DCCUEIT RSIUE

05222 - B0685602

Air Force Requirements for Blectronic arfare Operational Testand Training Equipment. PSAD-78-83; E-163058. arch 1, 1978. 14pp. + appendix (1 pp.).

Report to Rep. George H. ahon, Chairman, House Committee onAppropriations; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General.

Issue Area: Federal Procurement of Goods and Services:"rocurement of Only eeded Quantities of Goods (1901).

Contact: Procurement and Systems cquisition Div.Budqet Function: ational Defense: Department of Defense -

Procurament Contracts (058).Organization oncerned: Department of the Air ]rrce.Congressional Relevance: House Committee on Appropriations;

House Committee on rad Services; Senate Committee on rmedServices. ep. George E. ahon.

A:,thority: Air Force Regulation 57-1.

The fiscal yeaL 197d Air Force budget estimate included$16.5 million for procurement of threat simulators and relatede4uipment to upgrade its operational test, evaluation andtraininq equipment and an C's. These improveaents were intendedtc provide a realistic training environment in which to trainaircrews. Findings/-onclusions There s no goqstion of theoverall need to improve ir Force operational ranges or theattempt to achieve greater realism in training aircrews.However, the Air Force should improve the information itpresents to congressional decisionaaker- who must act onappropriations request for the program. In the case cf threatsimulators and related equipment, uch more is involved thanjust the procnrement of specific pieces of equipment. Documentsindicate a 5-year total pogram cost estimated at 694 million,but because the Air Force followed the traditional budgetapproach which fragments the program into segments financed bymultiple appropriations, its presentation to the ppropriationsCommittee may not have focused attention on the agnitude of thetotal program. Recommendations: The Secretary of the ir Porce,i presenting future fund requests for operational rangeimprovements, should give congressional deciLsionmakers acomprehensive picture of what the onels are for, why they areneeded, and how they P.re to be spent. (RS)

REPORT BY THE

Comptroller GeneralOF THE UNITED STATES

Air Force Requirements for ElectronicWarfare Operational Test andTraining Equipment

This report to the House Committee onAppropriations discusses the plan,ed expendi-tures of about $700 million for Air Forceoperational test and training equipment andrange improvements.

GAO reccrmmends that the Air Force givecongressional decisionmakers a comprehensivepicture of what future moneys are for, whyth y are needed, and how they will be spent.

4CtOU 0 MARCH 1, 1978

'A' -h, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNIT STAYESWAUHINGTON. DO,. Ads

B-163058

The Honorable George H. MahonChairman, Committee on AppropriationsHouse of Reoresentatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is the report you requested on the Air Force'ssystem of determining requirements for certain types ofelectronic warfare threat simulators and related equipment.

At your request, we did not take the additional timeto obtain written agency comments. The matters covered inthe report, however, were discussed with agency officialsand their comments are incorporated where appropriate.

As agreed with your office, we are sending dopies ofthis report to the Acting Director, Office of Managementand Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretaryof the Air Force. Copies will also be available to otherinterested parties who request them.

E C ely yours

Comptroller eneralof the United Sates

COMPTROLLER GENERAIW'S AIR FORCE REQUIREMENTSREPORT FOR ELECTRONIC WARFARE

OPERATIONAL TEST ANDTRAINING EQUIPMENT

D I G E T

Thie Air Force requested funds in the fiscalyear 1978 Presidential tLdget for upgradingits operational test, evaluation, and tra.ningequipment and ranges. These improvements wereintended to provide a realistic training en-vironment in which to train aircrews. Thereapparently is no question in the minds ofDefense officials that such training is es-sential and would significantly enhance thecombat capability of U.S. forces.

GAO found:

-- Earlier Air Force proposals for improvingand integrating selected ranges in thewestern United States were denied by tneCongress. (See p. 3.)

--Concern was expressed by some of the at-tendees at an A.r Force meeting heldto establish priorities for program re-quirements. Equipment desired was identi-fied, but the plan did not provide therationale eeded to justify fully the fund-ing for those requirements. (See p. 9.)

-- This program incluces more than just theprocurement of electronic equipment.Multiplv appropriations are involved,which include major budget categoriessuch as Other Procurement; Research,Development, Test, and Evaluation; Air-craft Procurement; Military Construction;Operations and Maintenance; and MilitaryPersonnel. When all aspects of this pro-gram ae considered, the total cost forthe 5-year period ending fiscal year 1983would be almost $700 million. The equip-ment portion of the program would beabout $500 million. (See pp. 11 to 13.)

