Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00002766

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT TF 94584

ON A

NILE BASIN TRUST FUND GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$7.00 MILLION

TO THE

EASTERN NILE TECHNICAL REGIONAL OFFICE

FOR A

EASTERN NILE FIRST JOINT MULTIPURPOSE PROGRAM IDENTIFICATION

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT

November 27, 2013

AFTN2 Africa Regional Integration Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 22, 2009)

Currency Unit = Ethiopian Birr 11.34 Birr = US$ 1 0.09 US$ = 1 Birr

FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAS Country Assistance Strategy EN Eastern Nile ENSAP Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program ENTRO Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office ENSAPT Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program Team ENCOM Eastern Nile Council of Ministers ENPM Eastern Nile Planning Model IO Intermediate Outcome JMP Joint Multipurpose Program JMP1 ID First Joint Multipurpose Program Identification JV Joint Venture NBI Nile Basin Initiative NBTF Nile Basin Trust Fund NRGs National Reference Groups OSI PAD PDO PoIR RTC

One System Inventory (for Eastern Nile) Project Appraisal Document Project Development Objective Panel of Independent Reviewers Regional Technical Committee

SBA Strategic Basin Assessment SSEA Strategic Social and Environmental Assessment

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Colin Bruce Sector Manager: Jonathan Kamkwalala Project Team Leader: Eileen Rose Burke ICR Team Leader: Eileen Rose Burke

EASTERN NILE TECHNICAL REGIONAL OFFICE

Eastern Nile First Joint Multipurpose Program Identification

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

0. Preface 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 3. Assessment of Outcomes 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 6. Lessons Learned 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Annex 2. Outputs by Component Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Result Annex 6. Summary of Borrower's ICR Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

MAP

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A. Basic Information

Country: Africa Project Name: Eastern Nile First Joint Multipurpose Program Identification (JMP1 ID)

Project ID: P116595 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-94584

ICR Date: 05/15/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: TAL Grantee: NILE BASIN INITIATIVE

Original Total Commitment:

USD 7.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 2.874 M

Revised Amount: USD 7.00M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO)

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: N/A

4.1 B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 04/13/2009 Effectiveness: 09/09/2009

Appraisal: 06/25/2009 Restructuring(s): 09/30/2011

Approval: 07/01/2009 Mid-term Review: 11/15/2010 10/20/2010

Closing: 09/30/2011 12/31/2012

4.2 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Low

Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Grantee Performance: Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Unsatisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Moderately Unsatisfactory Overall Borrower Performance:

Unsatisfactory

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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments (if any)

Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately Unsatisfactory

4.3 D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 40 40

Irrigation and drainage 30 30

Power 30 30

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Regional integration 33 33

Water resource management 67 67

4.4 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili

Country Director: Colin Bruce Richard G. Scobey

Sector Manager: Jonathan S. Kamkwalala Ashok K. Subramanian

Project Team Leader: Eileen Rose Burke Xiaokai Li

ICR Team Leader: Eileen Rose Burke

ICR Primary Author: Halla Maher Qaddumi

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F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objective: The project development objective was “to assist the three Eastern Nile countries in identification of the JMP1 investment package, through a series of studies and consultative activities that take into account economic, social and environmental sustainability issues in an integrated manner.” Revised Project Development Objective:

The revised project development objective was “to assist the three Eastern Nile countries in examining joint water resources development possibilities on the Abbay/Blue and Main-stem Nile, taking economic, social and environmental sustainability issues into account in an integrated manner.” (a) PDO Indicator(s) ─ from Project Appraisal Document (Indicators entered from the ISR) Baseline Values from Project Outcome Indicators/Date of Value (from approval documents)

Baseline Value Original Target Values

(from approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Values Achieved

at Completion or Target Years

PDO Indicator 1: Original: The SSEA provides a sound basis for the inclusion of social and environmental considerations in the selection of projects within the JMP program Revised: The SSEA provides a sound basis for understanding social and environmental considerations in projects within the potential JMP program

Value (quantitative or

Qualitative)

None

SSEA Stage 2 concluded successfully (and final report disclosed)

SSEA Stage 2 completed and endorsed by Panel of Independent Reviewers (PoIR)

SSEA Cancelled. Working Paper assessing social and environmental issues at a scoping level in draft form

Date achieved 9/09/2009 09/30/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2012

Comments (incl. %

achievement)

The SSEA had to be cancelled due to lack of progress on SSEA Stage 1, contracting issues, and a freeze in participation of two Eastern Nile governments.

PDO Indicator 2: Eastern Nile governments have an improved knowledge base to sustainably develop and manage the resources of the Blue and Main-stem Nile

Value (quantitative or

Qualitative)

None

Consultation and communications carried out on SSEA Stage 2 and Cascade Development Sequencing Study and Non-Anchor Studies conducted per Strategy/Plan

Final Study completed and reports disseminated

Draft tools and Working Papers 1 and 2 in draft form, but not formally consulted with governments

Date achieved 06/24/2009 09/30/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2012

Comments (incl. %

achievement)

ENTRO was unable to hold planned stakeholder consultations on Draft Working Papers 1 and 2, or the Roadmap before project closure due to complicated hydropolitics among the three Eastern Nile countries

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PDO Indicator 3: Original: The first set of coordinated investments is identified at the end of the project Revised: A roadmap for a coordinated set of investments is identified at the end of the project

Value (quantitative or

Qualitative)

None

Final Reports of Anchor Project definition and non-anchor project identification accepted by EN countries (ENCOM)

Roadmap completed Roadmap of further studies and analysis is in draft form

Date achieved 06/24/2009 09/30/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2012

Comments (incl. %

achievement)

The draft roadmap outlines the critical issues, information gaps and analysis that would need to be undertaken to promote sustainable development of the Abbay/Blue and mainstem Nile, but has not been formally consulted with the countries.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) - from Project Appraisal Document Baseline Values from Project Outcome Indicators/Date of Value (from approval documents)

Baseline Value Original Target Values

(from approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Values Achieved

at Completion or Target Years

IO Indicator 1: Original: A participatory strategic social and environmental assessment of water resources development alternatives in the Blue-Main Nile Revised: Strategic Social and Environmental Assessment (SSEA) of water resources development alternatives in the Abbay/Blue and Mainstem Nile

Value (quantitative or

Qualitative)

None

SSEA Stage 2 report completed and stakeholder’s comments incorporated

SSEA Stage 2 report completed and stakeholders comments incorporated [unrevised]

SSEA Cancelled. Working Paper assessing social and environmental issues at a scoping level in draft form

Date achieved 9/9/2009 09/30/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2012

Comments (incl. %

achievement)

The SSEA had to be cancelled due to lack of progress on SSEA Stage 1, contracting issues, and a freeze in participation of two Eastern Nile governments. ENTRO was unable to hold planned stakeholder consultations on the Draft Working Papers before project closure.

IO Indicator 2: Original: Identification of a regional Anchor Project, taking into account economic, social and environment considerations, including reservoir filling and operating rule studies to optimize system benefits and best manage related risks Revised: Study of the potential Anchor Project and subsequent cascade development, taking into account economic, social and environment considerations, including reservoir filling and operating rule studies to optimize system benefits and best manage related risks

Value (quantitative or

Qualitative)

None

Cascade Development Sequence determined and Anchor Project defined

Cascade Development Assessment and Sequencing Study completed

Cascade Development Assessment and Sequencing Study cancelled. Draft Working Paper 2 includes early

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analysis of possible anchor project and cascade development

Date achieved 06/24/2009 09/30/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2012

Comments (incl. %

achievement)

Lack of progress on SSEA 1 and delayed initiation of Cascade Development Assessment and Sequencing Study under original terms of reference delayed progress. Changes in national development plans necessitated modifications to the original study design. Additionally, a temporary suspension was instituted by the World Bank on one of the firms in the Joint Venture contracted to undertake the main study ("the JV"), for reasons unrelated to the project. This led to the development and implementation of an “alternate plan” that included Working Paper 2. ENTRO was not able to hold planned stakeholder consultations on the Draft Working Papers before project closure, nor was it fully able to address comments from the Panel of Independent Reviewers on Working Paper 2.

IO Indicator 3: Identification of potential nationally-implemented JMP1 Non-Anchor Projects, including irrigation modernization & development and watershed management centered on agricultural productivity and livelihoods improvement and watershed sustainability as well as floodplain management

Value (quantitative or

Qualitative)

None

All non-anchor investment study reports completed and discussed with key stakeholders

Not applicable – target values not revised

Reports not completed or discussed with key stakeholders

Date achieved 06/24/2009 09/31/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2012

Comments (incl. %

achievement)

It was not possible for ENTRO to undertake these studies due to lack of participation by the Eastern Nile governments, as well as inability to continue under an amended contract with the JV due to temporary suspension of one of the firms in the JV by World Bank.

IO Indicator 4: A well-conceived stakeholder involvement and communication program

Value (quantitative or

Qualitative)

None

The program fully implemented with good results

Program implemented as per Stakeholder Involvement and Communication Strategy Implementation Plan (SICAS-IP)

SICAS created, revised and updated. Final planned consultations with governments were not held. Outreach events with universities, etc. were held.

Date achieved 06/24/2009 09/31/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2012

Comments (incl. %

achievement)

Final consultations could not be held as planned due to political circumstances (refer above), including the freeze of some countries in participation in ENTRO (for reasons outside the scope of this project). An outreach event with universities was held in February 2013.

IO Indicator 5: Original: Capacity of ENTRO and related agencies in the three countries for preparation of JMP1 investment projects and other work related to their mandates Revised: Number of opportunities for capacity building for ENTRO and related agencies in the three countries

Value (quantitative or

Qualitative)

None

Core social/environmental staff (2 from ENTRO and three countries) trained on environmental/social assessment and

Four additional training offered

A total of six trainings for 164 participants were given, in addition to extensive training for the three JMP Visiting

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management planning Professionals.

Date achieved 06/24/2009 09/31/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2012

Comments (incl. %

achievement)

100% achievement.

IO Indicator 6: Original: A roadmap for preparation of the first set of JMP investment projects Revised: A roadmap for advancing investment and addressing critical issues for sustainable water resources development and management in the Abbay/Blue and Mainstem Nile

Value (quantitative or

Qualitative)

None

Roadmap development and endorsed by ENCOM

Roadmap completed Draft roadmap developed

Date achieved 06/24/2009 09/31/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2012

Comments (incl. %

achievement)

The draft roadmap outlines the critical issues, information gaps and analysis that would need to be undertaken to promote sustainable development of the Abbay/Blue and mainstem Nile, but it has not been consulted with the countries.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual Disbursements

(USD millions) 1 03/14/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.17 2 12/20/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.94 3 09/28/2011 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 2.23 4 05/27/2012 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 2.71 5 01/08/2013 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 3.03

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

09/30/2011 Y MU MU 2.23

The project was restructured, both to adapt to changing external circumstances and to correct implementation issues. As stated in the Restructuring Paper, restructuring consisted of: (i) extension of grant closing date from September 30, 2011 to December 31, 2012; (ii) revision of PDO and Results Framework to reflect recent changes in Ethiopia’s plans for hydropower development in the Abbay/Blue Nile; (iii) revisions to project component costs; (iv) adjustments to grant expenditure categories; and (v)

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Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

additional measures to reduce the risk of project delays and to enhance the quality of project outputs. Refer section 1.2 for further details.

If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving body) enter ratings below: Outcome Ratings Against Original PDO/Targets Unsatisfactory Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets Moderately Unsatisfactory Overall (weighted) rating Unsatisfactory

4.5 I. Disbursement Profile

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0. Preface: Coordinated Programmatic Support for the Nile 0.1. Introduction The project evaluated in this Implementation Completion and Results report (ICR) is one of 29 projects funded by the Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF), which are all part of a much larger programmatic approach to support Nile cooperation. Because of the complementary and strategic nature of the projects, it would be incomplete to either evaluate the individual projects in isolation of the overall programmatic framework or fail to look at the role each NBTF project played in building Nile cooperation. This preface provides an overview of the coordinated partner support to the Nile countries through and in coordination with the NBTF, to provide background and context for the individual project ICR that follows.

The NBTF was created to support a trend of increasing cooperation in the Nile region. In 1995, the Nile governments established the Nile Council of Ministers of Water Resources (Nile-COM) and designed the Nile River Basin Action Plan, identifying 22 technical assistance projects which aimed to address economic development and equitable use of the Nile waters. In 1999, the Nile-COM adopted a long-term Shared Vision: to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through equitable utilization of and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources. More specifically, Nile Ministers adopted policy guidelines, “to develop the water resources of the Nile Basin in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity, security and peace for all its people; to ensure efficient water management and the optimal use of the resources; to ensure cooperation and joint action between the Nile Basin countries; to target poverty eradication and promote economic integration; and to ensure that the program results in a move from planning to action.”

In order to advance these policy guidelines, the Nile-COM endorsed cooperation built around a Strategic Action Program with two complementary concepts: the need to enable a common basis to achieve the Shared Vision for the Nile Basin and the need to advance projects that benefited “the people and particularly the poor and disadvantaged in the Nile Basin.” As a result, Nile-COM endorsed two programs: the Shared Vision Program (SVP) and the Subsidiary Action Program (see Figure 1). First, the Shared Vision Program was designed to build trust, confidence, and an enabling environment for the sustainable and equitable use of the Nile resources among water professionals and the public. Second, as articulated by Nile-COM, “a shared vision can only be legitimized by action on the ground,” the Subsidiary Action Program (SAP), one for

the Eastern Nile and one for the Equatorial Lakes, which focused on investment projects that addressed agricultural needs, environmental risks, energy, and river management. To implement these programs, the following year the Nile-COM ministers agreed to establish the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) as a transitional institutional arrangement. At establishment, NBI’s member states were Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda with Eritrea holding observer status. Membership is now ten countries with South Sudan joining in July 2012.

Figure 1. Complementary Design of Early Nile Programs

Shared Vision

Action on the Ground

Shared Vision Program

Subsidiary Action Program

2

In 2001, the Nile Basin governments and international development partners convened for the International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile (ICCON) in Geneva to discuss the Nile Shared Vision and the proposed programs, pledging US$140 million for their implementation. Based on the interest expressed by the Nile-COM and partners at ICCON, a multi-donor funding mechanism, the Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF), was established at the World Bank in 2003 with a consortium of ten international donors1 to support the countries in their pursuit of the Shared Vision. Several donors also supported the NBI directly in coordination with the NBTF. With this considerable partnership, overall financial support to NBI has far exceeded the ICCON pledges.

Over the ten years, the NBTF supported twenty-eight completed NBI projects as part of the Shared Vision and Subsidiary Action Programs, and an Institutional Strengthening Project. The last set of projects closed at the end of 2012 (Table 1). To enable full disbursement of NBTF funds in support of NBI, partners to the NBTF agreed a two year extension of the fund until June 2015. An additional project, the Nile Cooperation for Results (NCORE) Project, was therefore approved in December 2012. The NCORE project is co-financed by the new Cooperation in International Waters in Africa (CIWA) Trust Fund managed by the World Bank. 0.2. NBTF Achievements to Date The NBTF supported the Nile countries to establish the NBI as a transitional institutional mechanism. The NBI is the only regional water organization for all Nile Basin countries, aiming to

operate as a catalyst for integrated growth, investment and risk management to achieve the Shared Vision. To carry out the Shared Vision and Subsidiary Action Programs, the three NBI Centers were formed; the NBI Secretariat in Entebbe, Uganda and two Subsidiary Action Program offices, the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program – Coordination Unit in Kigali, Rwanda (Figure 2). The governance structure is aligned with the basin-wide/sub-basin structure of the Nile Basin Initiative, (Figure 3). A Nile Council of Ministers and a Technical Advisory Committee (Nile-

1 Contributors to the NBTF are: Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and the World Bank. Partners providing bilateral financing include Germany, Sweden, and the African Development Bank. The United Nations Development Program and the United States are active in the development partnership and support efforts to increase Nile cooperation outside but in coordination with the NBTF partnership.

Figure 2. NBI Centers

3

TAC) guides the basin-wide work of the NBI Secretariat (Nile-SEC). At the level of the Eastern Nile sub-basin, an Eastern Nile Council of Ministers (EN-COM) and an Eastern Nile Strategic Action Program Technical Committee (ENSAPT) provide governance oversight. In the Nile Equatorial Lakes sub-basin, the Nile Equatorial Lakes Council of Ministers (NEL-COM) and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Technical Advisory Committee (NEL-TAC) provide governance services. Through the ten projects under the Shared Vision Program (SVP), the NBI has improved collaboration within the Basin. The US$87 million Shared Vision Program was designed to build trust, strengthen capacity, and advance the enabling environment for investment in the Nile Basin. The program created networks and partnerships that brought people together across the Basin countries in various water-related sectors. According to a 2008 opinion poll,2 the program created measurably greater levels of trust among such stakeholder categories as lawyers, media professionals and women leaders. Through work on joint projects on a range of critical issues, the SVP advanced a shared understanding of the need for regional engagement between the countries, including in water resource management, environment, wetlands, and regional power trade. The projects yielded a more organized knowledge base, a Decision Support System (DSS) and other tools to better understand, model and analyze the basin, an inventory of wetlands, plans for watershed management and regional power generation and transmission, studies of agricultural productivity and opportunities for water savings, and trained over 2,000 professionals.

Figure 3. NBI Governance Structure

The Shared Vision Program provided platforms to bring country officials together at the policy and the technical level. Based on these platforms, technical cooperation was strengthened thereby helping basin-wide processes and practices to be shared and consolidated. By establishing and managing a shared institution, and by collaborating on development projects and risk-management strategies, the Nile Basin countries established common principles, without which long-term cooperation would be difficult. Various project teams are in continuing contact across countries, through other NBI projects, or other initiatives. The NBI is also establishing an

2 Opinion Research with Key Stakeholders conducted by the NBI, 2008. For more information, see World Bank report number “ICR 1493 – AFR,” Annex 3.

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integrated policy environment, including a suite of policies called the Nile Basin Sustainability Framework.

The NBI centers have improved the collation, analysis, and access to information relating to the Nile basin, including a procedures and norms for date and information sharing and exchange. The NBI has helped foster greater exchange not only on the river itself but on energy, agriculture and trade opportunities. NBI is a platform that can be used as a mechanism to notify each other of certain planned development projects using Nile waters.

Given its programmatic nature, the Shared Vision Program was reviewed by the World Bank in a Programmatic Implementation Completion and Results Report in June 20103. The report reviewed the achievements of the seven thematic projects as well as the umbrella coordination project (Table 1). The Programmatic ICR found that the Outcomes, Bank performance and Grantee Performance were all moderately satisfactory, with the risk to development outcomes being rated as substantial. While the outputs of many of the SVP projects were mainstreamed into other on-going initiatives, two SVP projects implemented second phases; the Regional Power Trade Project which produced a Comprehensive Basin-wide Study of Power Development Options and Trade Opportunities: Proposed Development Options, Strategies and Investment Arrangements; and the Water Resources Planning and Management Project extended the closing date until December 31, 2012 to complete the Nile Basin Decision Support System - this second phase of support has been reviewed in a new ICR.4

The Subsidiary Action Program helped identify and prepare investments of transboundary significance to improve the livelihoods of the basin’s neediest populations and promote sustainable growth through improved watershed management, flood preparedness, agricultural improvement, power generation, and transmission. It also helped facilitate agreement among countries to move some investments forward – such as the regional Rusumo Falls Hydroelectric Project that is expected to make a significant contribution to access to power in Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania. The NBI facilitated US$919 million of investment projects currently under implementation, with a further US$1.584 billion under preparation (Table 2). In addition, the Subsidiary Action Program has helped the countries to consolidate their knowledge of the sub-basins and develop new tools and applications to help better identify and plan investments of regional significance. ENTRO and NELSAP-CU have provided studies and analysis to their member governments to improve planning and implementation of regional sustainable development projects. The NBI issues regional flood bulletins with hydrological forecasts for the Eastern Nile to assist national, regional and community authorities in predicting floods. University networks, especially in the Eastern Nile, have been strengthened through collaborative studies, internship programs, and workshops.

3 World Bank report number “ICR 1493 – AFR”. 4 World Bank report number “ICR00002770”.

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Implementation Completion and Results reports have been prepared for three Subsidiary Action Program Projects that closed in December, 2012, including the Regional Agricultural Trade and Productivity Project5, the Eastern Nile Planning Model Project6, and the Eastern Nile First Joint Multipurpose Program Identification Project.7 The results of these individual projects can be found in the individual ICRs.

