotion of democracy there. It was used as a public “sell out” case. The

US could not impose democracy, even if it was sincere with, through the use of force.

The argument supported the scheme of this dissertation.

Robert Zubrin, Energy Victory: Winning the War on Terror by Breaking Free of

Oil (2007): For the last century oil had been on the “centre of global politics”. It had been

decisive factor in finally determining victory or defeat of a nation struggling for “world

hegemony”. The US dependence on foreign oil in 1972 was 30%; the same figure had

risen to 60% in 2006. The corresponding rise in US oil import bill had been from $4

billion to $260 billion. American left viewed the US war on terror as a struggle for “oil

control” in the Middle East. However, this theory was indefensible. American

dependence on foreign oil increased greatly within the last four decades. The main

argument presented above supported the scheme of thought of this dissertation that great

powers were always looking for opportunities to exploit in their favor. The US moves in

Iraq could be seen in the US dependence on foreign oil.

Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (2004): The central idea of

the work was, the neocons who were on the front chair of Bush administration, wanted to

“restructure the entire Middle East” starting from regime change in Saddam’s Iraq.

Saddam regime would be replaced by a pro-America democratic government in Baghdad.

The pro-American government in Baghdad would “recognize” Israel. The case of Iraq’s

possession of “WMD” was used as a “justification” to invade Iraq. Saddam was the most

vocal enemy of Israel in the region. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, under whatever

pretext, was ultimately to give security to Israel and protection for oil.

The United States Contested: American Unilateralism and European Discontent

(eds.) (2006): Sergio Fabbrini, the American elections of 2000 were a watershed in US

foreign policy. The reason was the success of an ideological coalition in the election. 9/11

provided the opportunity to this coalition to invoke US unilateral invasion of Iraq in

2003, which in turn triggered a widespread protest movement worldwide especially in

45

Europe, having a tone of anti-Americanism. World saw significant increase in “mistrust”

between Europe and America as 9/11 led to “radical” transformation of the US foreign

policy. The central idea of the work was that 9/11 initiated a process of aggressive

unilateralism in the US foreign policy which in turn increased feelings of anti-

Americanism in Europe. President Bush pursued unilateralist strategy in Iraq. Later on,

the US took immediate control of the oil wells in Iraq. It provided the rationale. Sergio

Fabbrini argued that American “conservative nationalism” was destined to clash with

European “supra-nationalism” as the former reflects nationalist worldwide drive whereas

latter represents post-nationalist perspective. If Europe could have provided alternatives

to US unilateralism instead of contesting it then it could have helped in moderating

American conservative nationalism.

It might be agreed with the core argument of Fabbrini that 9/11 introduced

“aggressive unilateralism” in US foreign policy. However, it might be disagreed with the

author that conservative American nationalism was destined to clash with European

supra-nationalism on the grounds that the wave of anti-Americanism in Europe was not

that confrontationist. As Europe depended on American military might for oil supplies

from the Middle East. The argument presented supports my hypothesis.

Gabriel Kolko, The Age of War: The United States Confronts the World (2007):

The argument presented in this book was that the current pattern of the US foreign policy

towards the Middle East could be properly understood in historical context starting from

1950s. The US policy towards the region was continuity of its historical legacy. By 1940

the US spent only 18% of its budget on defense but coming of the Cold War saw a steep

rise in it up to 72% in 1952. There had been a fundamental shift in the original goals of

the US policy in the region which had resulted into frustrations and failures of US policy

in international arena. 9/11 tragedy was the “direct result” of US policy towards the

Middle East since 1950.

The author put forward the argument that Neocons played “critical role” in

making President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, however, they were not the only factor

behind this crucial decision. The Neocons simply exploited this big opportunity to

“restructure” Middle East compatible to Israel’s interests in the region. Finally, the author

argued that there was nothing “new and original” in President Bush’s policy towards the

46

region in particular. This policy was not an exception after 9/11 but a continuity of US

foreign policy tradition.

It might be disagreed with the author to the extent that neocons wanted to

restructure Middle East suitable to Israel only. The US policy was multifaceted and

complex. Neocons exploited the opportunity to increase US interest in the region. The

argument was supportive to the main argument of this dissertation that great powers tried

to “restructure world order” according to their interests.

Robert K. Brigham, Is Iraq Another Vietnam? (2006): The author was of the view

that Saddam’s Iraq was a rogue state pursuing “WMD” to threaten world peace and

security and his links with al-Qaeda in making 9/11 a reality were the “false pretexts”

used by the Bush Administration to invade Iraq unilaterally in March, 2003. The Vietnam

War was waged to stop the spread of communism and saving the falling dominos in

Southeast Asia. The central argument of this book was to explore the big differences

between the two wars. There were numerous important differences between the two wars.

However, the author pointed out a startling similarity between the two the ever

declining support of American public. Most Americans disagreed with Bush

Administration’s mission of planting the seeds of popular “democracy” in the region.

America had been suffering from great difficulty in Iraq since 2003. The great lesson of

the two wars, argued the author, was that in future the US must use its power cautiously

and wisely.

Richard Lock–Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation: From

Vietnam to Iraq (2006): Whereas the question of US unilateral and preemptive invasion

of Iraq in 2003 was concerned the author discussed the causes of invasion but gave a

regrettable scenario of post-Saddam miscalculation. The US invaded Iraq, argued the

author under the basis of “faulty intelligence” and wrong assumptions but it resulted into

a big and perhaps unintended human tragedy. Iraq immediately degenerated into an all

around violent insurgency. Neither the Bush Administration nor the occupation military

forces had preconceived plan of “reconstruction” and nation building. The main idea of

the author was that the Bush Administration deliberately “deceived” American people

and the world on the issue of Iraq’s WMD to pursue American “global dominance”. The

argument exactly fitted to the scheme of thought of this dissertation that how great

47

powers conducted their foreign policies in international political system and their

ultimate aim had been to gain “hegemony” in the system.

George Soros, The Bubble of American Supremacy: Correcting of Misuse of

American Power (2004): The Bush Administration’s war on terror was a declaration to

implement a radical foreign policy agenda that predated the attacks on World Trade

Centre and Pentagon. As the US indisputably had acquired the status of the most

dominant power in the post-Cold War era, by dint of its sheer power, it was in a position

to enforce her interests and values on the rest of the world. Occupation of Iraq was a part

of this agenda and the first application of the Bush Doctrine. Both the president Bush and

neocons exploited the opportunity, argued the author. The proponents of invasion of Iraq

were ready to argue the case even if it involved “deliberate deception”. And they did it.

The case of Iraq possessing WMD was deliberately pushed to deceive Americans and the

world at large. North Korea was and continued to be a more dangerous state.

Finally, the core idea of the work was the Bush Administration’s unflinching

course to pursue American worldwide dominance was a dangerous turn. Those who

supported Bush realized their mistake. They felt that they were deceived. One main

theme of the work also was that Americans must had repudiated the Bush Doctrine as a

foreign policy strategy and must had pursued a path of more enlightened vision for

playing the better US role in the world.

Mark Levine, Why They Don’t Hate Us: Lifting the Veil on the Axis of Evil

(2005): America, once again, had started the noble crusade of liberating Iraq by killing

them. Creation of Chaos, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, was necessary prerequisite for

liberation. The clash of civilizations between democratic America and axis of evil

seemed dangerous. The author argued that there could have been no “Axis of Evil” had

there been no “Axis of Arrogance and Ignorance” in the world. The Bush Administration

used this “axis of evil” fiction to strike terror in the hearts of Americans to justify his

invasion of Iraq as a part of his total dominance of the world.

The other theme of the book was that they should bring together the persons who

were, both interested and capable, of lifting the veil from both Muslim and Western

societies, particularly American society for initiating a positive “social change” in

Muslim and American cultures alike. This was indeed the most important thing before

48

scholars and activists. Their focus should be specifically on the culture of the Middle East

in the age of “globalization”. The task of social change was always through culture rather

than through political machinations and occupation and violence.

Solomon Hughes, War on Terror, INC Corporate Profiteering from the Politics of

Fear (2007): For some people war was a commercial bonanza. Solomon Hughes argued

that war on terror had extended the role of “private” companies bringing them on areas of

public policy that traditionally had been the sole responsibility of both politicians and

state alike. Hughes argued that the private sector with its army of lobbyists and salesmen

were lowering the practical and moral standards of military interventions (Afghanistan

and Iraq). Who was behind these private companies reaping the dividend of the war on

terror? Hughes threw light on it. These businessmen were close to the US political

“decision–makers”. Hughes cataloged the applying record of the private contractors that

were doing American government’s work. They were doing it in a dirty manner.

Yossef Bodansky, The Secret History of the Iraq War (2004): Soon after

Afghanistan, the Bush Administration invaded Iraq in 2003 to remove Saddam regime.

Instead of democracy taking hold, as claimed by the President, the country plunged into

violent insurgency with no end in sight. Yossef Bodansky offered a new version of the

Iraq war. The war, writer argued, was “doomed to be failure” from the beginning. It was

rather intelligence failure. Bodansky an expert on and director of the Congressional Task

Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare provided a vivid picture that all the

aspects of Iraq war were misunderstood. He gave startling revelations. Bodansky drew

upon previously untapped intelligence and regional sources on the war. The Secret

History of the Iraq War presented not only the convincing but also detailed account of the

most controversial contemporary war. He put the blame on the intelligence system for the

failure of the Iraq War. Empirical evidence disagreed with Bodansky that the Iraq war

actually was intelligence failure. The intelligence was deliberately misinterpreted.

Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to

the Presents (2007): The work had been deeply researched. The work provided the

comprehensive survey, in historical perspective of the US involvement in the Middle East

for the last 230 years. Extensively researched, the work provided a vivid picture of how

America replaced Britain in 20th century as an “imperial” power in the region.

49

John Davis, Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War (2006):

The main theme of the work was that Saddam Hussain was a threat to regional stability.

He must be eliminated. The invasion of Iraq was also motivated by US “oil interests” in

Iraq. Finally, Iraq was a part of “unfinished” US agenda in the Middle East. The author

presented no new idea. The author supported the main argument of this dissertation. Nine

contributors, War with No End (2007): The work dealt with the anti-war movement in the

US. The movement believed that Iraq war was a “mistake” and it must be ended

immediately. It was an effort on the part of Bush Administration to “legitimize US global

dominance” and for the control of resources. The theme of the book supported the main

argument of this dissertation.

Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars (2011): The theme of the work was that US invaded

Iraq on the basis of “unverified, false, and misinterpreted” intelligence. The issues used

were WMD and Iraq’s link with al-Qaeda. Real causes were change of “status quo” in the

Middle East, security of Israel, planting US power in the Middle East, security of oil etc.

The book supported the main theme of the dissertation.

James M. McCormick, The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy:

Insights and Evidence eds. (2012): The book was a reflection of two dozen articles on US

foreign policy. The articles mainly were related to US invasion of Iraq. The main theme

of the work was that US invaded Iraq under wrong arguments. The real reasons were

different such as oil and Israel. The book supported the main argument of this

dissertation.

Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and

al-Qaeda (2011): The work analyzed the most important contemporary conflict from the

perspective of bin Ladin. The author himself interviewed bin Ladin in 1997. Osama did

not believe in Saddam. He did not see Saddam as a true Muslim. There was no

connection between al-Qaeda and Iraq. Despite this all, the Bush Administration made

intense propaganda and persuaded Americans to attack Saddam. The author summarily

rejected any connection between them. The author believed that the President “already

had decided” to take on Saddam Hussain before 9/11 happened. The author supported the

main argument of this dissertation.

50

Christopher Doran, Making the World Safe for Capitalism: How Iraq Threatened

the US Economic Empire and Had to be Destroyed (2012): Title of the book was the

major theme of this work. The Iraq war was motivated by the fact that Iraq presented a

threat to US “economic” dominance. The US economic dominance of the world was

rooted in US access to the third world market. WMD was used as a “pretext” to wage war

on Iraq. The war was for the extension of “free market” policies. America has been

earning trillions of dollars. The book provided a fresh perspective on the war. The

argument of the author supported the main argument of this dissertation.

Michael Harland, Democratic Vanguardism: Modernity, Intervention, and the

Making of the Bush Doctrine (2013): The book had been written in the perspective of

“American Exceptionalism.” America had a tradition of “democratic crusade” abroad.

Planting democracy in foreign lands was seen as the best response to terrorism. For the

Bush Administration, rightly or wrongly, that was the solution to the problem of

extremism and terrorism. 9/11 provided the opportunity for democratic crusade. Role of

the Neoconservatives had been exaggerated in making Iraq policy. The principals of the

Bush Administration were the “prime shapers” of the policy. They included the President

himself, Rice, Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Colin Powell. None of these five principals

was a true neoconservative, argued the author. The work supported my scheme of

thought as great powers always try to restructure international political system suitable to

their “interests and values”.

Mohamed Elbaradei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous

Times (2011): The author was IAEA chief during run up to US war on Iraq. For the

author, it was a “needless war” because Iraq already had destroyed its facilities of “fuel

cycles” in 1990s. The inspections restarted in Iraq in November 2002. There were 139

inspections of 106 locations in 60 days. The inspectors did not get any proof of “revival”

of nuclear weapons activities in Iraq. Despite this, Condoleezza Rice made a statement on

CNN about the nuclear use of aluminum tubes in Iraq. It was a “misleading” statement.

They were meant for use in artillery shells.

Similarly, despite this all, both the President in his State of the Union address and Colin

Powell in his address to UNSC accused Saddam regime for buying uranium from Niger,

Africa. The author reported to the UNSC that reports regarding Iraq’s purchase of

51

“yellowcake” were not substantiated by empirical evidence. Still our credibility, as

independent inspectors, was arrogantly “dismissed and discounted”. Elbaradei requested

more time for further inspections but the same was refused by the US and invaded Iraq

unilaterally in March, 2003. The author supported my main argument because great

powers, in their pursuit of interests “cheat and lie”.

The following authors/ works supported the main argument of this dissertation:

(Bob Woodword: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008); (Noam Choamsky: 2003, 2004, 2005);

(Galbraith 2006); (Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bulent Gokay: 2005); (General Tony Zinny

and Tony Koltz, 2006); (Antonia Juhasz: 2006); (Stephen M. Walt: 2005); (Jonathan

Steele: 2008); (Stephen Zunes: 2003); (Mel Gurtov: 2008); (William Showcross: 2003);

(Tom Clancy with General Tonny Zinni (retd) and Tonny Koltz: 2004); (Rick Fawn and

Raymond Hinnebusch: 2007); (Geroge Kassimeris: 2006); (Kees Van der Pijl: 2006);

(Jeremy Jones: 2007); (Robert Zubrin: 2007); (Sergio Fabbrini: 2006); (George Soros:

2004); (John Davis: 2006); (Nine Contributors: 2007); (Jason Burke: 2011); (James

McCormick: 2012); (Peter Bergen: 2011); (Christopher Doran: 2012); (Michael Harland:

2013); (Mohamed El-Baradei: 2011) setc.

The above cited works supported the main argument of this dissertation. The

authors invariably maintained that the US invasion of Iraq basically was motivated by

power considerations. The core US interest had been the US drive to become hegemon in

the unipolar world under the promulgation of the Bush Doctrine which was a

combination of three interrelated themes of preemption, unilateralism and regime change.

The themes of Iraq’s links with al- Qaeda and possession of WMD were used for public

sell out of war on Iraq. Similarly the promotion of democracy in Iraq was not the

operational goal of the US.

There might be disagreement with some writers who maintained that Israel was

the sole motivation of US-Iraq policy leading to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The regime

change in Iraq with pro-US democratic government would recognize Israel and remove

the bitterest enemy of Israel. This could be termed as over simplification of a complex

geopolitical reality. That was also contradictory to great power behavior. Single factor

explanation did not fit into great power behavior in world political system, argued an

American scholar J.N.Rosenau (1966, 1980). The above cited arguments by different

52

authors exactly fitted into my scheme of thought. Hence it might be argued that great

powers conducted their foreign polices and exploited opportunities that came in their way

in international political system to “increase their share of world power”. Their ultimate

“aim” has been to become “hegemon” in the system. That also is the argument presented

by offensive realist model. Hence, the main argument of this dissertation is that the US-

Iraq policy from 2001 to 2008 constituted an excellent case study of offensive realist

model.

Several scholars have investigated only one of the multiple and complex aspects

of President Gorge W. Bush’s Iraq policy. Yet no comprehensive study has been carried

out on this topic. There is a serious lack of comprehensive or detailed analysis of

American policy toward Iraq during 2001 to 2008, and, also, the necessity to discover US

operational objectives behind that policy. After studying the existing literature at length a

gap has been identified in it. The US invasion of Iraq presented an excellent case study of

offensive realist model. No research work, based on this theme, has been found. This

work would fill this gap. This study is an attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of

US- Iraq policy and fill the gap. Its operational objectives and implications in the wider

context have been examined in depth.

1.9 Organization of the Study:The present dissertation consists of seven chapters followed by a conclusion.

The ‘Introduction’ clearly states the title, statement of problem, the theoretical

framework, the central questions, the main argument and the organization of this

dissertation along with literature review. The chapter two ‘Theoretical Framework’ the

main argument presented in this chapter is that there has been a close fit between the

theory of offensive realism and the US-Iraq policy from 2001-2008. The theory of

offensive realism constitutes the theoretical framework of this dissertation. The chapter

three ‘Overview of Historical US-Iraq Policy’ the main argument of this chapter is that

the US-Iraq policy from 2001-2008 in historical perspective fitted the power politics

paradigm. The historical policy was aimed at power maximization, particularly in the

post-WWII era.

53

The chapter four ‘US Invasion under False Pretexts’ the main argument presented

in this chapter is that the declared objectives of the US unilateral and pre-emptive

invasion of Iraq in 2003 did not withstand the test of empirical verifiability, and were

discredited after investigations. The US invaded Iraq under false pretexts. The chapter

five ‘The Operational Objectives’ the argument made in this chapter is that the

operational US-Iraq policy from 2001-2008 fitted the assumptions of offensive realism.

The empirical evidence in detail has been provided to prove the case.

The chapter six ‘Occupation Policy in Iraq’ the argument made in this chapter is

that the US occupation policy in Iraq from 2003-2008 further substantiated the empirical

evidence of the main argument of this dissertation. The prolonged occupation of Iraq was

in line with principles of offensive realism. The chapter seven ‘Consequences and

Implications’ this part of the dissertation discusses in detail the consequences and

implications of the US-Iraq policy for the period under study. The benefits US derived far

exceeded the limits of reasonable cost of the policy. It is followed by a conclusion.

Chapter Two

Theoretical Framework

54

The theme of the argument presented in this chapter was that there had been a close fit

between the US-Iraq policy from 2001 to 2008 and the theory of offensive realism. The

US-Iraq policy during this period could be analyzed, interpreted, and understood through

the theoretical framework of offensive realism. The theory provided the most convincing

explanation of the policy under study.

For understanding foreign policy of a state, there had been some conceptual or

theoretical foundations known as theories of international relations. The theories gave

intellectual guidelines to the researchers and provided the best explanation of foreign

policy of a state. Theory of realism, owing to certain reasons, remained the dominant

theory of international relations as it provided the most convincing explanation of war,

the permanent feature of international relations.55

2.1 Realism:Theory of realism, especially its latest variant neo-realism, fundamentally dealt with

international political security. The most important theme of world politics had been

power politics. President George W. Bush, while invading Iraq, pursued the paradigm of

power politics, more specifically offensive realism to reshape and dominate global

political system. The Neoconservatives in the George W. Bush Administration reinforced

his drive to restructure and dominate international political system.

The President’s policy in the US war on terror could be explained from the

perspective of John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism, the latest variant of realist

tradition, to explain and understand the US unilateral and preemptive decision to invade

Iraq in March 2003. The realist tradition in international relations had been identified as a

pursuit of national self-interest by a state in an anarchic world where war had remained a

permanent feature of world politics.56 Theory of realism provided the most convincing

explanation of the US unilateral and preemptive invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. Theory

of offensive realism made the theoretical framework of this dissertation.

Henry Kissinger wrote that realist tradition insisted that nothing had changed in

world politics since Thucydides and Machiavelli. Military and economic status of a state

55 Scott Burchill. “Realism and Neo-Realism”, in Burchill Scott, et al. Theories of International Relations. (N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 67

56 Dunne, Realism, 110

55

determined its fate.57 Realist tradition also maintained that essence of international

politics was the struggle for power among states. Henry Kissinger also wrote that the

given objectives of a state, at a given time, were imposed by the threats to its security and

existence.58 For all realist schools of thought states remained the key actors in

international politics, they must pursue power as there had been no guarantee of their

security in the international political system. War had been the legitimate instrument of

statecraft. The only guarantee of the existence of a state in international political system

is power. Realism offered a “manual for maximizing power” of a state in anarchic

system.59

2.1.1 Classical Realist Tradition:

The earliest realist thinking could be traced back to Thucydides, a Greek philosopher-

cum-historian. The “Melian Dialogue” in his famous book Peloponnesian War had been

cited as the basis of realist thinking in international relations.60 Thucydides wrote that

“power was the central theme of international politics” and all states, whether large or

small, must adapt to that natural reality. If states understood that reality they could

survive otherwise they might be vanished away from the face of the earth.61 Thucydides

made it clear that the “powerful (strong) did what they had the power to do” and the weak

had no choice but to accept. And states had no choice except to conduct their foreign

policies in accordance with power politics paradigm.62

Machiavelli, another important classical thinker, wrote that “power and

deception” were the two basic ingredients for states to conduct their foreign policies.

National independence was the “supreme political value” and the leaders must ensure it

as their primary responsibility.63 Thomas Hobbes traced back realism in human nature.

His understanding of international state of nature was that there could be no guaranteed

57 Stanley Hoffmann. “Clash of Globalizations”. Foreign Affairs, (2002), 104-11558 Ibid59 Robert Keohane. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations

Theory. (Westview Press, 1989), 3660 Paul Viotti, and Mark Kauppi. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism and

Globalism. (New York: Macmillan, 2001), 5761 Jackson and Sørensen, International Relations, 7262 Ibid, 7263 Ibid, 73

56

peace among states.64 To conclude this section, it could be safely said that classical

realists were of the opinion that “insecurity and conflict” was the human condition. They

also agreed that there was no escape to that reality and “there was no permanent solution”

to the perennial problem of international politics. For them power was at the center stage

of world politics and war was the legitimate instrument of statecraft. They identified

power as a “critical factor” in international politics. All states, irrespective of their size,

pursue power. Like Athens, powerful states were imperialist and they preyed upon

weaker states. The US-Iraq policy from 2003 to 2008 fitted that concept.

2.1.2 Modern Realist Tradition:

E.H. Carr made devastating critique on Wilsonian Idealism as the “basis for political

settlement in Europe” in the post-WWI period.65 His main argument was that Wilsonian

Idealism “ignored the central role of power” in international politics. He also made it

clear that “unequal distribution of power” in international political system was the real

cause of war.66 Pursuit of power was a natural drive, believed Carr. He also believed that

international political system was to be structured by realities of global power.67 Thus, it

might be said that conflict among states was inevitable in an anarchic world.

Hans J. Morgenthau, the real founding father of modern realism, consolidated

realist principles and provided theoretical support to US global role in the post-WWII era.

His theory was to provide intellectual and political guidance to US foreign policy makers

during the Cold-War years. Morgenthau believed that the world was “imperfect due to

the problems in human nature”. He wrote that pursuit of power was wedded in human

nature.68 He also wrote that international politics was “struggle for power” among states.

Whatever might be the other objectives but “pursuit of power” was the immediate goal of

international politics.69 The tradition of centrality of power continued in neo-classical

strand of realism. It also justified the US global role on the basis of power politics during

the Cold War years. It is to be understood that the US, at the end of the Cold War, was

64 Ibid, 75-7665 Burchill, Realism and Neo-Realism, 6766 E. H. Carr. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International

Relations. (N.Y.: Perential, 1939), 1467 Ibid, 29768 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 19269 Ibid, 195

57

the largest economy of the world and wielded unchallengeable military forces in the

world.

2.1.3 Neo-Realist Tradition

Neo-realists believed that states remained the principal actors in international politics and

“security of a state” was the ultimate interest which was often ensured by accumulating

power. Waltz focused on the “structure of the international political system” particularly

the relative distribution of power in it. For Kenneth Waltz, the international political

system had a “precisely defined structure.”70 The important feature of international

political system was the lack of order. States existed in the anarchic environment where

their survival entirely depended on their military strength. In such an environment states

were “socialized into mutual distrust, self-reliance and pursuit of security”. They did this

by continuously increasing their power.71 Waltz wrote that structure of the system forced

units to behave in a particular way. The units were distinguished in their “capabilities”

not in their functions.72 Waltz further wrote that great powers changed the structure of

international political system. Waltz identified “the systemic forces” that homogenized

the foreign policies of states. According to Waltz, anarchy in international political

system forced states to accumulate power as a “systemic requirement.”

2.1.4 Offensive Realism

The real objective of John J. Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism was to explain

recurrent patterns of behavior of great powers in international political system.

Particularly, he aimed to explain why did great powers strive for dominance and why did

this pattern of behavior was doomed to repeat itself. During this process, they fueled

security competition which, in turn, would cause occasional great power wars.73 There

would be continuity of the cycle of violence in global politics. The peace would probably

not be realized. The great powers, wrote Mearsheimer, “shape international political

system” feared each other and, resultantly, competed for power.

The great power’s ultimate aim had been to gain a position of dominant power

over others. The reason being they wanted dominance which, for them, was the best 70 Waltz, Theory of International Relations, 88-92 71 Ibid72 Ibid, 9773 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers, 30

58

means to ensure their survival. Mearsheimer wrote, “Strength ensures safety, and the

greatest strength is the greatest insurance of safety”. The great powers faced with this

incentive were “fated to clash” as they competed for comparative advantage over the

others. There seemed no escape to that tragic situation. The only solution had been the

formation of a world government. However, that seemed unrealistic and hardly possible.

The great powers would not agree on that. Consequently “conflict and war” were bound

to remain perennial and salient characteristics of international politics.74

Ruthlessness always remained in international politics since the dawn of history

and, without any doubt; it seemed to remain that way. For great powers feared each other,

they always competed for power resultantly. Their overriding objective had been the

“maximization of their share of world power.” They wanted to do that at the expense of

their rival powers. They did not merely want to become the most powerful of all their

rival powers. They wanted to be the “hegemon” within the system. That remained their

ultimate aim.75

Status quo great powers were not found in international political system. Great

powers were hardly satisfied with the current distribution of power in the system. They

always tried to change the power distribution in the system in their favor. They always

cherished “revisionist” intentions. They used force to meet that end. They would try to do

that at a “reasonable cost”. In this pursuit of power they would wait for good

circumstances to come. This desire for more power was endless and it ended only when a

great power achieved its ultimate objective of hegemony. The ultimate goal of “world

hegemony” was unlikely to be achieved by any great power. Consequently, that would

lead to perpetual competition among great powers.76

The unending pursuit of power meant that great powers were “looking for

opportunities” for changing the contemporary distribution of power favorable to them.

They would exploit such opportunities, if possible, and if they had the military capability.

In the words of Mearsheimer, “great powers are primed for offense”. That was not their

only job. Great powers also prevented their rival powers to gain the same.77 Why did

great powers behave like that? Mearsheimer wrote that the structure of the international 74 Ibid, xii75 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers, 276 Ibid77 Ibid, 3

59

political system based on anarchy forced great powers to adapt such an aggressive

posture.

A combination of certain features of international political system created an

environment of mutual fear among themselves. They included anarchy, some permanent

offensive military capability of states, and that state could never trust other states

intentions. Hence for great powers, the best guarantee of their survival was the pursuit of

hegemony. So that other states could not seriously threaten security of a hegemon. The

theory of offensive realism focused on great power politics because they impacted

international political system greatly. The decision and actions of great powers

determined the fortunes of all states in the system.

2.1.4.1 Five Assumptions of Offensive Realism:

Why had there been mutual competition among great powers? Why did they strive for

hegemony in the system? The answer could be found in the five assumptions of offensive

realism. The most contemporary realists shared those assumptions. The first assumption

was that international political system was based on “anarchy.” Here anarchy meant an

“ordering principle” not disorder. It meant that the system consisted of sovereign states

with no central authority above the states. The second assumption was that there had been

“some inherent offensive military capability” embedded in great powers. They could, if

possible, destroy each other. They had the potential to be mutually dangerous.78

The third assumption was that states could never trust each other. They could not

believe in the “intentions” of other states. It did not mean that states always cherished

hostile intentions. There could be multiple causes of aggression and no state could ever

be sure about other’s motivation. Furthermore, the intentions were not fixed and were

subject to change at any time. Element of uncertainty about other/rival states intention’s

was unavoidable. A state could be benign today and hostile tomorrow. Consequently,

security remained the “prime motivator” of state behavior. The fourth assumption was

that great power’s primary goal was their survival. Their strategy had been to maximize

their security both in the short-term as well as in the long run. The last assumption was

that the great powers were “rational actors.” They were concerned with the consequences

78 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers, 30-31

60

and implications of their actions. Particularly, great powers considered the preferences of

other states and vice versa. 79

Mearsheimer did not believe that a great power could ever become a global

hegemon. It could be a regional hegemon. They also attempted to prevent rival/other

powers from becoming regional hegemons. The reason being peer competitors could be

trouble makers for other states in their regions. Taking the above cited five assumptions

together, wrote Mearsheimer, they created an environment of big incentives for great

powers to behave offensively. They resulted into three general patterns of behavior

among great powers including “fear, self-help, and power maximization”. There was an

environment of mutual fear between great powers in addition to mutual suspicion

between them. They were also worried about imminence of war. There was no question

of mutual trust among states. They were reluctant to trust in other states. The element of

war sometimes forced them to see each other as “potentially deadly enemies.”80

States could not trust in others in matters of their own security. Security

vulnerability was their main fear. A great power’s top most priority was its survival in

anarchy. They always acted in self-interest. They had always been apprehensive about the

ill intentions of other states in the system. They knew that the best way to ensure their

existence was to be the hegemon in the system. The reason was understandable: to be

selfish paid dividends in an anarchic world. It was the ideal thing, wrote Mearsheimer, to

become “hegemon in the system.”

Consequently, great powers paid big attention to the distribution of power among

them. In this process, they strived for power maximization. The desire for power

maximization ended only, if ever, they achieved “world hegemony.” Hegemony

eliminated any possibility of a potential challenger in future. No state would ever waste

such an opportunity to become hegemon. Such an environment resulted into an endless

security competition among states, wherein they were ready to cheat, lie, and use brute

force if it paid dividends over their rivals. “The best defense is a good offense”.

That was the best way to seek advantage of other’s weaknesses. In their pursuit of

power maximization and their hunt for hegemony, great powers followed a number of

79 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers, 30-3180 Ibid, 33

61

strategies and “war is the best” one wrote Mearsheimer.81 Mearsheimer also wrote that

there was nothing as a status quo power, since the predominant power would behave

more aggressively in the system as they had the capability to do so.82 Mearsheimer gave

convincing answers to the question as to why great powers behaved aggressively in the

international system. The principal motive of such a great power behavior was its

survival. Mearsheimer was of the opinion that his theory of offensive realism was equally

applicable to all great powers.83 Offensive realism provided the most convincing

explanation of the US unilateral and preemptive invasion of Iraq in 2003. The theory

constituted the theoretical framework of this dissertation.

There had been some criticism on Mearsheimer’s theory of Offensive Realism.

Glenn Snyder had rejected Mearsheimer's view of the security dilemma as a synoptic

statement of offensive realism. He had argued that offensive neorealism's positing of all

states as revisionists removed the central proposition, uncertainty about other states'

intentions, on which the whole concept of security dilemma had been grounded.

Aggressive great powers' measures to maximize their security threatened others which

lead to an actual justified security competition between states rather than an unnecessary

one based on hypothetical threats.84

Christopher Layne further had highlighted the problems associated with the

geographic variable. He had criticized Mearsheimer's reasoning according to which the

stopping power of water prevented a great power from achieving global hegemony as this

constraint did not seem to apply to the case of an emerging rival's capacity to exercise

influence beyond its own neighborhood. As Layne had stated, apparently water stopped

the United States from imposing its powers on others in distant regions, but it did not stop

them from threatening American primacy in the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, he

found offensive realism's classification of regional hegemons as status quo powers

difficult to reconcile with the theory's emphasis on great powers as relentless power-

maximizers. In this sense, Layne questioned the ability of the water constraint to

transform a power-maximizing state into a status quo power and contradicts Mearsheimer

81 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 138-16582 Ibid83 Ibid, 5484 Glenn H. Snyder. “Mearsheimer's World- Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A

Review Essay”. International Security 27, no 1, (2002), 149-173

62

by arguing that a regional hegemon remains subjected to the quest for security, thereby

striving to attain global hegemony.85

Another group of criticism had addressed the issue of offensive neorealism's

restrictive focuses. Scholars had criticized Mearsheimer's theory for failing to take into

account domestic politics. No attention had been paid to a rising power's internal political

functioning, its economy or society, which played a role in a state's decision-making

process, in turn influencing its behavior in international politics.86 Moreover, Snyder had

argued that no consideration was given to transnational threats such as terrorism, and that

Mearsheimer's emphasis on security made him ignore states' non-security interests such

as ideology, national unification and human rights as an essential aspect of international

politics alongside power competition.87 Toft and Layne went a step further by asserting

that Mearsheimer had misjudged the United States as a regional hegemon engaged in

offshore balancing. Instead of being a regional hegemon with the strategic aim of

dominating the Western hemisphere while preventing the rise of peer competitors in

Europe and Northeast Asia, these scholars believed that empirical data pointed to the fact

that the United States had sought and achieved global hegemony, which in turn biased

Mearsheimer's predictions regarding future U.S. strategic behavior, mainly in terms of its

military involvement overseas.88

2.2 Neoconservatives: A Contributory Factor:

All aspects of the US- Iraq policy from 2001 to 2008 could not be properly explained by

the theory of offensive realism. For instance why did the US invade Iraq in 2003 and not

before? Who contributed to make the decision of invasion? In order to answer such

questions the theory of offensive realism was reinforced by what was known as

confrontationists or more commonly known as neoconservatives. The confrontationists in

85 Christopher Layne. “The Poster Child for Offensive Realism: America as a Global Hegemon”. Security Studies 12, no 2, (2002), 120–163

86 David C. Hendrickson. “The Lion and the Lamb: Realism and Liberalism Reconsidered”. World Policy Journal 20, no 1, (2003), 93–102

87 Snyder, Mearsheimer’s World, 149-17388 a Layne, Poster Child, 120-163

b Peter Toft. “John J. Mearsheimer an Offensive Realist between Geopolitics and Power”. Journal of International Relations and Development. Palgrave Macmillan. Vol 8 no 4, (2005), 381–408

63

the US viewed political Islam as “the new enemy” in the post-Cold War world.89 The best

intellectual representatives of this trend in the US were Samuel P. Huntington, Bernard

Lewis, and Daniel Pipes. Their main argument was summarized in the post-Cold War

perspective of “The Clash of Civilizations” by Samuel Huntington.

The central theme of the clash of civilizations was that Muslims were turning

toward Islam as a “source of identity.” They accepted modernity but rejected Western

culture. For the Muslims, religion was the “real motivating force” of political Islam. 90

Furthermore, he stressed that “Islam and democracy were incompatible.”91 In the post-

Cold War era, there would be clash at global level between political Islam and the West.92

Islamic world and the Western world saw each other from the enemy angle.93

Confrontationists, like Bernard Lewis, argued that “Islam and democracy” in reality were

antithetical.94 For confrontationists, in the post-Cold War era, Islam replaced communism

as the new threat to the Western predominant power and position in the system.95

The confrontationists gave serious policy recommendations to Washington. They

recommended that political Islam in the Middle East, the heart of Islamic world,

threatened the US and its Muslim allies in the region.96 Their main recommendation to

deal with “the new enemy” was that Islam must be “fought and defeated” the way the

West did against communism during the Cold War years. This group provided

intellectual fodder to the neoconservatives in the President George W. Bush

Administration from 2001 to 2008. The neoconservatives played important role in

making and implementing the US-Iraq policy during those eight years as they occupied

important policy positions during George W. Bush Administration.

89 Fawaz A. Gerges. America and Political Islam: Clash of Culture or Clash of Interests? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 42

90 Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (Penguin Books, 1997),110

91 Samuel P. Huntington “If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World”. Foreign Affairs, (1993),186-194

92 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 2293 Ibid, 25, 3994 Bernard Lewis. Islam in History: Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East. (Open Court

Publishing, 1993), 9195 Daniel Pipes. “Political Islam is a Threat to the West”. Islam: Opposing Viewpoints, (1995),

190-19696 Judith Miller. “The Challenge of Radical Islam”. Foreign Affairs 72, no 2, (1993), 42-56

64

The events of 9/11 set forth a big change in the US foreign policy toward the

Middle East in general, and toward Iraq in particular. The US preemptively and

unilaterally invaded Iraq in March 2003 aiming at regime change Baghdad. The Middle

East carried great importance in global politics owing to its geo-strategic location and big

oil reserves. Almost the entire world had been dependent upon the region for its energy

requirements. Former US president Richard Nixon wrote that Muslim world carried great

negative image in the US even more than the Communist China.97

Michael Harrington used the term neoconservative for the first time. He did it in a

derogatory sense for former comrades.98 They were actually a group of ex-liberals who

were later on driven rightward during 1960s and 1970s.99 The group played important

role during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan. In the post-Cold War era their main

activity was concerned in redefining their agenda in the form of DPG (1992) and PNAC

(1997). During this period their main advocacy was for a muscular US foreign policy

aimed at ensuring US global dominance. For them 9/11 came as a big opportunity. They

exploited it to advance their agenda. For this purpose they advocated the use of force to

ensure “US global dominance.”100 Robert Kagan and Bill Kristol, the two important

neoconservatives, advocated the establishment of “the global superpower” to reshape the

international political system according to the US interest.101

After 9/11 events, a neoconservative think tank in Washington, the Project for

New American Century (PNAC), in an open letter to the US President asked for “ regime

change” in Iraq. They asked the President for unilateral, preemptive, and even preventive

use of force ignoring multilateral institutions and norms of foreign policy behavior. In

reality they were asking the US for pursuing the “neo-imperial course” and that was what

the George W. Bush Administration did.102 Francis Fukuyama summarized

neoconservatives’ basic thoughts. They cherished the belief that the US foreign policy

must reflect the basic values of American society; that as a predominant world power

America needed to remain engaged in world politics and the US had the special function

97 Nixon, Seize the Moment, 19698 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 4499 Boot, Neocons, 20-28100 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 17101 Ibid102 Gaddis, Grand Strategy, 2-15

65

to perform in the realm of international security; and that they were skeptic about the

legitimacy of international law and institutions and that they were critical of UN in its

role to dispense international justice.103

Leon Trotsky, Leo Strauss, and Albert Wohlstetter were the three ideologues who

provided thought to the neoconservatives in America. Neocons got revolutionary impulse

from Trotsky. However, Strauss championed the cause of “noble-lie”. He was of the

opinion that the ruling elite were under duty to lie to the general masses. For only the

handful elite were capable of knowing the truth. He had taken this idea from Plato.104

Neoconservatives, particularly Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, inherited the idea of

strategic thought from Albert Wohlstetter. The ideas of expanded defense spending,

strategic Defense Initiative and Star Wars had their roots in Wohlstetter’s thought.

During the decades of 1970s and 1980s, Wohlstetter got involved in the Persian Gulf,

Iraq, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980s and the issue of nuclear proliferation in the region.

Later on, these ideas were taken up by the neocons.105 Inspired from the above

cited ideologues Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz worked in the Presidency of Bush

(senior) and produced Defense Policy Guide (1992), the first “unipolarist blue print.”

Subsequently the DPG was leaked to New York Times and the President disowned it.106

The central theme of the DPG was that the US did not want “peer competitor” in the

post-Cold War era.107 The US policy elite remained sincere to that objective.108 It could be

safely argued that the National Security Strategy of President George W. Bush of

September 2002, in reality, was an updated version of DPG (1992).

William Kristol founded PNAC in the year 1997 to promote the US world

leadership. It was the second major activity of neocons during 1990s. It followed the

theme of DPG (1992). Like the DPG, PNAC was the major contributor to the President’s

foreign policy from 2001 to 2008.109 The 9/11 happening helped create a new context for

103 Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads, 48-49 104 Irwin Stelzer. “Neoconservative Economic Policy: Virtues and Vices”, in Neoconservatism.

Edited by Irwin Stelzer, (Atlantic Books, 2004), 203105 Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads, 33106 John Gaddis. “A Grand Strategy of Transformation”. Foreign Policy, (2002), 50-57107 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 46108 Ibid109 Stelzer, Neoconservative Economic Policy, 5

66

the imperialist and hegemonic US foreign policy.110 National security strategy of the

President of September 2002 was, in fact, the most important development in the US

foreign policy since the end of WWII.111 The national security strategy of September

2002 aimed at establishing the US primacy in the international political system. It also

asked for preemptive strategy, if need be, to check terrorism and weapons proliferation.112

In short, the neoconservatives in the Bush Administration successfully translated

their agenda of “regime change and preemptive strike” through the NSS of September

2002. The US political elite usually used the liberal language in the conduct of their

foreign policy. There had been a perceptible gap between public rhetoric and real policy.

The US foreign policy had been mostly led by realist principles in its conduct. The US

political elite had been in the habit of speaking one way and acting otherwise.113 E.H.

Carr a realist and a British citizen, wrote as early as 1939 that it was the peculiar

characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon people to conceal their self-interests under the guise of

general good. He called this tendency “hypocrisy” of the Anglo-Saxon people.114 Certain

developments in Iraq could not be truly explained by offensive realism especially

phenomenon of introduction of democracy there. It was a failed attempt. This could be

explained by neoconservative agenda not by offensive realism.115

Having said this all, whatever the case might be no neoconservative was included

in the decision making elite of the Bush Administration. The decision makers were a

group of five. They included the President himself, Dick Cheney (the vice president),

Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice. None of these five decision

makers about the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a true neoconservative argued Michael

Harland. 116 It could be argued safely that the neoconservative’s role in invading Iraq

remained circumstantial.

2.3 National Security Strategy of September 2002:

110 Stephen E. Bronner. Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement. (Columbia University Press, 2004), 3

111 Gaddis, A Grand Strategy, 50-57112 Boot, Neocons, 20-28113 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 25-26114 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 79115 Interview with Dr. M. Islam (Ex. Director, Dept. of American Studies, Quaid-i-Azam

University, Islamabad) by the Researcher. Islalmabad. August 17, (2016)116 Michael Harland. Democratic Vanguardism: Modernity, Intervention, and the Making of the

Bush Doctrine. (Lexington Books, 2013), 148

67

The National Security Strategy of September 2002 of President George W. Bush was a

big shift in the US foreign policy in the 21st century. The NSS was rooted in DPG (1992)

and PNAC (1997) documents.117 Even before 9/11 happenings, the President pursued

unilateralist policy. In his unilateralist drive the President withdrew from the ABM

Treaty of 1972, rejected Kyoto Protocol of 1997 as the protocol was not beneficial to the

US “economic interests.”118 In 2001, the Administration withdrew from negotiations on

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Interestingly, the US itself was testing the

biological weapons at the same time.119 The same thing happened to CTBT and

International Criminal Court.

Shawcross quoted David Frum, the President’s speech writer, saying that the

“axis of evil” phrase was inserted for establishing the linkage between “rogue states and

terrorist groups”. The states indicated were Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, much like the

infamous “Tokyo-Rome-Berlin Axis” during WWII. In aggregate, these states constituted

an axis of hatred against the US. The US could not and must not wait for them to attack.

The US must preempt. The President used the expression in his State of the Union

Address in January, 2002. In his address, the President pledged to eliminate the threat to

the US security, posed by “the nexus between the rogue states and the terrorists.”120

The President seemed convinced that the defensive strategy was a wrong strategy.

The US could not win on the defensive. On June 1, 2002 the President delivered a speech

at West Point Military Academy, wherein he made it clear that in future the US could

adopt preemptive strategy to destroy the threats to US values and interests.121 John

Ikenberry called the NSS of September 2002 “a grand strategy” with basic objective to

maintain “unipolarity” in the international political system, wherein the US would be sole

superpower with “no peer competitors”. He used the expression “revisionist state” for the

US.122

117 Melvin Gurtov. Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy. (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2008), 33

118 John Feffer. Power Trip: US Unilateralism and Global Strategy after September 11. (Seven Stories Press, 2003), 81

119 David M. Malone, and Yuen Foong Khong. Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy International Perspectives. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 31

120 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 95121 Ibid, 132122 Ikenberry, America's Imperial Ambition, 44-60

68

Noam Chomsky had cited an interesting debate among scholars like Carl Kaysen,

Steven Miller, Marting Malin, and William Nordhaus among others, on the issue of the

nature of the Iraq war. In the end, Chomsky concluded that the NSS of September 2002

gave the US “the right” to wage a “preventive” war.123 William Shawcross argued that the

NSS consisted of three constituent elements- prevention, preemption and increased

defense budgets.124 The NSS document was written by Dick Cheney, Wolfowitz,

Rumsfeld and others. The document stressed that the US power must be beyond

challenges. There was a sharp increase in the US defense budget from $ 317 billion in

2002 to $ 419 billion in 2006.125 The NSS invoked preemption and unilateralism as basis

for the “US imperialism” in the 21st century.126

The neoconservatives contributed in the decision making of the Bush Presidency

from 2001 to 2008. They wanted US “global hegemony”. The central theme of

neoconservative’s agenda was the ouster of Saddam regime from power in Iraq. With the

collapse of the USSR in 1991 had ended the cold war. For the US remained the sole

superpower. The US dominance of the international political system was

unchallengeable.127 Richard Perle, a neocon and an adviser to the President Bush, during

a speech in November 2001, argued for a unilateral strategy in war on terror.128

Invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 was beginning of the US war on terror.

In the words of the President, though the war began in Afghanistan, however, it would

not “end” there. It would become “global” in operation. The invasion of Afghanistan had

the sanction of the UNSC. However, in March 2003, the US unilaterally attacked Iraq.

Iraq became the first test of the newly renounced Bush Doctrine. The US-Iraq invasion

was opposed by the Arab World including even Egypt and Saudi Arabia. At the same

time, the war was also opposed by major American NATO allies, France and Germany.

Russia also joined hands with France and Germany among others. The Bush

Administration, under the cover of war on terror started restructuring the world through 123 Chomsky, American Power, 12124 W. Shawcross. Allies: The US, Britain, Europe and the Aftermath of the War in Iraq. (London:

Westview Press, 2003), 64125 Antonia Juhasz. The Bush Agenda: Invading the World, One Economy at a Time. (N.Y.: Regan

Books, Harper Collins Inc., 2006), 44126 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 203

127 Stephen G. Brooks, and William Wohlforth. “American Primacy in Perspective”, Foreign Affairs 81, no 4, (July-August 2002), 20-33

128 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 260

69

unilateral and preemptive strategies. The US began pursuing the “neo-imperial”

discourse.129

Since then, the rationale of the Iraq war had been questioned. Why did the US

invade Iraq? George Packer wrote that “it still isn’t possible to be sure….” And that was

something important about that war. He quoted Richard Haas, an official of the State

Department during the time of Iraq invasion, saying that he (Haas) would “go to his grave

not knowing the answer.”130 George Tenet, director of the CIA at the time of the US

invasion of Iraq in 2003, wrote in his joint memoirs that “one of the great mysteries to me

is exactly when the war in Iraq became inevitable.”131 The war hawks in the

Administration had been the vocal supporters of supremacist ideology to establish and

maintain the US dominance in the international political system.132

They believed in the combination of “force and deception” in their pursuit of

foreign policy goals.133 A French Magazine called them followers of “American

Empire.”134 During two terms of the George W. Bush presidency, there seemed a clear

alliance between neoconservatives, the Zionist Lobby, and the Christian Zionists in

America. They had negative image of Islam.135 (Guardian 10 Nov, 2003). For the US,

they wanted a world with “no peer competitor.”136 They wanted the aggressive use of

military force to pursue their agenda in the post-Cold War era. They also recommended

unilateralist as well as preemptive strategies to the US Administration.137

Similar was the case with the founding statement of the PNAC. The project

wanted total “American dominance” in the international political system. They wanted to

confront the authoritarian rulers worldwide who dared to oppose the US interests.138 The

above cited mission statement was signed by twenty five persons including important

neoconservatives like Elliott Abrams, Zalmay Khalilzad, Lewis Libby, Norman

129 Gaddis, Grand Strategy, 2-15130 George Packer. The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,

2005), 46131 George Tenet, and Bill Harlow. At the Centre of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. (New York:

Harper Collins, 2007), 301132 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 10-12133 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 298134 Shawcross, Allies, 51135 136 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 46137 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 33-34138 Shawcross, Allies, 55

70

Podhoretz, Donald Rumsfeld, Francis, Fukuyama, and Paul Wolfowitz among others.

The 2000 AD report of the project declared that the real strategic goals of the US in the

21st century were to preserve “Pax Americana.”139 The central theme of the PNAC was

the ouster of Saddam regime from power.140

The PNAC’s open letter of January 1998, stressed President Bill Clinton to take a

military invasion of Iraq.141 When President Bush came to power in America in January

2001, he appointed a number of neoconservatives to the positions of power such as

Donald Rumsfeld, Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, Elliott

Abrams, and John Bolton among others. However, for them 9/11 came as a big

opportunity. They exploited the opportunity exactly in accordance with the principles of

offensive realism. The culmination of this exploitation was the preemptive and unilateral

invasion of Iraq in March 2003, despite the absence of empirical evidence of Saddam

Hussain’s involvement in 9/11 happenings in any way whatsoever. However, it must be

remembered that no neoconservative was a member of decision making elite of the Bush

Administration culminating into invasion of Iraq in 2003.

2.4 Close Fit between Offensive Realism and the US-Iraq Policy:

The central theme of theory of offensive realism was that great powers shaped the

contemporary international political system in accordance with their interests and

ideologies. The international political system was based on anarchy as the ordering

principle. There had been an environment of mutual fear and distrust between great

powers. Due to the presence of this mutual fear between great powers they competed for

power in the system. They always had been power maximizers. In their pursuit of power

maximization, they always had been “looking for opportunities in order to increase their

share of world power” at the acceptable cost. There were no “status quo” great powers.

Their final objective was the establishment of their hegemony in the system. Security had

been the top most interest of all states irrespective of their size and strength. According to

Mearsheimer, power guaranteed security of states and greatest power was the greatest

guarantee of their security. That was why great powers always struggled for dominance

139 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 37140 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 295141 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 8

71

in the system. That was why, in an anarchic world, great power’s ultimate goal had been

to become “hegemon” in the international political system.

If we have a close look on the central theme of offensive realism and President

George W. Bush’s Iraq-policy, we could immediately recognize striking similarities

between the two. Now the question arose was there a close fit between the two? The

answer could be both positive as well as negative. However, in this case the answer came

out to be positive. The theory of offensive realism reinforced by neoconservative agenda

exactly fitted the Bush Administration’s Iraq-policy from 2001 to 2008. A positive

relationship existed between them.

There remained an important question still to be answered. What explained the

partial policy failure in Iraq in the aftermath of the US invasion of 2003? To begin with,

insight for our understanding of the world we were part of was fundamentally flawed. It

meant the social world where the human beings were “thinking participants”. I did not

mean natural phenomena. The theory must correspond to the facts. Social world was

entirely different from the natural one. Because human beings, the thoughtful

participants, in a “social phenomenon” could influence it unlike the natural phenomena,

the social phenomena could not become independent standard for judging the authenticity

of our pronouncements. That was why our understanding of the social phenomenon fell

short of fully qualifying as knowledge.

The reality was that human beings, the “thinking participants” in a social

phenomenon might approximate the truth. But some difference was destined to happen

between truth and our understanding of the world. Reality was a moving object and not a

static one. The two features of the social phenomena around us, participation and

understanding, were mutually interfering with each other. It meant that in reality our

understanding of the social phenomenon was really flawed and imperfect. The

implication could be that human actions were entailed by “unintended consequences”.

The phenomenon was known as “reflexivity”. This remained the central theme of this

explanation.

In his book, “Logic of Scientific Discovery” Karl Popper reasoned that scientific

knowledge was not the ultimate truth. Scientific knowledge was accepted as true but only

provisionally. For there could raise a contradiction in the previous scientific knowledge.

72

It meant that there existed asymmetrical relationship between verification and…

falsification. Karl Popper resolved this asymmetry of scientific knowledge. The scholar

argued that the scientific knowledge gained through generalizations was accepted true

only provisionally.

The scientific knowledge could be falsified in future through empirical evidence,

consequently, the human beings, as thinking participants, had no escape but to be wrong

invariably. The magnitude of human misunderstanding could vary from person to person.

The author called this phenomenon the “postulate of radical fallibility”. Closely related to

this phenomenon was the concept of “fertile fallacies”. Fertile fallacies meant that we

might start with a verified concept and extend it to other fields where its application was

questionable. For instance, the application of positivist methodology in natural sciences

gave good results. Consequently, the methodology also was extended to the social

sciences. We already knew well that the two were entirely different. It became a case of

fertile fallacy.

Due to the influence of natural sciences the presumption became that reality was

well constituted. Human beings introduced an element of uncertainty in social

phenomena might be known as “human uncertainty principle”. The concept was taken

from the Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle related to particle behavior in modern

physics. The Bush Administration implemented the ideology of the US supremacy. The

President’s Iraq-policy fitted to this model. The Bush Administration in its pursuit of

American dominance in the system ignored both the concepts of radical fallibility and

human uncertainty principle.

In short, our understanding of the social phenomena around us was really

imperfect. The distortions were deliberately introduced in the public rhetoric of the

administration in the war on terror. For instance “war on terror” and “weapons of mass

destruction” could be cited as examples. Such manipulative distortions were employed.

They were fated to be entailed by some unintended outcome. The invasion of Iraq had an

“element of deliberate deception” on the part of the Bush Administration. Consequently,

some of the outcomes of the invasion and the subsequent prolonged occupation of Iraq

were bound to be unintended. This final note that explained partial failure of the US-Iraq

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policy, specifically the occupation policy was extracted from the book, “The Bubble of

American Supremacy” by George Soros.142

The theory of offensive realism constituted the theoretical framework of this

dissertation. The theory provided the compelling and convincing explanation of the US-

Iraq policy during the presidency of George W. Bush. But the theory could not explain

some aspects of the policy under study. The neoconservative’s agenda in the unipolar

world and in the post-Cold War era reinforced the theoretical framework of this

dissertation in explaining the US-Iraq policy during the Bush Administration. However,

the neoconservative’s agenda constituted only a circumstantial and contributory

explanation of some aspects of the policy. In concluding this chapter, it could be said that

there existed a close fit between the theory of offensive realism and the US-Iraq policy

from 2001 to 2008.

Chapter Three

Overview of Historical US-Iraq PolicyThe argument in this chapter was that the US historical policy, particularly after WWII,

was in line with the logic of offensive realism. The main argument of the chapter was that

the US-Iraq policy in historical perspective fitted the power politics paradigm. The US

policy toward Iraq could be viewed in two different periods of time. The first period dealt 142 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 191-203

74

with the US policy in the broader perspective of the Middle East during the Ottoman rule

of the region. This period roughly ended in the year 1900 AD. Though during this period

the US was not a world power, still the US foreign policy toward the Middle East

reflected the application of realist principles during this period. The policy aimed at

pursuing the national interest even if it involved the use of force. The “Barbary Wars”

provided the empirical evidence of this policy.

The second period mainly dealt with the US policy during the 20 th century. By

1900 AD, the US had become a world power. Iraq was created in the footsteps of WWI

as an independent state. The realist logic dictated the US-Iraq policy, particularly in the

post- WWII era. In this period, particularly after WWII, the US became the predominant

world player in the region. There was an intense competition between the US and USSR

for dominance of the region during the Cold War era. The US-Iraq policy in historical

perspective was one of power maximization with respect to the Middle East. The CIA

was involved in military takeover of Iraq in 1963. That signified the US involvement in

Iraq. Then the US used Saddam regime in checking the influence of Iranian revolution in

the Middle East by supporting Saddam Hussain’s eight year war against Iran. Whatever

the case might be, realist logic dictated the US-Iraq policy, particularly in the post WWII

era.

3.1 Early Phase (1776-1900):John Ledyard, the first citizen of independent America, travelled to London in search of a

sponsor to explore the unexplored regions of the world. In London, he got a sponsor in

the form of African Society in 1788. Henry Beaufoy, secretary of the society, asked

Ledyard to explore the Nile. He undertook this expedition from Cairo (Egypt) to Sudan.

Interestingly, no Westerner had ever undertaken this exploration before. To satisfy his

ambition of exploration, Ledyard immediately accepted the offer and started his

expedition to the Middle East in June, 1788. Thus, Ledyard became the first person of

independent America to interact with and explore the Middle East region. It was rather

beginning of the US policy of involvement in the region. John Ledyard himself wrote to

his mother that his passage will be to “Grand Cairo” and beyond that was unknown. He

also wrote to Thomas Jefferson that it was a “passage to glory.”143

143 Larzer Ziff. Return Passages: Great American Travel Writing, 1780-1910. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2000), 36

75

Since 1788, Americans and people of the Middle East had met many times from

battle fields to oil fields, other fields included such as education and Philanthropy. It was

Americans who, for whatever reasons, established the first modern university in the

Middle East region. During the initial phase, immediately after American Revolution of

1776, maritime trade was the basic U.S. drive to the Middle East. The American business

class traders exchanged timber tobacco, sugar and rum for carpers, figs, raisins and

opium. Sometimes unhappy incidents of piracy also occurred “enslaving American

crews” of ships. The pirates usually belonged to Morocco, Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers.

The Westerners collectively called these pirates “Barbary”. Throughout 16th and 17th

centuries “Barbary was the nightmare” of the West. Britain would “bribe” them for

sparing her commercial ships. British extended security to American trade ships till 1776,

the year of “American Declaration of Independence”. The “Barbary” was quick to change

their policy after 1776. Americans were too helpless to defend themselves against these

Barbary pirates.144 These pirates started plundering American commercial ships. They

also started enslaving American crews. The Barbary started capturing US trade ships

along with enslaving their crews. American commercial ships were totally unable to

defend themselves against them.145

John Lamb, America’s first diplomatic mission to Algiers (Middle East) in 1786,

failed to get release even of a single American captive. America started “paying tribute”

to the Barbary States of Tripoli, Morocco, Tunis and Algiers. The total sum was about

one million dollars.146 In the year 1786, for the gift of $20000, America negotiated its first

Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Ship-Signals with Morocco and secured the release of

captive ship “Betsey” and established its “oldest diplomatic mission” in Tangier in the

Middle East.147

Interestingly, as soon as Betsey got its release, it was “seized” by Tunis now. The

captured crews of other ships were “jailed” in Algeria. These were the days of “American

confederation” that had no navy to protect its international trade. A number of imprisoned

144 Robert J. Allison. The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World, 1776-1815. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), 3

145 Richard B. Parker. Uncle Sam in Barbary: A Diplomatic History. (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2004), 5-20

146 Allison, Crescent Obscured, 8-16147 James A. Field. America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882. (Princeton: Princeton Univ.

Press, 1969), 32-33, 40

76

American sailors were “jailed in Barbary States”. The Barbary States’ behavior, among

other factors, made some contribution in the “creation of American Federation.”148 The

U.S. Middle East trade played an important role in making American “Federal

Constitution of 1787” and in creating American Federation. Barbary States continued to

capture American commercial ships and imprison their sailors and the U.S. continued to

pay to these pirate states in “ransom and tribute”. Finally, in 1794, President George

Washington ordered the building of Navy frigates to protect American commerce against

“Algerian Corsairs”. A Treaty of Amity and Friendship was concluded between Hassan

Dey of Algeria (Middle East) and the U.S. in September, 1795. Under the terms of the

treaty the U.S. paid a handsome amount in ransom to get the release of American sailors.

Similar treaties were concluded between the US and Tunis and Tripoli.149

President John Adams continued to “pay tribute” and appointed permanent

representatives to the Middle Eastern regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli in 1799 to

facilitate American international commerce. Actually, owing to many reasons, Americans

of late 18th century had scant information about the Middle East. And the knowledge they

possessed about the region was mainly coming from “unreliable” sources. For them the

Middle East region was romantic. For the US, Middle East was the “ultimate frontier”

which needed exploration.150

Ledyard landed at Alexandria, Egypt, still a part of Ottoman Empire. By the end

of 18th century, Ottoman Empire had lost its real glory. The distant provinces like Egypt

had grown semi-feudal in nature.151 John Ledyard was “the first contact” between

independent America and the Middle East, which was then under ailing Ottoman Empire.

Ledyard died in Egypt in 1789. He provided valuable information about the Middle East

region. This first contact became the basis for American involvement in the Middle East.

Many Americans visited Middle East in the footsteps of Ledyard. They mainly visited

Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia (present Iraq). The region remained a great source of

interest for many Americans both explorers as well as decision makers.

148 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. The Federalist Papers. Cutchogue, N.Y.: Buccaneer Books, 1992: 49-50, 207-208

149 Ray Irwin. The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816. (New York: Russel and Russel, 1970), 100-101

150 Daniel Boorstein. The Americans: The National Experience. (N.Y.: Random House, 1965), 219, 264

151 Bernard Lewis. “Put the Iraqis in Charge”, Wall Street Journal. (August 29, 2003)

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The “Barbary States” continued their excesses against the US international

commerce. There seemed no end to this agony. Ultimately, President Thomas Jefferson,

side-stepping the Congress, personally authorized “military operation” against the

Barbary States in the Middle East. Thomas Jefferson, in the name of “police action”

made a precedent for future generations of the U.S. Presidents. Tripoli was the first pirate

state against whom America used force to protect US interests in the Middle East.

However, initially the US did not succeed in gaining her objectives.152

Finally, President Madison in 1815, decided to deal with the issue of Barbary

pirates militarily. The US had been waging struggle against the Barbary States to protect

her economic interests for more than “three decades”. During this phase the Barbary

pirates had seized about “thirty-five” American commerce ships and “enslaved seven

hundred sailors”. President Madison crushed them permanently by using US military

against them. These wars in the Middle East (Barbary Wars) in the early decades of

American independence had a “great transformative effect” on the U.S. One legacy of

these Middle Eastern wars was the stationing of “Independence” (US warship)

permanently in the Mediterranean.153

While writing about the purpose of the US “Barbary Wars” Michael B. Oren in

his “Power, Faith and Fantasy, America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present”,

declared that America wanted to bring enlightenment to the Middle East. The US also

wanted to to remake the region according to the American “interests and values”. It could

be safely argued that the first US historical involvement in the Middle East was centered

on the “theme of power”.

The second US interaction with the Middle East came in the form of American

missionaries to the region. Levi Parsons and Pliny Fisk were the first US Christian

missionaries to reach in the Middle East. They had two objectives to serve-propagation of

Christianity and liberation of “Holy Land”- Palestine.154 Interestingly, the famous French

traveler to America in 1835 – Alexis de Tocqueville in “Democracy in America”

152 Max Boot. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. (N.Y.: Basic, 2002), 14-15153 Drew R. McCloy. The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy.

(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. press, 1989), 18-26154 Clifton J. Philips. Protestant America and the Pagan World: The First Half Century of the

American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1810-1860. (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1969), 135

78

observed that Christianity carried great influence in America. Here in America, religion

was linked to democratic ideals. The American founding fathers, rightly or wrongly,

shared an idea of a divine mission to perform in the world. They believed in a higher

moral purpose. They shared the idea of emancipation of man.155

To pursue this objective, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions

was established in the year 1810. The Board’s founding objective was the establishment

of missionary centers around the globe. Middle East was the Board’s special interest. Till

now, Middle East was not claimed by any other European colonial power as its exclusive

sphere of influence as such. At the same time the “idea of restoration” was slowly gaining

ground in America.

The “Repatriation of Jews to Palestine” also was becoming a part of this

American mission to the Middle East. Ex-President John Adams wrote in 1819 to

Mordecai Noah, the first US diplomatic mission to Tunis, that he really wanted

restoration of Jews to the “Holy Land”.156 Levi Parsons was the first American

missionary to enter Jerusalem in December, 1820. He was followed by Pliny Fisk in

1821. Parsons died in February 1822 while Fisk settled in Beirut and established a

missionary school there in 1823. It was the first American institution in the Middle East.

By the end of 1820’s, nine American missionary school-houses were established in

Lebanon. These institutions had a total strength of six hundred students. Parsons and Fisk

were the first American missionaries to introduce American faith to the Middle East.

Ottoman Empire was in the advanced stage of decay and the local leaders in the

Middle East were burning with deep desires of independence. The European colonial

powers were busy in carving out areas of their exclusive control in the region. The

political atmosphere in the Middle East was becoming increasingly complex and

uncertain. An ever increasing number of Americans started traveling and interacting with

the region. Consequently, the US economic and military interests in the Middle East

increased manifold.

By 1820, the US had not established diplomatic relations with Ottoman Empire.

Great Britain and France were the real obstacles in the way of America. They enjoyed 155 Abdul Latif Tibawi. American Interests in Syria, 1800-1901. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966),

1-2156 Naomi Shepherd. The Zealous Intruders: The Western Rediscovery of Palestine. (London:

Collins, 1987), 39

79

commercial and diplomatic relations with the Empire. Now, it was the proper time to

establish diplomatic relations with Ottoman rulers. However, suddenly Greek revolt

broke out in 1821 against the Ottoman Empire.157 Thousands of Americans, in their

capacity, responded to Greek call for help. These American mercenaries viewed it as a

conflict between Islam and Christianity much like the Crusades. However, President

James Monroe refused to intervene in internal European affairs in line with George

Washington’s warning to Americans in his farewell address in 1796.158

This raised American image in Istanbul. Simultaneously, the European imperial

powers sided with the Greek revolt. It created troubles with Istanbul. Now the US was

better placed for the conclusion of a US – Ottoman treaty. Turkish Sultan tried in vain to

crush the Greek revolt. Rather the Sultan was defeated at Navarino in 1827 by the

combined forces of Britain, France and Russia. This defeat of Turkish Sultan resulted in

the slow amputation of the Ottoman Empire in the hands of European imperial powers.