-- The Air Force is updating its radarwarning receivers and electronic

i PSAD-78-83TcZS _. pon removal, the reportoer date hould be noted hereon.

countermeasures equipment that it installs inoperational aircraft to enable the equipment toreact against certain known threats; however,there is some risk that the modifications maynot be successful. (See p. 13.)

RECOMMENDATION

GAO recommends that the Secretary of the AirForce, in presenting future fund requests foroperational range improvements, give congres-sional decisionmakers a comprehensive pictureof what the moneys are for, why they are needed,and how they are to be spent. (See p. 14.)

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Contents

Pay!

DIGEST i

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION 1Function of threat simulators 1Continental operations range

concept rejected 2Scope of review 3

2 REQUIREMENTS PROCESS IN THEAIR FORCE 5

System for determining requirements 5

3 AIR FORCE GOALS FOR OPERATIONALRANGE IMPROVEMENTS 7

The validation of RC 305-76Statement of need 7Statement of required operationalcapabilities 8

Coordination within the AirForce 9

Multiple appropriations areinvolved 11

Compatibility of ground threatsimulators with airborneequipment 13

4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 14Conclusions 14Recnmmendation 14

APPENDIX

I List of related GAO reports 15

ABBREVIATIONS

COP Continental Operations RangeDOD Department of DefenseGAO General Accounting OfficeGOR General Operational RequirementOSD Office of the Secretary of DefenseROC Required Operational CapabilityTAC Tactical Air Command

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations, inReport No. 95-451, on the Department of Defense (DOD)fiscal year 1978 appropriations, asked us to assess thesystem by which the Air Force identifies training andassociated equipment requirements related to electronicwarfare threat simulators. These simulators are installedat Air Force electronic warfare training ranges to trainaircrews.

The fiscal year 1978 Air Force budget cstimate included$16.5 million for procurement of threat simulators :d ?-lated equipment. In fiscal year 1977, the Air Force budgeted$31.4 million for this program and the Congress approved theentire amount. Subsequently, there was a reprograming of$4.2 million so that only $27,2 million remained in the fis-cal year 1977 program. Furthermore, the listing of specificpieces of equipment to be procured changed dramatically.

When asked to explain these changes, the Air Force sup-plied the Committee information which raised questions asto whether the Air Force was giving proper management direc-tion to the program. The Committee's Surveys and Investiga-tions Staff also raised questions about management in a reporton a threat simulation system. As a result, the Committeerecommended denial of the $16.5 million budgeted for fiscalyear 1978.

FUNCTION OF THREAT SIMULATORS

Electronic warfare threat simulators reproduce andtransmit the same type of signals that would be transmittedby hostile radar-controlled surface-to-air missiles oranti-aircraft guns. The signals transmitted by thesimulators are picked up by radar warning receivers inour aircraft. These receivers alert the aircrew that theyare in danger of being destroyed unless they take imme-diate counteraction. The counteraction could includesuch things as dispensing chaff to confuse the enemy'sradar, activating electronic countermeasures to jam theenemy's radar, maneuvering the aircraft to avoid beinghit, or aborting the mission.

In order to achieve realism in operational testingof equipment and training modern aircrews for combat,

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it is not enough to simply fly to the target area, dropbombs or fire air-to-surface missiles, record the score,and go home. Modern aircrews must learn to do all of theabove while using electronic warfare tactics to defendagainst hostile actions. If not, chances are they willnot survive long enough to get to the target and home againin a real war. This need for realism in training is oneof the reasons for the Air Force's requirement for electronicwarfare threat simulators and range improvements.

CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS RANGE CONCEPT REJECTED

DOD and the Air Force made a number of studies in theearly 1970s. These studies identified the need for arange where operational testing and training could beconducted in a more realistic environment. The Air Force,in response to this need, developed a concept known as theContinental Operations Range (COR). COR was to provide:

--A range facility that would permit operational testand evaluation of equipment and strike-sized airwarfare elements in a realistic combat environment.

-- Large land and airspace areas where unconstrainedexercises could be conducted to train aircrews in arealistic but simulated combat environment and toevaluate tactics, performance, and capabilities of thepeople and their equipment.

-- A combat-like environment for selected developmenttests and evaluations which could not be accomplishedat existing research and development ranges.