The Institutional Strengthening Project (ISP) aimed to support the Nile Basin Initiative to strengthening the foundation for institutional sustainability, to enhance capacity, to

harmonize corporate management, as well as to consolidate the gains of the SVP and SAPs. The project started in 2008 and closed in December 2012. Through ISP, the NBI clarified its core functions developed a five year Strategic Plan and a Financing Strategy to advance its sustainability. As a result of this work, the Nile governments committed to incrementally increase their direct financial contributions to the NBI to cover the core costs of the institution by 2017 (FY2018). The NBI has also developed a suite of Strategic Plans for each Center and a consolidated concept note of projects for 2013 – 2017 which was presented to development partners in November 2011. The overarching Strategic Plan, (Figure 4) shows how the NBI’s current work expands its original programmatic structure including the Shared Vision and Subsidiary Action Programs.

As part of implementing the new Strategic Plan and building on other projects, the NBI prepared the Nile Cooperation for Results (NCORE) Project. This project is supporting NBI activities in its three core functions of facilitating cooperation, water resource management, and water resource development.

The support provided through the ISP enabled results to be achieved across the NBI, including the twenty-one other SVP and SAP projects that were undertaken by the NBI during ISP implementation, as well as the subsequent work that was enabled by the ISP project. While a stand-alone ICR for the ISP project has been produced8, the breadth of the ISP results can only truly be assessed when looking at the successes and lessons of the other NBI efforts as well. 0.3. Other Programmatic Evaluations. Given the historic nature of the approach of the Nile Ministers, as well as the lessons that can be learned for future transboundary efforts, the World Bank and the Development Partners have 5 World Bank report number -- “ICR00002447”. 6 World Bank report number -- “ICR00002631”. 7 World Bank report number -- “ICR00002766”. 8 World Bank report number -- “ICR00002573”.

Figure 4. NBI Strategic Plan 2013-2017

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recently commissioned an Independent Evaluation of the Nile Basin Trust Fund. While the Independent Evaluation is still being finalized, it assessed that the NBTF was a highly appropriate mechanism for funding the NBI’s Strategic Action Program, and that the portfolio of projects was relevant to the objectives of the NBI. It also highlighted areas needing further strengthening including sustainability and communications. The lessons learned from the Independent Evaluation provide a valuable complement to the project level findings and lessons of the individual project ICRs. 0.4. Political Aspects

In parallel to the technical activities being undertaken through the NBI, and outside the support provided by the Nile Basin Trust Fund, the Nile governments undertook negotiations on the text of a water agreement on the Nile, the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). Disagreements over the text of the document and the process by which the document was opened for signature have affected the work of the NBI, with two countries originally freezing participation in NBI regional activities pending the clarification of several aspects of the disagreement. While the evolving political situation has lessened the impact of some of the technical support activities undertaken by the NBI, the NBI has continued to advance cooperation and provide technical assistance that assists the Nile Basin countries to better assess transboundary issues, with a view to fostering closer collaboration ahead.

0.5. Conclusion International experience has demonstrated that building cooperation in large international river basins requires sustained engagement over many decades. For Nile Basin governments, the shift from a national orientation with limited collaboration to a broader regional approach was, and continues to be, a significant challenge. The Nile Basin countries with NBI support have made strides in sharing information, planning development programs and collaborating on investments. Today, the NBI has strengthened its institutional capacity, partnerships, and regional processes as well as its tools and procedures for cooperative water resources planning, development, and management in the Nile Basin. This ICR is an evaluation of one particular project as part of these overall inter-linked efforts to foster cooperation between the Nile Basin countries and should be viewed in this limited context.

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Table 1. Nile Basin Trust Fund Project Portfolio

Project

Grant Agreement

Signing Date

Grant Agreement

Closing Date

Grant Amount1

Shared Vision Program SVP: Applied Training Project 12-Feb-04 31-Dec-09 14.13 SVP: Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement Project 17-Mar-04 31-Dec-09 11.35 SVP: Efficient Water Use for Agricultural Production 16-Mar-05 30-Jun-09 4.12 SVP: Nile Tranboundary Environmental Action Project 22-Apr-03 31-Dec-09 8.99 SVP: Regional Power Trade Project 1-Nov-04 30-Jun-09 5.76 SVP: Additional Grant Financing Regional Power Trade Project - II 16-Sep-09 31-Dec-11 4.56 SVP: Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing Project 3-Feb-05 30-Jun-09 3.65 SVP: Water Resources Planning and Management Project 15-Oct-04 30-Apr-09 6.79 SVP: Additional Grant Financing Water Res. Planning&Mgmt - II 31-Mar-09 31-Dec-12 17.22 SVP: Shared Vision Program Coordination Project 22-Apr-03 31-Dec-08 9.94 Shared Vision Program (subtotal) 86.51 Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) NBTF - ENSAP: Eastern Nile Watershed Management Project 8-Nov-04 30-Jun-08 2.50 ENTRO Grant for launching the Joint Multipurpose Program 28-Sep-05 31-May-09 1.14 NBTF Grant for Institutional Strengthening of the Eastern Nile Regional Technical Office (ENTRO) 12-Oct-06 31-Dec-08 2.58

EN Flood Preparedness and Early Warning Project - Phase 1 19-Jun-07 31-Dec-10 3.96 EN Planning Model 9-Sep-09 31-Dec-12 6.50 EN Joint Multipurpose Program Identification Phase (JMP1) 9-Sep-09 31-Dec-12 7.00 Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) (sub-total) 23.68 Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP) NELSAP: Coordination Unit Project 22-Apr-03 30-Jun-06 0.67 NELSAP: NELSAP CU Institutional Strengthening and Scaling Up 30-Jun-06 31-Dec-08 1.87 NELSAP: Regional Rusumo Falls Hydroelectric and Multipurpose Project Preparation Grant 24-Oct-06 31-Oct-12 7.72

NELSAP: Agriculture and Trade 29-Apr-08 30-Sep-09 0.60 NELSAP: Additional Grant Financing Agriculture & Trade-II 30-Nov-10 31-Dec-12 7.00 NELSAP: Sio-Malaba-Malakasi RBM 24-Sep-09 31-Dec-12 2.15 NELSAP: Mara RBM 24-Sep-09 31-Dec-12 2.15 NELSAP: Kagera RBM 17-Sep-09 31-Dec-12 3.77 NELSAP: Power Program 24-Apr-10 31-Dec-12 3.80 NELSAP: Coordinated Water Resources Development Program 4-Feb-10 31-Dec-12 4.90 Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP) (sub-total) 34.63 Cross-Cutting NBI Institutional Strengthening Project 21-Oct-08 31-Dec-12 24.02 NBI: Nile Basin Secretariat Support 25-Jan-05 30-Jun-05 .20 NCORE: Nile Cooperation for Results 26-Dec-12 31-Dec-14 13.80 Cross-cutting (subtotal) 38.02 Total - NBTF Grants 182.84

1Reflects amount granted to NBI for project purposes from NBTF. Actual amount disbursed by project is lower, in some cases.

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Table 2. Investments resulting from NBI projects that are currently (I) Under Implementation, (II) Under Preparation or (III) Pre-Investment/Identification

I. INVESTMENT PROJECTS UNDER IMPLEMENTATION

Project Title

Total Cost

(Million

US$)

(est.)

Secured

Financing

Source(s) of Secured

Financing

Target Start of

Implementation

(Calendar Year)

A. NBI Project Portfolio

NEL Regional Transmission Interconnection Projects

(agreed regionally, prepared regionally and nationally, implemented nationally) 403 350

AfDB, JICA, KFW,

Netherlands 2013

Watershed management Projects

(Reg., Egypt, Sudan; excluding US$40 million Ethiopia - Tana Beles) (agreed and

prepared regionally, implemented nationally)

52 35.4 GEF, Finland, Egypt, Sudan 2009

Lakes Edward and Albert Fisheries Project (Uganda-DRC) 170 40 AfDB 2011

Ethiopia Tana-Beles Integrated Water Resources Development (implemented nationally, with some preparation by ENTRO) 70 70

IDA, Finland, Ethiopia,

Communities 2008

Ethiopia Irrigation & Drainage

(agreed regionally, prepared and implemented nationally) 110 110 IDA, Ethiopia 2007

Ethiopia-Sudan Interconnection

(agreed regionally, prepared and implemented nationally with technical assistance from

NBI)

70 70 IDA (for Ethiopia), Sudan,

Ethiopia 2008

EN Flood Preparedness and Early Warning-Phase 1

(agreed and prepared regionally, implemented regionally and nationally) 4 4 NBTF, EN countries 2007

TOTAL - NBI Prepared or Regionally agreed 879 679.4

B. Selected NBI assisted projects

Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project - Phase 2 for Rwanda and Burundi (prepared by NELSAP) 40 40 IDA, GEF, Sweden 2011

TOTAL - NBI assisted projects 40 40

GRAND TOTAL- NBI prepared & assisted 919 719.4

II. INVESTMENT PROJECTS UNDER PREPARATION

Project Title

Total Cost

(Million

US$)

(est.)

Secured

Financing

Possible Source(s) of

Financing

Target Start of

Implementation

(Calendar Year)

A. NBI Project Portfolio

Bugesera Integrated Water and Irrigation Project (Rwanda-Burundi) 50 0 AfDB African Water

Facility 2013

EN Flood Preparedness and Early Warning - Phase 2 42 0 2014

Regional Rusumo Falls Hydro-electric and Multipurpose Project (Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi)

430 0 IDA, AfDB, Netherlands

(Pledged ) 2014

Kagera Sub-Basin Small Multipurpose storage reservoirs and watershed management - (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda)

280 0 ($13 million under consideration from

CIWA) 2013

Sio Malaba Malakisi Sub-Basin Small Multipurpose storage reservoirs and water shed management (includes Maira and Bulusambu Dam Projects) (Kenya, Uganda)

115 0 62 – IDA (under

consideration -Maira Dam project)

2015

Mara Sub-Basin Small Multipurpose storage reservoirs and water shed management (Tanzania, Kenya)

90 0 See note for Kagera

above 2015

Small Scale Irrigation Investments in Tanzania (Prepared to pre-feasibility level through NEL Water Project)

265 0 Government of TZ is

looking to secure financing internally

2015

9

II. INVESTMENT PROJECTS UNDER PREPARATION

Project Title

Total Cost

(Million

US$)

(est.)

Secured

Financing

Possible Source(s) of

Financing

Target Start of

Implementation

(Calendar Year)

Power interconnection. Iringa-Mbaya Transmission Line. 200 0 IDA, JICA and AfDB 2015

Power interconnection. Kenya-Tanzania Transmission Line. 271 0 Under discussion with

several financiers 2015

Power Interconnection. Uganda (Nkenda) – Democratic Republic of Congo (Beni – Butembo – Bunia) Power Transmission Line Study Project (ongoing)

165 0

B. Selected NBI Facilitated Projects

Egypt Irrigation & Drainage: (agreed regionally through NBI, was to be prepared and implemented nationally) (project received financing previously, but was subsequently cancelled)

213 0 Egypt

Grand Total – NBI Projects Under Preparation 1,584 0

III. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PRE-INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES TO IDENTIFY PROJECTS FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE PREPARATION AND FINANCING

Advancing the NEL Water Resources Development Project (TA) Identification and preparation of pre-investment projects for water resources development and management with regional significance. Over $200 million of investments under identification. Includes: -Lake Kyoga Development Strategy and Investment Plan ($170 mn); Yala River Basin Development Strategy & Investment Plan ($639 mn); Gucha-Migori Basin Development Strategy & Investment Plan ($857 mn); Aswa Basin Development Strategy & Investment Plan ($728 mn); and Lake Victoria basin in Tanzania ($359 mn).

Baro-Akobo Multipurpose Project (Ethiopia, Sudan) USD 3.5 million from AWF and NEPAD

Future investments which may emerge from the EN Planning Model US$ 6.5 million from NBTF; and Cooperative Regional Assessments in watershed

management, irrigation and drainage, and power trade.

NEL Climate Adaptation Mainstreaming Project (TA) €400,000 from KfW

Regional Agriculture trade and Productivity Project USD 7.7 million from NBTF. Irrigation sites under identification. Pre-feasibility Studies to be funded under NCORE.

Sudan Irrigation and Drainage (Upper Atbara, Sudan)

Future investments may also emerge from the multisectoral investment opportunities analysis in the Eastern Nile, being undertaken through the NCORE project

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design:

1.1 Context at Appraisal (brief summary of country and sector background, rationale for Bank assistance): Country and Sector Context: The Eastern Nile (EN) Basin has historically played a strategically important role in the economic development of the three countries that shared and depended on its water resources: Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. 9 The population of approximately 135 million (at the time of appraisal) relies heavily on water for livelihoods and development, including given the critical role of the agricultural sector in all three countries, as well as hydropower development for energy security in the region as a whole. The Eastern Nile is the primary source of water for both Egypt and Sudan (Egypt receives 97% of its freshwater from the Nile; Sudan, 91%), and 85% of the river’s flows into Egypt originate in Ethiopia. The key water-related development challenges of the EN Basin fall into two categories: (i) productive development – maximizing the productive use of water resources to meet water security and food security requirements, as well as rapidly growing renewable energy demands; and (ii) risk management – reducing the risks associated with water and climate-related disasters and shocks to minimize their destructive impacts on country and regional economies. The three EN countries initiated efforts in 2005 to “identify and prepare an initial project, within a broader multipurpose program, to demonstrate the benefits of the cooperative approach to the management and development of the EN.” The Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO) – established in 2002 by the three EN governments under the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) – was charged with the responsibility to facilitate the development of this program, with the support of the Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF) administered by the World Bank. The “Joint Multipurpose Program (JMP) Launch Phase” consisted of a series of analytical work and consultative activities that led to a general consensus on the potential generic components of the First Joint Multipurpose Program (JMP1) – a regional “Anchor Project” for joint multipurpose water development, potentially including a large dam for hydropower generation and other purposes; watershed, floodplain and agricultural water management activities; and “Ancillary Projects” in such areas as transport, navigation, rural electrification aimed to leverage growth. Based on findings of JMP Launch Phase studies and additional studies commissioned by the Eastern Nile Council of Ministers (ENCOM) undertaken in conjunction with the World Bank, the general location of the regional “Anchor Project” was also agreed to be in the Blue Nile/Abbay sub-basin, which constitutes one of three sub-basins of the EN.10 In 2009 and following the completion of the Launch Phase, the three EN countries formally requested assistance from the World Bank for JMP1 Identification, also to be implemented by ENTRO. The JMP1 ID studies were designed to identify the first package of major investments, as broadly conceived in the JMP Launch Phase, to be informed by a site of studies, including a Strategic Social and Environmental Assessment of the possible developments. Rationale for Bank Assistance: The JMP1 Identification (ID) Project aimed to build on the substantial work undertaken during the JMP Launch Phase (by ENTRO, by the Eastern Nile countries and by the World Bank in its facilitation role in the Nile program), and the commitment of the EN countries to advance cooperative development and management of the EN. The Project Appraisal Document (PAD)

9 During the course of the project, South Sudan became an independent country. However, the project area (the Blue Nile sub-basin and the main-stem Nile downstream of it) does not include South Sudan. 10 See section 2.1 for further detail.

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highlighted the project’s alignment with the World Bank’s Africa Action Plan, including helping the EN countries to achieve their Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets. The high-risk, high reward regional development opportunities that the project sought to identify were noted to be in line with the World Bank’s Water Resources Strategy and the focus on sustainable economic development and poverty alleviation, with the Egypt Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)(2005-2009), the Ethiopia CAS (2008-2011), the Sudan Joint Assistance Memorandum (2005), and the Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa (2008). The World Bank’s comparative advantages were noted to be in the following areas:

Experience in inclusive and sustainable development of regional and transboundary water resources investment programs, and provision of financing and guarantees for large and complex infrastructure projects;

Role as a primary facilitator of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) since 1999, including coordinating the NBI donor partnership (of 17 partners) and supervising many of the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) “Fast Track” Projects – a series of regionally agreed and primarily nationally implemented investments in irrigation, watershed management, flood management, and power interconnection – as well as regional analytical work and consultative activities;

Support to sector and multi-sector development programs in Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, which provided the opportunity to link national/country programs and the regional work supported under the project; and

Close working relationship with the NBI, ENTRO and the countries involved, fostered through the above activities and processes.

Finally, the PAD mentioned World Bank recognition that, “development of large-scale regional investments is a critical factor in facilitating conclusion of ongoing legal and institutional discussions on the Nile.” In this regard, specific reference was made to letters expressing support for the JMP process from President Zoellick (March 2009) and the Vice Presidents of the Middle East and North Africa and the Africa Regions (January 2009) to the Egyptian and Ethiopian Ministers of Finance. The favorable context that was in place at appraisal, however, did not hold throughout the duration of the project. Outside of the JMP1 ID project, in mid-2010, disagreements related to a new water agreement for the Nile (the Cooperative Framework Agreement [“CFA”]) led to a “freeze” in participation of two of the three Eastern Nile countries in official regional NBI activities11, including the JMP1 ID project. Additionally, in early 2011, announcement of unilateral development of a dam at one of the potential JMP1 ID dam sites outside of the JMP1 ID process rendered the initial project development objective (PDO) obsolete. The project was formally restructured in September 2011 to modify the PDO (to focus on provision of information to riparians rather than on joint identification of a future project), to reduce the scope of the project, and to address internal implementation challenges12. A second attempt to restructure the project in 2012 was fully designed, but could not be processed because of political factors outside of the project’s control: ENTRO was unable to receive approval from

11 While there was a “freeze in participation,” the countries did not officially withdraw from the NBI or from ENTRO. 12 As usual with World Bank financing of technical assistance, the inclusion and examination of ongoing and planned infrastructure in a study should in no way be construed as an endorsement of any particular infrastructure projects by the World Bank, nor by any of the parties involved with the JMP1 ID project (other than where such projects have been specifically considered and expressly endorsed by the World Bank or any such parties, such as through an actual project financing).

12

its governance for the restructuring because of the continued freeze in participation in the NBI of two of its member countries due to issues related to the CFA. These challenges will be more fully explained throughout the document. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators: The original project development objective (PDO) as stated in the PAD was “to assist the three Eastern Nile countries in identification of the JMP1 investment package, through a series of studies and consultative activities that take into account economic, social and environmental sustainability issues in an integrated manner.” To achieve the PDO, the project provided support in two areas: (i) JMP1 ID studies and (ii) capacity building and implementation support. The Key Indicators associated with project’s PDO were:

The Strategic Social and Environmental Assessment (SSEA) provides a sound basis for the inclusion of social and environmental considerations in the selection of projects within the JMP program;

Eastern Nile governments have an improved knowledge base to sustainably develop and manage the resources of the Blue and Main-stem Nile;

The first set of coordinated investments is identified at the end of the project. 1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification: The revised PDO, as stated in the Restructuring Paper approved by the Director of Regional Integration on September 20, 2011 was “to assist the three Eastern Nile countries in examining joint water resources development possibilities on the Abbay/Blue and Main-stem Nile, taking economic, social and environmental sustainability issues into account in an integrated manner.” The Key Indicators associated with the project’s revised PDO were:

The SSEA provides a sound basis for understanding social and environmental considerations in projects within the potential JMP program;

Eastern Nile governments have an improved knowledge base to sustainably develop and manage the resources of the Blue and Main-stem Nile;

A roadmap for a coordinated set of investments is identified at the end of the project. The project was restructured both to adapt to changing external circumstances and to correct implementation issues.13 As stated in the Restructuring Paper, restructuring consisted of: (i) extension of grant closing date from September 30, 2011 to December 31, 2012; (ii) revision of PDO and Results Framework to reflect recent changes in Ethiopia’s plans for hydropower development in the Abbay/Blue Nile; (iii) revisions to project component costs; (iv) adjustments to grant expenditure categories; and (v) additional measures to reduce the risk of project delays and to enhance the quality of project outputs. An action plan with these additional measures was included in the project restructuring package. The

13 In other words, restructuring was both corrective and adaptive. Corrective restructuring refers to those cases where an operation is performing poorly because of inherent design flaws, low capacity, weak commitment, and/or implementation problems. Adaptive restructuring refers to those cases where an operation had to be restructured in order to retain or improve its relevance as external circumstances changed.