President Andrew Jackson came to power in Washington in 1830. He wanted to win the

same “trading and other privileged for the US as other European powers did enjoy in

Ottoman Empire. Finally, in May 1830, a Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between

the US and the Ottomans was concluded. The treaty granted “trading facilities” to the US

in the Black Sea region of the Ottoman Empire. In reciprocity, the US pledged to supply

weapons to Sultan on discounted prices. The Senate ratified the treaty. However, it

objected to the sale of “warships” to Ottoman. President Jackson ignored US Senate and

fulfilled his treaty obligations.159

From the US standpoint the treaty was a “turning point” in its relations with the

Middle East. America got “legal and commercial rights” in the Ottoman Empire at par

with other European powers. A precedent was established to sell “American weapons” to

the region. To sum up, the treaty increased American commercial and naval activity

along with expanded influence and presence in the Middle East. The President appointed

David Porter as the first American diplomat in Istanbul in 1831. Ultimately, Porter was

157 John Gaddis. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2004), 15

158 Samuel F. Bemis. John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy. (N.Y.: Knopf, 1956), 388

159 Donald B. Cole. The Presidency of Andrew Jackson. (Lawrence: Univ. press of Kansas, 1993), 128

80

raised to the status of an ambassador, the first of its kind to the Middle East. In the year

1840, Porter intervened in an incident in Syria where Jews were allegedly being tortured

by the Ottoman Administration. Thereby Porter established a tradition of extending

“protection” to the Jews in the Middle East.160

The American missionary activity had grown greatly in the Middle East since

1820’s. Their special focus was on education. The US missionary activity had been

extended as far as Kurdish Mesopotamia. Near about 1840, the American Board of

Commissioners dispatched a missionary group to as far as Mosul.161 In the year 1840,

European powers forced Egypt’s forces out of Syria and Palestine. In reciprocity, Sultan

Abdul Majid permitted “foreign nationals” to settle “permanently in Jerusalem”. The

decade of 1840’s saw coming of the idea of Manifest Destiny in America as a pretext for

the US continental westward imperialist expansion. The concept suited well with the

missionaries objectives. Consequently, the US missionary activity in the Middle East

greatly increased. The new US ambassador to Istanbul in 1842, Mr. Dabney Carr

“promised the US government’s protection” to the missionaries in the region. There was

one thing special with American missionaries in the Middle East. Unlike their European

counterparts, American missionaries had no hidden imperialist agenda. Consequently, the

number of missionaries greatly increased and so did the annual budget of America’s

Board of Missionaries.162

American missionaries built a school at Babek in 1842, just five miles away from

Istanbul which became Turkey’s first modern university in the times to come. 163 A large

number of students might be in thousands, coming from Muslim, Christian and Jewish

background were studying in these missionary schools throughout the Ottoman Empire.

In this regard, the US appointed agents (consuls) in six major cities of Palestine. Palestine

became the most “Western represented territory” in these times in the Middle East.

Beirut, Smyrna and Palestine became the major centers of American missionary activity

in the region.

160 Tibawi. American Interests, 3161 Ibid, 79162 Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 210, 250, 351163 David H. Finnie. Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East.

(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), 99-109

81

Dr. Anderson, a surgeon by profession, under the aegis of the American

Geographical and Statistical Society, George Bush, a New York University Professor of

Hebrew, Joseph Smith, a restorationist, and Warder Cresson among other Americans

gave a great speed to the “restorationist movement” in America during 1840’s. They

wanted the restoration of Palestine to the Jews.164 A number of American restorationists

took residence in Palestine. The main theme of the American restorationists was to help

Jews recover Palestine/ Israel second time.165

The Mediterranean was no longer a problem for American visitors to the Middle

East. The number of American visitors increased with every passing day. The tourists

included missionaries, engineers, doctors, educators and politicians alike. The American

visitors to the Middle East had, more or less one thing in common, that in the future the

region would be “remodeled” after the US.166

Then, America plunged into Civil War. During the period of American Civil War

the Ottoman King, Sultan Abdul Aziz, took important steps by renewing the 1830

Ottoman – US Treaty banning the “Confederate” citizens from operating in Ottoman

seas.167 Then in 1865, the US joined hands together with other nine European powers in

establishing a lighthouse on Tangier. It was the first US multinational treaty.168 Taking

the advantage of the US Civil War French Emperor, Napoleon III, tried to create an

empire in Mexico in January 1863. Sa’id Pasha, the Egyptian ruler, supported French

effort to carve out an empire in Mexico and contributed a battalion of five hundred

Egyptian soldiers for the French cause.

The Lincoln Administration severely protested the French adventure in Mexico. It

was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. The Monroe Doctrine had prohibited

future European interference in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. The Egyptian

ruler had expelled Robert Wilkinson, a confederate, from Egypt and had extended help to

the widows and orphans of the Union. Some Egyptian volunteers had fought for the cause

164 Andrew C.A. Jampoler. Sailors in the Holy Land: The 1848 American Expedition to the Dead Sea and the Search for Sodom and Gomorrah. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 60,142

165 Henry L. Feingold. Zion in America: The Jewish Experience from Colonial Times to the Present. (N.Y.: Twayne, 1974), 199

166 Finnie, Pioneers East, 155167 Benjamin P. Thomas. Abraham Lincoln: A Biography. (N.Y.: Random House, 1968), 281-283,

360168 Jay Monaghan. Diplomat in Carpet Slippers: Abraham Lincoln Deals with Foreign Affairs.

(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1945), 215-217

82

of the Union. America could not ignore such a highly objectionable role on the part of

Egypt. America threatened retaliation. Sa’id Pasha refrained from sending further

military forces to Mexico. Eventually, French were defeated.169

During the US Civil War period cotton got great boast in Egypt. Cotton acreage in

Egypt increased greatly. Egyptian cotton exports skyrocketed from $ 7 million in 1861 to

77 million in 1865. It was a huge increase. Ismail, the grandson of Mohammad Ali, used

this import money to Europeanize Egypt, especially his military forces.170 The US

missionary activity specially targeted Syria and Palestine. Traditionally Egypt had never

been a focal point of American activity. Despite some problems with Egypt, President

Lincoln informed the US Congress in 1864, that American relations with Egypt were

satisfactory.

In the year 1868 Ismael, the Egyptian ruler entrusted Thaddeus Mott, a former

American military officer, the task of modernizing Egyptian military. Mott was offered

Generalship in Egypt. He recruited a band of former American military officers to do the

job. In turn, the officers did their job well. By 1873, these officers had done their job.

They laid down the foundations of modern Egyptian army.171 Consequently, Egypt’s

foreign debt skyrocketed. The income from mere cotton or Suez Canal revenue was

insufficient to perform such a big job. The Egypt’s foreign debt increased to $500

million. Ismail was forced to sell Egypt’s shares in Suez Canal Company to Britain.

Resultantly, the military schools were closed down. The US advisers were retired.

However, whatever its debit side might be, they helped to become Egypt the most

powerful and modern in the Middle East.172

American missionary activity greatly expanded in the Middle East. The US

missionary activity in Syria did not make conversions but thirty only. Henry Field, a

historian, observed that Christian missions had very little impression on Islam in the

Middle East. Syrus Hamlin built “Robert College” in 1863, on Bebek Hills near

Bosphorous in Turkey. It was the first of its kind in the Middle East. Robert College

169 Thomas A. Bryson. American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784-1975. (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow, 1977), 25-26

170 E.R.J. Owen. Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914. (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), 89, 105

171 William Dye. Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia. (N.Y.: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 38-46

172 Bryson. American Diplomatic Relations, 27

83

successfully introduced Western ideas to its students in Turkey. Five future Prime

ministers of Turkey were the graduates of the college.173

Another university was built in Beirut by Daniel Bliss named “Syrian Protestant

College”. The college helped creating a modern Syria by indoctrinating ideas of

patriotism and republicanism among its graduates. An Arab historian, George Antonius

(The Arab Awakening, 1938, London) commented that the College provided a big

contribution to “Arab revival” in the region.174

Two years after Lincoln’s murder, the American consul in Jerusalem, noted that

five-hundred American restorationists entered the city in a short span of 18 months. An

influential newspaper, New York Times (editorial), observed that Jerusalem belonged to

Jews.175 The number of American visitors to the Middle East increased manifold in post-

Civil War decades. The first important political figure to travel the region was William

Henry Seward, the former US Secretary of State. He ultimately reached the “Holy Land”.

He visited Jerusalem. The next person in the trail of important Americans was General

Sherman to visit Jerusalem in 1872. Modern science came to the forefront to break the

traditional barriers between the West and the Middle East. However, the most important

US public figure to travel to the Middle East was the ex-chief of Union forces and the

former President of the US, Ulysses S. Grant. In the Middle East, Grant went to the Holy

Land-Palestine. Here in Palestine Grant visited Jerusalem.176

Though the record on the incident is ambiguous, however, the first abortive

American move to help Arabs achieve independence from the Ottoman Empire occurred

in Syria in the year 1868, claimed historian Michael B. Oren.177 The Baha’is of Baghdad

asked for American help in saving their leader Baha Ullah from exile. However, the

President Rutherford B. Hayes remained more interested in protecting Jews in the Middle

East – in Palestine, Persia and North Africa.178 It was in August 1873, the Turks

established their first embassy in Washington. The mutual trade continued to flourish. It

173 Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 355-356174 Bernard Lewis. The Arabs in History. (London: Hutchinson’s Univ. Library, 1950), 173-174175 Lester I. Vogel. To See a Promised Land: Americans and the Holy Land in the Nineteenth

Century. (Univ. Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1993), 125-126176 Geoffrey Perret. Ulysses S. Grant. (N.Y.: Random House, 1997), 454177 Michael B. Oren. Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present.

(WW Norton & Company, 2007), 247178 Bryson. American Diplomatic Relations, 29, 47

84

was December 1879, when the USS Ticonderoga, the first US warship navigated Strait of

Hormuz and passed on to the Persian Gulf. It was to be remembered that traditionally the

Persian Gulf had been the exclusive British area.

Egypt’s foreign debt condemned it into insolvency. This in turn fueled nationalist

movement in Egypt under Col. Urabi Ahmad. In July 1882, the British attacked and

occupied Alexandria. Thus began seventy – two years of the British occupation of Egypt.

France followed into the footsteps of Britain and they both together, in an imperial drive,

occupied some seven million miles of the Middle East. Americans, in general, supported

this European imperialism.179 Understandably, American Presidents from Grant to

Garfield did not pay any heed to repeated Egyptian appeals for help against British

imperialism.180

The US-Middle East policy was torn between two opposing forces–allegiance to

Western civilization and anticolonial tradition. After the British occupation all American

citizens left Egypt. The American approach to the Middle East had produced a model for

the expansion of the US dominance overseas. The model was three pronged–supported

missionaries, helping tourism and stationing permanent warships to protect its

international commerce. America saw imperialism as a force initiating a positive change

in the Middle East.181 America had established a tradition of appointing American Jews to

diplomatic assignments in the Middle East.182

American missionary activity in the Middle East increased manifold. So did the

restorationist movement. Even some important American citizens such as T. De Witt

Talmage went to so far declaring that America should lead the world in taking forcibly

Palestine from the Muslims. Followers of two faiths Judaism and Christianity–persons

like John D. Rockefeller, Charles Scribner, Pierpont Mogan, Supreme Court Chief Justice

Melville W. Fuller and Congressman McKinley supported the idea of restorationism.183

At least since 1890, the US had been asking Ottoman Emperor to open Palestine to

Jewish immigration. However, the Presidents Harrison, Cleveland and McKinley did not

179 Eric J. Hobsbawm. The Age of Empire, 1875-1914. (N.Y.: Pantheon, 1987), 59 180 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 261181 Ibid, 271182 Elbert Farman. Egypt and Its Betray. (N.Y.: Grafton Press, 1908), 286-290, 302-303183 Vogel, Promised Land, 228-229

85

entertain the idea of naked use of force in this connection.184 From 1885 to 1895, the

budget for American missionary activity in the Middle East increased sevenfold.

The term “Middle East” was coined in the year 1902 by Alfred Thayer Mahan, an

American working for Britain. He wrote a classic book titled “Sea Power and America”

(1897). In this book he emphasized the “inseparable link between great-power status and

the control of international commerce” by powerful navy. Mahan’s argument was that the

great powers had to control “the neck that connects together adjoining areas of Africa and

Asia”. These areas included Turkey, Iran, Egypt, the East Mediterranean basin. He

collectively named this huge area the “Middle East”. His main argument was that the

nation that “controls the Middle East controls the world”.185

With the coming of the 20th century, the US surpassed Europe in two ways-in her

national consumption of energy and production of industrial products collectively.

America, now, was ready to challenge “Europe’s dominant position” in the Far East and

in the Middle East.186 By the dawn of 20th century, the US exports to the Middle East

were fourteen times more than its imports. By the year 1900 A.D., America had become

world power.187 After Westward expansion and industrial revolution in the 19 th century,

America had become world power. President Theodore Roosevelt was the real

embodiment of this change. His policies such as “Open Door” to China and “Gunboat

Diplomacy” reflected this change in the US foreign policy.

Theodore Roosevelt successfully intervened in Ottoman territories four times

from Bulgaria (in a ransom case) to Morocco crisis where a contest was going on

between Germany and France for supremacy. The crisis was dragging the entire Europe

into war. Roosevelt co-sponsored major-powers conference on the Middle East in Spain

in 1906 and successfully helped diluting the crisis. During this conference the US

supported the Imperial principles of Anglo–French alliance as well as freedom for the US

trade. This remained the basic US policy toward the Middle East for next fifty years.188 It

184 Regina S. Sharif. Non-Jewish Zionism: Its Roots in Western History. (London: Zed Press, 1983), 92-93

185 William D. Puleston. The Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1939), 41-42

186 Fareed Zakaria. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1996), 46, 127

187 Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 327, 388188 Frederick W. Marks. Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt. (Lincoln: Univ. of

Nebraska Press, 1979), 69

86

could be safely argued that Theodore Roosevelt supported imperialism as a legitimate

instrument for expanded American influence in the Middle East.

3.2 Second Phase (1900 – 1980):Present Iraq has total area of 434, 128 square kilometers and is bordered by Turkey in the

north, Iran in the east, Syria and Jordan in the west and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the

South. The coastline of Iraq is just 19 kilometers along the northern end of the Persian

Gulf. During ancient times, it was called Mesopotamia, “land between the rivers”. The

rivers were Euphrates and Tigris. The classical Arab geographers used the term Iraq for

the first time in the 7th century for this region. However, the region had no definite

boundaries. On the advent of Islam, Mesopotamia was a province of Persian Empire. In

the year 637 A.D., the famous Muslim General Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas defeated the

Sasanian army at the battle of Al-Qadisiya and decided Iraq’s fate.

By the end of the next year, the Muslims occupied almost all of Iraq. The

“Abbasid Revolution” uprooted Ummayad dynasty. In the year 762 AD, al-Mansur

founded Iraq’s new capital, Baghdad. It remained the Abbasid Capital till 1258, when

Mongol invasion, in a bloody war, overthrew the dynasty. This initiated a process of

centuries of external invasion and internal strife in Iraq. Passing through a long historical

process, finally current Iraq became a part of Ottoman Empire in the year 1534 and

continued as such until the First World War.189

British influence in Baghdad increased since 1798. In this fateful year, Suleyman

Pasha allowed the appointment of a permanent British agent in Baghdad. In the last days

of Ottoman rule, the contemporary Iraq was divided into three separate provinces –

Basra, Mosul and Baghdad. It had been a historical fact that Iraq had never been a single

political entity. Iraq never had been a nation- state as well or an empire before the British

carved it on the foot-steps of WWI. There had been the provinces/ Vilayets of Basra,

Baghdad, and Mosul.190 The British interests in the Persian Gulf and Euphrate–Tigris

region had grown slowly since the later years of 18th century.

On the eve of WWI, there had been close ties between Berlin and Istanbul. For

the British it was troublesome. Ottoman rulers had given Germany a concession to build

189 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. (15th Eds). Vol. 21, Macropaedia, (USA, 2005), 972-988

190 Ibid, 988

87

a railway line through Anatolia to Baghdad. For London, it was fearful to see such a

development. London strongly protested against this rival German penetration.

Meanwhile the Anglo–Persian Oil Company had started its production in Iran. At the

same time, there were great indications about the presence of oil in Iraq as well. Due to

the above cited reasons a British military force entered Basra in November 1914 and

occupied Baghdad in March 1917. The oil factor was important in the creation of current

Iraq within its present borders after WWI.191

During WWI, Britain and France had secretly agreed upon the partition of the

Middle East region into their respective spheres of interests in what is known as Sykes-

Picot Agreement of 1916. As a result of this agreement Iraq had become exclusive British

sphere192. Just before the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Clemenceau, the French premier

met Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister in London. It was here in London that

Clemenceau ceded French claim to Mosul in favor of Britain. The quid pro-quo was a

French share in Mesopotamian oil. In this way present boundaries of Iraq were

determined and Iraqi oil was the central factor to shape borders of the country.193

It was in the San Remo Treaty in 1920 that the final borders of Iraq were created

and the treaty also formalized British mandate over Iraq and Palestine. Meanwhile, Iraqis

were simmering for independence.194 Interestingly, the British declaration made by

General Maude in Baghdad in March 1917 was drafted by Sir Mark Sykes and posed

British as “Liberators” not conquerors.195 However, in Iraq the nationalists were strongly

asking for freedom. In the year 1921 at the Cairo conference Faisal, son of Sharif

Hussain, was decided to be the future King of Iraq. Monarchy was established by the

British as the future political system for the country. Faisal was enthroned in August

1921 as the monarch. The Anglo – Iraqi Treaty of Alliance replaced the mandate of the

League of Nations. Iraq ratified the treaty in October 1922. The treaty actually

incorporated basic elements of the mandate system of League of Nations. It guaranteed

security of British interests in the newly established state of Iraq. However, in 1923, the

191 Rashid Khalidi. Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 92-93

192 David E. Long, and Bernard Reich. The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1980), 110

193 Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire, 94194 Long, and Reich, Middle East and North Africa, 110-112195 Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire, 97

88

treaty was revised and its period was reduced from twenty to four years. According to the

terms of the treaty British were to offer advice to Iraqi government on both foreign affairs

as well as domestic matters such as military and financial etc.196

The League of Nations assigned Mosul to Iraq in December, 1925. A treaty was

signed between Britain, Iraq and Turkey in 1926 confirming thereby “the final frontiers”

of Iraq as definitive. Iraq was to pay “ten percent of its oil royalties” to Turkey for the

next 25 years. A new treaty was signed between Britain and Iraq in June, 1930. The

treaty, among other things, provided for a “close alliance” between Iraq and Great

Britain. The treaty concluded in 1930 was to last for 25 years from the date of

independence of Iraq.

The year of “independence of Iraq” had already been agreed upon in 1929

between Britain and Iraq. Iraq was to get independence in 1932. Among other things, Iraq

gave bases to Britain. The treaty though opposed by Iraqi nationalists was ratified by the

Assembly in November, 1931. Ultimately, Iraq got independence in October 1932.197 The

British–Iraq relations were to be governed by the treaty of 1930, which made an

“obligation for Iraq to accept the advice” of the British High Commissioner, especially if

it was related to the discharge of “British economic and international obligations.”198

There had been a substantive rise in Turco-American bilateral trade since the

beginning of 20th century. By the beginning of WW1, Turkish exports to America had

been 23% of all its exports. Meanwhile domestic production of oil in the US was

insufficient to meet its growing demand. Consequently, after knowing about the oil

deposits in the Middle East, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey started exploration

in Mesopotamia in 1910. On the eve of WWI, oil of the Middle East had become an

American obsession. No sooner Turks entered WWI they outlawed English as an “enemy

language.”

The US missionaries in the Middle East asked Washington for help. The US

missionaries wanted protection against Turkish excesses. In response, President Wilson

asked the USS North Carolina and Tennesse, the two warships, to provide help to the US

missionaries. Till the end of 1914, America remained “neutral in the war in the Middle 196 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 988197 Peter Mansfield (Ed). The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey. (Oxford: Oxford

Univ. Press, 1980), 326198 Joe Stork. Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis. (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 16

89

East.”199 In February 1917, in the Laconia incident two American citizens lost their lives

as a result of unrestricted German submarine warfare. America declared war on Germany

in April. As a reaction Turkey broke off relations with the US. Along with the majority of

Congress, the ex-President Theodore Roosevelt put great pressure on President Wilson to

declare war on Turkey. For whatever reasons, President Wilson never declared war on

Turkey.200

The US remained neutral in the Middle East region. The Ottoman rule in the

Middle East collapsed. The Middle East was divided between Britain and France into

their respective spheres of control. Palestine and Iraq became a part of British share. 201

The Federation of American Zionism was created in the year 1897. However, the US as

per policy never promoted Jewish emigration to the Holy Land. Actually, Zionism was

Europe centered movement with its headquarters in Berlin. On learning about Sykes-

Picot secret treaty, President Wilson remarked that the US would not fight for such

“selfish clandestine” imperial interests of others. America rejected all such “secret”

attempts aiming at partitioning the Middle East.202

On the other hand, in September 1918, President Wilson expressed “satisfaction”

on Balfour Declaration related to the establishment of “Jewish national home” in

Palestine.203 America did not participate in WWI in the Middle East. The European

victors of WWI, during Paris Peace Conference in 1919, simply refused to apply

Wilson’s fourteen points on the Middle East. For whatever reasons, Wilson had

supported the mandate system and the “British policy in Palestine” what came to be

known as Balfour Declaration. Finally, in November 1920, American Senate rejected

American membership of League of Nations. America also refused to play an important

role in reshaping the Middle East. In post-war treaties, from San Remo (Italy) in April

1920 to Lausanne (Switzerland) in July 1923, the US goal had been “ensuring the policy

199 Arthur S. Link. Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960), 68-69

200 David E. Cronon (Ed.). The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-21. (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1963), 246

201 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 352-355202 Yaakov Ariel. On Behalf of Israel: American Fundamentalist Attitudes toward Jews, Judaism,

and Zionism, 1865-1945. (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1991), 45 203 Elizabeth Monroe. Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956. (Baltimore: John Hopkins

Univ. Press, 1963), 44-45

90

of open door” to the Middle East region. The main objective of the policy was ensuring

“American business” in the Middle East.204

By 1900 A.D., in the decades after US civil war, America had become the most

industrialized country of the world. The US industrial status greatly increased her

dependence on oil. At the same time in the year 1901, William D.’Arcy, a British

businessman had got a sixty-year concession from the Iranian government for exploration

of oil in the country. Oil production in Iran began in 1908. The next year Anglo-Persian

Oil Company was formed. In a great development, near WWI, Winston Churchill, then

lord of Admiralty, in an innovative move ordered production of new oil-powered ships.

This new generation of ships had great leverage over coal-powered ships in terms of

speed and destructive capability. This made Britain profoundly dependent on petroleum.

Oil became crucial to Britain’s “world dominance”. It greatly enhanced the “strategic

importance” of the Middle East. This opened the way for repeated major power’s

intervention in the Middle East.205 Britain and the US were fated to become rivals in the

Middle East.

The US companies became desperate in their search for overseas sources of

petroleum. However, Iran, then the largest producer of oil was a British monopoly. The

other “potential reservoirs” of the region – Iraq, Syria, and Palestine etc., were under

Franco – British mandate. The European imperial powers were determined to keep the

US out of the scene. However, on the other hand, America was also determined to rupture

European monopoly over Middle Eastern Oil resources. It was for the first time that the

US government became actively involved in the “oil business” in the Middle East.

In the year 1921, Herbert Hoover, the US Secretary of Commerce, rallied together

the seven most important American oil companies and formed an “oil consortium” of

them. The US companies included – New Jersey, Texas, Sinclair, Mexican, Atlantic, Gulf

and New York. This united front of the US companies forced their European rivals to

conclude a bargain with them. Consequently, the US oil companies and their European

counterparts joined hands and formed a new cartel – the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC).

204 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 394205 Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire, 83-87

91

America received 23.75% share from the entire Middle East Oil extracted. The agreement

was concluded in 1928.206

Oil was not the only American interest in the Middle East. The great US concern

was the rapid British decline and exit from the region. America feared that the vacuum of

power created by shrinking British empire in the region could be filled in by the rival

communist power–USSR. America wanted to keep USSR out of the Middle East. It is to

be noted that by 1950, Middle Eastern Oil producer countries were paid only nominal

royalties by the British.207 For example Britain paid Iran only 10 to 12 percent royalties

till 1950.208 Similarly, the initial royalties given to Iraq were at the rate of 4s. gold for per

ton crude petroleum exported from the country.209

The biggest US success in the Middle East came in the year 1933, when Ibn-e-

Saud awarded oil exploration rights to the US Company–Standard Oil of California

(SOCAL). Three years later, Texaco joined SOCAL which was renamed as ARAMCO,

and in 1947, they were joined by SOCONY (Standard of New York) making ARAMCO

consortium. It brought together three of the main elements of J.D. Rockefeller’s oil

empire. It made America the “dominant force” in the Middle East oil world.210

By 1939, the US was an oil exporter. However, by the end of WWII, the US had

started importing foreign oil to meet her ever-increasing need. By 1950, the Middle East

proven petroleum reserves were rather equal to the rest of the world total. However, till

1950, most of the Middle East was a British preserve. The Middle East had become a

“key to the future of the petroleum industry” of the world. The 1933 US–KSA agreement

was a “turning point” in the US – Middle East relationship.211

The dominant theme of the US foreign policy from 1790 to 1941 had been what

was known as isolationism. During these years the US avoided making “entangling

alliances” with European powers. However, owing to its great importance, the Middle

East had become the bone of contention among European colonial powers. The American

206 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 410-411207 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 991208 Gabriel Kolko. The Age of War: The United States Confronts the World. (New Delhi: Viva

Books Pvt. (Ltd), Raj Press, 2007), 42209 Mansfield, Middle East, 348210 Daniel Yergin. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. (N.Y.: Simon and

Schuster, 1991), 283-289211 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 414

92

policy toward the issue of Palestine in the first half of 20 th century, especially during the

interwar period was one of neutrality. In the year 1942, President Roosevelt said that if

we support either of the two groups we will create trouble.212

Later on, after the Pearl Harbor incident, America entered WWII in December

1941. However, during WWII, the basic US concern was Europe and Pacific not the

Middle East. The Roosevelt Administration established two bases in the region – Basra

and Cairo for the provision of supply deliveries to the allies in the region. It was for the

first time that in 1945, both houses of Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike,

adopted “pro-Zionist stance” by demanding that “Palestine must be opened for free entry

of Jews” and also asked for the establishment of a “Jewish state” there.213

President Truman, in the year 1945, urged the British Prime Minister Clement

Attlee to “open Palestine” for the “immigration and settlement” of 100,000 Jews and lift

the ban on the Jewish land purchases.214 The US also supported UN plan proposing

“partitioning plan for Palestine” into two independent states. Truman told Weizman in

March 1948, that “I am for partition”. Ultimately, Jews declared Israel as an independent

state on May 14, 1948. The news reached the US at six O’clock and America recognized

the newly independent state at eleven minutes past six.215

The destruction wrought by the two World Wars had very important

consequences. The multipolar Eurocentric world political system was replaced by bi-

polar world political system. The allies had great differences on two different ways of life

based on antithetic ideologies – capitalism and communism. Consequently, post-WWII

era was characterized by what was known as “Cold War” period. The world was divided

into two blocs – capitalist block headed by the US and communist bloc headed by the

USSR. They were locked up into an eternal struggle for survival as well as dominance.

Soviet Union embarked on a worldwide revolutionary struggle based on communist

doctrine and the US followed what was known as Policy of Containment on the advice of

212 David Shapiro. From Philanthropy to Activism: The Political Transformation of American Zionism in the Holocaust Years, 1933-1945. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1994), 71, 84

213 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 468214 David Schoenbaum. The United States and the State of Israel. (N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press,

1993), 44215 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 499

93

George F. Kennan. The entire world remained in the grips of Cold War from 1945 to

1991.216

The period from 1945 to 1991, in relation to world politics, could be properly

understood in the Cold War perspective only. Similarly, the US foreign policy toward the

Middle East in general and toward Iraq in particular during the same period could be

understood in the cold war perspective. In the post-WWII era, the basic US interests in

the Middle East were the control over its oil, checking Soviet penetration, fill the power

void created by retreating British imperial power, and supporting establishment of

Israel.217

The first active theatre of the Cold War was the Middle East. Stalin made some

demands on Turkey – joint Soviet – Turkish control of the Turkish Straits, provision of

naval bases in the Dardanelles, cession of some Turkish territory etc. The demands were

made in 1945. Stalin put great “pressure on Turkey” to succumb to Soviet demand.

Meanwhile, Soviet Union refused to withdraw Red Army from Iran. The USSR wanted

to convert Iran into a “Soviet Satellite”. After great pressure from Washington and

London, Stalin withdrew from Iranian Azerbaijan in 1946. Iraq shared her borders with

Turkey and Iran. In both cases the US put pressure on Moscow to back out from her

demands.218

In the post–WWII era, the US also replaced British power in the region. The CIA

used General Naguib to overthrow Egyptian monarch Farouk in 1952, who was a British

puppet in the region. Ultimately, Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser came to power as a result of

this coup. Again the factors of “oil and fear of Soviet penetration in Iran” were the causes

behind the CIA and MI-6 secret alliance against nationalist government of Mossadegh.

Under the tacit approval of President Eisenhower, both CIA and MI-6 staged a

“successful coup” against Mossadegh in 1953.

The five US companies that owned 40% of AIOC, suddenly dominated and

started production of petroleum. The US had intimacy with Mohammad Reza Shah and

CIA used him. America had agreed on “50-50 split” formula with Saudi Arabia in 1950.

216 William R. Keylor. The Twentieth-Century World: An International History. (N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, Inc., 1984), 262-273

217 Kolko. Age of War, 40-41218 Steven W. Hook and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy since World War II. (5th Ed.).

(Washington D.C., CQ Press, 2000), 37-38

94

However, UK paid only nominal royalties 10–12% to Iran. The US was fated to dominate

Iran and totally relied on Shah.219 A similar split formula was followed in Iraq in 1952

and consequently, government’s income from oil in Iraq rose steeply from £32.6 million

in 1951 to £74 million in 1955.220

After its independence, Iraq went through a period of political instability. From

1932, the year of Iraq’s independence, the country had more than fifty Cabinets. The first

military coup in Iraq was affected in 1936. Since then military forces dominated politics

in Iraq. A non-aggression pact known as “Sa’adabad Pact” was concluded between Iraq,

Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan in the year 1937. Then, during WWII, British occupied

Iraq.221

Meanwhile, Nasser became head of state in Egypt in 1954. He emerged as a

symbol of Pan-Arabism, anti-imperialism, and Arab nationalism in the Middle East.

Nasser recognized communist China in 1956. In its reaction, Washington backed down

from its commitment to finance the construction of Aswan Dam. Nasser retaliated

immediately and nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956. Suez Canal and Persian Gulf

was Britain’s lifeblood. The Western stakeholders retaliated culminating into tripartite

invasion of Suez Canal by Britain, France and Israel, in October 1956. The US President

Eisenhower put great pressure on Britain and France to end the hostilities and withdrew

from the canal.

Ultimately, they succumbed to US and Soviet combined pressure in December,

the same year. President Eisenhower saved the honor of Nasser. After this crisis Nasser

emerged as a powerful votary of Pan-Arabism and anti-Imperialism. President

Eisenhower did not want Soviet penetration in the Middle East on behalf of the Arab

world. The British eclipse in the Middle East produced a vacuum of power in the region.

The US filled that vacuum. The creation of Israel and the tripartite invasion of Suez

Canal produced great reaction in the Middle East. This straightway led to a chain of

military revolutions in the Arab world in the Middle East.222

219 Kolko. Age of War, 41-42220 Mansfield, Middle East, 348-349221 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 989-990222 William R. Keylor. The Twentieth-Century World: An International History. (N.Y.: Oxford

Univ. Press, Inc., 1984), 313-314

95

In January 1957, Eisenhower Doctrine was announced to the world. The Doctrine

was region specific and was linked to the future US policy toward the Middle East.

Henceforth, the US would extend military protection to the country asking for help

against “overt armed aggression”. If such an attack came from “international

communism.”223 After Suez Canal crisis of 1956, Nasser became popular in the Arab

World. He also became a symbol of Pan-Arabism, anti-West, anti-Israel, and Arab

resistance to the West. The political atmosphere in the Middle East was ripened for

revolutions. Iraq became the first country where such a pro-Nasser coup was affected in

1958. Iraq had been a British client state since 1932, the year of its independence. Under

the cover of Eisenhower Doctrine in 1958, Anglo–American troops intervened and saved

Jordan and Lebanon from Pro-Nasser revolutions.224

In Iraq an anti-West regime had already come to power under an army General,

Abdul Karim Qasim. An intense struggle for dominance between the two superpowers

was going on in the Middle East. Since 1955, Iraq had been a member of US sponsored

anti-Soviet military alliance called Baghdad Pact. After the revolution of 1958 Iraq left

Baghdad Pact.225 The 1958 coup in Iraq presented a greater danger from America-British

standards. It was the danger of losing one of the most important strategic regions of the

world. It would be a greater loss than China.226

The decades of 1960’s and 1970’s were turbulent for the Middle East. The regime

of Abdul Karim in Iraq was toppled, once again, in 1963 coup. This coup was a result of

secret bargaining between military and Ba’ath party. President Arif, the new Iraqi ruler,

suppressed the Ba’ath leaders in 1964. However, Ba’ath Party leadership was able to

stage a coup against Arif in 1968, as usual with the help of military officers. Within

months after the coup, Ba’ath consolidated her strong control over the country. Saddam

Hussain was the strongman behind this consolidation of Ba’ath power in Iraq. The US

support to Israel in 1967 Arab-Israeli war further estranged the Arab world from the US.

Ba’ath party came to power in Iraq and Syria, on the pro-Nasser agenda – Arab unity,

freedom and socialism. While Egypt, Iraq, Syria became Soviet clients in the Middle

223 Hook and John Spanier, American Foreign Policy, 108224 Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World, 362225 Ibid, 309226 Abraham Ben-Zvi. Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the

American-Israeli Alliance. (Columbia University Press, 1998), 76

96

East. The US heavily relied on Iran and KSA in the region. Arab nationalism and anti-

Americanism gradually intensified.227

There had been another interesting part of the CIA – Saddam Hussain

relationship. Saddam Hussain joined Ba’ath party in 1957 when he was just twenty years

old. He became an agent of the CIA within no time. At the same time he became a

member of Ba’ath Party. After the 1958 coup, Saddam Hussain took an active part in the

abortive attempt to assassinate Abdul Karim Qasim in 1959, possibly with the help of

CIA. General Qasim was anti-West and had withdrawn Iraq from Baghdad Pact after he

successfully seized power. During this failed attempt to assassinate General Qasim,

Saddam Hussain sustained bullet injury but was lucky to escape from the scene. In the

opinion of Eric Black, both Ba’athists in Iraq and CIA had one commonality. Both

wanted to get rid of Qasim–a pro-Moscow ruler. Saddam Hussain helped CIA and

Ba’athists to affect and coordinate military coup against Qasim.228

After the failed attempt on Qasim, Saddam Hussain fled from Iraq. For the next

four years he stayed in neighboring countries – Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. During these

years of exile, CIA sponsored him and paid for his accommodation. He went through a

training program while he was staying in Beirut. The CIA took him to Cairo where he got

law education. It was here in Cairo that he made frequent visits to the US Embassy. In

Iraq the Ba’athist activists in cooperation with military personnel overthrew Qasim and

killed him in a coup in 1963. In the aftermath of this successful coup, Saddam Hussain

came back to Iraq. This was a CIA sponsored coup. CIA monitored the coup through its

command centre in Kuwait, Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bulent Gokay had cited Richard

Sale, Sean Mac Mathuna, and David Morgan confirming their claim.

The authors wrote that after the 1963 coup, CIA supplied the list of “active

communists” to the conspirators who killed four thousand communists in Iraq in the

immediate aftermath of the coup. The same authors also cited Saddam Hussain’s

biographer, Said K. Aburish, author of Saddam Hussain: The politics of Revenge in

which the biographer confirmed that the relationship between CIA and Ba’ath were “very

close” at that time. In this connection a recent confirmation came from Roger Morris.

227 The New Webster’s International Encyclopedia. Florida: Trident Press International, 1994: 552228 Eric Black. “A History of Iraq, the Cradle of Western Civilization”, Star Tribune. (February 2,

2003)

97

This gentleman was a member of the US National Security Council during the

presidencies of Johnson and Nixon. Morris confirmed that CIA was well connected and

chose anti-communist Ba’ath as its puppet and instrument.229

In this whole episode, CIA was supported by MI-6, the British intelligence. The

1963 Coup in Iraq was the worst bloodbath in the modern history of the country.230 Sir

Roger Allen, the British ambassador to Iraq, wrote to the British foreign office that the

new regime in Iraq was doing well and we should support it. The regime would “purge

communists” and, the communist threat in Iraq would vanish. Not surprisingly,

Washington and London immediately recognized the new regime.

In this new regime, after his return to Iraq from exile, Saddam Hussain was

appointed head of the Al-Jihaz al-Khas, the secret Ba’ath intelligence. Consequently,

Saddam Hussain was involved in the killing of about 5000 Iraqi communists. Again in

the year 1968, another “CIA sponsored coup” was affected in Iraq. This time, Saddam

Hussain became vice president to Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Ultimately, in the year 1979,

owing to complex reasons, Ahmed Hassan was forced to resign and Saddam Hussain

immediately assumed presidency of Iraq with a US blessing. There had been no doubt at

all that Saddam Hussain was first recruited by the CIA in 1958 during his stay at Cairo.231

Similarly, Roger Morris also acknowledged that the CIA had a secret hand in

making both the coups of 1963 and 1968 in Iraq.232 How and when did the CIA establish

close relations with Saddam Hussain? CIA over the decades helped Saddam Hussain to

grow as an “absolutist ruler” of Iraq.233 A classic story of Saddam Hussain’s secret

connections with the CIA giving valuable information could also be found yet in another

book. How did the CIA use Baa’th regime and Saddam Hussain to pursue US interests in

Iraq for more than three decades?234 From these credible sources of information it could

229 Vassilis K. Fouskas, and Bulent Gokay. The New American Imperialism: Bush’s War on Terror and Blood for Oil. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2005), 195

230 Ibid, 101231 David Morgan. “Ex-US Official Says CIA Aided Baathists: CIA Offers No Comments on Iraq

Coup Allegations”, Reuters. April 20-21, 2003232 Roger Morris. “A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making”. New York Times, March 14, 2003, A27

233 David Wise, and Thomas B. Ross. "The Invisible Government." Phil. LJ 39, 1964: 478

234 Andrew Cockburn, and Patrick Cockburn. Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession. (UK: Verso, 2002)

98

be safely argued that Ba’ath regime in Iraq was thoroughly supported by the CIA. The

CIA used Saddam Hussain as a “policy instrument” for about 40 years.

Second phase of the US–Iraq relationship was important from many aspects. By

1900, the US had become a world power and now it was impossible to stick to her

traditional policy of isolationism, as her interests had grown worldwide. President

Woodrow Wilson had supported the 1917 “Balfour Declaration” for the creation of

Jewish homeland in Palestine but practically did nothing to implement that program. It

was in the post-World War II era, the US started playing increasingly important role in

the Middle East security issues. The US major interests during this phase had been the oil

of the region, checking communist penetration in the region, ever-increasing involvement

in the Arab-Israeli conflict, replacing Britain and France as the Western imperial power

of the region, and giving support to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East especially –

KSA, Iran and Gulf Oil monarchies.

After 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the US role in the Middle East heavily tilted in favor

of Israel. During these years Iraq had been active, though for a brief period, in the anti-

Soviet Baghdad Pact from 1954 to 1958. The CIA had played determining role in the

1963 and 1968 military coup in Baghdad. At the same time, CIA had engaged Saddam

Hussain and exploited him as a “policy instrument”. On the other hand, the US total

support to Israel, at least after 1967 Arab- Israeli war produced serious repercussions for

the US interests in the region. Arab nationalism and anti-Americanism intensified. From

1970 to 1980, oil prices raised to about twenty times. Arab States used oil as a political

weapon during 1970’s. The US policies toward the region alienated the Arab world.

3.3 Third Phase (1980–1990):No advanced economy could survive without petroleum whatsoever. Since 1920, oil had

been the central focus of major powers dealing with the Middle East. The US fulfilled

about its 70% oil needs from domestic production in the year 1970, however, the figure

reduced to 38% by 1996. Within 35 years from 1960 to 1996, the US oil imports

increased at least “fourfold”. In the year 1983, the Persian Gulf region fulfilled about 9%

of the US oil needs while the figure had increased to 22.1% by 2000.235

235 Kolko. Age of War, 40

99

Since 1953, America in the Middle East had heavily depended on Iran, K.S.A.

and Gulf oil monarchies. However, during the same period Iran and Iraq– the two

powerful countries of the region had been victim of mutual distrust and rivalry. The US

had gone closer to Iran in opposing Iraq during 1970s. The reason was that Ba’athist

regime in Baghdad had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR in

1972, as a reaction to the US support to Israel in the 1967 Arab – Israeli War. Iraq had

also “broken off its diplomatic relations with Washington” for the same reason.

Supported by the US, the Shah of Iran embarked upon a process of regional primacy

during 1970’s. Consequently, Shah not only seized islands in the Hormuz straits belonged

to Iraq, but also stirred revolt among the Kurds in Iraq.236

Hard pressed by the Shah of Iran, Baa’th regime in Baghdad relinquished its

historical claim to entire Shatt-al-Arab, the estuary of the two powerful rivers of Iraq,

Euphrates and Tigris in the 1975 Algiers Treaty and, accepted a boundary in the middle.

In the year 1978, to please Iran, Iraq expelled Ayatollah Khomeini, an arch opponent of

the Shah. The cleric had lived in exile in Iraq for 14 years. In return, the Shah cut off his

support to Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. The US had not only given “substantial

support to Iran” against Iraq to check Soviet influence in the region but President Nixon

also had ordered the CIA to provide $5 million secretly to the Kurds.237

Then things changed suddenly in the Middle East in 1979. Iran went through an

anti-monarchy popular revolution in 1979 while Saddam Hussain became president of

Iraq in the same year. Iranian Revolution of January 1979 provided Saddam Hussain an

opportunity to pursue the “goal of regional primacy” in the wake of turmoil in Iran. In

September 1980, Saddam Hussain “abrogated” the Algiers Treaty of 1975 and attacked

Iran. Iraq declared its “sovereignty” over the entire Shatt-al-Arab.238

Iranian Revolution brought an “anti-America” Islamist government headed by

Imam Khomeini to power. The Iranian Revolution was a failure of the US Iran policy. In

an immediate u-turn, the Reagan Administration started giving “support” to Saddam

regime in Iraq against Iran, often cited as the US obsession with post-Revolution Iran.239

During the 1970’s, the US sold more than $20 billion in weaponry to Iran. After Iranian 236 Kees Van der Pijl. Global Rivalries: From the Cold War to Iraq. (New Delhi: Vistaar

Publications, 2006), 337 237 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 69-70238 Pijl, Global Rivalries, 337

100

Revolution the “US armed both the warring states” during Iran-Iraq war. America did not

want any victor in this war. This US policy during 1980’s was termed as “dual

containment”.240

The Reagan Administration gave extensive support to Iraq during eight year Iran

– Iraq war. The US became concerned about Iranian successes in the war in 1982 and,

saw in the war an opportunity to serve her two important objectives. By supporting Iraq

the US could move Iraq away from its close alliance with the USSR, and could also use

Iraq to “replace eroded alliance” with Iran for protecting “US interests” in the Persian

Gulf.241 In the year 1982, CIA began providing “satellite and field intelligence” to

Saddam Hussain against Iran and in 1983 the Reagan Administration signed a security

directive to extend “every type of support” to Iraq to save it from losing the war against

Iran.242

In the year 1983, Reagan sent Rumsfeld as a special US emissary to Iraq with the

task to reestablish diplomatic relations with the country. Rumsfeld met with Saddam

Hussain and discussed America’s and Iraq’s common interests such as “common

antipathy” for Iran and Syria. President Reagan reestablished diplomatic relations with

Iraq in 1984, despite the fact that world knew about “the use of chemical weapons” by

Saddam Hussain against Iran in 1983. In the year 1984, the UN Secretary – General

submitted an expert’s report to the Security Council about the use of chemical weapons

by Iraq against Iran. The US did not “condemn” the resolution on this serious matter.

Whereas at the UN Human Rights Commission, the Reagan Administration “opposed a

condemnation resolution” against Iraq on this issue.243

Ronald Reagan removed Iraq from the list of the terrorist countries. The Reagan

Administration provided “guarantees” for Iraqi purchases of US agricultural products and

in the year 1984, extended “bank credits to Iraq” for imports. Not surprisingly, by the

239 Noam Chomsky. Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance. (London: Penguin Group, 2003), 111

240 Stephen Zunes. Tinderbox: US Foreign Policy and the Roots of Terrorism. (US: Common Courage Press, 2003), 67

241 Peter W. Galbraith. The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End. (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 17

242 Anthony Sampson. The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped. (Bantam, 1991), 361-363

243 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 18-19

101

year 1988, the “US subsidies” to Iraq had increased to $ one billion annually. 244 It was in

the year 1983, that President Reagan ordered CIA to share “battlefield intelligence” with

Iraq against Iran during the war. Iraq used that information aggressively against Iran

especially by attacking Iranian troop concentrations by chemical and biological

weapons.245

The Reagan Administration had vital interests linked with Iraq. If Iraq would lose

the war to Iran, it would make Iran the “preeminent power” in the region (Persian Gulf),

putting vast petroleum resources at its disposal. It would make Iran a nucleus of Shiites

from the entire Arab world. Actually, Reagan found in Saddam Hussain a potential ally in

the region.246 There was a big shift in the US policy toward Iran in 1985. The whole affair

would be notoriously known as “Iran–Contra Scandal”. Al-Shiraa, a Lebanese

newspaper, exposed the scandal in November, 1986.

Hizbollah, the Iran backed Lebanon’s Shiite group, had taken some Americans as

hostages. Washington decided to get the release of these hostages in a “secret” manner by

“selling the arms to Iran through Israel” (otherwise an illegal deal). Robert McFarlane,

Oliver North, William Casey traveled to Iran secretly in 1986, to finalize the details of

this “illegal secret arms deal” with Iran. D. Kimche, a former high official of “Mossad”

was at the centre of this secret deal.247 The funds generated by this secret supply were

transferred to Contras, who were fighting against “Nicaragua’s Sandinsita

government”.248

To finance his war against Iran, Saddam Hussain borrowed about $95 billion in

loans mostly from Kuwait and KSA. During these years, Saddam imported weapons,

mostly from the “US and her Western allies” of worth $42 billion. The US also supplied

Iraq with “battlefield intelligence”. Saddam Hussain used mustard, cyanide, and nerve

gases both against Iran and Kurds (Iraqi Kurds). Kuwait had been funding Iraq’s war

against Iran. In reaction, Iran began targeting Kuwaiti oil tankers. These tankers had been

transporting Iraqi oil. The Reagan Administration, in the year 1987, allowed Kuwaiti oil

244 Ibid245 Ibid246 Ibid, 19-20247 William S. Cohen, and George J. Mitchell. Men of Zeal: A Candid inside Story of Iran-Contra

Hearings. (U.S.: Penguin Group, 1989), 79248 Sampson. Seven Sisters, 349-353

102

tankers to “reflag as the US tankers” and escorted them through the Persian Gulf. This led

to the increased presence of “US warships in the Persian Gulf” from six to at least

forty.249

It was in October 1989, the war with Iran was over and Saddam had gassed his

own people, the Kurds. President Bush senior issued a national security directive. In this

directive the President declared that normal diplomatic relations with Iraq would serve

the “longer-term” US interests in the region. It would also furnish regional stability, in

both the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.250 The Presidents Reagan and Bush Senior

“secretly armed Iraq” for a decade both directly and indirectly.251

The US Western allies also had been arming Iraq during 1980’s. The Thatcher

government allowed Iraq to purchase “tools” from the UK which could be used in its

“nuclear program”.252 British arms companies built an important nuclear – capable

missile production complex in the vicinity of Baghdad.253 South Africa also did the same

job and supplied the US and British military technology to Iraq.254

West Germany, a US alley and NATO member, was the “main supplier” of

chemicals which could be used as “weapons” after conversion. In addition, German

companies assisted Iraq in its nuclear program.255 The US directly supplied Iraq with

“dual-use” materials. They could be used for military purposes. Surprisingly, from 1985

to 1990, the US companies provided Iraq with dual-use materials worth $782 million.

The US government indirectly sold conventional and chemical weapons to third parties

which were then transferred to Iraq.256 In the year 1988, Bechtel concluded an agreement

with Saddam Hussain to manage “PC-2 chemical complex” near Baghdad. A salient

feature of PC-2 project was manufacturing of ethylene oxide which could in turn be used

to produce mustard gas. This industrial complex near Baghdad was later on known as

249 Kolko. Age of War, 50250 Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, 111-112251 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 167252 Pijl, Global Rivalries, 338253 Gerald.James. “In the Public Interest.” London: Little, Brown and Company. 1996: 86254 Ibid, 193-196255 Sampson. Seven Sisters, 364-365256 Bruce Jentleson. With Friends like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990. (N.Y.:

W.W. Norton, 1994), 44-46

103

part of the “smoking gun” and was used as a proof that Iraq was pursuing WMD

program.257

President Bush senior and his secretary of State James A. Baker played important

role in “courting” Saddam Hussain after Iran-Iraq war. In the wake of Halabja massacre

(Halabja-a Kurd town in northern Iraq), the US Congress imposed restrictions on the U.S.

Export–Import Bank to finance Iraq. President Bush used his “veto power” and annulled

the prohibition declaring that it was not in the American “national interest”.258

It was during this period that Iraq became the second biggest trading partner of

the US in the Middle East. The US import of Iraqi oil in the year 1990 had increased

“eight times” since 1987. The US policy toward Iraq was influenced by her national

interests.259 President Bush sent a delegation of US Senators to Iraq under the headship of

Bob Dole in April 1990. Dole assured Iraqi regime that the US government had no

problem with Saddam Hussain. The Senator also told Saddam Hussain that the

commentator on V.O.A. who was critical of Saddam Hussain, had been fired.260

Iraq had accumulated a great debt during Iran-Iraq war. The creditors were

demanding back money. For whatever reasons, Kuwait seemed an easy prey to Saddam

Hussain. In an aggressive military posture, Saddam Hussain deployed his military forces

on the border with Kuwait in July, 1990. On July 25, April Glaspie, the US Ambassador

to Iraq, met Saddam Hussain and delivered an “infamous” message. She said that she was

under direct instructions by the President Bush, to seek better relations with Iraq. She

further said, the “US government had no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts” like Iraq-

Kuwait border dispute.261 A few days later, President Bush sent a “personal message” to

Saddam Hussain that Bush Administration wanted to inculcate “good relations” with

Baghdad.262

A large number of scholars extended the argument that the US and her Western

allies gave great amount of aid to Saddam Hussain which enabled him to build a

257 Alan Friedman. Spider’s Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq. (N.Y.: Bantam Books, 1993), 117

258 Friedman, Spider’s Web, 157259 James Mann. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. (New York: Viking,

2004), 183260 Miron Rezun. Saddam Hussein’s Gulf Wars. (Westport: Praeger, 1992), 587261 Bob Woodward. The Commanders. (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 211262 Friedman, Spider’s Web, 166

104

“formidable military” capacity.263 When Senator Caliborne Pell introduced (1988)

Prevention of Genocide Act to put pressure on Iraq in the backdrop of Iraq’s use of

chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds, President Reagan “killed” the move. Galbraith264,

Stephen Zunes265, and Noam Chomsky266 extended the opinion that the US-Iraq policy

during 1980’s, could safely be termed as “policy of appeasement”. This policy of

appeasement since Iranian Revolution in 1979, combined with American stated neutrality

in Iraq-Kuwait border dispute perhaps misled Saddam Hussain to go for an invasion of

Kuwait on August 2, 1990. By occupying and annexing Kuwait Saddam was now master

of about “20% of world’s oil reserves”.

Scholars had been sharply divided on the issue as to why America did not stop

Saddam Hussain’s invasion of Kuwait. One group of scholars argued that President Bush

did not really believe that Saddam Hussain would invade and occupy Kuwait,

notwithstanding the US vital interests in the region. They further argued that Saddam

Hussain, on his part did not believe that President Bush would stop him if he decided to

invade Kuwait. Both misconceived each other. But once Saddam Hussain did that

President Bush could not tolerate the ownership of Iraq of about “20% of global oil

reserves” and threaten K.S.A. Saddam “must go”.

Other group of scholars argued that Saddam Hussain was “intrigued into

invading” Kuwait. This would provide a “lame pretext” to remove Saddam Hussain from

power. Furthermore, this would provide an excuse to the US for a significant increase in

US military presence in the Persian Gulf. Whatever might be the case, once Saddam

Hussain invaded and occupied Kuwait, President Bush, for multiple reasons, used it as an

“excuse of war” and established greater military presence in the Middle East. Saddam

Hussain had “outlived his usefulness for America” and now he must be stopped. In

January 1991, just a day before the US declaration of war on Iraq, President Bush senior

signed NSA (National Security Directive) 54. The NSA-54 directive argued about the

vital US interests in the region. It wrote that America had “two vital interests” in the

263 See Mark Phythian, and Nikos Passas. Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine. (Boston: Northeastern Univ. Press, 1996)

264 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 25265 Zunes, Tinderbox, 75266 Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, 111-112, 141

105

region, access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of US friendly states. The US was

“committed to defend” both of them.267

Here arose a formidable question. Why did President Bush Sr. leave Saddam

Hussain in power after he was defeated in the First Gulf War? Perhaps the answer had

been that President Bush Sr. firmly but erroneously believed that Saddam Hussain, after

his defeat would be “dislodged from power” by domestic pressure. The White House

instructed CIA to do the job and look for an alternative leader. President Bush Sr. did not

want to do that directly because he feared that K.S.A. would not approve it. The “real

factor was Iran”.268 Dick Cheney, the defense secretary of Bush Sr. reasoned in April

1991, Iraq would have plunged into civil war after Saddam’s defeat, and it was

undesirable to engage US military forces into such a quagmire.269 The UN mandate was

the expulsion of Iraqi military forces from Iraq and not occupation of the country. If

occupied, Iraq might have become American responsibility.270

3.4 Fourth Phase (August 1990 - March 2003):Saddam Hussain invaded and occupied his weak neighbor Kuwait on August 2, 1990.

The US, KSA and Kuwait’s policy of backing Saddam Hussain against Iran during

1980’s had backfired and ended in a political disaster. Saddam Hussain misunderstood

that the major US concern in the Persian Gulf was Iran and that the US was his ally

against Iran. President Bush Senior believed that it was the question of “US vital

interests” and credibility, both to the US friends and allies alike, in the region. During

1980s, Washington had “promoted Iraq as a counterweight to Iran” in the region. Now

the US military action against Iraq created “political vacuum” in the Persian Gulf to be

filled in by Iran. The US policy had met a “disastrous failure” in the Persian Gulf.271

The real aim of Saddam Hussain to invade Kuwait was to make Iraq “dominant

power” in the Persian Gulf region.272 The United Nations Security Council immediately

condemned the invasion and demanded withdrawal through its resolution 660. The

267 Robert Bryce. Cronies: Oil, the Bushes, and the Rise of Texas, America's Superstate. Public Affairs, 2004: 161-162

268 Mann, Rise of Vulcans, 192269 Christian Parenti. The Freedom: Shadows and Hallucinations in Occupied Iraq. (N.Y.: New

Press, 2004), 15270 Mann, Rise of Vulcans, 190271 Kolko, Age of War, 65272 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 361

106

UNSC resolution 660 also imposed “economic sanctions” against Iraq. Under the US

leadership, on November 29, 1990, the UNSC passed important resolution 678 in which

the UNSC authorized to use “all necessary means” to expel Iraqi military forces from

Kuwait and restore Kuwait’s independent and sovereign position.

In this regard, the deadline given to Saddam Hussain for withdrawal from Kuwait

was January 15, 1991. President George Bush (Sr.) was not ready to give any concession

to Saddam Hussain whatsoever. The US President assembled a “37-nations formidable

international military coalition” to perform this task.273 Under the code name “Operation

Desert Storm”, Iraqi forces were quickly defeated by the international coalition. The

defeated Iraqi military forces pulled out from Kuwait in a great panic, suffering heavy

losses. Iraq lost about 150,000 soldiers. Thousands of retreating soldiers were mercilessly

slaughtered as they tried to escape northward. American killers named it as a “turkey

shoot”.274

Iraq’s infrastructure was totally destroyed in what was known as the “heaviest

bombing” campaign in the history of war, man had ever seen. It was a “deliberate

destruction” of Iraq’s industrial base.275 Kuwait was liberated but coalition forces did not

occupy Iraq. The coalition forces did not even advance into the heartland of Iraq after its

defeat.276 The First Gulf War (of 1991) ended with the UNSC ceasefire resolution 687

after the war. The Security Council ordered the destruction of Iraq’s WMDs, and any

facility if any, to produce them.277

Due to certain reasons the UN efforts to finish the task of disarmament of Iraq

remained unfinished. The reasons could be found on both sides- the aggressive US way

of finishing the job and Saddam Hussain’s delaying tactics. Whosoever was responsible

would be discussed in the next chapter. Richard Butler, the head of UN disarmament

inspection team left Iraq and reported back to the UNSC at the end of 1998. His

273 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 361274 Jensen, Jon A. The Effect of Operational Deployments on Army Reserve Component Attrition

Rates and Its Strategic Implications. Army Command and General Staff Coll. Fort Leavenworth KS School of Advanced Military Studies, (2002)

275 Gellman, Barton. “Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq.” Washington Post. (1991)276 Colin Powell. My American Journey. (N.Y.: Ballantine, 1995), 508277 David Cortright, and George A. Lopez. The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the

1990s. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 42

107

conclusion was that Iraq had not fully cooperated and in the “absence of full cooperation”

the mission was unable to perform the task mandated by UNSC.278

Finally, it was in November 2002, the UNSC passed a fresh Resolution 1441, in

which Iraq was strongly criticized for its “non-compliance” and demanded that the UN

weapons inspectors be allowed to return to Iraq and perform the unfinished agenda of

disarmament of Iraq.279 No sooner Iraq was defeated in 1991 than the US, UK, and

France unilaterally established two “no-fly zones” in Kurdish north and Shia South. Just

after the end of First Gulf War both Kurds Shias in Iraq rose in rebellion against Saddam

Hussain’s regime. They were encouraged by the US President in a worldwide VOA

broadcast to rise in rebellion against Saddam Hussain. However, once they did, the US

did not come to their rescue and Saddam Hussain’s forces slaughtered them in hundreds

of thousands.280

What was the rationale? Why did the US allow Saddam Hussain to slaughter

these post-war rebellions? The answer could be found in the explanation that the Bush

Senior Administration feared that the victory of Iraqi Kurds would have greater regional

implications. It would encourage Kurdish uprising in neighbouring Turkey, a US NATO

ally. By the same token a Shia victory in the south could have serious implications for the

US allies in the Middle East in general and in the Persian Gulf in particular.281

These “no-fly zones” were not sanctioned by the UN and as such had no

precedent in international law. They were established to extend protection to the rebelled

people. They failed to achieve their objective.282 Subsequently, France did not cooperate

in the implementation of these zones. The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq were

having deadly effects. World Health Organization reported that the infant mortality rate

from 1989 to 1994 had become doubled. Just to cite one UNICEF Report, 2003 on the

State of the World’s Children. The report inter alia said that the child death rate in Iraq

over the past decade had increased from 50 to 133 per 1000 live births. The two military

278 Richard Butler. Saddam Defiant. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000), 222279 Hans Blix. Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction. (New York:

Pantheon Books, 2004), 248280 Zunes, Tinderbox, 84281 Ibid282 Zunes, Tinderbox, 86

108

analysts observed that economic sanctions imposed on Iraq might have killed more

people in Iraq than have been slain by all WMDs in human history.283

Denis Halliday and Hans Von Sponeck, the two UN diplomats and chief

humanitarian coordinators in Iraq, resigned in protest against the “genocidal” character of

the economic sanctions. Their conclusion was that the “sanctions played havoc” with the

common people in Iraq whereas at the same time the common man’s dependency on the

regime had been increased.284 The effects of the sanctions were “catastrophic” for the

common man in Iraq.

The UN reversed her Iraq policy. It established, in the year 1995, the “Oil-for-

food” Program. As usual the implementation was closely watched by US–UK

partnership. According to the UNSC Resolution 986, some humanitarian relief was

provided to the Iraqi people.285 The US was part of the UN Committee that supervised the

economic sanctions and Oil-for-Food Program. Under this program, “Billions of dollars

were being earned” by a number of US companies including Haliburton, Chevron and

Exxon Mobil.286 Actually, reported Financial Times, Halliburton, when Dick Cheney was

its CEO, did more business with Iraq by selling its oil industry products than any other

US company doing the same business.287

By 1997 Saddam Hussain, once again, had consolidated his hold over Iraq

offsetting the implications of his defeat in 1991. However, he was in “dire need” of

money. He started negotiations with non-Anglo-American companies for the

development of new oil-fields in Iraq. The new contracts went to Lukoil (Russian), China

National, Total (France), Ranger Oil (Canada) and two Indian companies and so on and

so forth. None of the “contracts was awarded” to the any US Company. This was an

intolerable situation for the US business community. Saddam Hussain was becoming

more unacceptable to the US. Disagreement among the UNSC permanent members on

the issues of sanctions and oil became intensive. Russia, France and China were on the

283 John Mueller, and Karl Mueller. "Sanctions of Mass Destruction." Foreign Affairs (1999), 43-53

284 Danis Halliday, and Hans Von Sponeck, “The Policy of Punishment”. Al-Ahram Weekly. (26 Dec. 2002)

285 Cortright and Lopez. Sanctions Decade, 37286 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 175287 Carola Hoyos. “A Discreet Way of Doing Business with Iraq”, Financial Times. November 3,

2000

109

one side while the US and UK on the other. In the year 2000, France used the words

“unnecessary and murderous” for the “no-fly-zones”. Before coming to Clinton era an

important question needed some explanation. Why did President George H.W. Bush

leave Saddam Hussain in power in Baghdad even after Saddam’s defeat in 1991?

President Bush (senior) had written a joint memoir with his National Security

Adviser, Brent Scowcroft. Scowcroft, in his part of the memoir, provided a deep insight

into the President’s thinking. He wrote that we believed a coup or a popular revolt should

have toppled Saddam. The US was mainly concerned with the maintenance of long-term

“balance of power in the Persian Gulf” region. Nobody, neither the US nor the Arab

allies, would have tolerated breakup of Iraq. Disintegration of Iraq would have led to

creating instability in the region. Both Turkey and Iran could not “accept an independent

Kurdish” state. The principle of self-determination for Kurds and Shiites alike was good.

However, the political pragmatism dissuaded the US to help the uprisings. In short

“geopolitics took precedence over humanitarian concerns”. Consequently, President

Bush decided to “keep Saddam in power.”288

On the other hand, the Bush (Sr.) Administration Principals – Bush, Scowcroft,

Powell, and Cheney had extended another argument for not toppling Saddam Hussain.

They were of the view that occupation of Baghdad would have “exceeded the mandate”

given by UNSC. The mandate was limited to the liberation of Kuwait. If we had occupied

Baghdad, we would have been bogged down there for a prolonged period of time in a

quagmire and Iraq would have become our responsibility as well.289 Saddam Hussain’s

“genocidal” character was buried under the debris of imperative of stability.290

There had been writers who were of the opinion that global system of the US

military bases [from Pacific to Azores] was primarily framed for operations in the

“Persian Gulf” region. It had been further argued that since the Carter era, the main

“American interventionist military forces” had been deployed for intervention in the

Middle East.291 The major US interest in the Persian Gulf region during the decade of

288 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 58289 Ibid, 59-60290 Thomas Friedman, “NATO Tries to Ease Security Concerns in Eastern Europe.” New York

Times. June 7, 1991 291 Noam Chomsky. Power and Terror: Post 9/11 Talks and Interview. (New York: Vanguard

Books, 2003), 162

110

1990’s was to “maintain stability” in the region to ensure the continuity of dependable oil

supplies to the world economy.292 President Bill Clinton pursued what had been called

policy of containment of Iraq. President Clinton had two basic objectives to fulfill. He

ensured that Saddam Hussain must not be able to threat his neighbors and also must not

be able to restart his pursuit of WMDs.293

It was late in the year 1991, President George H.W. Bush, authorized a CIA

program to extend “covert assistance” to the opposition in Iraq. President Clinton

continued this program. The central idea was to give support to the London based Iraqi

National Congress (INC), an umbrella organization of opposition parties of Iraq. Ahmad

Chalabi, an exiled opposition leader of Iraq was the real activist. This program of “covert

assistance to Iraqi opposition” to overthrow Saddam Hussain did not work. And Saddam

remained intact in power in Baghdad.

It was in the year 1997 that corporate America launched “USA – Engage” an anti-

sanctions pressure group. Dick Cheney, CEO of Halliburton since 1995, was the active

supporter of the USA – Engage. Interestingly, it did not disclose its membership lists.

However, it was clear from its documents that at least in the first decade of twenty first

century, Halliburton, Lockheed Martin, Bechtel and Chevron were all its members.294

Persons like Dick Cheney and alike at the USA – Engage platform were

“connived” that Saddam Hussain was not going to sign agreements/ contracts with the

“US companies” even if Iraq would be made a sanctions free country. Now what was the

way out of this unfavorable situation? The solution was to overthrow Saddam regime.295

It is to be noted that a person of the stature of Henry Kissinger supported this idea in

March 1998. America could not negotiate with the dictator. America must try, if possible,

to overthrow Saddam Hussain.296

There was an important aspect of the US Iraq policy during 1990’s. No

explanation of the US Iraq policy during this decade was complete without understanding

this aspect. The aspect was related to the activities of neoconservatives during the decade

292 Gilles Kepel. The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2004), 63

293 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 67294 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 177295 Ibid, 178296 Henry Kissinger. “Our Shilly- Shally Strategy on Saddam”, Washington Post. March 23, 1998

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of 1990’s. By the mid1990s neoconservatives had strongly advocated use of force to

overthrow Saddam Hussain from power. They believed this would “benefit Washington

and Tel Aviv” alike.297 In June 1996, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and Marc Zell, wrote

an important strategy document titled “A Clean Break” for the guidance of incoming

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The document was written for a Jerusalem institute. The document recommended

overthrow of Saddam regime in Baghdad replacing it with Hashmite monarchy, deposed

in a military coup in 1958. The new monarch would come from Hashmite family still in

power in Jordan. This would put Shia religious centre Najaf under Hashmite control. The

Shiite community of South Lebanon would be taken away from the influence of Iran and

Syria. By so doing the “geostrategic environment of Israel” would be greatly improved.

The argument traveled from Chalabi to the writers. Chalabi enjoyed good relations with

Hashmite family of Jordan. Once in power, Chalabi promised his neoconservative friends

to make peace with Israel.298

The neoconservatives launched Project for New American Century in 1997. Their

ideas were written in the mission statement of PNAC (a think tank). They advocated that

being its predominant position in global politics, America had unique role to play in

maintaining peace and security in the world. They also advocated “increased defense

spending for the US” and challenging regimes hostile to the US global interests and

political values. The signatory to the mission statement of PNAC were famous

neoconservatives, numbered twenty five, including Elliott Abrams, Dick Cheney Francis

Fukuyama, Lewis Libby, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and others.299

On January 26, 1998, neoconservatives wrote a letter to President Bill Clinton in

which they demanded Saddam’s “removal from power” in Baghdad. This was an open

letter to the President. They asked for the “use of military force” to overthrow Saddam

Hussain. The letter was signed by eighteen neoconservatives including Elliott Abrams,

Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, William Kristol, among others. The

letter was written under the auspices of PNAC.

