THE RELAXATION OF RULES IN DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BASED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY SC relaxes rules on psychological incapacity as ground to annul marriages, says thenews title in a popular newspaper. While the news article does not mention the title of thecase, its clearly abundant that it refers to the 2015 case of Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma.Elena Fernandez (G.R. No. 166357, 14 January 2015). Did the Supreme Court, in thecase of Kalaw, relax the rules on petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage based onpsychological incapacity? Lets discuss this question and, at the same time, highlight tenmatters that may be of interest to those seeking answers.1. The rules provided in Molina remain validPractitioners refer to the guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36 asthe Molina Doctrine, considering that the set of guidelines were frst compiled in the1997 case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina (G.R. No.108763). There are eight guidelines: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of themarriage belongs to the plaintif. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existenceand continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity; (2) The root causeof the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identifed, alleged in thecomplaint, sufciently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) Theincapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of themarriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanentor incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of theparty to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The essential maritalobligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code asregards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code inregard to parents and their children; (7) Interpretations given by the National AppellateMatrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling ordecisive, should be given great respect by our courts; and, (8) The trial court must orderthe prosecuting attorney or fscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for thestate.In Kalaw, the Supreme Court reiterated its categorical statement, made in a 2009 case,that we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. The set ofguidelines in Molina, therefore, stays.The pronouncement in Kalaw that is closest to relaxation of the guidelines is itsreiteration that the foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that theirapplication to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullityto the fate of certain rejection. There is no doubt that the Molina Doctrine is strict, butthere is also no doubt that countless petitions have been granted pursuant to itsguidelines.The Court did not relax the rules when it reconsidered the Kalaw ruling. On the contrary,the ruling falls under the ambit of the Molina guidelines. The frst time the Supreme Courtdecided Kalaw in 2011, with Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo as the ponente, the Courtdismissed the petition for insufciency of evidence. There was no sufcient evidence toprove the alleged acts of the respondent wife constant mahjong sessions, visits to thebeauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. While it wasshown that the respondent-wife played mahjong (bringing the kids with her), thepetitioner-husband failed to show the FREQUENCY of the mahjong sessions. There is noproof that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family.In other words, the allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of theconclusions of his experts, were not actually proven.In 2015, with Justice Lucas Bersamin as ponente, the Supreme Court reconsidered itsearlier decision. The Supreme Court, lest it be misunderstood, explicitly stated that itsnot abandoning Molina. The Court, bound by the same set of proven facts, clarifed thatthe failure to show the frequency of mahjong sessions does not preclude a fnding ofpsychological incapacity. Its not the FREQUENCY of the mahjong sessions; its the factthat the respondent-wife should have known that bringing her children along her childrenof very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gamblingand other vices that would erode their moral fber. This, based on the totality of facts inthe case, supports the fnding of psychological incapacity. This ruling is very muchconsistent with the Molina Doctrine. There is no relaxation of the rules in this respect.The label that the Court relaxed the rules is most likely derived from the Courtsstatement that the rules set forth in Molina are rigid. This is bolstered by the apparentexpression of regret, also reiterated in Kalaw, that in hindsight, it may have beeninappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolvingall cases of psychological incapacity. In my opinion, and as discussed below, the termrigid should not be understood along the lines of relaxed as an antonym.2. Expert testimony is decisiveIf theres anything in Kalaw that can be construed as a relaxation or departure fromthe Molina Doctrine, its the rule on expert witnesses. Guideline No. 2 in Molina providesthat the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinicallyidentifed, alleged in the complaint, sufciently proven by experts and clearly explained inthe decision. However, it has been established in previous cases that expert testimony isnot a requisite in psychological incapacity cases. In other words, the absence of anexpert witness does not automatically result to a denial of the petition. In a number ofcases, including the case of Mendoza vs. Republic (G.R. No. 157649, 12 November2012), the Supreme Court had the occasion to state that the expert opinions ofpsychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of petitions for declarationof nullity of marriage, although the Court added that the actual medical examinationwas to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to supporta fnding of his psychological incapacity. The requirement of the totality of evidence isalso not new, having been discussed in similar cases prior to Kalaw.Going back to the value of expert testimonies, the Supreme Court in Kalaw restated therule that in the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a groundfor the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise inthe feld of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to informthemselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent andjudicious judgment. There is no relaxation of the rules in this respect.Incidentally, in one of our cases, the judge noted that it is for the court not thepsychologist to conclude that one or both parties is/are psychologically incapacitated.Indeed, the existence of psychological incapacity is a legal conclusion, which is within theexclusive province