13

restructuring was initiated on the basis of a request from ENTRO, which had received no formal objections from the three Eastern Nile countries to the proposed restructuring. The second point (ii) above requires explanation: In February 2011, Ethiopia announced the construction of a new dam on the Abbay/Blue Nile, the Renaissance Dam. As noted in the Restructuring Paper, “because the Government of Ethiopia is proceeding with Renaissance Dam outside of the JMP1 process, modifications to the JMP1 ID studies have been required to preserve the relevance of the JMP1 ID results.” 14 The JMP1 ID project provided a mechanism to study the implications of Blue Nile development from a regional perspective. Because of the strategic importance, and despite the operational challenges, the restructuring was approved by World Bank management on an exceptional basis, as stated in the Restructuring Paper: “Given the current performance ratings, the default operational option is to close the project in September 30, 2011, at the current Grant closing date… [However], there are strategic and development merits in providing more time to complete the studies. Therefore, the World Bank is considering ENTRO’s request for extension of the grant closing date and restructuring on an exceptional basis.” The restructuring also included ENTRO’s action plans to improve project performance, described in the Restructuring Paper, issues with performance were, “… in part caused by complications with the institutional and technical complexities of the first phase of work [the first phase of the SSEA, or SSEA 1]. To date, the most recent draft of the SSEA 1, received in May 2011, and which has been reviewed by the World Bank and ENTRO and its independent panel of reviewers, is still not viewed as being of satisfactory quality. Substantive revisions are needed to bring the SSEA to the level required before it will be ready for public disclosure.” ENTRO’s action plan at the time of restructuring included an enhancement of the Joint Venture (JV) team, improved contract management of the JV by ENTRO, and reduction in the scope of the overall JMP studies. The action plan also included ways to mitigate the challenges to the project posed by greater tensions in Eastern Nile hydro-politics. ENTRO outlined a number of plans to work with governments in order to hold consultations, as possible, and to institute alternate forms of consultation when necessary. ENTRO worked with the World Bank to design a second project restructuring in mid-2012. The attempted restructuring was needed because it was not possible for ENTRO to make needed amendments to the JV contract for the main studies15, after the World Bank’s Suspension and Debarment Officer imposed a temporary suspension of one of the firms in the JV, for reasons unassociated with the JMP1 ID Project. The second restructuring was also designed because of freeze in NBI participation of two of the Eastern Nile governments in the studies due to hydropolitics outside the scope of the project. However, this restructuring could not be processed, as ENTRO’s governance was

14As usual with World Bank financing of technical assistance, the inclusion and examination of ongoing and planned infrastructure in a study should in no way be construed as an endorsement of any particular infrastructure projects by the World Bank, nor by any of the parties involved with the JMP1 ID project, (other than where such projects have been specifically considered and expressly endorsed by the World Bank or any such parties, such as through an actual project financing). 15 The “main studies” in the original JMP1 ID project included most of the analytical work in the project, including the SSEA (divided into two segments), a cascade sequencing study, identification of ancillary investments, and economic analysis. A Joint Venture (JV) of consulting firms was contracted to undertake this work.

14

not meeting and so could not formally approve the restructuring (explained in detail in section 1.7).16 As such, the official Revised PDO and indicators for the project remained unchanged from the restructuring in September 2011, as outlined above. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries: The PAD did not explicitly specify beneficiaries, but implicitly it was expected that these would include the following:

The primary beneficiaries would be the people of the three Eastern Nile countries who would benefit from the output of the various studies, leading to an improved understanding of the river system, environmental and social issues, and potential cooperative investments in the EN, in addition to increased knowledge in those areas targeted by the Special Studies where information was particularly lacking (e.g., groundwater and recessional agriculture).

Specific groups of beneficiaries in the EN countries included Ministries of Water Affairs and other technical experts participating in the project’s technical working groups who would benefit from the knowledge gained and shared. The broader civil society would benefit through the consultations and communications which were to be formalized in a Stakeholder Involvement and Communication Strategy and Implementation Plan (SICAS - IP). Academia and researchers would benefit from the improved modeling tools and expanded information base that was expected to be made publically available.

The two other NBI centers – NBI Secretariat (Nile Sec) and Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program Coordinating Unit (NELSAP-CU) – would benefit from the information and knowledge base created under the project that would inform their related work on upstream identification and preparation of transboundary investment projects and knowledge management and services.

The wider global community would benefit from the methodological approach used to examine large scale and complex water investments (multipurpose and transboundary dams), in addition to lessons learned from the application of a relatively new tool for the study of environmental and social impacts, the SSEA.

The ultimate beneficiaries over a much longer timeframe would be those who would receive improved energy availability, irrigation services, flood mitigation, and other multipurpose benefits from the investments identified in JMP1 ID and subsequently implemented.

1.5 Original Components:

The project, as originally approved, consisted of the following two components: Component 1: JMP1 Identification Studies (US$ 4.335 million) Sub-component 1.1 – Information/Knowledge Base Enhancement (US$ 0.05 million): The first sub-component aimed to bridge the existing information and knowledge gaps to the extent needed to allow confident assessments of decisions on development alternatives, and adequate studies for identifying the first priority set of investments. 16 The World Bank and ENTRO worked together on a weekly basis to determine if there was a way that the request could be obtained from the governance. However, because of positions with regard to the larger political issues, it was not possible to do so.

15

Sub-component 1.2 – JMP1 Identification Studies (US$ 3.8 million): The studies consisted of: (i) a Strategic Social and Environmental Assessment (SSEA) that would strategically assess the environmental and social issues related to water resources development alternatives from a basin-wide perspective; (ii) “Anchor Project” Identification Studies that would aim to identify the optimum dam cascade development scenario and first priority project, and subsequently define an Anchor Project; and (iii) “Non-Anchor Projects” Identification Studies on irrigation development and modernization, watershed management and floodplain management to aid in identifying the Non-Anchor Projects. The JMP Identification Studies were designed to be carried out in two phases: (i) the first phase consisted of a first stage SSEA (SSEA 1); and (ii) the second phase consisted of a second stage SSEA (SSEA 2), undertaken integrally with the remainder of the studies under the sub-component (i.e., Anchor Project Identification and Non-Anchor Projects Identification Studies). The second phase was to be started upon successful completion of the first phase. Sub-component 1.3 – Special Studies (US$ 0.485 million): These studies would be undertaken on a need basis and could include: (i) studies of water saving measures to minimize system water losses; (ii) socio-economic studies on recession agriculture (and other recession activities) along the Blue Nile in Sudan; and (iii) studies on financing and institutional arrangements for the Anchor Project. Upon completion of the SSEA, additional studies on benefit sharing mechanisms would possibly be pursued. Component 2 – Capacity Building and Implementation Support (US$ 2.665 million) Sub-component 2.1 – Regional Consultation and Information Sharing (US$ 0.585 million): This sub-component aimed to: identify key stakeholders in more refined and concrete ways; develop consultation strategies, information sharing mechanisms and instruments; and incorporate consultative activities and information-sharing into the implementation program. The main output for this sub-component was planned to be a Stakeholder Involvement and Communication Strategy and Implementation Plan (SICAS-IP), with clear objectives, target audiences, timelines, organizational arrangements and activities. Sub-component 2.2 – Project Management and Capacity Building (US$ 2 million): This sub-component aimed to strengthen the capacity of ENTRO and related agencies from the three EN countries, to successfully complete JMP 1 Identification and to prepare for subsequent investments. Training topics were to include: different aspects of project planning and preparation, including social and environmental assessment and management. Sub-component 2.3 – Development of a Roadmap for the Preparation of JMP1 Investment Project(s) (US$ 0.08 million): This included a recommended approach, process, time schedule, financing options, and implementation modalities and arrangements for preparation of the JMP1 investment project(s). 1.6 Revised Components: The two project components were maintained in the restructuring. However, within these two components, the scope of some planned activities was reduced, “to align the components with the

16

proposed revised PDO and increase the likelihood that the project outputs can be completed on time and in a quality manner.” As stated in the Restructuring Paper, the changes included: Component 1: JMP Identification Studies (revised to US$ 4.5 million) Sub-component 1.1 – Information/Knowledge Base Enhancement (US$ 0 million): This sub-component remained unchanged in terms of content. However, the budget for these activities was moved to be included in sub-component 1.2 for reporting reasons, given that one JV was contracted to undertake both tasks1.1 and 1.2, and that it was not possible to disaggregate the work/expenses between the sub-components. Sub-component 1.2 – Anchor Project Identification Studies (US$ 4.354): Instead of identifying the Anchor Project, the studies under this component would investigate the benefits and impacts of a cascade of dams in the Blue Nile, which included current and on-going infrastructure development (dams in Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia) and the optimal cascade that could be developed after the construction of Renaissance Dam.17 Sub-component 1.3 – Special Studies (US$ 0.146): Five of the six originally envisioned studies were cancelled, given the short time remaining in the project. The one study maintained would examine possible institutional, financial and benefit sharing aspects of a potential JMP1 package of investments. Component 2 – Capacity Building and Implementation Support (revised to US$ 2.5 million) Sub-component 2.1 – Regional Consultations and Information Sharing (US$ 0.673 million): ENTRO would streamline the planned consultations and training opportunities under the project to better correspond with project outputs, taking into account the needs of the Eastern Nile governments, and the possible need for alternate consultation arrangements if issues in Eastern Nile politics persisted. Sub-component 2.2 – Project Management and Capacity Building (US$ 1.747 million): This sub-component was broadly unchanged. Sub-component 2.3 – Development of a Roadmap for Future Activities (US$ 0.08 million): The title of this sub-component was modified from the original “Development of a Roadmap for the Preparation of JMP1 Investment Project(s), “to indicate a change in focus away from solely project preparation.” The Roadmap would outline a plan for future studies that would need to be undertaken after the JMP1 ID, to fill in data and information gaps, understand the benefits and impacts of large infrastructure development on the Abbay/Blue Nile, for the preparation of ancillary investments, as well as for other activities to facilitate joint development on the Abbay/Blue and Main-stem Nile. 1.7 Other significant changes (in design, scope and scale, implementation arrangements and schedule, and funding allocations):

17 As usual with World Bank financing of technical assistance, the inclusion and examination of ongoing and planned infrastructure in a study should in no way be construed as an endorsement of any particular infrastructure projects by the World Bank, nor by any of the parties involved with the JMP1 ID project (other than where such projects have been specifically considered and expressly endorsed by the World Bank or any such parties, such as through an actual project financing).

17

There were several issues related to procurement that slowed project implementation. As noted above, it was planned that the full JMP1 Identification Studies (with the exception of several ancillary “Special Studies”) would be undertaken by one consultancy. In January 2010, ENTRO awarded the consultancy contract (US$ 3.777 million) to an international Joint Venture (“JV”). The procurement issues are detailed here:

JV contract amendment: Following the formal restructuring in September 2011, there was a need to amend the JV contract. After receiving a revised proposal from the JV and negotiating a price increase on the existing contract, in December 2011 ENTRO submitted to the World Bank for No Objection (NO) the negotiated contract that included an increase in the contract price to US$4 million, a time extension until October 31, 2012, and a replacement of several key staff. The World Bank was unable to issue a NO on the submitted contract, and requested that ENTRO clearly document how the increase in costs was linked to additional work required by the consultant due to the restructuring (as is typical in amending lump sum contracts), rather than renegotiating the original contract terms. This discussion continued until late March 2012.

Temporary Suspension of one firm in the JV. In March 2012, the World Bank’s Suspension and

Debarment Officer imposed a temporary suspension of one of the firms in the JV for reasons unassociated with the JMP1 ID Project. This change in status had potential implications on proceeding with negotiations of the amended contract, which the World Bank team began to explore internally.

Need for an “Alternate Plan” for Project Implementation. With the procurement matter unresolved and only seven months remaining before project closure, far too short a period to complete the work envisioned in the first restructuring of the project, ENTRO submitted to the World Bank an “alternate plan” for project implementation in June 2012. The alternate plan consisted of a reduced study scope, given the limited time remaining in the project. Specifically, the SSEA process (and subsequently the remainder of the JMP1 Identification Studies) was cancelled. Instead, two Working Papers were designed that would incorporate feedback from previous stakeholder discussions and constitute the main deliverables under the project. Working Paper 1 on “Environmental and Social Perspectives on Blue Nile Multipurpose Project Development” would discuss environmental and social issues associated with the development of the cascade of on-going and planned dams in the Abbay/Blue Nile using existing data and information, including from the draft SSEA 1. Working Paper 2 on “Strategic Options Assessment of Blue Nile Multipurpose Development” would assess dam options, in the Blue Nile cascade and related filling and operating strategies based on modeling exercises.18 The Roadmap under sub-component 2.3 would also to be included in Working Paper 2. The Working Papers were meant to provide a scoping of issues and identify key knowledge gaps that could inform future work.

18 As usual with World Bank financing of technical assistance, the inclusion and examination of ongoing and planned infrastructure in a study should in no way be construed as an endorsement of any particular infrastructure projects by the World Bank, nor by any of the parties involved with the JMP1 ID project, (other than where such projects have been specifically considered and expressly endorsed by the World Bank or any such parties, such as through an actual project financing).

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The contracting modality was also modified under the alternate plan. As opposed to one main consultancy, it was planned that the ENTRO core team would carry out the envisioned work, to be augmented by international experts and ENTRO junior professionals (recruited from those who had been carrying out similar research projects under ENTRO’s Eastern Nile Planning Model (ENPM) Project). The Panel of Independent Reviewers (PoIR) that had been established at the start of the project to review outputs and provide quality assurance would be retained under a revised TOR. As noted above, it was expected that the project would be formally restructured a second time, to reduce the scope of the Results Framework to reflect the alternate plan, as well as to cancel approximately US$ 3.6 million in project funds that would not be used before project closure. ENTRO was unable to obtain the mandate from its governance to submit the official request for project restructuring, but the alternate plan became the de facto operating modality, as its outputs were a subset of the official project design. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry: Background analysis and work supporting the project Upstream analysis and consultations. The project’s design was based on extensive consultations and analytical work undertaken during the JMP Launch Phase. As part of the on-going Nile Basin Initiative, the Launch Phase was initiated in 2005 by the Eastern Nile Council of Ministers (ENCOM), comprising the water ministers from the three EN countries, jointly with their energy ministers, with support from the Nile Basin Trust Fund and facilitation from the World Bank. The Launch Phase was intended to “identify and prepare a major initial project, within a broader multipurpose program, to demonstrate the benefits of a cooperative approach to the management and development of the EN.” The Launch Phase included a series of analytical and consultative activities that underpinned the project. These included: (i) establishment of a “no-borders” One System Inventory of natural resources and related information across the EN basin; (iii) a scoping study that examined the “development space” for future water developments; (iv) preparation of thematic papers on financing and implementation arrangements, and on institutional and legal issues; (v) broadly defining and locating in the Blue Nile/Abbay sub-basin a first set of potential investments – the first Joint Multipurpose Program (JMP 1); and (vi) wide consultations, including through the establishment of a multi-sectoral Regional Working Group and a Regional Parliamentary Committee. Project design also benefited from analytical work under the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program’s (ENSAP) parallel multipurpose track, including Comprehensive Regional Assessments on irrigation development and watershed management and the Eastern Nile Power Trade Study, as well as ENSAP’s “Fast Track” projects (irrigation and drainage, power interconnection, watershed management, flood preparedness and early warning, and EN planning model). All of these activities and projects were implemented by ENTRO. Lessons learned and reflected in project design. As noted in the PAD, project design integrated lessons learned from relevant past initiatives, in particular through a focus on:

An integrated approach for water development that planned to account for the engineering, economic, social and environmental aspects in the assessment and analytical studies, as well as

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the sustainability of investments ultimately identified. Indeed, the option of splitting the project was rejected in order to maintain full integration as noted in the PAD: “The option of SSEA as a first TA project was rejected because… undertaking an SSEA in isolation would lose the opportunity to interact and integrate with the related technical and economic studies.”

Stakeholder involvement, consultation and communication that included a strategy and plan/program (the SICAS-IP) to engage stakeholders in order to ensure government ownership and consensus on outputs, as well as their acceptance by the general public.

A smooth transition to the expected follow-on phase that included the development of a roadmap for future preparation of identified investment(s), supported by special studies on financing and institutional arrangements.

Simplicity, namely through the packaging of consultancy services into bigger contracts to reduce lengthy recruitment procedures and capacity over-stretch in monitoring and management of contracts.

The lessons learned and incorporated in project design were perhaps strong in principal, but proved difficult to implement in practice. Additionally, there were no mitigating measures put in place to manage the risks associated with some of these simplifying measures (for example, relating to the quality or pace of work produced by the main contract, or issues relating to combining many disciplines into one contract (i.e., social, environmental and infrastructure). The issues are discussed later in this section. Project Design – objective, components, institutional arrangements/organization, and timeline Objective and indicators/targets. The PDO was ambitious, although at the time of project preparation and based on the success of the JMP Launch Phase, not infeasible to achieve. Given the need for the Eastern Nile countries to agree on the indicators in the results framework, the results framework was formulated in a very literal and specific manner, which was at odds with good practice within the World Bank. This included: (i) the PDO was written in terms of outputs rather than outcomes; (ii) there were redundant indicators and targets at the PDO and the intermediate levels (e.g., those related to the SSEA); (iii) in many cases, the indicators did not match the descriptions of the targets (e.g., “capacity” was used as an indicator, but the targets related to training); (iv) a number of the indicators and targets, where they differed, did not comply with standard criteria for formulation, i.e., “SMART” – specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and timebound (e.g., “well conceived”, “good results”, “completed successfully”) ; and (v) the timeframe for achieving the targets specified in the results framework was overly optimistic (refer below). Additionally, all PDO level indicators relied on successful completion of the JMP1 ID Studies, which constituted only one sub-component of the project, albeit the largest one. Components. Because of the “negotiated process” in which the project was designed, which included agreement from countries on project details and design in line with the PDO, the design of the components was quite rigid and conceived in terms of specified outputs. Some of the original components could have been more clearly defined and differentiated from related activities, e.g., sub-component 1.1. By including activities related to capacity building, stakeholder communications, and analytical work, the project was comprehensive; all of these were needed to achieve project objectives. Institutional Arrangements. ENTRO, as the implementing agency for the project, was meant to work closely and consult intensively with a large number of entities at the regional and country levels. These

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groups covered both the technical and policy arenas and extended from the highest levels to the inter-institutional. They consisted of the following:

Regional level – a dedicated JMP 1 ID Team within ENTRO, Ad hoc Task Teams, JMP1 ID Steering Committee, Regional Technical Committee, ENCOM, the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program Team (ENSAPT), and a Regional Parliamentary Committee.

National level – JMP National Coordinators, National Reference Groups. The PAD also mentioned provisions for establishing formal mechanisms to coordinate activities with related dam site specific studies (SSSs) under the Ministry of Water Resources, Ethiopia (also refer below). Beyond simply consultation, it was envisioned that the groups at the governance level – ENCOM, ENSAPT – would provide approvals at key milestones to move to subsequent stages, or at a minimum indicate agreement. More broadly, envisioned consultations and review workshops were meant to validate findings and reports and to build buy-in among various types of stakeholder groups for the package of investments that was to be identified through the project. The regional scope of the project, its importance to the EN countries, and its technical complexity justified a comprehensive consultative process, on the one hand, and close interaction with several other related projects and activities, on the other. However, operationalizing such complex arrangements would be exceedingly time-consuming in even the best of circumstances, and impossible if critical assumptions did not hold in practice. In particular, the functioning of several of the groups (ENCOM, ENSAPT, etc.) was part of a much larger process related to cooperation in the Nile and outside of the control of the project itself. This left the project vulnerable to broader developments, particularly when issues arose related to wider hydropolitics. Timeframe. The timeframe was overly ambitious given the project’s complexity, in terms of both technical work and planned consultations. Project records show that, “the project was purposefully made two years to give the parties concerned a sense of urgency” and that other options such as a series of TAs were rejected for the sake of expediency. A more realistic, longer timeline could have been established based on lessons learned from the experience of the JMP Launch Phase. However, at the same time, some have posited that the over-arching JMP process (JMP launch and JMP1 ID) was not fast enough. Governments’ commitment, stakeholder involvement and participatory processes. EN governments displayed strong commitment to the project during its preparation. As noted in the PAD, “JMP1 ID was prepared at the request of the three EN countries, initiated through an historical letter to the WB President Robert Zoellick in 2008, from the Minister of Investment in Egypt, written as a collective request on behalf of the ENCOM in Egypt’s capacity as chair. This was followed by a confirmatory letter from Minister of Finance and Economic Development of Ethiopia (Feb 2009).” A meeting of the technical advisors to ENCOM (Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Team) took place on June 23, 2009 that re-affirmed the commitment of the EN to the JMP process and to overseeing the successful implementation of the JMP1 ID studies, and related site-specific studies (refer below for further details on site specific studies). The PAD stressed the importance of stakeholder involvement, consultation and communications, as “a crucial cornerstone to the success of the JMP process.” The aim was to: “inform, involve and consult

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relevant stakeholders on the studies and follow-up investments which can be of a potentially controversial nature.” To this end, a detailed Stakeholder Involvement and Communication Strategy (SICAS) was developed for JMP1 ID, and was in draft form by Appraisal. A Database of Nile Secondary Stakeholders (DaNSS) had also been completed prior to project effectiveness, noted in the PAD to be “the primary resource to implement the SICAS.” Partnership arrangements. Partnership arrangements for the project were strong. The project was supported under the multi-donor Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF) and the wider partnership of Nile donors, consisting of 17 development partners and facilitated by the World Bank. The project also promoted bi-lateral partnership with the Government of Norway that was, in parallel, financing separate site-specific feasibility studies (SSSs) of two potential multi-purpose dam sites on the Blue Nile with Ministry of Water Resources, Ethiopia as implementing agency. At the time of Appraisal and Negotiations, it was intended that the World Bank and Norwegian teams would establish a formal mechanism to ensure effective communication and coordination between the donors, but the details of this arrangement were not yet clarified. It was agreed with Norway that an independent Panel of Environmental and Social Experts for the SSSs would be appointed, to ensure the quality of social and environmental assessments. Finally, Norway committed to financing a hydropower expert at ENTRO, who would augment the JMP1 ID core team and coordinate with the SSSs. Identification of risks and their mitigation. The Risk Information Worksheet covered a wide-range of identified risks. Many of the large risks were identified, including the risk of waning cooperation between the countries, and capacity related to the scope of the work. However, in some areas, the project’s assessment of risks could have been more comprehensive and realistic, and risk mitigation measures could have featured more prominently. Several mitigation measures were backward looking, rather than forward. For example, mitigation measures for the “risk of stalled cooperative efforts among EN riparians” focused on the shared understanding that had been reached up to the point of the project and on EN countries’ demonstrated support for it. No mitigating measures were provided to protect the project in the event that issues arose over broader cooperation, which would have severe effects on the envisioned institutional arrangements, project staffing, and realizing project objectives. The technical and management capacity of ENTRO to implement the project was included as a risk at the time of Appraisal, given the complexity of the project. In retrospect, the identified mitigation measures (a detailed PIP, recruitment of quality international consultants, and the provision of training) were insufficient. The PAD mentions that the JMP1 ID Team would be comprised of a core team consisting of dedicated staff that would spend full or nearly full-time on JMP1 ID. Several of these were to be funded under related NBI projects (including the Institutional Strengthening Project financed through the NBTF) and one by Norway. However, possible risks of relying on staff funded from other sources, which could place competing demands on their time, were not articulated, nor were mitigation measures provided. Several critical risks were not identified during preparation. The main study was divided into two parts, with the SSEA Phase I to be completed before the other analysis was to begin. However, the risk of a delayed Phase I that would prevent any additional work on the project was not identified, nor were mitigation measures provided. Additionally, given the relatively new use of the SSEA as an assessment tool, the scope of the project area, extent of data needed, and the complexity of the task, additional risks

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associated with the execution of an SSEA could have been identified and mitigation measures provided at the time of project design. Project Readiness. The project began implementation on a firm footing in terms of readiness, for the majority of items. This included the following:

A number of the entities involved in implementation were established before project effectiveness; indeed, many had been in place some years before and were functional. These included: ENCOM, ENSAPT, National Reference Groups, JMP National Coordinators, and Regional Parliamentary Committee.