297 Michael Elliot, and James Carney, “First Stop, Iraq”, Time. March 31, 2003 298 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 65-66299 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 4-8

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The second letter was written to the President on February 19, 1998. The letter

was written to President Clinton with the same objective and under the influence of the

Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf (CPSG). The CPSG was founded by

Richard Perle, Ann Lewis and Stephen J. Solarz (former Congressman) in 1990. Its

founding objective was lobbying for the First Gulf War. The signatories were almost the

same persons who had written the first letter. The letters called on President Clinton to

“use military forces to oust Saddam Hussain” from power.300

It was on October 31, 1998 that under the great pressure by PNAC, CPSG and

others (neoconservatives), Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act. The Act called on

President Clinton to use force to topple Saddam regime in Iraq replacing it with a

democratic government.301 The regime change in Iraq became the “official policy of the

US” since October 1998. Under this act the US government allocated $97 million to Iraqi

opposition parties committed to the overthrow of the dictator. The main group they had in

mind was the INC headed by Ahmad Chalabi. President Clinton held a low view of

Chalabi and did little to enforce the act. President Clinton did not use force to topple

Saddam Hussain from power.302 However, the neoconservatives succeeded in making

regime change in Iraq an official US goal.

Then came the turn of President George W. Bush Jr., the neoconservatives occupied

important positions in the George W. Bush Administration, still they were unable to

convince the President to use force to overthrow Saddam Hussain. Actually, they were

losing the ground to overthrow Saddam regime in the beginning of his term.303 The two

principals of the Administration, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz wanted to topple Saddam

regime from power. They had promised that in pre-election campaign.

There had been a sharp controversy among scholars and political authors alike on

the issue whether President George W. Bush (Jr.) and his Vice President Dick Cheney,

had decided to invade Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussain from power as soon as they

took the oath. The basis of this controversy could be found in the two important books

published in 2004–Richard Clarke’s Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on

300 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 243-244301 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 243-244302 Robert Litwak. Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy. (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson

Centre Press, 2000) 303 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 41

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Terror and Ron Suskind’s The Price of Loyalty. The two authors floated the view that

President George W. Bush had decided to “invade Iraq from the moment he took oath” of

the President. This view was wrong and did not withstand the test of empirical

verification before the sorry incident of 9/11.

However, this must be understood that President George W. Bush, during his

election campaign in 2000, never promised or advocated the use of force against Saddam

Hussain. That was what President Bush Jr. made clear in his interview to Bob

Woodward. He categorically said that he was not thinking about using force against

Saddam Hussain before 9/11.304 It had been on record that his principal foreign policy

adviser in the election campaign of 2000, Condoleezza Rice, wrote an important article in

Foreign Affairs in the early months of 2000 arguing that the US had “no problems with

nuclear Iraq”. The US could accept Iraq armed with nukes. Saddam’s nukes would be

“unusable” because any attempt on the part of Saddam to use them meant “total

annihilation” of Iraq.305

Dick Cheney, the Vice President had advocated throughout 1990’s that invasion

and occupation of Iraq would be a “strategic blunder”. He did not sign either of the two

letters sent to President Clinton in 1998 for using force against Saddam Hussain. In the

election campaign of 2000, Cheney defended the 1991 Bush Sr. Administration’s

decision not to occupy Baghdad. In the Bush Sr. Administration, Mr. Dick Cheney was a

defense minister and he played an important role in making that decision.306 It could

safely be argued that there was “no empirical evidence” to suggest that President Bush

had decided to take military action against Saddam Hussain before 9/11. Before 9/11, the

neoconservatives were largely alone and had no active support in the US.307

The neoconservatives needed an opportunity to implement, if possible, their world

view. 9/11 was a “turning point” and provided neoconservatives with a golden

opportunity to drive forward. President Bush was a different man now. Three neocons-

304 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 12305 Condoleezza Rice. “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 79, no 1, (January/

February, 2000), 60-62306 Elliott and Carney, Stop Iraq307 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 245

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Scooter Libby, Paul Wolfowitz and Bernard Lewis played pivotal role in changing the

minds of the President and Vice President to go for an invasion of Iraq.308

Woodward had written an interesting story about Wolfowitz in his Plan of Attack.

Wolfowitz had been consistently advocating to the President about invading Iraq since

9/11, notwithstanding the lack of piece of evidence about Saddam’s “involvement” in

9/11.309 Now, invasion of Iraq was a “foregone conclusion” and it was on November 21,

2001 that the President ordered US military Generals to develop “concrete plans for the

US military invasion” of Iraq.310. It had been part of the historical record that Dick

Cheney, the Vice President “convinced” the President by early 2002 that America would

use force to overthrow Saddam regime from power in Baghdad. There was no alternative

to that.311

After 9/11, the neoconservatives lost no time in making a case that military

invasion of Iraq was an essential condition of winning the war against terror. On

September 20, they (12 signatories) wrote a letter to the President asking him for invasion

of Iraq. It was on September 28, a well-known neocon, Charles Krauthammer, reasoned

that after Afghanistan, Syria would be the next target to be followed by Iran and Iraq turn

by turn. The central theme of Charles Krauthamer’s article was that the “war against

terror would end in Baghdad” and nowhere else. He argued that Saddam was the most

dangerous absolutist ruler.312

In the coming months till March 2003, the neoconservatives waged an “unending

campaign in favor of war” against Saddam. In April 2002, the neoconservatives wrote

still another open letter to the President for invading Iraq. The letter reasoned that the

“US and Israel” were fighting the same war against the “same common enemy”. For

moral and strategic rationale the US must stand with the Jewish state of Israel in this war

on terror. The letter was signed by a large number of prominent neoconservatives.

The case for Iraq war was strongly advocated in 2002 by Kenneth Pollack’s

important book in which he argued for a “preventive war” against Iraq as the only

308 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 38309 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 25-26310 Ibid311 Ibid, 27-30312 Charles Krauthammer. “The War: A Road Map”, Washington Post. September 28, 2001

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realistic option to oust Saddam from power.313 Notwithstanding much dissimilarity, the

US war hawks were comparing “Hitler with Saddam” and opponents of war as

“appeasers” like Chamberlain. It was interesting to quote a columnist from the New York

Times. The columnist argued that Iraq was the “center of world terror.”314

There was another thread of the story which needed explanation. The Committee

for the Liberation of Iraq, established in 2002 was only an extension of the PNAC. The

founding objective of the CLI was to “replace Saddam regime with a democratic set” up

in Baghdad. The CLI claimed that Saddam regime had made and assembled WMDs.

George Shultz, Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of State was an important member of the CLI.

George Shultz in September 2002 wrote an important essay wherein he argued that

Saddam Hussain was an imminent danger and recommended to the Bush Administration

that he must be overthrown immediately. His main argument was that Saddam Hussain

had “acquired WMD” and posed an immediate threat to the US security and had links

with the international terrorists.315

It seemed interesting to note that war hawks “manipulated the intelligence” to

achieve their objective of painting Saddam regime as an immediate threat to the US

national security. Scooter Libby, a war hawk and neoconservative and an official of the

Bush Administration was the “central figure” to play this role.316 The story unfolded that

Israeli intelligence played a hidden role in convincing Paul Wolfowitz not to trust in CIA.

Ahmad Chalabi was trustworthy for this purpose. Intelligence reports were “maneuvered”

and President Bush was provided with alarming information on Iraq.317

Actually, the neoconservatives, both in the White House and Pentagon, depended

on Ahmad Chalabi and his INC for intelligence gathering about Iraq and promoted him as

a “new leader of Iraq” after Saddam’s ouster from power. However, today the world

knew the fact that Ahmad Chalabi disseminated, might be intentionally, “false

information” to the US.318 There is an important question here that why did the neocons

313 Kenneth M. Pollack. The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq. (N.Y.: Random House, 2002)

314 William Safire. “Saddam and Terror”, New York Times. August 22, 2002315 George Shultz. “Act Now”, Washington Post. September 7, 2002316 James Bamford. A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence

Agencies. (N.Y.: Doubleday, 2004)317 Julian Borger. “The Spies Who Pushed for War”, Guardian. July 17, 2003318 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 252

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trust in Chalabi? A person like Max Singer, related to Hudson Institute, described

Chalabi as a rare found deeply related to the Arab world. Chalabi was a “Westernized”

man having close links with the West. That was why Chalabi should replace Saddam

Hussain after the ouster of the latter from power.319

In reciprocity, Ahmad Chalabi pledged, once he would be installed in power in

Baghdad, he would establish good diplomatic relationship with Tel Aviv. He also

promised to reconstruct the “oil pipeline” as a good will gesture and a proof of his

commitment, from Haifa (Israel) to Mosul (Iraq) as the beginning of a “new era” in Arab

– Israeli relationship.320 Both for Israel and America the fulfillment of these

commitments, if possible, would be a welcome development.321

Before closing this chapter, I would like to give the last testimony of a person not

less than the stature of George Tenet, director of the CIA at the time of 9/11. He testified

that it was just eighteen hours after 9/11 incident, he happened to see Richard Perle in the

White House. Richard Perle was head of Defense Policy Board and a godfather of

neoconservatives, passed by him and then suddenly turned back and said that Iraq would

have to “pay the price” for 9/11 happening. Saddam was “responsible”. George Tenet

wrote that he was stunned by these remarks. In his final conclusion, Tenet testified that

“intelligence” then and now, showed no empirical evidence of Saddam Hussain’s

“involvement” in the happenings of 9/11.322 The CIA never found any link whatsoever

between Saddam Hussain and 9/11.323

As had already been written that 9/11 played the central role in changing the mind

of the President and the Vice President. 9/11 provided them with the golden opportunity

to use force for “regime change” in Iraq. Afghanistan war delayed the invasion of Iraq

but it was a settled fact. President George W. Bush made it clear beyond any doubt in his

January 29, 2002 State of the Union Address. He used the much cited “Axis of Evil”

phrase for North Korea, Iran and Iraq. He said in unequivocal terms that he could not

wait for the events “while dangers gather”. He further declared that these “axis of evil”

states were actively “seeking WMD” and were presenting an ever-growing danger to the

319 Bernard Lewis. “Put the Iraqis in Charge”, Wall Street Journal. August 29, 2003320 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 252321 Bamford, Pretext For War, 293322 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, xix-xx323 Ibid, 341

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peace of the world. This State of the Union Address decided the “fate” of Iraq. The

speech was about Iraq, commented Charles Krauthammer, a neoconservative columnist

for the Washington Post.324

In April 2002, President Bush while talking to a British reporter Trevor

McDonald in Crawford said that he had finally decided “Saddam needs to go... The

policy of my government is that he goes.”325 Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld

all followed the line of the President in their speeches and interviews thereafter. It was on

September 19, 2002, while talking to the House members the President said that Saddam

Hussain and his WMD were the most dangerous threat. Saddam could “burn Israel”. This

would, in turn, degenerate into a world conflict.326 It was in October 2002, both the House

and the Senate “authorized” the President to “use force” against Iraq. Finally, America

invaded Iraq in March 2003 under the pretext of WMD. However, after the war was over

and Saddam defeated, as was expected, nothing was found in Iraq as WMD.

To begin with, in the early phase the US predominantly was an isolationist power

having little political, strategic or ideological interest overseas. During this period

Mesopotamia had been a province of Ottoman Empire since 1534. The term Middle East,

as the region came to be known, was coined by an American in the first decade of the 20th

century. During the early phase, the US relationship with the Middle East was determined

by the nature of the over-all US relationship with the Ottoman Empire. The US

interaction with the region mainly was restricted to the philanthropic activity followed by

some bilateral trade. The first challenge to the US economic interests in the region came

from “Barbary” pirates. America resorted to the use of her military forces to protect her

economic interests in the region against these pirates in what was known as “Barbary

Wars”. The pirates were eliminated once for all. It was the first use of US military forces

in the region.

The second phase of US policy toward the Middle East was important in the sense

that it was during this phase that important developments happened both in the US as

well as in the Middle East. The US became a global power and with it her interests as

well. A number of new countries created in the Middle East in the aftermath of WWI & II

324 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 92-95325 Ibid, 119326 Ibid, 186

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especially KSA, Kuwait, Iraq and Israel. Oil was discovered in the region in the first

decade of the 20th century. Oil was known as the lifeblood of modern industrial societies.

The discovery of oil intensified the major power’s rivalry for supremacy in the region.

The creation of Iraq by the British was heavily shaped by the fact of presence of oil in the

country. Iraq contained, and still it did, the second largest oil reserves in the region.

Owing to its geostrategic importance and oil wealth the Middle East became a

major theatre of Cold War politics. During this phase, the US replaced Britain as a new

Western imperial power and successfully checked Soviet penetration in the region.

Without any doubt, the US rose to the position of primacy in the region with expanded

military and political role. The US started providing unflinching support to Israel after

1967 Arab – Israeli war.

Another aspect of the US policy was to provide support to the oil rich

authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Stability got precedence over other

considerations in the Middle East. The US Iraq policy was conducted in the broader

aspects of regional developments, oil flow and cold war rivalries etc. During this period

(1900 to 1979), especially in the post-World War II era, the US Iraq policy had certain

distinct features. They included the CIA’s involvement in the 1963 and 1968 coups in

Iraq, and simultaneously its establishment of secret relations with Saddam Hussain

starting in the late 1950’s.

After Iranian Revolution in 1979, the US Iraq policy was heavily shaped by two

factors. The major US policy goals were the containment of Iran through Saddam

Hussain and courting Iraqi oil. Immediately, after the revolution in Tehran, the US

established close relations with Saddam Hussain and removed Iraq from the US list of

terrorist states. The US wanted to make Iraq a new Iran. The entire West under the US

leadership supported Iraq during the eight year Iran – Iraq war.

They provided Saddam with every thing ranging from political support to “dual-

use” technology. So much so, America turned a blind eye to the Saddam Hussain’s

human rights violations and use of chemical weapons first against Iranian forces and then

against his own Kurdish population. America helped Saddam Hussain to develop one of

the most formidable military forces in the Persian Gulf region. The overall US policy

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toward Iraq during 1980s could safely be categorized as policy of appeasement

particularly in the backdrop of containment of Iran.

The last phase of US Iraq policy in historical perspective ended with the US

invasion of Iraq in 2003. We should understand the context of US-Iraq policy during

1990s. The new context came from four sources–Mackinder theory, rise of

neoconservative movement in America in 1990s, end of the Cold War and disintegration

of the USSR, unipolarity, and major power behavior in world politics (offensive realism).

Saddam Hussain’s conquest and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990, initiated a

new era of US-Iraq policy. It triggered immediate US response and degenerated into First

Gulf War under the UN mandate. The UN forces under the US leadership defeated and

expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The US with the support of her two European allies

created and administered two “no-fly zones” in Iraq. However, the US did not protect the

rebels – Kurds and Shias, from the aggressive backlash of Saddam regime.

America exploited this whole affair to justify her expanded military presence in

the Persian Gulf region. Throughout 1990s, the UN sanctions did not work properly.

Meanwhile, there was a rise in the neoconservative activity in America in 1990s. The

neoconservatives wanted to “reshape the critical regions” of the world, most importantly

the Middle East, according to the “US interests and values”. However, regime change in

Iraq had become an official US policy since 1998.

The US policy towards the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions in 20th century in

general and towards Iraq during the last four decades was not without debits. Most

importantly, it had generated intolerance, extremism, and anti-Americanism in the

Persian Gulf region in particular. The anti-Americanism in the Middle East culminated

into 9/11 and provided President George W. Bush with a golden opportunity to enforce

his agenda, according to the assumptions of offensive realist model, starting from regime

change in Iraq, without UN mandate. The rationale for the preemptive and unilateral

military invasion of Iraq in March 2003 had been constantly debated since the invasion

among politicians and scholars throughout the world. There had been a sharp controversy

among them on the rationale of the invasion. The US unilaterally, ignoring UN and

important NATO and Arab allies, invaded Iraq under false pretexts. This constituted the

topic of the next chapter.

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Chapter Four

US Invasion under False PretextsIn this chapter the basic argument was in line with the logic of offensive realism

involving lying and cheating on the part of Bush Administration. This chapter is an

important part of this study. There is an established principle of offensive realism that

great powers, in their pursuit of power maximization and hegemony within the system,

cheat and lie. The theme of this chapter was that the declared objectives of the US

unilateral and pre-emptive invasion of Iraq in 2003 did not withstand the test of empirical

verifiability. Even before the invasion took place, the rationale of the invasion was

questioned by a large number of world renowned scholars. After the invasion, it was

established that the declared causes of the war were used as a mere pretext as a sellout

case of the war. In the subsequent investigations by the different US commissions, all the

three declared objectives were discredited. Through an intense propaganda campaign, the

American peoples were misled into believing that the Saddam regime possessed WMD.

This type of great power behavior involving cheating and lying closely fitted the theory

of offensive realism. The US invaded Iraq under “false pretexts”. Later on, in an

interview, Paul Wolfowitz provided the testimony.

The basic question was that why did the US invade Iraq in March 2003? George

Packer in The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq wrote that “it still isn’t possible to be

sure, and this remains the most remarkable thing about the Iraq War”. Interestingly,

Packer quotes Richard Haas, the director of policy planning in the State Department

when America invaded Iraq, saying that he would “go to his grave not knowing the

answer.”327 George Tenet, the CIA Director when the US invaded Iraq, writes in his

memoirs that “one of the great mysteries to me is when the war in Iraq became

inevitable.”328

The uncertainty of George Packer, Richard Haas and, George Tenet was

understandable because the use of military force to overthrow Saddam Hussain in March 327 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 46328 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 301

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2003 seemed difficult even today in 2016. It was beyond any doubt that he was an

absolutist dictator with dangerous ambitions. His ambitions included a deep desire to

acquire WMD. But the world knew that his military forces had been destroyed in the First

Gulf War in 1991. He was further weakened by a decade of UN sanctions. After the First

Gulf War, the tough UN inspections deprived Iraq of its nuclear program and forced

Saddam Hussain to destroy his “biological and chemical weapons” as well.329 At the time

of 9/11, Osama bin Laden was in Afghanistan under the protection of Taliban regime and

not in Iraq. After 9/11 happening, instead of focusing solely on al-Qaeda, President Bush

opted for a unilateral invasion of Iraq, already a thoroughly decaying country that had no

links with 9/11 tragedy. If we approached the US decision of invasion of Iraq from this

angle it was puzzling.330

Militarily, America was unchallengeable and could overthrow Saddam Hussain, if

it did choose. For America, it was a period of great shock and American leaders feared

that what would happen if terrorists might obtain WMD. In short, the US military was

very powerful and deeply apprehensive and fearful about its national security. It was a

fearful combination. However, war hawks had been demanding ouster of Saddam

Hussain since 1998. The Bush Administration exploited the opportunity provided by the

9/11 and took the step. It was under these circumstances that the US went to war against

Saddam’s Iraq in 2003. The war hawks believed that removal of Saddam Hussain from

corridors of power in Iraq would benefit “America and Israel” alike and would also

improve their strategic position in the region. The war hawks in the Administration, also

believed that ousting Saddam Hussain would force other “rogue states” to change their

behavior as they would be convinced that America was too powerful to be challenged.331

Since then, the rationale of the Iraq war had been hotly debated not only among

scholars and politicians alike over the world but also among American people. A number

of reasons had been put forward which contributed in making the US decision to go to

war on Iraq in March, 2003. Critical evaluation of all the three stated causes of invasion

followed, one by one. President George W. Bush cited three major reasons for the US

unilateral and preemptive invasion of Iraq in 2003. They included the threat from Saddam

329 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 380330 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 220331 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 230

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Hussain’s WMDs, terrorist coalition between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and promotion of

democracy in Iraq. Combining the first two reasons together, what would be the result if

Iraq were to secretly supply WMD to its terrorist ally al-Qaeda? While talking to the

United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002, President George W. Bush

said that under such a situation 9/11 seemed “a prelude to far greater horrors.”332

4.1 Al-Qaeda-Iraq Terror Link:The Bush Administration repeatedly claimed that al-Qaeda had close and

operational links with Saddam Hussain and 9/11 was the result of that close complicity

between them. The President said “that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb

making and poisons and gasses.”333 The President talking to Richard Clarke on

September 12, 2001 said: “…see if Saddam was involved. I want to know any shred …”

The President further said, “…look into Iraq, Saddam… The President said testily and

left us.”334

On September 26, 2002 while talking to 18 House members in the Cabinet Room

at the Saddam’s links with al-Qaeda the President said, “Saddam Hussain is a terrible guy

who is teaming up with al-Qaeda…”335 While making an indirect reference to Saddam-al-

Qaeda coalition, President George W. Bush on September 20, 2001 in his address to the

joint session of Congress remarked, “Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and

every government that supports them”. He further declared “and we will pursue nations

that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.”336

In the final days of run-up to Iraq war, two high profile cases facilitated the US

decision establishing a possible linkage between 9/11 and Iraq. In the first case it was

alleged that one of the 9/11 hijackers, Muhammad Atta, met with Ahmad Khalil al-Ani,

an official from Iraqi intelligence in Prague. The accused meeting took place few months

before 9/11 happening. The second case was related to Shakir, an Iraqi citizen who

worked at the Kuala Lumpur airport. He worked as a facilitator for Arab nationals. He

got this job with the help of an employee of Iraqi Embassy. It was alleged that Shakir

332 George W. Bush. “Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly”, September 12, 2002333 George W. Bush. “Remarks on Iraq at Cincinnati Museum Center –Cincinnati Union Terminal,

Cincinnati, Ohio”, October 7, 2002334 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 32335 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 188336 George W. Bush. “Address to Joint Session of Congress”, September 20, 2001

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helped Khalid al-Mihdhar in January 2000 to escape through the airport.337 The Saddam-

al-Qaeda connection controversy continued even well after the US invasion of Iraq in

2003. Now critical evaluation of the alleged al-Qaeda-Saddam connection leading to 9/11

followed.

4.1.1 Critical Analysis:

The CIA produced a paper on the subject in June, 2002 titled, Iraq and al-Qa’ida:

Interpreting a Murky Relationship. The regional analysts of the CIA who focused on the

Middle East and Persian Gulf believed that there was a “fundamental ideological distrust”

between Saddam Hussain and al-Qaida Chief, Usama bin Ladin. Saddam feared the

potential danger of Islamic extremism to Iraq. They concluded in unequivocal terms that

there was no “conclusive proof of Iraq-al-Qaida complicity” leading to 9/11. The CIA

published its second paper on Iraq-al-Qaida linkage in September 2002. The second

paper was revised by CIA by December the same year and titled Iraqi support of

Terrorism. The paper was sent to the White House. From the White House, Scooter

Libby, asked CIA for more revisions or withdrew the paper. The CIA’s response to

Scooter Libby’s pressure was no. Jami Miscik categorically refused to make more

revisions and stood firm, wrote George Tenet in his memoirs. Jami Miscik did not write

anything not supported by “intelligence evidence”. Jami threatened to resign rather than

“succumbing to pressure” for any more revision of the report from Steve Hadley from the

NSC. On this situation, George Tenet himself intervened and made it clear to Steve

Hadley that the paper had been done and that there could be no more changes in it. The

second paper supported the conclusion of the first paper.338

Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, a senior al-Qa’ida operative arrieved in Baghdad in May,

2002 for supervising camps in northern Iraq run by Ansar al-Islam. Ansar-al-Islam, a

radical Kursidh militant organization, had close links with al-Qa’ida. Both organizations

in collaboration had established a safe haven for al-Qaida in 2000 in northeastern Iraq.

The area was not under Saddam regime control. The rationale for establishing this safe

haven for al-Qaida could be found in the possible exit of the organization after its loss of

sanctuary in Afghanistan. The camps became a hub for al-Qaida activity after the US

attack on Afghanistan. George Tenet was of the opinion that Zarqawi’s presence in 337 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 355338 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 344-350

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northeastern Iraq was not a sufficient proof of Iraqi complicity with al-Qaida. However,

the area was not under Saddam regime control. Tenet wrote that Iraqi government did not

even know about the presence of these terrorists in Baghdad. Baghdad had “no control

over Zarqawi” whatsoever.339

A senior al-Qaida prisoner told CIA in 2002 that Bin Ladin would not make an

alliance with Saddam Hussain. If he did, it would amount to making “compromise” on al-

Qaida’s “mission and independence”. Saddam Hussain showed interest in al-Qaida, if

any, only after the incidents of East Africa and Cole bombings. By then, al-Qaida had

been well established in “Afghanistan sanctuary”. Another senior al-Qaida operative, ibn

Sheikh al-Libi told CIA, his captor in 2001, that between 1997 and 2000 al-Qaida sent

Muhammad Atef and Abu Abdullah three times to Iraq to get training in poisons and

mustard gas. George Tenet was of the opinion that “al-Libi lied in order to get human

treatment and to avoid physical torture.”340

There was another high profile case in late 2001. It was alleged that Muhammad

Atta, one of the hijackers of 9/11, had met Ahmad Khalil al-Ani, an Iraqi intelligence

personnel in Prague in 2001 before 9/11 happenings. The CIA never found any “reliable

evidence” that the visit was actually made. Both CIA and FBI concluded that such an

alleged meeting in Prague was unlikely. The meetings did not happen. A second possible

connection between 9/11 and Saddam regime was related to Shakir, an Iraqi national,

working at Kuala Lumpur airport as facilitator for Arab tourists. Shakir, it was alleged,

helped Khalid al-Mihdhar, a 9/11 hijacker, to escort through the airport in January 2001.

Shakir left the airport after one week. Despite its exhaustive work, CIA failed to

prove that he was an Iraqi agent. Then the US invaded Iraq in March, 2003. The invasion

was followed by an exhaustive search to find the Iraq-al-Qaida linkage. CIA worked with

other US secret services and “checked and rechecked the Iraq intelligence documents”

and interviewed former Iraqi intelligence personnel. Interestingly, the documents that

were supposedly produced during the 1990’s were found to be forgeries. And the former

Iraqi intelligence personnel also did not confirm and authenticated the documents.341

339 Ibid, 351340 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 353341 Ibid, 356

125

The best source of information about Iraq-al-Qaida complicity leading to 9/11

was a paper produced by the CIA in January 2003 as the final NIE on the subject. The

paper concluded with the remarks that Iraq had no “authority, direction, or control over

al-Qaida.”342 George Tenet was of the opinion that he was “misquoted” by the Bush

Administration officials. In his final conclusion, George Tenet, the CIA Chief at the time

of 9/11 and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003, wrote that “let me say

it again: CIA found absolutely no linkage between Saddam and 9/11.”343

On the issue of Iraq-al-Qa’ida complicity leading to 9/11, Ron Suskind gave the

following version. In order to prove this operational link between al-Qaida and Iraqi

regime, the White House concocted a fake letter backdated to July 2001. The letter said

that Atta Muhammad, a senior al-Qaida operative, was actually trained in Iraq to

implement the mission which culminated into 9/11. The letter finally was meant to

establish secret operational connection between Iraq and al-Qaida. Dick Cheney, the US

Vice President, was leading the whole movement to justify the US invasion of Iraq. The

idea was to take the letter to Habbush, the Chief of Iraqi intelligence the Mukhabarat

since 1999. He would write the letter in his own handwriting on a paper taken out of Iraqi

official stationery.

Then the CIA would transport the letter to Baghdad and had it released to the

media through some trusted hand. The Vice President’s office played the central role in

this concocted story. Ron Suskind cited Rob Richer the head of CIA’s Near East Division

and unfolded the whole story. Richer narrated the whole story. The important figures who

played central role in this fake letter story were Rob Richer, Michael Shippter, the

Mideast intelligence chief for SIS, British intelligence, Saad Khayr, the chief of GID,

Jordan’s intelligence, Habbush, Maguire, the Chief of CIA’s Baghdad station, George

Tenet, the Vice President’s office and the White House.

The other figures in this long story were Con Coughlin, a journalist, and Ayad

Allawi, the Iraqi exile and destined to become post-Saddam Iraq’s first head of

government. Con Coughlin had written extensively on Saddam regime and his WMD

program. The letter was silently shipped to Con Coughlin by a trusted official from

Allawi. The Daily Telegraph published the whole story of “the letter with authenticity” 342 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 358343 Ibid, 341

126

on 14 December, 2003. Interestingly, on the same day, a few hours later, even more

important and bigger news exploded. The news was of the capture of Saddam Hussain.

Looking back, Richer said, “It’s called lying”, wrote Suskind.344 The letter, among other

things, related a concocted story and clandestine operational linkage between Mohammad

Atta, al-Qa’ida and Saddam Hussain.345

On September 14, 2001, the principals of Bush Administration met at Camp

David to discuss about the first target of the US War on Terror. Cheney, Rumsfeld,

Powell, Andrew H. Card and Tenet agreed not to make Iraq as the first target. Paul

Wolfowitz disagreed with them and insisted on making Iraq the first target. On the very

next day President Bush told Rice that Iraq would not be the first target. Iraq was being

put off. But eventually we would have to return to Iraq.346 Brent Scowcroft, President

Bush (Senior’s) national security adviser and a towering figure in the US intellectual and

political circles wrote on August 15, 2002 in the Wall Street Journal titled, “Don’t Attack

Iraq”. Scowcroft was disturbed to see that Cheney and Rumsfeld were so “focused” on

Iraq. He argued, among other things, that Saddam Hussain had “no links with terrorist

organization al-Qaida and was not involved” in 9/11 happenings.347

Senator Bob Graham was critical of Iraq war. He was of the opinion that Iraq War

was one of the most intriguing mistakes of the US foreign policy in post WW-II era.348

Karl Rove also shared the same opinion, wrote Woodward. There were deep-rooted

ideological differences between Saddam Hussain and al-Qaida. Saddam Hussain was

“secular and nationalist” while bin Laden deeply religious and believed in the

“universality of Islamic faith” and rated Saddam’s regime as “corrupt” one. By making

an alliance with al-Qaida Saddam Hussain would have put his fate in Bin Laden’s hands.

The politicized US intelligence could not produce even a shred of empirical evidence

linking al-Qaida with Iraq that could have been accepted as a proof. There was nothing to

establish that Mohammad Atta ever visited Prague.349

344 Suskind, Way of the World, 361-380345 Ibid, 375-376346 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 25-26347 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 159-160348 Ibid, 427349 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 79-80

127

The key players of the Project for the New American Century were bent to prove

that Iraq had links with al-Qaida even if it involved “deliberate deception and lying.”350

The US war on terror was based on “false pretenses”. There was absence of any reliable

evidence linking al-Qaida with Iraq.351 There were no proven ties between al-Qaida and

Iraq.352 The Bush Administration’s charge of Iraq al-Qaida complicity leading to 9/11

remained “unsubstantiated or downright false.”353

Immediately after 9/11, President George W. Bush declared in very clear terms

that the countries that supported terrorism were enemies of the US. It was an illusion to

Iraq. The war hawks in the Administration wanted to invade Iraq first, despite the fact

that no evidence whatsoever existed of connecting fundamentalist al-Qaida with secular

Iraq.354 Muhammad Atta’s meeting with an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague was being

cited as a proof of al-Qaida-Iraq connection. However, CIA, FBI and Czech Intelligence

refuted any such meeting whatsoever.355 Turki bin Faisal, a Saudi Prince and former

Chief of Saudi intelligence, said that bin Laden viewed Saddam Hussain as an “apostate”

who was not a Muslim even.356

Fifteen out of the nineteen hijackers hailed from Saudi Arabia and none from Iraq.

Saudi Arabia had been the main financier of al-Qaida. George Tenet testified before

Congress that there was “no direct link between al-Qaida and Iraq”. There could be only

tactical cooperation between the two. Abu Nidal was murdered in Baghdad in August

2002. A 2002 CIA report indicated that Saddam Hussain intentionally avoided any

actions against the US.357 The US Department of State could not provide any proof where

Iraq sponsored any active international terrorism. It might have been a mistake for the

Bush Administration to try to establish a “collaborative operational linkage between Iraq

and al-Qaida” leading to 9/11 tragedy.358

350 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 25351 Ibid, 28352 Ibid, 41353 Ibid, 58354 Kolko, Age of War, 103355 Robert Scheer. “President Bush’s Way-the-Dog Policy on Iraq”, Los Angeles Times. May 7,

2002356 Ibid357 Zunes, Tinderbox, 98358 Shawcross, Allies, 69

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President Bush wrongly put Iraq in the context of US war on terror, despite the

fact that he had been told about the non-existence of operational links between al-Qaida

and Iraq. Iraq had no connection with 9/11 tragedy. It was rather an act of “imperial

arrogance.”359 While writing on al-Qaida–Iraq connections Mel Gurtov argued, President

George W. Bush actually misread about the Saddam-al-Qaida secret connections. He

even argued that bin Laden and his al-Qaida never really were the main American

concerns during his Presidency.360

Richard A. Clarke, one time head of counter-terrorism during Bush

Administration gave a grim picture while writing in his memoirs. America was doing

something else than getting on al-Qaida. He realized with pain that Rumsfeld and

Wolfowitz had their own agenda about Iraq. They were exploiting this “national tragedy

for their own Iraq agenda”. Since the beginning of the Bush Presidency they had been

pressing for war on Iraq.361 In fact all the branches of the US intelligence concluded that

no such ties existed between al-Qaida and Iraq. CIA was also convinced that Saddam

Hussain never handed over biological or chemical weapons to al-Qaida or other terrorist

organizations.362 An official from FBI said that we “tried hard for more than an year” to

find any presumed operational link between al-Qaida and Iraq. There was nothing like

that.363 Richard Clarke reveals an important thing about the US war on Iraq. According to

him it was a “decision which had already been made” and nothing could change it.364

Rashid Khalidi was of the opinion that in the post invasion environment it was

now an established fact beyond any doubt that there did not exist ties between Iraq and

al-Qaida.365 Immediately after 9/11, an offensive propaganda campaign was launched

against Saddam Hussain to portray him as a serious threat to the US. He was further

indicated as a party to 9/11. It was clear from the very beginning that the allegations

against Saddam Hussain “lacked credibility”. No evidence existed to prove these

359 Jonathan Steele. Defeat: Why They Lost Iraq. (New York: I.B Taurus, 2008), 255360 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 61361 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 30362 James Risen. “Terror Acts by Baghdad Have Waned, US Aides Say”, New York Times.

February 6, 2002363 James Risen, and David Johnston. “Split at CIA and F.B.I on Iraq Ties to Al Qaeda”, New York

Times. February 2, 2003364 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 265365 Khalidi, Rusurrecting Empire, ix

129

allegations.366 On the topic of al-Qaida Iraq complicity leading to 9/11, B.W. Jentleson

gave an interesting account of President Bush with Richard Clarke, his antiterrorism head

on September 12, 2001. The President asked Mr. Clarke, time and again, to find any

piece of evidence against Saddam Hussain’s links with al-Qaida…“ see if Saddam was

involved… I want to know any shred.” None of the two “compelling reasons” (WMD &

Terrorism) of War on Iraq “proved valid.”367

Interestingly, war hawks had been pressing since long for regime change in Iraq.

Paul O’ Neill, secretary of treasury during Bush Administration, gave a testimony to this

effect, that “a plan to invade Iraq” was discussed at the “first meeting” of the Bush

Administration’s principals on 30 January, 2001.368 President George W. Bush’s senior

staff members such as Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Vice President Dick Cheney,

advocated “military invasion of Iraq” just after the 9/11 happenings. Similar testimony

had also been documented by Bob Woodwind in his Bush at War. Richard A. Clarke in

his Against All Enemies gave the same testimony.369 Not surprisingly, the White House

conceded in September 2003 that Saddam Hussain was “not involved in 9/11” tragedy.370

Noam Chomsky was of the opinion that the real reasons for the invasion of Iraq had

nothing to do with the stated rationale. And it was the “oil factor not Iraq’s WMD” or

presumed links with al-Qaida.371

General Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz drew an interesting analogy. American

leaders used the Gulf of Tonkin incident to justify the US War in Vietnam. In the same

way, President George W. Bush Administration used Iraq’s presumed collaboration with

al-Qaida to justify US invasion of Iraq in 2003. America might suffer the same fate as we

did in Vietnam.372 After 9/11, there had been intensive investigation to prove, if any, Iraqi

complicity in 9/11. However, there was no hard empirical evidence to prove Iraq-al-

Qaida nexus leading to 9/11 happening.373

366 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 18-19 367 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 380368 Paul O’ Neill cited in Ron Suskind. The Price of Loyalty. (Simon and Schuster, 2013)369 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2370 Ibid, 7371 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 130-131372 Tony Zinni, and Tony Koltz. The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and

Purpose. (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 89373 Vincent M. Cannistraro. “Keep the Focus on Al Qaeda.” New York Times. December 3, 2001

130

Interestingly, Richard Crockatt had given an important piece of the charged

political environment after 9/11. He cited Richard Perle, a well known neoconservative

and assistant secretary of defense under President Reagan. Richard Perle wrote that “the

US must strike at Saddam Hussain…” because America could not “win war on terror” if

Saddam Hussain’s regime continued to reign in Baghdad.374 Richard Perle believed that

there was an operational connection between al-Qaida and Iraq. Saddam Hussain praised

9/11 attacks.375

Despite the repeated warnings from George Tenet since the beginning of Bush

Presidency that al-Qaida was a serious threat, no attention was paid on the issue. Rather

the primary focus was on Iraq. In the first NSC meeting in January 2001, Condoleezza

Rice made Iraq the total focus. The title was, “How Iraq is destabilizing the region,” and

how he could be removed. Since inauguration of President George W. Bush till 9/11,

dozens of reports and documents were produced inside the Defense and State

Departments about the possible military invasion of Saddam Hussain’s regime in

Baghdad. However, Iraq and al-Qaida were two separate and naturally hostile entities.

As cited above, Richard A. Clarke’s encounter with the President on September

12, 2001 was well known. And then came the turn of Mohammad Atta’s presumed

Prague meeting with Iraqi intelligence officials. After intense investigation George Tenet

refuted this meeting. Both FBI and CIA concluded that Atta was in “Virginia during the

period under investigation.”376 According to Dick Cheney, even if there were one percent

chances of Saddam’s involvement in 9/11, that was very low probability of Iraq’s

complicity with al-Qaida, it “must be treated as a certainty” in US reaction to 9/11.377

On June 17, 2004 President Bush insisted that there was a complicity between

Iraq and al-Qaida which led to 9/11 happenings.378 The theme of the first was also

discussed in the US. That war should be for a just cause, by a legal authority and not as a

first but last resort. The argument was evoked by the Christian leaders in the US. Bob

374 Richard Crockatt. America Embattled: September 11, anti-Americanism and the Global Order. (London: Routledge, 2003), 157

375 Richard Perle. “The US Must Strike at Saddam Hussein”, New York Times. December 29, 2001376 Ron Suskind. The One Percent Doctrine: Deep inside Americas Pursuit of Its Enemies since

9/11. (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 22-23377 Ibid, 213378 “President Discusses Economy, Iraq in Cabinet Meeting”, White House Press Release, June 17,

2004

131

Elgar, Secretary General of the National Council of Churches and a representative of 50

million American Christians, while talking on the Iraq war argued that “I do not” find it

as such a just war.379 The Iraq War of 2003 did not meet the criteria set by the UN.380

The US attacked Afghanistan, the al-Qaida sanctuary, was understandable

because there was no other way to attack al-Qaida and the Taliban regime. The Taliban

protectors of al-Qaida were not ready to handover Osama bin Laden to the US. However,

the US war on Iraq did not make it a just and “legal war under international law.”381

Gilles Kepel had given a worth reading account on the issue of Iraq al-Qaida

complicity leading to 9/11. He had cited an interview by Paul Wolfowitz after the US

invasion had occurred. Paul Wolfowitz was deputy secretary of defense when the

decision was made. In the interview, Wolfowitz said that on the issue of Iraq–al-Qaida

complicity, there was a sharp division within the Bush Administration bureaucracy. This

answer in itself was questionable. Who opposed in clear terms going after Iraq within the

bureaucracy? Only Colin Powell had been cited as a reluctant warrior by some writers.

However, he was the one who defended the case before UN. Ultimately, however, in June

2004, a US Bipartisan Commission was established to investigate the 9/11 tragedy. The

Bipartisan Commission reported back that presumed Prague meeting of Mohammad Atta

never happened. The Prague rumor was false; Mohammad Atta was in Florida, the US,

on the day of the presumed meeting.382

Kepel cited Richard Clarke’s testifying statement before 9/11 Commission.

Clarke testified that the “overthrow of Saddam regime” in Baghdad had been a “priority”

for the US Administration since January 2001. He went on saying, so far as, that

unfortunately the advisers to the Bush Administration exploited the 9/11 “national

tragedy” and used it as a tragic opportunity to start a war against terror in which the hunt

for al-Qaida was not a priority. It was a secondary goal. The primary goal was the

destruction of Saddam regime in Iraq and plant a pro-American democracy there.383

379 David Masci, and Kenneth Lukas. Ethics of War, Global Issues. (Washington: CQ Press, 2005), 275

380 “The UN report on providing a secure world”, available at www.un.org/secureworld381 Robert J. Jackson, and Philip Towle. Temptations of Power: The US in Global Politics after

9/11. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 173-176382 Kepel, War for Muslim Mind, 205-207383 Kepel, War for Muslim Mind, 207

132

America went to war mainly on the issues of WMD and Iraq-al-Qaida nexus.

Later on, both were discredited. America went to war “under false pretexts”. It raised the

issues of “mistakes, myths, and misjudgment” that led to the US involvement in Indo-

China.384 The US Grand Strategy of unilateral invasion of Iraq despite the opposition

from UN and two important European allies, France and Germany, was unjustified. This

preventive military intervention was mainly made for three reasons–WMDs, links with

al-Qaida and, Americans as liberators. All the three reasons were discounted.385 President

George W. Bush put Iraq on the top of his list of security issues and by doing that he

discarded the effective system of containment of Iraq. He went to war against Iraq on the

basis of wrong assumptions and questionable intelligence. He launched a “preventive

war” against Iraq.386

The initial war aims in Iraq did not include promotion of democracy. The stated

reasons were three-WMDs, terrorism and Saddam. They were discounted later on.387 The

US went to war against Iraq under misperceptions and even used deliberate exaggeration

and deception. By doing that the Bush Administration made it difficult to assess its true

aims of war.388 The US war on Iraq did not fall under the category of preemption. It was

like the American war on Mexico in 1847–premeditated and unprovoked. There was a

word for such an adventure called “militarism.”389

In summing up the issue of Iraq – al-Qaida complicity, leading to 9/11, it might

be said that Bush Administration’s claim mainly rested on a questionable source. It was

based on an al-Qaida detainee “identified as a likely fabricator” by the two important US

intelligence agencies CIA and DIA. But the Office of Special Plans (OSP) established in

the Pentagon after 9/11, really was a bastion for war hawks. The OSP provided their own

analysis of the intelligence coming to them. The OSP continuously insisted that al-Qaida

terrorists and Iraq were teaming up. They took it for granted. The war hawks at the 384 Robert K. Brigham. Is Iraq another Vietnam? (New York: Persus Books Group, 2006), x385 Sergio Fabrinni (Ed.). The United States Contested: American Unilateralism and European

Discontent. (London and NY: Routledge, 2006), 6386 Richard Lock Pullan. US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation: From Vietnam to Iraq.

(London: Routledge, 2006), 181387 Jeremy Jones. Negotiating Change: The New Politics of Middle East. (London and NY: I.B.

Tauris, 2006), 232388 Jeremy Black. Great Powers and Quest for Hegemony: The World Order since 1500. (London

and N.Y: Routledge, 2008), 210389 Anonymous (Micheal Scheuer). Imperial Hubris: Why the West is losing the War on Terror.

(Dulles, VA: Potamac Books, 2004), xvi-xvii

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Pentagon, Vice President’s office, and National Security establishment played with the

intelligence on the issue. They maneuvered the “normal interagency process” on the topic

in such a way so that others might not be able to raise the objections.390

In short, the 9/11 Bipartisan Commission reported back in June, 2004. The

commission findings ended the controversy, if any, on the al-Qaida – Iraq collaboration.

On the Prague affair the commission concluded, “it was false”. Nothing happened like

that. Atta was in “Florida” on the day of accused meeting. However, the commission

offered a devastating conclusion “ to date we have seen no evidence that these or the

earlier contacts [between Iraq and Al-Qaida] ever developed into a collaborative

operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with

al-Qaida in developing or carrying out attacks against the United States.”391 Richard A.

Clarke, another primary source, about the US war on Iraq in 2003, concluded that it “was

an idee fixe, a rigid belief”. The “decision to invade Iraq had already been made and

nothing could change it” whatsoever.392 (Clarke: 2004: 265).The Bush Administration

had already decided to make a military invasion of Iraq.393

4.2 Iraq: A Rogue State with WMDs:The second stated reason given by the Bush Administration that received the most

emphasis was the Saddam Hussain’s WMD threat to the US and the world at large. In his

State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002 President George W. Bush said that

among his great objectives was the “elimination of threats to the US security” posed by

“international terrorists” and by the “absolutist regimes” that were relentlessly seeking

weapons of mass destruction. He cited Iran, Iraq and North Korea as such states. His

central sentence in this connection was that “states like these, and their terrorist allies,

constitute an axis of evil.” They were acquiring WMD to “threaten the peace of the

world.” These states posed “a grave and growing danger.” He pledged before Congress

and the American people, “I will not wait on events while dangers gather.”394

390 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 107391 9/11 Commission. "Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the

United States." (Retrieved September 2004), 97392 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 265393 Interview with Dr. Noman O. Sattar (Director, Dept. of American Studies, Quaid-i-Azam

University, Islamabad) by the Researcher. (Islalmabad. July 22, 2016)394 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 92

134

President Bush, while delivering his Graduation Speech at West Point, the US

Military Academy, New York, on June 1, 2002 said, containment of dictators possessing

WMD was impossible if they acquired delivery system. They could deliver these lethal

weapons directly through missiles or could secretly provide them to the terrorists with

whom they had alliances. In the same speech, the President also declared the US strategy

in war on terror. The US military forces, without any reservation “must be ready for

preemptive action” against such rouge states to defend American lives. Without any

exaggeration, the President referred to Iraq and its WMD program.395

In his interview with the ITV Television Network, UK, reporter Trevor

McDonald put tough questions to the President on Iraq. While responding to the reporter

the President said that “the policy of my government is that he goes”. It’s the worst

development if America “allow Saddam Hussain to develop WMD… I am not going to

let that happen.”396 President Bush hosted Tony Blair in Crawford on the weekend, April

6-7, 2002. Addressing to the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002

President George W. Bush remarked that Saddam Hussain could supply WMD to al-

Qaeda terrorists. In this scenario the 9/11 tragedy would be “a prelude to far greater

horrors.”397

While talking to the 11-House members on September 19, 2002, the President

remarked that the war against terror was going well. But the real and biggest threat was

“Saddam Hussain and his WMD.”398 Similarly, the President remarked at the Cincinnati

Museum Center that there existed empirical evidence that Saddam Hussain was

“reconstituting” his nuclear weapons program. The US Administration learned through a

reliable source that Saddam Hussain attempted to buy high-strength “aluminum tubes”

and other related equipment that were required for “gas centrifuges” which in turn were

used for “uranium enrichment” to produce nuclear weapons.399

In his State of the Union Address in January 2003, President George W. Bush

made startling announcement. By quoting the British government the President said,

395 George W. Bush. “West Point Graduation Speech”, June 1, 2002396 “George W. Bush’s Interview with the United Kingdom's ITV Television Network (By Trevor

McDonald)”. April 4, 2002397 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 119-120398 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 186399 Bush, “Remarks on Iraq at Cincinnati Museum Center”

135

“The British government had learned that Saddam Hussain recently sought significant

quantities of uranium from Africa.”400 In the buildup to Iraq war Vice President Dick

Cheney said, there was “no doubt” that Iraq had WMD. He would use them against “US

friends, allies, and against the US.”401 George Tenet, the CIA Director, while talking to

the President in the Oval Office on the issue of Iraq’s WMD assured the President,

“Don’t worry, it’s a slam dunk.”402

Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, while delivering a speech in

February 2002 to the Conservative Political Action Conference said that America would

do everything in its power to “prevent the world’s most dangerous countries to possess

most dangerous weapons.”403 Colin Powell, Secretary of State, in his speech at the UN

said that the facts indicated the Saddam regime was concealing their weapons of mass

destruction. Saddam regime was putting big efforts to produce more WMD. Iraq had not

been cooperating with the UN inspectors. He further claimed that whatever he said today

was backed by “solid intelligence” sources. He, further said, these were “not just

assertions”. Whatever he shared were “facts” and based on “credible intelligence”.404

The Bush Administration gave various reasons for going to war against Iraq. Of

these reasons Iraq’s WMD and its secret links with al-Qaeda were the most compelling. I,

being a researcher, after going through many sources, both primary and secondary, am of

the opinion that the main declared reason which led to the Bush Administration to war on

Iraq was the issue of WMD. Whether Saddam really possessed WMD?

4.2.1 Critical Analysis:

First of all I would like to give George Tenet’s point of view on the issue of Iraq’s status

of WMDs on the eve of US invasion of Iraq. He had given the following analysis.

America did not invade Iraq in 2003 solely because of WMD. In his view “WMD was

not even the principal reason” of invasion. George Tenet quoted Paul Wolfowitz’s article

in Vanity Fair in May 2003, wherein Wolfowitz said that the Bush Administration

400 George W. Bush. “State of the Union Address”, January 28, 2003401 Dick Cheney. Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, quoted in David E. Sanger, “Allies Hear Sour Notes in ‘Axis of Evil’ Chorous”, New York Times. February 17, 2002

402 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 249403 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 95404 Collin Powel. “UN Presentation”, CNN. February 5, 2003

136

Principals “settled on” WMD because it was “the one issue that everyone could agree

on.”405

The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of September, 2002 wrote in its key

judgments that Iraq had not only “chemical and biological weapons” but also missiles to

deliver them in access of ranges prescribed by UN sanctions. Iraq, if unchecked, might

also produce a “nuclear weapon by the end of the current decade”. Baghdad was

following what was known as “denial and deception” strategy. The notorious piece of bad

information came from Bonn known as “Curve Ball”. This source provided “fabricated

information” about Iraq’s mobile biological weapons production facility on trailers. The

information was included both in the NIE and Colin Powell’s speech to the UN on

February 5, 2003. However, the information provided by Curve Ball was not validated by

other sources.406

Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and George

Tenet were operating from the mind-set of mid-1990s. They believed that Saddam

Hussain possessed WMD. In reality, Saddam Hussain was bluffing. They could not

believe he was bluffing. To begin with, Martin Indyk was convinced that Saddam

Hussain had WMD. Later on, after his capture, they got the answer. Why did Saddam

Hussain bluff about WMD? He had “rough neighborhood of Iraq” in mind. He was

genius in “denial and deception” strategy. Saddam Hussain led US to believe the things

that were untrue.407 The intelligence used over the years on the issue of Saddam Hussain’s

WMD was flawed. The NIE never became the basis of US invasion of Iraq, and, in the

opinion of George Tenet, the US decision to invade Iraq was “not solely made” on this

basis.408

It was accused that George Tenet’s use of the phrase “slam dunk” played the

central role and “intrigued” the President’s decision to invade Iraq to remove Saddam

Hussain from power. According to George Tenet, facts did not support this charge. The

meeting in which this phrase used was held in December, 2002 in the Oval Office of the

President. Actually, the decision to invade Iraq had “already been made”. That meeting

was held ten months after President George W. Bush saw the first plan to invade Iraq; 405 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 321406 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 324-328407 Ibid, 330-333408 Ibid 337

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four months after the vice president Dick Cheney delivered his Veterans of Foreign Wars

speech wherein he alleged that there was “no doubt” that Iraqi regime had WMD; three

months after the President strongly warned Iraqi regime in the UN that it should

“immediately and unconditionally destroy its all WMD”; two months after the US

Congress authorized President George W. Bush to use force against Iraq.409

On that fateful day of December 21, 2002 in the Oval Office, everybody who

participated in the meeting “already believed” that Iraq had WMD.410 Later on, George

Tenet wrote that he used the alleged phrase in that meeting, however, in a different

context. Actually George Tenet told the President that strengthening the “public

confidence” was a “slam dunk”. The phrase was later on taken completely “out of the

context” and was “intentionally misused” to mislead American public.411 George Tenet

sorrowfully regrets that Bush Administration principals found a “scapegoat” in him in the

form of “slam dunk” phrase and he believed that it never shaped the “timing and

legitimacy” of Iraq invasion in March 2003.

Bob Woodward’s book, Plan of Attack, on the run-up to the Iraq invasion caused

a media bonfire. The Oval Office “deliberately fed the slam dunk” scene to Woodward to

shift the blame from the White House to CIA. The “rationale of Iraq” War had been a

“failure” and White House needed a scapegoat. George Tenet provided the one. The trust

had been broken down between the White House and CIA’s Director George J. Tenet.

Consequently, George Tenet resigned in July 2004 within a couple of months after

coming of the book.412

The reports of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and UNMOVIC

(U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) were of special importance.

After an interval of about four years, IAEA and UNMOVIC, once again, had been

working on the ground situation in Iraq from November 25, 2002 to March 17, 2003.

They submitted their several respective reports between January 27 and March 7, 2003.

Mohammed El-Baradei, the Director of IAEA reported to the UN Security Council that

“no nuclear production facilities” or activity were found in Iraq. Hans Blix, the Director

of UNMOVIC reported to the UN Security Council on February 14, 2003. His central 409 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 359410 Ibid, 361411 Ibid, 362412 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 479-487

138

conclusion was that Iraq did not “possess WMD”. The testimony of IAEA and

UNMOVIC was rejected by the Bush Administration.413

The same author further alleged that after one year of the US invasion of Iraq in

March, 2003, it became clear that President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony

Blair “deliberately used” the issue of Iraq’s WMD. Their objective in doing so was to get

support for Iraq War from their respective people and among their Western allies. For the

first time, the evidence came to surface from a BBC reporter in May 2003. The reporter

cited David Kelly, a Ministry of Defense specialist of Great Britain on issues of nuclear

proliferation. Using the source cited above, the BBC reporter alleged that Blair

Government ordered its intelligence services to “sex up” the issue of Iraq’s WMD. After

the disclosure, Blair Government “denied the report” and on July 17, under pressure,

David Kelley committed suicide.414

On January 28, 2004, David Kay who had just resigned as head of the Iraq Survey

Group gave his statement before the US Senate Armed Services Committee that, “we

were almost all wrong”. He had been working as head of American inspectors in Iraq.

There were no WMD stockpiles in Iraq and he further declared that it was “intelligence

failure” on WMD in Iraq and it needed an inquiry to investigate the issue.415 David Kay

actually confirmed the conclusions already made by the IAEA and UNMOIC.

About fifty days after the US invasion of Iraq, Paul Wolfowitz explained to

Vanity Fair’s Sam Tannenhaus that why did the Administration put the issue of WMD at

the center of the war campaign in the US? Answering a question about the war strategy

meeting held at Camp David immediately after 9/11, Paul Wolfowitz Deputy Secretary of

Defense, said that there was a long discussion about the US strategy in war on terror.

There was agreement about action against Iraq that it “should be”. The question debated

was not about whether but about when. Answering another question, the Deputy

Secretary of defense said that the truth of the matter was that for “bureaucratic reasons”

the participants agreed on the one issue. The participants agreed on the WMD as the

“core reason”. It means the issue of Iraq’s WMD was used purely for political reasons as

a case of public sell out.416

413 Kepel, War for Muslim Mind, 204414 Kepel, War for Muslim Mind, 204415 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 434

416 Kepel, War for Muslim Mind, 204-206

139

Richard Clarke, former head of antiterrorist coordination at the National Security

Council, declared before 9/11 Commission (investigatory commission) that “removal of

Saddam regime from power” had been the “top priority” of President Bush as early as

January, 2001. He further said that some important officials of the Bush Administration

used 9/11 happenings as a tragic opportunity to initiate the US war against terror. In this

war on terror the pursuit of al-Qaida was a “secondary” goal. The basic objective was the

removal of Saddam regime from power, install in its place a pro-American democracy.417

After fall of Saddam regime, no stockpiles of WMD were found in Iraq. It proved

policy failure in Iraq. Then in June 2004, President Bush appointed a Bi-partisan

Commission (Robb-Silberman Commission) to investigate the matter. On the issue of

Iraq’s WMD as a core cause of war, the commission submitted its report to the President

in March, 2005. The report, among other things, concluded that the “assessments about

the Iraq’s WMD” were “riddled with errors”. And the assessment about Iraq’s nuclear

program was “almost completely wrong.” Similarly the assessments about biological and

chemical weapons were “also wrong”.418

Similarly, the report of the “US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the

US Intelligence Community’s Pre-war Intelligence Assessments on Iraq” came to the

same conclusion. The report of the Senate Committee concluded intelligence provided in

the case of Iraq’s WMD was “flawed and rich in errors”.419 The Comprehensive Report of

the Special Adviser of the CIA to the DCI on the status of the Iraq’s WMD known as

Duelfer Report also concluded the same. That the Iraq war was an “intelligence failure”

and the information provided in this regard was “faulty”.420

In this regard, as cited above, the report of the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence was of special importance. The committee found that the analysis, in a large

number of cases, based largely on their expectations rather than objective empirical

evidence of the information provided to them. Mostly, the analysts expected to see

empirical evidence on WMD coming from Iraq after the fall of Saddam regime. That Iraq

417 Ibid, 207418 “Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Robb-Silberman Report)”, March 31, 2005, 8-9

419 “Report of The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence”, July 9, 2004, 18420 “The Comprehensive Report of CIA’s Special Adviser to the DCI (Duelfer Report)”,

September 30, 2004

140

retained prohibited weapons and would resume banned activities regarding Iraq’s

WMD.421

The basis of this bias could be found in “group think” behavior. It meant selective

gathering of information, looking for no or few alternatives, and withholding critical

analysis etc. The main sources of information on Iraq’s WMD was an Iraqi defector

code-named “Curveball” the man who had undergone nervous breakdown and was a

habitual drinker. His credibility as a source of information, on such an important issue

was not questioned. Similarly, the dissenting voices of the State Department Bureau of

Intelligence and Research (INR) and the Energy Department were summarily ignored.

They had questioned the claims about “Iraqi purchases of uranium in Africa and of

aluminum tubes”. Their opinion was that these claims were “highly dubious”.422

There were distortions at the highest political level as well. The President and the

Vice President made unequivocal claims about Iraq’s WMD. On this process, George

Packer wrote that there was “deliberate slanting” of ambiguous facts.423 The author

recounted an incident. Richard Haas, State Department Policy Planning Director, while

talking to the National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, was told by the adviser in

June 2002, the President George W. Bush had already decided and “made up his

mind”.424

There was another thread of the story of Iraq’s WMD. Rob Richer was at the

centre of that story. It was in the first-week of December, 2002 Rob Richer, the newly

appointed head of CIA’s Near East Division held a meeting at the agency’s office in

London. Richer, CIA’s station chiefs from ME to London introduced Michael Shipster,

the Middle East intelligence Chief for SIS, the British intelligence Service. Richer and

Shipster knew each other over the years and both had worked in the Mideast and Persian

Gulf regions. The US had some assumptions on Iraq’s WMD and lacked hard evidence to

prove the case for invasion of Iraq. For Richer the absence of hard evidence was a failure

of intelligence community. Shipster agreed with Richer. Shipster had a plan in his mind.

421 Report US Senate Intelligence Committee, 18422 Murray Waas. “What Bush was Told About Iraq”, National Journal. (March 2, 2006)423 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 62424 Ibid, 45

141

Shipster had a credible source inside Iraq-Habbush, the head of Iraqi intelligence service-

the Mukhabarat.425

After getting permission from Dear Love, George Tenet, the heads of SIS and

CIA respectively, Richer and shipster decided to work collectively. Richer telephoned

Saad Khayr, the head of Jordon’s General Intelligence Department (GID). Richer had

helped Saad to get this job in 1999. Saad Khayer actively cooperated and a secret meeting

was planned for January, 2003, in Amman. Habbush secretly came to Amman but to the

prior knowledge of his boss, Saddam Hussein. On the appointed date the meeting was

held in Amman. Saddam Hussein did not know about all the agenda items of the meeting

between Shipster and Habbush. During the meeting, Habbush told Shipster in clear terms

that Iraq had “no WMD”.426

The information was passed on to George Tenet. Richard Dear Love flew to

Washington to pass on the information to Tenet. Dear Love personally reported to

George Tenet what Habbush had said. Saddam Hussain had finished Iraq’s nuclear

program in 1991. He also destroyed his chemical weapons the same year. Same was true

for biological weapons. Since 1996, Iraq had no biological weapons facility. The

presence of WMD did not constitute a justification for the invasion of Iraq. For the

Administration Iraq was an outstanding issue. They wanted to resolve it. The real reason

was the regime change.427 The Administration used the issue of WMD to invade Iraq.428

Tenet digested the report and then briefed the President and Rice. The report

contradicted the convictions of the Bush Administration. The White House rejected and

buried the Habbush report. President Bush wanted to invade Iraq since the beginning of

his Presidency and nothing could stop him. By the end of 2003, it became clear that

Habbush was right and there were no WMD in Iraq.429 America had gone to war under

“false pretenses” for Tahir Habbush was paid handsomely by the CIA ($5million) and

resettled in Amman.430 Finally, it was on February 8, 2004, that President George W.

425 Suskind, Way of the World, 361-362426 Suskind, Way of the World, 363-364427 Interview with Dr. Noman428 Interview with Dr. M. Riaz Shad Awan (Head, Dept. of International Relations, National

University of Modern Languages, Islamabad) by the Researcher. Islalmabad. July 18, 2016429 Suskind, Way of the World, 365-369430 Ibid, 373

142

Bush made an acknowledgement on NBC’s Meet the Press, that “I expected” there would

be “stockpiles of weapons” in Iraq, and “we thought” that Saddam Hussain had WMD.431

4.3 Promotion of Democracy in Iraq:Promotion of democracy in Iraq was the third declared objective of the Bush

Administration in Iraq. Removal of Saddam Hussain from power was a first step to

introduce a larger scheme of regional transformation in the Middle East in ways that

would benefit long-term US interests in the region. Iraq would be turned into a functional

democracy and would become a “model democracy” in the Arab world. Democracy in

Iraq would trigger democratic revolutions in the region. Once democracy got roots in the

region, then the democratic governments in the Middle East would be friendly to

America and Israel alike. As a result, Israeli and Palestinian conflict would be

“transcended”. The two most important problems of the Middle East, terrorism and

nuclear proliferation, would be largely eliminated.432

Vice President Dick Cheney was the first person to unfold this vicious scheme of

democratic regional transformation in his speech to the VFW (Veterans of Foreign Wars)

convention in August, 2002. This was the opening speech to sell the idea of Iraq war. Mr.

Vice President said that after the gravest threats in the region would be eliminated, then

people would have opportunity to promote democratic values in the region, Moderates

would take roots in the region. The US would have opportunity to advance the

Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process. He repeated these arguments many times till the US

invasion of Iraq.433

President George W. Bush spoke the similar language about regional

transformation in run-up to war against Iraq. It was on February 26, 2003, while

delivering a speech at AEI (American Enterprise Institute), the President said that the

basic objective of my administration was to “cultivate liberty and peace in the Middle

East”. He further said that we had great interest in the promotion of democracy in the

region because democracy did not breed violence and extremism. Democracy means

431 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 424432 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 255433 Dick Cheney. “Remarks by the Vice President to Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National

Convention”, August 2002

143

better life for the people. The US success in Iraq would pave the way for a “truly

democratic Palestinian Peace.434

Undoubtedly, it was a departure from the traditional US Middle East policy.

There had been no empirical evidence to prove that either George W. Bush or Dick

Cheney entertained this idea of regional transformation before 9/11. President Bush, Vice

President Cheney and National Security Adviser Rice were opposed to this scheme of

regional democratization. It’s on record that President Bush strongly criticized Bill

Clinton’s program of nation building in the Middle East-in 2000 election campaign. How

did these changes in US Middle East policy occur? The important forces behind this

major change were Israel and the war hawks in the Bush Administration.435 According to

Charles Krauthammer, this program of democratization of the Middle East was the

brainchild of Natan Sharansky, an Israeli politician whose writings had great effect on

President George W. Bush’s mind.436

Ephraim Halevy, National Security Advisor of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon

delivered a speech at Munich in February 2003, wherein he said that the post-Saddam

Middle East would have great effects in Tehran, Damacus and Ramallah. He envisioned a

domino effect in the Middle East region.437 By 2002, when the US invasion of Iraq had

become a burning issue in US foreign policy, democratization of the Middle East had

also become neoconservative’s regional agenda. The neoconservatives sitting in Bush

Administration helped make it the centerpiece of American Middle East policy.438 It

could be said that the Bush Administration, neoconservatives and Israeli leadership saw

removal of Saddam Hussain as the beginning of an ambitious program of democratic

regional transformation of the Middle East.439

4.3.1 Critical Analysis:

While writing on promotion of democracy abroad as the US Foreign policy rationale,

Amitai Etzioni declared that our next leaders would have to make compromise on this

434 “In the President’s words: Free People Will keep the Peace of the World”, New York Times. February 27, 2003

435 George Packer. “War after the War”, The New Yorker. November 24, 2003, 58-85436 Charles Krauthamer. “Peace through Democracy”, Washington Post, June 28, 2002437 Bennet, James “Israel Says War on Iraq Would Benefit the Region”, New York Times, February

27, 2003438 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 76-90439 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 259

144

issue. It had become clear without any doubt that democracy could not be promoted

abroad by force of arms, particularly in “poorly prepared countries”.440 He further wrote

that “Security First Rationale might replace democratization” as the basis for US foreign

policy. The security of life was more fundamental than all other rights. For a

comprehensive understanding of human security we could see Roland Paris’s work which

simply defined human security as “physical safety of life, freedom from killing and

torture.”441 In Countries like post-Saddam Iraq, democratization must be preceded by

security first foreign policy. Democratization of such a people would never end their

aggressive attitude. The US should leave “coercive regime changes” as policy option. In

these countries, process of political development should be led by “internal forces”

themselves and not by foreigners.442

Liberals and Neo-Cons concept of world political reality had one basic flaw: they

grossly “overestimated the capacity of the US to reengineer” the governments of other

countries such as Iraq. Particularly, neoconservatives shared one fundamental belief that

democracy could be “imposed by force of arms” as attempted in Iraq. Similarly, liberals

also believed in the “transformative ability” of soft power. The tragedy was that both

approaches had failed in most places in international realm.443 It was clear from the

historical record that democracy was a “delicate plant” and it grew “slowly and steadily”

but for its growth there must be favorable conditions it needed to be cultivated by the

“indigenous people themselves” who wanted to live under it and not the foreigners.444

If foreign powers imposed regime changes in the name of spreading their own

political values, it would start bleeding the target people. International politics was

ruthless. In international political system choices had often been difficult and outcomes

were often imperfect, dissimilar to the role these values played in domestic affairs.445

Historical evidence showed that democratic governments were undermined by their 440 Amitai Etzioni. Security First: For a Muscular Moral Foreign Policy. (New Haven and

London: Yale University Press, 2007), 1441 Roland Paris. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift on Hot Air?” International Security 26, no 2,

(Fall 2001), 87-102442 Etzioni, Security First, 2443 Kurt M. Campbell, and Michael E.O Hanlon. Hard Power: The New Politics of International

Security. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 238-246444 Claude Ake. “The Unique Case of African Democracy”, International Affairs 69, no 2, (April

1993), 239-244445 Michael Lind. The American Way of Strategy: US Foreign Policy and American Way of Life.