The COR concept provided for improving and integratingthree existing range complexes located in the western UnitedStates. The range complexes are (i) Tactical Fighter WeaponsCenter located at Nellis Air Force Base, near Las Vegas, Nevada,(2) Wer.dover-Hill-Dugway ranges near Salt Lake City, Utah, and(3) Fallon Naval Air Station near Reno, Nevada.

The COR concept also involved the addition of threatsimulators, instrumentation, communications, and groundtargets so that strike-sized air forces could be testedagainst large-scale, multi-defended areas. Joint exerciseswith the Army and Navy were also suggested. The estimatedcosts for COR were $208 million. The estimate excludedoperation and maintenance costs. Completion of COP wascontemplated for 1982.

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The Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Ap-propriations Committee conducted a review of COR and sub-mitted its report to the Chairman on May 13, 1974. Thereport identified the following problems:

-- A lack of coordination within the Air Force and a lackof Army and Navy stated requirements for such a facil-ity, which suggests that a triservice range was notprobable.

-- A deficiency in detailed user requirements; therewas no documented plan setting for Lh what was goingto be done at COR, how, when, dnd by whom.

-- Evidence that COR could be much more expensive thaninitial estimates.

The Air Force requested Ot r Procurement appropriationfunds for COR in fiscal year 1974. That request was deniedby a congressional conference committee after the House com-mittee recommended denial and the Senate committee recom-mended restoration of the funds. As part of the fiscal year1974 supplemental request, the Air Force again requestedfunds for COR and the conference committee again enied therequest after the House committee recommended denial andthe Senate committee recommended restoration.

During March and May 1974, subcommittees of the Houseand Senate Appropriations Committees held hearings on thefiscal year 1975 DOD appropriations. In August 1974, theHouse and Senate reports were issued. The House reportrecommended denial of all fiscal year 1975 funds associatedwith COR. The Senate report recommended restoration ofCOR funds. A conference report issued on SeptemLer 18,1974, upheld the denial of COR funds proposed by the Hc:;se.

Although funding for COR was denied, the Air Forcecontinued to believe there was a valid need for improvingits operational training and test ranges by providinga more realistic combat environment. (See pp. 7 and 8.)

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We made our review during the period August 1977 toJanuary 19;,5 We visited Headquarters, Tactical Air Command,Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and the Armament Develop-ment and Test Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Wealso interviewed Air Force officials of Headquarters, U.S.Air Force, Pentagon; Air Force Systems Command, AndrewsAir Fo.:ce Base, Maryland; and Air Force Logistics Command,

3

Wright-Pa*terson Air Force Base, Ohio. We examined require-ments supporting documents in the Air orce's files.

4

CHAPTER 2

REQUIREMENTS PROCESS IN TEE AI. FORCE

SYSTEM FOR DETERMININGREQUIREMENTS

Air Force Regulation 57-1 provides that an operationalrequirement may be recognized, stated, and forwarded byany echelon of the Air Force or DOD. Air Force organizationsrecognizing an operational deficiency or need and proposingcorrective action must coordinate a statement of the require-ment with the other commands that will ultimately use or beaffected by the proposed capability. This statement iscalled a Required Operational Capability (ROC). Officialrecognition of a requirement begins with the preparationand submission of the ROC to Air Force Headquarters.

RObs should go through a rview process within thecommand recognizing the need, before approval and submissionto Air Force Headquarters. In each command there is anoffice assigned responsibility for controlling the processingand submission of ROC proposals. An action officer isassigned the responsibility for preparing the ROC, guidingit through the various reviews and evaluations by theheadquarters staff, and incorporating pertinent decisionmatters into the final document. Review within the commandheadquarters consists of examination and evaluation of theROC by working groups, panels, and command staff. Thecommander of either the Strategic Air Command or theTactical Air ommand has the final authority within hiscommand to apr.rove proposed ROCs for submission to AirForce Headqu:arters dealing with electronic warfare threatsimulators which are the subject of this report.

At Air Force Headquarters, the Deputy Chief of Stafffor Research and Development receives the ROCs. A programofficer is selected to be the sponsor of the ROC whileit is being considered at Air Force Headquarters. It isthe program officeL's responsibility to see that debateand advocacy within the Air Force and outside the Air Forceare brought to the attention of the decisionmakers.

The first step in processing the proposed ROC is forthe program officer to obtain an evaluation by tne Head-quarters Air Staff. The program officer must developa position regarding the ROC and defend its validity orrecommend rejection or modification. In some instances,

5

the program officer may ask coordinating commands forcomments. Coordinaticn should be completed within 90days.

tfter coordination with the Air Force hadquarters,the program officer submits and defe,,ds the ROC before aRequirements Review Group. After a review and evaluationof the proposed ROC, the group can recommend validation,rejection, or return of the ROC to the program officerfor additional information.