Draft TORs for the JMP1 ID Steering Committee, the Regional Technical Committee, National Project Coordinators, National Reference Groups, the JMP1 ID Team within ENTRO, and the JMP1 ID Technical Task Teams had been prepared by Negotiations.

Important documents for guiding project implementation, such as a Project Implementation Plan

(PIP) and draft SICAS had been prepared.

The TOR for the main JMP1 ID Studies (including the SSEA) had been developed, and the SSEA TOR was disclosed in English before Appraisal, and summaries in Arabic and Amharic were disclosed before formal Negotiations (on June 22, 2009). The ongoing NBI Institutional Strengthening Project (ISP) had prepared and disclosed a “Strategy for Addressing Environmental and Social Safeguards” including consultation and disclosure requirements that was applicable to all TA projects falling under the NBI, including JMP1 ID. This was re-disclosed by ENTRO in English, Amharic and Arabic prior to project negotiations.

Procurement of the main JMP 1 ID Studies consultant was at proposal stage and was expected to

be completed upon project effectiveness.

The TORs for several of the Ancillary “Special Studies” were not developed at Appraisal, but were expected to be developed soon after implementation started. The TOR for the Independent Panel of Reviewers was not prepared during Project Preparation.

2.2 Implementation (including any project changes/restructuring, mid-term review, Project at Risk status, and actions taken, as applicable): Overarching Challenges to Implementation. Notwithstanding an extended project preparation period (the Launch Phase), advanced readiness on several grounds, and the achievements noted above, developments both outside and within the control of the implementing agency had serious implications on implementation. This led to the formal restructuring of 2011 and later the ‘alternate plan’ of 2012. Supervision reports and other documentation point to two overarching challenges that affected project performance: unforeseen political issues and technical difficulties.

Unforeseen political issues in the EN basin. As noted earlier, at the time of project appraisal, the political climate in the EN basin was favorable. Indeed, significant commitment of the EN

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countries was demonstrated not only in the lead up to the project (under the JMP Launch Phase), their request for the JMP1 ID in early implementation19, and in the request of two of the three EN countries to continue with the project at restructuring in 2011.

During the course of the project, the political environment changed dramatically and contributed to delaying project implementation progress.20 In mid-2010, disagreements between the EN countries over the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) led to two EN countries freezing participation in NBI regional activities (including JMP1 ID), pending the clarification of aspects of the disagreement. These difficulties persisted throughout the remaining life of the project and translated at the practical level in various ways. For example, ENTRO (and supporting consultants) could not travel to some EN countries, impairing planned data and information collection activities; it could not procure consultants for two of the Special Studies because it was unable to advertise the procurement notice in two of the three EN countries; and planned stakeholder consultations could not be conducted as per the Stakeholder Involvement and Communication Strategy and Implementation Plan (SICAS-IP) developed under the project.21 In the last months of the project, consultations on the two draft Working Papers and the Roadmap were cancelled due to instructions from one EN country to hold project activities until wider issues in Eastern Nile cooperation could be resolved. ENTRO presented aspects of its work to participants at an outreach event in February 2013, but was not able to hold formal consultations with governments on the Working Papers or on the Roadmap before the time of this ICR.

Quality issues related to technical work. The second issue that persisted throughout project

implementation and had a significant bearing on performance relates to technical difficulties that affected the quality and progress of the studies. The JMP1 ID Studies as originally designed were exceedingly complex. In some areas, there were few models or examples to follow (e.g., the structure and substance of an SSEA of this magnitude, and divided into two parts), as well as significant data and information constraints. That said, as early as the Consultations on the Inception Report for the JMP1 ID Identification Studies, supervision records refer to study delays and poor quality. Quality issues continued throughout the four versions of the SSEA 1, drafted over a period of approximately two years (the final fourth draft was submitted by the JV in December 2011). As the JMP1 ID Studies were designed to be carried out in phases, slow

19 The project’s Launch in January 2010 was well attended by over 70 people, including high level representatives from each of the three EN countries, as well as other key stakeholders (e.g., civil society, NGOs, academia, government organizations, media, independent technical experts, etc.). The Consultations on the JMP1 ID Studies Inception Report held in March 2010 was attended by some 40 people – including members from Steering Committee, Regional Technical Committees, and other country representatives, development partners, technical experts, etc. – and agreement was reached on the planning horizon for the project, report submission, and additional work needed (i.e., gap filling strategy). 20 As early as June 2010, project records noted: “one risk to the project increased substantially since appraisal – tensions between EN riparians related to signing of the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). JMP consultations have already been delayed one month because of the tensions.” 21 Mid-term review for the project was delayed several times, due to the uncertainty in the Basin related to the unforeseen political issues. In March 2011, the Bank fielded a mission to Ethiopia to assess the state of cooperation in the Basin, given Ethiopia’s announcement of a new dam. The Bank then undertook the restructuring mission in June 2011. Because of these missions, the official “mid-term review” was delayed until November 2011. However, it should be noted that the earlier missions in 2011 were all focused on supporting ENTRO in taking corrective action to improve project performance, including the design of a major restructuring.

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progress in the first phase (consisting of the SSEA 1) affected the second phase of work (also refer below).

Similarly, project records show that there were quality issues related to other technical work under the project. For example, under the original project design, progress in advancing the Special Studies was delayed, not only because of the political issues, but also because of clear technical difficulties, e.g., in finalizing the TORs.22 In the restructuring, all but one of the Special Studies were dropped because they were “not possible to undertake, given the short time remaining in the project” (Restructuring Paper); the final one was dropped a few months later under the alternate plan. Challenges at a technical level continued under the alternate plan. The PoIR expressed early concerns that the TORs for the Working Papers were overly ambitious given the limited time remaining. Although their scope was subsequently reduced (refer below), the PoIR repeated concerns with the quality of the Draft Working Papers.

Specific challenges and adaptive response. Despite the number of adaptive measures were taken by both the Client and the World Bank to address implementation issues and to maintain the relevance of the JMP study in light of evolving development in the Eastern Nile. However, the response measures adopted at various stages of project implementation were insufficient to fully overcome a number of specific challenges:

Two-Phased Approach of main JMP1 ID Studies. There were problems with implementing the project’s main JMP1 ID Studies, including strict adherence to the two phase approach given the significant delays in advancing the first phase. Indeed, as early as the June 2010 mission, it appears that the two phased approach was reconsidered in light of these issues, with references in project documents to the consultant’s ability to move to the second phase of the contract before the closure of the first phase. Subsequent project records indicate that the original design was, however, maintained until restructuring, which jeopardized the achievement of project objectives.

JMP1 ID Studies Contracting Modalities. Project design sought to minimize procurement

risks and implementation delays by packaging consultancy services into bigger contracts. It additionally adopted an integrated approach, with environmental and social work (in the form of the SSEA) undertaken integrally with engineering and economic work. At a practical level, this resulted in contracting one large consultancy to undertake all activities under the main JMP ID studies, with the understanding that the SSEA1 would be completed before the other studies were undertaken. The risks of such an approach were only fully appreciated during project implementation, when work progressed slowly and the first major deliverable, the SSEA1, could not be concluded. A number of mitigation measures were taken up, including use of the Panel of Independent Reviewers (PoIR), intensive technical meetings and discussions to guide the JV, and direct ENTRO and World Bank team involvement in providing strategic advice on the overall approach to the SSEA. However, these proved to be insufficient for reversing trends and improving SSEA1 document quality. At the time of design of project restructuring in June 2011, the ENTRO team did not choose to cancel the on-going contract despite the slow progress of the

22 The June 2010 Aide Memoire noted, the “substantial work needed to revise TORs for Special Studies.” The concern was repeated a few months later (in October 2010): “despite the fact that ENTRO employed the JV and then technical advisors to revise various drafts of the TORs, they are still weak and need to be strengthened.”

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project, as there was not enough time remaining in the life of the trust fund financing the project to hire another firm. Instead, ENTRO proposed several measures to improve performance of the already contracted JV, including changing several team members.

Institutional Arrangements and Consultations. Institutional arrangements were purposefully

designed in order to involve and foster a sense of ownership across many ministries and stakeholders in the three EN countries, but they were exceedingly complex. Consultation and communications within this structure proved to be increasingly challenging as the political environment deteriorated.23 The continuing difficulties surrounding broader Nile Basin politics meant that this situation continued throughout the life of the project, with official consultations effectively halted; regular governance and technical meetings could not be held as planned, nor could broader consultations. At the September 2011 restructuring, it was noted that ENTRO’s consultation plans would be adjusted to the on-going situation, with aim of implementing the complex consultation and governance structures originally envisioned in the project, but if necessary “seeking alternate ENTRO plans to work closely with the countries, to find ways to solicit proactively country feedback in a manner acceptable to the Eastern Nile governments.” Project records highlight that ENTRO worked around the constraints to the extent possible by, e.g., seeking feedback from formal group participants in writing and by telephone, keeping them apprised of progress in the form of status reports and other briefs, etc. ENTRO also attempted to maintain open communications at a broader level by participating in technical discussions and meetings, including workshops that were technically funded under other related projects (e.g., ENPM Project). However, participation by many levels of governance was minimal.

Managerial and Technical Capacity at ENTRO. The high-levels of technical and managerial capacity needed to oversee the project were perhaps underestimated during the project design, as was the extent to which political risks could eventually affect this capacity. Project progress was negatively affected by staffing issues, with reduction in the managerial and technical capacity at ENTRO, due to larger issues in hydropolitics. Beginning in May 2010, with the freeze in participation in NBI of two Eastern Nile governments, ENTRO management had to spend an increasingly large amount of time dealing with overarching ENTRO governance issues relating to the freeze, leaving less time for supervision of the JMP1 ID project team. In June 2011 and April 2012, the two key managers in charge of oversight of JMP1 ID resigned from ENTRO, due to issues related to the larger Eastern Nile hydropolitics and were not replaced. This left significantly reduced managerial capacity at ENTRO. Further, some of the core staff positions to be financed under the project remained unfilled to its end, including the Economist and the Finance Specialist (which were both unsuccessfully advertised twice). ENTRO reported that the institutional uncertainty surrounding ENTRO, with the freeze in participation of two members from 2010 onwards, discouraged qualified candidates from applying for the positions.

Because of the institutional uncertainty at ENTRO and its impact on capacity, supervision reports highlight challenges that affected the management of the main JMP1 ID Studies consultant, as well as other consultants hired by ENTRO. Mitigation measures were put in

23 For example, in October 2011, project documents noted that, “ENCOM, the project governing body, has not met since July 2009, before the project was signed. Although their technical advisors, ENSAPT, met in January 2010, there has been no meeting since that time, despite efforts of ENTRO to convene a meeting. The Regional Technical Committee for the project last met at a consultation in late March 2010”.

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place, such as more frequent technical working meetings with ENTRO, the WB team, the JV and the PoIR. However, challenges persisted through project restructuring (e.g., problems with negotiating the JV contract extension and difficulties in managing contract settlement), the “alternate plan” (e.g., the Panel was tasked with reviewing a non-traditional work product, which presented many challenges, etc.), and to the end of the project (e.g., completing the work outputs by project closure). Earlier, decisive action by the government owners of ENTRO to enhance ENTRO’s staffing structure could have improved its ability to provide necessary management and technical oversight.

Coordination with related Site Specific Studies on Abbay/Blue Nile dams. In parallel to the

JMP1 ID Studies, Ministry of Water and Energy (MoWE), Ethiopia planned to undertake Site Specific Studies (SSSs) of two dams in the Abbay/Blue Nile with Norwegian support. JMP1 ID was designed to coordinate closely with the SSSs so that the two efforts could benefit from one another through provision of critical data and study findings. While the SSS were on-going, ENTRO did make significant strides in advancing information sharing among the EN governments. For example, MoWR shared various versions of early drafts of the Site Specific Studies with ENTRO, on which ENTRO was able to collect comments from the Eastern Nile countries. This was a significant step forward in terms of transparency and cooperation between the Eastern Nile countries. This arrangement persisted through mid-2011, when the SSS work was put on hold (for reasons unrelated to the JMP1 ID project).

Factors Contributing to Implementation. ENTRO made several efforts throughout the course of the project to adapt to the changing hydro-political environment, to maintain the relevancy of the project and to correct for problems with quality of outputs. This included the changes made at the time of project restructuring, which involved reducing the scope of the project, changing implementation modalities, and incorporating other risk mitigation measures, such as strengthening the JV’s study team. This also included the alternate plan for implementation in mid-2012, which represented a valiant attempt at turning the project around despite continued challenges late in the implementation process. Factors in ENTRO’s implementation that contributed to progress in some project areas included:

Modifications to study design. As outlined in section 1.6, ENTRO undertook a major restructuring in September 2011, in order to continue analysis despite the changes in plans for infrastructure development in the Blue Nile. Additionally, when it was not possible to continue with the JV to conduct the study post restructuring, in June 2012, ENTRO adapted and designed a new implementation modality for the work, using a team of international consultants to augment its staff. Because of this flexibility, ENTRO was able to repackage the work undertaken to date and to produce several outputs to further the Eastern Nile knowledge base and the understanding of regional issues involving Blue Nile dam development, as detailed in Annex 2.

Interaction with Eastern Nile countries and governance to attempt to find a way forward on the project, and on the larger political situations outside the control of the project. ENTRO management proactively communicated with the Eastern Nile governments on the project, including through “visits to the countries preceded by comprehensive letters, status reports and concept notes as well as telephone calls.” (ENTRO Project Completion Report, page 31). ENTRO noted in its closing report (P. 48) that, “the Project, through the ENTRO Executive

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Director, has tirelessly sought the assistance of ENCOM and ENSAP to get over the current impasse, consequences of the CFA and Renaissance Dam.” While “ultimately, the problem has proven a challenge beyond the mandates and goals of the project to resolve,” ENTRO was able to navigate a complicated political landscape in order to deliver some information and analysis to advance understanding of a critical water resource issue in the Basin.

Adaptability in stakeholder consultations. There were several challenges to ENTRO’s originally planned consultations in the SICAS because of the over-arching political issues, including unwillingness of some countries to engage in direct consultations as late as November 2012. ENTRO found other fora in which to consult with EN governments and wider stakeholders on the JMP studies, including through written exchanges with the countries, in Eastern Nile modeling fora (organized through the ENPM project), and in other gatherings. Following project closure, ENTRO plans to distribute outputs (e.g., floodplain mapping analysis) on its website. While far short of the originally envisioned consultation plan and input needed for a full-fledged SSEA, ENTRO was able to gather and distribute information, as possible within its mandate.

Project achievements. Project achievements were in stark contrast to the significant implementation delays and challenges, both internal and external to the project. Although many were not captured formally (including because of the inability to process the second restructuring), the project managed to produce a number of valuable outputs, deliver capacity building and training, and facilitate a deeper understanding of the complex issues surrounding water development in the EN. Project achievements are described in later sections of this ICR.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization: M&E design. Design issues related to the M&E framework are discussed above. As noted, there were several weaknesses that limited its use in tracking achievement of project objectives and in providing a learning platform to inform project management and improve project performance. The restructuring of 2012 partly addressed this issue by correcting obvious issues (e.g., that many of the indicators themselves were not SMART). However, the major issue was not remedied, namely, that all key (PDO level) indicators relied on progress related to one sub-component of the project. The decision not to remedy this issue was not a result of lack of capacity at ENTRO: ENTRO specialists noted the lack of use of “SMART” indicators. However, because of the need to avoid lengthy negotiation of new indicators between ENTRO member countries, ENTRO decided to make only the changes to the already agreed study design and indicators that were needed to adjust for the changing infrastructure plans in the basin, and the reduced project scope. However, by the end of the project and particularly after the alternate plan was adopted, it became exceedingly difficult to measure performance according to the pre-defined performance indicators. Several outcomes/outputs were not captured in the M&E framework and, therefore, inadequately tracked. M&E implementation. The project M&E system was part of a broader results-based M&E system used for all ENTRO projects (and all NBI programs). The system relied on collection of data in order to produce regular reporting on results, budgeting, work planning, etc., for dissemination to key stakeholders. ENTRO’s M&E officer was responsible for all ENTRO activities, including JMP1 ID, working closely with the respective project teams. The institutionalization of the M&E system and experience with its broader application increased the efficiency with which the M&E function for the project was performed.

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M&E utilization. Collected data were evaluated and used to inform decision-making and resource allocation, as reflected in both the restructuring and the alternate plan, although the M&E framework could have been used more effectively to inform the timing and substance of both. The challenges of applying the M&E framework had a positive side-effect, by giving the project team, specifically, and ENTRO, generally, an appreciation of the tool’s use and the need to carefully craft it to adequately reflect activities and efforts. The lessons learned from this experience helped to build capacity and strengthen ENTRO’s broader M&E system, which will continue to be applied in ENTRO’s future activities. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance (focusing on issues and their resolution, as applicable): Safeguards. The respect of safeguards issues is rated satisfactory. The project was classified as environmental safeguard category B. The main provision incorporated in project design to ensure compliance with safeguards was the SSEA. It was meant to integrate social and environmental considerations – importantly including cumulative impacts – into options assessments and Anchor Project identification under the JMP1 ID Studies. The TOR for the SSEA was disclosed before project appraisal. While OP 7.50 on International Waterways was also triggered, the project was except from notification requirements under paragraph 7b as the work was upstream in nature and did not involve engineering studies. However, the consultations and communications program supported under the project was meant to keep all relevant parties informed of work and outputs. OP 4.37 was not triggered, also because of the upstream nature of the project. In the spirit of OP 4.37, the project provided for independent review of key outputs by the PoIR, comprised of technical/water resources, environment and social specialists. The SSEA was cancelled under the alternate plan due to reasons described elsewhere in this report, and a partial assessment was undertaken. The results of the assessment were presented in the two draft Working Papers. The PoIR provided timely and substantial comments on the Working Papers. ENTRO also fully engaged its environment and social team throughout the reviews of Working Paper drafts. The consultations on the draft Working Papers and the Roadmap had to be cancelled, but ENTRO held consultations on several inputs to the working papers – including drafts of the SSEA – in various fora earlier in project implementation. Additionally, ENTRO presented some elements of its work at an outreach event in February 2013. Fiduciary Compliance. The PAD dedicated significant attention in assessing ENTRO’s procurement and financial management capacity and in detailing corrective measures to mitigate potential risks. Compliance with Bank procurement policies was assessed to be satisfactory, for the reviews that had taken place at the time of project completion. Procurement registers provided to the Bank for review were satisfactory. However, at an operational level, procurement issues slowed implementation at several points in project implementation, as discussed in section 1.7. First, ENTRO’s proposed contract amendment with the JV following the September 2011 restructuring did not follow standard procedures for costing of an amendment to a lump sum contract, resulting in a lengthy review of the proposal by the Bank in early 2012. Second, the implications of the temporary suspension of one of the firms in the JV by the World Bank (for reasons unrelated to the contract) on ENTRO’s contract amendment review were not answered by the World Bank.