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006)

145

failure to “address basic human needs” for example security of life, and not by other

factors. The case of Weimar Republic was in reference. It had been concluded that

Weimar Republic, as a liberal democracy, lost its legitimacy because of its failure to meet

peoples needs, particularly physical security.446

Akbar Ganji, an Iranian journalist argued that they were only Iranian people who

could plant “liberal democracy” in Iran. No foreigners could ever do that.447 Similarly,

it’s on record, CIA met an utter fiasco in its struggle against Islamists for Mogadishu in

2006.448 It did not matter how much money the US spend, the US could not evolve them

as liberal democracies. The US easily overthrew Saddam Hussain from power, however,

could not establish “liberal democracy in Iraq”.449

By December 2005, it had become clear that the world was not undergoing the

process of democratization. Democratic–peace theory might have been true for well

established liberal democracies but not for the people who were democratizing – usually

(usually) through a painful, bloody and unstable process.450 Iraq taught US the basic

lesson that the establishment of “human security was the prerequisite for planting

democracy” there and not vice versa. This was exactly the pattern followed in Germany,

Japan and Italy.451 By December 2006, America had lost three thousand soldiers in

violent insurgency. Insurgency in Iraq “intensified” with every passing day since 2003. It

could be safely said that democracy preceded security thesis failed in Iraq.452

The first American civilian, L. Paul Bremer, the appointed head of CPA

(Coalition Provisional Authority) took certain steps which greatly affected Iraq. These

steps created power vacuum in Iraq that negatively affected both security and

democratization. Paul Bremer permanently dismantled the entire Ba’ath Party apparatus

in Iraq, thereby removed one hundred and twenty thousand personnel, including mostly

professionals like doctors, engineers and teachers. They were cast out of their jobs.453 In 446 Amitai Etzioni. How Patriotic is the Patriotic Act? (New York: Routledge, 2004), 12-14447 Akbar Ganji. “Money cannot Buy US Democracy”, New York Times. August 1, 2006448 Anothony Barnett, and Patrick Smith. “US Accused of Covert Operations in Somalia”, The

Observer (U.K.). September 10, 2006449 Etzioni, Security First, 14450 Edward D. Mansfield, and Jack Snyder. Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to

War. Cambridge Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2005451 Etzioni, Security First, 19452 Ibid, 22453 David Philips. Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco. (New York: Westview

Press, 2005), 145

146

total disregard of the US military advice, Bremer also disbanded four hundred thousand

Iraqi soldiers by the single stroke of the pen.454 De-Baathification apparently was

modeled on de-Nazification, however, this policy failed in Iraq. Allies had left many low

level Nazis in power and hence avoided “power vacuum” in Germany. This could not

happen in Iraq. Another issue was the “lack of sufficient manpower” on the ground to

maintain order.455

There was violence and chaos in Iraq in the post-Saddam period. They lost their

confidence on imposed democracy. The violence drove many middle-class families out

of Iraq, thereby removed one main factor of democratization.456 America took certain

wrong decisions in Iraq. Ahmad Chalabi was the first Iraqi expatriate promoted to the

position of power in Iraq. He was widely viewed as an “American puppet”. The

American “advisers were appointed to oversee the Iraqi ministers” who often used their

veto power in the provision of funds, the main source of revenue for these ministries. It

was seen as America’s “unwarranted intrusion” in domestic politics of Iraq. Local

politicians were left with “no free choices” in their own politics.457

Paul Bremer rejected repeated Iraqi requests for a constitution to be framed by an

elected assembly. Instead, Bremer framed the constitution through handpicked personnel

of Iraqi Governing Council. Moreover, Bremer objected to declare Iraq as an “Islamic

State and Islam as a source of legislation.”458 American interference in Iraqi politics

continued unabated. The elected Prime Minister al-Jaafari was forced to resign and

replaced by Nouri al-Maliki in May 2006. Both major groups of Iraqi population Sunnies

and Shias criticized this interference. Al-Jaafari asked the US to end its interference in

Iraq’s internal politics.459

In disregard of nature of Iraqi society America imposed a “highly unitary

constitution” rather than a federated one. Security situation had been improved if

454 Eric Schmitt. “US Generals Fault Ban on Hussain’s Party”, New York Times. April 21, 2004455 Etzioni, Security First, 23456 Sabrina Tavernise. “As Death Stalks Iraq, Middle Class Exodus Begins”, New York Times. May

19, 2006457 Yochi J. Dreazen. “Tough Love in Baghdad”, Wall Street Journal. April 1, 2006458 Philips, Losing Iraq, 186459 Edward Wong. “Beleaguered Premier Warns U.S. to Stop Interfering in Iraq s Politics”, New

York Times. March 30, 2006

147

America would have accorded regional autonomy to all the eighteen provinces of Iraq.460

It had been claimed by critics and proved by empirical evidence on ground that the

project of regime change in Iraq turned it into a breeding place for terrorists. The

National Intelligence Estimate of 2006 assessed that the Iraq war created more terrorists

than it eliminated.461

Both America’s political reputation and military credibility suffered greatly in the

aftermath of removal of Saddam Hussain from power.462 America must realize that

international political system was brutal and the capacity of the US, even as a

superpower, was limited to reshape it, particularly through the force of arms. Democracy

could not be “imposed” upon others. It must be cultivated directly by the people

themselves and “largely homegrown”.463

The Neo-Cons came to the surface in response to “US democratic experiments in

social engineering” in the decade of 1960s. Then, their central theme was that social

engineering, specifically undertaken by the US government was destined to fail. The

Kennedy and Johnson administrations failed to deliver. During 1960s, the Neo-Cons

were convincing that the experiments in social engineering undertaken by the US federal

government often did not work. Surprisingly, some of the same Neo-Cons, in the decade

of 1990s “advocated social engineering” by the US federal government around the world

under “unfavorable conditions” than those at home in America.464 Democratization had

been the major form of long distance social engineering (LDSE) in Iraq. In this process of

democratization “no distinction was made between forced democratization and

persuasive” one. The US experimented with forced democratization in Iraq

notwithstanding the “local culture” of Iraq. The same attempts had also been made earlier

from Haiti to Congo.465

What made a democracy? Some scholars had made extensive studies on the

subject. Important among them were Thomas Carother’s “Critical Mission: Essays on

460 Joseph Biden, and Leslie Gelb. “Unity through Autonomy in Iraq”, New York Times. May 1, 2006

461 “Declassified Key Judgements of the National Intelligence Estimate on Global Terrorism”, New York Times. September 27, 2006

462 “US Image Up Slightly, but Still Negative”, Pew Global Attitudes Project Report, June 23, 2005. Available at http:// pewglobal/ repors/ display

463 Etzioni, Security First, 36464 Ibid, 40-41465 Etzioni. Patriotic Act, 1-17

148

Democracy Promotion”466, Robert A. Dahl’s Polyarchy467 and most importantly Adeed

and Karen Dawisha, “How to Build a Democratic Iraq”468. Drawing on the works of these

scholars a list of the factors required to make a democracy could be made. There were

two types of factors that make a democracy – facilitating and constituting factors.

First group of factors referred to “democratic infrastructure” while second group

of factors factors meant the basic building blocks of democracy”. These factors had been

far from complete. They were nothing more than an approximation. First group included”

law and order, literacy, level of economic development, presence of middle class, rule of

law and presence of civil society while second group included true political parties, merit

system for public offices, free and fair elections, a constitution vested with sharing as

well as separation of powers and theory of checks and balances, low level of corruption

in the given society, protection of minority rights in the given society, freedom to make

association, free press, and guarantee of rights against government”. It was clear from the

above cited list that developing these factors were a slow and cumbersome process,

specifically impossible for foreign powers.469 It took several generations for Britain and

America to develop liberal democracy there especially under favorable conditions.470

America faced multiple difficulties in democratization drive in Iraq. During

twentieth century, America made sixteen attempts at nation-building through forced

democratization, from Cuba (1898 – 1902) to Haiti (1994 – 1996). Out of these sixteen

cases of forced democratization, America suffered failure in eleven to establish a

“functional democracy”. The US succeeded in only four cases – Japan, Panama, Grenada

and West Germany. Grenada was a tiny Island and Panama was also a tiny state with its

population less than three million.471

Japan and West Germany presented the only two examples of US successful

democratization in large and complex societies. The important factors which made these

466 Thomas Carother. “Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion”. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2004)

467 Robert A. Dahl. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 3

468 Adeed Dawisha, and Karen Dawisha. "How to build a democratic Iraq." Foreign Affairs 82, no 3, (2003), 36

469 Etzioni, Security First, 43470 Ibid, 44471 Minxin Pei, and Sara Kasper. “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation

Building”, Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief. no.24, (April 2003)

149

two examples successful were missing in other societies – for example “high level of

education, ethnic homogeneity and large middle class.”472 The concept that there was a

small hidden democracy in every society just waiting to be released was untrue.473

American policy to direct the course of “internal politics” in other societies was

“unjustified”.474

The case of “reconstruction and democratization” of Japan and Germany were

special one. Under special conditions which could not be produced everywhere. They had

surrendered and were defeated. The occupation lasted longer. There was full control of

allies over every walk of life from foreign relations to foreign trade. Military security

rested with the allies till 1955. There was no danger that they, unlike Iraq, would break

up due to civil war, there was no civil war, unlike Iraq, among different ethnic groups and

above all there was strong national unity in both the nations. The presence of transparent

governments was among other factors.475 Some writers attributed to “technical and

financial expertise, well developed political parties, visionary leadership, well-educated

people and strong national feelings” as the other factors.476

The conditions were different in case of US invasion of Iraq in 2003. George

Packer quoted John W. Dower on the subject. Dower had compared the difference

between two US occupations – Japan and Iraq. He argued that “America lacked moral

legitimacy” in Iraq that she had in Japan.477 Another factor had been the “higher US level

of commitment” for democratic reconstruction of Germany and Japan. That spirit was

missing in case of Iraq. The year 1948 was the first year of Marshall Plan and the US

spent thirteen percent of its entire budget for reconstruction and democratization while in

case of both Afghanistan and Iraq it was just one percent.478

Despite this all, the Neo-Cons in the Bush Administration made promotion of

liberal democracy a central theme of US foreign policy and President George W. Bush

472 Ibid473 George Packer. “Dreaming of Democracy”, New York Times Magazine. March 2, 2003474 F.Gregory Gause. “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs 84, no 5,

September/October (2005), 62475 Marina Ottaway. “Nation Building”, Foreign Policy 132, (September/October 2002), 17476 Robert A. Packenham. Liberal America and the Third Worlds. (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1973), 34-35477 Packer, Dreaming of Democracy, 2003478 Karin Von Hippel. Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War

World. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 187

150

made it a post- hoc reason for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.479 Critics even wrote that

President Bush and the Neo-Cons “knew very well that democratization of Iraq was

impossible” still they used it as a “fig leaf” to justify their run for power and oil.480

Amitai Etzioni was of the opinion that the US decision makers had different goals

to serve. Their main concern was to show American military resolve and take “control of

oilfields of Iraq” from the other contenders such as France and Russia.481 In the footsteps

of Iraq Study Group’s Report, Roger Cohen wrote that Iraq badly needed Iraqis,

nationalist in their feelings and not citizens of a tribe. After decades of dictatorship Iraq

needed “generational commitment to become a functioning democracy.”482 There had

been writers who were of the opinion that given the present scenario, democratization of

the Middle East would bring, for many reasons, Islamists to power. They had referred to

the cases of Hamas, Egypt, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Kuwait etc.

Democratization in those lands was against US interests. The developments in Iraq had

proved that anarchy, the alternative of Saddam Hussain regime, was worse than Saddam

regime.483

Authors, from right to left, expressed their concern about the promotion of

democracy in the Middle East. While commenting on the situation in the region,

Washington Post editorial wrote that three principles had emerged. There could be no

“forced democratization” without a mature civil society in place. Secondly, America

should not put pressure for holding elections. America was better off with absolutist

rulers such as Mubarak and Musharraf. Anarchy, terrorism, and religious extremism were

the worst alternatives of these dictators.484 Elections alone did not make a democracy.

Elections were just one of the nine constituting factors of a democracy.485

By December 2006, more than four hundred contractors had lost their lives in

violence in Iraq. No American contractor could move, even inside Green Zone, without

security details. By April 2006, according to Stuart Bowen Jr, no big reconstruction

479 Etzioni, Security First, 46480 Kevin Philips. American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil and

Borrowed Money in the 21st Century. (New York: Viking, 2006)481 Etzioni, Security First, 46482 Roger Cohen. “Iraq’s Biggest Failing: There is no Iraq”, New York Times, December 10, 2006483 Shibley Telhami. “The Return of the State”. The National Interest 84, (Summer 2006), 113484 “The Case for Democracy”, Editorial, Washington Post. March 5, 2006485 Etzioni, Security First, 51

151

projects in Iraq would stop insurgency.486 At about the same time testimony also came

from a former USAID Director Andrew Nations. He said, without the provision of basic

security, no reconstruction work was possible in Iraq.487

Etzioni argued, American foreign policy suffered from one problem which he

called “Multiple Realism Deficiency Disorder (MRDD)” or simply speaking “realism

deficiency.” By this term author meant the US foreign policy was based on certain

assumptions whether stated or otherwise, that America was omnipotent, that American

society had reached the final form of political organization- achieved liberal democracy,

that America was too powerful to effect the desired changes in the world and, that

America had the right and ability to remake the world in accordance with American

values. The “unrealism” had reached to great heights among war hawks in Washington.

Furthermore, Etzioni had quoted Charles Krauthammer’s speech at American Enterprise

Institute, Washington, D.C., 10 February 2004, titled “Democratic Realism.” In his

speech, Krauthammer criticized war hawks concept of “democratic globalism”

specifically their attempt to democratize the “Islamic crescent” as “highly unrealistic”

mission.488

Etzioni had published another work, (From Empire to Community) in which he

concluded that Iraq, in coming days and years, would become second Vietnam for the

US.489 John Kerry, on the issue of democratization of Iraq wrote, that American soldiers

could not bring democracy to Iraq as Iraqi leadership was “unwilling to make the

compromises” which were hallmark of democracy.490 Francis Fukuyama, once a Neo-con,

departed from them and criticized “democratic globalism” the ideology of Neo-cons. He

asked for a different approach rather than forced democratization.491

America must acknowledge that democracy could not be imposed specifically

through the force of arms on the people with no tradition of free press and civil liberties.

Democracy promotion in such societies like Iraq must be preceded by two conditions.

486 Stuart W. Bowen. “Hearing to examine Iraq Strategization and Reconstruction”, testimony before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 8, 2006

487 Joel Brinkley. “Give Rebuilding Lower Priority in Future Wars State Department Spurning Iraq Strategy”, New York Times, April 8, 2006

488 Etzioni, Security First, xiv489 Amitai Etzioni. From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations. (New

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)490 John F. Kerry. “Two Deadlines and on Exit”, New York Times. April 5, 2006491 Fukuyama, America at Crossroads, 9-10, 186

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One was the provision of basic security. Other was a stable government.492 Not only

American policy of “democratic globalism failed” but with it global respect for US also

decreased.493

Open society and democratization had been most difficult to establish in a

country. There had never been democracy in Iraq. The country was ridden with ethnic

and religious strife and, introduction of democracy there could have easily led to

disintegration of Iraq. That was why President Bush senior did not overthrow Saddam

Hussain in the First Gulf War. The promotion of democracy in Iraq was not the top

priority of President George W. Bush.494

Both USA and Britain had their negative image in the minds of Iraqis. The reason

was their special relationship with Israel, Britain was related to the creation of Israel and

America became its protector after 1967. Due to this reason Iraqis were not ready to see

the two invading powers as liberators.495 The original goals of democracy, stability and

pro-West government had not been achieved and, perhaps, they would never be.496

Introduction of democracy in Iraq was beyond the US reach and America could not do

that. The culture in Iraq was “democracy deficit” and the biggest hurdle.497

The problem was that the US imposed regime in Iraq would be undemocratic. Iraq

was a Shia majority state. If there would be democracy in Iraq, the country definitely

would move toward Iran. That was against American interests in the region.498 The

American idea of promoting democracy in the Middle East was not workable because

there were twenty two Arab – states. Out of them none was a functioning democracy.

Majority of Arabs saw America as an empire that supported “absolutist rulers” in the past

and pursued her economic interests in the region.499

Elie Kedourie, a historian on Iraq, argued that overwhelming population of Iraq

came from tribal origin. They were uneducated, illiterate, and did not understand alien

ideas such as elections and parliamentary democracy. They were accustomed to obey

492 Etzioni, Security First, x 493 Ibid, ix494 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 59495 Steele, Defeat, 251496 Ibid, 9497 Noam Chomsky. Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the post 9/11 World. (New York:

Henry Holt and Company, 2005), 117498 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 132499 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 38-39

153

their tribal chiefs and government officials. Shias of Iraq were also deeply had great

religious. They had great respect for their religious divines living in Najaf and Karbala.

Iraqi society was beset with such defects.500 Iraq feared domination of “Western cultural

imperialism”. For them, they were being asked to relinquish their fundamental identify –

social, political and religious and instead. They were adamant to relinquish their old ways

of life and embrace alien concept of liberalism.501

Regime change in Iraq had met a dead end. It had degenerated into a simple moral

issue of good and bad. Remove the age old local bad and replace it with an alien good.

That was a gamble the US played over Iraq and lost it. Now Iraq was paying the heavy

price. Regime change in Iraq resulted into a failure.502 Change in the Middle East would

only be negotiated when the West would be ready to talk directly with Hamas, Hizbollah,

Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian government. For, somebody might like it or not, but

it was these organizations that currently represented mainstream opinion in the Middle

East.503

The Governing Council of Iraq had serious flaws from the very beginning. It

faced image problem due to the inclusion of controversial Iraqi exiles, especially persons

like Ahmad Chalabi. Secondly, CPA delayed the creation of popular representation and

legitimate body. Thirdly, its members (GCs) failed to develop their constituencies.

Mostly, they remained out of Iraq.504 Paul Bremer never met Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the

most respected Shia religious leader in Iraq. Sistani asked Bremer not to appoint

members of the governing council. Rather they must be elected through general elections

by the free will of the people. Bremer rejected Sistani’s call and appointed governing

council instead, in utter violation of principles of democracy. This non-elected body

framed the future constitution of the country against the wishes of the Iraqi people. It was

against basic principles of democracy. Sistani did not endorse such a rule as legitimate

and democratic.505 There was a widely held belief among Iraqis that governing council

500 Elie Kedourie. Democracy and Arab Political Culture. (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), 29

501 Jones, Negotiating Change, 9502 Ibid, 8503 Ibid, 9504 Larry Diamond. “What Went Wrong in Iraq”, Foreign Affairs. (September/October, 2004)505 Larry Diamond. Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to

Bring Democracy to Iraq. (New York: Time Books, 2005), 40

154

was actually composed of “US puppets”. It eroded its credibility. Yet governing council

members formed “core” of the successive government. Thus foundations of Iraqi

democracy, if any, were extremely deficient as it did not reflect popular feelings.506 The

promotion of democracy in Iraq remained rhetoric only. The declared causes were not

real.507

On the basis of above cited empirical evidence, it could be safely said that the

compelling reasons of US war on Iraq, WMDs and Iraq’s links with terrorism, lacked

empirical evidence. Particularly, the rhetoric of promotion of democracy in Iraq was a

post-hoc rationale. None of the three stated reasons of US invasion of Iraq in 2003 proved

true. They mainly remained rhetoric and part of Bush Administration propaganda

campaign in the run-up to war. The Administration had hidden agenda to pursue (Amin,

2016). Now the question arose, if there had been a contradiction between stated

objectives of invasion and US operational policy in Iraq, then what was the explanation

of Iraq War? What were the operational objectives of the US invasion of Iraq? This

constituted the most important part of this dissertation and subject of the next chapter.

Chapter Five

The Operational Objectives5.1 Offensive Realist Model:This chapter constituted the second most important part of this dissertation in line with

the logic of offensive realism. The argument built in this chapter was that the operational

US-Iraq policy, particularly from 2003-2008, fitted the assumptions of offensive realism.

Empirical evidence in detail had been provided to prove the case. The US policy during

the period under study was one of “power maximization” in accordance with theory of

offensive realism, and if possible, the establishment of “global hegemony”. In an era of

uni-polarity, 9/11 provided a big opportunity to the Bush Administration. The

administration successfully exploited the opportunity to increase its “share of world

power” and, as an offshore balancer, to remove its rival from power in the Middle East.

506 Jones, Negotiating Change, 252507 Interview with Dr. Tahir Amin (Ex. Head, Dept. of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam

University, Islamabad) by the Researcher. Islamabad. June 16, 2016

155

The unending cycle of wars would continue in the new millennium. The basic

reason for this was that great powers that shaped world political system lived under an

environment of mutual fear and distrust. There had been continuous competition for

power among them. The ultimate objective of a great power had been to attain the

position of a hegemon in the international political system. For the dominance

guaranteed its survival. Consequently, great powers were “fated to clash” because they

always competed for a comparative advantage at the cost of others.508

Great powers, with no exception, always competed for “power maximization”.

Simply speaking they had been “power maximizers”. Their overriding objective had been

to maximize their “share of global power” at the cost of other states. Their final objective

had been to attain the position of a “hegemon” within the international political system.

Great powers had never been “status quo” powers and they were always dissatisfied with

the current configuration of power in the world political system. They always cherished

“revisionist” intentions. They used force to alter the contemporary balance of power in

their favor, most specifically, if practically possible, at a payable price.509

Sometimes, for great powers, the revisionist moves were too risky entailed by

high costs. Under such situation, they waited for favorable circumstances to come. They

constantly scan the horizon and looked for “opportunities” to increase their “share” of

global power. This endless pursuit of power never ended, unless, they achieved their

ultimate goal of a “hegemon” within the contemporary international political system.

Since none of the great powers was likely to attain that position, however, the

international political system was condemned to “permanent great power competition.”510

In other words “great powers are primed for offense.” Great powers perform two

functions. They exploited opportunities to increase their own share of world power. They

also checked rival powers to gain the same advantage.511

Within the international political system “fates” of all states, irrespective of their

power fundamentally depended on the “decision and actions” of great powers. In this

nuclear age, a great power must be armed with nuclear weapons and powerful

508 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, xi-xii509 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 2510 Ibid511 Ibid, 3

156

conventional forces.512 It had been a distinctive character of great powers that they

miscalculated, time and again, and their decisions were based on “wrong judgments”.513

Great powers, as regional hegemons, did not like peer competitors and at the same time,

acting as offshore balancers, prevented potential regional hegemons to achieve that status

in other regions of the globe. Such aspirants, from the stand point of great powers, could

be potential trouble makers. Great powers could go to great lengths to safeguard current

configuration of power in other regions of the world.514

Offensive realism consisted of five basic assumptions. Firstly, international

political system was based on “anarchy” as an “ordering principle”. It meant international

political system consisted of sovereign states having no supra-state controlling authority

over them. Secondly, some “inherent offensive military capability” was wedded in great

powers. They were mutually dangerous competitors. Great powers could “hurt each

other” and at the same time, if possible “destroy each other”. Thirdly, states could never

trust in other states “intentions”.

States never cherished fixed intentions and they could be changed overnight. The

most important thing about intentions was their uncertainty. There had been number of

causes of aggression among states. Rival states could be motivated by any of them at any

given time. Fourthly, like all states existence was the “top most priority” of great powers.

Survival dominated other interests of a great power. Other interests become meaningless

if existence of a great power was jeopardized. Fifthly, like all the states at a given time,

major powers, with no exception, behave in international system as “rational” actors.

They thought strategically about the priorities of rival states. They also rationally thought

about the “outcomes” of their actions and their rival’s actions. Taken together, these five

assumptions created “formidable external environment” of great powers wedded with

great incentives to think and act offensively in relation to each other. Under such

conditions “international political environment” was characterized by “fear, self- help

and power maximization.”515

On the basis of these five assumptions we could understand great power behavior

in international politics. Great power relationship was characterized by fear and 512 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 5513 Ibid, 38514 Ibid, 41515 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 30-32

157

suspicion. There was no room for mutual trust. They always anticipated war. Fear had

been the real motivating force in international politics. It led to dangerous competition

among states. States had to ensure their own existence. They were vulnerable to dangers

in world politics as there was “absence of central authority” to ensure their survival. The

system was based on “self-help. States made alliances, though temporarily, for their

survival. Great powers almost always acted in self-interest. It “pays to be selfish” in

international politics. Great powers feared their rival power’s intentions. In the self-help

system, great powers quickly understood that their survival could be guaranteed only

after gaining “hegemony” in the system. Consequently, they pursued “hegemony” in the

system.516

They constantly scan the horizon and looked for opportunities to change the world

balance of power in their own favor at the expense of their rival powers. Simply

speaking, great powers cherished “aggressive and offensive” intentions (Ibid: 34). John

Mearsheimer, the offensive realist, was of the opinion that only a “misguided great

power” would lose opportunities to become “hegemon” within the system. They did not

behave as “status quo powers” unless they became predominant power in the system. In

this process they even “lie and cheat” and use naked force, if necessary, to gain the

advantage over others in their favor. For them, their “best defense lay in a good

offense.”517 It was clear, Mearsheimer argued, that great powers were “power

maximizers” and with no doubt it was the only “currency of survival in an anarchic

world.”518 Comparatively, powerful great powers behaved more aggressively in the

international political system as they had more military capability to gain advantage.519

The assumptions of offensive realism were “equally true for all great powers.”520

As was the case with all social science theories, there were limits to offensive

realism. Social science theories suffered from anomalies as, for practical reasons, they

simplified complex social phenomenon in two ways. They emphasized some factors,

while at the same time, omitted others. One of the basic principles of offensive realism

was that “systemic factors” shaped the behavior of states. Offensive realism emphasized

516 Ibid, 32-33517 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 36518 Ibid519 Ibid, 37520 Ibid, 54

158

“anarchy and distribution of power” within international political system as the most

important factors to explain international politics. While it paid little consideration to

individual decision makers and domestic politics. Sometimes, the omitted elements,

played central role in decision-making process of states. The factor of “indeterminacy of

offensive realism” was another problem of the theory. It did not answer all the questions

arising in international politics. Under such conditions, other theories supplemented it.

The theory explained how great powers conducted their foreign policy in the past, and

how would they behave in future.521

America had been a “liberal” state. American leadership always presented conflict

and war as a “moral crusade”. Most people in America disliked realism because realism

was at odds with fundamental American values known as American Creed. Most

Americans tended to see America as a benign force in world politics. For rival powers,

American leadership used derogatory terms like “evil empire” and “axis of evil”. The

pronouncements of American decision makers had been always “heavily couched in

liberalism”. However, in privacy, without any exception, they always spoke in “realist”

language. They thought and acted according to realist principles.522 American foreign

policy usually followed realist logic. There had been a “discernible gap between

leadership rhetoric and real policy”. The United States spoke in liberal language but acted

according to realist dictates. Intelligent observers, the worldover, understood this

tendency in US foreign policy.523

The US imposed unilateral and preemptive war on Iraq in March 2003, ignoring

UN. Later on, on the basis of empirical evidence, the stated reasons of the war were

discredited. On the eve of US War on Iraq in March 2003, the US context consisted of

three elements. America was “too powerful, confident of its military capability, and also

worried about its national security”. It was a fearful context. It was a dangerous

combination of “hubris and anxiety” that led to Iraq war.524 Iraq became a case study of

the application of offensive realism.525

521 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 10-11522 Ibid, 22-25523 Ibid, 26

524 Ari Shavit. “White Man’s Burden”, Ha’aretz, May 4, 2003525 Interview with Dr. M. Islam

159

It was under this context that US invaded Iraq in March 2003. The following

factors, in combination, made the US war on Iraq in 2003 an excellent case study of

offensive realist model. The US conduct in war on terror, especially in case of Iraq, could

be analyzed according to the principles of offensive realism. The US unilateral and

preemptive invasion of Iraq was made under “The US Grand Strategy”- the new

theoretical foundations for conducting US foreign policy in war on terror. The new

offensive theoretical foundations were laid down in this respect. This chapter analyzed

these new theoretical foundations along with the operational objectives of the US war on

Iraq.

5.2 The US Grand Strategy: The Bush Administration introduced new theoretical basis in its conduct of war on terror.

It worked as a blueprint for over- all US foreign policy. These offensive principles were

as followed:

5.2.1 Maintenance of Unipolarity:

To begin with the US wanted to keep its predominant position in the post-Cold War

period. The US wanted a world without competitors in 21st century. The US also wanted

to keep military predominance beyond challenges. The President made this point in his

West Point speech in June, 2002. In 21st century the US would maintain “unchallengeable

military forces” to manage world order.526

5.2.2 New Analysis of Global Threats:

In the contemporary world “new type of global threats” had emerged. They were coming

from small groups of international terrorists. In some cases, perhaps, they were in

collusion with outlaw states. These terrorists might acquire WMD. The terrorists could

not be appeased. They could not also be deterred. The Bush Administration believed

there was no other way to deal with them but only their elimination.527

5.2.3 Irrelevance of Theory of Deterrence:

In this age of terrorism, theory of deterrence had become irrelevant believed the Bush

Administration. The theory was no more viable. The new threats were coming from

terrorists who had no home addresses. The threat was coming from non-state actors. They

526 Ikenberry, America’s Imperial Ambition, 44-60527 Ibid, 50

160

could not be deterred either because they were willing to die. The only effective strategy

against them was “offensive”.528

5.2.4 Recasting the Terms of Sovereignty:

The terrorists did not respect international borders and sovereignty of states. There were

countries that harbored these terrorists. They did so either by consent or they were too

weak to take actions against these terrorists. These states “forfeited their right to

sovereignty” believed President Bush. If possessed, these “rogue states” might deliver

WMD to terrorists. America had the right to take action against these states. These

countries would be held responsible for the developments within their borders. The Bush

Administration decided to apply this provocative principle on global level.529

5.2.5 No Room for Multilateral Institutions:

For the Bush Administration, multilateral institutions like UN had outgrown their utility.

They had become outdated and obsolete. They were obstructionist. The US would

operate on its own terms in the system.530

5.2.6 The Bush Doctrine-A Blueprint for Dominance/ Hegemony:

The Bush doctrine fundamentally consisted of three elements.

(i) Preemption

(ii) Unilateralism

(iii) Regime Change

In his state of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, about fourteen months before the

US war on Iraq, President George W. Bush said that his great objective was the

elimination of threats coming from terrorists and absolutist-dictators that pursued

weapons of mass destruction. These absolutist regimes and terrorists constituted what he

termed as “axis of evil”. Iraq was hostile to the US interests and supported international

terrorists. He included Iran, Iraq, and North Korea in his “axis of evil”.531

The President further said, grave dangers were gathering around America and we

could not wait for them to strike on America.532 Bob Woodward cited Charles

528 Ibid, 51529 Gaddis, Grand Strategy in Second Term, 2-15530 Meena Bose, and Rosanna Perotti. From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of

George HW Bush. Vol. 393. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002531 George W. Bush. “President’s State of the Union Address”, U.S. Capitol, Washington D.C.:

January 29, 2002532 Bush, State of the Union Address, 2002

161

Krauthammer’s comments on President’s address in the Washington post. Krauthammer

commented that “the speech was all about Iraq”. There had been “serious discussion” in

the Bush Administration on what to do about Iraq. That discussion was over now. The

address was but just short of a “declaration of war” on Iraq.533

In the following days, it became clear that America was developing plans for a

war on Iraq in 2003.534 To the “axis of evil” speech Europe reacted immediately. The

Europeans were worried about the possible extension of the war against terror. Chris

Patten, European Union Commissioner for international relations commented on the

speech as “absolutist and simplistic”.535 A British columnist, Hugo Young, called the

speech as American “triumphalism”.536

There was big criticism in Europe. Colin Powell reacted negatively to this

European criticism. Reacting to European criticism Richard Perle wrote that America

would protect herself against terrorism. We would, if necessary, “leave friends and go

alone”. Richard Perle also argued in New York Times that America could not win war on

terror if Saddam Hussein continued to rule Iraq. The US “must overthrow” him.537

Daalder and Lindsay in their book, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in

Foreign Policy argued that President Bush came to power with a clear concept of use of

hard power through unilateralist approach in foreign policy.538 Condoleezza Rice, the

National Security Advisor criticized Clinton Administration’s internationalist agenda and

asserted that the new Administration would start from the firm grounds of the US

national interests.539 The essence of the matter was that the challenges were essentially

military in nature and that only a military power could resolve them.540

With the coming of unipolar world, Samuel Huntington argued that the US

needed new strategic doctrine in accordance with the new international political

environment. Mel Gurtov citing Charles Krauthammer wrote, about Saddam Hussein

533 Woodward, Plan Of Attack, 95534 Thom Shanker, and David E. Sanger. “US Envisions Blueprint on Iraq Including Big Invasion

Next Year.” New York Times. April 28, 2002, A1535 Jonathan Freedland. “Patten Lays into Bush’s America.” The Guardian. February 9, 2002

536 Hugo Young. “Only American National Interest Counts Now.” The Guardian. January 31, 2002537 Crockatt, America Embattled, 157-158538 Ivo H. Daalder, and James M. Lindsay. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign

Policy. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2003)539 Rice, National Interest, 60-62 540 Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, 2, 31-35

162

after First Gulf War, America squandered away unipolar moment to oust Saddam from

power in Baghdad. The US should have done that.541

A radical version of realism was emerging that it was the proper time for the US

to impose its power as well as its values on the world.542 The Bush Administration

developed a new doctrine regarding the use of US military forces based on fear after

9/11.543 David Dunn argued about the Bush Doctrine that it was a combination of four

elements “realism, American exceptionalism, unilateralism and threat inflation.”544

(Dunn, 2003). For the first time the Bush Doctrine was enunciated in President Bush’s

speech at West Point in June, 2002. Later on, the doctrine was incorporated in the

National Security Strategy President Bush of September 2002. The doctrine was based on

two pillars. Firstly, America would maintain its military supremacy at any cost; secondly,

America arrogated the “right to preemptive action” under the cover of self defense.545

Taken together, the doctrine carried two implications. First, American sovereignty

took precedence over international obligations and treaties. Second, sovereignty of all

other states on the globe was subject to the Bush doctrine.546 Spreading democracy

worldwide was one of the stated objectives of the National Security Strategy. In reality it

meant America would prevail.547 The key threats were seen coming from terrorists, weak

states, and rogue states. The US administration decided to counter them through a

combination of two factors, strong military forces and American values and. For the

President Bush the threat was unprecedented and so was the American response.548 The

basic thinking enshrined in the Bush doctrine was that the US would act before enemies

did.549

541 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 27542 Ibid543 Randeep Ramesh (Eds.). The War We Could Not Stop: The Real Story of Battle of Iraq.

(London: Faber and Faber, 2003), 3-22544 David H. Dunn. “Myths Motivations and Misunderestimations: The Bush Administration and

Iraq”, International Affairs 79, no 2, (2003), 279-297545 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 11546 Ibid547 Ibid548 Jeffery Record. Dark Victory: America’s Second War against Iraq. (Annapolis, MD: Naval

Institute Press, 2004), 32-44549 The National Security Strategy of United States of America. (Washington D.C.: GPO,

September 2002), iii, 1

163

Another policy tied to the Bush doctrine was outlined in the 2001known as policy

of regime change.550 The Bush doctrine did not emphasize on immediate threat. The

doctrine emphasized on action rather.551 The problem with the controversial doctrine was

that the US made two separate standards of conducting foreign policy. One was for the

US. Other for rest of the world.552 The expression “axis of evil” was deliberately used

equating Iraq with Axis Powers of WWII.553 The underlying objective was to mobilize

public support for Iraq war.554 President Bush put Iraq on the top of his security agenda.

In case of Clinton it was in the last of his list.555

Washington destroyed dual policy of containment and deterrence as being

outdated. President Bush invaded Iraq on the basis of “faulty intelligence and

questionable assumptions”. America imposed “preventive war” on Iraq.556 The Bush

Doctrine mainly consisted of three elements preemption, unilateralism, and regime

change.557 In an era of unipolarity, being a great America tried to restructure international

political system in accordance with its values and interests by the use of military force.

President Bush took it as a US right. Iraq became first victim of the doctrine.558 The Bush

doctrine made Iraq a case study of the application of offensive realism.559

i) Preemption:

In his address to the graduating cadets at West Point, New York, on June 1, 2002,

President Bush announced his “doctrine of preemption” for the first time. Later on, the

doctrine was incorporated in his National Security Strategy of September the same year.

The State of the Union Address 2002 identified the possible targets. The President was

worried about the grave dangers being presented from a fatal combination of religious

“radicalism and modern technology” of warfare. The cold war strategies of “deterrence

and containment” were no more viable in this age of terrorism.

550 Quadrennial Defense Review. (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2001)551 Lawrence Freedman. Deterrence. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 94552 Ibid, 84-108553 David Frum. The Right Man: An Inside Account of the Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush.

(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2003), 224-245554 Pullan, US Intervention Policy, 181555 Bill Clinton. My Life. (USA: Vintage Books, 2005), 935556 George A. Lopez, and David Cortright. “Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked”, Foreign Affairs

83, no 4, (2004), 103557 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 2558 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 13559 Interview With Dr. Noman

164

Containment had outlived its utility because absolutist regimes secretly could

deliver WMD to the terrorists. America could not win war against terror “on the

defensive”. America had no choice but to become “forward-looking and resolute”. The

President said, America must be “ready for preemptive action” to defend our sovereignty.

In the speech, President warned the rogue states. They would “pay dearly”.560

The doctrine of “preemption” was “a shift with profound implications”. It was a

“dangerous example”. The new doctrine poised for unilateral invasions of other

countries.561 The doctrine declared US intention to “maintain its hegemony”, certainly by

using powerful US military forces.562 John Ikenberry argued about the doctrine and NSS

as the “basis for maintaining US unipolarity”. America wanted a world with no “peer

competitor”. The doctrine disregarded multilateral institutions. Now they carried “little

value”. It presented US as a revisionist state. It left the US less secure.563 The doctrine

was a blueprint for “preventive not preemptive war”. The concept of preventive war was

actually a war crime.564 President Bush pursued policy of “anticipatory self-defense”. It

was a policy similar to the policy of “imperial Japan” which Japan employed at Pearl

Harbor. Then Japan lived in infamy. Today, America lived in infamy.565

Historian Arthur Schlesinger further argued that the “global wave of sympathy”

for the US after 9/11 had ended. It had been replaced by a “global wave of hatred” for the

US. It was the result of American “arrogance and militarism” argued the historian on the

eve of Iraq war.566 Richard Falk, an international law expert argued that Iraq war was just

like German attack which started WWII in 1939. That was the crime under “international

law” for which German leaders were indicated and punished at Nuremberg trials.567

It became clear that Washington was determined to maintain US world primacy

ignoring the UN. Later on, rationale of the war was discounted. Then, the Bush

Administration revised its basis of engagement in Iraq. The new rules, though self made,

560 Bush, West Point Speech, 2002561 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 133562 Chomsky, American Power, 11563 Ikenberry, America’s Imperial Ambition, 44-60564 Noam Chomsky. “Preventive War: The Supreme Crime”, Z Net Interactive. (August 11, 2003) 565 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. “Good Foreign Policy a Casualty of War.” Los Angeles Times. March 23,

2003, M1566 Schlesinger, Good Foreign Policy, 2003567 Richard Falk. “Resisting the Global Domination Project.” Frontline 20, no. 8, (2003), 12-25

165

would give the right to the US to act against a hostile regime that was intended to develop

WMD. Only the US would decide about the potential intentions of such a regime.568

The US would rule the world through the naked of use of her military forces.

Henceforth the US would have the right to strike preemptively.569 It meant preventive

action and not preemptive.570 The US preemptive war on Iraq was interpreted as the US

“right to aggression”.571 The doctrine of preemption was a fundamental departure from

traditional US policy. It unleashed a new era in international relations with profound

implications on war and peace.572 The preemptive wars had been a “practice” in US

foreign policy for a century in the “Western Hemisphere.”573

What Bush Administration advocating was, in fact, preventive war, an offensive

war fought to destroy enemy. The US Department of Defense defined “preventive war”

as a war though not “imminent but inescapable”. The delay would be dangerous.574 The

doctrine strongly implied the concept of “limited sovereignty” even for unfriendly

countries.575 Lemann interviewed Richard Haas in the first term of President Bush. In

response to a question Haas said in US war on terror, the states that “failed to meet their

obligations forfeited their right to sovereignty”. He further said that under these

circumstances other sates, including America, retained their “right to preventive self-

defense”. America could act in anticipation. It was a question of “when not if.”576

9/11 initiated a fundamental revision in the US national security strategy. The

underlying belief was that contemporary international norms did not protect US interests.

The new approach was followed by a “preemptive” policy. America, in reality, followed

“preventive war strategy” in invading Iraq in March, 2003.577 The Iraq war was imposed

on the basis of false intelligence. The war reinforced great concerns of the world related

to the use of US military power without restraints. The doctrine made it clear that 568 Guy Dinmore, James Harding, and Cathy Newman, “Iraqi Arms Finds Not Likely, Says US

Official”, Financial Times (London), (May 3, 2003), 1569 Chomsky, Imperial Ambition, 2570 Ibid571 “The Bush Administration's Doctrine of Preemption (and Prevention): When, How,

Where?”CFR.org. Council on Foreign Relations, 1 Feb. 2004572 Kolko, Age of War, 129573 Ibid, 126574 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated terms. Department of Defense, April 12, 2002, in

Jeffery Record Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, 49575 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 41576 Ibid577 Walt, Taming American Power, 58-59

166

America would “impose preventive war” whenever it decided, most importantly, on the

basis of its own interpretation of empirical evidence not with standing concerns of the

world.578

The US preventive invasion of Iraq did more “harm than good.”579 Lawrence

Freemand, a British Scholar argued about the ambiguity of situations on which doctrine

of preemption could be applied. Other states might use the doctrine as “rationalization for

aggression.”580 Critics raised three main objections on preemption; the doctrine was used

against Iraq in violation of international law and norms, preemptive action required that it

must be taken after reliable intelligence, and thirdly, the world had ended up as a more

dangerous place. Still the US applied that doctrine in the name of its own security, on the

basis of its own threat perception, and its own choice of time and decision.581

The “doctrine of preemption” reflected American strategy for 21st century, the

“US imperialism” which other nations could not accept for being dangerous. Dan Plesch

argued, Iraq was the first target and China the last one.582 The National Security Strategy

of President Bush based on preemption was a blueprint for spreading American values.583

The doctrine and its application on Iraq created greatest divide between the US and its

NATO allies since the end of WWII. It was a big disaster.584 Peter Boenisch, Helmut

Kohl’s press secretary, called doctrine of preemption a “crime”.585

The war marked a major change in the behavior of the US, the “world hegemon”

and in the international norms that dealt with world politics since the end of WWII. The

US war on Iraq adversely affected war on terror and the relevance of international law

and UN. It also negatively affected NATO, the stability of the Middle East region, and

the Persian Gulf. It also affected role of oil in the international political economy.586

The war initiated a “qualitative change in the coercive methods of American

foreign policy” in the Middle East. The doctrine of preemption invoked the “US right to

use military forces” to overcome the resistance, if any, in the way of hegemony through

578 Walt, Taming American Power, 59-60579 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 1580 Freedman, Deterrence, 4581 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 370-371582 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 203583 Black, Great Powers, 209584 Shawcross, Allies, 72-73585 Ibid, 103586 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, vii

167

preventive wars. It is important to note that some authors had cited Paul O’ Neil,

Treasury Secretary and Richard Clarke, Bush advisor on terrorism, saying that an attack

on Iraq was discussed in the “first-meeting of National Security Council” in the aftermath

of 9/11 tragedy.587

The Iraq war was illegal. It was illegal because it was not supported by UN.588

The words preemptive actions were carefully chosen. The application of the word

preemptive had been driven by solid empirical evidence. The missiles in Cuba could be

cited as reference to preemptive. But here the use of the word preemptive was very close

to the concept of prevention. Here in case of Iraq real basis of prevention was

“suspicion”.589 There was only, if any, just one percent probability of hard evidence. The

Cheney doctrine stated it must be treated as certainty in the US reaction. The war was

launched from the brain of the Vice President.590

General Tony Zinni ® wrote that he was known as “outspoken” in US military

force. He further said that many of our Generals did not speak the truth. In the US war on

Iraq he saw “negligence and irresponsibility” on the part of decision makers; at worst he

also saw it was “lying and corruption”. We went to Iraq under “false rationales”…there

was lack of planning as well as alienation of American allies. All these things forced me

to speak the truth.591 Since September 20, 2002, the Bush Administration officially

adopted a new approach to “global governance” an “imperial posture” known as the Bush

Doctrine. The US invasion of Iraq in March, 2003 was an “unprovoked” war against

Iraq.592 Bob Woodward quoted Senator Edward Kennedy saying that it was nothing less

than “21st century American imperialism”. The world could not and should not accept

it.593

The policy which President Bush followed in Iraq war was more than preemption.

In reality it was prevention. The difference between preemptive war and preventive war

was one of legality. First was legal war while second one, an illegal act of aggression. A

587 Ibid, 290-292588 Steele, Defeat, 6589 Suskind, One Percent Doctrine, 150590 Ibid, 213591 Tom Clancy, Gen Tony Zinni (retd) and Tony Koltz, Battle Ready. (New York: G.P.Putnam’s

Sons, 2004), 426-427592 Fouskas and Gokay, New American Imperialism, 3593 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 203

168

preemptive war was legal under international law under the special set of circumstances.

International law did not recognize preventive war.594 This policy could be a greater

threat to the US national security than the actual use of WMD by any of the so called

rogue powers. This was “preventive war” as well.595The most important question was

whether America was more secure after two wars-Afghanistan and Iraq?

The US war on Iraq under the cover of the Bush doctrine of “preemption” was

illegal. This was a view given by overwhelming majority of international lawyers. In the

view of Ed Firmage, professor of law, university of Utah College of Law, that this war

was “unconstitutional” that it was imposed in gross violation of international law, and

greatly threatened US national security. America was not attacked by Iraq. The “war

constituted a war crime.”596 The late US supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, who

acted as prosecutor at Nuremberg trials said whatever might be the case an “aggressive

war was illegal act” come what may.597

(ii) Unilateralism:

Unilateralism was a condition which referred to “go-alone” approach in foreign policy of

a state. It also referred to a situation where a state acted with other states but on its own

terms.598 States acted alone because they did not want to bind themselves by the

standardized principles of conduct. For them such principles might be inimical and

against their national interest.599 During 19th and early 20th centuries, Britain was the

dominant power on world political stage. In post-WWII era, the US replaced Great

Britain as a dominant power in international political system.600

George W. Bush’s approach to foreign policy, especially during his first term,

was largely unilateralist, if the President could afford.601 The unilateralist foreign policy

strategy of the US was mainly rooted in the following six bases. With the end of the cold

war and subsequent disintegration of USSR, the bipolar system also ended. The US

594 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 44-45595 James H. Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security

Policy after 9/11. (London: Routledge, 2007), 9-10596 Geoffrey Leslie Simons. Future Iraq: US policy in reshaping the Middle East. (New Dehli: Viv

Books, 2006), 16-17597 Ibid598 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 259599 Malone and Khong, Unilateralism and US, 2-5600 Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 231 601 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 259

169

remained the sole superpower. To borrow Charles Krauthammer’s words, it was the

“unipolar moment”. America possessed powerful military and globally domineering

economy. Democracy was in progress around the globe.602

No country in the world history ever dominated international political system of

sovereign states the way America did.603 Indeed some authors called it an age of

“American empire”. Richard Perle advocated unilateralist approach in the US foreign

policy in war against terror. He cited two reasons for this approach-price of a collective

judgment in an alliance and collective decision making. Coalitions and alliances

restrained US freedom of action. He delivered this speech in November, 2001 about

eighteen months before the Iraq war.604

The first basis of the US unilateralism was unipolarity. Condoleezza Rice argued

during 2000 election campaign that power was the most important ingredient of the

national interest. Majority of Americans were not “comfortable with the concept of

power politics” and great power behavior.605 Clinton administration was criticized for its

inaction. “American power” was the “inescapable reality” of contemporary era.606

American foreign policy should reflect and sustain this “primacy”.607 Some realists

opposed US war on Iraq as it was against the logic of power politics. John J.

Mearsheimer argued that states always pursued and would always continue to seek

opportunities at the cost of other states. They also tried their best to deny any comparative

advantage to other states.608 The US needed to seek and maintain its primacy in

international political system but in ways that were acceptable to other states.609

The third basis of US unilateralism was that the US democracy at home was being

undermined by the multilateral institutions and international agreements. The decisive

issue which America faced was how to protect US sovereignty against the onslaught of

602 Krauthamer, Charles. “The Unipolar Movement Revisited”, The National Interest. 70, 2002-03: 5-17

603 Brooks and Wohlforth, American Primacy, 2002604 Perle, US Must Strike, 2001605 Rice, National Interest, 2000606 William Kristol, and Robert Kagan. “The Present Danger”, National Interest 59, (Spring 2000),

67607 Christopher Layne. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand

Strategy after the Cold War”, International Security 22, no 1, (summer 1997), 86-124608 John J. Mearsheimer. “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security

19, no 3, (winter 1994-95), 12609 Walt, Taming American Power, 217

170

multilateralism?610 The issues mostly debated in America were about the jurisdiction of

International Criminal Court over American soldiers, or American soldiers operating

under UN in peace-keeping missions. The debate was not only about the foreign policy. It

was about the US constitutional limitations. Historian Arthur Schlesinger argued that

unilateralism was the oldest tradition of US foreign Policy.611 Unilateralists took their

concept from “American exceptionalism”. It was neither good for the US nor for the rest

of the globe. They constituted “conservative wing” of the Republican Party.612

Inefficacy of multilateral institutions was the fourth basis of opting for

unilateralist approach in US foreign Policy. If going through multilateralist way, the US

would face loss of freedom of action in vital foreign policy issues. UN would get veto

power over US interests. Mearsheimer was of the view that multilateral institutions

carried little weight, if any, on the conduct of states. Thus they would not promote

stability in international political system, during post-Cold War era. This was one of the

principal reasons that President Bush opted for unilateralist-invasion of Iraq in 2003.613

So many countries with diverse national interests participated in the process jointly.

Mainly they hindered quick action. The decisions were made on the basis of one-country,

one-vote. The US carried equal weight with Luxemburg and Ecuador. The problem with

international law was that it was deeply flawed.614

The fifth basis of US unilateralist policy was the concept of US national interest.

Much emphasis on global interests actually relegated national interest to a second-order

level, argued Rice.615 In reality, global interest, as such, could not make justification for

major foreign policy decisions and action.616 That was what on the basis of which

unilateralists criticized Clinton Administration for its policy on global issues such as the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, and

International Criminal Court. These were not in American interest.617 In run-up to Iraq

610 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 263611 Ibid612 Ibid613 Mearsheimer, False Promise, 1994-95614 John R. Bolton. “Unilateralism is Non-Isolationism in American Foreign Relations” In Gwyn

Prins (ed.), Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign Relations. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000: 81

615 Rice, National Interest, 2000616 Ibid617 Ibid

171

war Bush Administration criticized humanitarian military interventions as “social work”.

In these cases vital US national interests were not-involved. America could not commit

US troops for social work.618

The concept of the US as a “benevolent hegemon” was the last basis of US

unilateralism. The US occupied unprecedented powerful position, both in strength and

influence, the human history had ever seen. This position must be used for the “spread of

American values.”619 The US must use its dominant position to expand liberal world

order.620 The US had to play the “unique role of spreading American values across the

globe” through the use of American military force.621 Some war hawks held powerful

positions in the Bush Administration. Others influenced through media and think tanks.

The result was American unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003.

President George W. Bush’s foreign policy was a big departure from previous US

administrations. He was “skeptical of multilateral institutions” such as cold war alliances.

The president followed “go alone” foreign policy.622 In his drive to unilateralism,

President Bush formally removed his Bill Clinton’s “signature” from International

Criminal Court treaty and put great pressure on some other nations to reject the

international treaty on international criminal court.623

By September 2001, the President had already rejected Kyoto Protocol on global

warming, actively campaigned against international criminal court, also did the same to

Biological Weapons Convention, and also strongly opposed international convention on

landmines. On this unilateralist approach, Economist commented…which treaty did the

President like? In reality, the President opposed “multilateral” approach.624 9/11 tragedy

made President Bush a “War President” overnight and it strongly reinforced his

unilateralist approach to the US foreign policy.625

618 Micheal Mandelbaum. “Foreign Policy as Social Work”, Foreign Affairs 75, no 1, (January/February 1996), 16-32

619 National Security Strategy, 2002620 Richard K. Betts, “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of

Terrorism”, Political Science Quarterly 117, no 1, (2002), 21621 Andrew J. Bacevich. The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War.

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 75 622 Walt, Taming American Power, 31623 Ibid, 56

624 “Can Sanctions Be Smarter?” The Economist. May 26, 2001625 Walt, Taming American Power, 58

172

In his drive to unilateralism, President Bush even abrogated ABM Treaty of 1972

despite opposition from the US allies626 Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor,

later on confirmed that the decision to enforce war on Iraq was made even before the US

went to UN for consultation. Failure to get fresh UN stamp did not slow the US drive to

war.627 The unilateralist turn in US foreign policy was, in fact, the result of some internal

developments in the US, which led to the electoral success of a political and ideological

coalition known as neoconservatives. This coalition had an overriding vision of a distinct

cultural tradition in America. This vision was based on a new “American nationalism”.

This type of nationalism emerged whenever Americans perceived themselves as a

universal nation, a people with a special mission to perform. American interests were

identified with the interests of the world.628

In its unilateral drive, Congress held back American dues to UN and imposed

unilateral measures over IMF, World Bank and WTO.629 The Republican President and

the Republican majority in the Congress after November 2002, the midterm elections,

took an activist global perspective and left the multilateral approach in favor of

unilateralism in American foreign policy to pursue national interests.630 With little regard

to the opposition coming from majority of the UNSC, particularly from France and

Germany the US decided to invade Iraq unilaterally.631 The unilateralism in American

foreign policy since 2000 was the outcome of a “complex process of redefinition of

political and cultural identity” of America.632

There had been a big increase in US defense budget after 9/11. In the year 2000,

the US defense budget was $295 billion. For the same year the combined respective

figure for both Russia and China was $100 billion. America spent $310 billion in 2001,

more than the sum total of next nine countries of the world. In the year 2005, the US

military spending had risen to $440 billion. The same expenditure for the year 2007 was

626 Walt, Taming American Power, 97627 Nicholas Leman. “How it came to War: When Did Bush Decide That He Had to Fight

Saddam?” The New Yorker. March 31, 2003: 36628 Fabrinni, United States Contested, 3-4629 Ibid, 10630 Ibid, 12-13631 Ibid632 P.T. McCartney. “American Nationalism and US Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq

War”, Political Science Quarterly 119, no 3, (2004), 399-423

173

over $500. Such was the US unilateral drive after 9/11 tragedy.633 In its turn to

unilateralism President Bush departed from President Clinton who saw China as a

“strategic partner”. President Bush now saw China as a “rival rather than a partner.” 634

The doctrine asked for an unrestrained use of military force.635 Even friendly countries

were not immune from the doctrine.636

(iii) Regime Change:

The Bush Administration was unable to make a case for regime change in Iraq. The

Administration concocted a story about Iraq being an “imminent” threat. The

Administration became selective in picking the facts. In reality, Iraq had abandoned

WMD programs, and as a devastated country Iraq was not an imminent threat. The

intelligence agencies exaggerated Iraq’s military capabilities especially WMD. The

invasion was deliberately exaggerated on the basis of Saddam’s intentions. The war on

Iraq started unraveling immediately after the invasion by some personnel who were under

pressure to make the case of WMD possession.637 Two reporters concluded after

interviewing some important officials of the Bush Administration that “selective

information was deliberately floated” in media. The White House did not correct this

situation.638

Allegations on Iraq about aluminum tubes, yellow cake, and revelations from

Iraqi defectors were exaggerated. Joseph Wilson visited Niger on CIA’s behalf to

investigate about the “Yellow cake” issue, who wrote later on in New York Times and in

his memoirs. He criticized Administrations rationale about Iraq war.639 George Tenet

ultimately accepted blame for the “failure of intelligence” community.640 Ultimately, the

White House acknowledged failure of incorrect story about the “yellow cake”.641 The

administration claims about Iraq’s WMD, later on were discredited.642

633 Black, Great Powers, 209 634 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 37-38635 Ikenberry, America’s Imperial Ambition, 44-60636 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 42637 Nicholos D. Kristof. “Save our Spooks”, New York Times. May 30, 2003638 Barton Gellman, and Walter Pincus. “Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence”,

Washington Post. August 29, 2003639 Joseph Wilson, The Politics of Truth: Inside the Lies That Put the White House on Trial and

Betrayed My Wife's CIA Identity. Public Affairs, 2005640 Ibid641 David Sanger. “Bush Claim on Iraq Had Flawed Origin”, New York Times. July 8, 2003

174

Similar developments were going on in Great Britain. The BBC reported that intelligence

officials were compelled by the Blair government to “sex up” a report on the status of

Iraq’s WMD. The report said, among other things, that Iraq’s WMD could reach Britain

within a short span of “forty five minutes” only. Blair government used this report to

invade Iraq along with the US.643 The subsequent Parliamentary inquiries established that

the Blair government “ignored contradictory evidence and exaggerated the threat” of

Iraqi WMD. Blair participated in the war just to satisfy Bush Administration. In protest

Robin Cook, a cabinet member, resigned in March 2003. Later on, Cook wrote in his

memoirs that Blair participated in the war just to please President Bush.644

Blair government, in an utter deceit, kept dissenting opinion out of place and did

not make it available to the House of Commons committee on intelligence.645 Saddam

regime did not use WMD against the invading forces. It was a “big surprise”. On the

other hand, the invading forces did not find any WMD. The Bush Administration was

simply wrong about Saddam regimes intentions.646 It seemed, as if, the administration

“intentionally” kept the relevant information about the presumed al-Qaeda-Saddam

regime link out of place. The information given by high level al-Qaeda captives was

“deliberately kept out of the public reach.”647

The Al-Qaeda captives summarily rejected the hypothesis about al-Qaeda links

with Iraq. Osama bin Laden had “rejected collaboration” with Iraq, said the captives. The

US administration knew this information about “a year before the war” on Iraq. The

administration deliberately did not share the information with the public at large. The

administration knowingly did that. The careful and cautious language of NIE of 2002 was

ignored.648 This fictitious link between Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda was kept alive in public

statements as a rationale of war. President Bush told American people in September 2003

about the operational collaboration between Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda. Colin Powell, in 642 Judith Miller, and William J. Broad. "Some Analysts of Iraq Trailers Reject Germ Use." New York Times, 2003: A1

643 Sarah Lyall. “Blair Denies Distorted Reports on Iraq Weapons”, New York Times. May 31, 2003

644 Warren Hoge. “Inquiry Shows How Blair’s Inner Circle Made Case for Iraq War”, New York Times. August 24, 2003

645 Ibid646 James Conway, cited in James Dao, and Thom Shanker. "After the War: Evidence; Powell

Defends Information He Used to Justify Iraq War." New York Times. 2003, A6647 James Risen. “Captives Deny Al-Qaeda Worked with Baghdad”, New York Times. June 9, 2003648 Walter Pincus. “Bush Overstated Iraq-al-Qaeda Link”, Washington Post. June 23, 2003

175

his address to the UNSC in February 2003, alleged about the “sinister nexus” between

“Iraq and al-Qaeda” in terrorism.

After fall of the Saddam regime, the US weapons inspection team, after spending

two months in searching WMD in Iraq, returned empty handed.649 They were followed by

a bigger US inspection team consisted of 1400 experts headed by David Kay rather than

UN weapons inspectors. The US inspection team was known as Iraq Survey Group. The

team spent four months in Iraq in searching WMD.650 Ultimately, David Kay resigned.

Kay insisted that Iraq did not “possess WMD on the eve of war” due to UN inspections in

Iraq.651 Charles Duelfer reported back after extensive survey with the ISG. The result was

the same. No WMD were found in Iraq. The last weapons inspector left Iraq in early

2005.652

Both, Hans Blix and his successor, Demetrius Perricos, criticized US and Britain

for their culture of “hyping” in the run-up to Iraq war in relation to WMD issue. Hans

Blix compared the search for Iraq’s WMD with medieval “witch hunt”. Perricos came to

the same conclusion about the possession of WMD’s. It was hard to believe about the

presence of stockpiles in Iraq.653 Both, Hans Blix and David Kay argued that Iraq was not

an imminent threat on the eve of war. The Administration’s stand on Iraq’s WMD as

imminent threat was “fatally flawed”.654 Kay and George Tenet, the CIA director argued

before Congress that Iraq did not present an “imminent threat” and Tenet insisted that

CIA never saw Iraq as an imminent threat to the US, and its neighbors. However, both

agreed that the Administration’s decision to go to war against Iraq on the basis of

Saddam’s presumed intentions was right. Powell also agreed with this conclusion.655

However, Tenet resigned in June, 2004.

Everything taking into account, the presence of WMD in Iraq was a false issue.

The Bush Administration was not satisfied short of “regime change” in Iraq. The

administration “twisted the intelligence” even “lied” to the people about its real

649 Barton Gellman. “Frustrated US Arms Team to Leave Iraq”, Washington Post. May 11, 2003650 James Risen, and Judith Miller. “No Illicit Arms Found in Iraq, US Inspector Tells Congress”,

New York Times. October 3, 2003651 Richard W. Stevenson. “Iraq Illicit Arms Gone Before War, Inspector Insists”, New York

Times. January 24, 2004652 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 84653 “Blix Decries Spin and Hype of Iraq Weapon Claims”, Reuters (London), September 18, 2003654 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 84655 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 84

176

objectives in Iraq war, and used the issue of presence of WMD in Iraq. Finally the theme

of spreading democracy in Iraq and the region was presented to manipulate public

opinion. The worst case scenario suited Bush Administration’s ambitions in the Middle

East region and the world at large. Mel Gurtov cited Ron Huisken, an Australian, who

contended that the Bush Administration went beyond “misusing the intelligence”.

Regime change in Iraq was part of a broader project. The Administration wanted to

project America’s unique position as the most powerful state in the world.656

Paul Wolfowitz conceded in an interview that the issue of Iraq’s WMD was used

for bureaucratic reasons “as it was the issue on which everyone could agree on.”657 Dick

Cheney, the Vice President, Rumsfeld, Rice and the President all were determined to

impose war on Iraq. The opposition was dubbed as “revisionist historians”.658 On the

basis of above cited empirical evidence it could safely be said that the Bush

Administration was determined to go to war against-Iraq for regime change. The

Congress hearings on Iraq started in August 2002. By then the US military forces were

actively involved in war planning on Iraq. The question was about the reason? By then, at

least, if not before, the President had finalized the decision to go to war. The empirical

evidence had been provided by a “secret memorandum” of July 23, 2002. The

memorandum was leaked to the British print media, and known as the Downing Street

Memo.

The memo provided irrefutable evidence that President Bush had decided about

the war about “eight months before” the actual invasion took place in March, 2003. The

memo was classified as “Secret and Strictly Personal UK Eyes only”. It was further

marked as “extremely sensitive”. The memorandum was related to a meeting between

Prime Minister Tony Blair and his top aides. The text of the memo said that Sir Richard

Wilson, the head of British intelligence, reported about his recent talks with the Bush

Administration officials. The war was seen as inevitable. President George W. Bush had

decided to topple Saddam regime in Iraq, through the use of military forces. The

conjunction between terrorism and WMD provided the sufficient justification for regime

change, and the “decision to invade Iraq had already been made”. Now facts and

656 Ibid, 85657 Paul Krugman. “Waggy Dog Stories”, New York Times. May 30, 2003658 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 85

177

intelligence would be fixed around the decision. The Administration did not want to go

through UN route. They were least concerned about the aftermath of the war.659

The memorandum testified about the Bush policy on Iraq. The Administration

was committed to war. Nothing was going to divert or stop it. The memo further stated

that the US decision of regime change in Iraq was not legal. Iraqi regime was no more a

threat to its neighbors. The memo also stated that “the accounts of O’Neill and Richard

Clarke were correct”. These two men testified that the decision to go to war was made at

about “mid-2002”.660 The most important accusation President Bush put on Iraq in his

State of the Union Address was known as “sixteen-word fiasco”. The President accused

Saddam Hussein of buying significant quantities of uranium from Africa known as

“Yellow Cake”. The main theme presented in his speeches was that Iraq made a direct

threat to US security and interests.661

There were other important personnel of the Bush Administration who overstated

the Saddam threat. Powell in his speech to UNSC on February 5, 2003 accusing Iraqi

regime of having large amounts of chemical and biological materials and an active

nuclear weapons program. Dick Cheney followed the same line of argument. Cheney’s

sources of evidence were Iraqi exiles on US payroll. These exiles had their own political

ambitious. Ahmad Chalabi, as a source of information, was worthless.662 The Vice

President, Dick Cheney insisted that they had “irrefutable evidence” that Iraq was

actively pursuing its nuclear weapons program. Rice was also telling CNN the same

story.663

About two years later, the US Senate Committee on Intelligence criticized

intelligence agencies for “overstating Iraq’s WMD threat” in the NIE, October 2002. The

intelligence agencies “misinformed” national leadership by ignoring the country

evidence. The intelligence agencies were guilty of “group think”.664 Top officials of the

Bush Administration surely knew that General Hussain Kamel, incharge of Iraq’s WMD

659 “The Downing Street Memo”. Available at www.downingstreetmemo.com660 The Downing Street Memo661 Bush, UN Speech, September 12, 2002662 Douglas Jehl. “Agency Belittles Information Given by Iraq Defectors”, New York Times.

September 29, 2003663 David Barstow. “How the White House Embraced Disputed Iraq Arms Intelligence”, New York

Times. October 3, 2004664 “Report of The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence”, July 9, 2004

178

program before defecting, had told UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in 1995

that he ordered the destruction of Iraq’s all WMD. It was done.665

Saddam regime ordered UNSCOM to leave Iraq in 1998. A US Navy intelligence

officer headed the UNSCOM. By 1998, said the official, what was left in Iraq was

nothing but only some documents and scraps of material which could not be used to

reconstitute a WMD program.666 Charles Duelfer, head of Iraq Survey Group (ISG)

submitted his report in October 2004, concluded, that it was during 1991-92, Saddam

regime decided to leave its “WMD pursuit” in order to end the UN sanctions. Ending the

UN sanctions was Saddam Hussain’s most important objective.667

Later on, George A. Lopez and David Cortright, reported on Iraq’s WMD status,

wherein they concluded that intelligence community and US policymakers deliberately

discarded available evidence regarding the destruction of Iraq’s WMD program.668 It was

not later than April 6-7, 2002, when President Bush invited Tony Blair at his ranch,

Crawford. On this occasion, in his interview to the British ITV Television Network

reporter Trevor McDonald, President Bush said that he had “made up his mind” that it

was the policy of his administration “Saddam goes”… Saddam “needs to go.”669

5.3 The Operational Objectives:5.3.1 The Neocons/ War Hawks Iraq Agenda:

With the end of the Cold War and subsequent disintegration of USSR, the era of

unipolarity replaced bipolar world with the US as the remaining sole superpower. It was

in the year 1992, during the presidency of Bush Senior (1989-1993), six men produced

what was known as Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). They included – Dick Cheney,

Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz, Scooter Libby, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Eric Edelman. The

DPG had been a classified document and was regularly produced after every two years.