If the proposed ROC is not for a major weapon system--asin the instance of electronic warfare simulators--approvalby the Requirements Review Group constitutes validationof the ROC. Now the ROC is considered an approved programwhich must compete for funds against other valid Air Forceprograms.

The program officer, in an effort to obtain funding,presents the program to the Air Staff Board, whose membersinclude the Director of Programs, the Budget Director, theDirector of Operational Requirements and Development Plans,and the Director of Personnel Planning. The board hascommittees and panels staffed by specialists. All programssubmitted for board consideration normally are reviewedfirst by the appropriate panel. The board considers thepanel's comments, then evelops and submits its recommendedbudgeting dollar level to the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff,who is Chairma of the Air Force Council, the next higherreview level.

The Air Force Council considers the recommended budgeteddollar level cf the board and accepts it or suggests changes.The Council's recommendation is submitted cc the Chief ofStaff for his consideration. If the Chief of Staff approves,the program budgeted dollar level is submitted to the Sec-retary of the Air Force for approval. The Secretary ofthe Air Force makes the final decision within the Air Forceon the proposed budget or the program.

Each year the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)solicits Air Force programs to be entered in the Planning,Programming, and Budgeting System. The Air Force respondswith recommendations for the Joint Force Memorandums andprovides its Program Objective Memorandum to OSD. Afterreview of the Air Force proposals, OSD issues Program Deci-sion Memorandums, which form the basis for the budget submis-sion to the Congress ani subsequent updating of the DOD Five-Year Defense Plan.

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CHAPTER 3

AIR FORCE GOALS FOR OPERATIONAL

RANGE IMPROVEMENTS

THE VALIDATION OF ROC 305-76

According to the Air Force, the document supportingthe request for appropriated funds to acquire electronicwarfare threat simulators and related range equipment isROC 305-76 (Revised), dated December 6, 1976, "ImprovementsTo Tactical Air Force Ranges." The Air Force's statementof need and operational capabilities is summarized underthe following side captions.

Statement of need

The Air Force believes tactical air forces requirerealistic training ranges, with targets and threats closelyresembling the postulated combat environment. Tacticalair force training ranges are one of the cornerstones of theaircrew's capability to accomplish the tactical air missionon short notice throughout te world. Combat experiencesupports the premise that realistic training improves thesurvivability and effectiveness of the aircrews.

Southeast Asia data showed the probability of survivaland the mission effectiveness increased markedly as air-crews became familiar with he combat environment. Asignificant decrease in aircraft losses and improvedmission results could be expected afte_ the aircrews flewover ten combat missions.

Although realistic training cannot remove the unexpectedfrom the combat equation, highly trained aircrews quicklyadjust to meet the changing threat.

Besides training aircrews, realistic training environ-ments provide continuing opportunities to aalyze tacticsas well as command and control procedures. Comprehensiveoperational testing, realistic training, and effectiveevaluation of combat techniques cannot be accomplishedon poorly equipped ranges. According to the Air Force,current tactical ranges sufrer frAn many deficiencies.These deficiencies an be summed up in the following cate-gories:

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-- nadequate realistic threat simulation.

-- Range area limitations.

-- Lack of range instrumentation.

--Electromagnetic emanation limitations (interferencewith TV and radic signals).

-- Encroachment on land, water, or airspace.

-- Inadequate real-time all weather/night control.

-- Inadequate range communications.

In order to develop the ranges to the degree required, anorderly, comprehensive range improvement program must beinstituted to provide the necessary capability in an dc-ceptable period of time.

Statement of required operational capabilities

Since weapon systems' capabilities and combat skillsmust ultimately be developed and evaluated in actual flightsituations, the Air orce believes that their tactical airforces require range facilities which will:

-- Permit operational test and evaluation in a realisticcombat environment.

--Provide capability for conducting large-scale exercisesto evaluate and train combat flying units under realis-tic combat conditi ns.

-- Provide realistic conditions, including visual cuesfor routine flying training.

-- Provide a capability to monitor, reconstruct, debriefthe aircrew, and evaltite precisely both single andmultiaircraft operations, which include surface-to-air, air-to-surface, a ' air-to-a'r ordnance exchangesaided by computer simulation with real-time scoringand information feedback.