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Financial Management. ENTRO maintained adequate staffing arrangements for Financial Management throughout the project implementation. The project consistently submitted audited financial statements and the associated management letter within the stipulated deadline. Audit reports were unqualified, although concerns were noted about the project’s inability to execute planned activities. ENTRO maintained a computerized accounting system for all accounting operations and it adequately produced all the relevant reports. The project submitted timely and acceptable quarterly IFRs to the World Bank within the stipulated deadline of 45 days after the end of the each quarter. Due to the issues with project implementation, withdraw applications for funds were irregularly submitted. Internal audit remained a challenge throughout project implementation. Budget execution was affected by the regional freeze of project activities. ENTRO developed a plan for asset transfer; in line with ENTRO’s policies, project assets (e.g., furniture, equipment, vehicles, etc.) will remain with ENTRO for future use. The project’s final audit for the period July 1, 2012 – April 2013 (including the project grace period) is currently underway. Overall, the ISR rating throughout implementation was maintained at moderately satisfactory due to slow rates of disbursement, the need to establish an internal audit function, and the lack of governance approval of budgets, as the EN-COM did not meet due to overarching political issues.  

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase (including transition arrangement to post-completion operation of investments financed by present operation, Operation & Maintenance arrangements, sustaining reforms and institutional capacity, and next phase/follow-up operation, if applicable): Looking forward to the post-NBTF period, the NBI – including all of its centers – developed a five year Strategic Plan and a program of activities to implement it. NBI requested support from the World Bank and its large donor partnership for this program, to which the World Bank responded in the form of the NCORE project. The project aims to facilitate cooperative activities, support improved integrated water planning and management, and assist in identifying and preparing feasibility studies of potential regional investments. The NCORE project consists of three components, one of which provides targeted support to ENTRO. The component builds on ENTRO’s achievements, including as related to JMP1 ID, through its focus on the continuation and expansion of the knowledge base and analytical activities, as well as on identification and preparation of investment projects. Specific activities that build from JMP1 ID include improving public domain access to the EN knowledge base; developing analytical tools for investment preparation, hydrologic modeling, etc.; enhancing knowledge partnerships with stakeholder networks (government, academia, private sector, etc.); and improving dam safety in the EN through training on regional dam safety frameworks and guidelines. Institutional capacity building is a central element of the project. This included training for technical specialists in government, academia and others in the use of analytical tools; on-the-job training for those involved in dam safety issues; and an intensive training program in environmental and social issues. The NCORE project maintains the web-portal, through which ENTRO may distribute several JMP outputs (maps, toolkits, annotated bibliography, etc). NCORE design reflects several lessons learned from implementing JMP1 ID – by focusing work at the technical level, including on filling critical knowledge gaps, specifying more realistic and likely achievable results, etc. – and seeks to consolidate and further the progress made under JMP1 ID.

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3. Assessment of Outcomes 33..11 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation (to current country and global priorities, and Bank assistance strategy): The relevance of objectives, design and implementation is rated moderately satisfactory. The assessment of each is described below. Objectives. Relevance of objectives is rated moderately satisfactory. The original project objective reflected a proper diagnosis of a development priority in the EN basin, and was strongly supported by the EN countries at Appraisal, as noted earlier. At the time of restructuring, the original objective was modified to maintain relevance in light of changing conditions. In particular, the development objective shifted the focus away from identification of a joint package of investments and towards providing information and analysis on large scale infrastructure development in the basin. The revised objective reflected two factors that had changed since the project’s inception:

Evolving plans for infrastructure development in the region. Ethiopia’s announcement of the construction of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was incorporated into the design of the project. As the only existing regional mechanism at the time to study dam development in the Blue Nile, JMP1 ID provided an opportunity to fill an important information gap and to inform EN country dialogue on the dam and on other future development of the river24; and

The freeze in EN government participation in some NBI activities, including JMP1 ID, did not allow for consultative activities as planned. Hence, the original reference to ‘consultative activities’ was deleted in the revised PDO.

However, the fact that only two of the three countries formally approved the restructuring throws into question the extent to which relevance was maintained in terms of alignment with country priorities. The alternate plan represented a second attempt to maintain relevance in light of continuing external events. ENTRO was unable to submit the official request for project restructuring to the World Bank, also due to political reasons. Sill, given the importance of the issue in the region, the objective is still considered to be highly relevant. The project objective remained highly relevant in terms of current WB country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals, contributing directly to the following:

The Nile engagement program, that supports cooperative initiatives that advance responsible and sustainable development and management of shared Nile waters;

Regional Integration Assistance Strategy (RIAS) and the Africa Region strategy that recognize regional approaches as a means for increasing opportunities and for realizing economies of scale; and

Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) goals of the three EN countries that include the promotion of economic growth, improved food security, and regional integration.

24 As usual with World Bank financing of technical assistance, the inclusion and examination of ongoing and planned infrastructure in a study should in no way be construed as an endorsement of any particular infrastructure projects by the World Bank, nor by any of the parties involved with the JMP1 ID project, other than where such projects have been specifically considered and expressly endorsed by the World Bank or any such parties, such as through an actual project financing.

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Design. Relevance of design is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The components and implementation arrangements to a degree matched what the project aimed to achieve as stated in the PDO, but there were important shortcomings. The three components of both the original and restructured project linked directly with the PDO, perhaps unsurprising as the PDO itself was written in terms of outputs rather than outcomes in both the original and restructured formulations, as noted above. The design of the components could, however, have been more flexible to allow for necessary modifications during project implementation.25 Implementation arrangements – and in particular the project’s governance structure – proved to be difficult in practice as the political circumstances in the basin changed. These implementation arrangements were maintained under project restructuring, notwithstanding the fact that one year after the project’s start, they had been largely inoperable. The timeframe was overly ambitious given the project’s complexity and the difficult operating environment, as noted above. This was, however, remedied with the project’s extension during restructuring. Implementation. Implementation in the interests of maintaining relevance is rated moderately satisfactory. Overall, the adaptive actions taken by ENTRO and supported by the World Bank during project implementation were responsive to changing needs and circumstances, including an exceedingly complex political environment and various implementation challenges. Additionally, development of a draft road map of suggested future actions to assist the countries in identifying needed studies and activities in an area of critical regional importance, bolsters the relevance during implementation. However, relevance could have been enhanced if some (more drastic) corrective actions were taken earlier and important opportunities that presented themselves during implementation, more expeditiously and fully seized (refer Section 2.2). 33..22 Achievement of Project Development Objectives (including brief discussion of causal linkages between outputs and outcomes, with details on outputs in Annex 4): The achievement of the PDO is rated unsatisfactory, as shown in the table below. This final rating is derived from the assessment of achievement against: (i) the original PDO and (ii) the revised PDO at restructuring. The assessment – presented after the table below – yields ratings of unsatisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory for the original and revised PDOs, respectively. These two ratings are weighted in proportion to the share of actual disbursements made in the periods before and after approval of the revision to arrive at the final rating.

Item Number

Item Against Original PDO Against Revised PDO

Overall

1. Rating Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory

2. Rating Valuea 2 3 3. Weight (% disbursed US$ 2.15m US$ 0.56 m

25 This would have been helped if the original and restructured components were conceived in terms of activities, rather than specified outputs (i.e., reports for the vast majority of the work under the project in terms of overall budget). That the contribution of some of the original components could have been more clearly defined was recognized during restructuring.

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before/after PDO change)b

75%

25%

4. Weighted Value (2x3) 1.5 0.75 2.25 5. Final Rating

(rounded) Unsatisfactory

a Rating Value: highly satisfactory=6; satisfactory=5; moderately satisfactory=4; moderately unsatisfactory=3; unsatisfactory=2; highly unsatisfactory=1. b Original amount: US$ 7 million; cancelled amount after project closure: US$ 4.128 million Assessment of achievement against original PDO The achievement of the original PDO is rated unsatisfactory. The original project aimed to: “assist the three EN countries in identification of a JMP1 investment package through a series of studies and consultative activities that take into account economic, social and environmentally sustainability issues in an integrated manner.” While ENTRO was able to provide valuable information and analysis through the course of the project, the Eastern Nile countries did not identify a joint package of investments. In fact, they ceased the process of identification of a joint package of investments through this project at restructuring, approved in September 2011. The table below provides a summary of achievement of the original PDO. The first column presents the achievements in terms of targets reached for Key Project Indicators. The second provides the ICR rating on the achievement of the PDO. As can be seen, a number of formal targets were not met, but several valuable outputs were produced.

Original PDO/Outcome Indicators

Achievement of PDO Rating

(i) “the SSEA provides a sound basis for the inclusion of social and environmental considerations in the selection of projects in the JMP program.” The SSEA was not completed. The first phase of the SSEA was ceased before its completion, for reasons outlined in section 1.7 of the ICR. This indicator was not directly met. When the SSEA process was cancelled, ENTRO repackaged some of the analysis that was being used in the SSEA 1, including key environmental and social issues to be considered in Eastern Nile development. This information is reflected in the draft Working Paper 1, which identifies key issues for the countries to consider in the development of the Blue and main-stem Nile, and gaps that need to be filled in order for the countries to include environmental and social considerations in Eastern Nile development and management decisions.

Unsatisfactory

(ii) “Eastern Nile governments have an improved knowledge base to sustainably develop and manage the resources of the Blue and main-stem Nile.” ENTRO has improved the “knowledge base” in two ways: through the provision of information and analysis; and by improving the capacity of key stakeholders to engage in sustainable development.

Moderately Unsatisfactory

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a) Provision of information and analysis. Through the initial work on the SSEA (before the SSEA was cancelled) and through the draft working papers and other related analysis, ENTRO has advanced the consolidation of information and analysis on issues related to development and management on the Blue and Main-stem Nile. While additional data are still needed by the Eastern Nile governments in order to make informed investment decisions from a regional perspective, ENTRO has made advancements in this indicator. Outputs include: Two draft Working Papers (WPs) were developed under the alternate plan.

Draft WP 1 is discussed above. Draft WP 2 included a scoping level analysis of the development, filling and operation of a cascade of dams in the Abbay / Blue Nile based on modeling exercises (although the Panel of Independent Reviewers still had several outstanding questions related to the draft papers that were not resolved at the time of this ICR).

A draft roadmap that outlines the critical issues, information gaps and analysis that would need to be undertaken to promote sustainable development of the Abbay/Blue and mainstem Nile;

Annotated Bibliography on Abbay/Blue Nile and Main Nile; Social and Environmental Mapping and Spatial Analysis Report; Eastern Nile Water System Riverware Simulation Model Reports; Eastern Nile Water Resource Modeling using Mike Basin; Preliminary Assessment Report for Dam Safety Management in EN; Good Practice Guidelines for Designing Water Efficient and Sustainable

Irrigation Systems for EN region; and Toolkits that organize and facilitate access to studies on irrigation, flood,

power and watershed management previously undertaken by ENTRO. This information has been both gathered and shared with countries through: Consultations: The SICAS-IP had been developed and discussed with key

stakeholders. ENTRO held two formal regional consultations at the start of the project and made presentations to the Nile Basin Discourse, a network of NGOs. Two consultations were held in the early stages of the project, ENTRO was unable to hold stakeholder consultations on draft WP 1, draft WP 2 and the Roadmap before project closure due to instructions from one EN country to hold project activities, and as the Panel still had outstanding questions on the Working Papers.

Provision of information through other channels: ENTRO continued to communicate and share information out through the other channels when formal consultations were not possible, including discussion of some elements of its work at Eastern Nile modeling fora and at an outreach event in February 2013. Additionally, it solicited and shared written comments from EN countries on early drafts of the SSEA 1, as well as on the site specific studies (SSSs) of dams on the Abbay (undertaken by Ministry of Water and Energy, Ethiopia, with Norwegian support). ENTRO may make publically available some of the project outputs, including the maps, annotated bibliography, and tool kits, through a web portal currently under development.

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(b) Capacity building: ENTRO undertook a training program to improve the human capacity of its own organization and key national stakeholders to be able to foster sustainable development. This included six regional training programs for stakeholders in the three countries and ENTRO in topics related to SSEAs and other critical issues to transboundary water resource development, with a total of 164 participants trained. In addition, the three JMP Visiting Professionals received extensive training through the six month course of their work with ENTRO.

(iii) “The first set of coordinated investments is identified at the end of the project.” The first set of coordinated investments was not identified at the end of the project. The pursuit of identification of a joint set of investments was discontinued at the project restructuring.

Highly Unsatisfactory

Assessment of achievement against revised PDO The achievement of the revised PDO is rated moderately unsatisfactory. At project restructuring, the PDO was revised and simplified significantly to the following: “assist the three EN countries in examining joint water resources development possibilities on the Abbay/Blue Nile and Main-stem Nile, taking economic, social and environmental sustainability issues into account in an integrated manner.” Indicators at the PDO and intermediate levels were also revised, and a number of the original weaknesses were corrected. The table below provides a summary of achievement of the PDO using the indicators approved at September 2011 project restructuring. While a number of formal targets were not met, several valuable outputs were produced in line with the alternate plan, but these were not formalized through a second restructuring.

Achievement of PDO/Indicator Targets (restructuring to project closure)

Achievement of PDO Rating

(restructuring to project closure)

(i) “the SSEA provides a sound basis for the inclusion of social and environmental considerations in the selection of projects in the JMP program.” This indicator remained unchanged after restructuring (refer explanation in table with original PDO above).

Unsatisfactory

(ii) “Eastern Nile governments have an improved knowledge base to sustainably develop and manage the resources of the Blue and main-stem Nile.” This remained unchanged after restructuring (refer explanation in table with original PDO above).

Moderately Unsatisfactory

(iii) “a roadmap for a coordinated set of investments is identified at the end of the project.” This indicator was changed in the restructuring, to replace the indicator on the identification of a coordinated set of investments. Intermediate results indicator 2.3 in the new results framework further described this output as, “a roadmap for advancing investment and addressing critical issues for sustainable water resources development and management in the Abbay/Blue and Mainstem Nile.” The draft roadmap outlines the critical issues, information gaps and analysis that would

Satisfactory

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need to be undertaken to promote sustainable development of the Abbay/Blue and mainstem Nile. More information is provided in Annex 5. The activities and outputs that contributed to the PDO by component are detailed in Annex 2. 33..33 Efficiency (Net Present Value/Economic Rate of Return, cost effectiveness, e.g., unit rate norms, least cost, and comparisons; and Financial Rate of Return): Project efficiency is rated moderately unsatisfactory, on the basis of the following: (i) implementation; (ii) disbursement patterns; and (iii) impacts. Each is described below. Implementation. Implementation efficiency is rated moderately unsatisfactory. Implementation efficiency was negatively affected by a number of factors. Although some of these factors were external to the project (notably, the changing political climate in the Nile Basin), a number were within its control, including those related to project design and complexity. Significant mitigating actions were taken by ENTRO and the Bank26, but the mitigation measures that were put in place to respond to issues were unable to counter-balance the significant implementation delays, which extended throughout the life of the project, even after formal restructuring. The relative progress in advancing work during the short life of the alternate plan indicates that if issues had been addressed earlier, implementation could have been more efficient. Disbursement. Disbursement efficiency is rated unsatisfactory. Disbursement is used as an efficiency measure as there is an opportunity cost associated with the allocation of funds: unused resources allocated to one project could have been allocated to productive uses elsewhere. Annex 1 presents a cost breakdown for the project. It reveals that the appraisal disbursement estimates were generally over-estimated. The project had to cut or substantially revise several activities for various reasons, including related to implementation issues and political challenges. The project disbursed 41% of appraised and restructured funds by closure. Importantly, Annex 1 also includes the budget estimates under the alternate plan, which could not be formalized in a second restructuring as discussed above. Had the project been again restructured, the final disbursements would have fared much better relative to the revised budget. Project impacts. Efficiency of project impacts is rated moderately satisfactory. The relevant question for evaluating efficiency in terms of project impacts is whether those outcomes/impacts achieved are reasonable when compared with the costs. The costs in this case are those funds that were actually expended and not the full project budget; efficiency issues related to disbursement delays and un-utilized funds have already been addressed above. The benefits include all positive impacts of the project, which were broadly: an enhanced and consolidated knowledge base on the EN, including analytical tools for evaluating complex multipurpose water investments; an increased understanding of and appreciation for the opportunities for coordinated water development in the EN gained through knowledge shared in stakeholder consultations, technical meetings, etc.; and skills development through training and other capacity building activities. The draft JMP Working Papers 1 provided a broad, yet reasoned assessment of issues that should be explored in sustainable Eastern Nile development, and the draft roadmap outlines the critical issues, information gaps and analysis that would need to be undertaken to

26 See section 1.3.

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promote sustainable development of the Abbay/Blue and mainstem Nile (although this roadmap has not been formally consulted with the countries). Because the impacts were of an upstream and qualitative nature, standard methods for evaluating them are difficult, and arguably impossible, to apply directly. Indeed, for this same reason, a rigorous economic and financial analysis was not included in the PAD or in the Restructuring Paper. However, both stated that the costs of the project (US$ 7 million at appraisal) were considered to be nominal when viewed relative to the following benefits: the information base established through joint assessments and studies, a trained staff as a result of capacity building programs, more rigorous analytical tools, and a common understanding of the opportunities and risks built through stakeholder involvement. While a joint investment project was not identified, many of these expected benefits were achieved – albeit in a different form than envisioned – at an actual cost of $2.874 million. 33..44 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating (combining relevance, achievement of PDOs [GEO], and efficiency): The overall outcome is rated moderately unsatisfactory. It takes into account the relevance of objectives, design and implementation that is rated moderately satisfactory; the achievement of the project development objectives that is rated unsatisfactory (section 3.2); and project efficiency that is rated moderately unsatisfactory (section 3.3). Notwithstanding this rating, the project can count several important achievements that were attained in a difficult political environment and in spite of significant implementation challenges. 33..55 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (if any, where not previously covered or to amplify discussion above): (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development The project’s impact in these areas was expected to be indirect because activities primarily consisted of knowledge base enhancement, consultations, and capacity building. The direct impacts were to be generated in later stages, through the implementation of the investment package that was to be identified under the project. The project, however, implemented actions to increase knowledge and skills of ENTRO technical staff and others (e.g., Visiting Professionals), including women. The social and environmental work under the project – Draft SSEA 1, Draft Working Paper 1, Environmental and Social Mapping, etc. – helped to bring to the fore issues related to poverty, gender and social development, sensitizing ENTRO staff and those benefiting from knowledge transfer. Indeed, Draft Working Paper 1 covered two directly related key issues – access to water and livelihoods, and vulnerable groups. Furthermore, the SICAS-IP gave focused attention to inclusion of women and vulnerable groups in its consultation and communications plans (though these plans could not be implemented). (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening (particularly with reference to impacts on longer-term capacity and institutional development): The achievement of the project’s development objectives was directly linked to institutional change and strengthening supported under the project. One intermediate outcome of the JMP1 ID studies was to provide capacity building opportunities for ENTRO and related agencies in the three countries. This

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included six trainings for over 164 participants in the three EN countries, in topics including SSEAs, Environmental and Social issues, and conflict resolution, in addition to extensive training provided for the ENTRO staff and Visiting Professionals. This is one component of the project where ENTRO fully achieved its official formal Intermediate Outcome target, in spite of the difficult operating environment. In addition, during the course of the project, ENTRO was strengthened considerably through new equipment, training, and knowledge gained through interactions with technical consultants, PoIR, and other experts (e.g., those participating in modeling workshops), etc. Inter-institutional coordination was also improved in the later stages of the project. All of these were necessary not only for generating project results, but also for placing ENTRO on a firmer footing in terms of enhanced technical strength more generally. Still, the experience with implementing JMP1 ID shows that weaknesses remained on many fronts, including technical, managerial and administrative. This is perhaps unsurprising for a relatively young institution, charged with conducting challenging work in a complex regional arena. Follow-on operations supporting ENTRO’s Strategic Plan, such as NCORE and others, include targeted activities for furthering institutional development. Beyond ENTRO, the project aimed to support institutional development within the EN countries. Although activities could not be undertaken as planned for reasons described elsewhere in this report, capacity building was undertaken in various ways, including through the Visiting Professionals program and the dissemination of project outputs (e.g., preliminary assessment report for dam safety management in the EN). 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops: A qualitative assessment of the impacts of this JMP1 ID Project and the Eastern Nile Planning Model (ENPM) Project was gathered though a survey conducted at the NCORE project launch workshop involving approximately 40 participants. The survey did not portend to be representative of the diverse institutions that participated in or benefited from either or both projects, nor of the stakeholders in the Eastern Nile basin. It is considered, however, to be a useful mechanism for gathering input from stakeholders on important aspects of the project implementation. Findings of this survey are also presented in Annex 5. The main conclusions of the qualitative assessment in relation to the JMP1 ID Project are summarized below: Achievement of PDO. The evaluation found the Project was able to achieve its development objective. The survey asked participants how strongly they agreed with the statement that the Project has met its objectives: 40% gave a “strongly agree” or an “agree” response and 35% gave an “average” response. Only three respondents indicated that the development objective was not met, and seven did not know. Contribution of recent activities carried out by ENTRO. In relation to the recent activities conducted by ENTRO, the evaluation found the majority of interviewed stakeholders were satisfied with ENTRO’s contribution towards the goal of NBI. Participants were asked to express their agreement with the contribution of the recent activities carried out by ENTRO (with the support from the JMP1 ID Project and the ENPM project) to address key challenges in the Eastern Nile: 95% gave an “average” or better response to the contribution to develop a common vision for the Eastern Nile, 98% to build capacity for