665 Rolf Ekeus. “General Hussain Kamal interview, head of UNSCOM,” on August 22, 1995666 Scott Ritter. Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem, Once and For All. (Diane Publishing

Company, 1999), 127, 219667 The Duelfer Report, September 30, 2004 668 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 72669 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 119

179

The DPG, actually, was a blueprint of US military strategy in the 21st century.670 The

authors of the document asked for expansion of American military abroad. The

documents envisioned unchallengeable “US military supremacy in the world.”671

The DPG 1992 envisioned unipolarity.672 The basic theme of the document was

that the US did not want “peer competitor” in international political system.673 The

authors of the document made it clear in no ambiguous words that their top most

objective was “to prevent the re-emergence of new US rivals” on the world political

map.674 The document drafted by Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby was a “radical” one. The

document called for “global US military dominance” preemptive strikes, if necessary,

especially against the nations involved in the development of WMD. It also asked for

steep increase in “US defense budget” to achieve the ends provided in the document. The

document was leaked to New York Times.675

The war hawks envisioned and worked for the strategy of unipolarism.676 With the

end of the Cold War and subsequent disintegration of Soviet Union, to borrow Charles

Krauthammer’s phrase, the US found itself in a “unipolar moment”.677. The overall

objective of the US, according to the 1992 DPG, was to remain “predominant power in

the Middle East” and ensure US and its Western Allies access to the oil. It also asked for

policy of “unilateralism” in the US foreign policy.678

The DPG draft of 1992 was meant for asserting US global supremacy. It asked for

the use of American military power wherever US vital interests were challenged. The

supply of oil from the Middle East and “security of Israel” were at the top of the list.679

By the mid 1990’s, the top most priority of war hawks agenda in the Middle East, was

attacking Iraq and perhaps other states in the region as well, to create more “congenial

environment for Israel” in the region.680 After fall of the USSR, wrote Weekly Standard,

670 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 28671 Ibid, 33672 Gary Dorrien. “Benevolent Global Hegemony: William Kristol and the Politics of American

Empire”. Logos 3, no. 2 (2004)673 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 46674 Ibid675 Shawcross, Allies, 53-54 676 Charles Krauthammer. “The Unipolar Moment”, Foreign Affairs. (Winter 1990-91), 22-33677 Ibid678 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 33679 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 58680 Kolko, Age of War, 96

180

the post-WWII institutions had become “irrelevant”. It was time for “realignment”. It was

time for the promotion of American interests and values worldwide.681

The leading neoconservatives, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, argued in their

book titled Present Dangers that the victory over communism and communist bloc could

be repeated. The reason they gave was only one. If America could use its military might

to fashion its foreign policy. They also argued that regime changes in absolutist states

were possible. It was a realistic policy. Following Kristol and Kagan’s reasoning,

Wolfowitz believed that it could be done in Iraq. Regime change could be effected in

Iraq. It was just possible.682

The President George Bush Administration appointed war hawks at high

positions, especially the drafters of the DPG, 1992. They held important positions in the

Bush Administration.683 It is beyond any doubt that NSS of President Bush of September

2002 was rooted in DPG, 1992. President Bush clearly accepted and adopted Paul

Wolfowitz’s world view as sketched in DPG, 1992.684

On the footsteps of 9/11, President Bush declared war against terror. Under the

guise of this war President Bush implemented a “radical foreign policy agenda”. This

agenda predated 9/11 tragedy. The basic principles of this agenda could be summed up as

under: International relations were based on power not law; it was power which prevailed

first and law legitimized achievements of power later on; after disintegration of USSR

and end of the Cold-War, the US was the only predominant power in the international

political system; the American position of predominance on the globe fitted it to impose

its interests and values on the globe; the world could benefit from American values.

America was under obligation to impose its supremacy on the world.685

The war hawks formed a powerful group within the Bush Administration. The

neocons ideas were stated in the mission statement of the PNAC.686 The PNAC was

founded in the year 1997 by William Kristol and Robert Kagan. The PNAC was a

681 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 60682 Brigham, Iraq another Vietnam, 27683 Melvin Gurtov, and Peter Van Ness (Eds). Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from

the Asia-Pacific. Routledge, 2004, 9684 Dorrien, Global Hegemony, 2004685 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 3-4

686 “Project for the New American Century Report”, 2000. Available at http://www.newamericancentury.org

181

neoconservative think tank. According to them America must perform its global

responsibilities. America was to maintain peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the

Middle East. If America did not, it would jeopardize its own fundamental interests. The

PNAC recommended four policy options: Significant increase in defense spending to

carry out global military responsibilities; powerfully challenge the regimes that cherish

hostile policies against US interests and values; promotion of American variant of

democracy and capitalism abroad; and finally restructure international political order

according to the US interests and values. There was no escape to this reality. It was

necessary if the US wanted to ensure its security and greatness in the 21st century. The

mission statement was signed by 25 neoconservatives.687

It was in the year 1998, many out of the twenty five signatories of PNAC mission

statement wrote an open letter to President Bill Clinton wherein they argued the

overthrow of Saddam regime in Iraq.688 The neocons shared one predominant objective:

the “overthrow of Saddam regime” in Iraq. Several of the neocons were in close

association with Israel. They considered the defense of Israel as the litmus test of

American foreign policy. They believed that Israel could achieve peace through

restructuring its regional environment, predominant military force, and through daring

initiatives. They wanted democratic transformation of the Middle East. But they laid

down one precondition for this all: It must start with overthrowing the absolutist regime

in Iraq.689

They also shared certain other common threads, among them a grand strategy to

assert Pax Americana, maintenance of unipolar world, dislike of permanent alliances, and

follow unilateral foreign policy, if necessary, to protect US core interests such as access

to oil, and prevention of proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and also

nuclear weapons.690 President George W. Bush appointed some neoconservatives to high

positions such as Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, Eliott

Abrams, and John Bolton among others. Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of

687 Project for the New American Century, Statement of Principles”, June 3, 1997688 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 8689 Shawcross, Allies, 55-56690 Ibid, 57-58

182

Defense Rumsfeld were sympathetic to neoconservative’s worldview and thinking. 9/11

provided neocons the “big opportunity” to implement their worldview.691

The PNAC was founded for the promotion of US world leadership. They wanted

to create a world political order based on “American military supremacy”. The

neoconservatives constituted the backbone of Bush Administration’s foreign policy

agenda.692 Neoconservatives got role in the decision-making process in the Bush

Administration.693 They exploited President Bush to translate their own ideas into foreign

policy. They also shared President Bush’s emphasis on rebuilding American military

might.694

The PNAC’s report of September 2000 was important; titled as Rebuilding

America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century. According to

this report the primary strategic objective of America in the unfolding century would be

to “preserve Pax Americana”. The term Pax Americana was used nineteen times in the

report.695 A number of core aspects of Bush agenda were found in the above report, for

example-overthrow of Saddam regime, maintaining permanent military in the Middle

East region, and American policy of acting preemptively, if necessary, to defend US

interests especially with respect to the Middle East.696

The advocates of PNAC called for regime change in Iraq even if it involved

“deception and lies.”697 Sympathizers of the neocons like Dick Cheney and realists like

Rice along with President Bush were hegemons. They believed in “American Century”

and 9/11 provided them the common ground. They believed in US global supremacy

through military might, regime change, unilateralism, and considered rogue states as

major threat to US survival and security.698

Dick Cheney, as Vice President possessed the largest national security staff in US

history.699 Neoconservatives were changing US politics.700 During the Presidency of 691 Ibid, 63692 Stelzer, Neoconservative Economic Policy, 5693 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 38694 Ibid, 113695 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 37696 PNAC Report, 2000697 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 25698 Ibid, 34-35699 David J. Rothkopf. “Inside the Committee that Runs the World”, Foreign Policy. (March-April

2005), 37700 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 41

183

George W. Bush, neoconservatives got influence. They wanted the overthrow of Saddam

regime from power and initiate a process of restructuring the Middle East, among other

objectives.701

Neocons influence increased after 9/11 in the Bush Administration.702 They

played a “key role” in invading Iraq in March, 2003.703 Some neocon members of the

Bush Administration believed that the US had the divine mission to remake the world.

Neocons exploited 9/11 tragedy in a way to constitute an aggressive foreign policy

favorable to the interests of Israel in the region.704 The neocons agenda included, among

other things, US world hegemony, military supremacy, support to Israel and above all,

the “centerpiece” of their agenda was the ouster of Saddam Hussain from power even in

the absence of empirical evidence to link Saddam to 9/11 happening.

Richard Perle argued that the US must overthrow Iraqi regime. He further

contended that America could not win war against terrorism if Saddam regime continued

to rule in Iraq.705 President Bush adopted Perle’s assessment and translated it into an

operational policy and invaded Iraq in 2003.706 Neocons thought that America had

become too powerful and could act unilaterally and preemptively, if necessary, to

maintain its preeminence.707 They encouraged President Bush to link Saddam regime with

9/11 tragedy despite the contradiction of the evidence.708

William Kristol and Robert Kagan argued that in order to achieve real world

security and peace, Saddam regime must be removed from power in Iraq. It would

entirely change the political environment of the Middle East.709 It was at Camp David on

September 15, 2001, Paul Wolfowitz advocated military invasion of Iraq and won the

day.710 Consequently, permanent military dominance and preventive war became official

policy of the Bush Administration.711 The Bush Administration issued its “war strategy”

701 Fabrinni, United States Contested, 48702 Kolko, Age of War, 96703 Ibid, 97704 Ibid705 Perle, US Must Strike, December 29, 2001706 Crockatt, America Embattled, 157707 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 31708 Ibid, 32709 Robert Kagan, and William Kristol. “What to Do About Iraq”, Weekly Standard. January 21,

2002710 Bob Woodward. Bush at War. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 83-84711 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 37

184

known as NSS of September 2002. The document called for maintenance of American

supremacy and adoption of doctrine of preemption, if necessary, among other things. It

was a neoconservative strategy.712 The goal of this document was the “Americanization of

the world through US variant of democracy and capitalism.”713 It could be safely argued

that NSS of September 2002 was an “updated version” of DPG. Neocons successfully

translated their agenda into national security policy of the Bush Administration.

5.3.2 Arrogance of power: Sidelined UN, NATO, and Traditional Muslim Allies:

According to article 51 of the UN Charter, it was fundamental and inherent right of states

to act in “self-defense” but with one condition, “if an armed act occurs” against them.

Some experts extended this argument to include situations where such a threat was

imminent and certain. But under this extended argument only UN had the right to act.

This right to action could not be extended to an individual country. Taken from this

standard, the preemptive US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, constituted a case of

violation of international law. Secondly, the preemptive action must be based on “reliable

intelligence” where enemy was certain to act “preemptively” and attack before you did.

The US preemptive action against Iraq did not fulfill this criterion.714

Lawrence Freedman, a British scholar argued that the US invasion of Iraq up-

graded “doctrine of preemption to a security doctrine”. The US created opportunities for

other states to use this doctrine for their old-fashioned aggression against their enemy

states.715 The Bush Administration initially decided to go through UN route and got it

passed into a unanimous UNSC resolution 1441, saying therein that Iraqi regime was still

in “material breach” of Resolution 678 of 1990 and subsequent resolutions as well. Iraq

must cooperate with inspectors and prove Iraq did not possess WMD.716 Within a week,

Iraq had to make a “declaration” of full acceptance of the resolution. Hans Blix was

appointed as Chief of UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection

Commission) and Mohammad El-Baradei of IAEA. Iraq did not give any new evidence

712 Max Boot. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. (N.Y.: Basic, 2002), 21

713 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 43714 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 370-371715 Freedman, Deterrence, 4716 Shawcross, Allies, 118

185

to the UN inspectors. By December 19, the US and Britain accused Iraq of “material

breach” of the resolution.717

From the very beginning, France was opposed to war against Iraq. It was no more

a secret. On January 22, 2003, Germany also sided with France. Now on the issue of Iraq,

the differences between these NATO allies became inescapable718 France and Germany

joined hands against the US. The entire Europe was divided on this issue. France,

Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium opposed US while Great Britain, Italy and Spain

supported Bush.719 On January 27, 2003, Hans Blix presented his report to the UNSC and

so did El-Baradei. Blix was critical of Iraq for being “non-compliant” while El-Baradei

presented a positive picture and appealed to the UNSC for a “few more months” to finish

his work positively to divert war. It was on February 9, 2003, Russia joined hands with

France and Germany as well in opposing US attack on Saddam regime to implement the

UNSC resolution 1441.720

There was much wrangling in UNSC between pro-war and anti-war groups. Hans

Blix and ElBaradei submitted their final reports to the UNSC on March 7, 2003. Both

men told UNSC about the improved position of Iraqi cooperation. But completing the

process of inspections of weapons would take months. Chirac, the French President

finally made his position on March 10. In a television interview the President declared

that France would oppose a new UNSC resolution, through thick and thin. On 17th March,

the US and UK withdrew the resolution and decided to invade Iraq unilaterally and

preemptively.721

In the last few weeks, tensions mounted in the UNSC. Russia and France, along

with some nonpermanent UNSC members resisted Washington to take military action

against Iraq. Finally, US decided to launch war on Iraq unilaterally without a fresh UNSC

vote on Iraq. The US claimed that America had sufficient legitimacy to invade Iraq in

self-defense, under the doctrine of preemption, under UNSC resolution 1441. France,

717 Ibid, 122718 Ibid, 125719 Shawcross, Allies, 127720 Ibid, 137721 Ibid, 147-149

186

Russia, Germany, and Egypt opposed the attack.722 The US had decided to take military

action against Iraq.723

The Iraqi regime was offering full cooperation to the UN inspections. With the

coming of 2003, there was a pressure on the US for second UNSC resolution before

military action against Iraq. The key Muslim allies, like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, whose

territories were to be used for invasion, demanded fresh UNSC resolution before

extending their cooperation. Many countries of the world waited empirical evidence of

Iraqi defiance of Resolution 1441. Even London asked Bush Administration for a second

UNSC resolution.724 Hans Blix, despite his relentless struggle, was unable to find any

signs of WMD. Blix was getting least cooperation from the US intelligence.725

Colin Powell gave his presentation to the UNSC on February 5, 2003. Later on,

he admitted that it was totally unsubstantiated.726 In their reports on February 14, 2003,

Blix and El-Baradei gave contradictory opinion against Powell’s assertions. Meanwhile,

Tony Blair had already agreed with President Bush for a second UNSC resolution. The

draft to the second resolution was submitted to the UNSC. According to Washington and

London, Iraq had failed to comply with the resolution 1441. On the other hand, Blix and

El-Baradei were confirming, contrary to the official opinion, ever increasing cooperation

from Iraq. Even then, Washington insisted that the US had war powers under UNSC 687.

Ultimately, the US decided for unilateral, without a second UNSC resolution, invasion of

Iraq.727 Kofi Annan said the invasion was against the provisions of UN charter.728

Hans Blix and El-Baradei worked in Iraq since November 25, 2002. They did not

detect any WMD or nuclear program in Iraq. The testimony of both men was not only

disregarded but also “ridiculed”. Washington and London complained of the

incompetence of UN and unilaterally invaded Iraq. Both Washington and London

deliberately exploited the situation and used the invented threat of WMD to extract

support at home and among European allies.729 President Bush rejected Kofi Annan’s

722 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 375723 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 260724 Ibid, 261725 Blix, Disarming Iraq, 248, 265-266726 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 262727 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 263728 Ibid729 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 204

187

proposal for a clear cut UN mandate for invasion of Iraq. President’s position was that the

US already had one under the UNSC past resolutions, 678 and 1441.730 Such a view was

against international law governing the use of force. NATO allies wanted multilateralism

and collaboration among themselves and the US were disappointed.731

The European NATO allies did not understand that America was

“indispensable”.732 Dick Cheney made it clear in his speech that it was only America who

was to lead in this cause to victory.733 Fifteen members of the European Union fully

supported working through the UN route to disarm Iraq.734 Similarly there was a strong

criticism among the Middle East countries. Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia remained

the most important Arab ally of America. Crown Prince Abdullah was blunt in his

remarks. In the present circumstance it was hard to defend the US. America was under

moral obligation to end repression against Palestinians. France threatened to use veto

power to kill second US sponsored resolution to get tacit approval of the UNSC to invade

Iraq. Russia, Germany and China strongly backed this French movement. America

withdrew the resolution and unilaterally invaded Iraq.735

The United Nations recently laid five conditions for the use of force as followed:

First, if the threat was serious enough and certain that could justify the use of force.

Second, the primary objective of the use of force must be to halt or avert the imminent

threat. Third, the force must be used as a last resort. Fourth, the force used must be of

minimum strength just to avert the threat and, lastly, the consequences of use of force

would not be worse than the relevant consequence of inaction.736

The US war on Iraq did not meet UN criteria.737 France, Russia, and China had

economic interests to serve in Iraq. They opposed unilateral overthrow of Saddam

regime.738 France, Germany and Russia were debating in the UN. They wanted to give

730 Elaine Sciolino and Steven Lee Myers, “Bush says ‘Time is Running Out’ as Forces Move into Place”, New York Times. October 7, 2001

731 Patrick E. Tyler. “European Split with US on Need for Iraq Attack”, New York Times. July 22, 2002

732 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 65733 Cheney, Speech to Veterans, August 2002734 Blix, Disarming Iraq, 248, 265-266735 Blix, Disarming Iraq, 248736 The UN Report on Secure World737 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 176738 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 222

188

extended time to UN inspectors to complete their work.739 President Bush was clear in his

conviction. America could not avoid this war. The UN was obstructionist. Powell was of

the view that Saddam regime could be effectively contained. Saddam was depressingly

isolated and friendless.740 On February 10, 2003, Chirac, Schroeder and Putin issued a

joint statement asking for giving more time to UN weapons inspectors.741 On March 12,

2003, President Bush strongly criticized the UN. For him, UN was a “ridiculous”

organization.742

All the following authors/scholars, more or less gave the same arguments: (Pijl:

2006: 364-366); (Soros: 2004: 49, 24,55-57); (Fabbrini eds.: 2006:13); (Brigham:

2004:12-13); (Chomsky: 2003: 11, 32-33, 242); (Simons: 2006: 273-288); (Clancy,

Zinni, and Koltz: 2004:1-7); (Kolko: 2007:125-129).)

The summary of these arguments followed: For the US, UN was an aimless

organization; UN was nothing more than a debating society; America did not need UN

permission when the issue of US security was involved (Chomsky).743 President Chirac

threatened the use of veto power against a new UNSC resolution to use military force

against Iraq. The US decided to go ahead without UN authorization (Soros).744 The US

military predominance justified its unilateralism ignoring UN, NATO allies. The US

treated its European allies with disdain and indifference (Kolko).745 Colin Powell said that

the UN had become irrelevant (Brigham, 2004)746.It could safely be argued that due to its

military predominance in the world, America sidelined the UN, NATO, and its Muslim

allies such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia and unilaterally and preemptively invaded Iraq in

March 2003, without UN authorization.

5.3.3 Violation of International Law and Norms:

739 Ibid, 226-227740 Ibid, 271-272741 Ibid, 315742 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 342743 Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, 11, 32-33, 242744 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 24, 49, 55-57745 Kolko, Age of War, 125-129746 Brigham, Iraq another Vietnam, 12-13

189

The UN charter, article 51, recognized state’s right to self defense. According to this

article it is the fundamental right of all member states, without any exception, to act in

self-defense, only after fulfilling two preconditions written in the UN charter. A state

could act in self–defense only, if there was an “armed aggression” committed against it.

The right to self defense was also qualified with the condition through the UN Security

Council only (UN Charter). There were writers who extended this right to act in self-

defense to include situations where threat of armed aggression was so imminent and

certain. But the decision about such an extended situation would be made by the UN, not

by an individual state alone. The US preemptive action against Iraq did not even conform

to this standard as it was taken and acted upon unilaterally. The US invasion of Iraq

violated both international law and norms.747

The US invasion of Iraq put big question mark on the relevance of international

law and the UN.748 The war on Iraq was a violation of the norms the US and UK wanted

to advance.749 The US administration justified war on the basis of three norms. First was

the democratic reconstruction of Iraq. America was the sole protector of international

political system against dangers coming from terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The

defiant states would be considered as “rogue states” and could face imposition of

sanctions including “regime change” through the use of military force. These three norms

were advanced to mobilize support in favor of Iraq war but it was loaded with risks for

American national interests.750 The above cited three norms served as counter norm to

defeat international law and UNSC procedures. The UNSC might have successfully

restrained the US invasion.751

The US legal justification of Iraq war was based on two rationales: preemptive

self-defense and Iraq’s non-compliance with UNSC resolutions. The UN charter, article

51, included two conditions where use of force was allowed under international law. Self-

defense was one of them. The use of force in self-defense under international law was

allowed only “if an armed attack occurs.” In simple words, international law prohibited

747 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 370748 D. Hiro. Secrets and Lies: The True Story of the Iraq War. Politico's, (2005), xx749 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 270750 John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephen M. Walt. “An Unnecessary War”, Foreign Policy. 134,

January-February 2003, 56-57, 59751 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 272

190

the use of force until a state had been physically attacked.752 Prior to the UN Charter

framed in 1945, there were prohibitions on the use of force in world politics. Those

prohibitions never allowed use of force in “anticipatory self-defense” or preemption.753

The right to anticipatory self-defense was strongly questioned in the “Caroline” case

where Canadian soldiers attacked American sailors in 1837. The reason given for the

attack was that Canadian soldiers were under threat of attack. Daniel Webster, the US

council argued that such a preemptive self-defense was justified with the fulfillment of

four conditions: if the threat was” instant, overwhelming and exhausted other means and

no time left for deliberation.”754

In its NSS of 2002, Bush Administration made clear the preemptive use of force.

In this document, the Bush Administration argued that the international law related to the

use of force must take into account two new factors: New technologies and new extremist

groups. This was a dangerous combination. Saddam regime fulfilled these criteria.

Saddam could attack the US without warning. Despite this all, the US asked for

“preventive use of force and not preemptive” action. Iraq was not an imminent or instant

threat to the US sovereign territory on March 19, 2003, the date of attack on Iraq. It could

be said the war was preventive and illegal.755

The second legal justification the US and UK sought for war was Saddam

regime’s non-compliance with the UNSC resolution 1441 of November 2002. The

resolution 1441 alleged that Iraq was in “material breach” to discharge its legal

obligations under the previous UNSC resolutions 678 of November 1990 and 687 of

April 1991. These resolutions required Iraq to disarm itself completely and give tangible

evidence thereof. Iraq had destroyed its WMDs, missiles and missile technology which

could act as missiles carriers over distances greater than 150 kilometers. The UNSC

resolution 1441 gave Iraq exactly one month for compliance with the previous UNSC

resolutions 678 and 687. In case of non-compliance within the required timetable Iraq

was threatened with “serious consequences.” The UNMOVIC was to supervise this all.

Hans Blix headed UNMOVIC.

752 Ibid753 Louis Henkin. International Law: Cases and Materials. Vol. 1. (West Publishing Company,

1980), 927754 Ibid, 872755 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 273

191

Hans Blix gave his larger report on March 6, 2003 known as “Cluster Report”

titled Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Program.

UNMOVIC never said that Saddam regime in Iraq was in material breach of its legal

obligations under UNSC resolutions 687 and 1441.756 The Hans Blix reports were subject

to multiple interpretations. France, Russia and China, the three UNSC permanent

members strongly objected unilateralist invasion of Iraq. They also advocated the

continuity of inspection process by UNMOVIC and IAEA. However, Bush

Administration rejected this demand and went ahead alone. Under these circumstances it

could be said with certainty that the war on Iraq was illegal.757

The Anglican Church in America and Britain also opposed the Iraq war on the

same grounds. The Anglican Church issued a statement to parliament in October 2002

opposing a preventive war against Iraq. The Episcopal Church of America also opposed

the war. The Church wrote a letter to the members of the US Congress. The use of force

against Iraq would not be according to the standards of the just war tradition.758

The leaders of the Roman Catholic and Anglican Church questioned “self-

defense” as a just cause of war. Michael Walzer, a theorist of the just war tradition, called

this war unjust. Walzer asked international community to disarm Iraq through better ways

by involving other world powers such as France, Germany and Russia. Former President

Carter argued that ever increasing “unilateral and domineering policies” of Bush

Administration had created a trust deficit between international community and America.

The US status would be further eroded if America launched war on Iraq without UN

authorization in clear defiance of the organization.759

Some scholars like John Ikenberry in Foreign Affairs, (September, 2002); Noam

Chomsky in Hegemony or Survival (2003: 12); Schlesinger in Los Angeles Times (23

March, 2003); and Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond in Preventive War and

Permissive Normative Order (pp. 385-94), clearly argued that it was a “preventive war

not a preemptive” one. The war was also a violation of international law.

756 Ibid, 274757 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 275758 “A Letter from the house of Bishops of the Episcopal Church”, Episcopal Church of the US,

October 2, 2002759 Jimmy Carter. “Just War or a Just War?” New York Times. March 9, 2003

192

5.3.4 Weak Saddam Regime: An Opportunity to Increase US Share of World

Power:

For the Bush Administration, Iraq was a weak and easy target.760 A major part of Iraq’s

military equipment already had been destroyed during the Gulf War and continuous air

strikes subsequently. Iraq had no access to military hardware and spare parts as it had

been under strict sanctions since 1990. Iraq’s military forces remained just one third of its

pre-war position. The destruction of Iraq’s WMD under the UN resolution 678 and 687

was complete. Its economy was also destroyed. Iraq’s navy was actually nonexistent and

air-force just a fraction of its prewar position of First Gulf War. Its military budget had

been reduced to ten percent (10%) of its prewar level.761

Iraq did not possess a system of support and supplies for its military forces other

than the one under sanctions.762 There was no reason to believe that under such conditions

Iraq posed a threat to its neighbors in the foreseeable future.763 In the year 1991, Iraq was

defeated and forced to leave Kuwait. Since then, Iraq remained under UN sanctions and

“no fly zones” imposed by the US and Britain. Bush (senior) and Clinton Administrations

continued ongoing bombing of Iraq ever since 1991.764 US Secretary of State, Madeleine

Albright, once said that the US would act against Iraq unilaterally, if necessary. She

further said that Middle East was a region vital to American interests.765

The continued UN sanctions on Iraq killed many more people in Iraq. The

mortality rate among children was doubled.766 According to a FAO report (UN-FAO)

about one-fifth of the total population of Iraq severely suffered from starvation. Children

were the worst sufferers. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, put serious accusation

on America for blocking and preventing Oil-For-Food program for Iraq. It was an issue

of survival of millions of Iraqis.767

760 Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire, x761 Zunes, Tinderbox, 47762 Les Aspin. “Gulf Diplomacy Needs Arms Threat to Succeed”, Centre for Strategic and

International Studies. (December 21, 1990)763 Zunes, Tinderbox, 47764 Ibid, 89765 Madeleine Albright. cited in Anoushiravan Ehteshami. From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players

in the New Great Game. (University of Exeter Press, 1994), 198766 “Iraq Survey Shows Humanitarian Emergency”, UNICEF. August 12, 1999767 Colin Lynch. “Humanitarian Goods Are Being Blocked, U.N. Chief Charges”, Washington

Post. October 25, 1999

193

As Colin Powell came to power he imposed new set of sanctions, through the UN,

called “smart sanctions,” on Iraq. These sanctions imposed strict control over Iraqi trade

and finance.768 The same magazine noted that Iraq intensely required massive investment

to rebuild its infrastructure such as industry, power grids and schools. Nothing would

happen under smart sanctions.769

The First Gulf War and the ongoing sanctions on Iraq put Iraq under a situation

termed as “impoverished isolation.”770 Iraq was a minor power severely damaged by

sanctions. The Bush Administration knew that Iraq remained one of the weakest nations

in the Persian Gulf region. Iraq’s economy and budget were hopelessly less than

Kuwait’s. However, Kuwait had just 10% of the Iraqi population.771 The US policy

makers knew well that Iraq did not pose any threat to its neighbors whatsoever in 2002.

To argue contrary to the ground reality was dishonest.

Noam Chomsky argued, Iraq was targeted for some reasons. It was a weak

country. It was easily conquerable. Iraq was a good opportunity to make it a precedent.772

Michael Howard argued in Foreign Affairs that Iraq was chosen because it was both an

easily identifiable target as well as allegedly a hostile state.773 Bob Woodward cited Paul

Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in an important strategy meeting on September

15, 2001, saying that in contrast to Afghanistan, Iraq was an easy target. In the words of

Wolfowitz, it was “easily doable”. America could easily defeat Saddam Hussain. There

were 10 to 50 percent chances of al-Qaeda-Iraq nexus culminating into 9/11 tragedy.

Wolfowitz argued further that America could not win war on terror if did not pursue

oppressive Saddam regime. Sooner or later, America would have to do that.774

Now Iraq was not a threat at all. His military forces were too weak. The US was

successfully pursuing policy of containment. Under these conditions there were nearly

zero percent chances that Saddam would ever attack his neighbors in near future. Saddam

also could not attack America whatsoever.775 The opponents of US war on Iraq

768 “Can Sanctions Be Smarter?” The Economist. May 26, 2001769 “Smart Exit: The End of the Smart Sanctions”, The Economist. July 7, 2001770 Zunes, Tinderbox, 95771 Chomsky, Preventive War, August 11, 2003772 Chomsky, Preventive War, August 11, 2003773 Michael Howard. “What’s in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism”, Foreign Affairs 81, no 1,

(January/February 2002), 9774 Woodward, Bush at War, 83775 Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, 21

194

consistently argued that the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was not necessary. As

Saddam regime in Baghdad was no more a threat to its neighbors and that his WMD had

already been destroyed.776

While writing this dissertation, almost all the sources I studied, which ran into

hundreds, invariably argued that the war hawks played important role in George W. Bush

Administration’s decision making establishment in war on terror. They found 9/11 as an

opportunity for the US to “remake critical areas” of the world, especially the Middle East,

according to the US vision. In the preceding pages of this dissertation I quoted these

sources with references. Just to mention a few of them as followed: (Woodward: 2004:

25-27); (Walt: 2005: 23); (Kepel: 2004: 58-63); (Kolko: 2007: 95-98); (Fawn and

Hinnebusch: 2007: 33, 309); (Soros: 2004: 34-35); (Black: 2008: 210); (Jentleson: 2007:

360); (Jackon and Towle: 2006: 37); (Gurtov: 2008: 1); (Halper and Clarke: 2004: 17,

44, 66); (Boot: 2004: 21); (Fukuyama: 2006: 32-33); (Simes: 2003: 95); (Dorrien: 2004:

1); (Mearsheimer: 2001: 46); (Stelzer: 2004: 17); (Rothkopf: 2005: 39); (Gurtov: 2005:

9); (Gaddis: 2002: 50); (Ferguson: 2004: 20). In short, the US did not act as a status quo

power. Rather the US used its militarily predominant position in a unipolar world to

change the status quo in its favor and increase its world influence and its share of global

power and position.777

5.3.5 Disregard of World Public Opinion:

On the eve of US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, opinion polls in Great Britain,

Germany and other European Union countries clearly indicated opposition to US war on

Iraq. Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, supported the US war on Iraq. A large

number of persons within his party did not. Even Kuwait royal family opposed the war.

King Abdullah II of Jordan commented scornfully on potential US invasion of Iraq. The

King visited Britain in July 2002. He gave an interview to the London Times, the King

said that the US invasion of Iraq would “destabilize US interests” in the Middle East.

And he refused to give permission to allow Jordanian territory to be used as “launching

pad” for such an eventuality.

776 Steele, Defeat, 254777 Walt, Taming American Power, 23

195

Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia took the same line and strongly opposed the

invasion.778 General Pervez Musharraf, the military ruler of Pakistan, also opposed the

invasion. Similarly, Turkish Parliament did not permit Turkish territory to be used for an

invasion of Iraq.779 West European countries did not appreciate the US Middle East

policy. They accused it of being favorable to Israel. The opinion poll in France and

Germany in May 2002 disapproved the US Middle East policy. Whatever the reasons

Russia, France, and Germany did not support the US war on Iraq. Approximately 11%

French and 12% Germans approved the US unilateral invasion of Iraq.780 An opinion poll

in August 2002 in Britain showed that approximately above 50% Labor voters opposed

the US invasion of Iraq.781

London saw the largest demonstration there had ever been. There was also a full

scale debate in House of Lords on the legality of the war. The majority of British legal

experts opposed the war. In the run-up to war, the British deputy legal adviser in the

Foreign and Commonwealth Office resigned in protest against the war attacking it as a

“crime of aggression”.782 It’s on record that 120 Members of the Parliament belonging to

Labor Party voted against the war on February 26, 2003.783

A number of retired British diplomats such as Sir Harold Walker, the former

ambassador to Iraq, Sir Patrick Wright, former head of the British Diplomatic Service, Sir

Brian Barder, Sir Alan Munro and Sir Nicholas Barrington, among others, publically

opposed the war.784 During the US war on terror, world public opinion turned sharply

against the US as the war progressed. Surveys were conducted world over. A British

survey conducted in November 2002, showed that about 33% Brits saw President George

W. Bush as a “greater threat to global peace and security” than Iraqi dictator.785

It is on record that a large majority of the people in the world opposed the US war

on Iraq in March, 2003. About fifteen lac people protested against the war in mid-

778 Thomas Ricks. “Military Trying to Head Off Iraq Strike”, International Herald Tribune. May 25-26, 2002

779 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 80780 The Guardian, February 11, 2003781 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 50782 “Revealed: The Rush to War”, The Guardian, February 23, 2005

783 “Labor MPs Revolt Over Iraq”, The Guardian, February 26, 2003784 Wright, Barder and Munro Letter”, The Times. March 23, 2003785 Wintour Patrick, and Ewen MacAskill, “1 in 3 Say Bush is Biggest Threat,” The Guardian,

November 14, 2002

196

February 2003 to express their opposition to the imminent US invasion of Iraq. Gerhard

Schroeder was reelected in Germany in September 2002 largely because he refused to

become a party in US war against Baghdad. Similar developments happened in South

Korea.786 Public opinion in the world deeply resented the US unilateral invasion of Iraq in

March, 2003.787

It meant in mid-February 2003, the anti-war protests were made throughout the

world; millions of protestors took to the streets. In an unprecedented anti-war protest one

million protesters came out in London.788 Turkish parliament democratically rejected

cooperation with the US in war on Iraq. So did France where Chirac called it a

“dangerous precedent” that would unleash a “clash of civilizations”.

Even in Latin America public opinion went against Washington. Opinion polls in

many states like Japan, Philippines, Germany, Pakistan, Turkey, Italy and Great Britain

etc. showed that the US “image” had fallen in these countries. Public opinion in Muslim

world became “highly critical” against the US unilateral war against Iraq. Consequently,

America became isolated.789 While talking in a prime-time news conference just one

month after 9/11 happenings, President George W. Bush complained, he did not

understand the reason of widespread “citriolic hatred” of America in the rest of the world.

For the President this psychological process feeling was a result of misunderstanding

about the US.790

The percentage of foreign people living in their own countries having a

“favorable” image of America had been on the decline since turn of the century. The US

attack on Iraq in March 2003 speeded up this declining trend. The Pew Research Center

conducted different surveys in this regard. The surveys gave empirical evidence of this

declining global trend. The US image declined in the West in Britain, Italy, France, and

Germany in 2002 to 2003, approximately from 73 to 45, 68 to 31, 61 to 29, and 59 to 24

respectively. Same was the case with the Muslim world. Approximately it was 31 to 13,

24 to 1, unknown to 12, unknown to 11, and 60 to 13 for Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, Egypt,

786 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 23-24787 Ibid, 50788 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 6789 Kolko, Age of War, 127-128790 President Bush’s Prime time News Conference”, October 22, 2001

197

and Indonesia respectively.791 Similarly, in another research project by the same research

organization in 2004, majority of the people around the globe attributed GWOT to US

self- interest.

Similarly, in the year 2003, barely 30% people of Europe approved President

George W. Bush’s foreign policy.792 The American image was negative in Muslim

heartland, the Middle East. A survey was conducted in June 2004 in six Muslim

countries. Just about 10% of the respondents surveyed in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United

Arab Emirates, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan had a positive view of the US Iraq

policy.793 Such a negative US image was not confined to Arab World only. Economist,

reported in February 2003, in a run-up to war on Iraq that there existed a big gap on US

foreign policy between Europe and the US.794 In short, it could be safely said that the US

disregarded world public opinion and invaded Iraq in March, 2003.

5.3.6 American Refusal to Give More Time to UN Inspectors:

The UN inspectors returned to Iraq in November, 2002 after the UNSC Resolution 1441.

The resolution declared that the Iraq was in “Material breach” of the past resolutions of

the same body. The inspectors found nothing which constituted an imminent threat form

Iraqi WMD. Mohammad El-Baradei, head of the IAEA, in his January 27, 2003 report to

the UNSC declared, till today they had found no evidence about the “revival of Iraq’s

nuclear program” since its elimination in 1990s.795 Hans Blix, head of the UNMOVIC in

Iraq, reported back to the UNSC on Iraq’s attitude. There was absence of “active and

unconditional cooperation” on the part of Iraq.

However, Blix also disputed Bush Administration’s allegations on Iraq about

WMD status and its links with al-Qaeda. Blix enlisted possible reasons why did Iraq give

impression that Saddam regime possessed WMD despite its contrary status. The enlisted

reasons included that full cooperation with inspectors in the past did not end sanctions on

Iraq, Saddam took it as “insult to his pride and the deterrent effect from the enemies in

791 “Views of a Changing World”, The Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, 3 June 2003

792 Transatlantic Trends 2003793 mpression of America 2004794 “How Deep Is the Rift?” The Economist. February 15, 2003795 “The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq”, IAEA Report on January 27, 2003

198

the neighborhood.”796 His main conclusion was that “disarming of Iraq was possible

through UN inspections.”797

Some top American military Generals also opposed war on Iraq.798 While talking

on the eve of Iraq war an American General said that why there was so urgency? It was

not an urgent issue. There was nothing to indicate whether the US or the US allies in the

Middle East were under an imminent threat of nuclear attack. There was nothing like that.

General John M. Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was

another example who warned Bush Administration against being too quick.799

Secretary General Kofi Annan asked time and again to follow the path of UN for

war on Iraq. There was no substitute for the UN. Kofi Annan, in his interview on BBC

after the war said, it was an “illegal” war waged by the US.800 It was in December, 2002

Saddam regime ordered Iraqi officials to extend their full cooperation to UN inspectors.801

The Bush Administration willfully held certain intelligence from the UN inspectors

working in Iraq, to be used later on for an attack on Iraq. The CIA withheld intelligence

about 21-sites in Iraq. The Bush Administration did not want the “success of UN

inspectors” in Iraq. The Administration wanted to clear the way for war on Iraq.802

Douglas Jehl and David Sanger later on wrote, CIA admitted for not giving entire data to

the UN inspectors.803

Under pressure, Saddam regime once again, extended invitation to the UN in July

2002, for renewed consideration on UN inspection in Iraq. In the next month, August

2002, Saddam regime extended invitation to the US Congress to send its delegations

along with experts to find WMD in Iraq. Saddam regime, in December 2002, opened Iraq

for inspections “without any conditions”. Iraq offered to provide every access to every

place hitherto kept secret. Nothing satisfied the US short of attack on Iraq.

796 Blix, Disarming Iraq, 265-266797 Judith Miller, and Julia Preston. “Blix Says He saw Nothing to Prompt a War”, New York

Times. January 31, 2003798 Ricks. Iraq Strike, May 25-26, 2002799 Ibid800 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 78801 Duelfer Report, September 30, 2004802 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 79803 Douglas Jehl, and David E. Sanger. “CIA Admits It Did Not Give Weapon Data to the UN”,

New York Times. February 21, 2004

199

In submitting unconditionally in September 2002, Iraqi dictator tried his best to

avert war. Iraq submitted 12,000 pages printed material on the issue of WMD. One Iraqi

General declared Iraq without WMD. Saddam Hussein extended his televised apology for

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Hans Blix, the chief inspector, submitted his report in

December 2002 saying that there was little new information about the matter. In

response, Washington said that Iraq was in “material breach” of Resolution 1441. Iraq

responded with a new proposal to CIA to search Iraq from the alleged WMDS the way it

liked. However, the UN inspectors were complaining for receiving little cooperation from

Western intelligence.804 Iraqi cooperation was forthcoming. At the same time US military

encirclement around Baghdad continued.

In his State of the Union Address, on 28 January 2003, President Bush talked

about the “Yellow Cake” which Iraq had recently got from Africa. Later on, this claim

was used to justify the war on Iraq. There were sweeping assertions substantiated with no

material evidence.805 Colin Powell, the US foreign secretary, presented his case against

Iraq to the UNSC on February 5, 2003. According to Powell, Iraq was deceiving UN

inspectors on many aspects of Iraq’s WMD. Later on, Powell admitted that his

presentation relied on “bad information” provided by intelligence agencies.806 However,

the very next day after Powell’s presentation, UN inspectors gave “favorable” report of

Iraqi cooperation.807

The France-German proposal on February 9, 2003 to speed up the inspection

process by increasing number of inspectors infuriated the US administration. The next

day Belgium joined alliance. It created serious crisis in the NATO. Rumsfeld called this

development “inexcusable”.808 By mid February 2003, Hans Blix, reported back to the

UNSC about Iraq’s good behavior and complete compliance with the inspectors. Some

177 inspections were conducted taking 300 samples from 125 different sites. There was

nothing like that in Iraq.809

804 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 111, 113, 115805 Todd S. Purdum, “As Bush Prepares Public for War, He covers His Domestic Flank”, New York

Times. January 29, 2003806 Kessler, Glenn. “Analyst Questioned Sources' Reliability”, Washington Post. July 10, 2004807 Suzanne Goldenberg, Ed Vulliamy, Jason Burke and Helena Smith. “Hope As Iraq Gives

Ground over Arms”, The Observer. February 9, 2003808 The Guardian, 2003809 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 143

200

On March 7, 2003, Hans Blix and El-Baradei finally reported to the UNSC. They

concluded that Iraqi cooperation had “increased” since January 2003, and declared

further that full inspection of Saddam regime would require “several months” to search

on the WMD status of Iraq. On March 10, 2003 Chirac, the French President, went on air

and declared that there did not exist, any cause to invade Iraq unilaterally. If it was done,

it would begin a “clash of civilizations” and would constitute a dangerous precedent.

Chirac proposed 120 days for extended WMD inspection in Iraq to finish the task.810

At Azores Summit on March 15-16, 2003, President Bush, Tony Blair (British

P.M.), and the Prime Ministers of Spain and Portugal gave a 24-hour ultimatum to the

UN to disarm Iraq or face a war on Iraq. Ultimately, the US and its allies launched war

against Iraq on March 19, 2003, on the basis of “alleged possession of WMD” and

“Iraq’s connections with al-Qaeda” culminating into 9/11. After war, all the three causes

of invasion were discredited. Later on, Hans Blix said that the US tried to undermine

honest conduct of the inspections.811

It was a year after the war, it became clear to the world that President Bush and

Prime Minister Tony Blair “intentionally exploited” the situation and deliberately used

the fake threat of WMD to maneuver support both at home and across the globe.812

Similar explanations to the run-up to war had been provided by the following scholars as

well (Woodward: 2004: 293, 317); (Shawcross2003: 131-155); (Steel: 2008: 6-7);

(Jackson and Towle: 2006:174); and (Soros: 2004:55-57). These scholars invariably gave

the following arguments on the US war against Iraq.

The US bypassed the UN and ridiculed the evidence coming from the UN

inspectors in Iraq. The UN inspectors had just begun their work in Iraq when US

provided the questionable evidence of presence of WMD in Iraq and its alleged

connections with al-Qaeda. The US did not give proper time for extended inspections in

Iraq, and that all the claims the US made for an invasion of Iraq proved wrong. Now the

question arose what was the explanation of US Iraq policy? Why did the US sideline UN,

NATO, and its Muslim allies? The answer to this question could be found in the declared

810 Shawcross, Allies, 149 811 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 7812 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 204

201

US policy toward Iraq known as policy of “regime change” under cover of the

application of Bush Doctrine of preemption under the guise of self-defense.813

The US war on Iraq was actually an operational part of US policy of “regime

change” in Iraq. It was motivated by what was known as US policy of “energy security

and interventionism”. It was in November 2001 that President George W. Bush asked

Rumsfeld about the status of war plan for Iraq. By December 2001, a preemptive

invasion of Iraq was planned and was ready for execution within a couple of months. It

was to be a unilateral invasion of Iraq.814

President Bush turned up with the theme of “Axis of Evil”. Iraq was connected

with Iran and North Korea. The US war against terrorism was not to be confined to

Afghanistan only but was being extended to “rogue states” as well. President Bush made

this all the central theme of his State of the Union Address in January 2002. The “regime

change” in Iraq constituted the heart of this theme.815 In the back drop of 9/11, the US

invoked doctrine of preemption to deal with the new emerging threats to US security. For

the US, the terrorist organizations and rogue states were the epicenter of these threats.

The doctrine of “regime change” was tied to the Bush Doctrine of preemption. It was

outlined in the Year 2001 in Quadrennial Defense Review. These were controversial

issues in world politics. However, they constituted a new political reality in global

political system.816

Different scholars had given explanations of the US war on Iraq. Bruce W.

Jentleson had argued that the war hawks in the Bush Administration were putting

pressure for “regime change” in Iraq even before 9/11.817 Similarly, Rice, the national

security advisor of President Bush told Richard Haas, Policy Planning Director of State

Department, in June 2002 that “Save your breath”. President Bush had “already decided”

on the issue of invasion of Iraq and had made up his mind for a “unilateral” attack on

Iraq.818

813 Simons, Future Iraq, 272814 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 1, 83, 54-60815 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 86-87, 90, 93816 Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001817 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 363818 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 45

202

Nothing could have satisfied the Bush Administration short of regime change in

Iraq. President Bush was determined to overthrow Saddam regime in Iraq. The issue of

Iraq’s WMD could be resolved through continued inspections but that was not the US

policy under Bush Administration.819 Whatever the reasons, Iraq’s case of possession of

WMD was a “false” one. The Bush Administration would be never satisfied short of

“regime change” in Iraq. The Bush Administration not only “twisted the intelligence” but

also lied to the Americans. To achieve its end the Administration used the issue of “Iraq’s

WMD” to influence public opinion. President Bush and his Administration assumed

worst-case scenario about Iraq as it suited best to their intended ambitions in the Middle

East and elsewhere on the globe. Ron Huisken went further saying the issue of WMD

was even more than the “misuse of intelligence”. The regime change in Iraq was taken to

project America’s unique position in world history as the most predominant power since

the fall of Roman Empire.820

5.3.7 Israel Factor:

The pro-war group in Washington had been asking the US government for regime change

in Iraq since 1998. They believed that overthrow of Saddam Hussein from power would

benefit both America and Israel. They also wanted democratic transformation of the

region.821 Israel also supported these efforts as Saddam Hussein was the man who

launched Scud missiles at Israel in 1991 during First Gulf War.822 The objective of the

war was to make Israel safe.823 Philip Zelikow, a member of US President’s Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board, executive director of the 9/11 Investigatory Commission

and one of the principal architects of the NSS of September 2002, while talking to the

University of Virginia students in September 2002 said, Saddam regime was a direct

threat to Israel and not the US.824

General Wesley Clarke, the (Retd.) NATO commander argued in August 2002,

Iraq was not a threat to the US. The pro-war faction in Washington feared that Iraq was

819 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 56820 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 85821 Interview with Dr M. Islam, August 17, 2016822 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 230 823 Ibid, 231

824 Emad Mekay. “Iraq was Invaded ‘to Protect Israel’-US Official”, Asia Times Online. March 31, 2004

203

making one.825 On the eve of Iraq war, journalist Joe Klein argued, the war was being

fought to make Israel stronger. The war hawks in the Bush Administration wanted war.826

Some important Americans supported the concept that war hawks in the administration

wanted war. Just a few to be cited here (Patrick J. Buchanan, “Whose war?” American

Conservative March 24, 2003);(Arnaud De Barchgrave “A Bush-Sharon Doctrine?”

Washington Times, February 14, 2003); (Ami Eden “Israel’s Role: The ‘Elephant They’re

Talking About,” Forward, February 28, 2003); (Spencer S. Hsu, “Moran Said Jews Are

Pushing War,” Washington Post, March 11, 2003); (Lawrence F. Kaplan, “Toxic Talk on

War, “Washington Post, February 18, 2003); and (Robert Novak, “Sharon’s war?” CNN.

com December 26, 2002) and others.

On the eve of the war, Bill Keller, the executive editor of the New York Times

argued that the war was about Israel.827 Haaretz reported in 2001, for Sharon, Saddam

regime was a greater threat to regional stability than Iran.828 Israel joined hands with the

pro-war faction in selling the war to the Bush Administration and American society.829 In

May 2002, Shimon Peres the contemporary foreign minister of Israel said that Saddam

was building nuclear weapons and the US could not wait. The US should overthrow

Saddam.830 Ehud Barak, the former Prime Minister of Israel, the US should overthrow

Saddam from power. After him Arab world would be different.831 Doctor Noman Sattar,

current head of department of American Studies, Quaid-I-Azam University Islamaadid,

Pakistan said in his interview with the researcher that “ Israel was not a factor” because it

did not improve Israel’s position in any way.832

In August 2002, Sharon, the Prime Minister of Israel said that Iraq presented the

“greatest danger” to the existence of Israel.833 Israeli politicians, both former and current

office holders, such as Peres, Sharon and Ehud Barak were silently putting pressure on

Washington not to wait for nuclear Iraq to challenge US interests in the Middle East.

825 “US Assumes UK Help in Iraq, Says General”, Guardian. August 20, 2002

826 Joe Klein. “How Israel is wrapped up in Iraq”, Time. February 10, 2003827 Bill Keller. “Is it Good for the Jews?” New York Times, March 8, 2003

828 Aluf Benn. “Sharon shows Powell His Practical Side”, Ha’aretz. February 26, 2001829 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 234830 Price, Joyce Howard. “Peres Encourages US Action on Iraq”, Washington Times. May 12, 2002831 Ehud Barak. “No Quick Fix”, Washington Post. June 8, 2002832 Interview with Dr. Noman, July 22, 2016833 Nina Gilbert. “Iraq Poses Greatest Threat”, Jerusalem Post. August 13, 2002

204

Delay to topple Saddam regime could be fatal.834 After the US invasion of Iraq no WMD

were found in Iraq. Then Senate Intelligence Committee issued a report wherein the

Committee wrote that most of the intelligence Israel provided to the US Administration

was “false”.835

Israel portrayed Saddam Hussein as a new Hitler. Israeli leadership claimed that

history would repeat itself if Saddam Hussein was not overthrown.836 Netanyahu further

wrote that the only solution to the Saddam’s nuclear program was a “pre-emptive strike”

against it.837 An opinion poll conducted in Israel on the eve of the war showed that 77.5

percent respondents (Israeli Jews) wanted war on Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein

from power.838 They favored the use of predominant American military force to

“restructure critical areas of the world” especially the Middle East.839

They included Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, Kenneth Adelman,

John Bolton, Elliott Abrams, Scooter Libby, James Woolsey, and David Wurmser. They

also included journalists such as William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer

and William Safire. For his distinguished services to Israel, JINSA awarded Wolfowitz

Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award and the Jerusalem Post titled him as

“Man of the Year” in 2003.840 Douglas Feith, Perle and Wurmser were the co-authors of

“Clean Break” report of 1996. The report was written for Netanyahu, the incoming prime

minister of Israel. The report, recommended to Netanyahu, among other things, the

overthrow of Iraqi dictator from power in Iraq.841

George Packer argued, Feith and Wurmser supported the Iraq war due to “Israeli

security interests.”842 James Woolsey, former CIA Director, along with Dick Cheney

834 Jonathan Steele. “Israel Puts Pressure on US to Strike Iraq”, Guardian. August 17, 2002835 Molly Moore. “Israel Shares Blame on Iraq Intelligence, Report says”, Washington Post.

December 5, 2003836 Benjamin Netanyahu. “The Cause for Toppling Saddam”, Wall Street Journal. September 20,

2002837 Ibid838 Ephraim Yaar, and Temar Hermann. “Peace Index: Most Israelis Support Attack on Iraq”,

Ha’aretz. March 6, 2003839 Micheal Hirsh. “Hawks, Doves and Dubya”, Newsweek. September 2, 2002840 Bret Stephens. “Man of The Year”, Jerusalem Post. September 26, 2003841 “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm”, prepared for the Institute for

Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, Jerusalem: June 1996842 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 32

205

invoked “Prague Affair” to advocate the war on Iraq.843 Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt

argued that the Jewish Organizations in 2002 supported the US war on Iraq.844

Mortimer Zuckerman, the Chairman of the Conference of Presidents, one of the

outspoken advocates of the US attack on Iraq, frequently made pro-war public

statements. He supported “preventive attack” on Iraq.845 The political leadership of Israel,

the neoconservatives, and majority of Israel Lobby in the US wanted the US to invade

Iraq. However, Iraq war mainly was the function of neoconservatives.846 The

neoconservatives (Israel Lobby in America) wrote two letters to President Clinton on

January 26, 1998 and February 19, 1998, wherein they demanded ouster of Saddam

regime from power in Iraq. Then they lobbied Congress for passing “Iraq Liberation Act”

of October, 1998, which made, henceforth “regime change” in Iraq “official US Iraq

policy” since 1998.847

Then 9/11 came as a turning point to US Iraq policy. The neocons in the Bush

Administration started pushed the President for an invasion of Iraq.848 Some members of

Israel lobby (Neocons) were obsessed with the idea of ousting Saddam Hussein from

power. Bob Woodward cited Colin Powell coming back from the White House meetings

saying “what a fixation about Iraq.”849

A few days after 9/11 tragedy, important neocons wrote an open letter to the

President asking him to overthrow Saddam regime from power even if Saddam Hussein

had no established links with al-Qaeda. America could not win war on terror without

toppling Saddam Hussein. Israel was the most important ally against the US war on

terror. Twelve neocons singed the letter. They included William Bennett, Eliot Cohen,

Robert Kagan, Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Krtistol, Perle, and Norman Podhoretz among

others.850

843 R. James Woolsey. “The Iraq Connection”, Wall Street Journal. October 18, 2001844 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 241845 Mortimer B. Zuckerman. “Clear and Competing Proof”, US News and World Report. February

10, 2003846 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 243847 The first letter could be seen on the website of PNAC, www. newamericancentury. org/

iraqclinton/letter.htm (Jan. 26); second letter could be found on the Iraq Watch website, www. iraqwatch. org/perspectives/Rumsfeld-openletter.htm

848 Jacob Weisberg. “Are Neo-cons History”, Financial Times. March 14, 2007849 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 410850 The PNAC letter, 2001

206

Charles Krauthammer argued that Afghanistan would be followed by other rogue

states like Syria, Iran and Iraq. The war on terror would be concluded in Iraq. Robert

Kagan and William Kristol asked for immediate regime change in Iraq after

Afghanistan.851 The neoconservative wing of Israel lobby wrote yet another letter to the

President in April, 2002, wherein they linked Israeli security with the overthrow of

Saddam regime. They also wrote That Israel’s fight against terror was the American

fight.852

The neoconservatives used the same language and the arguments that Israeli

political leadership used against Saddam regime. They argued that Saddam Hussein

would use WMD against the US and Israel. They further argued that he would pass

WMD to terrorists.853 The neoconservatives also manipulated the intelligence for their

cause. In this sense the role of the OSP (The Office of Special Plans) was especially

questionable. The OSP was created after 9/11 with the objective to sell the Iraq war to the

public. The OSP trusted in Ahmad Chalabi for information. Ahmad Chalabi, an exile

Iraqi, was infamously incredible for the State Department and CIA. Expectedly, Chalabi

provided “false information” to the Bush Administration through OSP.854 In this run-up to

war, Ahmad Chalabi “promised” to the Israel lobby to build “good relations with Israel.”

In short, the Israeli leadership, the Israel lobby, especially the neoconservative

pro-war hawks and the international political environment created by 9/11 led the US to

wage a war against Saddam regime in Iraq. The following authors took the same line of

argument. They argued about the regime change in Iraq. The regime change in Baghdad

was the non-compromising objective of the Bush Administration in war on terror. The

war on terror could not be won without removing Saddam from power: (Soros: 2004: 53-

54); (James Risen: 2006: 72-73); (Gurtov:2008:64); (Clarke: 2004: 129-131);

(Walt:2005:209); (Clarke: 2004); (Kolko:2007:96-97); (Suskind: 2004); (Fouskas and

Gokay:2005:134-139); (Packer: 2005: 32,38); (Pijl: 2006:363-365); (Pollack and

Rose:1999); (Pollack: 2002); (Khalidi: 2004:124-137); (Zunes:2003:24); (Young:2006:

851 William Kristol, and Robert Kagan. “The Right War”, Weekly Standard. October 1, 2001852 The PNAC letter, 2002853 Robert Kagan, and William Kristol. “Remember the Bush Doctrine”, Weekly Standard. April

15, 2002854 Franklin Foer. “Founding Fakers”, New Republic, August 18, 2003

207

440-46); and (Pillar, F.A. (March/April2006). Woodward cited President Bush saying

that Saddam Hussein would “use WMD against Israel” and it would be a disaster.855

5.3.8 Oil Security:

In the last century, oil became the important determinant of contemporary world’s

balance from military to economics. All the aspects of oil, especially its production,

refining, and distribution had been dominated by few corporations. Out of these oil

businesses five corporations belonged to America and two to Europe. By 1950, the

Middle East approximately held 49% of global proven oil reserves. By 1990s the

corresponding figure approximately rose to 66% and by 2002 declined to about 64

percent.

A large number of scholars and commentators alleged that energy consideration

was one of the major driving forces behind the US aggression against Iraq. The Middle

East was a huge source of petroleum wealth and Iraq was central to this position. Iraq

was blessed with the “second largest energy reserves” on the globe after Saudi Arabia.

The invasion of Iraq was all about to have strong “control over the oil” the strategic

wealth.856 American presence in Iraq was not due for getting oil. America would get oil,

this way or that way. However, the US wanted “control over the oil” and it was a

different thing.857 The presence of corporations like Halliburton in Iraq was to keep

control over energy resources of Iraq in future.

There were important geopolitical considerations that led to the overthrow of

Saddam regime. The most important one was the “US dependence on foreign oil”. Saudi

Arabia was a treacherous country. It had kept stability within the country but had

supported fundamentalism abroad. In the aftermath of 9/11, Saudi regime was in danger.

It could become a second Iran. It could become unstable the way Iran did in 1979. Iraq

possessed great energy reserves in the world. The Occupation of Iraq removed American

military bases from Saudi Arabia and established in Iraq. Iraq was secure alternative to

Saudi Arabia’s oil in the unstable circumstances after 9/11. The oil supplies were

becoming ever difficult. Reopening of Iraqi oil was a matter of time only. Saddam regime

was dangerous and could not be trusted in. Saddam had to be overthrown. There was no

855 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 186, 188, 320 856 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions, 6857 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions, 112

208

other way around. Saddam must go. Control over Iraqi oil and security of Israel

constituted the two basic reasons for the US invasion of Iraq.858

Petroleum had been the life blood of advanced economies. It carried great weight

in the eyes of all nations dealing with the Middle East. In the year 1970, America

produced about 69% of its domestic need while it had been reduced just only to 38% in

1996. American oil imports, from 1960 to 1996, increased about four fold. The oil supply

to the US, from the Persian Gulf was 8.8% in 1983 while the same figure rose to 22.1%

in 2000-mostly from Saudi Arabia. The region carried even great significance for Europe

and Japan in terms of oil supply. The region possessed round about 65% of the global

reserves of petroleum and 35% of natural gas.859 The US consumption from 2000-2020

was approximately expected to rise from about 19 to 26 million barrels daily. The 7

million barrels of oil increase for daily consumption must be imported. However, the

world competition for oil imports was getting intense. The leverage of the Persian Gulf

oil producers was likely to increase in coming days and decision makers in Washington

knew more than others did.860

The US move in Iraq was motivated by its desire to have “control over world’s

greatest petroleum reserves”. About 25% of US petroleum consumption was supplied

from the Gulf.861 Today America controlled Iraq. Iraqis knew it and we also knew it. Iraq

was a country with lot of oil and America needed the oil.862 The US invasion of Iraq in

2003 had its one of the basic motives to establish control over the world’s great

petroleum reserves.863

It might be argued that control over oil was the prime motive of US invasion of

Iraq in 2003. In the year 2003, some high-ups in the Bush Administration believed it was

vital to the US national interest. President Bush and the Vice President, Dick Cheney

came from “oil industry” background and they knew the “centrality of oil” in industry in

the US.864 America was the “biggest consumer of oil” in the world.

858 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 52-54859 Kolko, Age of War, 40860 Ibid861 Zunes, Tinderbox, 102862 William Loonay. Defence Week. November, 1998863 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 69864 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 40

209

9/11 provided the US with an opportunity which could be exploited to change the

situation. Consequently, America used its military forces to transform the entire Muslim

Middle East. At the same time America would get control of Iraqi oil. Control over oil

certainly was one of the major reasons of US attack against Iraq.865 Iraq was situated in

the Middle East. That was the central reason of its invasion. It was invaded to secure

“control of its oil” reserves, among other things, to dominate the region.866 People in Iraq

thought that it was an “imperial project” to get control over the Muslim oil in the Middle

East and to protect Israel.867 Gunter Grass, a German novelist, alleged that the Bush

Administration invaded Iraq for oil. That was the only real interest of Washington in

Iraq.868

Cheney Commission gave its report on the US energy situation in 2001. The

report said that the First Gulf War returned the Western oil companies in the field which

were ousted by a wave of nationalization in 1970s. The sanctions imposed over Iran, Iraq,

and Libya restored US hegemony in international markets which it had lost to OPEC in

1970s, argued Peter Odell, an oil expert. The European oil companies suffered severely

as a result of these sanctions. America threatened Saudi Arabia in 2000, for the

application of US anti-trust laws on OPEC making it illegal if it did not increase oil

production.

In May 2001, the Cheney Commission said that the US level of dependence on oil

imports would increase to “66% by 2020” from its current 52%. To ensure increased

supply, Washington would ask producers to produce more and sell it to the international

consumers including the US. The five OPEC members of the Middle East-Saudi Arabia,

Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and UAE, owned “66% of World’s petroleum reserves but produced

only 27%” of the world production in 1997. In order to realize Cheney Commission

projection, there must be a major political restructuring of the Middle East region. The

US war on Iraq for “regime change” was motivated by energy security in the Persian

Gulf region.869

865 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 40866 Steele, Defeat, 250 867 Ibid, 4868 Shawcross, Allies, 90869 Pijl, Global Rivalries, 363

210

The US domestic production of oil hit its peak in 1970. Then it started declining,

and 1970 was the year when the US dependence on imported oil started. It was in the

backdrop of 1973 Arab-Israeli war that the Arab OPEC members used oil as a weapon

and imposed oil embargo on the US in October 1973. From 1970 to 2005, there had been

a “468% increase in oil prices.”870 Since then oil became a weapon of war. The US

secretary of defense, Harold Brown, testified before Congress in 1977 that the most

serious threat to the security of the US was the deficiency of secure energy resources. In

1980, President Carter explained US interests in Persian Gulf in what was known as “the

Carter Doctrine.” The President said that there was an overwhelming dependence of the

Western industrialized nations on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region. We would

not allow any outside power to change the status quo in the Middle East. For the US, it

would an assault on our “vital interests” in the region. The US would use force to repel

such an eventuality.871

President Carter ordered the World Bank to invest in search of and find more

resources of oil.872 In 1979, Revolution in Iran changed a lot. America lost Iran, its

dependable source of oil in the Persian Gulf. Now the US needed another country in the

region to replace Iran and ensure supply of oil to the US. After the loss of Iran, Iraq was

the best option in the region. It had “second largest oil reserves” in the world. Whatever

his demerits but Saddam Hussain was a potential ally.873 For the Bush Administration,

war hawks, and the US Corporations, the three interlocking groups and policy makers,

Iraq represented three things “oil, wealth and power”. After 9/11, Iraq presented them

with a big opportunity for their imperial ambitions. Consequently, they invaded Iraq and

got access to the Iraqi oil.874

In the 2000 Bush/Cheney Presidential election campaign, the oil and gas industry

donated 2 million dollars – a big amount. In 2004 campaign they donated even more

money. It was for the first time in US history that the President, Vice President, and

secretary of state belonged to one sector. All the three were former energy sector

officials. The big US oil and gas companies, twenty nine in number, earned $43 billion in

870 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 65871 Ibid872 Yergin, The Prize, 625873 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 156874 Ibid, 183-184

211

profits in 2003 and the corresponding figure rose to $68 billion in 2004. In 2005, the

three top companies–Exxon–Mobil, Chevron, and Conoco Philips, earned about $64

billion from oil profits. More than half of this oil profit went to Texas-based Exxon-

Mobil. Exxon-Mobil profits represented the “highest figure” in world history in both

2004 and 2005.875

The new laws of Iraq favored the “US corporate control” of Iraqi oil. In one year

only 2003-2004, the value of American petroleum imports from Iraq increased by “86

%”.876 The US used 9/11 as a pretext to impose war on Iraq to restore “US hegemony

over Persian Gulf oil”. Some factors were behind this decision. There was a recent

increase in US petroleum imports from the Persian Gulf region. The US share of Gulf oil

import was 8 percent in 1985 but it had become 21 percent in 2003. According to the

studies conducted by the Center for Global Energy Studies, the US dependence on Gulf

oil would go upto 43 percent in 2000s. If the US domestic production would not increase,

rather would be reduced further, then the US dependence level on “Gulf oil” might

increase to “57 percent”.877

Traditionally, the US oil hegemony depended on Saudi Arabia. The alliance was

in doubt now. Saudi Arabia was birthplace of the founder of al-Qaeda and majority of

9/11 hijackers. Due to bin Laden movement the “US dependence on Saudi oil” faced an

uncertain future. The US occupation of Iraq provided a replacement of Saudi Arabia,

among other things.878 There was a strong evidence to prove that the decision makers in

the Bush Administration got lucrative profits in Iraq. The president, of course, included

and got reelected.879 Robert Fisk, a journalist, argued from Amman in January, 2003, that

it was all “about oil”.880 In January 2003, the US Department of Energy declared that by

2025, the US oil imports for its domestic consumption would increase to 70 percent.

Again in January 2003, wrote Michael Runner of the World Watch Institute that the “US

875 Tom Petruno. “Taking Aim at Oil’s Riches”, Los Angles Times. October 26, 2005876 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 8877 Fadhil Jafar Al-Chalabi. “Comment”, Energy Studies Review 4, no 1, (1992), 40-44878 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 255879 Jan Nederveen Pieterse. Globalization or Empire? (Routledge, 2004), 47-54880 Robert Fisk. “This Looming War is not about Chemical Warheads or Human Rights: it’s about

Oil”, The Independent, January 18, 2003

212

oil reserves were depleting”. A large portion of the future supply would come from Gulf

region.881 The US could not take control of Iraq’s oil.882

Anthony Sampson, while writing in August 2002, observed that the US oil

companies were in “danger of running short” in supplies. They were looking on Iraq as

an alternative to Saudi Arabian oil. In the run-up to war, there was widespread view that

the US was worried about oil supplies from Saudi Arabia, and wanted to get control over

Iraq’s oil. The US was contemplating three alternatives. First, there was a secret plan to

partition Saudi Arabia leaving holy places to Saudi Arabia while capturing oil fields.

Now it was time to end the US reliance on Saudi oil.883 The US simply desired to replace

Saudi Arabian oil supplies with Iraq.