-- Provide range surveillance necessary for range, mis-sior, and traffic control as well as safety of opera-tion.

-- Provide an ongoing program to keep pace with changingenemy threat developmen ;.

COORDINATION WITHIN THE AIR FORCE

On April 14, 1976, the Commander, Tactical Air Command,transmitted ROC 305-76 to Air Force Headquarters. However,he did not provide the applicable range management plansbecause they were in the final stages of publication. Therange management plans provide details on proposed equipmentneeded to fulfill the required operational capability. Inthe coordinating comments on the ROC, during the summer of 1976,several Air Force activities stared that, while the requirementappeared valid, constructive comments or meaningful evaluationscould not be provided because they had not received the rangemanagement plans.

On August 10, 1976, a meeting was convened at AirForce Headquarters to establish priorities for the fiscalyears 1977 and 1978 operational range requirements andthe requirements for fiscal years 1979 and beyond. Reprsentatives from the Tactical Air Command presented therecuirements for their command as well as those for thetactical air forces in Alaska, Europe, and the Pacific.Representatives from each of the following organizationspresented their individual requirements

--Strategic Air Command;

--Air Defense Comm tnd;

--Air Force Logistics Command; and

--Air Force Test and Evaluation Center.

The attendees expressed their opinion that ROC 305-76should be validated. However, Air Force Headquarterspersonnel expressed concern that the range management plansidentified equipment desired but did not provide the rationaleneeded to fully justify the funds needed to fulfill the re-quirements. They stated that additional information wasneeded concerning the numbers and different types of radars,threat simulators, and other related equipment and the objec-tives to be achieved by obtaining this equipment. They alsoneeded information on training requirements, the numbers oftraining sorties to meet these requirements, nd the locationswhere training was to be conducted.

This lack of detailed data was the same type of defi-ciency reported by the Surveys and Investigations Staffof the House Appropriations Committee in May 1974 whenthey reviewed the COR. (See p. 3.)

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On Novcmber 20, 1976, the Commander, Tactical AirCommand, provided additional supporting information foroperational range requirements. He stated that the rangeimprovement program had taken on a new imension in thelast 2 years. What w;s initially a program to upgradethe range at Nellis Pir Force Base had grown to encompassall Air Force operational ranges.

On December 8, 197., the Air Force Headquarters programofficer recommended that ROC 305-76 be validated. The esti-mated total program cort for equipment in the 5-year periodending fiscal year 1983 for the tactical air forces was $502.1million. The recommendation did not reflect any adverse com-ments from other Air Force commands. In summarizing otherrelated considerations, the program officer wrote:

"The Air Force originally pursued the ContinentalOperations Range (COR) to satisfy its requirements.When the Congress recognized the Air Force require-ments but did not fund COR, the Air Force wasforced to undertake improvement of its alreadye:isting ranges to meet its needs. This ROC wassubmitted after-the-fact in order to provide abasis independent of COR documentation for theAir For.e Range Improvement Program."

The following table shows the total program cost base-line estimated as of December 8, 1976, for the 5 fiscalyears ending 1983.

Total Program Cost Estimate

(millions)

Fiscal vearsCommands 1979 1980 1981 1982 1982 Total

Tactical airforces (note a) $120.9 $101.7 $102.0 $109.6 $67.9 $502.1

Strategic AirCommand (note b) 24.4 41.9 36.4 31.6 16.5 150.8

Air DefenseCommand (note b) 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 .3 6.3

Total $146.8 $145.1 $139.9 $142.7 $84.7 $659.2

a/ROC 305-76 includes Tactical Air Command, U.S. Air ForceEurope, Pacific Air Force, and Alaskan Air Command.

b/A ROC had not been prepared for these items.

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On January 18, 1977, the Requirements Review Groupvalidated ROC 305-76 at a cost baseline of $502.1 millionfor equipment. While the $150.8 million for the StrategicAir Commandc and the $6.3 million for the Air Defense CommandHere included in the total program cost estimate, separatedocumentation for these requirements had not been prepazed.When we asked why separate ROCs had not been prepared for':he Strategic Air Command and the Air Defense Command, AirForce representatives advised us that a new ROC, includingall Air Force operational range improvement requirements,was being prepared. As of February 10, 1978, that AirForce-wide ROC was being coordinated with affected commands.In the future, the ROC will be called a General OperationalRequirement (GOR).