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basin-wide development and management and more efficient use of Eastern Nile resources, 93% to increase awareness about Eastern Nile issues and the need to jointly develop and use the common resources of the Eastern Nile for the benefit of all, 95% to generate knowledge products and modeling tools for better development and management of Eastern Nile resources, 98% to strengthen the capacity of ENTRO to provide technical knowledge helpdesk services to other regional and national institutions, and 88% to strengthen the capacity of ENTRO to facilitate regional-scale land and water investments. Long-lasting benefits. The evaluation found a strong belief among interviewed stakeholders that the Eastern Nile institutions will benefit from the Project. Participants responded that the Eastern Nile institutions will benefit from the various products and services delivered under the Project: 72% gave a “strongly agree” or an “agree” response, and 14% gave an “average” response. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome The risk to development outcomes is rated low. This rating is based on a strict interpretation of development outcomes, as defined in the formal Project Development Objective and associated results framework. Several targets were not reached and the development objective was only partially met. It is not evident that these will be fully reached / met in the near future. It is not possible to officially rate in this ICR the risk to the unstated, unofficial development outcomes. However, it is useful to discuss such a rating, as many of the achievements of the project were not captured in the PDO or intermediate outcome ratings. Again, it was expected that the formal PDO would be revised in a second restructuring that ultimately could not be formalized. The second restructuring would have aligned the project’s development objectives with the outputs produced given the ground realities. If it were possible to rate assessment of risk to development outcome against the unofficial project indicators, the risk to development outcomes would be rated moderate. The project’s main accomplishments in the key areas of building the knowledge base and strengthening capacity are to a large extent irreversible. The use of various avenues for stakeholder consultations and communications expanded the reach of the project, created opportunities for regional dialogue, and allowed for a broad transfer of information, analytical tools and technical expertise. Information exchange through the partnerships that were established helped to inform discussions surrounding infrastructure in the basin, including a heightened awareness of the importance of environmental and social issues. A concrete case that should be highlighted is the Visiting Professionals program; whose participants benefited from funding under the project conducted hydrological modeling of the Nile Basin using a number of modeling tools. The skills and expertise developed through this experience are directly relevant to their permanent place of work. The follow-on NCORE project expects to consolidate and build on these achievements. The NCORE project itself is a part of a larger Strategic Plan that has been developed by ENTRO, along with the other two NBI centers. ENTRO is currently in the process of seeking funding for other aspects of the Strategic Plan that focus on many of the same areas advanced under JMP1 ID and other related projects, and several parties have indicated an interest. There are factors, however, that may affect the sustainability of the “unofficial” project outcomes. The primary risk is an external one: that the political environment will worsen, which could dilute motivation

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and disrupt the ability of stakeholders to benefit from ENTRO’s work. Further, many future actions – such as filling critical information and data gaps identified in the JMP1 ID studies – will need to take place at the national level. The implementation of these activities relies on the commitment of EN countries to furthering cooperation, in addition to a strengthened regional institution that would serve a facilitation role. Political realities in the EN basin will weigh in heavily here as well. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance (relating to design, implementation and outcome issues) 5.1 Bank (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry (i.e., performance through lending phase): Bank performance at ensuring quality at entry is rated moderately unsatisfactory. Strengths at entry include the following:

The project’s objectives addressed an important development need that was in line with World Bank and EN country priorities, as evidenced by the strong commitment from the highest levels of all parties.

The upstream work and consultative activities during the Launch Phase established a strong foundation for the project, which provided an opportunity to leverage the momentum that had been gained to that point.

Activities were a mix between analytical work and capacity building, and included a strong element of stakeholder communication and consultation. All of these were needed to realize the project’s objective.

The project’s objective was ambitious but (correctly) perceived as feasible to achieve in light of these factors and, critically, the then prevailing political environment.

Environmental and social safeguards issues were well addressed through the project’s activities themselves, and namely the SSEA, as well as the establishment of a Panel of Independent Reviewers (PoIR) consisting of environmental and social experts for quality assurance of project outputs.

The project reflected strong partnership with development partners: it was funded through the multi-donor NBTF and mechanisms were planned for coordinating work under JMP 1ID with the related site specific studies of two dams in the EN, supported by Norway.

Project implementation was potentially moved forward by the early completion of preparatory work, including finalization of TOR for main studies, selection of the JV, and establishment of many of the planned institutional arrangements.

Notwithstanding these strengths, the project suffered a number of design weaknesses that were to affect implementation and the ability to achieve objectives. These include the following:

The timeframe for the project was overly ambitious given its technical complexity, high profile nature, and the objectives it sought to achieve in a sensitive operating environment. The challenges of the Launch Phase were well appreciated by the Bank team. The stated desire for expediency should have been counter-balance by lessons learned from the Launch Phase to arrive at a more realistic timeframe.

The components were rigid and conceived in terms of outputs (i.e., reports) as opposed to activities, which would not allow for needed flexibility to respond to changing conditions. Sub-

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component 1.2 was particularly constraining – one study contracted to one consulting firm – a danger as it constituted the majority of work under the project, including in terms of funding allocations.

Linked to the above, the PDO was written in terms of outputs rather than outcomes, and all PDO level indicators relied on successful completion of the one study under sub-component 1.2. Any issues with the quality of the study’s technical design (i.e., the TOR), the abilities of the (one) consulting firm contracted, and/or the movement from one stage to the next would disproportionately jeopardize the success of the entire project. The M&E framework could have been better designed – particularly at the PDO level – in order to better reflect the other activities under the project.

Implementation arrangements were exceedingly complex, involving a number of structures at various levels in three countries. The limited capacity of ENTRO meant that operationalizing these arrangements would likely have been a difficult under any circumstances, and impossible if key assumptions did not hold in practice (refer below).

Risks were underestimated and needed mitigating measures not established. Perhaps most importantly, the Bank was over-optimistic in its assumption that the cooperative environment would persist, making the project highly vulnerable to shifting EN country priorities and commitment. Additional risks could have been identified, including risks of executing the bulk of the project through one consultancy, and the phasing of the project into two parts, with the second phase contingent on the completion of the first phase.

(b) Quality of Supervision: The quality of supervision is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The strengths of supervision include the following:

The records reveal that supervision teams had a clear appreciation of the issues and provided recommendations to the client on ways to move forward.

The supervision team worked pro-actively to correct implementation issues in close collaboration with the client, and was heavily involved undertaking remedial actions, e.g., improving the quality of documents, coordinating and participating in meetings, etc.

Supervision took some important and bold decisions, including the restructuring to enhance relevance of the project and supporting the alternate plan at the later stages.

The supervision team took active measures to navigate the politically sensitive environment, including by maintaining open communication channels directly with the EN countries.

The supervision team should be commended for keeping management apprised of implementation issues in a comprehensive and candid manner – including due to the complexities of the political environment.

The weaknesses of supervision include the following: Supervision was uneven in intensity, particularly at the early stages of the project when there

were already clear indications of challenges and implementation delays. The actions taken could have at times been more forceful, in particular as critical sub-

components failed to perform (SSEA Phase 1), and certain key decisions should have been taken earlier.

Some important risk mitigation measures were not operationalized by the Bank team. For example, the Internal Group of Advisors (comprised of legal, safeguards and communications

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experts) that was established to provide guidance and strategic support met only infrequently and had high turn-over.

Notwithstanding Bank management support, supervision team leadership – that changed three times over the project period – demonstrated an uneven approach and commitment to the project.

Issues beyond the narrow scope (and power) of the supervision team and at the broader Bank level had a critical role to play in project performance issues. These include the following:

Slow handling of internal processing and lack of clarity on Bank policies directly impacted on project implementation. This includes the long wait and lack of response by the Bank on implications of the temporary suspension of one of the firms in the JV, which was instituted in March 2012. This effectively delayed implementation by five to six months out of the extended fifteen month period.

Links with associated Bank-executed work were explicitly mentioned in the PAD. As the work took longer than expected and the changing plans for development in the region rendered the results out-of-date, it was not shared with ENTRO as input for the JMP1 ID studies.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance: The overall Bank performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory, given the moderately unsatisfactory ratings on quality at entry and on supervision. There were several design flaws and supervision could have been stronger, particularly given the complexity of the project and its sensitive political environment. Although the alternate plan represented a valiant attempt to turn the project around and to generate results in the form of concrete outputs, it came very late in the process. The Bank team can be credited with reacting to changing conditions and other implementation challenges, as well as working closely with the client to produce a number of useful outputs by project’s end. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance: Government performance typically assesses the central government, which is the borrower of the loan. It does not strictly apply in the case of this project. The direct borrower of the loan was ENTRO, an inter-governmental regional organization and one of three centers under the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). This meant that, technically, the “government” involved is its governing body, the Eastern Nile Council of Ministers. ENCOM is comprised of the ministers of water affairs from the three EN countries (Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia) and is responsible for providing policy guidance and approving projects, work plans and budgets. Thus, the role of the EN countries in JMP ID through ENCOM was clearly critical to the implementation of the project. As discussed above, there was a high degree of ownership and commitment to the project’s development objectives at the start of the project, as reflected by ENCOM’s strong support. However, commitment around the project was not constant. The political events that broke out only a few months after project approval had a profound impact on the project’s ability to be successfully implemented in pursuit of its objectives. The challenges are described in various sections of this report, and include minimal participation from some of the governments in providing feedback in the JMP1 ID studies and no governance meetings. The restructuring that included extending the closing date and heightening the

42

relevance of the project reflected mixed support; there were signs that the project’s activities were valued, but also evidence to the contrary. The latter includes that a structure outside this project and the NBI was established shortly after restructuring (January 2012) to study on-going dam development. Later, the second attempt at restructuring was not ultimately formalized because ENTRO was unable to obtain required authorization from ENCOM. Finally, one country asked for a halt to new work in the JMP process in November 2012 until larger hydro-political issues could be resolved. As ENCOM and the project governance bodies that it mandated did not formally meet after mid-2012, Government Performance is rated unsatisfactory. However, it also is recognized that the position of the Eastern Nile governments with regard to NBI participation relates to issues beyond the scope of this project. The low rating here only reflects performance with regard to this project, and does not reflect on the overall positions of the Nile governments on larger issues in Nile hydro-politics, which are matters for sovereign states to decide. It is important to place the experience of the project in its wider context. The challenges were not unique to JMP1 ID and affected the NBI portfolio, more generally. That said, JMP1 ID was arguably the most high profile, complex and politically sensitive project in ENTRO’s portfolio. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance: Borrower performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The strengths of implementing agency performance include the following:

ENTRO took a leading role in facilitating consultation and communication, to the extent possible in light of exceptionally difficult political circumstances. Although the SICAS-IP could not be implemented as planned for these same reasons, creative avenues were found to disseminate project outputs. This included presenting in modeling fora, NBI meetings, and other conferences and workshops.

All legal covenants were initially met, with effectiveness conditions met two months after negotiations. Due to the freeze in participation of two EN countries, several of the project groups specified in the legal covenants were unable to formally meet in later stages of the project. ENTRO responded by seeking feedback from members of these groups on an informal basis, including through writing and by telephone.

ENTRO was able to fully comply with the legal covenant on carrying out project activities in accordance with the NBI’s “Strategy for Addressing Environmental and Social Safeguards.” Even though it had to cancel consultations on JMP1 ID draft documents, ENTRO has developed a plan for consultation, dissemination and disclosure once the hydropolitical situation is conducive and if it is given permission by its member governments, and began to implement this plan (e.g., ENTRO discussed some elements of its work at an outreach event in February 2013).

In later stages of the project, ENTRO corrected coordination issues with related projects, including by working more closely with the ENPM project’s Visiting Professionals program to produce valuable products and disseminate these to the wider technical community.

ENTRO responded to challenges and the need to maintain relevance by overhauling project plans at two critical points during project implementation.

ENTRO took pro-active steps to arrange for a sustainable transition, including developing a Strategic Plan for the next five years (part of NBI’s larger Plan) and soliciting funding, including through country contributions.

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The weaknesses of implementing agency performance include the following: Management issues were increasingly evident at later stages of project implementation, with the

decreased number of management staff at ENTRO. This includes oversight of procurement problems leading to delays in Bank reviews of the proposed contract amendment after restructuring and in arriving at a settlement with the JV at contract cancellation. The slow hiring of legal assistance to manage contract settlement with the JV was a reflection of broader difficulties in the procurement of several supporting consultants at various points. Some of these issues could be attributed to external conditions (e.g., the fact that ENTRO could not advertise the Special Studies), but others were within the control of ENTRO.

ENTRO faced challenges in managing the JV for the Main JMP1 ID Studies, as discussed above. This was largely the result of limited capacity, an issue that was never adequately corrected. At the end of the project, ENTRO also noted having difficulties managing the timely outputs of 12 individual consultants required to execute the alternate plan in the short remaining time.

There was poor communication and coordination with the PoIR, which led to a lack of understanding (and agreement) on the alternate plan and its relationship with the cancelled JMP1 ID Studies, and in particular the SSEA. The adoption of the alternate plan itself was communicated to the PoIR several months (October 2012) after the decision was taken and notwithstanding the fact that a meeting was planned as a “next step” in the June 2012 Aide Memoire. When the meeting took place, the PoIR expressed several concerns with the alternate plan, including its ambitious scope. The late date provided very little time to address these concerns, which were repeated by the PoIR at the end of project, including in comments on the two Working Papers and a more general statement about the cancellation of the SSEA process.

ENTRO could have more pro-actively provided technical input to the studies, and more generally taken responsibility for their quality. This would have been helped if the envisioned coordination mechanisms with other related activities (i.e., ENTRO projects) were put in place and stronger at earlier stages of implementation.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance: The overall borrower performance rating is unsatisfactory based on the unsatisfactory rating for government performance, and moderately unsatisfactory rating for implementing agency performance and outcomes of the project, as per OPCS guidelines. As explained in the paragraphs above, ENTRO confronted several unexpected external challenges, and responded by adopting a number of adaptive measures. This allowed the project to count several achievements at its end, although not formally captured in the project’s original or restructured design. However, the challenges posed by the larger hydropolitical context irreversibly delayed project implementation. 6. Lessons Learned (both project-specific and of wide general application) The experience with implementing a complex regional project in a difficult operating environment provided several lessons that could inform future generations of similar projects, in the EN basin and elsewhere. Many have been incorporated in the follow-on NCORE project. A number of the lessons learned are not new or unique to this project, but rather have been generated through other operations. Useful lessons learned include the following:

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Simplicity is needed in project design – including implementation arrangements – particularly if

the implementing agency exists in a complex transboundary context and faces a limited institutional mandate. However, over-simplifying to the degree of effectively collapsing all major activities into one comes with its own challenges. Simplification should be balanced by a realistic prioritization and sequencing so as to spread workload demands and reduce risks.

Flexibility needs to be built into project design in order to respond to evolving needs and

circumstances, particularly in situations where the context is in flux. At the same time, clarity of purpose is needed. The possibility for directed adaptive management would be helped by being unambiguous about the development objectives being pursued, on the one hand, while allowing flexible implementation modalities to achieve these, on the other. Additionally, sufficient time and effort should be taken to design a useful M&E framework, with meaningful objectives and ‘SMART’ indicators that allow for this flexibility.

The importance of securing government ownership and commitment cannot be underestimated, a

particularly difficult task with regional projects that involve a number of countries with possibly different (and even conflicting) agendas. However, subordinating the technical to the political risks missing both. A critical and continual assessment of what is politically feasible is likely to help manage expectations and align targets to achievable results.

SSEA’s are relatively new tools, and the complexity of the JMP1 ID SSEA was further complicated by the immense project area covered under the project, as well as the transboundary nature of the project area. In beginning an SSEA process, it is important to ensure that all involved, including implementing agency, governments, local authorities, other stakeholders, and those conducting the analysis, have a common understanding of the level and type of analysis to be included, as well as the level of effort required of all parties. It would also be advantageous to outline “terms for engagement.” Additionally, the staff required for undertaking (on the consultant side) and managing (on the client side) this type of work should not be underestimated.

In anti-corruption cases where the World Bank makes a judgment regarding a firm, the World

Bank should be better prepared to provide clear, rapid guidance to its other clients who may also have contracts with said firm, to advise whether the change in status of the firm affects the client’s current or future procurement plans.

There is need to be realistic about the time required to implement complex regional projects,

while remaining mindful of the exigency for delivering results to respond to development needs at a time of opportunity. Striking such a balance argues in favor of a programmatic approach that would allow the gestation period required for certain activities (e.g., institutional development and capacity building, consultation and communication, etc.), while producing concrete outputs ‘just in time’.

For strategically important projects of this type, including high risk – high reward projects, there

is a final lesson learned related to the broader issue of the criteria against which project success judged. As objectives such as maintaining strategic interests cannot be captured in standard

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project design and tracking systems (e.g., results framework), project achievement cannot be fully assessed. This inevitably leaves the picture incomplete and the evaluation a partial one, as was the case with this project, where several positive outcomes were achieved, despite the challenges.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies: N/A.

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ANNEXES Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

(US$ million)

Estimate at Restructuring (US$ million)

Estimate under Alternate Plan (US$ million)

Actual /Latest Estimate

(US$ million)

Percentage of Appraisal

1. JMP ID Studies 4.354 4.5 1.85 1.74 40%

2. Capacity Building and Implementation Support

2.665

2.5 1.60 1.12

42%

Total Project Costs (NBTF grant)

7.00 7.00 3.45 2.87 41%

In-kind Contributions .60 .60 .60 .60 100%

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Financing Appraisal Estimate

(US$ million)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(US$ million)

Percentage of Appraisal

Governments In-kind contributions .60 .60 100% NBTF Grant 7.00 2.87 41%

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component This Annex presents a detailed discussion of the achievement of outputs by project component organized in two sections: (i) prior to restructuring (September 2011); (ii) post restructuring. It also provides a summary of the major outputs produced under the project and their impact or uptake. Achievement of Outputs by Component Prior to Restructuring As shown in the below table, by the time of restructuring, many of output indicators had not been fully achieved, for reasons that are described in detail in this ICR. This led to reformulating many of the indicators in the restructured RF.

Results Indicators by Component

Baseline Targets Progress at Restructuring (September 2011) in Reaching Targets

Component One: JMP1 Identification StudiesA participatory strategic social and environmental assessment of water resources development alternatives in the Blue-Main Nile

None SSEA-Stage 2 report completed and stakeholder’s comments incorporated

Draft SSEA 1 developed; comments from EN countries, Technical Advisors, Panel of Independent Reviewers (PoIR) and World Bank solicited, received and partially incorporated. SSEA 1 still of inadequate quality delaying commencement of SSEA Stage 2.

Identification of a regional Anchor Project, taking into account economic, social, and environmental considerations, including reservoir filling and operating rule studies to optimize system benefits and best manage risks

None Cascade development and sequence determined and Anchor project defined

SSEA Stage 2 and cascade sequencing study not commenced.

Identification of potential nationally-implemented JMP1 Non-Anchor Projects, including irrigation modernization & development and watershed managed centered on agricultural productivity and livelihoods improvement and watershed sustainability as well as floodplain management

None All non-anchor investment study reports completed and discussed with key stakeholders

Not completed.

Component 2: Capacity Building and Implementation Support

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Results Indicators by Component

Baseline Targets Progress at Restructuring (September 2011) in Reaching Targets

A well-conceived stakeholder involvement and communication program

None The program fully implemented with good results

A stakeholder involvement and communication program developed and discussed with stakeholders. Changes needed in light of implementation difficulties, including those beyond project control (e.g., linkages with secondary stakeholders, improvements in consultation schedule and modalities, etc.) Two formal regional consultations held at the start of the project (Launch and Inception Report workshops). ENTRO also made presentations to Nile Basin Discourse, a network of NGOs.