of the court, but this does not preclude the expert witness fromexpressing a similar opinion, pointing to the exact condition or personality disorder ofthe spouse/s.3. The psychologist need not personally examine the incapacitated spouseThe usual objection raised against the testimony of the expert witness, especially whenthe services of the expert witness has been obtained by the petitioner-spouse and thereis a conclusion that the respondent-spouse is psychologically incapacitated, is the usualinability of the psychologist to examine or interview the respondent spouse. In Kalaw, theSupreme Court reiterated the rule that the lack of personal examination and interview ofthe person diagnosed with personality disorderdid not per se invalidate the fndings ofthe experts. There is no relaxation of the rules in this respect.The opinion of the expert opinion should not be lightly brushed aside in the presence ofthe totality of evidence in the case. This is the reason why, in the cases we arehandling, we require the client to present other witnesses to corroborate the clientstestimony on the facts which constitute the basis for the fnding of the personality disorderand, ultimately, psychological incapacity. While clients initially complain about thepresentation of other witnesses, we make it a point to carefully explain that this is neededto avoid an outright denial of the petition.4. Article 36 is patterned after Church doctrinesIt has been said that the Philippines is the only country in the whole world that does nothave divorce. This, of course, did not deter the Ofce of the Solicitor General (OSG) tomake, in the language of the Supreme Court, an exaggeration in Molina that Article 36is the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. In Kalaw, the Supreme Court notedthat it was sensitive to the exaggeration of the OSG when it enunciated the rigid rulesin Molina. The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on peoplewho have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personalityanomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families,our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina hasbecome a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to ft into and be bound by it. Wittingly orunwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosedsociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuouslydebase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulledmarriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.Article 36 is patterned after Church rules. As noted in Molina: Since the purpose ofincluding such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with thereligious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, greatpersuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also bedecreed civilly void.5. Article 36 protects the familyThe frst guideline under Molina provides that any doubt should be resolved in favor ofthe existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.Marriage is protected under the Constitution and existing laws. In case of DOUBT inpetitions for nullity cases, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.In other words, the petition must be examined strictly in favor of the validity of marriage. Ifthe issue can be resolved both ways for or against declaration of nullity the issuemust be resolved in favor of marriage, which means that petition must be dismissed.This Constitutional protection of marriage, however, does not apply to void marriages. Asreiterated by the Supreme Court in Kalaw, Article 36 protects the institution of marriage the fulfllment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as aninviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legalexistence.Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by apsychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement ofthis constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promotingmarriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of thenation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not furtherthe initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlockamong persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated tounderstand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.Heres the dilemma that I see: the determination whether the marriage is void (in whichcase it loses any protection under the Constitution) is done at the latter part of the trial(the decision), while the application of the presumption of the validity of marriage (as wellas the strict interpretation in favor of validity) exists at the time of fling of the very samepetition.In my opinion, there is no inconsistency, and there is no relaxation of the rules. Apresumption can always be overturned by contrary evidence. Once contrary evidence isadmitted and the marriage is declared void, then the presumption loses any value and themarriage cease to be constitutionally protected. Under this scenario, it does not help tobe saddled with presumptions (or assumptions, predilections or generalizations) at thestart of the petition. The task is to examine the evidence and look at the totality of thecase. In the words of the Supreme Court, we reiterate once more the principle that eachcase must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections orgeneralizations but according to its own facts. There should be no rigid applicationof Molina and Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally readand applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of lessspecifcity obviously to enable some resiliency in its application.6. Article 36 has no defnitionPsychological incapacity is characterized as as a ground for the nullity of marriage underArticle 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness aficting a partyeven prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party ofthe awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she wasabout to assume.However, the Family Code has not defned the term psychological incapacity. Thecommittee that drafted the Family Code decided to adopt a provision with less specifcitythan expected in order to have the law allow some resiliency in its application. Theintent of the commitee is to give courts sufcient leeway to interpret the provision on acase-to-case basis, guided by experience, the fndings of experts and researchers inpsychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive efectby virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.The intended resiliency of Article 36 had, somehow, been rendered inefectual by theimposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, yet the Supreme Court still maintainsthat it is not abandoning Molina.7. One or both spouses can be psychologically incapacitatedIn the Kalaw case, the petitioner-husband alleges that the respondent-wife ispsychologically incapacitated. The wife, in her answer, denies her psychologicalincapacity