MULTIPLE APPROPRIATIONSARE INVOLVED

The Air Fc'ce operational range improvement program in-cludes more than just the procurement of electronic warfarethreat simulators and range instrumentation. Multiple ap-propriations are involved which include major budget cate-gories such as: 3080--Other Procurement; 3600--Research.Development, Test, and Evaluation; 3010--Aircraft Procurement;3300--Military Construction; 3400--Operations and Maintenance;and 3500--Military Personnel.

In the table on page 12, we have summarized the costsof the total program to the extent data was available.

12.

estimated Proqram Cost By Budget Cate oryFiscal years 1979-83

Budget cate_qry Amounts

(millions)

3080--Other Procurement

Acquisition of electronic warfare threatsimulators, range operation controlcommunications, air traffic control, andsafety equipment and test instrumentation. $564.3

3600--Research, Development, e:etand Evaluation

Necessary research, development, andtesting of the systems before procurement. a/74.9

3010--Aircraft Procurement

Procurement cf electronic equipment "pods,"which are attached to aircraft trainingwith the air combat maneuvering instrumen-tation (ACMI) system. a/20.0

3300--Military Construction

Site preparation, rad construction, andbuilding modifications required by theprogram. a/5.9

3400--Operations and Maintenance

Day-to-day costs of operating andmaintaining equipment, excludingmilitary personnel costs. a/23.3

3500--Military Personnel

Pay and allowances for the militarypersonnel required by this program. a/ 5.4

Total $693.8

a/Does not include estimated amounts that may be needed bythe Strategic Air Command and the Air Defense Command.

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As the table shows, when all aspects of this program areconsidered, the total cost for the 5-year period ending fiscalyear 1983 probably is almost $700 million.

COMPATIBILITY OF GROUND THREATSIMULATORS WITH AIRBORNE EQUIPMENT

As mentioned in chapter 1, the effectiveness of aircrewtraining depends not only on the signals generated by thethreat simulators, bu- also on the equipment in the aircraft.If the radar warning eceivers do not alert the aircrews,no amount of threat simulation can be effective. Furthermore,if the signal is received and the aircrew has no electroniccountermeasure to use against the threat, the value of threatsimulators is also degraded. Therefore, the acquisition ofcompatible simulators, receivers, and countermeasureequipment is important.

A prior GAO report 1/ and a set of Air Force briefingcharts on the status of equipment installed on some opera-tional aircraft suggests that all threat signals cannotbe received. There are some signals that our radar warningreceivers should b able to receive, but the capability hasyet to be demonstrated in actual operations. To demonstratethis capability, ground threat simulators are needed. Thesame is true for certain types of countermeasure equipment.While modifications are being made on radar warning receivers,the Air Force has not yet fully solved the problem of modify-ing all of its electronic countermeasure equipment to makethem fully effective. Therefore, there is a degree ofrisk that the modifications may not be successful.

1/"Review of Tactical Air Defense Suppression Programs,"(SECRET), PSAD-77-81, March 3, 1977.

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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

CONCLUSIONS

We do not question the overall need for improving AirForce operational ranges, which includes threat simulatorsand related equipment, and the attempt to achieve greaterrealism in training aircrews. Such training hould increasethe aircrew's chances of survival in actual rca!,at. We be-lieve, however, the Air Force can improve th. i formationit presents to congressional decisionmakers i,, must acton appropriations requested for this program. We believethat a comprehensive explanation should be provided show-ing--as clearly as possible--all the related costs andplans for utilization cf the facilities.

In the case of the threat simulators and related equip-ment, much more is involved han just the procurement ofspecific pieces of equipment. Air Force documents indicatea 5-year total program cost estimated at $94 million. Be-cause the Air Force followed the traditional budget approachwhich tends to fragment the program into segments financedby multiple appropriations, its presentation to the Committeeon Appropriations may not have focused attention on themagnitude of the total program.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force, inpresenting future fund requests for operational range im-provements--which inLlude electronic warfare threat simula-tors and related equipment--give congressional decisionmakersa comprehensive picture of what the moneys are for, why theyare needed, and how they ere to be spent.

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APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

LIST OF RELATED GAO REPORTS

"GAO Staff Study on the Continental Operations Range,"February 1975

"Review of Tactical Air Defense Suppression Programs,"(SECRET), PSAD-77-81, March 3, 1977

"Mission Budgeting: Discussion and Illustration of theConcept in Research and Development Programs,"PSAD-77-124, July 27, 1977

(950425)

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