Dan Morgan and David B. Ottaway argued that overthrow of Saddam regime

from power in Baghdad would “open a bonanza for the US oil companies” that were

replaced by French and Russian oil companies since First Gulf War.884 The US needed 20

million barrels oil daily. It had to import half of this need. For the US it was a matter of

life and death and could not be ignored. However such things were not generally said on

media. Paul Wolfowitz said in a summit in Singapore that America had “no choice in

Iraq” whatsoever. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was about oil. Oil was its primary

consideration.885 Scholars in Pakistan whom the researcher personally interviewed like

Dr. Noman Sattar, Dr. Riaz, Dr.Tahir Amin believed that oil was one of the factors in

making US decision to invade Iraq.

5.3.9 The Leverage against Rival Powers:

It had been a characteristic feature of great powers that they acted as offshore balancers

in other regions of the world. They exploited an “opportunity to increase their share of

world power”. As offshore balancer they also denied the benefits to rival powers. Noam

Chomsky wrote that the US did not care much about terror. The decision makers knew

very well that the attack on Iraq was likely to increase terrorism.886 Chomsky cited

Chalmers Johnson’s view that it was good to have military bases in the heart of the

881 Fisk, Loomin War, January 18, 2003882 UNSC Resolution 986, 1995883 Irwin Stelzer. Sunday Times. August 11, 2002884 Dan Morgan, and David B. Ottaway. “In Iraqi War Scenario, Oil is Key Issue”, Washington

Post. September 15, 2002885 Simons, Future Iraq, 263886 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions, 112

213

Middle East, the largest oil producing region of the world. It was important. It was not

important because the US wanted oil supply for its domestic consumption but because it

wanted “control over oil”. It was entirely a different matter. The “control over oil” had

been a big leverage against the enemy powers since 1940’s. Europe and Asia had been

the US rival powers. Europe and Asia could move toward independent policies spinning

out of US control. The control over the “oil leverage” would prevent that keeping the

leverage with itself.887

The Middle East carried great strategic importance on the globe. It remained a

source of contest among great powers for more than 4000 years. It was located at the

interjection of three continents and source of big oil reserves. The US State Department

declared that the Middle East was one of “the greatest material prizes” in human history,

a great “economic prize” on the globe for investment abroad.888 President Eisenhower

while talking about the importance of the Middle East said that the Middle East was the

region that carried “greatest strategic importance” on the globe.889

The Gulf monarchies were allies of the US. These monarchies owned big oil

reserves and the US needed its access to these reserves. Some scholars argued that the US

wanted to use their oil as a leverage against oil hungry/dependent Europe and Japan.890

Some scholars correctly observed that the US was less dependent on the Middle Eastern

oil than “Europe and East Asia”. The control over Iraq was important. Iraq was the

country that possessed “second largest oil reserves in the world”. It also was bordered by

three of the globe’s five largest petroleum producers-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait etc. If

America would successfully establish its hold over Iraq and permanent military bases

there, it would give her an important leverage over Europe and Japan. The US could use

Gulf oil as a “trump card against Europe and Japan in future trade wars”. Same was right

about China. In a sense, it was a repetition of nineteenth-century “great power politics” to

establish control over key economic resources of the world.891

887 Ibid888 “Foreign Relations of the US, 1945, Vol. viii” cited in Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of

Power. New York: Harper and Row, 1972: 45889 Steven Spiegal. The Other Arab-Israel Conflict. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985),

51890 Noam Chomsky. Towards a New Cold War. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 97-98891 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 29

214

Geoff Simons gave the same argument as above. The oil supply to the US from

Saudi Arabia had uncertain future due to “rise of Islamic fundamentalism” in that

country. American military presence in Iraq, heart of the Middle East, would remove

uncertainties about oil supply to the US. Additionally, America would get “great leverage

over other nations around the globe”, the nations that mostly depended on Arab oil,

particularly Japan, the trade rival of the US. Moreover, the increased leverage of the US

on the other oil producers of the Middle East would provide US another additional

benefit to extract maximum advantages from Iraqi Oil. For example, America might force

Kuwait and Iran to give up their compensation claims against Iraq, a country with

destroyed oil industry.892

James Woolsey, former CIA Director, gave a vivid picture of the US position.

The issue was straightforward. Russia and France had oil interests in Iraq, the two

countries whose oil companies had been working in Iraq since the aftermath of First Gulf

War. They had oil contracts in Iraq. If Russia and France cooperated with the US in

invasion of Iraq then they would be rewarded, otherwise they would be exiled form

Iraq.893 If there would be an invasion of Iraq, then the existing oil contracts would end.

Russian President Putin was worried about the situation and wanted financial and oil

guarantees from the US.894

In January 2003, New York Times argued that war planners in Washington were

prepared to takeover oilfields of Iraq quickly. The report of “The Oil Depletion Analysis

Centre” declared that the Britain’s domestic oil production in the North Sea region had

been under decline since 1999. It had increased British dependence on imported oil. It

meant that Blair government also wanted share in post-Saddam Iraqi oil. Jack Straw, the

British foreign minister, while addressing a meeting of 150 British ambassadors in

London, declared that security of energy sources was the top priority of this

government.895

The American control of oil at source, as much as possible, would give a great

leverage to the US around the globe. Anglo-American military adventure in Iraq was for

892 Simons, Future Iraq, 255893 Ibid, 260894 Carola Hoyos. “Putin Drives Hard Bargain with US over Iraq’s Oil”, The Financial Times.

London, October 4, 2002895 Simons, Future Iraq, 263

215

control over oil supplies the world-over. Sanctions had been a common feature of the US

foreign policy. Washington used economic coercion against its rival powers. Having

largest petroleum reserves on the globe under its security, and protection in the Middle

East in a post-Saddam world and flanked by the US role in Central Asia could be a big

feast. It meant, America would be in a position to switch off, if possible, the current

economic boom of China. And so could happen with Japan and India as well.896

5.3.10 Intense Propaganda Campaign:

In September 2002, President Bush and his administration announced the new NSS based

on Bush Doctrine of preemption, unilateralism and regime change. Again it was in

September 2002, the administration launched a propaganda campaign against Saddam

regime in Baghdad. Saddam regime was depicted as an imminent threat to the US

national security at home and its global interests abroad. The most important feature of

this propaganda campaign was to establish operational link between Saddam Hussain and

al-Qaida culminating into 9/11. It was also accused that Saddam regime was planning

more attacks against the US. The campaign equated with mid-term Congress elections in

the US. The campaign was successful with high approval rates of policy on terror and

also won the election targets.897

It was clear from the start that the propaganda offensive against Iraq “lacked

credibility”. The administration even resorted to plain “lies” to achieve its objectives in

Iraq.898 Washington opposed UN inspections. The underlying reason was that the

Administration already knew nothing would be found in Iraq. It would discredit the

Administration’s stand. The propaganda campaign was meant to seduce American people

to support the Administration’s war plan in Iraq.899

The anti-Saddam propaganda campaign bore fruit. Within a couple of weeks,

about 60 percent American people saw the Iraq regime as a “looming threat” to the US.

Consequently, Saddam must be overthrown immediately under the right of self-defense.

About 50 percent American population believed that the dictator was “personally

896 Mark Almond. “It’s All about Control, Not the Rise of Petrol”, The New Statesman. April 7, 2003

897 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 3898 Blitzer. “Interview of Rice”, CNN. September 8, 2002899 Mearsheimer and Walt, Unnecessay War, 56-57

216

involved” in the 9/11 tragedy. Jim Rutenberg and Robin Toner also confirmed this

baseless propaganda offensive against Saddam regime.900

The Propaganda campaign within domestic environment of America succeeded in

establishing links between 9/11 and Iraqi dictator. About 90 percent Americans believed

that Saddam Hussain was aiding and abetting international terrorists who were actively

planning terrorism against the US. The propaganda campaign involved “systematic

mendacity” to discredit Saddam regime. The campaign worked with Congress which

granted President Bush authority to invade Saddam regime.901

The propaganda offensive was led by the President, Vice President and Rumsfeld.

All the three persistently made unequivocal statements about presence of WMD in Iraq.

This campaign against Saddam regime proceeded by “rhetorical hyperbole and involved

deliberate twisting of facts.”902 There were important reasons for the invasion of Iraq but

they, expectedly, remained undeclared. They included oil and Israel. The war on Iraq had

to befitted in the context of 9/11 happening and the US war against terror. The

propaganda offensive based on “misinformation” was led by the President himself. In so

doing, he might have been deceived by the neoconservatives around him. The issue of oil

supply was not debated at all.903 The Western propaganda campaign geared up in

September 2002. Saddam Hussain’s past activities were especially focused to malign him

and to prepare ground for an invasion of Iraq.904 Notorious impressions like “Axis of

Evil” and “new Hitler” were used against Saddam.

5.3.11 Invasion of Iraq under False Pretexts:

The US invasion of Iraq proved to be an incredibly questionable affair. The declared

rationale of this war included two objectives/ causes – Iraq’s WMD and links with al-

Qaeda leading to 9/11. In retrospective, both proved wrong. The rationale of invasion was

seriously questioned in the run-up to war. The invasion of Iraq was a predetermined

affair, at least since 9/11 tragedy. Ron Suskind gave a vivid account of “false pretexts”

leading up to war. He argued nothing could stop President Bush short of war on Iraq. 905

900 Jim Rutenberg, and Robin Toner. “A Nation at War”, New York Time. March 22, 2003901 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 19902 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 62903 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 25-26904 Simons, Future Iraq, 273905 Suskind, Way of the World, 367

217

He had written a long story about the involvement of intelligence of the US,

Britain, Jordan and Iraq. A senior official of the British intelligence Shipster,

manoeuvered a contact with Iraqi intelligence Chief Habbush, through Saad Khayr,

Jordanian intelligence chief. In the run up to war, Habbush met Shipster in Jordan.

Habbush told Shipster in plain words that Iraq had no WMD. Richard Dearlove, the chief

of British Intelligence, himself flew to Washington and told Bush Administration’s high

ups about this fact. But Bush Administration disregarded this disclosure and rejected it

summarily. Consequently Iraq was invaded and nothing as WMD was found there. The

author ended his account with the remarks that the US invaded Iraq “under false

pretenses.”906 Actually, Habbush undercut the US declared justification of war. Ron

Suskind even argued that many personnel in intelligence – CIA, believed it was just

“denial and deception strategy” the Administration followed.907

The US Administration saw in 9/11 a big opportunity to mobilize public opinion

in support of war against terror. The Administration had other projects to perform and

other motives to achieve. After 9/11 President Bush said this was the “great opportunity.”

Rumsfeld declared it a “great opportunity to restructure” the world.908How this war

against terror could turn on Iraq? The Bush Administration wanted to extend war on

terror to Iraq. For the end to achieve, President Bush linked Iraq with al-Qaeda. And

Saddam regime was actively involved in the development of WMD. Iraq was an

“imminent threat” to the US security. Later on, all those claims of Bush Administration

were discredited. There was almost conclusive evidence that the decision makers

“deliberately exaggerated” unreliable claims. The war party knew that Iraq was not a

threat to the US security. It was a “false pretext” they used to wage war against Iraq.909

The above cited report concluded that the Iraq’s WMD were no more a threat to

the US. The nuclear program of Iraq had been suspended over the years and production

capabilities for chemical weapons were also destroyed. Furthermore, Iraq had been under

sanctions over the years. Consequently, Iraq was no more an “immediate threat” to the

US security. There was no functional linkage between Saddam regime and Osama bin

906 Suskind, Way of the World, 361-373907 Ibid, 365908 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 32-37909 Joseph Cirincione, Jessica Mathews and George Perkovich. WMD in Iraq. The Report of the

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2004, 291

218

Laden.910 The report finally concluded that CIA’s “NIE of October 2002 was

intentionally misrepresented”. The Bush Administration knowingly did that. None of

Colin Powell’s claims before the UNSC stood the test of verification.911 The “Duelfer

Report” prepared by special adviser to the CIA, after pain-taking work for 15 months

involving 1200 CIA inspectors, finally concluded that Iraq was in no more possession of

WMD but it had destroyed them all after First Gulf War.912

“The Kean Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks” also gave

the same conclusion that there was no functional “linkage” between Saddam and Osama

bin Laden.913 After investigation, the “US Senate Intelligence Committee” finally

declared in July, 2004, that “unqualified claims” about “Iraq’s nuclear status” must not

had been extended as a proof and included in NIE of October, 2002.914 Scott Ritter argued

that a large number of former weapons inspectors who worked in Iraq refuted the case of

immediate threat from Iraq in the run-up to Iraq war.915

George Tenet, the contemporary head of CIA, in his statement before Congress

testified in February 2001 that Iraq was “no imminent threat to American security” and

CIA had no clear evidence that Iraq was making a nuclear bomb. Despite this all the CIA

reviewed its stance on Iraq’s WMD in NIE of October, 2002. The NIE of October 2002

played a decisive role in Congress authorizing the administration to invade Iraq.916

Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber argued that the Bush Administration deceived on the

issue of Iraq’s WMD. The authors gave a list of deceptions. The important deceptions

included the deception on aluminum tubes, deception on drones that could reach

America, deception on yellow cake, deception on Atta affair.917

The following authors gave empirical evidence that the Bush Administration

“deliberately distorted facts and misled public opinion” in America about Iraq, al-Qaeda

and WMDs: (Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski, “The New Pentagon Papers,” ; (David Corn, 910 Cirincione et al, WMD in Iraq, 2004911 Ibid912 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 507913 Ibid, 505914 Ibid, 504915 Scott Ritter. “Not Everyone Got it Wrong on Iraq's Weapons”, International Herald Tribune.

February, 6, 2004916 Jason Leopold. “CIA Intelligence Reports Seven Months Before 9/11, said Iraq Posed No

Threat to US”, September 21, 2005917 Sheldon Rampton, and John Clyde Stauber. Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of

Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq. Penguin, 2003: 79-99

219

“Willful Ignorance”, Tompaine.com); (John B. Judis and Spencer Ackerman, “The

Selling of the Iraq War,” New Republic, 30 June , 2003); (Seymour Hersh, “Selective

Intelligence,” New Yorker, 12 May, 2003); (Julian Borger, “The Spies Who Pushed for

War,” Guardian, 17 July 2003); and (Jason Leopold, “CIA Probe Finds Secret Pentagon

Group Manipulated Intelligence on Iraqi Threat,”).

Most importantly, Paul Wolfowitz admitted in an interview, though after the war,

the issue of Iraq’s WMD was used to mobilize public support in America for US war on

Iraq.918 George Tenet argued about the issue of “Curve Ball,” possibly a fabrication in the

custody of BND, the German intelligence. The invasion of Iraq was a settled fact.919 The

CIA permitted “flawed information” about the WMD issue. The Congress, the Bush

Administration, the UN and the world at large got that “flawed information” and

“believed” in it. It must not have happened like that.920 Our “judgments on Iraq proved

wrong” argued Tenet.921

In addition to the above cited empirical evidence the following authors also made

the same argument. That the declared reasons / rationale of war – WMD and al-Qaeda

links with Iraq proved discredited. There was intentional distortion of facts, maneuvering

of intelligence and exaggerations involving even selective citations of facts and outright

deceptions: (Soros: 2004: 54, 58); (Packer: 2005: 62); (Suskind: 2006: 243); (Peter

Galbraith: 2006: 84); (Gurtov: 2008: 80-83); (Walt:2005: 59); (Black: 2008: 210);

Brigham: 2006:X); and (Blix: 2004: 232-34).

5.3.12 Control over the New Epicenter of World Politics:

With the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the USSR, era of bipolar world ended.

So did stability of the Cold War. The era of unipolarity started with the predominant

position of the US, the only superpower left on the world political stage.922 The

geopolitical and geo-economic environment of the world underwent radical

transformation. There were major regional powers in the new unipolar world. However,

none of these powers militarily matched with the US, economically and in technological

918 Paul Wolfowitz. Guardian. June 4, 2003919 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of the Storm, 383920 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of the Storm, 383921 Ibid, 493922 Eric J. Hobsbawn. The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991. (New York:

Vintage, 1994), 9-11

220

advancement. Relatively, the US was left free to use its military strength to dominate the

world and also to use it as a political leverage to dominate major natural resources on the

globe.

There emerged a fierce competition among major powers of the post-Cold War

world-the US, Russia and China, to exploit the natural resources of Eurasia, the land that

stretched from Germany to China. Eurasia had been a super-continent with huge natural

resources.923 America was in the leading role in this competition with huge military

spending. The persistent use of its military might in international arena was a witness to

its declinist position in the post-Cold War world. Critics argued that predominant military

power of the US was a “trump card” in the US hands to prevail over US rivals on the

world political landscape in this drive for resources.924

The American global hegemonic status rested on three elements. Firstly, control

over the resources of oil; secondly, monopoly over transport routes for energy supply,

and thirdly other strategic resources supply the other industrial powers needed. Access to

oil resources was the prime and vital interest of the US. America predominated control

over energy resources of Eurasia, most specifically Central Asia and the Middle East.925

Oil constituted, without any exaggeration, the lifeblood of world economy. The life and

death struggle had been going on to establish control over the energy resources among

the major powers of the world. The US superpower status was dependent on the control

of oil resources. America was the largest oil consumer in the world. America needed

control over the oil reserves/fields of the world. Approximately, American energy

expenditure in 2000 was $558 billion, one-fourth of the world total. Industrial sector was

the largest consumer.926 American military supremacy was unprecedented in world

history in the post-Cold War world.927

After the removal of Saddam regime from power, America did not choose early

with-drawl from Iraq. The neoconservative hawks in the Bush Administration wanted

“prolonged occupation” of Iraq. The presence of US occupation forces in Iraq would

923 C. Clover. “Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland”, Foreign Affairs. 78, (March/April 1999), 9924 Andre Gunder Frank. “NATO, Caucasus/ Central Asia Oil”, World Socialist Web Site. June 16,

1999 925 Z. Brzezinski. “A Geostrategy for Asia”, Foreign Affairs. (September/October 1997)926 “Energy Highlights of the US”, Energy Policy Division, April 2002927 P. Beaumont, and E. Vulliamy. “Armed to the Teeth”, The Observer. February 10, 2002

221

develop a new pressure on Iran and Syria. It would also develop the US military bases in

Iraq.928 In May 2007, Robert Gates, the US defense secretary, said that America wanted a

“long and enduring presence” in post-Saddam Iraq. The US occupation forces would

withdraw to the military bases recently established in Iraq. For majority of Iraqis it meant

Washington deliberated “imperial ambitions” in Iraq to control oil of the country.929 For

the multiple reasons America was not going to withdraw her military forces soon from

the Middle East. There was a crisis situation in the region. It would not be a smart

move.930

In March 2007, the Saudi Monarch went public on the US-Iraq policy. The king

called American military presence in Iraq as “illegal foreign occupation”. The next

month, Rice sent David Satterfield met Saudi Monarch, king Abdullah of Saudi Arabia

remained the most trusted ally of America in the region for more than 50 years. Saudi

Arabia was a Sunni Muslim State. Saudi Monarch wanted a Sunni ruler in Iraq who

would not be a tyrant like Saddam. Shia dominated government in post-Saddam Iraq was

nightmare for Saudis and Satterfield understood king Abdullah’s concern on “Shia

crescent” from Iran to Syria.

King Abdullah’s meeting with Satterfield remained “uncomfortable”. King was

angry. America had handed over Iraq to Iran, said the king. A Shia led government in

Baghdad would never be “independent” of Iran. On this, Satterfield’s reply was a true

reflection of US policy in Iraq. On this issue Satterfield replied that “America was here”.

The US had been here in the Middle East for more than 50 years. “America was not

going anywhere”. Satterfield further said that President Bush was committed to Iraq. So

did to the region, America would remain here. America was not going anywhere.931

General (Retd) Jack Keane had an important assignment in Iraq to perform. He

went to see General David Petraeus, the field commander in Iraq, at his residence. While

discussing the situation in Iraq General (Retd.) Keane said to Petraeus that the Middle

East was “The center of gravity for international security and strife in the world”. In the

last century “It had been Europe”. Two world wars were fought in Europe. In the 21 st

928 Steele, Defeat, 9929 Robert Gates. “US looking to long term presence in Iraq”, Agency France Press. June 1, 2007930 Interview with Dr. Noman, July 22, 2016931 Woodward, War Within, 347-348

222

century, “It would be the Middle East”. America “will fight other wars in the Middle

East.”932

Keane visited Iraq for the second time in March, 2008, to discuss next assignment

of General Petraeus. During the discussion with Petraeus, Keane said important things

about the Middle East. Bob Woodward quoted those words. The “global center of

gravity” was in the Middle East now. The US was going to stay in the Middle East “for

50 years” at least. During this stay America would do a number of things. America would

“fight other wars” in the region. America would “militarily confront radical Islam” and

that America would protect its “economic interests in the region” as well. America would

formulate a national military strategy for the Middle East. America was “going to do it”

at any cost and “anyway”. The US had “no choice”. The US military forces did not want

to do that. They wanted “to end war and go home”. Without any doubt that was “not

going to happen.”933

Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, chaired a meeting in the State

Department in May, 2008. She discussed many things at length in the meeting. Her words

were thought provoking and reflected US future policy in the Middle East. The important

ideas she uttered were as follows: The “real battlefield against al-Qaeda” was the Middle

East. America was to defeat it there. She maintained that America had got a “better

posture in the Middle East as a result of Iraq” war. On Iran, she talked in plain words.

Iran was a “challenge to US interests in the Middle East” and America would not “let

Iran to become nuclear power” anyway. Nuclear status would make Iran “dominant

regional power”. For sure, Iran would be either “transformed or defeated.”934 Rice

declared further that “the center of American power” had moved from “Europe to the

Middle East”. In post-WWII era “the epicenter of American military might” had been in

“Europe” however, it had now “shifted to the Middle East”. America did not intervene in

Iraq to continue the status quo. A “historical change” had started and America was there

to “supervise” it.935

Bob Woodward conducted a number of interviews with President George W.

Bush from December 2001 to May 2008. The last interview was conducted on May 21, 932 Ibid, 392-393933 Woodward, War Within, 410934 Ibid, 421-423935 Ibid, 423

223

2008. The last interview carried special importance for this thesis. Woodward asked the

President about the US national security. What worried the President most? The answer

was the “rise of radical fundamentalism” in the Middle East. The most thematic question

Woodward put was about the region. Was there any “recentering of American might” in

the Middle East? The President replied, “Absolutely”. The President explained there were

multiple reasons: 9/11 emanated from the Middle East. More attacks were expected. A

“nuclear Iran” was a dangerous idea. Woodward asked did it mean “the US military

hegemony” in the Middle East ? President’s answer was a classic replied America had

“freedom hegemony” in the region. Wherever American forces had been deployed in the

region, they had been positioned there on the “invitation of respective governments to

protect them” to give them security.936

5.3.13 Prolonged US Military Presence in Middle East:

The US world system of “military bases from the pacific to the Azores” was established

for military operations in the “Middle East” particularly in the “Persian Gulf” region.

Since 1976, President Carter’s period, the “Persian Gulf region” had been the main target

of the major “US intervention forces.”937 One consequence of the US war on Afghanistan

was the establishment of military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia with two basic

objectives to achieve. One was to establish control over Central Asian resources. Other

was “encirclement of the Persian Gulf”. The Iraq war also left bases in Iraq, the heart of

the Middle East.938 Diego Garcia was the only reliable military base until recently nearby

the Middle East.939

It had been argued that America long wanted to establish permanent military

bases in the Persian Gulf region. The US conquest of Iraq in 2003 fulfilled this desire.940

In 2004, the Bush Administration announced a plan for the redeployment of troops,

mainly from Germany and South Korea. These troops were to be redeployed mainly in

Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia.941 After First Gulf War in 1991, the US

military presence in the Persian Gulf region became permanent. The underlying concern

936 Woodward, War Within, 425937 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 162938 Thorn Shanker, and Eric Schmitt. “Pentagon Expects Long-Term Access to Four Key Bases in

Iraq,” New York Times. April 20, 2003939 Ibid940 Cirincione et al, WMD in Iraq, 2004941 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 46

224

was the ever present danger to the allied Arab countries from Iraq and Iran. The US

asserted that she was under an “obligation to safeguard the security” of six allied Arab

monarchies, the GCC.942

Tom Vanden Brook citing official sources from the Defense Department argued

in July 2014 about the presence of 35,000 US troops in the Middle East. Mainly, the

troops had been deployed in Kuwait and Jordan along with destructive military

weaponry. Along with the troops, there were about 90 air force fighters and more than 50

ships in the region.943 David Martosko wrote in June 2014, citing Commander Bill

Speaks, US Central Command Spokesman, that America maintained 35000 troops in the

Middle East and a combined Air Operations Center in Qatar. The US navy’s 5 th fleet was

also stationed in Bahrain. The spokesperson further said that the US had “significant

military presence” in and around the Middle East.944 In June 2014, there were

approximately 10,000 US troops deployed in Kuwait and the sme number in Jordan.945

The number of US troops deployed in each country in the Middle East based on

information from US Department of Defense as late as June 30, 2014.The deployment

was as followed: (Iraq-2350, Kuwait-13021, Bahrain-3227, Qatar-592, Saudi Arabia-332,

Turkey-1539, Egypt-267, and UAE-313).946 There was an increase in number of US

troops in Iraq owing to the activities of ISIS in Iraq. Now the number arose to about

3100.947

5.3.14 Drive for Global Hegemony:

The historians especially from the US argued that America had become an empire, much

like the great empires of history such as the Greek, the Roman, and the British. Some

historians even argued that America always aspired to be an “imperial power”. Historian

Richard Van Alstyne called America, by the standard of its very policies, an “imperial

power” not different from the empires of the times passed. It grew like Roman Empire.948

942 Zunes, Tinderbox, 64943 Tom Vander Brook. “U.S. Troops Won't Fight in Iraq Battles, Hagel Says”, USA TODAY, July

3, 2014944 David Martosko. The US is Armed to the Teeth in the Middle East: What Are the Options?

Mail Online. June 12, 2014945 Ibid946 “United States Military Deployments”. Wikipedia.947 “American Troops”. BBC. November 10, 2014948 Richard Warner Van Alstyne. The American Empire: Its Historical Pattern and Evolution. No.

43. (Historical Association, 1960), 10-11

225

Similarly, Gore Vidal wrote, since its inception America entertained imperial

ambitions.949 William Appleman, much like Alstyne called America “an empire” that

evolved like Roman Empire of the past.950 The imperialist policy adopted by Presidents

Mckinley and Theodore Roosevelt in the last decade of 19th century and first decade of

20th century respectively became the defining feature of the US foreign policy since

then.951

He further wrote that American empire was not a result of deliberate planning, it

was a “benevolent empire.”952 Furthermore, overwhelming majority of writers saw

America as an “informal empire” and not a formal one. America sought “economic

control” rather than “political and military” control.953 By about 1930 A.D., the US

industrial production had increased greatly, equal to the combined production of

Germany, France, UK, Russia, Italy and Japan.954 America acquired overseas territories

for the first time after Spanish -American War of 1898. It was an imperial war which

America imposed over Spain. The US got Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Hawaii as

a war prize. The US also became a Pacific power.955

Petras and Morley wrote in 1995 that as American empire expanded, the US as a

republic receded.956 Woodrow Wilson won elections in 1916 for keeping America out of

WWI. Franklin Delano Roosevelt won elections in 1940 by promising not to send “our

boys overseas” to fight. Lyndon Johnson won elections in 1964 as a “peace candidate”

and, Bill Clinton won in 1992 to direct the US energy to be focused on “internal affairs”

of the country. All the four Presidents, contrary to their election promises, sent American

troops abroad. Wilson and Roosevelt entered in two World Wars respectively, Johnson

sent American troops to Vietnam, and similarly Clinton made military interventions in

Bosnia 1995, and in Kosovo in 1999.957

949 Gore Vial. Armageddon: Essays 1983-1987. (London: Andre Deutsch,1987), 118950 William Appleman. Tragedy of American Diplomacy. (WW Norton & Company. 1959), 59951 Appleman, Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 59952 Ronald Steele. Max Americana. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1968), 15953 Geir Lundestad. The American Empire and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a

Comparative Perspective. (Oxford University Press/Norwegian University Press, 1990), 37-39954 Paul M. Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict

1500-2000. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 200-202955 Walter LaFeber. The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913. (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1993). Chap 5, 7956 James Petras, and Morris Morley. Empire or Republic? American Global Power and Domestic

Decay. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), xv957 Crockatt, America Embattled, 34

226

Generally, as a rule, American Presidents exaggerated the contemporary issues to

get public support. They, in fact, “manufactured the US vulnerability” argued British

historian John Thompson. President Lyndon Johnson manufactured the same sense of the

US vulnerability on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964 and got support from the

Congress. Similarly, Richard Nixon’s secret bombing of Cambodia in 1969 and Ronald

Reagan’s “Iran-Contra Affair” of 1980’s were just to cite only two examples. They

constituted the cases of “imperial presidency”- the “willful aggrandizement” of executive

power.958

After 9/11, President Bush declared war on terror and compared it with moral

struggle between good and evil. The linkage of war on terror with moral struggle was a

move to deflect the connection of 9/11 tragedy with specific American policies toward

the Middle East in the preceding decades.959 Since WWII, the US had been active in the

Middle East. Basically, American national interest had three elements in the Middle East-

continuity of oil supplies, protector of Israel, and checking USSR influence in the

region.960 Due to its strategic importance, America evolved Iran as a “regional stabilizer”

in the Middle East.961

After Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, America became preoccupied with

“Islamic fundamentalism” in the region and exploited to increase American political

power.962 America wielded disproportionately larger military power vis-à-vis other

powers of the world. American military might have its own justification.963 US after 9/11,

in the words of Geoff Simons, followed new “colonial policy” toward the Middle East.

America wielded predominant military power in the world without any counterweight

empire on the globe. The US would continue to shape the parameters of world politics in

21st century, especially in the Middle East. America would continue to reshape, till

foreseeable future, the Middle East region according to the US national vision.964

958 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. The Imperial Presiding. (New York: The Popular Library, 1974)959 Hugo Young. “We Are Good At Getting In, Not So Good At Getting Out.” The

Guardian. October 8, 2001960 H.W. Brands. Into the Labyrinth: The United States and The Middle East, 1945-1993. (New

York: McGrawHill, 1994), xi-xiii961 Ibid, 125, 153-155962 Gerges, America and Political Islam, 42 963 Crockatt, America Embattled, 161964 Simons, Future Iraq, 22

227

General Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz argued in The Battle for Peace that America

was an “empire” now, “the indispensable nation” that carried power every-where on the

globe.965 Another historian wrote that America had a war plan for Iraq but no

reconstruction plan for the war ravaged country. It was December 7, 1941, when Japan

attacked Pearle Harbor. That put America into the global role. 9/11 enhanced that role. In

this era of imperialism, America had no choice but to be actively engaged in world

politics. America could not withdraw from world politics.966

He had been criticized for speaking the truth, argued General Tony Zinni.

America invaded Iraq “under false” rationales.967 The authors further wrote that America

was “an empire now”. It was an “empire of influence not of conquest”. The US had been

reluctant to deliver as a hegemonic power.968 President George W. Bush, in the aftermath

of 9/11 used US military might to implement Neo-Cons Agenda of imperial ambitions.969

The Bush Administration pursued Pax Americana much like Pax Romana. President

Bush pursued “an empire of oppression” based on US economic interests.970

The following scholars/ authors invariably discussed, in their respective books/

articles, the “theme of US hegemony” in the international political system. More or less,

they agreed on a broader theme that America was a hegemon/empire, a predominant

military/ economic power within the system and the invasion of Iraq was, in reality, an

imperial project undertook by the George W. Bush Administration. They were being

enlisted below: (Chomsky: 2003:11, 162-165); (Gurtov: 2008: 37-48, 100); (Waltz: 2005:

19, 31-32); (Haas: 2002, a lecture, Foreign Policy Association, April 22, 2002); (Brooks

and Wohlforth, Foreign Affairs, (July/ August 2002); (Posen, International Security,

(Summer 2003); (MIT Technology Review, at www.technologyreview/scorecards, 2004);

(The Military Balance: 2004: 354-358); (The Military Balance: 2003); (Johnson: 2004:

132); (Williams: 2002: 244-246); (Stephen Fielder, Financial Times, December 8-9,

2001); (Hirsh: 2003: 42); (George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft: 1998: 542-43); (A

National Security Strategy, for a New Century: 1998: 23); (Fabbrini eds: 2006: 8-14);

965 Zinni and Koltz, Battle for Peace, 4966 Ibid, 8-12967 Clancy, Zinni and Koltz, Battle Ready, 426968 Clancy, Zinni and Koltz, Battle Ready, 431-432969 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 18 970 Ibid, 22-23

228

(Fouskas and Gokay: 2005: 1-6); (Brzezinski, New York Times, 9 January 2002);

(Woodward: 2002: 32-37); (Fukuyama: 2006); (Kennedy: 1993: 19); (Bacevich: 2002);

and (Fergusson: 2004).

5.3.15 Maintenance of US Unipolarity in 21st Century:

Since 1989, the first year of Bush senior’s Administration, when Dick Cheney was

Secretary of Defense, Colin Powell, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Wolfowitz,

under-secretary of defense, worked actively as a team to make responses, in military

terms, regarding “weakening of Soviet global” presence. The answer to this question

came from neoconservative’s camp in 1992. The answer could be found in the “Defense

Planning Guidance,” produced by Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby. The draft was a

guide for the US Administration. The document consisted of neocons recommendations

in the field of foreign policy. It was the first blueprint for “maintaining the US

unipolarity” in the 21st century.971

The central objective of the DPG 1992 was that the US did not want “peer

compititor”.972 The draft DPG was leaked to New York Times in March 1992. According

to the DPG the US wanted “global hegemony”. The document recommended “strategy of

unipolarity” for the US to achieve the objectives.973 William Kristol, editor Weekly

Standard, wrote about the document that it was prophetic in nature. It was prophetic

because President George W. Bush adopted the same policy recommendations in his

foreign policy.974

The DPG 1992 and the PNAC 1997 provided the answer, in the form of neocons

agenda to respond to the post-Cold War realities. 9/11 marked the beginning of a new era

of world politics based on unipolarity.975 The neocons agenda consisted of three basic

objectives. First, checking the emergence of a rival superpower on the world stage;

second, the US must use this opportunity, provided by 9/11, to fashion the world

according to the US interests and values and third, America must use, if need be, the US

military forces unilaterally, preemptively, and for regime change.

971 Dorrien, Imperial Designs, 4972 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 46973 Krauthammer, Unipolar Moment, 1990-91974 Fouskas and Gokay, American Imperialism, 58975 Fouskas and Gokay, American Imperialism, 61

229

In June 2002, President Bush announced his Bush Doctrine of preemption at West

Point, Naval Academy, New York. The Bush doctrine made it clear that the US reserved

the right, if need be, to use its military forces preemptively to destroy an “imminent

threat” to the US security. The National Security Strategy of September 2002 provided a

blueprint for US hegemony in the world.976 The NSS of 2002 translated neoconservative

ideas into reality.977 America wielded the strongest military forces on the face of the

earth. It had evolved into an empire. It could impose its will over others.978

The neoconservative ideology wanted the US, among other things, maintenance

of unchallengeable military superiority in the 21st century.979 The 1992 DPG draft was

slipped to media and ultimately Bush (senior) Administration repudiated the draft but it

revealed, without any exaggeration, the US goals in 21st century. The document wanted

the world in 21st century without any challengers to the US. The revised draft contained

most of the same “policy recommendations” as did the original document, argued James

Mann.980

The end of Cold War and subsequent disintegration of USSR started a new debate

in the US about its role in the post-USSR world. It was an unprecedented opportunity, the

unipolar moment. America should use its “predominant military forces” to keep the

world unipolar. Maintenance of “unipolarity” was the most suitable and desirable policy

for the US in 21st century. Unipolarity would ensure restructuring of the international

political system according to American interests and values in 21st century. Zalmay

Khalilzad gave the same recommendations about the US foreign policy. Like other

neocons he also supported DPG 1992 recommendations for the US foreign policy.981

The NSS was announced in September 2002. It declared in plane words that the

US would “maintain its hegemony” within the international political system through the

use of military forces.982 John Ikenberry, argued that NSS was committed to “maintain

unipolarity” in world political system and ensured a world without “peer competitor” to

976 Gaddis, A Grand Strategy, 2002977 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 9978 Henry Kissinger. “Henry Kissinger at Large, Part Two”, Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg, February 5, 2004979 Mann, Rise of Vulcans, 208-215

980 Mann, Rise of Vulcans, 208-215981 Zalmay Khalilzad. “Losing the Moment? The US and the World after the Cold War”,

Washington Quarterly 18, no 2, (Spring 1995)982 The National Security Strategy, 2002

230

the US. The scholar further wrote that “international law” and “institutions” like the UN

carried “little value” in the eyes of this new national strategy.983

In short, the proponents of DPG 1992 and founders of the PNAC argued that with

the end of Cold War the US was left as the only surviving superpower in the world. The

US possessed superior military forces and a powerful economy. The US ideology was

spreading around the globe. The US was the predominant power on the world stage.984

The theorists of unipolarity and American primacy argued that these very characteristics

made the world politically stable.985 William Wohlforth also extended the same argument

as did Lieber.986 In the words of Michael Mandelbaum, America was a “Goliath”.

American military might was the distinctive and salient feature of world politics today.

America was a “Goliath” but a “benign Goliath”.987

5.3.16 Sharp Increase in US Defense Budget in post 9/11 Era:

During a couple of years preceding 9/11 from 1995 to 2000, the US defense expenditure

was 37 percent of the total world military expenditure.988 The US defense budget in 2000

was $ 295 billion. In 2001 the corresponding figure was $ 310 billion. 9/11 gave Bush

Administration blank cheque for military expenditure. In 2003, the figure rose to $ 417

billion.989 In 2005, the US defense expenditure was $ 440 billion.990 The US defense

expenditure for 2007 would be more than $ 500 billion.991 It was a huge increase in the

US military expenditure in post- 9/11 era.

5.3.17 Reasonable Cost of the War:

The war hawks in the Bush Administration had established good relations with Ahmad

Chalabi, an exiled dissident from Iraq. Ahmad Chalabi had convinced them that the

revenue coming from Iraqi oil would be sufficient for the reconstruction of Iraq.

983 Ikenberry, Imperial Ambition, 2002984 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 260985 Robert J. Lieber. The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century. (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5986 William Wohlforth. “The Stability of the Unipolar World”, International Security. 24, no 1,

(summer 1999), 5-41987 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 310988 “SIPRI Figures”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2000989 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

(SIPRI) 2003990 Black, Great Powers, 209991 Ibid

231

Whatever the cost of war in terms of money, the war would not be a financial burden for

the US. It would be self-financed by Iraqi oil sources.992

5.3.18 Warning for Iran and Syria:

President George W. Bush also included Iran in his “axis of evil” speech in January 2002.

The origin of US-Iran hostility started with Iranian Revolution of 1979. For Washington,

Iran had been a “serious strategic challenge” at least since 1979. Tehran, like Damascus,

had been supportive of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, the avowed enemies of

Israel in the Middle East. Iran had also been seeking “nuclear capability.”993 Iran had the

capacity to deliver nuclear warheads against Israel. Iran was the most powerful state in

the Gulf region. Powerful Iran was not in American interests in the Middle East. That

was why Reagan Administration supported Saddam against Iran during Iran-Iraq war.994

Washington wanted Iran, for multiple reasons, keep in check.995

For the last 50 years, the US-Syria relationship had been problematic. Damascus

was an ally of Moscow during the Cold War years. President Bush did not include Syria

in his list of “axis of evil” states, however, considered it a “rogue state.” In the aftermath

of 9/11, the US policy toward Syria became more hostile. In the aftermath of US invasion

of Iraq in 2003, and initial victory, it seemed as if Iran and Syria, the two rogue states in

American eyes, would suffer the same fate as did Iraq.996

5.3.19 No Regard for Geneva Convention:

The US established and maintained a military base at Guantanamo Bay since Spanish-

American war a century ago. The US used this base as a prison for suspected terrorists

after 9/11. The Bush Administration maintained, as the base was not located at the

sovereign territory of the US, the prisoners encamped there were not entitled to the right

of habeas corpus and other laws applied within its own borders. The Administration

further maintained that there was a limited applicability of international laws as well,

specifically the applicability of 1949 Geneva Conventions about the protection of

992 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 84 993 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 280 994 Ibid, 281995 Ibid, 282996 Ibid, 263

232

prisoners of war. For that America was strongly criticized throughout the world for

maintaining “legal black hole”.997

In a test case Hamdan V. Rumsfeld, American Supreme Court ruled that for the

prisoners of Guantanamo Base, and the military tribunals established there were

“unconstitutional and violated international law” regarding protection of rights of

prisoners of war as declared in Geneva Convention of 1949.998

5.3.20 None of 9/11 Hijackers Came from Iraq:

None of the nineteen hijackers identified, who were involved in 9/11 tragedy was an

Iraqi. America did not take any action against Saudi Arabia. Fifteen hijackers of 9/11

belonged to Saudi Arabia. Rest of the four belonged to Egypt. Still America decided,

against empirical evidence, to wage war on Iraq. It was a big question mark.

The truthfulness of the rationale of US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was seriously

questioned by scholars; even before the invasion. That was disregarded by Bush

Administration. As expected, the rationale of the US war on Iraq was discredited after

investigations. Then what was the real rationale of the preemptive and unilateral invasion

of Iraq? This chapter answered this question in detail. It explained the factors that made

the US war on Iraq an excellent case study of offensive realist model. The factors

discussed above clearly showed that there was a close fit between offensive realist model

and the US war on Iraq in 2003. The factors discussed above increased US share of world

power. The factors proved that US being the great power was “power maximiser”. These

factors in combination made Iraq a case study of offensive realist model.999 The US also

sought global “hegemony” if possible. The US occupation policy in Iraq constituted the

next chapter of this dissertation. The US occupation policy in Iraq 2003-2008 further

substantiated the main argument of this dissertation.

997 “Guantanamo Bay: A Human Rights Scandal”, Amnesty International998 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 401999 Interview with Dr. Tahir Amin (Ex. Head, Dept. of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam

University, Islamabad) by the Researcher. Islamabad. June 16, 2016

233

Chapter Six

The Occupation Policy in IraqThe main theme in this chapter was that the US occupation policy in Iraq from 2003-

2008 further substantiated the empirical verification of the main argument of this

dissertation. Instead of early withdrawal from Iraq after removal of Saddam regime, the

US decision of prolonged occupation of Iraq exactly was in accordance with the

principles of offensive realism. This decision was made to consolidate the gains of the

invasion. In retaliation, insurgency started in Iraq. The insurgency was used as a pretext

for a big and prolonged US military presence in Iraq and the Persian Gulf region.

America invaded Iraq unilaterally and preemptively in March 2003 under “false

pretexts”. The US operational policy was contradictory to the Bush Administration’s

declared objectives in Iraq. The US policy in Iraq, in reality, reflected great power

behavior according to the assumptions of offensive realist model. A close look on the US

occupation policy in Iraq from 2003 to 2008 made clear that there was close fit between

the occupation policy and assumptions of offensive realism. The invasion was not

followed up by any serious plan of reconstruction of Iraq. Rather, it seemed, as if the

invasion was made to increase the US share of world power in multiple ways and to

establish its unchallengeable predominance in the Middle East, in general and, the

Persian Gulf region in particular.

6.1 The Occupation of Iraq:The planners of invasion in Washington underestimated the resistance in Iraq. On the eve

of war, in February 2003, US Army Chief General Eric Shinseki, during a Senate

hearing, made it clear that we needed “several hundred thousand soldiers” to maintain

security and law and order in post-war Iraq. Other assessments also concluded the same.

They concluded that occupation forces needed not less than twenty security personnel per

234

thousand populations, under Saddam regime it was 43.1000 It meant the number of

occupation forces must be between 400,000 and 500,000 to maintain law and order in

post-Saddam Iraq.1001 However, the civilians working on the top position in Pentagon did

not agree with these assessments and provided low number of troops to the field

commanders in Iraq. They presumed, a coup would “overthrow” Saddam regime.1002 The

top officials in Pentagon believed that in case of absence of a coup, the Iraqi forces would

surrender to allied forces (in thousands) as they did in 1991.1003

Donald Rumsfeld, the secretary of defense, asked General Tommy Franks to

keep number of troops as low as possible while invading Iraq. Resultantly, the US

deployed only 116,000 troops on the ground. The total number of personnel involved in

the invasion was 310,000. It should have been 500,000.1004 Rumsfeld was criticized even

by Republican members of Congress for his “failure” to provide sufficient troops to

maintain law and order situation in post-Saddam Iraq.1005

The neoconservatives simply rejected General Shinseki’s proposal about large

number of troops for such a task. Paul Wolfowitz had assured Congress that the

campaign would be “cheap and self-financed” {Iraq’s oil}.1006 From the very beginning it

was clear that the number of troops being provided for such a formidable task was

insufficient. The field commanders were asking for more troops but the same was

dismissed by civilians in the Pentagon.1007 On March 16, 2003, Vice President Dick

Cheney, during his interview on NBC’s Meet the Press Program, with reference to

General Shinseki’s testimony before Congress about a higher number of troops argued

that it was not “accurate” assessment. It was an overstatement.1008

1000 Faleh A. Jabar. Post Conflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction and Legitimacy. Special Report no.120. (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace, May 2004), 6

1001 James Dobbins, et.al. America’s Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq. (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003)

1002 Alan George, Raymond Whitaker and Andy McSmith. “Revealed: The Meeting That Could Have Changed the History of Iraq”. The Independent of Sunday. 17 October, 2004

1003 Lawrence Freedman, and Efrain Karsh. The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991. (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), 307

1004 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 3, 6, 8, 4061005 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 1141006 Kolko, Age of War, 1421007 David E. Sanger, and Douglas Jehl. “Generals in Iraq Consider Options For More Troops”,

New York Times, April, 20041008 Bob Woodward. State of Denial. (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 151

235

The National Security Directive 24 of January 20, 2003, issued by President

Bush, authorized Donald Rumsfeld to “manage” war on Iraq and also follow-up of the

war.1009 The Pentagon officials favored Ahmad Chalabi, the head of INC (Iraqi National

Congress). INC was created through the efforts of Richard Perle and American Enterprise

Institute. Chalabi had left Iraq in 1958.1010 However, Chalabi as a choice of Pentagon was

“rejected” by the State Department and CIA.1011 The Pentagon managed the appointment

of Chalabi as an interim oil minister in transitional government in Iraq.

The decision of “de-Baathification” of Iraq was also taken by Rumsfeld. The

decision of “dissolution of Iraqi army” also took its origin from Pentagon. These

decisions of de-Baathification and dissolution of army, proved disastrous for establishing

law and order and internal security of the country. These decisions were taken “against”

the desires of the State Department. The State Department had started the “Future of Iraq

Project” involving a number of agencies and dissident Iraqi exiles including

professionals. The Future of Iraq Project started as early as April, 2002.1012 The “Future

of Iraq Project” study was important as it was related to the specific problems emanating

form above cited decisions such as looting, weak civil services, elimination of academics

etc. However, this study was ignored summarily.1013

The Pentagon, in reality, wanted reconstruction of Iraq under its own man,

Douglas Feith; he was special to Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld ordered General Garner, the State

Department appointee, to ignore the recommendations of “Future of Iraq Project”

study.1014 The same theme was also extensively discussed in David Rieff’s article

“Blueprint for a Mess” cited above.1015 Like the State Department, the CIA also warned

about the problem the aftermath of the war related to reconstruction. It seemed, as if, the

officials in the Pentagon had planned the wrong war.1016 The State Department had its

own reservations about the security and domestic resistance in post-Saddam Iraq. It was

1009 Peter Slevin, and Dona Priest. “Wolfowitz Concede Iraq Errors”, Washington Post. July 24, 2003

1010 David Rieff. “Blueprint for a Mess”, New York Times Magazine. November 2, 2003, 311011 Seymour M. Hersh, “The Debate Within”, The New Yorker. March 11, 2002: 34-391012 State Department Documents released to the National Security Archive on 17 August, 20051013 Eric Schmitt, and Joel Brinkley. “State Dept. Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq”, New

York Times. October 19, 20031014 Packer, War after War, November 24, 20031015 Rieff, Blueprint for a Mess, November 2, 20031016 Schmitt and Brinkley, State Dept. Study, October 19, 2003

236

an issue of foreign occupation.1017 Later on, Wolfowitz conceded that “serious errors”

were committed under the Pentagon. Those errors could have been easily avoided.1018

In the year 1991, Dick Cheney opposed “deposing” Saddam regime for right

reasons. However, in 2003 he did not oppose that.1019 President Bush did not remember

two important rules of war. They included a peace plan and an exit strategy. The

Pentagon spent much resource on the war than on reconstruction. Rebuilding of state

after removal of Saddam regime was important but was mostly ignored.1020 Iraq was

going to be an occupied country for years to come under the occupiers coming from a

different world view and culture. Rebuilding and reconstruction required people from

different culture.1021 Christopher H. Varhola was a US Army reserve major. He served in

Iraq and wrote his observations.

Even the US military forces warned, time and again, about the big difficulties

lying ahead in reconstructing Iraq but the US administration did not pay any heed to

those warnings. They continued to make “simplistic comparisons” between Japan and

Germany of post-WWII era and Iraq of post-9/11 era.1022 The US followed top-down

approach to reconstruction and unrestrained private investments in Iraq. The Iraq

opposition criticized US officials for dictating terms about post-Saddam political set up in

the country.1023

The US had ratified Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. The article required,

among other things, that the occupation forces would establish law and order and ensure

safety of human life. The provision number 363 of the US Army’s Law and Land

Warfare had repeated the Article 43 as such with no changes whatsoever. The US

administration “failed” to meet the requirements of the article and provision #363.

Rather, in contrary to the above cited article and provision, the US changed existing laws

1017 Rieff, Blueprint for a Mess, November 2, 20031018 Ibid1019 George F. Will. “What to Ask the Nominee”, Washington Post. November 17, 20041020 John Paul Lederach. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.

(Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 74-751021 Varhola, Christopher H. “American Challenges in Post Conflict Iraq”, Foreign Policy

Research Institute. May 27, 20041022 Conard C. Crane, and W. Andrew Terril, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and

Missions for Militancy Forces in a post Conflict Scenario. Charlisle, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 2003

1023 Judith Miller, and Lowell Bergman. “Iraq Opposition Is Pushing Ties with Iranians”, New York Times. December 13, 2002

237

of Iraq dealing with economy of the country. Till mid 2005, there was a great dearth of

basic services in Iraq such as water, electricity, hospitals, and schools.1024

General Jay Garner was nominated as head of the Office of Reconstruction and

Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) on January 20, 2003. The ORHA had to operate under

the US Ministry of Defense. According to the original plan the occupation set up in Iraq

would not last for more than three months. General Garner, as head of the ORHA,

reached Iraq on April 21, 2003. On the very first night in Iraq, General Garner received a

telephone call from Rumsfeld telling the General that he would be replaced by Paul

Bremer in less than one month.1025 In an interview to BBC reporter Greg Palast, General

Garner said that he wanted “elections” and put Iraqis in-charge of their country as soon as

possible. It was necessary to make Iraqis in-charge of their own destiny.1026

General Garner believed that prolonged occupation of Iraq would create “hatred”

against US. He also disagreed with the proposal of “privatization” of 192 state-owned

enterprises of Iraq. He was of the opinion that Iraqis should be the in charge of their

country. The General was fired out of Iraq.1027 The fall of Saddam regime in Baghdad was

followed by widespread looting and chaos in Iraq. Even weapon installations were also

looted.1028 The military success in Iraq was swift. At the same time there was “absence”

of any planning of post-Saddam rehabilitation in Iraq. One of the reasons was that the

occupation policy was an exclusive domain of the Pentagon. The Pentagon deliberately

ignored preparation about post-war Iraq done by State Department under the ‘Future of

Iraq Project’. Moreover, Rumsfeld deliberately refused to deploy more troops necessary

for the maintenance of post-Saddam security in Iraq.1029

The planners of regime change in Iraq “underestimated” the security challenges in

post-Saddam Iraq. It led to lack of forces to cope with the situation.1030 There was

widespread looting in Iraq immediately after the fall of regime. Neither the US military 1024 Jowan Masum. “The Iraqi development Programme”, June 28, 20051025 David Leigh. “General Sacked by Bush Says He Wanted Early Elections”, Guardian, March

18, 20041026 Greg Palast. “Iraq for Sale”, BBC Television Interview with Jay Garner, March 14, 20041027 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 1901028 James Glanz, and William J. Broad. “Looting at Iraqi Weapons Plants Was Systematic,

Official says”, New York Times. March 13, 20051029 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 81030 Bethsheba N. Crocker, “In Iraq: Going it Alone, Gone Wrong”, in Robert C. Orr (ed.),

Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction. (Washington D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 267-268

238

forces nor civilians had any plan for post-war reconstruction in Iraq.1031 President Bush

during his election campaign in 2000 said that he opposed to nation-building as a basis of

US foreign policy. Then he was criticizing President Clinton for these activities.

President Bush and his administration made “no plans for rehabilitation and

reconstruction” of post-war Iraq. He also refused to increase troop levels in chaotic Iraq

to establish and maintain law and order in the country.1032 Paul Pillar argued in 2006 in

Foreign Affairs that in the run-up to war intelligence community warned the Bush

Administration about the messy aftermath of the war and make preparations accordingly.

The administration paid no heed to these warnings.1033

Richard Perle was of the opinion that the State Department and the CIA were the

real culprits of democratization of Iraq. They felt some relief when Bremer replaced

General Garner. Now Bremer was the proper man.1034 The Bush administration neglected

to establish law and order in post-Saddam Iraq as well as to repair its war torn social

fabric. The 135,000 Us troops in Iraq were not trained for peace keeping, and at the same

time they were too few in numbers to perform the job-provision of security to the

people.1035

On the post-conflict conditions in Iraq the Economist in September 2003 wrote

that it was a story of incredible failures on the part of American administration. They had

not prepared, it seemed, for the worst-case scenario.1036 There was a lack of post-Saddam

preparation in Washington. Same was true about stability and security as well.1037 There

is a common misunderstanding about lack of planning for post-war Iraq. It led to triple

failure in Iraq. There were too few troops available for peacekeeping, no provision of

security against looting, and non-provision of basic human services-water and electricity

etc. it was not the case. The failure was more significant. Both the US and Britain could

not comprehend the political and cultural forces in post-regime Iraq that would play

central role in the country. Jonathan Steele wrote that he served eight assignments in Iraq

1031 Ibid, 2661032 Brigham, Iraq Another Vietnam, 691033 Ibid, 70-711034 Ibid, 721035 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 1991036 How Deep Is the Rift? February 15, 20031037 Eric Schmitt. “Iraqis Not ready to Fight Rebels on Their Own, US Says”, New York Times.

July 21, 2005

239

on behalf of Guardian from 2003 to 2007. His observation was that there was an “ever

widening gulf” between Iraqis and the occupiers.1038

The US policy of “prolonged presence” in Iraq was intentional. The Bush

Administration, especially the neoconservatives, did not want early withdrawal from Iraq.

By mere presence of US troops in Iraq, the US would put pressure on Iran, Syria, develop

military bases there, and also would give a message of “US predominance” in the

region.1039 Andrew Card was the White House chief of staff of President Bush. He

resigned in 2006. He recognized American “failure” in Iraq. After he stepped down as

chief of staff, Card said that “alternative solutions” in Iraq were never entertained. There

had never been a serious discussion on Iraq for alternatives to staying in post-Saddam

Iraq. What could be the alternative “exit” strategy from Iraq? It was never deliberated

upon.1040

Later on, Richard Perle a war hawk regretted on CNN in April 2007. Perle told

CNN that the “biggest folly” US committed in Iraq was not to “transfer political power”

to the people in Iraq immediately after fall of the regime.1041 Aftermath of the war was a

dismal failure. On the part of the Bush Administration there was little preparation for the

aftermath. There were warnings from US European allies and the managers of First Gulf

War. The warnings were “dismissed arrogantly” especially by the Pentagon.1042

Washington allocated little resources for reconstruction of Iraq.1043

Tom Clancy wrote in the backdrop of Iraq war that he was known as outspoken in

military. Majority of our senior commanders were step-ford soldiers and they failed to

speak the truth. The US Army chief testified before Congress that US needed 300,000

troops to pacify Iraq in the aftermath of removal of Saddam regime. However, Pentagon

did not agree with the General and sent just half of the required number in the field. The

administration had no proper “strategy and planning.”1044 Clancy believed that such a

1038 Steele, Defeat, 61039 Steele, Defeat, 7-81040 Woodward, State of Denial, 4551041 Roger Cohen. “The Failure Of Iraq Captured in a Sentence”, International Herald Tribune.

April 28-29, 20071042 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 601043 Shawcross, Allies, 1651044 Clancy. Zinni and Koltz, Battle Ready, 438

240

situation would not be repeated in future wars.1045 General Tony Zinni argued that the US

had a war plan but “no plan of reconstruction.”1046

6.2 Paul Bremer-The US Administrator in Iraq:America invaded Iraq on 20th March, 2003. General Garner took charge of Iraq on 21st

April 2003. As head of ORHA, Rumsfeld told General Garner that he would be replaced

by Paul Bremer not later than one month. Why did this happen? ORHA was created for

three months; whereas, it was being closed just within one month. According to the

General, the reason for early closure of the ORHA could be found in the

interdepartmental rivalry, specifically between Colin Powell and Rumsfeld. However, the

real reason could be found in two “competing” visions about the future of Iraq. It was

actually about the method and magnitude of “political and economic dominance” over

Iraq.1047

L. Paul Bremer III replaced General Garner as administer of CPA (Coalition

Provisional Authority) Iraq, just two weeks after his appointment on May 6, 2003.

Bremer continued as head of the CPA till 28 June, 2004. For about 13 months, Bremer

had full authority over the CPA. In turn, during this period, the CPA had “total control”

over Iraq-Legislative, executive, and judicial.1048 Bremer was not an expert on Iraq. Still

he was selected for such an important job. The reason was unknown. It might be his

charming personality.1049

However, Bermer had other qualifications with him, though he had no experience

in Iraq. His most important qualification was his long-time political and corporate

linkage, for about four decades. He served as a State Department official for 23 years

after graduating from school. His first assignment was in Kabul, Afghanistan. It was

during this period that he developed good relations with Rumsfeld. He also served under

Henry Kissinger and George Shultz when they were Foreign Secretaries. These two

persons were powerful voices as representatives of “corporate America” in Iraq. Bremer

1045 Clancy. Zinni and Koltz, Battle Ready, 4381046 Zinni and Koltz, Battle for Peace, 81047 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 1891048 The Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA Official Documents, 20031049 Barbara Slavin. “U.S. New Transition Chief Brings Lot to the Table”, USA Today. May 13,

2003

241

left the State Department and joined Kissinger Associates in 1989. There he provided

advice to the largest multinational corporations of the US. He served there for 11years.1050

In November 2001, Bremer wrote a paper titled, “New Risks in International

Business”. He argued about the risks the multinational corporations faced due to

“corporate globalization” policies. Whatever Bremer argued in the paper was

implemented in Iraq later on during Bremer era.1051 Globalization caused “socio-political”

unrest argued Bremer. He knew well that his policies in Iraq would cause “unrest” and

would also reduce provision of basic services. This in turn would give support to foreign

business in Iraq vis-à-vis the local business. Chris Foote, one of Bremer’s associates in

Iraq, departed company with Bremer just after two months and returned to America.

After his return, Foote wrote about the US “predominated political and economic” grip

on Iraq. He argued that America followed “unpopular” economic policies in Iraq. The

policies were benefiting big “US corporations” rather than Iraqis.1052

It’s a rare phenomenon that we got a chance in our lives to see a country with

such great “oil reserves” but with no civilian commercial infrastructure to manage it,

wrote Stephen Thomas from Baghdad.1053 The Bush Administration, at least, had an

economic plan for Iraq. The Administration signed three-year contract with Bearing

Point, Inc., Virginia. The Bearing Point was to provide technical assistance to the USAID

for “restructuring” Iraq’s economy in accordance with the objectives of the

administration in Iraq.1054 Paul Bremer stayed in Iraq for about fourteen-months. During

his stay from 16 May 2003 to 28 June 2004, he enacted “hundred” orders. Those orders

gave birth to new laws in Iraq that, later on, continued to govern Iraq.

Paul Bremer, as administrator of CPA in Iraq, enacted CPA Regulation # 1 on 16

May, 2003, whereby he defined his powers as head of the CPA. His “orders” had the

effect of laws and as such, were binding on Iraq.1055 Both, his “Regulations and Orders”

1050 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 1911051 Bremer, L. Paul. "New Risks in International Business." Viewpoint: The Marsh and McLennan

Companies Journal 2. (2001)1052 Chris Foote. “Reviving the Iraqi Economy in the Aftermath of the War”, Regional Review Q3,

13, no 3, (2003)1053 Dan Baum. “Nation Builders for Hire”, New York Times. June 22, 20031054 Iraqi Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme. Contract No. DASW01-

03-P-0366, Ronco Consulting Corporation and Defense Contracting Command, Washington: 20031055 L.Paul Bremer. “Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation #1,” CPA. CPA/REG/ 16 May

2003/ 01

242

took precedence over contemporary laws of Iraq. Bremer was all powerful in Iraq. He

made laws. He wrote them. The US military forces implemented those laws. Bremer was

too powerful in Iraq. It was due to this all powerful position, Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN

Special Envoy in Iraq called Bremer the new “Dictator of Iraq.”1056

Bremer’s Regulations and Orders “failed” to provide basic services to the people

such as water, electricity, and health care. They also changed the fundamental “structure

of Iraqi economy” according to Bush Administration’s economic model. He ensured

increased access of US corporations to Iraqi economy. He implemented “corporate

globalization” agenda of the Bush Administration. He patronized Americans in Iraq.1057

Before 1991, Iraq stood at 15 out of 130 states, enlisted in the 1990 United

Nations Human Development index. The index, as usual, measured national achievement

of states in “socio-economic” sectors such as education, health, etc. The index also

measured per capita income for the states. Iraq ranked at “medium human development

category” of states with respect to the provision of basic social services to its citizens.1058

Similarly, Iraq topped the last of college-educated citizens in the Middle East region.

According to W.H.O. prior to 1991, about 90% Iraqi people had access to safe drinking

water.1059

During his 14-months stay as CPA administrator in Iraq, Bremer passed 100

orders. Out of them, sixteen orders carried special weight and reflected big significance

for Iraq and the Middle East. They also reflected American method of governance in Iraq.

They are discussed below. Order No.1, De-Ba’athification.1060 By passing this order

Bremer dismissed all the Ba’ath Party members from the top three layers of management

in Iraq. The experienced and high ranking civil servants such as doctors, engineers,

scientists, professors, administrators and others indiscriminately were fired out of their

jobs. By this order 120,000 personnel became jobless. The order eliminated remnants of

Saddam Hussain’s regime. During Saddam era Ba’ath Party membership was a

1056 Tom Lasseter. "UN’s Brahimi: Bremer the ‘Dictator of Iraq’in Shaping Iraqi Government." Knight Ridder News. 2004

1057 John Barry, and Evan Thomas, “The Unbuilding of Iraq”, Newsweek. October 6, 20031058 “Report on Development in Iraq, UNICEF, 20021059 United Nations Annex II of S/ 1999/ 356, 30 March, 1999, report of the second panel

established pursuant to note by the president of Security Council of 30 January 1999(S/ 1999/100) concerning the current humanitarian situation in Iraq

1060 Bremer, CPA order 1, 2003

243

precondition for employment in Iraqi public sector. It was the only route to enter into

public sector jobs.1061

David Philips, author of “Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco”

argued order No.1 removed the personnel who opposed “liberalization of Iraq

economy.”1062 Bremer passed Order #2 on 23 May, 2003. The order dissolved/disbanded

Iraqi army along with its intelligence department among other things. The strength of

Iraqi army was more or less 500,000 troops. It was a huge figure. The consequent

unemployment rate in Iraq rose to somewhere between 50 and 70 percent. The disbanded

army “inflated” the number of insurgents in Iraq. They had lost their jobs and with it the

life blood of their families. It was a drastic step and the disbanded army had gone

“desperate”. It was not a part of initial plan.1063

A retired DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) official, Patrick Lang said that Iraqi

units after proper and careful screening would do better job under US control. They were

knowledgeable personnel about Iraq. They could do much better job against the enemy

than the US troops.1064 Despite this, Bremer disbanded the entire military structure

making it unemployed. Private US contractors were hired to do the “work of

reconstruction”. The security of Iraq was the duty of US military. Bremer also stopped

social security benefits to widows even. Ronco Consulting Corporation of Washington

DC was hired for this job on 14 March, 2003, the company was to develop plan to

“disarm” and demobilize military forces of Iraq.1065

The CPA Order No.12, 7 June 2003 was replaced with CPA order No.54, 24

February, 2004. These orders introduced “Trade Liberalization Policy” in Iraq. Under

these orders tariffs, customs, import duties and many other duties were suspended. The

contemporary local laws in Iraq protected “domestic industry” against foreign

competition. The CPA orders No. 12 and 54 eliminated all the “protective barriers” in

Iraq. The local producers and sellers in Iraq were unable to compete with the global

1061 Ibid1062 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 2011063 L.Paul Bremer. “Dissolution of Entities”, Coalition Provisional Authority Order# 2, CPA/

CRD/ 23 May / 021064 Peter Slevin. “Wrong Turn at Postwar Crossroads?” Washington Post. November 20, 20031065 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 202

244

competitors. It was “disastrous” for local industry.1066 For Iraqis this transition was

problematic.1067

The CPA Order No. 14, 10 June 2003, was related to media control. The order

prohibited media to incite violence against the occupying forces. It also banned

advocating alternatives in Iraq and advocating return of Ba’ath to power structure

whatsoever. In case of any violation of the order, the office of the offender would be held

responsible.1068 This order was used against al-Arabiya and al-Hawza newspapers in

Baghdad. Both were closed. Al-Hawza was the newspaper of Muqtada al-Sadr. The

closure of al-Hawza led to country wide protest by the followers of Muqtada al-Sadr in

April 2004. Al-Sadr asked his followers to “terrorize” the occupying enemy forces.1069

The CPA Order No.17, revised Order, 27 June 2003, granted full “immunity” to

occupiers from laws of the land including military forces, foreign contractors, even

security firms doing private security activity. The order extended to the personnel of

corporations sub-contractors of corporations, and their employees and so on and so forth.

The grievances of the Iraqis against occupiers could be addressed in the “foreign courts”

only. The order actually provided “diplomatic immunity” to all the occupiers.1070 It was

why the offenders of “Abu Ghraib Scandal” could not be tried in Iraq under Iraqi laws.1071

The order No. 17 would remain in effect till the last soldier left Iraq. The order remained

in effect even after the end of the formal occupation.