Capacity of ENTRO and related agencies in the three countries for preparation of JMP1 investment projects and other work related to their mandates

Weak Core social/environmental staff (2 from ENTRO and three countries) trained on environmental / social assessment and management planning

Capacity building on environmental and social issues ongoing, including: September 2009: Regional SEA

training with focus on JMP-1 SSEA - Regional Advisory Environment Group (includes national focal points).

October 2009: Water resources development and social conflict management – 41 participants – Khartoum.

November 2009: SSEA – 36 participants from all countries – Addis.

November 2009: Integrated Watershed Management and SSEA – 26 experts from all countries – Bahir Dar.

February 2010: World Bank safeguards policies – environmental experts from all three countries and NBI staff - Addis.

March 2010: training on SSEA for members of JMP Regional Technical Committee – Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt.

Additionally, in October 2009, a training course on contract negotiation, contract management and WB procurement guidelines was provided to three senior officials from the three EN countries and JMP1 ID team members.

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Results Indicators by Component

Baseline Targets Progress at Restructuring (September 2011) in Reaching Targets

A roadmap for preparation of the first set of JMP investment projects

None Roadmap developed and endorsed by ENCOM

Not yet commenced

Achievement of Outputs by Component Post Restructuring At project restructuring, many components were re-focused or otherwise adjusted. This led to a revised Results Framework at the component level. Shortly after restructuring, an alternate plan that consisted of a reduced study scope and a modified implementation modality was adopted. The alternate plan could not be formalized because ENTRO was unable to receive the necessary authorization from its governing body. Although a number of the formal restructured targets were not fully met, the work undertaken by ENTRO – including two draft Working Papers and a number of other studies, modeling exercises, etc. – were aligned with informal targets under the alternate plan, as noted below.

Restructured Results Indicators

by Component

Baseline Restructured Targets

Progress in reaching

Restructured Targets

Progress in reaching Alternate Plan Targets

Component One: JMP1 Identification Studies Strategic Social and Environmental Assessment (SSEA) of water resources development alternatives in Abbay/Blue and Mainstem Nile

None SSEA Stage 2 report completed and stakeholder’s comments incorporated

SSEA cancelled. Working Paper 1 assessing social and environmental issues at scoping level in draft form. Stakeholder comments not incorporated.

Under the alternate plan, the SSEA was cancelled for a number of reasons, as detailed in this ICR. The main project deliverables became two Working Papers. Working Paper 1 (WP 1) was not meant to replace the SSEA, but rather to provide a scoping level assessment of possible environmental and social issues based on available information and to identify information/ data gaps as a basis for discussion and post-project work. ENTRO was unable to hold planned stakeholder consultations on draft Working Paper 1 (WP 1) before project closure because one EN country instructed it to hold project activities until broader issues related to cooperation in the EN could be resolved. A report on Social and

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Restructured Results Indicators

by Component

Baseline Restructured Targets

Progress in reaching

Restructured Targets

Progress in reaching Alternate Plan Targets

Environmental Mapping and Spatial Analysis was also produced.

Study of potential Anchor project and subsequent cascade development, taking into account economic, social and environmental considerations, including reservoir filling and operating rule studies to optimize system benefits and best manage related risks.

None Cascade Development Assessment and Sequencing Study completed

Cascade Development Assessment and Sequencing Study not completed.

The Cascade Development Assessment and Sequencing Study was replaced by Working Paper 2 (WP 2) under the alternate plan (refer above). Draft WP 2 included a scoping level analysis of possible cascade development, as well as areas of uncertainty and knowledge gaps for further discussion and study. However, the Panel of Independent Reviewers still had outstanding questions related to the draft WP2. Several other related outputs were completed, including: Modeling exercises on cascade

sequencing using Mike Basin and Riverware and reports summarizing methodology and results;

Annotated Bibliography on Abbay / Blue Nile and Main Nile.

Identification of potential nationally-implemented JMP1 Non-Anchor Projects, including irrigation modernization & development and watershed managed centered on agricultural productivity and livelihoods improvement and watershed sustainability as well

None All non-anchor investment study reports completed and discussed with key stakeholders

Reports not completed

Although the target reports were not completed, several other related outputs were produced, including: Good Practice Guidelines for

Designing Water Efficient and Sustainable Irrigation Systems for EN Region

Toolkits that organize and facilitate access to studies on irrigation, flood, power and watershed management previously undertaken by ENTRO.

A Preliminary Assessment

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Restructured Results Indicators

by Component

Baseline Restructured Targets

Progress in reaching

Restructured Targets

Progress in reaching Alternate Plan Targets

as floodplain management

Report for Dam Safety Management in the EN Basin

Component 2: Capacity Building and Implementation Support A well-conceived stakeholder involvement and communication program

None Program implemented as per the Stakeholder Involvement and Communication Strategy (SICAS) Implementation Plan

A Stakeholder Involvement and Communication Strategy Implementation Plan (SICAS-IP) developed, but not fully implemented.

Although consultation on and eventual dissemination of project reports could not take place as planned, ENTRO made use of other fora, including discussing EN modeling work through ENPM project modeling workshops, as well as continued to communicate informally with EN countries by writing and through telephone. A shorter, more concise SICAS-IP was developed under the alternate plan, focusing on consultation and communication activities around the two Working Papers. ENTRO was not able to implement the Plan in its entirety, or to hold stakeholder consultations on draft WP 1, WP 2 and the Roadmap before project closure due to instructions from one EN country to hold project activities, as well as resolve issues with the methodology in WP2. However, it presented some of its work at an outreach event in February 2013. ENTRO is considering making some of the project outputs publically available, including the maps, annotated bibliography, and tool kits, through a web portal currently under development.

Number of opportunities for capacity building for ENTRO and related agencies in three countries

Less opportunities

Four additional trainings offered*

Four+ additional trainings offered

In addition to the trainings noted prior to restructuring, the following was provided: Training in environmental

safeguards and social management was provided to

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Restructured Results Indicators

by Component

Baseline Restructured Targets

Progress in reaching

Restructured Targets

Progress in reaching Alternate Plan Targets

university staff, ministry representatives, watershed management unit representatives from the three EN countries at workshops held in Khartoum (34 participants, Jan 2012) and Cairo (14 participants, September 2012).

Training in ENSAP Environmental management Guidelines was provided for13 stakeholders representing ENTRO, Egypt, Sudan, NGOs and academia in Cairo in November 2012.

Various training was extended to the three JMP Visiting Professionals and additional ENPM interns that participated in the internship program and who gained modeling experience (July – December 2012).

A roadmap for advancing investment addressing critical issues for sustainable water resources development and management in the Abbay/ Blue and Mainstem Nile

None Roadmap completed

Roadmap in draft form.

The draft roadmap was developed, but not formally consulted with countries.

* This is four additional trainings relative to previous year target of: “core social / environmental staff (5 from ENTRO and 9 each from the three countries) trained in environmental / social assessment and management planning) Summary of Project Outputs and Impacts The Table below provides a short summary description of the main project outputs and their impacts or uptake. As can be seen, several valuable outputs were produced by the project’s end, which are impressive in light of the significant implementation challenges, both external and internal to the project.

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Project Outputs Summary Description Impacts or Uptake

Draft SSEA Stage 1 Provides an assessment of the strategic environmental and social issues associated with various development options to allow for informed decision-making on the identification and selection of investments for water resources development.

Informed ESIA reports for MoWE, Ethiopia Site Specific Studies of dams in Abbay/ Blue Nile.

Informed university modeling exercises of Abbay / Blue Nile water resources cascade development options.

Fed into preparation of draft Working Paper 1.

Draft Working Paper 1 Discusses key environmental and social issues, risks and opportunities associated with the development of water resources in the Abbay / Blue Nile (including the development of a storage cascade, the expansion of downstream water uses and consequent changes in flow regimes), as allowed by available data and analysis.

Increased understanding of key environmental and social issues surrounding dam development in Abbay / Blue Nile in terms of 8+1 “key strategic issues” – water security; access to water and livelihoods; water quality; hydropower development; erosion and sedimentation; critical habitats, ecosystem functions, and biodiversity; vulnerable groups and resettlement; dam safety; climate change; and informed future work.

Draft Working Paper 2 Presents the findings of a modeling exercise of the Abbay / Blue Nile water system an assessment of storage options in the Blue Nile cascade and related filling strategies, as well as an evaluation of operating rules. The results are summarized in a comparative analysis of impacts in terms of key strategic issues. However, several key questions about the methodology remain, limiting the use of the modeling outputs.

Increased understanding of impacts of dam development, filling and operating.

Draft Roadmap of next steps The Draft Roadmap provides recommendations for further data collection, analysis and institutional strengthening, and investments, including based on

Outlined a future phase of activities, to build on and sustain project achievements and further advance activities and investments to facilitate

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the findings of and data/information gaps identified through ENTRO’s work.

sustainable development on the Abbay / Blue and Mainstem Nile, from a regional perspective. Some technical work has been taken up by ENTRO.

Report on Data Gaps and Coordination of Gap Filling Strategy

An early assessment of data gaps relating to information needed to make investment and management decisions in the Abbay/Blue and Min-stem Nile.

Highlighted areas needing further data collection, and provided initial/early information on where impacts may occur.

Annotated Bibliography of Abbay/Blue Nile and Main Nile (economic, social and environmental issues)

Compiles and provides a thorough review of relevant literature from a variety of sources and organized along the following topics: environmental/climate change and development, gender and water resources development, governance of water resources, livelihood and livelihood dynamics, poverty, vulnerable groups, displacement and resettlement, and water resources and development.

Further consolidated EN knowledge base. Has been presented at NCORE workshop and may be posted on website.

Social and Environmental Mapping and Spatial Analysis Report

Provides social and environmental mapping and spatial analysis on the Abbay / Blue and Mainstem Nile, taking economic, social and environmental sustainability issues into account in an integrated manner.

ENTRO is considering posting on website.

Report on Eastern Nile Water System Riverware Simulation

Analyzes and assess cascade development options and proposes scenarios along the Blue / Main Nile system based on water demands, water availability, environmental impacts, efficiency, etc. Builds on the extensive databases and planning models developed under the ENPM Project.

Increased understanding of river features with various infrastructure combinations.

Report on Eastern Nile Water Resources Modeling using Mike Basin

Provides a preliminary draft analysis of possible integrated water resources management for

Increased understanding of river features with various infrastructure combinations.

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the EN region, and the identification of risks and opportunities.

Preliminary Assessment Report for Dam Safety Management in EN

Provides an overview of dam safety practices worldwide, and gaps existing in the Eastern Nile.

Information has been presented in various fora, including a workshop with Eastern Nile countries hosted by the Ministry of Water and Energy – Ethiopia, in April 2013.

Good Practice Guidelines for Designing Water Efficient and Sustainable Irrigation Systems for EN Region

Provides information and best practice guidance on the design of irrigation systems in order to improve performance and sustainability.

Improved understanding of measures for enhancing irrigation and drainage system design.

Toolkits on Irrigation, Flood, Power, and Watershed Management Studies

Consolidates information on resource base and provides baseline in Eastern Nile countries, in an interactive, user-friendly fashion.

Information distributed at EN modeling fora. Posted in ENTRO website.

Stakeholder Involvement and Communication Strategy and Implementation Plan (SICAS-IP)

Provides a roadmap for an intensive, regional consultation and decision making process.

Improved country understanding of state of art consultation / communications and provided a best practice guideline for consultation processes.

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis) Neither the PAD nor the Restructuring Paper included a rigorous economic or financial analysis, but the following benefits were expected: an enhanced information base from joint assessments and studies, a trained staff as a result of capacity building programs, more rigorous analytical tools, and a common understanding of the opportunities and risks built through stakeholder involvement. The impact of the project was also assessed relative to the alternative of ‘no cooperation,’ including the possibility of continued unilateral development that could generate significant negative externalities and lost opportunities for maximizing welfare. The project activities were analytical in nature and expected to catalyze considerable economic benefits in the longer-term, i.e., through the investments identified through the project. The package of investments was to include large scale multipurpose dams and other activities that could generate a range of positive impacts, including hydropower production, flood mitigation, and irrigation development. These longer benefits were not considered a direct result of the project. This ICR did not attempt to quantify the direct gains of the project because of methodological issues and the lack of starting point estimates. However, an overview of the positive outcomes from project activities is included in the table below. As can be seen, many of the expected project benefits were realized, notwithstanding the fact that the form and substance of activities changed significantly from their original design.

Activities Gains / Outcomes Provision of new analysis and consolidation of existing information (e.g., SSEA 1 drafts, Draft Working Papers 1 and 2, Social and Environmental Mapping, Annotated Bibliography, Toolkits, Report on Data Gaps, etc.)

Heightened awareness of key social and environmental issues surrounding development in Eastern Nile.

Improved appreciation of impacts of dam development, filling and operation in Eastern Nile.

Increased understanding of areas of uncertainty / key gaps that need to be filled on a number of fronts (social and environmental, technical, economic, etc.).

Provision of a possible (draft) roadmap for addressing critical issues for sustainable water resources development and management in the Abbay/Blue Nile.

Creation of consolidated “one stop shop” for access to existing vast information base on water issues in EN.

ENTRO capacity building (e.g., training and workshops, skills generated through knowledge generation)

Improvement of ENTRO’s technical strength through provision of training (e.g., on social and environmental issues), new equipment, as well as knowledge gained through interactions with technical experts and “learning by doing.”

Enhanced inter-institutional coordination for more efficient project implementation.

Stakeholder skills development (e.g., transfer of analytical tools and technical expertise through training and technical workshops)

Improved evaluation of large complex multipurpose water investments and investment preparation through sharing of new analytical tools (e.g., hydrological models) and data in modeling fora and other technical workshops.

Enhanced skills for three visiting professionals participating in the project over the course of six months that can be applied to place of work.

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Activities Gains / Outcomes Improved capacity of key national stakeholders in three countries in

topics related to SSEAs and issues critical to transboundary water resources development and management.

Enhanced knowledge through development of partnerships with stakeholder networks (government, academia, etc.).

Dissemination and Consultation (e.g., development of SICAS – IP, sharing of information and data through various fora and at various levels)

Broad-based understanding of key issues related to development and management of the Eastern Nile, in addition to improved understanding of targeted areas, such as designing efficient and sustainable irrigation systems (i.e., Good Practice Guidelines), flood and watershed management (i.e., Toolkits).

Critical information for use in related work, e.g. ESIA reports for MoWE, Ethiopia Specific Studies of dams on Abbay / Blue Nile.

Maintenance of channels of communication for regional dialogue on important issues related to development in EN during period of intense hydro-political difficulty.

Improved country understanding of state of art consultation / communications through best practice guidelines.

The costs of activities were well defined at project preparation and accounted for at project closing. The cost breakdown by component and sub-component is presented in Annex 1. It reveals that the appraisal budget estimates at appraisal and restructuring were generally over-estimated. Some of the non-performing activities that were not progressing were eventually stopped under the alternate plan. By project closure, 41% of appraised and restructured funds were disbursed, with a roughly equal disbursement rate by component. Disbursements stood at 83% relative to the budgeted amounts in the alternate plan. It should be noted that project activities were closely associated with other ENTRO-executed projects, making it difficult to fully disentangle the costs and benefits and attribute them to the project-specific interventions, particularly in later stages of implementation. For example, the project linked with the Eastern Nile Planning Model Project by tapping into its Visiting Professional/Internship program, benefiting from its knowledge products, and participated in joint technical workshops. Similarly, the impacts of the project’s capacity building initiatives were intermingled with those of other projects. Implementation efficiency was negatively affected by a number of factors within the project’s control and external to it. This resulted in significant implementation delays and inability to achieve all of the project’s objectives. The alternate plan represented a valiant effort to turn the project around and to generate concrete results with qualitative benefits. The relatively swift progress in producing valuable work during the short life of the alternate plan indicates that if issues had been addressed earlier, implementation efficiency could have been improved and more impressive outcomes realized. More than four years passed between project effectiveness and closure. An earlier closing date, as originally planned, could have allowed the client and WB to assess the costs and benefits of the achievements, and to design a new follow on project without the legacy of the original one. The strategic merits to extending the project at restructuring are impossible to estimate, but should not be overlooked.

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending

Xiaokai Li Sr. Water Resources Specialist Hydropower Specialist

Barbara Miller Lead Water Resources Specialist Nile Program Coordinator

E.V. Jagannathan Senior Irrigation Specialist CO-TTL

Yves Andre Prevost Lead Environmental Specialist Environment, Safeguards

Roxanne Hakim Senior Anthropologist Social, Safeguards

Daryl Fields Senior Hydropower Specialist Hydropower, participatory decision making

Halla Qaddumi Economist Water Economist

Richard Olowo Senior Procurement Specialist Procurement

Tafesse Freminatos Abrham Financial Management Specialist Fiduciary

Raihan Elahi Senior Energy Specialist Power Sector Development Specialist

Evarist Baimu Legal Counsel Project Lawyer

Kimberly Versak Communications Specialist Communications

Eileen Burke Operations Analyst Project Appraisal, negotiations

Duncan Burrell Operations Analyst Project processing

Mikael A Ketsela Operations Analyst Project processing

D. Guo Hydropower Consultant Technical Appraisal

D. Gunaratnam Water Resources Planning Consultant Technical Appraisal

Thembi Kumapley Program Assistant Project processing

Supervision

Xiaokai Li Sr. Water Resources Specialist TTL, Hydropower Specialist

Nihal Fernando Sr. Water Resources Specialist TTL

Eileen Burke Sr Water Resources Mgmt. Spec. TTL

E.V. Jagannathan Senior Irrigation Specialist CO-TTL

Gustavo Saltiel Program Manager Nile Program Coordinator

Barbara Miller Lead Water Resources Specialist Nile Program Coordinator

Yves Andre Prevost Lead Environmental Specialist Environment, Safeguards

Maria Concepcion J. Cruz Lead Social Development Specialist Social/Safeguards

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(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) No. of Staff Weeks US$ Thousands

(including travel and consultant costs) Lending

FY09 FY10 34 56.219

TOTAL: Supervision/ICR

FY11 31 75.751 FY12 24 74.296 FY13 0 0

TOTAL 55 150.047

Warren Waters Lead Social Development Specialist Social/Safeguards

Roxanne Hakim Senior Anthropologist Social/Safeguards

Harshadeep Nagaraja Rao Senior Water Resources Specialist Water Resources Modeling

Kimberly Versack Communications Specialist Communications

Habab Taifour Young Professional Technical/Project Supervision

Sirein Awadalla Operations Analyst Technical/Project Supervision

Jonathan Pavluk Legal Counsel Project Lawyer

Evarist Baimu Legal Counsel Project Lawyer

Tafesse Freminatos Abrham Financial Management Specialist Financial Management

Lillian Brenda Namutebi Financial Management Specialist Financial Management

Meron Tadesse Techane Financial Management Specialist Financial Management

Mulat Negash Tegegn Financial Management Specialist Financial Management

Zaure Schwade Resource Management Analyst NBTF Fiduciary oversight

Binyam Bedelu Procurement Specialist Procurement

Richard Olowo Senior Procurement Specialist Procurement

Andrew James Roberts Senior Operations Officer Regional Integration Oversight

Thembi Kumapley Program Assistant Project processing

Dawit Tadesse Mekonnen Program Assistant Project processing

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results Feedback Obtained After Project Closure During the NCORE workshop launch, which took place in March 2013, ENTRO conducted a survey among workshop participants to obtain their feedback on several aspects of the JMP1-ID and ENPM projects. A total of 40 participants responded to the survey representing Egypt (4), Ethiopia (14), South Sudan (3), Sudan (13) and others (6). The survey did not portend to be representative of the diverse institutions that participated in or benefited from either project or both projects, or the stakeholders in the Eastern Nile basin. It is considered however a good mechanism to gather input from stakeholders on important aspects of the Project implementation. When asked to indicate how close the objective of the Project has been met, 74% responded with an average or better answer.

When asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with the contribution of ENTRO recent activities (including those supported under the ENPM Project and the JMP-1 ID Project), the great majority responded with an average or better answer with regard to: developing a common vision for Eastern Nile (95%), built capacity for basin wide development and management and more efficient use of Eastern Nile resources (98%), increased awareness about Eastern Nile issues and the need to jointly develop and use the common resources of the Eastern Nile for the benefit of all (93%), generated knowledge products and modeling tools for better development and management of Eastern Nile resources (95%), strengthen the capacity of ENTRO to provide technical knowledge helpdesk services to other regional and national institutions (98%), and strengthen the capacity of ENTRO to facilitate regional-scale land and water investments (88%) – see table below.