and alleges that the husband is the one psychologically incapacitated. Bothspouses presented expert witnesses to support each others allegation that the otherspouse is psychologically incapacitated.In the original Kalaw case, the Court focused solely on the psychological incapacity of thewife, concluding that there was insufcient evidence; the Court did not discuss theincapacity of the husband. This appears to be consistent with the frst guidelinein Molina the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to theplaintif.In the reconsidered Kalaw case, the Court declared BOTH spouses as psychologicallyincapacitated. While it can be argued that this is a deviation, or relaxation, of the rulethat was followed in the original Kalaw case, there is no basis for such argument.As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of psychological incapacity is with thepetitioner. This is based on the basic rule that he who alleges must prove the allegation.This basic rule, stated in another manner, simply means that the person who allegespsychological incapacity must prove such psychological incapacity.Under the circumstances, the court has three options: (a) declare the WIFE aspsychologically incapacitated; (b) declare the HUSBAND as psychologicallyincapacitated; or (c) declare BOTH spouses as psychologically incapacitated. It doesntmatter who raised the allegation of psychological incapacity. In the words of the SupremeCourt in the reconsidered decision: The courts are justifed in declaring a marriage nulland void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner orthe respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as theimputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist inone party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both isestablished, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.As far as remarriage is concerned, it doesnt really matter who between the spouses ispsychologically incapacitated there is absolutely no prohibition for the psychologicallyincapacitated spouse to marry again.Lets consider a number of scenarios. What if, in another case, the husband alleges thatthe wife is psychologically incapacitated and the wife simply denies such allegation,without replying that the husband is the one psychologically incapacitated? What if thehusband alleges that wife is psychologically incapacitated and the wife fails to answer? If,for one reason or another, evidence shows that there is no basis for fnding that the wifeis psychologically incapacitated, but sufcient evidence exists to support a fnding ofpsychological incapacity on the part of the husband, can the court still declare theexistence of the psychological incapacity, albeit on the part of the husband?8. Trial court decision is bindingIn the original Kalaw case, the Supreme Court concluded that there is no factual basisfor the conclusion of psychological incapacityThe trial courts Decision merelysummarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it didnot actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, andthe weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual fndings which can serveas bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.In reconsidering its earlier decision in Kalaw, the Supreme Court cited the general rulethat fndings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of apartys psychological incapacity should be fnal and binding for as long as such fndingsand evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to beclearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation where the fndings of the trial courtare sufciently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellatecourt should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment.9. There are sufcient safeguards to protect marriageWithout a divorce law, and with the perceived relaxation of the rules on petitions fordeclaration of nullity, its normal to be apprehensive about the deluge of cases that willchoke court dockets. This possible onslaught might also be interpreted as an attack onthe institution of marriage.In EACH and EVERY petition for annulment or declaration of nullity, the State (throughthe OSG and the public prosecutors) is mandated by law to participate and ensure thatthe institution of marriage is amply protected. According to the Supreme Court, it neednot worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there areample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State,through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/orfabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number ofcases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.10. Other perspectives for Article 36The Supreme Court took pains to stress in Kalaw, again pointing to an earlier case, that itis not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. It is not accurate to say thatthe Supreme Court relaxed the psychological incapacity guidelines in Kalaw. Mattersthat can be interpreted in Kalaw as a relaxation of the rules have been taken up inprevious cases. Kalaw simply reiterates those principles.What the Supreme Court again pointed out in Kalaw is the need to emphasize otherperspectives that should guide courts in dealing with petitions for declaration of nullityunder Article 36 of the Family Code.What are the other perspectives? The Supreme Court noted that Article 36 casesshould not be decided based on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizationsand emphasized that courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;guided by experience, the fndings of experts and researchers in psychologicaldisciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.This, in my opinion, means that other perspectives can run parallel tothe Molina guidelines. In other words, the Molina Doctrine is not the be-all and end-all ofArticle 36 interpretation. The intention not to defne Article 36 simply means that theprovision should not be static; it is intended to be a living provision, with courts guidedby experience, the fndings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, andby decisions of church tribunals.Casesthat dont fall squarelyunderthe Molina guidelinesshouldnot bedismissedoutright. Arigid interpretation of Molina means that petitions must be strictlyconstrued in favor of the validity of marriage and any deviation from the guidelines,no matter how reasonable, must lead to the dismissal of the petition. But it should beremembered that a void marriage enoys no protection andnot entitled to anypresumptionof regularity, which means thatevenif a particular case doesnotfallsquarelyunder the Molina principles, thecourt must still e!amine thetotalityofevidenceandmust applyother perspectives."his way, diagnosedsociopaths,schi#ophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists andthe li$e will not beallowedtocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.