The CPA order No. 37, September 19, 2003 amended with Order 49, February 19,

2004. The order dealt with US tax policy in Iraq. The order imposed flat tax rate up to 15

percent, for both individuals and corporations. Whereas according to contemporary Iraqi

tax laws, the flat tax rate was 40 percent.1072 The order no.40 dealt with the establishment

of foreign banks in Iraq. Before the invasion it was a “closed” sector. Now foreign banks

1066 L.Paul Bremer. “Trade Liberalization Policy”, Coalition Provision Authority Order No 54, CPA/ ORD/ 7 June 2003/ 12 and CPA/ ORD/ 24 February 2004/54

1067 Ariana Eunjung Cha. “Iraqis Face Tough Transition to Market–Based Agriculture”, Washington Post. January 22, 2004

1068 L. Paul Bremer. “Prohibited Media Activity”, CPA Order No 14, CPA/ORD/ 10 June 2003/141069 Nimroa Raphael. “Understanding Muqtada al-Sadar”, Middle East Quarterly. Vol.II, no.4,

(Fall 2004)1070 L. Paul. Bremer. “Status of Coalition Provisional Authority”, CPA Order No. 17, CPA/ ORD/

27 June 2004/ 171071 Kamal Ahmed. “Iraqis Lost Right to Sue Troops over War Crimes”, Observer. May 23, 20041072 L. Paul Bremer. “Tax Strategy of 2004”, CPA Order No. 49, CPA/ ORD/ 19 February 2004/

49

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could purchase up to 50 percent of Iraqi banks. The limit was extended to 100 percent

later on. They could also establish branches within the country.

The order No.62 determined the “qualifications” for Iraqis to hold public offices.

Bremer could “disqualify” any person from participating in an election. For elections,

Bremer could nominate candidates of his own candidates. The Order no.65 established a

Communications and Media Commission in Iraq. The commission could issue licenses to

the media for operations in Iraq and could also control media. The orders number 57 and

77 placed US personnel on important top positions of “decision-making” in Iraq. They

would last for five years starting from 2006, when the elected government would start its

term. These two orders were the repetition of the British “imperial laws” imposed on

Iraq in the aftermath of WWI.1073 According to Order no.57, Bremer appointed an

Inspector General on the top of all the departments to supervise them. He would have

total control over the entire department. These Inspector Generals, on the top of every

Ministry, were to remain there for 5-years.1074

The Order nos. 80, 81 and 83 replaced existing patent, trademarks, and copyright

laws of Iraq before a couple of weeks to handover Iraqi government to Iraqis. These

orders were imposed to ensure the “unhindered access” and protection to foreign products

whatsoever. This was done in the name of transition of centrally planned economy to free

market one. Order no. 97, established a commission with the power to debar any political

party from elections if they did not follow the rules and code of conduct given by the

occupiers.1075

The last Order no. 100 transferred Iraqi authority to an interim Prime Minister,

Dr. Iyad Allawi. The powers related to the above orders were an exclusive preserve of the

occupiers themselves and did not transfer those powers to the interim prime minister.

They were inserted as laws in the constitution of Iraq of October, 2005.1076

The CPA Order number 39 dealt with foreign investment in Iraq. The order

consisted of six provisions regulating foreign investment in Iraq. Henceforth the state

owned economic enterprises were open for “privatization”. Now the foreigners could

have 100 percent ownership of business in Iraq, there would be no preference of local 1073 Phebe Marr. The Modern History of Iraq. (2nd ed.). (Boulder, CO: West view Press, 2004), 271074 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 2091075 Ibid, 2111076 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 211

246

business over foreign business in Iraq, this led to a US “corporate invasion” of Iraq, there

would be unrestricted and tax-free transfer of profits out of Iraq, the licenses would be

issued for 40 year ownership to foreign investment in Iraq and the foreign investors

would have the right to take legal disputes in “international tribunals” out of Iraq.1077

The order 39 actually was a blueprint for the “privatization” of 192 state owned

large enterprises. They included a wide range of enterprises from all walks of life related

to diverse fields of life such as electricity, water, schools, hospitals, TV Stations, food,

housing programs, newspapers, factories, and airlines etc. The articles 13 and 16 of the

Iraqi constitution prohibited the private ownership of natural resources of Iraq and basic

means of production in Iraq under Saddam regime. The CPA announced the first list of

enterprises to be put for privatization in October 2003 which included fertilizers, cement

plants, sulpher and phosphate mines. The list also included pharmaceutical factories as

well as airlines of Iraq.1078

At that time the unemployment rate in Iraq was somewhere between 50 to 70

percent. The resistance from Iraq’s labor was but natural under such conditions. The

inflation rate was at about 36 percent. Paul Bremer slowed down the privatization of state

owned enterprises. By April 2004, even water sector was under consideration for

privatization, said minister of public works in Iraq.1079 A conference was organized in

London in the early months of 2005 for the privatization of Iraq’s telecommunication

sector.1080

Halliburton, Chevron, and Bechtel topped the list of big profits in Iraq.1081 These

big US corporations returned their political patrons in 2004 with big bounties in

presidential elections. Halliburton, Chevron and Bechtel heavily contributed to

Republican candidate as their donations 85%, 83percent, and 53percent respectively.1082

The Bremer orders seriously damaged Iraqi economy. The Iraqi companies, both private

and public, were excluded form reconstruction works. An Iraqi woman wrote that the

1077 Ibid, 211-2121078 David Bacon. “Um-Qasr From National Pride to War Booty”, Corp Watch. December 15,

20031079 Clayton Hirst. “Iraqis Investigate Halliburton over Allegations of Bribery”, Independent. April

25, 20041080 Masum, Iraqi Develoment Programme, June 28, 20051081 Sheila McNulty. “Working in Iraq Boosts Income at US Group,” Financial Times. April 29,

20041082 The Centre for Responsive Politics. www.opensecrets.org

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military invasion was followed up by a large number of foreign companies in Iraq. They

were earning billions of dollars. However, local work force and professionals were kept

out of jobs. She wrote in the name of “Riverbend.”1083

Iraqi workers were also put out of jobs. At the time of handing over state authority

to Iraqis in June 2004, approximately there were two million unemployed Iraqis and only

25000 locals had jobs in the post-Saddam Iraq.1084 It is to be remembered Halliburton

brought 500 US workers to Iraq per week and paid them “four times” more wages than

the local workers/regional workers in Iraq.1085 Even by March 2005, shortage of

electricity was one of the big issues in Iraq. As occupiers, the US should have provided

the basic needs of human life. However, the US did not.1086

Bechtel was given contract for the provision of electricity in Iraq. However, the

company provided neither spare parts nor money to manage this failure.1087 The story of

the provision of water and sewage was not different form electricity. There remained

shortage of water and sewage facilities.1088 American companies did nothing to help

Iraqis. The issue of the provision of basic human services continuously haunted Iraqis

throughout the years of occupation.

Stephen C. Pellectiere, a former CIA official, wrote that America could do big

things in the Middle East. The US could control its “oil” as well as water. Ouster of

Saddam from power would benefit American “companies” in a lucrative way.1089 A group

of citizens from Bolivia, who had bitter experience of Bechtel’s working there, wrote an

open letter to Iraqis wherein they warned Iraqis about their sufferings in the hands of

Bechtel. They apprehended the replay of story of Bolivia in Iraq about the provision of

water.1090

Paul Bremer opened Iraq for privatization to Western buyers. Iraqi politicians

summarily rejected this move. Bremer made it clear in unequivocal terms that America, 1083 Riverbend Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog From Iraq. (New York: Feminist Press, 2005), 361084 James Glanz, and Erik Eckholm, “Transition in Iraq: Bricks, Mortar and Money; Reality

Intrudes on Promises in Rebuilding of Iraq”, New York Times. June 30, 20041085 Russel Gold. “The Temps of War: Blue Collar Workers Ship Out for Iraq”, Wall Street

Journal. February 25, 20031086 “Poll”, International Republic Institute (IRI), February 27 to March 5, 20051087 Pratap Chatterjee. Iraq Inc.: A Profitable Occupation. (New York: Seven stories Press, 2004),

681088 James Glanz. “New Election Issues: Electricity and Water”, New York Times. January 26, 20051089 Stephen C. Pelletiere. “A War Crime or an Act of War?” New York Times. January 31, 20031090 David Baker. “Bechtel in Iraq”, San Francisco Chronicle. December 26, 2003

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for whatever reasons, could not delay this privatization process.1091 The Iraqi Governing

Council (IGC) was created in July 2003. Paul Bremer concluded an agreement with the

IGC in November 2003 whereby the authority would be handed over to an “unelected”

interim government in Iraq. In June 2004, the unelected government would write a

constitution for Iraq. Noah Feldman, an advisor to Bremer in Iraq, gave the explanation

for this step. If America moved fast, the “unwanted” people might be elected.1092

The reverend Shia leader of Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani opposed that

development and demanded instead the direct election of the interim government in Iraq.

However, his proposal was rebuffed. Ultimately, Iyad Allawi was “selected” as Prime

Minister of Iraq unanimously by the IGC. Allawi was a former Ba’athist who went into

exile before Saddam Hussain took power in Iraq. Allawi enjoyed good relations with

CIA. On his part, Allawi opposed US policies in Iraq including de-Ba’athification and

dissolution Iraqi army.1093 The power was transferred to an unelected interim government

on June 28, 2004. Like the IGC members, 2/3 members of the interim government

possessed either American or British nationality.1094

Before leaving Iraq in 2004, Bremer passed an order that the newly created Iraqi

army would be commanded by an American General. Pentagon also ordered the

construction of “fourteen military bases” for staying US military forces in Iraq.1095 The

war planners in Washington expected an easy situation in Iraq after fall of the regime.

However, it did not turn up like that. The occupiers took residence in the “Green Zone” in

Baghdad and had little information and knowledge, if any, of Iraq. They were dependent

upon a small group of personnel, Iraqi exiles, who were not intimately connected to the

society in Iraq since long. The main exile group, Iraqi National Congress, did not have

proper understanding of domestic settings in Iraq. They saw Iraq as a divided and

sectarian society. The ground situation in 2003-2004 was different.1096

1091 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 91092 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 4351093 James Drummond, and Roula Khalaf, “Iraq Council Backs Former Exit with CIA Links as

Interim Leader,” Financial Times. May 29, 20041094 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 484-4851095 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 458-4591096 Isam Al-Khafaji. “A Few Days After: State and Society in a Post-Saddam Iraq”, in Toby

Dodge and Steve Simon (eds.), Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003

249

The constitution of Iraqi Governing Council was based on sectarian divide. It was

criticized such a political discourse was alien to Iraq during Saddam regime.1097 Whereas

the question of number of Iraqi deaths was concerned, from all war-related causes in Iraq,

the occupation powers deliberately played with the information. However, British

medical journal, The Lancet estimated the figure at 98,000 persons in October, 2004.1098

Stuart Bowen, special Inspector General for the reconstruction of Iraq, issued a

report on January 30, 2005 about the financial corruption in Iraq. He had conducted

audits in Iraq. He reported back to state Department and Pentagon on the issue. He placed

the charges of “incompetence, embezzlement, and outright fraud” on the part of those

Americans working in reconstruction projects in Iraq. He also cited widespread

corruption in the new Iraqi ministries. Bowen asked the US Army, in November 2004,

not to pay $90million to Halliburton as it already had not justified the large sums of

money paid to it. Bowen’s final conclusion was that CPA could not keep track of

“approximately $ 9 billion” a huge amount of money. The money was collected from

Iraq’s “oil sales” or sold out assets of Saddam regime.1099

Similarly, the Observers also talked about widespread corruption in Iraq during

years of occupation.1100 Bob Woodward in his State of Denial disclosed that first two

orders of Bremer De-Ba’athification of Iraqi society and Disbanding of entire Iraqi

military forces were carried out on the clear cut instructions from the President. The

President was determined to do De-Ba’athification of Iraq even at the cost of

administrative problems.1101 For General Jay Garner, the first two orders of Paul Bremer

were a “disaster” for Iraq.1102 Now the US had, at least, 350,000 more deadly enemies in

Iraq than the days before, argued General Garner.1103 Bremer’s policy of de-

1097 Rend Rahim Francke. “On the Situation in Iraq”, Iraq Democracy Watch. Report no.1, September 2003

1098 Les Francke, Riyadh Lafta, Richard Garfield, Jamal Khudhairi, and Gilbert Burnham. Morality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. The Lancent, October 29, 2004

1099 Yochi J. Dreazen. “Former Bush Aide Turns Critic As Iraq Inspector”, Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2005

1100 Ed Vulliamy, and Richard N. Taylor. “Millions Embezzled at Iraqi Ministry”, The Guardian. August 22, 2005

1101 Woodward, State of Denial, 1961102 Ibid, 1941103 Ibid, 200

250

Ba’athification and dissolution of Iraqi army created more enemies for Americans

working in Iraq under any position.1104

De-Ba’athification and dissolution of Iraqi army was a gamble which the Bush

administration played. Jeffrey Record, a historian, commented on the US decision of

dissolution of Iraqi army a “tragic mistake”. It adversely affected both Iraq and the

occupation powers.1105 In the views of Sunnis of Iraq the newly established NIA (New

Iraqi Army) was “Shiite-Kurdish militia” breathing on American “steroids.”1106 Whatever

standard might be used, the American occupation of Iraq had been a failure. The failure

in Iraq led to ever-increasing insurgency in the occupied country.1107

The Governing Council of Iraq was established in July 2003. It was constituted in

an undemocratic way. It was selected rather than elected. In the establishment of IGC, the

“sectarianization” of Iraqi politics was legally institutionalized.1108 By doing that, the US

committed the same mistake in Iraq in 2003 which British did in 1920’s. The US

succumbed to “Primordializtion” in Iraq. The representation in 25-member IGC was on

the bases of ethnicity and sect. It did not discover the “essence” of Iraq.1109 It was a

common practice for majority of the IGC members to remain absent out of Iraq at any

given time during its tenure. The IGC failed to mark a distinction for itself.1110

Paul Bremer remained in Iraq for about 14-months and issued exactly 100 orders.

The orders established “total US control” over Iraq. For the US policy makers Iraq

represented three things “oil, wealth, and power”. For these policy planners 9/11

provided them with a big opportunity to pursue their “imperial” ambitious. The US

unilaterally invaded Iraq and got control of the second largest oil reserves of the

world.1111 Michael Scheuer, the former CIA official, wrote in his book “Imperial Hubris”

(with the name of Anonymous) that the US war on Iraq in 2003 was not a preemptive

war. Rather it looked like the US war on Mexico in 1846; an “unprovoked” war. Iraq did

1104 Shawcross, Allies, 1691105 Brigham, Iraq Another Vietnam, 801106 Ibid, 811107 Kolko, Age of War, 1481108 Jones, Negotiating Change, 246-2471109 Toby Dodge, and Steve Simon (eds.), Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow

of Regime Change. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1591110 Diamond, What Went Wrong in Iraq, September/October, 20041111 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 183-184

251

not constitute an imminent threat to the US security. Saddam’s ouster, in reality, offered

“economic benefits.”1112

6.3 Insurgency in Iraq- Reaction to Prolonged Occupation:Three consecutive developments, Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, and imposition of

“sanctions” on Iraq in the aftermath of the First Gulf War had severely affected Iraqi state

and society. The period between 1991 and 2003 created hyperinflation, poverty, and

other socio-economic problems in Iraq. During these years the middle class was

impoverished. Iraq suffered a lot, specifically macroeconomic problems.1113 The

Administration erroneously thought that the institutions would remain intact even after

the defeat of Iraqi army.1114

The civil servants did not return to their duty after the end of the war. Their

offices suffered from widespread looting and burning especially in Baghdad.1115 The war

planners at Pentagon believed falsely that there would be a coup against Saddam regime

on the entry of US forces in Iraq. The governing institutions would remain as such. 1116

Saddam regime faced with powerful US military forces ran short of options to defend

Iraq. Saddam Hussain had learned from his mistakes in the past and decided to

decentralize command and control structure of the army to the low level so that the

resistance could continue after the fall of Baghdad.1117

However, the resistance in Iraq was strong and widespread against the

assumptions of Pentagon especially in southern Iraq.1118 The real motivation behind this

resistance was the presence of militant Iraqi nationalism. The nationalism was the

creation of three wars in the recent times followed by punitive sanctions led by the US in

1112 Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), Imperial Hubris, xvi1113 Peter Boone, Haris Gazdar and Athar Hussain. “Sanctions Against Iraq: Cost of Failure”, paper

presented at the Conference, Frustrated Development: The Iraqi Economy in War and Peace. University of Exeter Centre for Gulf Studies, in collaboration with the Iraqi Economic forum, 9-11 July, 1997

1114 Micheal Gordon. “Catastrophic Success: The Strategy to secure Iraq did not Foresee a 2nd War”, New York Times, 19 October, 2004

1115 Mark Boone, Robin Wright and Doyle McManus. “Washington Battle Plan: Preparing for War, Stumbling to Peace”, Los Angeles Times. July18, 2003

1116 George, Whitaker and Smith, Revealed, October 17, 20041117 Stephen Biddle, et al. Toppling Saddam: Iraq and American Military Transformation.

(Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004)1118 Ibid, 6,9, 10

252

1990’s. The widespread opinion in Iraq was that the real driving force for the occupiers in

Iraq was “oil” and none else.1119

The occupation policy in itself was responsible for creating insurgency. The

peacekeeping experiences in post-Cold War era had made clear that establishment of law

and order within 6 to 12 weeks of occupation was seen crucial in establishing the

legitimacy and credibility of the occupation forces.1120 The speed with which regime

change in Iraq was effected was certainly impressive for the people of Iraq. In April

2003, regime change in Iraq was followed by three weeks of uncontrolled looting and

violence especially in Baghdad. The occupation forces seemed either unable or unwilling

to establish control especially in the capital city.

That was a message for the potential insurgents that the US forces could not

control Iraq. It created a “security vacuum” in Iraq. It also diffused, to some extent, the

concept of US omnipotence and helped in turning the criminal violence and looting into

an insurgency. This political vacuum in Iraq resurrected the conditions which had

historically been shaped by Islam, Arab nationalism and Iraqi nationalism. These forces

motivated the insurgents to fight and free Iraq from foreign occupation forces.1121

The insurgency in Iraq evolved from different sources and multiple causes.

Firstly, the criminal gangs present, especially in the urban centers like Baghdad, Basra,

and Mosul, constituted about 80 percent of violence in Iraq.1122 These criminal groups

came to surface in mid 1990’s with the weakening of the state caused by First Gulf War

and continued sanctions. In the aftermath of the war, widespread chaos and lawlessness,

availability of weapons, absence of efficient police structure, and the little intelligence of

the occupation forces revitalized those gangs. Secondly, a group of the remnants of

Ba’ath regime’s security personnel, loyalists of the Ba’ath party, and Saddam Hussain’s

loyalists carried responsibility of about 60 percent political violence in Iraq.1123

1119 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2171120 Simon Chesterman. You, the People: the United Nations, Transitional Administration, and

State-Building. (Oxford University Press on Demand, 2004), 100, 1121121 Isam Al-Kafaji. “War as a Vehicle for the Rise and Decline of a State-Controlled Society: The

Case of Ba’athist Iraq”, In Steven Heydemann (ed.), War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East. Berkley: University of California Press, 2000

1122 Eric Schmit, and Thorn Shanker. “US says Resistance in Iraq up to 20,000”, The Guardian. October 23, 2004

1123 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 215

253

This second group of insurgents started following hit-and-run tactics against

occupying troops in May 2003 and increased in frequency, skill and territorial scope. The

insurgency started with reactive and was localized in nature. Toby Dodge conducted

interviews from Saddam loyalists in Baghdad in the summer 2003. On the basis of these

interviews, Toby Dodge concluded that it was a “spontaneous and fractured” rebellion

against occupation forces.1124 Another important work on insurgency in Iraq came to the

same conclusion as cited above by Toby Dodge.1125

Whatever the reasons, de-Ba’athification and the dissolution of the Iraqi army in

May 2003, made a large number of unemployed personnel available for the increasing

insurgency.1126 At the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004 a new organization of Iraqi

Ba’ath Party came into existence. Both the military and civilian wings were represented

in the new organization. Thirdly, Iraqi Islamism, representing both Sunni and Shia wings

of Muslims in Iraq. The nationalist and Islamic tradition in Iraq combined and gave rise

to an ideology to defend mother land. In 2004, this group constituted the fast growing

wing of insurgency in Iraq. This group approximately shared 20 percent violence against

the occupation forces.1127

Fallujah, a city of 300,000 inhabitants situated in the west of Baghdad. Fallujah,

along with a town named Ramadi had been famous for Sunni traditions in Iraq. The city

became a hotbed of violent resistance against occupation forces. The US forces made

some search operations against the hidden members of the former regime. Resentment

grew against the arrest of two imams. The US forces opened fire against the people who

were protesting against these arrests. The gunfire killed 17 and injured 70. That created a

spiral of violence and strong feeling of revenge among the inhabitants of the city. In

retaliation, they killed four US private guards. The resistance seized the city as well. The

US marines took it back, after a bloodbath. The incidents in Fallujah increased the

magnitude of insurgency in Iraq.1128

1124 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2151125 Ahmed S. Hashim. “The Sunni Insurgency”, Middle East Institute Perspective, (August 2003),

31126 Phyllis Bennis, et.al. A Failed Transition: The Mounting Cost of The Iraq War. (Washington

D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies and France Policy in Focus, 2004), 371127 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2161128 Jonathan Steele. “To the US Troops It Was Self-Defence. To the Iraqis It Was Murder.” The

Guardian. April 30, 2003

254

Fifthly, Muqtada al-Sadr, a prominent political-cum-religious figure of Iraq,

represented one of the nationalist and Islamic forces in Iraq. His following consisted of

poor Shia sections of “Sadr City” nearby Baghdad. The occupation forces failed to

deliver. In turn, Sadr’s popularity increased. He wanted a share in the post-Saddam Iraqi

political organization, however, the CPA wanted to exclude him from such a political

arrangement. Sadr deployed his “Mehdi Army”- his militia in Southern part of the

country along with some parts of Baghdad slums. The CPA struck back and closed down

Sadr’s newspaper and arrested Sheikh Mustafa al-Yacoubi, Sadr’s deputy at Najaf. This

step drew Sadr into open conflict with the occupation forces. The cities in South of Iraq

such as Basra, Karbala, Kufa, Najaf, Ammara, Nasiriya, and Kut, along with Baghdad

itself, rose in revolt. The US used its air force to quell this revolt especially in Sadr City

and Najaf. The revolt was suppressed but only after widespread causalities. The

suppression left great resentment against the US.1129

Sixthly, another constituent factor in the origin of insurgency in Iraq was the

presence of foreign fighters in Iraq, particularly, the al-Qaida fighters such as Abu Musab

al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian Islamist. These foreign fighters played important role in

insurgency and suicide bombings. They moved into Iraq in the aftermath of the US

invasion. According to US Army’s sources, their strength varied from 500 to 2000. In

initial months of 2004, there were only less than 150 prisoners of non-Iraqi origin under

the custody of US Army in Iraq.1130 The revolt, in reality, was homegrown.1131

There was a crucial thing to understand, there was initial support for the invasion,

especially from the oppressed and persecuted sections of Iraqi society. It did not mean

prolonged support for occupation. In Northern Ireland, the Catholics initially welcomed

British troops in 1969. The Catholics hoped that British troops would protect them from

Protestants.1132 Similarly, the Shia community of southern Lebanon welcomed Israeli

invasion of 1982, against PLO. As Israeli occupation prolonged, they went against Israel.

The Israeli occupation played important role in creating Hizbollah. The US repeated the

same story in Iraq. It created “militant Islamist-cum-Nationalist” movements in Iraq. The

1129 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 217-2181130 James Drummond. “A Year After The Invasion the Specter of Murderous Civil War Still

Hangs Over Iraq”, Financial Times. March 20, 20041131 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2181132 Chris Ryder. “Joe Cahill”, The Guardian. July 26, 2004

255

Mehdi Army was non-existent before the invasion. However, by mid 2005, the Sunni

insurgency approximately killed 2000 American troops.

In the year 2004, one could get a DVD from Iraqi markets praising those

inhabitants of Fallujah who did not surrender to the occupation forces.1133 Interestingly, it

was in 2003, the US troops interrogated an imam from Ramadi for his objectionable

sermons. The imam had been imprisoned by Saddam regime for 3 years. The imam asked

the interrogators, “Will you not resist if Germans or Fiedel Castro occupied America?”1134

David Hawkins, a CBS reporter, reported in July 2003 after interviewing few Iraqis, who

remained a part of insurgency in Iraq. Hawkins asked the interviewee that why did they

attack American troops? The answer was because they “occupied our country”. They just

wanted America to leave Iraq. They were happy that Saddam was no more. Ahmed

Manajid gave the same answer in August 2004 in Athens Olympics.1135 The Mehdi

Army of Muqtada al-Sadr and like minded repeatedly confront occupation forces in 2004

and 2005. Sadr declared in March 2003 that we, the Iraqis, would never accept whatever

the price might be “subjugation” and occupation of our motherland.1136 During American

siege of Imam Ali Mosque at Najaf, a member of Mehdi Army gave reference that

President Bush called this war on terror a “crusade”. They attacked Iraq due to “oil”.

They wanted control over oil, the wealth of Iraq. They were occupiers. Iraqis had no

other option but to resist the occupiers.1137

In August 2004, during the US siege of Najaf, a young member of Mahdi Army

said that Iraq was their country. We would fight till end to protect our country and our

religion. They were not afraid of the US.1138 The important point to understand was that

the Iraqi people fighting against the Western occupation forces were Islamists. At the

same time they were Iraqi nationalists. The US occupation of Iraq forced them to fight.

Just as the “Vietcong” did during the occupation of Vietnam. The US failed to 1133 Melinda Liu. “War of Perceptions”, Newsweek. April 29, 20041134 Jonathan Steele, and Micheal Howard. “US Confused by Iraq’s Quiet War”, The Guardian.

July 18, 20031135 “Unwilling Participants: Iraqi Soccer Players Angered by Bush Campaign Ads”. August 19,

20041136 Sabrina Tavernise. “British Army Storms Basra Jail to Free 2 Soldiers from Arrest”, New York

Times. September 20, 20051137 Saad Sarhan, and Doug Struck. “To Mehdi Militiaman, Firing on Americans Is Act of

“Patriotism”, Washington Post. August 15, 20041138 Orly Halpern. “A New Iraqi Army Takes Aim at US led Coalition”, Globe and Mail. August

11, 2004

256

understand. Same was the case in Iraq. A US-led invasion of an Arab state followed by

occupation was bound to create reaction in the form of “resistance” not only in the Arab

world but also among the Muslims the world over. President George H.W. Bush clearly

understood this point and, therefore, intentionally refrained form “occupation” of

Baghdad during First Gulf War.1139

The Shiite Muslims constituted 60 percent of Iraqi population- a majority as such.

Kurds in Iraq might be politically insignificant but Shiite was not. For them the removal

of Saddam regime was an end of Sunni oppression and in new Iraq they had the right to

govern. However, Arab nationalism had always Sunni Muslim Coloration. Expectedly, in

January 2005, after elections in Iraq, Al-Dawa and SCIRI (Supreme Council for the

Islamic Revolution in Iraq) emerged as the dominant political forces in Iraq. These

organizations were Shiite and had close ties with Tehran. The Bush Administration did

not foresee this dimension of the invasion.1140

Richard A. Clarke, Served as national security official under four US Presidents

from Reagan to George W. Bush argued that America attacked, conquered, and occupied

Iraq, a country with “big oil reserves” that was no more a threat to the US security.

America did not pay any attention to Israeli- Palestinian problems. America, through its

policies especially in Iraq, provided a fertile ground to al-Qaida for recruitment

propaganda.1141 The occupation of Iraq strengthened and increased “militancy” in Iraq.1142

In fact, the Bush Administration “underestimated” post-Saddam resistance in Iraq.

Major part of the resistance originated form former Ba’athists and Sunnis of Iraq. The

Bush administration attributed resistance in Iraq to “international terrorism” whereas the

US field commanders attributed it to local elements. The foreign fighters in Iraq

constituted a “low percentage of the resistance” in numerical terms not more than 1000

out of 16000 insurgents.1143 Most of the violent attacks on occupation forces in Iraq were

coming from former Saddam loyalists and indigenous people.1144 As the occupation

1139 George H. Bush, and Brent Scowcroft.  A World Transformed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1998: 489-490

1140 Richard A. Clarke. “Is a State Sponsor of Terrorism Winning?” New York Times Magazine. March 27, 2005

1141 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 263-2641142 Jessica Stern. “How America Created a Terrorist Heaven”, New York Times. August 20, 20031143 “Brookings Institution: Iraq Index”, New York Times. September 9, 20051144 Joel Brinkley. “US Officers in Iraq Find Few Signs of Infiltration by Foreign Fighters”, New

York Times. November 19, 2003

257

prolonged, so did the daily number of attacks on US forces. Nothing deterred attackers,

neither the killing of Saddam Hussain’s two sons or the capture of Saddam himself. With

the passage of the time the US occupation of Iraq seemed in tatters. The cost of

occupation approximately increased form $2.1 billion per month to $4 billion by January

2003.1145

The number of US soldiers killed in unfolding insurgency by the end of August

2003 had increased the number of killed during the initial phase of the war. Whatever the

reasons the psychological impact of insurgency was great. As the number of US

causalities increased, so did the political troubles for the Bush Administration. The

President had two options now. Either to opt for a major troop surge in Iraq to improve

post-war security or involve the UN in Iraq and open the door to deployment of non-US

military forces in Iraq. The field commanders on the ground situation in Iraq assessed

that the US needed to commit 300,000 to 500,000 soldiers to maintain law and order in

the country.1146

The Bush Administration ignored the warnings of the field commanders in Iraq.

Paul Bremer regretted later on for not asking for more troops while taking charge of the

occupation.1147 For the Bush Administration, a major troop surge and troop commitment

in Iraq meant creating a new “Vietnam” there. To counter increasing insurgency, the US

commanders in Iraq asked for a prolong presence of US military forces there.1148 Thirty

countries had sent their soldiers in Iraq as a symbol of their support to US. Out of them

about 50% had withdrawn their military forces from Iraq by early 2005. Others were also

preparing for their withdrawals in 2005 or early 2006. Italy was scheduled to withdraw

by September 2005. The governments of Japan, India, and Pakistan, for their own

reasons, were not ready to send troops in Iraq without a UN route. So did Turkey.1149

The UN endorsed the US occupation of Iraq under the UNSC Resolution 1511 of

October 2003. In pursuit of UN recognition of occupation, US put pressure on other

1145 David Firestone, and Thom Shanker. “War’s Cost Brings Democratic Anger”, New York Times. July 11, 2003

1146 John P. Abizaid. “The US Commander in Iraq”, New York Times. August 29, 20031147 Elisabeth Bumiller, and Jodi Wilgoren. “Bremer Critique on Iraq Raises Political Furor”, New

York Times. October 6, 20041148 Abizaid, US Commander in Iraq, August 29, 2003 1149 Eric Schmitt. “Commander does not Expect More Foreign Troops in Iraq”, New York Times.

September 26, 2003

258

member states to help reconstruction of Iraq. In response, the US got $2 billion only from

world community for such an important task. France and Germany did not contribute

anything at all. Iraq’s neighboring states were not even ready to send their ambassadors

to Baghdad due to decaying security situation in Iraq.1150

In November 2003, there started a phenomenal increase in the activities of

insurgents; killing 39 US troops in four separate helicopter gunship-incidents. The US

administration got under big pressure. It shifted its occupation. Now formation of self-

government would precede the writing of the new constitution for Iraq. The resentment in

Iraq, due to prolonged occupation, must be quelled. The post war chaos was a fertile

ground for thriving nationalist’s resentment in Iraq and so did the chances for al-Qaida

recruitment there. Iraq was becoming a real battle ground of al-Qaida operations rather

than Afghanistan.1151 Paul Bremer himself admitted that the presence of coalition troops

in Iraq was a cause of insurgency. Now the views of Iraqis were changing. For them,

foreign troops were “occupiers” not liberations.

In the last days of 2003, General Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of coalition

forces in Iraq declared that the US forces would stay in Iraq for a “couple of more years”

might be till December 2005. In the follow up statement Rumsfeld declared that the

“insurgency” was increasing day by day killing more people. It might take even “10 to

12” years to subdue insurgency.1152 With each passing day, Insurgents were getting

stronger and stronger and the security situation was continuously deteriorating. Sunnis

were “dissatisfied” with their share in the new governmental set-up and in the

constitution-making process. Same was true for Kurds. They were also dissatisfied about

their future role in Iraq.1153

In the mid-2005, the indicators about “quality life” showed high rate of

“unemployment, high infant mortality rate” and there was also lack of infrastructural

facilities such as electricity and drinking water. People in Iraq were suffering a lot. 1154 In

June 2005, President George W. Bush told Americans that the US government was not

1150 Steven R. Weisman. “Rice Urges Arab States to Send Envoys to Baghdad”, New York Times. June 26, 2005

1151 Brace Hoffman. “Saddam Is Our: Does Al Qaeda Care?” December 17, 20031152 Brian Knowlton. “Rumsfeld Certain But Cautious.” New York Times. June 27, 2005: 181153 Edward Wong. “Kurds Vow to Retain Militia as Guardians of Autonomy”, New York Times.

February 27, 20051154 Brookings Institution: Iraq Index, September 9, 2005

259

eager to give a “timetable” of withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. America would “stay

the course.”1155

Richard Armitage visited Iraq in late 2004. After his return, President Bush asked

his opinion about the situation in Iraq. His answer was classic. He told the President that

America was “neither winning in Iraq nor losing” there. He further said, while agreeing

with CIA and DIA analysis, that the enemy in Iraq was “mainly” indigenous. Syria and

Iran, the external factors, were also playing their role in insurgency.1156 In another move,

Condoleezza Rice sent Zelikow to Iraq in order to get firsthand information about the

state of insurgency in Iraq. He reported back in February, 2005. Zelikow reported back to

Rice, at the current stage Iraq was a “failed state”. There was constant violence in Iraq.

The life was “insecure” there. The immediate cause was the political dominance of

Shiites and Kurds in the elections of January, 2005. The Sunnis were marginalized and

consequently were dissatisfied with the emerging domestic power structure in Iraq. They

had, for their own reasons, boycotted the elections.1157

The level of violence in Iraq insurgency was increasing. The frequency of terrorist

attacks on US forces in Iraq in April 2005 was 1700, causing 52 American deaths; while

the corresponding figure for May were 2000 and 82 dead respectively. The insurgency

had taken a “dangerous” turn. Mike Gerson met Henry Kissinger in September 2005 and

asked him why did he support Iraq war? Kissinger answered that the West was in conflict

with Islam. The insurgents wanted to “humiliate the West” particularly the US and vice

versa. America’s clear message to “radical Islamists” was that the West would not live in

a world dominated by them.1158 Kissinger saw war on Iraq in terms of power politics.

The violence in Iraq touched its peak in October, 2005. There were 3000 terrorist

attacks in one month. President George W. bush finally released his National Strategy for

Victory in Iraq in November 2005. This national strategy declared, among other things,

that the US “goal” in Iraq was to “win” war against terrorism. The US soldiers would be

returning home only after achieving their target.1159 General Chiarelli, made commander

1155 Schmitt, Iraqis Not Ready, July 21, 20051156 Woodward, State of Denial, 3731157 Ibid, 3881158 Woodward, State of Denial, 4091159 Ibid, 429

260

of the US troops in Iraq in January 2006. He declared that the Iraqi population had been

alienated due to unwanted civilian killings in Iraq in the hands of occupying forces.1160

In May 2006, in the words of Casey report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General

Pace’s intelligence, and CIA’s SECRET Assessment of May 24, 2006 (NIE), all

categorically declared that insurgency in post-Saddam Iraq was getting “intensified” and

gaining strength.1161 With every passing day, insurgency intensified in Iraq. With this

nature of the conflict was also changing from “terrorist insurgency” having its al-Qaida

and Saddam loyalist variants to sectarian violence.1162 In September 2006, the Bush

Administration gave its new National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. President Bush,

meanwhile, had decided for a troop surge in Iraq.1163 In December 2006, Iraq Study

Group stated that the conditions in Iraq were worsening. Iraq presented a “grave and

deteriorating” situation.

There were 1550 terrorist attacks on coalition forces and civilian targets per week

in June, 2007. It represented a new peak. By now, the US had lost 3562 soldiers in Iraq.

By the end of summer 2007, the level of troops in Baghdad had increased to 40,000 from

17,000. By the end of 2007, the number of US troops present in Iraq was 157,000

supported by more than 180,000 contractors and 1000 officials of the State

Department.1164 The two security related ministries of Iraq-defense and interior were

crowded with 2500 American advisers. By mid 2008, America had lost approximately

4100 troops in Iraq with 30,000 seriously injured. America retained 140,000 US military

forces in Iraq.1165 After ordering an invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush

approximately spent three years in denial strategy.1166 He did not share with Americans

the on ground reality about Iraq.

The concentration of all political and administrative powers in Paul Bremer rather

than handing it over to the Iraqi people was perhaps the fateful decision. This decision

changed American position from a liberator to an occupier and post-Saddam situation in

1160 Ibid, 4441161 Ibid, 4841162 Woodward, War Within, 1881163 Ibid, 2351164 Woodward, War Within, 4081165 Ibid, 4341166 Ibid, 436

261

Iraq.1167 General Jay Garner had assembled professionals like Barbara Bodine, Tim

Carney, Robin Raphel, Ryan Crocker, and Bill Eagleton to run Iraq after fall of the

Saddam regime. However, the White House substituted these professionals with

Republicans. As soon as Bremer stepped in he replaced them all.1168 As soon as

insurgency unfolded itself in Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld dismissed it as nothing more than a

bunch of “former-regime dead enders”. The insurgency-led violence killed at least 2000

Americans in two years after the fall of Baghdad as an answer to Rumsfeld’s challenge to

insurgents in Iraq.1169

The Sunni Arab insurgency might have developed in response to the US actions

against Dulaym tribe and Fallujah, a result of bad intelligence and mismanagement. The

Sunni Arab insurgency and Ba’athists were as anti-American as anti-Shiites. They had

different goals. The Ba’athists wanted to revive the old regime type while the Sunnis, if

got an opportunity, might have evolved a variant of Taliban.1170 In January 2003,

intelligence warned the Bush Administration about the risk of insurgency. In case of an

invasion, the risk of insurgency could be reduced if the administration did certain things-

restoration of necessary human services and early transfer of authority to Iraqis.

Otherwise, most probably, the invasion would lead to nationalist backlash even if the

regime was unpopular in Iraq. The warnings went unheeded.1171

By October 2004, some twenty two cities fell under insurgent’s control.

According to Pentagon sources, there were 2700 insurgent attacks in August 2004.

Foreign Secretary, Colin Powell, admitted that the insurgency was worsening day by day.

Insurgent fighters mostly were locals. There were, at least, 35-organiztions involved in

violent insurgency in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad. They were united under the banner of

Iraqi nationalism. They shared hatred for the US. They were coming from diverse origin

such as tribal warriors, criminals, religious extremists and orthodox, and the revenge

seekers whose families were killed by the US forces.1172

1167 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1251168 Ibid1169 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1251170 Ibid, 1801171 Kolko, Age of War, 1471172 Ibid, 152

262

Two factors helped grew resistance. One was Washington’s “arrogance” to give

no time limit of occupation; and, the other was its domination of post- Saddam political

set-up in Iraq. Majority of Iraqis believed that open-ended policy of occupation was, in

fact an imperial project to control Iraq’s oil. The big mistake the administration

committed in Iraq was the failure to give a “timetable” for early US exit strategy from

Iraq.1173 Invasion of Iraq was a risky business. Arab World, actually, resented West’s

contempt for Arab culture and religion. Western media played central role in this

movement of cultural contempt. Arabs had long memories of West’s intervention, both

military and political, in the Middle East. They deeply suspected the motives of invasion.

They saw the invaders, Britain and the US, as creator and protector of Israel

respectively.1174

The other reasons included the methods of operating in Iraq. The occupiers

created resistance. They committed excesses such as breaking down doors at nights,

arresting people in front of their families handcuffing, breaking furniture’s, arresting

thousands of innocents, and abusing them. It was against their sense of human dignity.

Air strikes on villagers also aggravated the situation. They saw this all as against their

honor and looked for revenge against Americans. Such acts of high handedness turned

neutral Iraqis into US enemies. They started supporting insurgency. The prison scandal at

Abu Ghraib represented West’s enmity of Islam. That added to the revenge of Iraqis.1175

Many factors created insurgency in Iraq. The most important reason was Paul

Bremer’s decision to disband and disarm Iraqi army of 400,000 strong military

personnel.1176 Foreign fighters also came around in Iraq intensifying the insurgency

there.1177 The rules related to the regular warfare were not applicable in the post-conflict

environment in Iraq. This was not the culture of occupation.1178 There had been changing

nature of warfare. The military forces needed to address this new nature of warfare.

American Marine General, Kraulak called it the “Strategic Corporal” and “Three bloc”

1173 Steele, Defeat, 2501174 Ibid, 251-2521175 Ibid, 252-2531176 Pullan, US Intervention Policy, 1811177 “Iraq is Al Qaeda Battleground”, BBC News. July 29, 20041178 Rod Thornton. “The British Army and the Origin of its Minimum Force Philosophy”, Small

Wars and Insurgencies 15, no 1, (2004), 83-106

263

war. Actually, the ground forces simultaneously had to deal with three aspects of a war-

fighting, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance to the war affected people.1179

The Pentagon did not have any organization to coordinate against such

insurgency. It was only in 1998 that the US military forces initiated such a program

related to urban insurgency threats and the tactics to cope with them.1180 The US Army

lacked conceptual understanding to deal with asymmetric threats; especially how to deal

with the violent threat of IEDs (Improvised explosive devices). The IED-related violence

emerged as the particular problem in Iraq.1181 The Pentagon got guidance from Tel Aviv’s

experiences and practice.1182

The former Ba’athists, foreign fighters, and Iraqi nationalists constituted three

different strands of insurgency in Iraq. Primarily, they all came from Sunni origin, mainly

of Saudi Arabia. De-Baathification and disbanding of Iraqi army fed insurgency with new

recruits. Robert A. Pape conducted a study of 315 suicide bombers the world over during

2003-2004, and “concluded” that suicide bombing was more a phenomenon of foreign

occupation. To a lesser extent, it was also caused by “Islamic fundamentalism”. In case

of Iraq, both the variables inter-merged.1183 Citing a British source, Washington Post,

wrote in October 2004 that approximately 100,000 Iraqis had been perished in

insurgency. Susan Rice quoted George Marshall, the US foreign Secretary in post-WWII

era saying that it was not business of America to design a reconstruction plan for Europe.

It was business of Europeans. It was exactly what happened in Europe. But in case of

Iraq, none of the three stake-holders-Sunnis, Shiites or Kurds- designed reconstruction

plan for Iraq.1184

Britain had successfully ended insurgencies. Sir Charles Gwynn’s Imperial

Policing could be cited as a reference text book. Gwynn’s principal reasons for ending

insurgency were as followed. The mixing of fighters with a neutral people added to the

1179 Charles C. Kraulak. “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in Three Block War”, Marine Corps Gazette 83, no 1, (1999), 18-22

1180 Alice Hills. Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma. (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 42-47

1181 Elaine M. Grossman. “Army to Create Asymmetric Warfare Group to Prepare for New Threats, Inside the Pentagon” July 8, 2004

1182 Marcus, Jonathan. “Analysis: US 'Emulates' Israeli Tactics.” BBC. April 14, 20041183 Robert A. Pape. Dying to Win: The Strategic ‘logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random

House, 20051184 Susan E. Rice. Herald Tribune. October 25-26, 2003

264

problems of the occupiers. Excessive severity on the part of occupation forces

antagonized the neutral element of the population. It created bitterness and resentment.

Mistakes of judgments added to the difficulties and frustrated the end results. Population,

in general, must not be antagonized and authority of the sitting government also must not

be seriously injured by the occupation. If not taken care of all these things, it might lead

to a long period of insurgency. The key to victory, according to Gwynn, was “winning

over” potential supporters of the fighters.1185

America did not follow these guidelines in Iraq, and consequently ever-increasing

violence continued in Iraq especially till 2007. Sir Robert Thomson, in 1974 wrote a book

Defeating Communist Insurgency closely studied the problem and prescriptions thereof.

Thomson gave certain important principles to confront insurgency. Important, among

these principles were the government must start with a clear objective to gain, the

government must act according to law and there must not be any excuses to bulldoze the

due processes of law, and finally confronting and defeating political suppression was far

more important than taking aim at terrorists. For the US it was more important to win the

Muslim world. The “mistreatment” of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, holding them

without trials, and employment of “torture” against them were among the few examples.

The US did not follow the policy prescriptions of Thomson in war on Iraq.1186

The biggest error, US committed in Iraq was the absence of any practicable and

viable plan for ending the war.1187 In the past, America did not use enough troops in

Vietnam. She did not also follow an effective counter-insurgency plan and also did not

win the support of the local population and, ultimately lost Vietnam. America repeated

the same mistakes in Iraq.1188 The most important mistake of the US and her allies

committed in Iraq was that they “underestimated the strength of Iraqi nationalism” The

phenomenon of Iraqi nationalism, in fact, was a fusion of nationalist feelings and

religious sentiment.1189

1185 Sir Charles Gwynn. Imperial Policing. (London: MacMillan, 1934), 71186 Robert Thompson. Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.

(London: Chatto and Windus, 1974), 511187 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 1881188 Ibid, 1891189 Ibid, 192

265

In Iraq, the US failed to “penetrate” the terrorist’s organization to frustrate their

operational plans.1190 Insurgency in Iraq was like a hydra-headed monster, we killed many

terrorists and insurgents but they had quick replacements, told a military officer to New

York Times. About the nature of insurgency in Iraq, The International Institute for

Strategic Studies reported that the “strength” of National Guard and the armed forces was

too short of the required international standard.1191

James Dobbin and Edward Luttwak in their two different articles in Foreign

Affairs in came to the same conclusion. They gave the opinion that on the footsteps of US

withdrawal from Iraq, sooner or later, Iraq would “sink into chaos”. The private militias

would rule Iraq making their own spheres of influence and dominance.1192 Peter W.

Galbraith argued in 2006 that TAL was written secretly by Americans. It undermined the

legitimacy of TAL. Such a development had ever been unheard in framing a modern

constitution in the world. It angered majority of Iraqis.1193

Whereas the question of legality of Bremer’s 100 orders, TAL, and Iraqi

constitution was concerned, the laws made during the occupation of foreign forces, under

international law, were not valid in post-occupation era in Iraq. They must have been

endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. But it was not done.1194 Paul Bremer

admitted in his letter written to Chief Justice of Iraq, for transferring sovereignty to

Iraqis, that America “failed” to create and maintain a “secure environment” in Iraq.1195

The US government badly mishandled the post-Saddam situation in Iraq. The CIA

gave repeated warnings to the decision makers on Iraq about the growing insurgency

there. They went unheeded. The Bush Administration was not serious enough to tackle

the on ground conditions and seemed either “unable or unwilling” to cope with the

insurgency in Iraq. The insurgency in Iraq had domestic roots and it worsened with every

passing day. The military conditions in Iraq, in reality, went out of hands.1196

6.4 Civil War in Iraq:1190 Philips, Losing Iraq, 145, 1861191 The Military Balance 2004-2005. (London: IISS/ Oxford University Press, 2004), 126, 354-

3581192 James Dobbin. “Winning the Unwinnable War”, Foreign Affairs 84, no 1, (January/ February

2005), 16-251193 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1401194 Ibid, 1451195 Ibid, 1461196 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 493

266

Iran converted to Shiism in the 15th century. The Safavid Dynasty adopted Shiism as the

state ideology of Persia as opposed to Sunniism of Ottoman Empire. The Iranian people

following their rulers adopted the same. The Arabs in Iraq followed Iranian example even

more recently, in the 19th century. Some Pastoral Sunni tribes, after wandering for

centuries, settled in Mesopotamia and converted to Shiism. Najaf and Karbala, the two

most sacred cities of Shia Imams, Hazrat Ali (AS) and Hazrat Imam Hussain ibn Ali (AS),

provided these converts with religious comforts and social regulations.1197

Najaf and Karbala carried great sanctity in Shia Islam. The martyrdom of Hazrat

Imam Hussain ibn Ali (AS) has been commemorated since his martyrdom at Karbala in the

year 680 AD at the hands of Yazid, the second Ummayad absolute monarch, Muawiya

being the first one. The commemoration of ceremony of Ashura continued at Karbala

since the martyrdom till 1977. However, in the year 1977, after some sectarian riots at

Karbala, Saddam Hussain banned the ceremony of Ashura there. Saddam Hussain being a

Sunni resorted to harsh crackdown against the Shia population at Karbala. The Shiite

leaders, coming from Najaf, were arrested and tortured to death. The executed leadership

did not cherish political motives. The ceremony remained banned until April 2003. The

US invasion uplifted the ban and there came about three million pilgrims to Karbala to

commemorate the ceremony.1198

General Qassem affected a coup in Iraq in 1958. He was born to a mixed marriage

between a Shiite woman (his mother) and a Sunni father. General Qassem relied on

Communist Party for support. The Communist party of Iraq extracted its support from

poor Shia classes in Baghdad and the south. The secretary general of the Communist

Party was a Sayyid from the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) descendants at Najaf. General

Qassem did not discriminate between a Shia and a Sunni. A successive coup in Iraq in

1968 affected by Baa’th Party consolidated Saddam’s power and “marginalized” the Shia

community. The Shiites of Iraq got little or no representation among Saddam’s officer

class. The nationalization policy of Baa’th regime in Iraq also impoverished Shiite

Community of Iraq. The leader of Islamic Revolution of Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini,

remained at Najaf between 1963 and 1977, during his exile from Iran.1199

1197 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 2241198 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 2251199 Ibid, 226-227

267

The Islamist Shiite political party “Dawa” (the call to Islam) was founded in Iraq

in late 1950s when the monarchy was overthrown. Baqir al-Sadr wanted Dawa to

spearhead the Islamic movement in Iraq and wanted to convert Iraq into an Islamic state.

The religious leadership of Dawa opposed Baa’th regime in Iraq. The Baa’th regime

repressed the movement and its leadership. Baqir al-Sadr was forced to leave his Dawa

and retired to his family. Consequently, the Shiite religious movement in Iraq since 1960s

had been divided into two factions-the religious and political. In 1970, the Grand

Ayatollah Mohsin al-Hakim died his natural death. The deceased was succeeded by Abu

Qasim al-Kohoei, who in turn was succeeded by Ali Sistani in 1992 after Khoei’s

death.1200 Khoei and Sistani were of Iranian origin.

Abu Qasim al-Khoei and Ali Sistani were opposed by Shiite Iraqi leadership,

Baqir al-Sadr and his cousin Sadiq al-Sadr. Owing to their opposition to Saddam regime,

they were murdered by Saddam’s secret service; Baqir in 1980 and Sadiq in 1999. They

were succeeded by Sadiq al-Sadr’s son, Moktada al-Sadr, the youngman who represented

Shia opposition to the US occupation of Iraq. Saddam Hussain’s secret service kidnapped

Baqir al-Sadr and his sister Bint al-Huda in 1980 and, they were found dead in Najaf.

Saddam invaded Iran in September 1980, to capture Shatt-ul-Arab. At the same time, the

exiled Shia leadership in Iran in 1982 founded the Supreme Council of the Islamic

Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), under the leadership of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, a scion

of respected family of Najaf. The party raised a militia known as Badr Army.1201

In the aftermath of First Gulf War, after the defeat and expulsion of Saddam’s

military forces from Kuwait, the Shiite after their encouragement from Washington,

raised revolt in southern Iraq. Saddam Hussain’s Republican Guard butchered these

helpless Shia folk in hundreds of thousands. However, the US watched silently. Iraqi

Shiism went through continuous repression with the coming of Baa’th regime to power in

Iraq in 1968. In April 2003, Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army took Abd al-Majid al-Khoei

to hostage, escorted him to nearby Sadr’s residence and killed him. That represented an

“intra-faction struggle for power” among Shiite of Iraq. Al-Khoei was a pro-West, liberal

Shia. On the other hand, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim was killed in August in Najaf in a

1200 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 2281201 Ibid, 229-230

268

bomb explosion, most probably by Sunni extremists. His brother, Abd al-Aziz, succeeded

him as a new head of SCIRI.1202

Different ethno-religious communities of Iraq showed different reactions to the

invasion and occupation of Iraq. Kurds and Shiites, generally speaking, were happy on

the ouster of Saddam Hussain. They were oppressed people especially under Saddam

regime. Shiites and Kurds approximately constituted 60 percent and 20 percent of the

population respectively.1203 For the Shiites, the removal of Saddam regime signified the

end of their oppression and subjugation by the minority, the Sunnis. Shiites saw

themselves as the new rulers of Iraq. On the other hand, the Sunnis of Iraq considered

themselves as the real rulers of Iraq. Furthermore, the Sunnis had a negative perception of

Shiism in Iraq and they saw it as a primitive and Persian variant of Islam.1204

For the Sunnis, Shiites were barbarians and savages and they did not understand

true religion of Islam. For the Sunnis, Shiism was the twisted form of Islam.1205 Fouad

Ajami wrote that in Islamic political and religious history, Arab-Ajam divide was deep-

rooted. Ajami in Arabic is used for Persian. A Shia religious leader/scholar with black

turban on his head was seen as a threat to the true Arabs and true Islamic faith. That was

a paradox for Fouad Ajami which he could not resolve.1206 The main “beneficiaries” of

the US war on Iraq were “Shiites” of Iraq as well as Iran. The January, 2005 elections in

Iraq, made it clear that the al-Dawa and SCIRI, the two Shiite parties of Iraq, were the

dominant political forces of future in Iraq. Kurds were the other people who emerged as

important political player in Iraq. Kurds wanted an independent state.1207

Both SCIRI and al-Dawa had been closely associated with Iran. For Iran it was a

big positive development, the Bush Administration never intended that.1208 However,

most Sunni Islamist parties condemned the US war on Iraq as opposed to the Shiites and

Kurds of Iraq. For the two communities of Iraq, Shiites and Kurds,` the war was a

blessing. For the Shiites, Saddam Hussain was an oppressive despot. Furthermore Musab

1202 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 231-2361203 “Ansar-ul-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan”, Human Rights Watch Briefing, February 5, 20031204 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2411205 Neil Mac Farquhar. “Iraqi’s Anxious Sunnis Seek Security in the New Order”, New York

Times. August 10, 20031206 Fouad Ajami. The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1986), 111207 Juan Cole. “The Shiite Earthquake”, February 20051208 Clarke, State Sponsor of Terrorism, March 27, 2005

269

al-Zarqawi, a Sunni militant from Jordan and an al-Qaeda activist, killed many Shia in

Iraq for nothing. Zarqawi’s militant activities against Shia of Iraq further aggravated the

Shia-Sunni tension in Iraq.1209

There had been a deep distrust between Shiites and Sunnis, ethnically both Arabs.

In the aftermath of WWI, Iraqi Shia saw Sunnis as traitors and collaborators with the

British imperialist forces in Iraq. Shias boycotted the British in Iraq while the Sunnis

found it as an opportunity, and exploited it to consolidate their minority rule over whole

of Iraq. That position was undone in 2003 with the US take over of Iraq. In 1991, Sunnis

supported Saddam’s repression of Shiites in which thousands of innocent Shiites lost

their lives. However, in 2003, the conditions in Iraq were ripened for a civil war. Sunnis

were bitter on the overthrow of Saddam regime. They had lost their position of power and

prestige. They were apprehensive about their uncertain future. The Shiites had majority

and now wanted to rule over Iraq. Now the Sunnis believed that Shiites of Iraq were

traitors and had collaborated with the invaders.1210

In August 2003, Ayatollah Bakir al-Hakim, a leader of SCIRI was killed on the

door of Hazrat Imam Ali (AS) mosque in Najaf along with 94-followers. In March 2004, on

the day of Ashura, near the Shrine of Hazrat Imam Hussain at Karbala, some 180 Shiites

were killed in suicide attacks. In mid 2004, 37 killed in Hillah in June, 70 in Baghdad in

July, 45 in Kufa in August, in October 52 army recruits; in 2005, an ambulance used for

suicide attack killed 11, 135 in Hillah, 50 at a funeral in Nineveh, 98 in Musayib in a

truck explosion, 99 in Balad in a car bomb explosion, and 111 in Baghdad in a minibus

explosion. All the above cited examples were where all the dead belonged to the Shiite

community. On August 31, 2005, some 965 Shiite victims lost their lives near the Shrine

of Imam Musa Kadhim (A.S).1211

The Shiites of Iraq retaliated in deep revenge. They picked up a large number of Sunnis

and killed them. The Sunni dead included Baa’thists and former police and army officers.

The destruction of Samarra’s Askariya Shrine in February, 2006 escalated this civil war.

The Shiites blamed Sunnis for the sorry incident. In November 2005, the US troops found

a secret prison. The troops found there some 169 half-starved Sunnis in that secret prison

1209 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2421210 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1751211 Ibid, 175-176

270

run by Interior Ministry of Iraq. Mr. Bayan Jabr, the Interior Minister, was blamed for

running this secret prison. Jabr headed the Badr Corps, the militant wing of SCIRI, before

getting the portfolio of Interior Ministry. Mr. Bayan inducted his Badr activists to the

security wings of new Iraq.1212

The main centers of Iraq’s civil war were Babil, Diyalas, Nineveh, Kirkuk, and

Baghdad Governorates. Here, in these Governorates, all the three communities, Sunnis,

Shiites and Kurds, were mixed. From 2003 to 2005, in Baghdad Governorate only, some

14,829 civilians and 453 policemen were killed. Just in one month only, in July 2005, the

Baghdad obituary got more than one thousand murder cases. They were overwhelmingly,

the sectarian killings. The Sunnis suffered mainly in Basra and Baghdad. The two

communities, both Shiites and Sunnis, left their residences due to security reasons and

settled into their respective secure regions. In the initial four months of 2006, some

100,000 persons left their homes for security reasons.1213

There had been a peculiar characteristic of both civil war and insurgency in Iraq.

The Baa’thist activists and al-Qaida operatives in Iraq considered the Shias of Iraq as the

most dangerous enemy in the “struggle for power” in Iraq. For Salafis, a Sunni orthodox

school of thought, the Shiites were “apostates”. The Salafis constituted an important

element of violence in Iraq. The Baa’thists saw them as hostile to Arab nationalism. For

both Baathists and Salafis (both Sunni Muslims), civil war might be the only workable

strategy to recapture power in Baghdad, once again.1214

The Kurds of Iraq mainly remained in the sidelines of Sunni-Shia civil strife.

Arabs and Kurds clashed in Mosul, Iraq’s third largest city. America called in the

Peshmerga which “intensified” the civil strife between Arabs and Kurds in Mosul.

Kirkud had been the other city where Kurds clashed with Arabs. Kurd nationalist leaders,

Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talbani, called Kirkuk the “heart of Kurdistan.” Kirkuk

carried special importance in Iraqi politics due to its “oil”. Kirkuk possessed one of the

largest oil reserves of Iraq. It was oil that attracted Arabs to Kirkuk. They changed its

demographic structure. In the decades of 1980’s and 1990’s, Saddam regime followed

what was called policy of “Arabizing” Kirkuk. Kurds, the natives of Kirkuk were

1212 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1761213 Iraq Body Count, available at www.iraqbodycount.net1214 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 181

271

systematically expelled from there. However, after the fall of Saddam regime, Kurds

started returning to Kirkuk. They did the same to the Arabs in Kirkuk.1215

Civil war in Iraq was caused due to multiplicity of reasons. At the root of these

reasons were the “clumsy” policies of the CPA. The other reason was the activities of

American Embassy in Iraq. The activities of al-Qaida in Iraq also played important role

in provoking civil strife there. Al-Qaida wanted to make Iraq ungovernable. Many Iraqis

had warned Washington about the possibility of drifting Iraq into a “civil war” as a result

of the invasion. However, their opinion was summarily rejected.1216 The US invasion of

Iraq ended Saddam regime and so did the Baa’th party. The Shiite majority of the country

stepped into the “power vacuum” in Iraq.1217

It came as a surprise for Washington. Under the regional political context in the

Persian Gulf, Washington never wanted that: American assumption was that the coalition

forces would assume that role.1218 Iraqi population was ethnically and religiously diverse

and divided. The Shiites constituted 62 percent of the population while Sunnis were 33

percent. The Sunnis consisted of three ethnic groups – Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen.

Ethnically Arabs constituted 79 percent and Kurds 16 percent of the population. In the

aftermath of WWI, British vested power in the Sunni Minority. After the overthrow of

monarchy in 1958, the Sunnis consolidated their power and ruled Shiites with ruthless

repression.1219

In post-Saddam Iraq, the Shiite organization and political parties quickly setup

armed militias to prepare themselves for the future “struggle for power.”1220 They did not

want to repeat the mistake their forefathers committed in 1924. In that year they

boycotted the elections which resulted in their exclusion from power for eight decades

and during this period they suffered brutal treatment especially under Saddam regime.1221

The Baa’thist regime, especially under Saddam, suppressed Shiite opposition through the

use of force.1222

1215 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 182-1841216 Steele, Defeat, 253-2541217 Fouskas and Gokay, American Imperialism, 1931218 Lewis, Iraqis in Charge, August 29, 20031219 David Hirst. “As Shiites Inherit Iraq, the Arab World Trembles”, Daily Star. January 27, 20051220 “Shiite Power in Postwar Iraq”, CBS News. April 24, 20031221 “Press Anxiety over Post Election Iraq”, BBC News. February 14, 20051222 I.M. Lapidus. A History of Islamic Societies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),

656-658

272

The Askariya shrine was destroyed on 22 February 2006, most probably by the

Mesopotamia wing of al-Qaida. Al-Qaida wanted to restore Sunni Caliphate in the

Middle East. In retaliation, the Mahdi Army went wild and three Sunni Imams

mercilessly were killed in Baghdad. Not surprisingly, both the US and Iraqi troops did

not intervene to restore law and order. Basra saw a different type of violence. A violent

Shiite mob broke into the jail and killed 10 foreign Arab prisoners. The next day Sunnis

reacted by killing 47 Shiites in Baquba. Curfew was imposed on Baghdad. However, 29

dead bodies were found around the cities. The dead were handcuffed and shot in their

heads. It meant the dead were Sunnis and picked up by the Shiite dominated police or

militia – and killed them.1223

In the next week, 184 Sunni mosques were destroyed. The violence left one

thousand plus dead; both Sunnis and Shiites. Atwar Bahjat, the child of a mixed

marriage, and reporter of al-Arabiya the Dubai based T.V. network, was abducted during

a live broadcast and later on found dead. In the coming month civil war accelerated. For

the Iraqi leadership it was a “civil war”. The leadership used that phrase in their

conversation with Peter W. Galbraith. After the US war on Iraq, in July 2004, the

National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the CIA warned the Bush Administration

about the danger of potential civil war in Iraq. However, the President did not take it

seriously.1224

Deadly sectarian violence was going on in Iraq, particularly Sunnis killing Shiites

and vice versa. The “sectarian violence” was coming down lower into the different

sectarian groups. That was startling. After the Askariya mosque destruction in Samarra,

there occurred more than 450 violent incidents, mostly around Samarra and Baghdad,

killing approximately 1800 Iraqis.1225 Iraq was on the brink of “civil war.”1226 By mid

2008, when the presidential elections in America were approaching, Baghdad was far

from a normal city, concluded Satterfield after his visit to Baghdad. American withdrawal

from Iraq in haste would give rise to a new phase of “struggle for power” in Iraq among

1223 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1-21224 Ibid, 2-51225 Woodward, State of Denial, 4771226 Ibid, 445

273

different ethno-religious communities.1227 By July 2008, the sectarian violence in Iraq

was going on but at a lower pitch.1228

6.5 The Economic Agenda in Iraq- Corporate Globalization:

For many Americans, Iraq was the test case for Bush Administration whether America

could introduce capitalism in the Middle East.1229 Just within a month of “Mission

Accomplished” in Iraq, President Bush proposed MEFTA (Middle East Free Trade

Area). The “economic invasion” of Iraq was to engulf the entire Middle East. The US big

corporations like “Halliburton, Chevron, Bechtel, and Lockheed Martin have vital

interests in the region”. They had made big investments in the region. These corporations

made a business lobby in the form of MEFTA. Amanda Martin, with over 150 other

students, did not join graduation ceremony of the University of South Carolina in May,

2003 where President Bush was the Chief Guest. When a reporter asked about the cause

of her protest, she replied that in South Carolina alone some 70,000 labor had lost their

jobs because of free trade agreements.1230

The reasons of the “US invasion of Iraq and corporate globalization” of the

Middle East mostly overlap. Approximately “20 percent of the oil the US consumed” was

imported from the Middle East. In this connection, Iraq remained at the second place

after Saudi Arabia. The “MEFTA and US oil corporations” wanted their control over the

oil of the Middle East. The five top most oil-rich countries of the globe accounted for 54

percent of the oil reserves were enlisted in MEFTA. They included Saudi Arabia, Iraq,

Kuwait, Iran, and the UAE. With the exception of Iran, the other four countries had been

actively involved in the MEFTA.1231

Robert Zoellick wrote in January, 2000 several important pieces while advising to

George W. Bush as presidential candidate, about his economic agenda. He wrote that

“corporate globalization” was an instrument related to the pursuit of national security

strategy and Pax Americana. He was of the opinion that the “US military and economic

predominance” could be expanded through “corporate globalization”. The 21st century

1227 Woodward, War Within, 4081228 Ibid, 4191229 Neil King Jr. Wall Street Journal. May 1, 20031230 Jacob Jordan. “Some South Carolina Grads Forego Ceremony in Protest of Bush”, Savanah

Morning News. May 10, 20031231 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 264-265

274

was the proper time to assert the US predominance on the globe he argued also. He

further argued that the US should overthrow Saddam regime as it threatened “vital

interests” of America. At the top was American access to oil in the Persian Gulf.1232 Later

on, Zoellick became trade representative of America. Iraq was granted Observer status in

WTO in February, 2004 even without an elected government in Iraq.1233 In reality, that

was “economic imperialism” in essence. It would increase subservience of the Middle

East to the US corporations.1234

CIA conducted a study in 2000. These studies were conducted every five years to

determine the most serious threat to US interests, particularly security. The conclusion of

the study was worth quoting. The study put the blame at the principles of “corporate

globalization”. It would create winners and losers. The gap would be sharpened. The

result would be deepening economic stagnation, and political instability. The policies of

corporate globalization would give rise to political, ethnic, and religious extremism

accompanied by violence.1235 CIA conducted a similar study in 2005 as well. The study

repeated the results of previous study even by 2020.1236

Paul Bremer, as the head of CPA, had an ambitious economic agenda about Iraq.