ENTRO’s Activity Contribution Percentage of Respondents Who Reported …

Strongly Agree

Agree Average Disagree Strongly disagree

NA/don't know

Developing a common vision for Eastern Nile

48% 40% 8% 0% 5% 0%

Built capacity for basin wide development and management and more efficient use of Eastern Nile resources

45% 48% 5% 0% 3% 0%

Increased awareness about Eastern Nile issues and the need to jointly develop and use the common resources of the Eastern Nile for the benefit of all

43% 43% 8% 5% 3% 0%

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ENTRO’s Activity Contribution Percentage of Respondents Who Reported …

Strongly Agree

Agree Average Disagree Strongly disagree

NA/don't know

Generated knowledge products and modeling tools for better development and management of Eastern Nile resources

58% 35% 3% 0% 5% 0%

Strengthen the capacity of ENTRO to provide technical knowledge helpdesk services to other regional and national institutions

34% 44% 20% 0% 2% 0%

Strengthen the capacity at ENTRO to facilitate regional-scale land and water investments

25% 43% 20% 0% 5% 8%

When asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement on whether the Eastern Nile institutions would benefit from the various products and services delivered by the JMP1 ID Project, nearly 85% responded with an average or better answer.

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Annex 6. Summary of Borrower’s ICR I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. Introduction For over a decade now, the NBI, through its Shared Vision and Subsidiary Action Programs, has opened avenues for member countries to embark on serious consultation, capacity building and investment programs. Increasingly, Nile Basin governments in general and those of Eastern Nile in particular, have come to realize that unilateral or business-as-usual approaches carry significant risks, not the least of which is sub-optimal development. Encouraged by the results of the first set of regionally agreed, identified, and planned and nationally implemented fast track investments in irrigation, watershed management, flood management, and power interconnection, as well as regional analytical work, the Cooperative Regional Assessments (CRAs), of the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP), Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan opted to embark onto more ambitious multi-country/joint, multi-sectoral/multipurpose, large-scale water resources development program of transformational nature and magnitude. The Joint Multipurpose Program (JMP) is envisioned as a long-term program to be implemented in stages. The JMP 1 ID was initiated after ENTRO successfully completed major activities of the Launch Phase in 2008. The Launch Phase, mandated by ENCOM was to initiate efforts to “identify and prepare a major initial project, within a broader multipurpose program, to demonstrate the benefits of a cooperative approach to the management and development of the Eastern Nile”. ENTRO launched JMP1 ID in 2010 with a budget of US$ 7.0 m funded by grants from the World Bank administered Nile Basin Trust Fund and US$ 0.6m from countries contributions. Of this, US$2.872 from the trust fund and 0.6 from countries’ in kind contributions US$ 3.472was utilized. JMP I ID was designed to identify an investment package through a series of studies and consultative activities that take into account economic, social and environmental sustainability issues in an integrated manner. Because of complications arising from the current challenges related to Eastern hydropolitics, the project had to be restructured several times. While the project was forced to discontinue the identification of a joint package of investments and several related processes as originally envisaged (including the Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment), it nevertheless did succeed to provide a sound basis for understanding key social and environmental issues in the basin and strengthen the Eastern Nile knowledge base through provision of information and analysis for strategic water resources planning, development and management; as well as through the creation of opportunities for regional dialogue and capacity building. It also provides a roadmap for subsequent measures. 2. Assessment of overall JMP performance 2.1 Meeting Project Development Objective. The original JMP-1 ID Study PDO was to “assist the three Eastern Nile countries in identification of the JMP1 investment package, through a series of studies and consultative activities that take into account economic, social and environmental sustainability issues in an integrated manner”. However, achievement of this objective assumed a favorable environment in Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan for holding consultations and review workshops to validate findings and reports. Six months into the study, however, following the current CFA-related hydropolitics disagreements, Egypt and Sudan froze participation in NBI – a situation which rendered the PDO as originally formulated unachievable. The original PDO had to be scaled down and revised to “assist the three

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Eastern Nile countries in examining joint water resources development possibilities on the Abbay/Blue and Main-stem Nile, taking economic, social and environmental sustainability issues into account in an integrated manner." This latter objective has been achieved as described in the following sections. 2.2 Achievement by Component Indicator 1: Strategic Social and Environmental Assessment (SSEA) of water resources development alternatives in the Abbay/Blue and Mainstem Nile; Achievement: the SSEA was not completed as envisaged and had to be terminated at the draft Stage. Instead, Working paper No 1 that discusses key environmental and social issues, risks and opportunities associated with the development of water resources on the Abbay/Blue Nile (including the development of a storage cascade, the expansion of downstream water uses and consequent changes in flow regimes, as allowed by available data and analysis) has been produced. Indicator 2: Study of the potential Anchor Project and subsequent cascade development, taking into account economic, social and environment considerations, including reservoir filling and operating rule studies to optimize system benefits and best manage related risks Achievement: Working paper No 2 containing a summary of the findings of a modeling exercise of the Abbay/Blue/Main Nile water system, an assessment of storage options in the Blue Nile cascade and related filling strategies, and an evaluation of the operating rules, to be summarized in a comparative analysis that is informed by the key findings of Working Paper # 1 has been produced. The development options include four existing and proposed dams and reservoirs on the Blue Nile - Karadobi; High and low Beko-Abo; Upper Mandaya; and Renaissance dam. A selection of these proposed reservoirs were compared in the analysis, based on the judgment of the consultant and in consultation with ENTRO. The dam cost, height, spillway capacity, reservoir full supply level, storage (dead, live) and installed hydropower capacity as determined in the site specific studies were used for each of the cascade options. Component 2: Capacity Building and Implementation Support Indicator 1: A well-conceived stakeholder involvement & communication program ENTRO has held several consultations with key stakeholders in government and civil society. In the first year of the project, ENTRO held two formal consultations; Kick-off and inception Report Review workshop; made presentations to the Nile Basin Discourse (a network of NGO’s), and its consultants met with a wide variety of stakeholders to collect information. Such an effort has provided some measure of stakeholder involvement and information sharing ENTRO has also solicited written comments from the Eastern Nile governments on the early drafts of the SSEA, as well as the Site Specific studies of potential dam projects on the Abbay, conducted by the Ministry of Water and Energy. Due to complications in Eastern Nile hydropolitics, in 2010, two Eastern Nile governments froze participation in most ENTRO activities. Since that time, ENTRO has collected and disseminated information through other fora, including discussion of Eastern Nile modeling work through ENPM modeling workshops. In November 2012, ENTRO received a request from one government to put on hold project activities until wider issues in Eastern Nile cooperation can be resolved. ENTRO was not able to hold the final JMP consultations to discuss the findings from the Working Papers before the official grant closure date. However, it held a consultation workshop in February 2013, and is continuing with plans to disseminate information about the Eastern Nile knowledge base, and to request further feedback on the JMP Working Papers from the EN countries. In addition, the two working papers were presented on 24 and 25 February, 2013 to the participants who attended the NCORE project launching workshop. After the project grant closure, the two working papers, financed from NCORE project, have been reviewed and refined based on the comments and feedback collected from the IPoR, WB team and ENTRO staff.

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Indicator 2: Number of opportunities for capacity building for ENTRO and related agencies in the three countries. In October, 2009 a one day training on contract negotiation, contract management and World Bank procurement guideline which enabled participants to enhance their capacity on consultant recruitment procedures was provided to three senior officials from the three EN countries, and JMP I core and extended team members. As part of the JMP I Plan B Modalities and capacity building program, three Interns (from Universities) have been involved in modeling exercise of the Abbay/Blue/Main Nile water system. In addition, JMP I Core and extended team members were also provided technical training on social management and environmental safeguards to University staff, Ministry’s representatives, Watershed management units representatives from the three eastern Nile counters in Khartoum and Cairo. Preliminary Assessment Report for dam safety management in the Eastern Nile Basin has been produced. The numerous interactions, consultations and workshops with study consultants, and Independent Reviewers provided ENTRO’s JMP Task Team and EN various stakeholders to gain exposure in both the technical and managerial processes of the project. Indicator 3: a roadmap for advancing investment and addressing critical issues for sustainable water resources development and management in the Abbay/Blue and Mainstem Nile As part ofWP2 a roadmap of future work is prepared, outlining studies and activities that need to be undertaken for the sustainable development of the Blue/Abbay Nile. The knowledge and data gaps identified throughout both working papers will need to be addressed in order to identify and mitigate adverse impacts and enhance benefits of Blue Nile development, and to agree on future development. The road-map identifies institutional functions that will need to be developed, and investments (infrastructure) to maximize regional benefits and to mitigate regional impacts. 3. JMP-I ID Study contribution to overall NBI vision NBI’s long term goal is sustainable socio-economic development in the Nile Basin through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources. All JMP I ID project results directly contribute to the NBI/ENSAP mid-term (10-20year) and short-term (5-10) outcomes as enunciated in the NBI Results Chain. For example, one of the NBI mid-term outcomes pertains to “efficient Transboundary Management and optimal use of Nile Basin water and related resources”. The outputs of this project, namely both Working Paper I and Working Paper II have contributed, by wherever possible quantifying critical variables that will determine the efficient mangemetn of the shared Nile resources. By bringing to the fore a range of risks pertaing to the socio-economic (viz. downstream impacts to livelihoods), political (viz. water security; inter-riparian non cooperation), environmental (viz. dam safety, water quality, , ecosystem decline and habitat loss) dimensions associated with large scale water infrastructure development in the Abbay-Blue Nile, the JMP-1 ID study has unambigiously driven home not only the desirability, but the necessity and imperative of a transboundary, cooperative approach to the management of the common Nile resources, as envisaged in the Shared Vision. Similarly, by more clearly defining the development space. the Study has shed light on the economic and environmental win-win gains to be made from cooperative development (viz. hydropower generation and power trade; increase in downstream hydropower efficiency, flood risk reduction, savings in dredging costs of irrigation channels, watershed development, etc.). The JMP -1 ID study has also produced data and information along with availing analytical results – all of which will contribute signficantly to the enahncement of “basin wide water resources managemenet capacities and capabilities based on best practices” as envisaged in the NBI short-term (5-10 year) results chain.

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4. Project financing The project was financed though the multi-donor Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF) and contributions in kind from member countries. The NBTF was managed by the World Bank. Out of the total project budget of US$ 7.6 million, the amount utilized is US$3.472, amounting to 45.7% % of the budget. The Audit Report submitted on 26April, 2013 confirmed that. o the financial position of Eastern Nile Joint - Multipurpose Project as at 31 December 2012 and of its income received and expenditure incurred are in accordance with the records of the Organization and comply with the Accounting Policies. o External funds have been used in accordance with the conditions of the relevant financing agreements, with due attention to economy and efficiency, and only for the purposes for which the financing was provided; o Goods and services financed have been procured in accordance with the relevant financing agreements and the financiers' procurement policies and procedures; o All necessary supporting documents, records, and accounts have been kept in respect of all Project ventures including expenditure reported using statements of expenditure (SOE) method of disbursement; o Designated Accounts have been maintained in accordance with the provisions of the relevant financing agreements and disbursement letter and funds disbursed out of the Accounts were used only for the purpose intended in the financing agreement; o The financial statements have been prepared in accordance with the organization's accounting policies and relevant World Bank guidelines; o National laws and regulations have been complied with, and that the financial and accounting procedures approved for the project; and o There is verifiable ownership by ENTRO or beneficiaries in line with the financing agreement in respect of assets procured. 5. Sustainability of Project Achievements Actions taken to ensure sustainability of project achievements: Technical The roadmap in Working Paper 2 outlines clear path in moving forward; ENTRO plans to discuss this during consultations Analytical tools to be further utilized as part of NCORE activities Institutional sustainability Knowledge base that was consolidated and expanded under JMP will be used under NCORE, and will continue to be strengthened. However, the filling of critical data gaps, as well as site specific studies relies on the willingness of countries to complete. Financial sustainability To implement proposed and identified subsequent studies under the JMP Road Map, in addition to NCORE project financing, a resource mobilization strategy need to be developed 6. Challenges and mitigation measures

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ENTRO has made continued efforts, consultations and mitigation measures adopted to proceed on JMP I ID studies and activities unimpeded by developments outside its realm of control. ENTRO recognized the challenges at early stages and developed mitigation measures to ensure quality implementation of its mandate and activities. Among others the main critical challenges were: CFA-related: That the Cooperative Framework Agreement, a parallel track to the NBI, was signed by six upstream countries and that consequently Egypt and Sudan chose to freeze participation in NBI activities had huge adverse impact on project implementation. For one, regular ENSAP governance meetings could not be held; depriving ENTRO of reliable institutionalized channels normally used to jointly and cooperatively resolve ENSAP related project implementation issues and challenges. Further, the Project could not hold the planned technical and broader consultations, particularly technical consultations involving government experts, which were scheduled to take place alternately in each country. Regional Working Groups and National Reference Groups, main vehicles for examining studies and ensuring stakeholder participation and inputs, could not be functional. Critical data collection activities to take place in each Egypt and Sudan were impaired. GERD-related: That Ethiopia announced the beginning of the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in the midst of this, complicated the situation further. One of the most important tasks of the JMP-1 ID studies, namely identification of the first anchor project for joint investment, was preempted, requiring serious revision of the entire study mid-course. Consultant related: The consultant did not prove up to the task to manage the complexity of the assignment. After several draft SSEA Stage 1 report submissions, the quality of the reports was not of such standard to allow public disclosure and consultations. Further, one of the partners of the Consulting Firm, for reasons unrelated to this Project, was temporarily suspended from World Bank, hampering efforts to complete the studies with the desired quality and speed. The EN countries' stands on Nile issues do pose a challenge to ENTRO, but they were not unexpected. For example, ENTRO 2006-2010 Strategic Plan identified the political risk and changing policies and dwindling official support to ENTRO/ ENSAP as major potential risks to the sustainability of ENTRO operations and ENSAP activities. Mitigation of these emphasized ENTRO’s proactive role in augmenting and cementing EN cooperation. Therefore, ENTRO has had to intensify interaction and information sharing and engagement with EN governance and decision makers. ENTRO adopted these mitigation measures with the requisite sensitivity and reinforced it with close consultations with the WB Nile team, which included a recent to the three EN countries. Through these measures, ENTRO has been able to sustain its operations and ensure quality progress in ENSAP projects. ENTRO management has been and is keen to ensure that members of ENCOM and ENSAPT are well informed on development of JMP I Project progress. This has been mainly accomplished through visits to the countries preceded by comprehensive letters, status reports and concept notes as well as telephone calls. The ED has also striven to make best use of other NBI venues and event (NBTF, Nile COM, Nile TAC, etc.) to engage EN authorities in persuasive and constructive dialogue, which proved an excellent medium to underscore the inevitability, desirability and win-win nature of pursuing cooperation under ENSAP. These communications to the EN countries have not been limited to reporting project implementation status, but more importantly, also alerted the respective authorities of threats and likely adverse outcome to the goal of sustaining Eastern Nile cooperation. Despite the challenges stemming from the current EN countries' stands on issues pertaining to the CFA negotiations, JMP I ID project activities are still making reasonable progress. ENTRO has done its best to be proactive, engaging positively and constructively ENCOM members and EN countries’ senior officials. Overall, these briefings and consultations pave the way for ENTRO to proceed with the

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agreed changes to the project and JMP I ID extension. ENTRO looks forward for the Development Partners usual support to pursue benefits to the EN people. 7. Institutional Assessment The Project management was originally designed to enable robust regional consultations among ENTRO, JMP-1 ID International consultants, International Panel of Independent (Technical) Reviewers, national technical representatives of the three countries organized under the Regional Technical Committee, Country teams organized under the National Reference Group to provide space also for non-governmental stakeholders. This original design was effectively rendered unworkable because of the CFA-related stance of Egypt and Sudan, which hindered meaningful participation of these countries in the JMP-1 ID Study. Effective consultations and participation were reduced to very basic levels. This being so, however, the internal organization of the project succeeded to continue being effective until the last days of project closure. ENTRO had internally organized itself into Core (consisting of ENTRO Environment Specialist and Social Development Officer and Stakeholder and Consultation Specialist; Hydropower Specialist and the Project Coordinator) and Extended Teams (adding Watershed Management, Procurement, Finance, M&E specialists to the Core) to manage the consultancy. Such internal organization of the project enabled monitoring of assumptions and evolving risks that impacted project implementation. This enabled the Project to adopt mitigation strategies and flexible management in consultation, to the extent possible, with pertinent authorities in the three countries. Eventually the project had to be restructured; the PDO to be scaled down and redefined to realistic and achievable level. The biggest institutional challenge to the project was the inability to secure governance (ENCOM and ENSAPT) support and guidance and consequently the predicament of being unable to execute planned review and consultation workshops. On the whole, the JMP 1 ID Study tested ENTRO’s institutional resilience and in a way has also been a test case of the overall NBI institutional architecture and viability. The JMP 1 ID study was caught at the CFA-induced convergence of the hitherto parallel political and cooperation tracks of the NBI. That the project navigated these challenges thru its flexible and adaptive management approaches has resulted in the delivery of the two working papers is a testament to the effectiveness of the organizational and institutional arrangement adopted. Assessment of recipient performance Performance of the project has been rated as Moderately Satisfactory as a result of the challenges in achieving the PDO level indicators caused by the various project complexities in a Regional context. Had a final restructuring of the project been processed in mid-2012 following the temporary suspension of a key consulting firm working on the project by the World Bank, as originally envisioned by ENTRO, the project could have been rated higher. However, ENTRO was not able to receive permission from its governance to process the final restructuring to be able to reflect the new project results, and as such, the project is evaluated against the deliverables expected from a large international consulting firm, and assuming the full participation of EN governments. Assessment of Development Partners’ performance Overall Satisfactory in view of the appropriate technical and management guidance provided to implement a complex project, timely clearances/feedback in almost all cases, except some delays in addressing contractual issues at the time when one of the fims in the JV was partially temporarily suspended by the World Bank. The flexibility to adjust implementation modalities, effective liaison between NBI and NBTF and the smooth flow of funds has been particularly notable. 8. Lessons learnt

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Allocating adequate time commensurate with the complexity of the study The JMP I-ID Study was envisaged to be implemented under complex institutional and management conditions. Over 18 technical and non-technical consultations were planned. At each milestone of project implementation governance decision was to go to the next stage was awaited. Several sectoral institutions in each country (e.g. power and energy, agriculture, environment, water resources, etc.) were to be involved. The project involved several concurrent studies, interlinked in a feedback, input-output loop. This complexity required intense, time-consuming coordination in the best of circumstances; leave alone when a major political disagreement among these countries that emerged soon after the study was initiated is factored in. Though the project management succeeded in coping with these challenges by adopting mitigation and adaptive measures, it is evident, in hind sight, that the time allocated for completing the studies initially (24 months) was in adequate. Complexity of institutional arrangement The Project institutional set up was complex, involving a number of entities (viz. ENCOM, ENSAPT, Project Steering Committee, Regional Technical Committee, National Reference Groups, National Coordinators, Task Teams) whose engagement and approval, or at a minimum, agreement with the successive study results, was one way or the other being sought. This made the decision making process inherently slow, though possible more deliberative. Project Phasing That Phase II of the Study (Cascade Studies) was contingent upon the successful completion and conclusion of Phase 1 proved to be a major challenge in finalizing the Project. This is because Phase I was expected to deliver a Stand alone, disclosable document that meets international best standards and acquires endorsement of the countries. However this proved to be daunting. For one, the countries i.e. ENCOM could not convene at all, much less guide and endorse project findings. Second, the incomparability of the initial three development alternatives to be analyzed as part of Phase I had to be modified. Thus finalizing Phase I took much longer than expected thus affecting the start of Phase II, Cascade Studies. Instead of investing time in consideration of incomparable development options, starting the JMP I ID straight away with SSEA of water infrastructure development up to the threshold/tipping point (i.e. that would trigger significant social and environmental impacts) on the Abbay/Blue Nile would have simplified the assignment and allowed the start of the Cascade development and sequencing studies much earlier. Assessment of political risk That the JMP I Study would be caught in the midst of political turmoil stemming from the CFA negotiation soon after the project start was unanticipated. That is to say, the speed with which political developments took place caught the project midway. Indeed the PAD had anticipated the political risk, but it was difficult to precisely predict how soon that would happen. Launching such complex studies under such uncertainty was, in hind sight, fraught with considerable risk. Also, the impatience of countries for the outcome of long-gestating study outcomes could have been appraised, which would have enabled the anticipation of the GERD, which made the JMP-1 ID study even more cumbersome. Adequacy of assessment of existing baseline data The Study assumed the data generated by previous ENSAP studies (e.g. CRAs) and data available at national level would be of such quantity and quality to satisfy the requirements of the study. This anticipation ought to have been based on thorough evaluation of the quality and availability of the data, which would have enabled provision for primary data collection or data gap filling.

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Dependency on data from a national source The SSEA was designed and assumed to be fed by data from the concurrent Site Specific Studies (Beko Abo and Mandaya) undertaken by the Government of Ethiopia. For its own internal reasons, the Ethiopian study was suspended which affected the conduct of the Study.

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

1. Project Appraisal Document, June 2009. Report No: 49189-AFR 2. Project Restructuring Paper, September 2011 3. Project Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet 4. Project Information Document

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This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on thismap do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on thelegal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

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