The key to his reconstruction plan was the “privatization of a large number of state-

owned enterprises.”1237 Peter W. Galbraith wrote that under international law an

occupying power could not privatize the enterprises of an occupied country, still the US

did that.1238 Bremer sold state-owned “economic enterprises” of Iraq to Halliburton,

Bechtel and other American corporations. By doing that America became an occupier

rather than a liberator. Corporations got big profits.1239 Dick Cheney, as Secretary of

1232 Robert Zoellick. “Campaign 2000: A Republican Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs. (January/ February 2000)

1233 Guy de Jonquieres. “Brussels Resists Demand for Iraq WTO Seat”, Financial Times. January 2004

1234 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 2901235 “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts”, approved

for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board under the authority of the director of Central Intelligence, NIC 2000-02, December 2000

1236 “Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project,” Global Trends 2020: Maping the Global Future,” NIC 2004-13, December 2004

1237 Paul Bremer. Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2003, an op-ed piece1238 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1261239 Michael R. Gordon. “Debate Lingering on Decision to Dissolve the Iraqi Military”, October

21, 2004

275

Defense, opposed occupation of Baghdad in 1991 for the right reason.1240 It might be for

hegemonic ideology.1241

6.6 The US-Iraq Policy in Muslim Eyes:The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, released a survey report on 3 June

2003, after the fall of Saddam regime titled “Views of a Changing World”. The report

said that there had been a “phenomenal increase in Muslim hostility” toward America

from 2002 to 2003. Among the countries included were the traditional Muslim allies of

America as well. The survey included nearly 16,000 individuals in 21 countries. The

survey was conducted from 28 April to 15 May, 2003. The results of the survey were

supplemented from an earlier survey conducted in 44 countries of the world in 2002. The

number of individuals included in the earlier survey was 38,000. In mid 2002, 61 percent

Indonesian people entertained favorable American view. However, by June 2003, the

percentage had been dropped to 15 % only. For Turkey and Jordan the corresponding

figures had been dropped from 30 percent to 15 percent and from 25 percent to 1 percent

respectively.1242

The US invasion of Iraq had “intensified Muslim hostility” toward America. The

US policy under President George W. Bush had been cited as the major cause of that

shift. The report also founded, among other things, that only a little percentage of the

Muslims worldwide supported the US war on terror the way it was being waged by the

Bush Administration. Only 23 percent Indonesians, 22 percent Turkish, 16 percent

Pakistanis, and 2 percent Jordanians supported the war on terror as waged by America

under President George W. Bush.1243 The above cited percentage had been dropped from

31 percent, 30 percent, 30 percent, and 13 percent for Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan and

Jordan respectively from mid 2002 to mid 2003.1244 For the overwhelming majority of the

Muslims worldwide the US attack on Iraq was an “imperial invasion”.

Similarly, a Zogby International Poll conducted in six Muslim countries Egypt,

Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and UAE between February 19 and March 11,

2003. The survey concluded that overwhelming majority of Arab Muslims believed that

1240 Will, Ask the Nominee, November 17, 20041241 Gurtoc, Superpower on Crusade, 1141242 Pew Research Report, June 3, 20031243 Ibid1244 Ibid

276

America invaded Iraq to ensure “security and control of oil” in the Middle East. They

also believed the other US objective was to help “Israel by eliminating a deadly enemy of

Israel.”1245 The overwhelming majority of the Arab Muslims rejected the view that the US

invaded Iraq out of humanitarian motives. So much so, even in Iraq where the Shiites and

Kurds generally welcomed removal of Saddam regime, just 5 percent of Iraqis believed

that the American invasion was intended out of humanitarian concern to help out Iraqis.

Gallup Survey was conducted in Iraq from 28 August to 4 September 2003.1246

America invaded Iraq unilaterally and preemptively in March 2003, under “false

pretexts”. It was an act of “deliberate deception” to the American people.1247 A part of

accusation of that “deliberate deception” lay with the CIA.1248 The distortions also came

at the highest political level of the White House. President and Dick Cheney made

unequivocal statements about the presence of biological and chemical weapons in Iraq.1249

However, the operational US policy was contradictory to the Bush Administration’s

declared policy objectives in Iraq. The operational policy in Iraq, in fact, reflected

offensive realist model.

A close look to the US occupation policy in Iraq, particularly during George W.

Bush Presidency, made it clear that the policy fitted the assumptions of offensive realism.

The invasion of Iraq was not followed-up by any serious plan of reconstruction of post-

Saddam Iraq. After the fall of Saddam regime, Iraq was left to looters for a couple of

weeks. Paul Bremer’s “policy of de-Baathification and disbanding” of the army created

more problems than solving them. There was no provision of basic services, such as

electricity and water for years under occupation. The open-ended occupation, without

giving any timetable for military withdrawal, initiated insurgency against the occupiers

and “struggle for power” among different stakeholders leading to civil war in Iraq.

On the other hand, America did not provide sufficient economic resources for the

reconstruction of the country. Instead, the big US corporations entered into Iraq earning

1245 Shibley Telhami. “Arab Public Opinion Survey”, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace And Development at the University of Maryland, in Cooperation with Zogby International, 19 February- 11 March 2003

1246 Walter Pincus. “Skepticism about US Deep, Iraq Poll Shows”, Washington Post. November 12, 2003

1247 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 25-261248 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 4101249 Ibid

277

super profits from contracts. The security of Israel had been ensured for the foreseeable

future, through the elimination of its arch enemy, Saddam Hussain. It goes without saying

that the neoconservatives, in Bush Administration, intended for a long-time presence in

Iraq in order to exert more pressure on Syria and Iran. They also wanted to establish

military bases in Iraq. Without any exaggeration, they also wanted to send a message of

the “US hegemony” in the Middle East.1250

In short, it could safely be argued that the invasion of Iraq was intended to

increase the “US share of world power” and to establish its “hegemony” in the Middle

East. The control over the Middle Eastern oil (especially Persian Gulf region) constituted

the important instrument of “US hegemony” in the region. The US occupation policy in

Iraq under President George W. Bush reinforced the theme of this dissertation. It

constituted an excellent case study of the application of offensive realism. The US-Iraq

policy created diverse consequences and implications for the international political

system, the UN, the NATO, the Middle East, and the US at large. They constituted the

next chapter.

Chapter Seven

Consequences and ImplicationsThe consequences and implications of the policy also were in line with the assumptions

of offensive realism as they constituted an acceptable cost of the policy. There was no

major upset for the US at any level as the cost of the policy. The dividends offset the cost.

This chapter discussed in detail the consequences and implications of the policy from

2001-2008. The consequences and implications fitted the offensive realist model. On the

credit side (as discussed in detail in chepter-5) it led to the big US military presence in

the region. It uprooted the main US rival in the Middle East. It benefitted the US in

multiple ways including the increased pressure on Iran, the improved US strategic

position in the region, the increased US control over the oil in the region etc. On the debit

side, whatever the direct cost for the US might be, as discussed in this chapter, however,

it did not exceed the reasonable limits as the theory of offensive realism had predicted.

7.1 Implications on IR Theory:

1250 Steele, Defeat, 9

278

7.1.1 Hegemonic Stability Theory:

The basic thing about the US war on Iraq in 2003 was that already Iraq was a destroyed

country, specifically since the First Gulf War and successive UN sanctions since 1991. In

2003, Iraq did not constitute an imminent threat to the US. The war was a result of the US

determination to “play the role” of the “World hegemon.”1251 The war proved a watershed

in the US role as a “global hegemon”. Instead of stability, the hegemon became a source

of “global disorder”.1252 The concept of a hegemon existed in all the three major schools

of thought in IR liberalism, realism and structuralism. Despite the merits of the existence

of a hegemon in all the three schools of IR, the US war on Iraq exposed the weakness of

all the three variants of “hegemonic stability theory” as a hegemon, instead of being a

source of “stability” might become a source of “world disorder”. All the above cited three

variants of “hegemonic stability theory” failed to appreciate this fact.1253

Contrary to liberalist version, all the realist versions of “hegemonic stability

theory” had been of the view that the “hegemon” always pursued “self-interests” and the

hegemon “taxed” the beneficiaries of the system for the service it rendered.1254 In an era

of unipolarity, there had been an absence of any powerful rival power that could check

militarily predominant America from degenerating into a “predatory hegemon”. America

was no more willing to accept restraint on its foreign policy pursuits.1255 Which factors

made a hegemon benign or malign? The US war on Iraq under President George W. Bush

had turned the “US hegemony into a coercive empire.”1256

The US war on terror, particularly against Iraq, made it clear that “self-restraint

and multilateralism” were no more relevant. America had already become a partisan

player in the Middle East and through “coercive hegemony” had created “instability” and

terrorism in the region. As was the case of great powers of the past, America was

dissatisfied with the power configuration in the world and in order to increase its own

“share of world power” by invading Iraq risked “global instability” instead. America

1251 Michael C. Hudson. “To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy in the Middle East”, Middle East Journal 50, no 3, (1996)

1252 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2841253 Ibid1254 Robert Gilpin. War and Change in World Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1982), 153-1561255 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2851256 Ibid, 287

279

acted as a “revisionist power” in the Middle East in 2003.1257 The Iraq war also suggested

that in an era of unipolarity, the excessive power America wielded made it malign.1258

Waltz further argued that power in itself was a threat particularly “if unchecked”

it did not matter who possessed that.1259 The US-Iraq policy had created more “terrorists”

in the Middle East.1260 The US squandered away much soft power in the Middle East in a

short time.1261 The US did not use its predominant military power in Iraq in a “stabilizing”

way. It had been a big question. The answer could be found in the offensive realist

model. The great powers were not “status quo” oriented. They always looked for

“opportunities” to “increase their share of world power”.

7.1.2 Theories of Imperialism:

America had become an “empire”. According to Chalmers Johnson, America was an

empire of “clients and military bases” over the world. It depended on its “control of

strategic territories” such as a territory “swimming in oil”. It was a big benefit rather than

a liability to control such a territory.1262 The US war on Iraq also made it clear that

military was “central” to the maintenance of empire.1263 Michael Klare’s concept of

empire basically was concerned to the “resource wars” waged America to control the

resources weak third world countries owned. Great powers waged wars for the

exploitation of these resources. The US war on Iraq validated Michael Klare’s theory

where an imperial power exploited oil.1264

Benjamin Barber gave a different concept of the US Empire. It was a function of

Bush Administration to exploit American people’s “fear” of terrorism generated by

9/11.1265 Roger Burbach and Jim Tarbell argued about the US invasion of Iraq that, in

reality, it was to establish “control over oil” of the Middle East. Personally, it was also a

source of big profits for the US decision makers of the war.1266 The war might be 1257 Anatol Lieven. “The Empire Strikes Back”, The Nation. July 7, 20031258 Waltz, International Relations, 12 1259 Ibid, 271260 Pieterse, Globalization or Empire, 26-291261 Ibid1262 Chalmers Johnson. Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. (Macmillan,

2004)1263 Ibid1264 Michael T. Klare. “Oiling the Wheels of War”, The Nation. October 7, 20021265 Benjamin R. Barber. Fear’s Empire: War, Terrorism and Democracy. (New York: W.W.

Norton, 2003)1266 Roger Barbach, and Jim Tarbell. Imperial Overstretch: George W. Bush and the Hubris of

Empire. (London: Zed, 2004)

280

counterproductive. A report of experts led by Paul Wilkinson, UK, made it clear that,

among other things, the war on terror boosted “al-Qaeda” in terms of “recruitment,

funding and propaganda”. It would also affect new generation of terrorists.1267

From Samuel Huntington’s point of view, the US drive for empire apprehended

“clash of civilizations”. The US war against Saddam regime fueled a violent clash

between Muslims on the one hand and Jews/ Christians on the other.1268 Some writers

were of the view that American use of militancy force for “imperial ambitions” not only

created but also increased level of “resistance” among the targeted countries.1269 Iraq had

become a test case for Bush Administration’s concept of American empire. Certainly, the

President hoped Iraq would be done at a low cost but things did not turn-up that way.

7.1.3 Theories of World Order:

Stephen Krasner, a realist, gave the view that in the absence of a powerful “world

Judiciary” great powers would use international norms which well suited to their

“national interests” and ignore others that constrained their foreign policy.1270 Liberals

failed to prevent the US invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. Domestic constraints on the

Bush Administration were easily sidelined and so were the UN and international law as

external constraints in case of Iraq. The Bush Administration invented a new doctrine of

“preventive” war and justified on the basis of “self-defense”. A number of scholars

observed that Bush Administration, in fact, pursued a “Machiavellian” model of politics,

in which the administration justified the use of violence and “deliberate deception” to

achieve its end.1271

7.1.4 Implications for State Sovereignty Theory:

Since the Vietnam War, America lost its goodwill as a global player. The end of the Cold

War and 9/11 had made standard concepts of international relations inadequate in an era

of terrorism and “US unipolarity”. The world had become too complex and too diverse

1267 “UK’s Preparedness for Future Terrorist Attack”, report of St. Andrews/ Southampton Universities ESRC Project. Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence and the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, 2004

1268 Glenn Perry. “Huntington and His Critics”, Arab Studies Quarterly 24, no 1, (Winter 2002)1269 Michael Mann. Incoherent Empire. (New York: Verso, 2003)

1270 Stephen Krasner. “Rethinking the Sovereign State Model”, in M. Cox, J. Dunne, and K. Booth (eds.), Empires, Systems and States. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 191271 Danny Postel. “Noble Lies and Perpetual War: Leo Strauss, the Neo-Cons and Iraq”, November 17, 2004

281

since 1990s. The new global order, specifically exhibited some new characteristics –

America had become a “hegemon” in an era of unipolarity, assertiveness of political

Islam taking a militant turn, foreign military interventions in weaker states were justified,

and American claim that “preventive war” was justified and legal under the cover of

“self-defense”. Such a world order was dangerous.1272

In the new era of “unipolarity and terrorism” the traditional concept of “state

sovereignty” had undergone a marked decline. Many of the military actions in this new

era had been taken in violation of traditional concepts of state sovereignty and

international law. These concepts in their traditional sense had become “confused”.1273 In

the post-Cold War era, a new practice of “military intervention” in the internal affairs of

weaker states had been developed, however, there had been an absence of parallel

development in international law.1274 Boutros Boutros-Ghale, former UN Secretary

General, observed on the subject of sovereignty that it was no more “absolute.”1275

John Mearsheimer, the offensive realist, argued that all the great powers had been

“power maximizers” and would continue to be, all the time. By doing that they would

cause strife in international political system. The ways and methods of doing that carried

central place in any interpretation. The role of political circumstances was also important

in doing that.1276 President Bush initiated an open ended war in Iraq as the cardinal

principle of US war on terror. He opted for “coalition of the willing” support.

Consequently, America was caught in strategic overextension and, in the process, was

relatively isolated.1277

America confronted a situation in Iraq about which Theodore Roosevelt already

had a warned. If the US would use its military power to overthrow a medieval kind

tyranny just to replace it with anarchy; it was advisable for the US not to do that job.1278

The US invaded Iraq in 2003, and within a short span of time, just within 18 months, the

US became a “chief destabilizer of global political system.”1279

1272 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 4-51273 Ibid, 81274 Ibid, 91275 “Agenda for Peace”, UN. January 31, 19921276 Black, Great Powers, 191277 Fabrinni, United States Contested, 67 1278 J. Judis. The Folly of Empire. (New York: Scribner, 2004), 62 1279 Gaddis, American Experience, 101

282

Many realists believed that new conflict would act as a check on US power. Two

scholars, Robert Jackson and Philip Towle argued that some realists saw 9/11 as the

proof of coming conflict between, in the words of Huntington, the Islamic world on the

one hand and the West on the other. They also believed that the resistance in the targeted

societies would increase with the every US action taken under the logic of Iraq war.1280

7.2 Rise in anti-Americanism: There was an important question about the rise of anti-Americanism in the Muslim

Middle East, culminating into 9/11. Historically, America had been supporting

“absolutist regimes” in the Middle East in the countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan,

and Kuwait etc. for many decades. That was a leading cause of origin and increase in the

phenomenon of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Terrorism was a reaction to US

historical policies in the Middle East, argued Noam Chomsky with reference to an

Egyptian scholar. The reaction culminated into 9/11.1281 The US invasion of Iraq

intensified feelings of “Islamic fundamentalism” throughout the Muslim world, however,

the US allies in the Muslim world in general and the Middle East in particular did not

trust in American intentions and policies. There existed a deep mistrust about.

Overwhelming majority of people in the Middle East believed that US was the

source of “evil” on this globe. So did the professors, officials, and businessmen in the

Arab world. The policies pursued by the Bush Administration led to the further growth of

“anti-Americanism” in the Middle East.1282 A research on this issue about public opinion

in the 21 Muslim countries in June 2003 was released. The survey concluded a

“phenomenal increase in anti-Americanism” and hostility toward America in the Muslim

world. The results of this survey were compared to an earlier survey conducted in

summer 2002. According to these surveys, 61 percent Indonesians, 30 percent Turkish,

and 25 percent Jordanians had favorable image of America in summer 2002. But the

same corresponding figure dropped to 15 percent, 15 percent, and 1 percent respectively

in those countries.1283

1280 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, xii1281 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 2151282 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 3701283 Pew Research Center Report, June 3, 2003

283

As for reasons about this hostility, Osama bin Laden frequently gave, included,

presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia, the US support to Israel over the decades,

and America’s Iraq war. Al-Qaida issued a policy declaration in 1998. The statement,

among other things, declared that it was the individual duty of every Muslim to kill

Americans and their allies, no matter whether civilians or military.1284 In December 2001,

Al-Qaida released a video tape which confirmed the involvement of the organization in

9/11.1285 In American and coalition response to 9/11, they tried to shift the connection

between 9/11 and the past US-Middle East policy. America actively remained involved in

the Middle East since 1950s. The rationale of US involvement mainly was related to four

areas including oil supply, protection to Israel, support to authoritarian regimes, and

checking USSR’s increased involvement in the Middle East.1286

There had been a phenomenal increase in “anti-Americanism” in the Middle East

since the beginning of Intifada (uprising) in Palestine, September 2000, reported Al-

Ahram. “Anti-Americanism” increased in intensity in the region following a halt in the

peace process the following year.1287 The roots of “anti-Americanism” could be found in

the “heart of resentment” to the US foreign policy toward the Muslim world.1288 There

had been an increased “anti-Americanism” around the globe caused by the US policies.

The interventionism of President George W. Bush was at the heart of the present global

anger. His policies had little international support.1289

The Bush Administration, perhaps intentionally, did not understand that the US

aggressive foreign policy was leading to the intensification of the phenomenon of “anti-

Americanism” around the globe.1290 Two authors argued about the “militaristic” foreign

policy of George W. Bush that the policy was provoking phenomenon of “anti-

Americanism” around the world, specifically among Muslim countries.1291 Egyptian 1284 Fred Halliday. Two Hours That Shook the World: September 11, 2001, Causes and

Consequences. (London: Saqi Books, 2002), 2191285 Laurie Goodstein. “Some Muslims Say Tape Removes Previous Doubt”, New York Times.

December 15, 20011286 Brands, Into the Labyrinth, xi-xiii1287 Thomas Gorguissian. “A Valid Fear”, Al-Ahram Weekly, Online, October 26 to November 1,

20001288 Mushahid Hussain. “Anti–Americanism Has Roots in US foreign Policy”, Inter Press Service.

October 19, 20011289 Black, Great Powers, 2151290 “US Image Up Slightly, but Still Negative”, Pew Global Attitudes Project Report, June 23,

20051291 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 17

284

President, Hosni Mubarak, warned President Bush not to invade Iraq. Israel already had

been killing Palestinians. Now America would kill Iraqis. This would lead to outbursts of

uncontrollable protesters. The spokesman from Riyad, Saudi Arabia was even more

critical. The spokesman said that the US was threatening “stability” of the region not only

of Iraq.1292

Similarly, according to the result of a poll conducted in May 2002, before the US

invasion of Iraq in March 2003, majority of French and German citizens clearly opposed

the US policy toward the Middle East.1293 The US war on Iraq in March, 2003, sparked a

“global” movement of protest. The movement took anti-America tone. Since long anti-

American feelings had been a part of European culture particularly in post-WWII period.

However, things were different now. European mistrust of America increased

significantly.1294

The US unilateralist and preemptive move against Iraq provoked a global reaction

in Europe, Latin America, and the Muslim countries. The justification of the invasion

provided was discredited.1295 An opinion survey was conducted in January 2005.

According to the opinion poll a “wide majority” of citizens throughout the world

considered President Bush’s re-election as a “negative factor for global security and

peace”. They included approximately 75 percent Germans, 76 percent French, 63 percent

Brits, 53 percent Italians, 80 percent Argentines, 77 percent Brazilians, and 67 percent

Indonesians.1296

What might be the explanation of this European discontent with America? The

answer could be found in the presence of a new American nationalism known as

“conservative nationalism.”1297 This new “conservative nationalism” in America

expressed itself in a Universalist turn in its foreign policy since 1990s. It was this

nationalism that provoked resistance/reaction around the globe, particularly in Europe.1298

1292 Scheer, Bush Policy, May 7, 20021293 Tyler, European Split, July 22, 20021294 Fabrinni, United States Contested, 31295 Timothy Garton Ash. Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West.

(New York: Random House, 2004)1296 Fabrinni, United States Contested, 61297 Anatol Lieven. America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism. (Oxford

University Press, 2004)1298 J. Peterson and Pollack M.A (eds.), Europe, America and Bush. Transatlantic Relations in the

Twenty First Century. (London: Routledge, 2003)

285

Such a “Universalist nationalism” America wielded as a “hyper-power” constituted a

threat to the rest of the world by its very nature. This process already had set in motion

“supra-nationalism” in Europe.1299

Woodward had quoted former US President Bill Clinton as saying that by waging

a war on Iraq and its subsequent deterioration, America “alienated” itself around the

world. Now everybody “hated America.”1300 German leadership, particularly Schroeder,

wanted to build reunified Germany as a leader of “new Europe”. Anti-Americanism

became his rallying cry. Even a German minister compared President Bush to Adolf

Hitler.1301 Hundreds of thousands of Germans, in an utter show of “anti-Americanism”

protested around the country.1302

There was an ever increasing “gulf of mistrust” between US and the People of

Europe. It was intensified by George W. Bush’s policies.1303 It was in November 2003

that 53 percent peoples of Europe said that America had a “negative role” to play in

global peace.1304 Some observers commented on the origin of this anti-Americanism in

the world. They linked it with the “US global policy” and the aggressive way the US

military power was being used in the world. September 11 was a direct response to a

world’s self-proclaimed superpower, a result of US actions worldwide.1305

For General Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, the “root cause” of this worldwide

“mistrust” was that American political leadership lacked understanding of the

complexities of the world, and conditions on the ground thereof.1306 However, George

Tenet, referring to the opinion given by scholars, attributed this phenomenon of anti-

Americanism, particularly in the Middle East to the “arrogance and incompetence” of

American political leadership.1307

7.3 Future of Iraq:

1299 C.A. Kupchan. The End of the American Era. U.S. Foreign Policy on the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century. (New York: Alfred A. Knopt, 2002)

1300 Woodward, War Within, 2281301 Shawcross, Allies, 102-1031302 Ibid, 1231303 “How Deep is the Rift”, February 15, 20031304 Standard Euro barometer, November 20031305 Susan Sontag. “Reflection on September 11”, The New Yorker. September 24, 20011306 Zinni and Koltz, Battle for Peace, 2231307 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 492

286

Critics of the new constitution of Iraq had argued that it was nothing short of a blueprint

for the political disintegration of Iraq. Kurds did not, for their own reasons, whether valid

or otherwise, want a united Iraq. They intensely hated united Iraq. The post-Saddam Iraq

had recognized their de facto independence under the new constitution. It seemed as if

they were waiting for the politically favorable circumstances to declare their

independence. On the other hand, religion had moved to the “center-stage” of post-

Saddam Iraq. The Shia-Sunni divide had become unbridgeable. The civil war in Iraq,

particularly between Sunnis and Shiites had further estranged these two people away

from each other. The new constitution of Iraq had established a system of “loose

federalism” that allowed each of the three communities of Iraq to develop its institutions

the way it liked.1308

This three-state solution of the historical problem of Iraq, imposed from above on

post-Saddam Iraq, might culminate into the political fragmentation of Iraq. There would

be nobody to mourn on the dissolution of Iraq. Iraq had given “non-stop misery” to

eighty percent of its population since 1920s. At least, the full independence of Kurdish

autonomous region just was a matter of time. The top US-decision makers in Washington

had been committed to Iraq as a single political entity. Exactly in the way the US was

committed to the political sovereignty of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the last

quarter of 20th century. Historically, the political unity of Iraq had been held together by

coercive security apparatus of the country since 1920s to 2003. On the basis of their

historical experience the people of Iraq had concluded that a united Iraq was no

possibility but in name only. They had settled for a three-state solution into the

constitution. Last, but not least, the Sunnis did not approve at all the newly framed

constitution of Iraq.1309

The US military invasion of Iraq in 21st century was a risky business. People in

the Arab lands deeply resented the continuous onslaught of the contempt and negative

depiction of their religion and culture in Western media. For the Arab world, the issue in

Palestine was land, however, in case of Iraq it was one of control. For the Arab Muslims,

both issues had one commonality. In both cases, Western armed forces invaded and

occupied Arab lands. Arab world still remembered that America supported military coup 1308 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 2051309 Ibid, 206-207

287

in 1963 that empowered Baath Party in Iraq. American delay in transferring sovereignty

to the people in occupied Iraq created there insurgency. By 2007, the insurgency along

with its attendant violence intensified. Islamism also was on the rise. It was a new

political force to reckon with in Iraq.1310

Sectarianism and al-Qaida also were heavily “taxing” and preying on Iraq. Al-

Qaida acted as a magnet for terrorists in Iraq.1311 President Bush’s Iraq policy was a

combination of “imperial arrogance and lying” argued Jonathan Steele, which in turn

created more terrorists.1312 Roberts Gates, the US Secretary of Defense, quoted in

Jonathan Steele through Agency France-Presse saying in June 2007, that America wanted

a prolonged and “enduring presence” in Iraq. American forces would go back to the

“military bases” it had established in Iraq.1313 The US war on Iraq turned out to be a

bloody war of attrition. Feeding Iraqi quagmire with more troops did not change the

ground reality after April 2003.1314

7.4 Coercive Hegemony and Invasion of Iraq:President Bush marked a “qualitative” change in the “coercive” character of American

foreign policy toward the Middle East. For the Bush Administration, the Middle East

region was a key to the sustenance and extension of “US global hegemony”. At the same

time, it also was a major threat to that. The Bush Doctrine was at the “center” of this US

drive for hegemony. The doctrine also retained the right to cope with the resultant

“resistance.”1315 As had already been written in this dissertation, supported with empirical

evidence, that Bush Administration invaded Iraq under “false pretexts”. Later on, Paul

Wolfowitz admitted it. Why did America target Iraq and not North Korea? An

interviewer asked him. Wolfowitz answered, because Iraq was “swimming in oil.”1316

The US “dependence” on imported oil was continuously increasing. In 2002, just

before the Iraq invasion, America imported 53 percent of its domestic need. By 2004, the

oil imported from the Gulf constituted 20 percent of the US need. Any disruption in the 1310 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq”, Department of Defense Qarterly Report. March

20071311 Steele, Defeat, 253-2541312 Ibid, 2551313 Ibid, 2571314 Ibid, 2581315 Edward Rhodes. “The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda”, Survival 45, no 1, spring

20031316 Paul Wolfowitz. Guardian. June 4, 2003

288

smooth supply of oil from the Middle East might have resulted into an oil shock. An

American diplomat told an interviewer that Iraq was the only substitute to “Saudi

Arabia.”1317 In the words of Michael Klare, an expert in oil-geopolitics, the country that

would control Iraq oil would exert great “leverage over the oil politics” of the 21st

century.1318

Due to a number of factors, the US oil hegemony was also threatened since First

Gulf War when Russia, France and Saudi Arabia opposed sanctions over Iraq. Iran and

Iraq were demanding their oil payments in Euros rather than Dollars. The War hawks in

Washington believed that relaxations of “sanctions regime” on Iraq would provide Iraq

an opportunity to recover its “military strength.”1319 The US Administration never wanted

Saddam regime to recover from that position.

As for as the consequences of this policy were concerned, the invasion and

occupation of Iraq became the test case of the Bush Doctrine and of the

neoconservative’s belief that predominant military power could be converted into

“hegemony” in the Middle East. The results were exactly in accordance with the

assumptions of offensive realist model. The consequences constituted purge of Baath

party, bureaucracy, and public sector layoffs.1320 About 100,000 people suffered death,

mostly civilian, since the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003.1321 America established

permanent military bases in Iraq; US also made attempt to sale out oil of the country to

Western buyers. This led to insurgency in Iraq.

The US started using anti-insurgency tactics, borrowed from Israel, including

bombing of the cities, destruction of homes of the people, inflicting collective

punishments to the populace, and putting people into detention camps.1322 It was also

accompanied by occasional brutalities of occupation forces. An year after occupation,

Western polls conducted in Iraq showed that 82 percent Iraqis did not like occupation at

all and were opposed to it, and more than 50 percent people supported, at least morally,

1317 Trevor Royale. “The World’s Petrol Station: Iraq’s Past Is Steeped in Oil and Blood”, Sunday Herald. October 6, 2002

1318 Michael T. Klare. Resource Wars. (London: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2002)1319 Pollack, Threatening Storm, 1671320 “Continuing Collateral Damage: The Health and Environmental Costs of War on Iraq”. Iraq

Faces Severe Health Crisis”, BBC News. November 11, 20031321 Les Francke, et al. Morality. The Lancet. October 29, 20041322 Tony Karon. “Learning the Art of Occupation from Israel and Israel Trains US Assassination

Squads in Iraq”, Time Magazine. December 8-9, 2003

289

insurgent attacks on occupation forces. For them these attacks were justified.1323 The

magnitude of insurgency continuously increased. It proved to the world that “asymmetric

warfare” could check the most powerful “military forces” on the globe. In the year 2004,

opinion polls conducted in Iraq concluded that 92 percent Iraqis saw the US as

“occupier” and just 2 percent as “liberator.”1324

The US did not want to withdraw her military forces from Iraq. However,

borrowing from earlier British experience of occupation, US retreated to newly establish

“permanent military bases” and a huge American embassy in Baghdad. In the post-

Saddam Iraq the US started playing Kurds against Arabs. An America dictated

constitution was imposed under pressure. The US was granted privileges and also made

permanent “sectarian divide” in Iraq. The vote on the constitution was delayed due to

differences among Iraqis on the nature of the constitution. Zalmay Khalilzad was

American ambassador to Iraq. He was a member of PNAC. He was playing the “big role”

in framing of the constitution argued Negus and Rasan.1325

Iraq was created into a “loose confederation” which deprived Iraq of its collective

identity so that it could not reemerge, in future as a harbinger of “Arab nationalism.”1326

A UN report on the new constitution of Iraq called it a “blueprint for political

disintegration” of Iraq into mini-states. An undeclared civil war was ravaging Iraq.

Nobody could impose “liberal order” if any, on gunpoint and it would be entailed by

continuing “military intervention” in Iraq.1327

The costs of war started rising up. The “deliberate deceptions” of the Bush

Administration came to surface as well. The public in the US turned against the war. In

America, the public support for the war fell from 65 percent in 2004 to 44 percent in

2005. Iraq became a test case for “US hegemony and preventive war”. In February 2003,

in the run-up to war, the UNSC asked UN member states to give their opinion on the

1323 Thomas Melia, and Brian Katulis, “Iraqis Discuss their Country’s future: Post War Perspectives from the Iraqi Street”, National Democratic Institute. July 28, 2004

1324 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 486-4881325 Steve Negus, and Dhiya Rason. “Iraqi Parliament Delays Constitution Vote”, Financial Times.

August 23, 20051326 Pieterse, Globalization or Empire, 551327 Rhodes, Imperial Logic, 2003

290

impending war on Iraq. Some 64 delegates of diverse origin gave their opinion; they all

opposed war.1328

According to one reliable account, Prime Minister Tony Blair sided with the US

because he feared, if left alone, the US being a hyper power, would become more

dangerous and “destabilizing.”1329 America coerced UNSC in getting post facto

recognition of the war. The main security fear in Europe was that America would

destabilize Middle East and initiate “clash of civilizations between the West and

Islam.”1330 Europe also worried that the war on terror in Iraq had “intensified

terrorism.”1331 The Bush Administration had sacrificed “trust for remaking” the Middle

East.

American “militarism and arrogance” created a “global wave of hatred” for the

US and world saw President Bush as a greater threat to world peace than Iraqi regime.1332

In an opinion poll conducted some 84 percent people in Europe said that America was the

“major threat” to global peace.1333 So was the case in the Muslim world. America eroded

the concept of inviability of sovereignty of states.

Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, declared the war “illegal” with dangerous

precedent of unilateral and lawless use of force. Evidence suggested that Russia, China,

and India joined hands to oppose imposition of further sanctions against Iran in 2005, on

the issue of its nuclear program. Similarly, China and South Korea joined hands to stop

US actions against North Korea.1334 The US attempt to remake the “Middle East

according to its interest and values” was nothing more than “hypocrisy and double

standards” argued Samuel Huntington. This exactly was in accordance with the

assumptions of offensive realism. The great powers pursuing “hegemony” were “fated to

clash” because they try to achieve a comparative advantage over others. That was a

“tragic situation” argued the theorist.1335

1328 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 1501329 David Marquand. “Why Blair Dressed Up War Realpolitik in Dodgy Moralistic Rhetoric”,

Guardian. February 21, 20041330 Clyde Prestowitz. “America the Arrogant: Why Do not we listen anymore?” Washington Post.

July 7, 20021331 The National Intelligence Council Report, 20051332 Schlesinger, Good Foreign Policy, March 23, 20031333 International Herald Tribune, 20031334 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 3041335 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, xi-xii

291

7.5 Implications for the UN and International law: In run-up to war against Iraq, the Bush Administration rejected Kofi Annan’s proposal.

The UN Secretary General advised US for “UNSC authorization” to invade Iraq, if

invasion was necessary Washington “rejected” the proposal of the UN Secretary General

saying that Washington already had that authorization under the previous UNSC

resolutions.1336 Such an opinion of Bush Administration about war was contrary to

international law. Fifteen member statement of European Union asked the US to “use

force” only as a last resort.1337 Washington saw UN as an “incompetent organization” that

had outlived its utility and had become outdated.1338 Colin Powell, the US Secretary of

State, warned the UN, in his February 5 speech to the UN, for not passing a second

UNSC resolution. It would make UN an irrelevant international body. Otherwise, the US

was poised to “go alone.”1339

The US exploited, even humiliated, the UN during run-up to Iraq war.1340 In his

speech to the UN General Assembly on 12 September, 2002, Collin Powell put pressure

on the UN to cooperate with the US in attacking Iraq otherwise it would become

“irrelevant”. He gave UN the last chance. In reality, President Bush “bullied” the UN

over Iraq issue.1341 The headlines of the three London based dailies read as followed,

“The UN challenged”, “The Bush gives UN last chance” and “Bush bullies UN over

Iraq” respectively.1342

Kofi Annan, on March 10, 2003 clearly mentioned in his official statement that

the war on Iraq would be “illegal under international law” without UN authorization.

Mark Littman argued that in the absence of a fresh UNSC resolution the war on Iraq

would be an “international crime.”1343 A big majority of international law experts

declared that the US war on Iraq was “illegal” in the eyes of international law. Tam

1336 Serge Schmemann. “America Urges New Method to Fight Terrorism”, New York Times, September 25, 2001

1337 Text of the 15 EU countries was available in New York Times, 18 February 20031338 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 2041339 Brigham, Iraq Another Vietnam, 131340 Simons, Future Iraq, 2691341 Bush, Remarks at UNGA, September 12, 20021342 Ibid1343 Mark Littman. A Supreme International Crime. March 10, 2003

292

Dalyell called Tony Blair a “war criminal” on the basis that the war was initiated without

any “specific UNSC authorization.”1344

Article 51, UN Charter, allowed war under international law only in “self-

defense”. However, the right to “self-defense” had been qualified by one condition. A

state had the “right” to wage war only if it was physically attacked. Simply speaking, the

UN Charter prohibited the “use of force” until it was physically attacked.1345. However,

the Bush Administration was unable to “legally justify” war on Iraq in March, 2003.1346

Preventive wars were to be avoided as they threatened “global political systems”.

Preventive wars, is any, would be followed by “chaos”.1347 Later on, Condoleezza Rice

acknowledged that the decision to wage war on Iraq “already” had been made before the

Administration went to the UN for authorization.1348

7.6 Implications for Nuclear Regime: Iraq did not possess WMD. Still it was invaded and occupied. The US was deeply

involved in Iraq. However, Iran and North Korea became free from pressure exerted from

Washington. North Korea expelled UN nuclear inspectors from its soil. North Korea also

“withdrew from NPT” and restarted “plutonium reprocessing.”1349 Similarly at the

beginning of 2006, Iran restarted its uranium enrichment program.1350 There had been a

structural flaw in the NPT. America along with other members of the nuclear club

possessed nuclear weapons. However, at the same time, they preached tirelessly against

the spread of nuclear weapons. On this basis, Tehran called America a “hypocritical

power.”1351

Iran began enrichment of uranium in the aftermath of invasion of Iraq. It was

sovereign right of Iran.1352 Despite pressure coming from Washington, North Korea tested

her nuclear device and Tehran refused to stop “enrichment of uranium”. It was a

“dangerous” development.1353 America, along with Iraq, included both Iran and North 1344 Tam Dalyell. “Blair, The War Criminal”, The Guardian. March 27, 20031345 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2721346 Woodward, State of Denial, 5811347 Chris Brown. “Self Defense in an Imperfect World”, Ethics and International Affairs 17, no 1,

(2003)1348 Leman, How It Came to War, March 31, 20031349 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 10 1350 Ibid1351 Suskind, Way of the World, 1231352 Suskind, Way of the World, 1221353 Ibid , 124

293

Korea as well into “axis of evil” states. They very well knew the fate of Iraq. They

apprehended the same fate. That was why they opted, if possible, for “nuclear”

capability.

7.7 Favorable Outcome for Israel: The US war on Iraq created favorable strategic regional environment for Israel. Since its

creation in 1948, external security environment of Israel had been its biggest problem.

Comparatively, it was favorable now. With the demise of Saddam regime, few states in

the Middle East could challenge Israel’s military dominance. Under US umbrella, Israel

concluded peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan in 1979 and 1994 respectively. Libya was

also neutralized after its surrender of nuclear program. Fall of Saddam regime removed a

big enemy of Tel Aviv. Bashar al-Asad was under great pressure due to big US presence

in the region and the fate Saddam Hussain met.1354

Under the new strategic environment created in the Middle East due to the ouster

of Saddam regime, Damascus also was under great pressure. Damascus proposed renewal

of dialogue with Tel Aviv over the future of Golan Heights. It was in this new strategic

context in the Middle East General Moshe Yaalon said in August 2004, the Israel’s

security would not be jeopardized even if the Golan Heights be returned to the

sovereignty of Damascus. Now the Syrian security was mainly linked to the US policy in

the region. However, reconciliation of Damascus with Washington was necessary.

However, without any misconception, the road to Washington passed through Tel

Aviv.1355

Israel enjoyed good relations with Ankara since mid-1990. In May 2004,

Abdullah Gul, the Turkish foreign minister asked Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv to

revive the peace process with Israel that was halted due to multiple reasons along with

Israel’s policy of targeted killings in occupied territories.1356 Clive Jones argued that

Israel was the Major beneficiary of the war.1357

1354 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 1901355 Eyal Zisser. “What’s Behind Bashar al-Assad’s Peace Offensive?” Tel Aviv Notes 9. January

11, 20041356 Neill Lochery. “Israel and Turkey: Deepening Ties and Strategic Implications”, Israel Affairs

5, no 1, autumn 19981357 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 187

294

It was in March 2007, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and foreign minister Tzipi

Livni addressed the annual conference of AIPAC in the US. During his address, Livni

said that in a volatile region like the Middle East, countries (the US and Israel) must not

show any sign of weakness.1358 Prime Minister Olmert went a step further, that the US

success in Iraq was a must. It was linked with Israel’s security. Olmert ended his address

with the remarks, after American success in Iraq; Israel would be “safer”. The Israeli

friend knew it.1359

Bradley Burston became angry with Olmert’s remarks for becoming a part of the

US debate on Iraq. For him Olmert had committed a mistake. Bradley Burston had been a

regular writer for Haaretz.1360 Prime Minister Olmert visited the White House in

November 2006. He supported American invasion of Iraq. American Invasion of Iraq had

brought stability in the Middle East, said Olmert during his visit.1361

7.8 Consequences for Al-Qaeda and Terrorism:In 2000, Eqbal Ahmad wrote that America sowed “poisonous seeds” in the Middle East

and South Asia. They were to germinate now. Why did America do that? The use of

missiles against Sudan and Afghanistan would not solve the problem.1362 Later on, Jason

Burke confirmed what Eqbal Ahmad had predicted in 2000. He was a Brit doing

investigative journalist.1363 The bombings in Sudan and Afghanistan made Osama bin

Laden a symbol. The subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, in the aftermath of 9/11,

increased “recruitment and financial support for Al-Qaeda” and similar groups.1364 Burke

observed that use of force added to the victory of bin Laden every time. The US war on

Iraq exactly did the same.1365 Exactly same were the consequences in case of Iraq.1366

The US State Department admitted in June 2004, they were “wrong” in their

conclusion when they presented their report on “Patterns in Global Terrorism”. In this

1358 Shmuel Rosner. “Livini to AIPAC: US cannot Show Weakness on Iraq, Iran”, Ha’aretz. March 12, 2007

1359 Hilary L. Krieger. “PM’s AIPAC Talk Surprises Delegates”, Jerusalem Post. March 13, 20071360 Bradley Burston. “Israel Must Stay the Hell Out of US Debate on Iraq”, Haa’retz. March 13,

20071361 President Bush Welcomes to Prime Minister Olmert of Israel to the White House”, White

House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 13, 20061362 Eqbal Ahmad. Confronting Empire. (South End Press, 2000), 1351363 Jason Burke. Al- Qaeda. I.B Tauris, 20041364 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions,1111365 Burke, Al-Qaeda, 2391366 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions,111

295

report the State Department had concluded that policies of the Bush Administration had

reduced terrorism.1367 However, in reality, it had increased.1368 The increase in terrorism

mainly was due to US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. It was exactly according to the

predictions of intelligence agencies. Another scholar argued, the neoconservatives

invaded Iraq knowingly that it would increase terrorism. They did not care about. It was

the question of priorities because they wanted “military bases” in Iraq.1369

As a result of US war on terrorism, al-Qaeda had grown into an organized

“movement”. To begin with, al-Qaeda was an organization of loose network, however,

US strategies of anti-terrorism grew it into a movement.1370 In Iraq the terrorist attacks

tripled in 2004 over the previous year. They were followed by violent terrorist attacks in

London, Madrid, Amman and Egypt. There also grew new terrorist groups. In short, there

occurred a “phenomenal growth in terrorism” as well as terrorist groups and networks,

particularly in the Muslim world.1371

In January 2007, Amatzia Baram, an Israeli citizen and expert on Iraq argued that

he was wrong in supporting US war on Iraq. Saddam Hussain was less dangerous.

Furthermore, he admitted that the war had created more terrorism. In February 2006,

Yuval Diskin, the head of Shin Bet, a security agency of Israel responsible for domestic

security admitted the same.1372 In the view of George Tenet, the CIA chief at the time of

invasion of Iraq “peace was hell” in Iraq in the aftermath of invasion of 2003.1373

7.9 Problems in U.S. Relations with NATO:On the issue of Iraq war, Europe was divided, in the words of Donald Rumsfeld, into the

“Old Europe” and the “New Europe”. Germany and France made the nucleus of “Old

Europe” with majority of populations opposing the war while the governments of “New

Europe” supported US was on Iraq. The Europe based former Communist states joined

US war on Iraq. Their leaders declared themselves what came to be called “New

1367 Barry Schweid. Associated Press. June 11, 20041368 Max Boot. “Bush's team is dysfunctional, not duplicitous”, Financial Times. June 17, 20041369 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions, 1121370 Zinni and Koltz, Battle for Peace, 114 1371 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 3701372 Chris McGreal. “Israelis May Regret Saddam Ousting, Says Security Chief”, Guardian.

February 9, 20061373 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 399

296

Europe”. These leaders asked the UNSC to make sure the “full compliance” of its

resolutions about Iraq.1374

The criterion of this divide in Europe was who supported or opposed the war on

Iraq. These were the former East European communist countries who supported the US,

despite Germany and France, the two importance NATO allies of the Cold War, did

not.1375 Governments of Italy and Spain sided with Washington despite their popular

majorities opposing the war. They were praised for being leaders of “New Europe”. The

percentage of support in the former USSR satellite countries ranged from 4 percent in

Macedonia to 11 percent in Romania. The former foreign minister of Latvia said that they

were to please Washington at any cost.1376 In reality “Old Europe” included countries

where overwhelming popular majorities opposed war while “New Europe” consisted of

few leaders who supported Washington.1377

The NATO countries who wanted genuine collaboration with Washington were,

in reality, disappointed (Patrick Tyler, New York Times, 22 July 2002). The old

Europeans had forgotten that Washington was indispensable. Only America had the right

to lead. America would lead this coalition to victory. Only the US could do that,

reminded Cheney.1378 Old NATO allies saw the world differently as did the US on issues

such as nuclear testing, global warming (Kyoto Protocol) etc. It was Iraq that pushed the

tensions to the peak. Fifteen members of European Union officially supported disarming

Iraq but only through the UN route.1379

The French Foreign Minister was even more critical of Washington’s new

“simplistic” approach to confront terrorism.1380 There occurred a big rift between

Washington and the “Old Europe” on the issue of Iraq. In the words of George Soros,

Washington demanded subservience from NATO allies of the US. That created rift.1381

1374 Steven Weisman. “Threats and Responses: Timetable; US Demands Iraq Show Cooperation by this Weekend”, New York Times. February 10, 2003

1375 Ibid1376 Andrew Higgins. “New Europe' Is as Skeptical Of Iraq War as Old Europe”, Wall Street

Journal. March 18, 20031377 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 1321378 David E. Sanger. “Allies Hear Sour Notes in ‘Axis of Evil Chorous”, New York Times.

February 17, 20021379 Text of the 15 EU countries, New York Times, 18 February 20031380 Suzanne Daley. “French Minister Calls US Policy’ Simplistic”, New York Times. February 7,

20021381 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 14

297

There had been empirical evidence that no US President in 20 th century was so poorly

regarded in European continent as did President George W. Bush.1382 In short, the Old

Europe (Western Europe) was divided on the issue of Iraq war, in March 2003. The

dissident states were led by Germany and France in Europe to be followed by Belgium

and Luxembourg and others while Britain, Spain and Italy became part of “coalition of

the willings.”1383

Colin Powell called this opposition as “betrayal of trust”. America became

annoyed. Donald Rumsfeld divided Europe into “Old Europe” (bad) and “New Europe”

(good). He further said France and Germany were the problem.1384 While outpouring his

displeasure on the attitude of Schroeder, President Bush remarked that it was an act of

“personal betrayal.”1385

7.10 Power Vacuum and Emergence of ISIS:American military invasion of Iraq destroyed political and social institutions of the

country without replacing them with the new and viable ones. The invasion was followed

by political chaos and violent insurgency. The Sunni led insurgency culminated into civil

war between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq. Thousands of innocent people perished in it. This

created vacuum of power in Iraq. Out of this scenario emerged a fundamentalist and

violent movement in Iraq known as ISIS-or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.1386 The

power vacuum in Iraq was filled by ISIS.1387 Hussain and Smith called ISIS a “state-

building organization” under the leadership of Ibrahim Awwad al-Badri, commonly

known Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi- a Sunni from Samarra-Iraq. The ISIS expanded to Syria

after crisis there. Today the Islamic State shared its presence in Iraq and Syria on large

tracts of land.1388

7.11 Implications for Clash of Civilizations Thesis: In the post-Cold War era, the world political order entered into a new phase. A group of

scholars, led by Samuel P. Huntington, showed up with the opinion that the new “global

1382 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 111383 Shawcross, Allies, 1271384 Ibid, 1261385 Shawcross, Allies, 1041386 Interview with Dr. Noman, July 22, 20161387 Interviw with Dr. Riaz, July 18, 20161388 Abdul Hussian Hussain, and Lee Smith. “On the Origin of ISIS”, The Weekly Standard.

September 8, 2014

298

conflict” would be “cultural rather ideological.”1389 Samuel P. Huntington presented this

argument in a classic way. According to this perspective, the highest cultural grouping of

the people on this earth was the civilization. These civilizations were differentiated in

many ways such as religion, language, and history.1390

Huntington rejected the concept of universal values leading to global ambitions.

Such belief in the universality of particular culture was dangerous, argued Huntington.

Imperialism would be the ultimate end of such a belief. As such it would initiate an inter-

civilizational war.1391 Huntington predicted the conflict between Western civilization on

the one hand and the Muslim and Confucious civilizations on the other hand. The

terrorist incidents of 1990s, the tragedy of Septemebr11, 2001, and the subsequent US

wars on Afghanistan and Iraq testified to the truthfulness of Huntington’s claim; though

not at a great level. The two regional wars, in the name of US war on terror, underpinned

those principles which the US Administration wanted to pursue in the world. Franklin

Graham, a Christian evangelist and pro war supporter of Bush Administration, among

some other church leaders, categorically denounced Islam and supported efforts to defeat

it.1392

7.12 Other Consequences and Implications: America had become more vulnerable to nuclear weapons of Iran and North Korea as a

consequence of this war.1393 (Galbraith: 2006: 11). The US invasion of Iraq made

Islamists more powerful, especially in the Middle East. Hamas won elections in

Palestine.1394 On September 20, 2001, while addressing the American people, President

Bush “globalized” the war against terror. In his address the President argued that it would

be a “civilizations” war and warned the whole world that “either you are with us” or with

the “terrorists”. President Bush repeated the same theme time and again.

In contradiction to historical and traditional record, President Bush ceased talks

with “rogue-states”. His position was that these states/leaders lacked “legitimacy” and 1389 Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Penguin

Books, 19971390 Samuel P. Huntington. “If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World”.

Foreign Affairs, (1993), 186-1941391 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 191392 Gustav Niebuhr. “Muslim Groups Moves to Meet Billy Graham’s Son”, New York Times.

November 20, 20011393 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 111394 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 11

299

had no right to sovereignty.1395 Francis Fukuyama also opposed US war on Iraq. Iraq

became the “new magnet” for terrorists. The war also distracted US decision maker’s

attention from other parts of the world. Fukuyama argued that the policy of regime

change was “obsessive” in nature.1396 America could not withdraw from Iraq in haste.

Here was the issue of American dependence on oil. American invasion of Iraq also did

“radicalization of Islam.”1397 Iraq became an example of “strategic overextension” of the

US. It adversely affected the US ability to project power in other parts of the world.1398

The consequences of the war proved “disastrous” both for American economy and

“global military predominance.”1399

The US attack on Iraq fuelled terrorism and extremism in the Middle East and

South Asia. It was exactly what al-Qaida hoped for.1400 Now some of the cities used the

term “hyper power” for the US.1401 Other nations of the world had resented about the US

behavior when it acted hypocritically, applying two different standards of international

conduct, and one for itself and a different for others. Numerous examples of US

“hypocrisy” could be cited. For instance, the US had conducted approximately more than

one thousand nuclear tests and had in its ownership more than 7000 nuclear weapons.

However, at the same time, the US had tried hard to deny the same nuclear weapons to

others. This inconsistency was a big question.1402

Similarly, America supported absolutist dictators like Saddam Hussain when it

suited to US geopolitical interests in the Middle East. Stephen Walt used the phrase

“double standards” for such a behavior of America in world politics.1403 Such US

behavior did not go unnoticed in the world. It remained the key theme of Osama bin

Laden’s many denunciations he made.1404 Such a foreign policy created several problems

for America on the world political stage. It cost doubts on American credibility abroad.

1395 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 411396 Fukuyama, America at Crossroads, 1397 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 62 1398 Ibid, 641399 Ibid, 741400 Suskind, Way of the World, 2351401 Black, Great Powers, 1991402 The Military Balance 2003-2004. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003,

214-2151403 Walt, Taming American Power, 98 1404 Ibid, 100

300

To the foreigners, it seemed unfair. It also meant that the US was unwilling to observe

restraint in the use of force.1405

Regrettably, Condoleezza Rice’s answer to a question was a classic example of

the inconsistency in the attitude of US Administration. She was asked, why in her

opinion, France and Germany opposed US-Iraq policy leading to invasion of the country

in March 2003? She answered, we “did not understand.”1406 America invaded Iraq under

“false pretexts”. Expectedly, there were no WMD in Iraq. For America, that was a sad

turn of history. America had lost its “moral authority.”1407

America also did not talk to Iran and Syria, the two stakeholders in the region, on

the issues created in post-Saddam Iraq. On account of this situation, both Iran and Syria

became determined to resist the US in the region. Such US policy not only isolated Iraq

but also isolated the US in the Middle East.1408 Consequently, the post-Saddam Middle

East had become less stable.1409 Due to US attack and occupation, Iraq had entered into

the politics of religious and ethnic identification. Sectarian violence in Iraq became a

regular fashion of Iraqi political life. The future of Iraq seemed uncertain. Whether there

would be reconciliation in Iraq or not was the question which only future could

address.1410

Criticizing US Iraq policy, John Kiesling, a US career diplomat, wrote in his

resignation letter in February 2003, that America started destroying the international

political system that world had ever made.1411 Condoleezza Rice, in May 2008, in an

important meeting of the State Department said that Iran had increased its involvement in

Arab world politics, from Lebanon to Palestine. Iran was a “challenge to the US

interests” in the region. Furthermore, she said Iran wanted to become a “dominant

player” in the regional politics. Iran had been continuously improving its nuclear

capability. America would not allow this to happen. Iran’s claim to a “major power status

in the Middle East” went through its becoming a nuclear power. America would not

1405 Ibid1406 How Deep is the Rift, Ecomist, February 15, 20031407 Suskind, Way of the World, 141408 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of the Storm, 4941409 Ibid, 4911410 Ibid, 4951411 Simons, Future Iraq, 21

301

allow that.1412 Brookings scholar, Kenneth Pollack observed that the US policy of “dual

containment” adopted by President Bill Clinton was, actually, in response to “Israel’s

security” needs.1413 The war against Iraq strengthened Iran in the Persian Gulf region. In

the post-Saddam era, Israel had become increasingly concerned with the growing power

of Iran.1414

All these consequences and implications were in line with the principles of

offensive realism. On the debit side, the US- Iraq policy adversely affected the

international political system, the UN, international law and norms, future of Iraq, the

concept of state sovereignty and hegemonic stability theory etc. the US advantages of the

policy, discussed in detail in chapter five, far exceeded the debit side as a reasonable cost

of the US-Iraq policy.

ConclusionPresident George W. Bush pursued power politics paradigm in his war on terror,

particularly, in the preemptive and unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003. In this era of

unipolarity, the US as a great power, attempted to restructure international political

system according to American interests through the offensive use of her military might.

Since the times of Thucydides, nothing had changed in world politics and states had been

pursuing their self-interests in an anarchic world. Historically, the fates of all states,

invariably, had been dependent on their power. For all strands of realism, all states

irrespective of their size must pursue power as there had been no guarantee of their

1412 Woodward, War Within, 420-4221413 Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 261-2651414 Orly Halpern. “Israeli Experts Say Middle East Was Safer with Saddam in Iraq”, Forward.

January 5, 2007

302

existence in a system where wars had remained a legal instrument of statecraft and

international political system.

Whether it was classical or modern realist tradition, power played central role in

determining nature of contemporary world politics, and international politics had been

identified as a “struggle for power” among states. Classical realism further argued,

powerful states had always remained imperialist in the conduct of their foreign policy.

Thucydides argued, justice in world politics was different from the concept of justice in

domestic politics which was based, at least theoretically, on rule of law. In international

environment based on anarchy, justice was the function of a state’s military might. It was

equivalent to a state’s military capability. States were unequal in their power. It was a

natural reality. Leadership of a state must adapt to this reality. Fate of a state depended

on the decisions of its leadership.

Machiavelli introduced element of deception in inter-state relationship. Moral

values had no room in international politics. It was the end which justified the means.

Doctrine of preemption was also another addition of Machiavelli to international politics.

Foreign policy of a state was the best combination of power and deception. Thomas

Hobbes linked power politics among states with human nature. The pursuit of power was

wedded in human nature. This pursuit of power was the predominant character of man.

For Hobbes man was also selfish. These characteristics of man were translated into

foreign policy of a state. E.H. Carr identified relative role of power and morality in

international politics. He identified power as the central theme of world politics. Power

was the real currency of international political system. Wars in world politics were the

outcome of unequal distribution of power in the system.

Hans J. Morgenthau became the first theorist of the field of international relations.

He identified the concept of national interest in inter-state relationship. For him, foreign

policy of a state was the reflection of its national interest. He linked this concept of

national interest with the pursuit of power. For him international politics was “struggle

for power” among states. States were “magnified” individuals. States “pursue” power.

Historically, with no exception, powerful states always preyed on weaker states. Modern

realists argued that international political system was based on global power structure.

Most importantly, the centrality of power continued in modern realist tradition. Classical

303

and modern realism identified the “central role” of power in international political

system. The modern realist tradition explained US global role in power politics paradigm.

For Kenneth Waltz, great powers always tried to remake international political system

suitable to their security needs and accumulated power as a systemic requirement.

Theory of offensive realism explains great power behavior in world politics. They

were power maximizers and their real objective was to gain hegemony within the system.

Great powers wanted to achieve predominant position in the system. That was the central

theme of great power conduct in world politics. That exactly was what the Bush

Administration pursued in preemptive and unilateral invasion of Iraq. The US-Iraq policy

from 2001 to 2008 fitted offensive realist model. The empirical evidence had proved the

main argument of this study. There was contradiction between stated and operational

objectives of the invasion of Iraq. This had also been verified. The promotion of

democracy in Iraq remained rhetoric only. The Bush Administration used the issue of

Saddam regime’s WMD to get support from American people. America behaved as a

revisionist power.

Role of neo-conservatives in making and implementing US Iraq policy during the

period under study had been exaggerated. They played only circumstantial role in

invading Iraq in 2003. If there had been no 9/11 there would have been no invasion of

Iraq, at least in 2003. 9/11 put neo-conservatives in the circumstantial role. Michael

Harland concluded that none of the neo-conservatives was a member of “decision

making” team of President George W. Bush. The neo-conservatives wanted removal of

Saddam from power. However, it was exaggeration they were masters of “decision

making” process of Bush Administration. They might have sympathy with Israel.

However, Israel factor was not the only US interest in the Middle East. Social scientist

Rosenau (1966, 1980) had summarily rejected monocausal explanations of US foreign

policy. The explanation for the partial failure of US-Iraq policy in post-invasion period

could be found in the general limitations of theories of social sciences.

Historically, the US pursued economic interests in the Middle East since her

independence in 1776. The US involvement in the Middle East slowly happened in the

last decade of 18th century. The US economic interests in the region were the real

incentive. Generally, during 19th century, America followed policy of political and

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military disengagement from world politics called Isolationism. However, economic

interests brought US to the region. The US pursuit of economic interests was entailed

with military challenge. The Barbary pirates were the challenge. The US must protect her

economic interests in the region. The Barbary pirates had to be defeated. The US did the

job. The US used her military forces against the pirates. America established the tradition

of “use of force” in this distant region in the early years of 19th century to protect her

interests against the regional challenges. America removed the challenge through

“Barbary Wars”. The US Middle East policy in the early period of her independence

fitted power politics paradigm. America used her military forces in the first quarter of 19 th

century to protect her interests in the region. America established a tradition of use of

military forces to protect her interests in the Middle East.

By the beginning of 20th century America had become a great power. The US

interests also had become global. The US policy of isolationism was no more viable.

With the coming of 20th century, active US involvement in the Middle East started.

Discovery of oil in the region became the real source of power struggle among great

powers. Oil became the life-blood of industrialized West. It became an important factor

for the continuity of dominance of the West in the international political system. The

Communist Revolution of Russia of 1917 intensified great power struggle in the Middle

East. Ottoman Empire, due to its medieval character, was unable to withstand the

Western challenge. The two World Wars were a watershed in the political power

equation of the region. America replaced Britain as a great power not only in

international political system but also in the Middle East in post-WWII scenario.

During cold war years Middle East was one of the important strategic regions of

the world. Western world under the US leadership became dependent on oil. Geostrategic

theorists like Mackinder had argued about the world role of the Middle East. The power

that controlled Middle East controlled the world. Middle East occupied great importance

in world politics. It also became a source of major conflict among regional power

contenders-Arabs and Israel. Iraq was created in the footsteps of WWI. Oil played central

role in its origin. Iraq was created artificially. Britain was the main player in its creation.

Britain got mandate over Iraq under League of Nations charter. Presence of oil was the

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main factor in its artificial creation under the Sykes-Picot secret agreement between

Britain and France.

In 1956 war, America saved Nasser by putting pressure on Britain and France to

withdraw from Suez Canal. After the war, under Eisenhower Doctrine, the US and British

troops saved pro-West regimes in Jordan and Lebanon. In the footsteps of 1956 Middle

East crisis, CIA’s involvement intensified in Middle East politics. Against Western

excesses Middle East was boiling for revolutions. Iraq became the first one to suffer a

coup in 1958. Iraq left Baghdad Pact, an America sponsored anti-USSR military

agreement. CIA managed another coup in Iraq in 1963. CIA established good relations

with Saddam Hussain during the decades of 1950s and 1960s. Saddam was made head of

intelligence in Iraq. He killed thousands of pro-Soviet personnel in Iraq. It was the first

use of Saddam by CIA. During Cold War period, the US policies in the Middle East were

in line with the logic of offensive realism. They were mainly concerned with the

protection of pro-US regimes, ensuring oil supplies to the US and her Western allies,

protection of Israel, and checking Soviet penetration in the region. America successfully

achieved them all.

After popular revolution in Iran in 1979, US supported Saddam’s war against

Iran. Containment of Iran became major US concern in the region. During 1980s,

European NATO allies of the US supplied “dual use” technology to Baghdad. America

also ignored Saddam’s use of WMDs against his own population. These US policies

fitted realist logic especially the offensive realistic model. They were aimed at increasing

US share of world power in the system. They also fitted offensive realist logic. Acting as

offshore balancer in the Middle East, America also denied USSR, Iran, and Saddam

regime the same benefits. America pursued policy of “dual containment” of Iran as well

as Iraq. During 1990s, America as an offshore balancer in the Middle East, denied Iraq

an opportunity to increase its share of power in the system and to become a regional

power. It could be safely said, the US-Iraq policy in historical perspective fitted realistic

logic especially offensive realism as it was aimed at two things. One was the increase in

its share of world power by immediately courting Saddam as a new source of oil after the

loss of Iran. Other was, acting as offshore balancer, denied Iran, Iraq, and Soviet Union

any benefit of the loss of Iran.

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In the year 1990, Saddam regime occupied Kuwait. It greatly added to the power

of Saddam regime. Kuwait was one of the five big producers of oil in the world. It

disturbed regional balance of power. For the US, it was against the logic of power

politics. Saddam regime could aspire to be a regional hegemon in the Persian Gulf region.

It could have been great disadvantage for the US. Saddam was defeated in Kuwait mainly

due to US resolve. His military forces were destroyed. However, he was left to power in

Baghdad. His removal from power could have resulted into Iran’s advantage. It could

have also disturbed regional balance of power. Brent Scowcroft gave the testimony to this

reality. The realist logic was at work in dictating this decision. Once again, acting as

offshore balancer, America denied any advantage to Iran as well as Iraq.

The US invaded Iraq in 2003 under false pretexts. All the three declared causes of

preemptive and unilateral invasion of Iraq were discredited in post-invasion

investigations. The post-invasion investigations proved the authenticity of another

principle of offensive realism. Great powers cheat and lie in the conduct of their foreign

policy. They were mainly concerned with their objectives to achieve. The objective was

of increasing their share of world power. In this pursuit of increase in relative power, US

ignored everybody UN, NATO allies, and the traditional Muslim allies in the Middle

East. Iraq was under UN sanctions since 1990. Iraq was accused of having WMDs.

However, America denied UN inspectors a fair opportunity to conduct inspections. Once

again, the US was mainly preoccupied with her objective to achieve. All these

developments fitted the assumptions of offensive realism. Later on Paul Wolfowitz

admitted in an interview. Iraq was “simmering in oil”. Oil was the life-blood of the US.

The US operational objectives in Iraq were multifaceted and complex. They

greatly increased US “share of world power”. Saddam Hussain, being a dictator in one of

the geo-strategically most important regions of the world did not fit into the 21 st century

US agenda. The 21st century was known as the “New American Century”. For the US,

Middle East represented the “new center” of global politics and also remained center of

the new threat-political Islam, to Western dominance in the system world. The new

center of world politics had been shifted to the Middle East. As a great power there must

be big US military presence in 21st century in the Middle East mainly to ensure two

307

things, containment of the new threat of political Islam to the West and US dominance of

the region.

The US occupation policy in Iraq also was in line with the logic of offensive

realism. There was lack of any serious plan of reconstruction of Iraq. America eliminated

traditional political, economic, and social structure of Iraq without any functionally

viable structural replacement. The Bush Administration was not serious to reconstruct

Iraq. The Bush Administration did not pump into enough money in Iraq which was

required for such a serious task. The Bush Administration also destroyed traditional

tribal, ethnic, and sectarian balance in post-Saddam Iraq. This led to steep rise in violence

culminating into sectarian civil war in Iraq between Sunnis and Shias. Post-Saddam Iraq

presented a politically and socially fractured structure just waiting for a proper time to be

divided into three states. It seemed a matter of time. The new Iraqi constitution was a

superimposed political arrangement by an alien power under force of the arms. America

was not ready to pay the price of reconstruction as it might have exceeded the reasonable

limits of the cost of war. Efforts to serious reconstruction were against the logic of

offensive realism. It could have created a stable Iraq. At the same time it would deny the

US its rationale of military presence in the region.

The policy under study had created certain negative implications for international

political system. The stability of the Middle East had also been adversely affected. The

effects on nuclear regime were also negative. By eliminating Saddam regime in Iraq the

US created vacuum of power in Iraq. No stable political structure replaced Saddam

regime. US policy created crisis situation in the region. Arab spring followed US

invasion of Iraq. Since then, the entire Middle East region had been burning in instability

from Libya to Syria. The power vacuum in Iraq was being filled by ISIS. The ISIS

expanded to Syria. The US policy also disturbed regional balance of power in the Middle

East, especially in the Persian Gulf region in favor of Iran. Iraq was now a Shia

dominated state.

Whatever the consequences and implications of US-Iraq policy from 2001 to

2008, the US cost of the policy did not exceed the reasonable limits of the policy. By the

end of second term of President Bush the US had lost about 3500 soldiers in violence in

Iraq. It was not a big cost the US paid in Iraq as compared to the US cost of wars in

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Korea and Vietnam which was 33,000 and 58,000 dead respectively. The US constructed

military basis in Iraq. The cost in money also was not much. The US oil corporations

like Halliburton, Bechtel, and Chevron had been earning trillions of dollars since the

invasion. Most importantly, the policy under study did not create any serious/major upset

for the US at any level whether domestic, global, or regional. The policy also facilitated

the US pursuit of global hegemony. The policy not only increased US control over

Middle Eastern oil but also on the region as well.

This dissertation critically answered in detail all the central questions of this study

one by one. The main argument of this dissertation proved true. The empirical evidence

provided in the dissertation through chapter three to seven proved the authenticity of the

main argument of this dissertation that the US-Iraq policy 2001-2008 was a case study of

the application of theory of offensive realism. The second main argument had also been

proved true. The contradiction in the stated causes of invasion and operational causes had

also been proved. The 9/11 Commission concluded that there were no WMDs in Iraq, the

main cause of invasion. Similarly, the introduction of democracy in Iraq mainly remained

rhetoric and did not withstand the test of empirical verifiability. The policy under study

increased US share of world power in multiple ways. It could be safely said that there had

been a close fit between offensive realism and US – Iraq policy 2001-2008 and it

constituted an excellent case study of the application of offensive realism. The renowned

experts of American Studies in Pakistan- Dr. Tahir Amin, Dr. M. Islam and Dr. Noman

O. Satttar- had also been in agreement with the main aurgument of this study that the

U.S.- Iraq policy 2001-2008 constitued a case for application of offensive realism.

309

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