public seminar on maritime security in southeast asia...6 idss-nupi public seminar on maritime...

29th November 2005Traders Hotel, Singapore

A Report For

IDSS-NUPIPublic Seminar on

Maritime Security inSoutheast Asia

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological UniversityBlock S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798

TEL: 65-6790-6982, FAX: 65-6793-2991Email: [email protected], Website: http://www.idss.edu.sg

IDSS-NUPI PUBLIC SEMINAR ON MARITIME SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1

29th November 2005Traders Hotel, Singapore

A Report For

IDSS-NUPIPublic Seminar on

Maritime Security inSoutheast Asia

2 IDSS-NUPI PUBLIC SEMINAR ON MARITIME SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA


In his opening address, Mr Barry Desker,Director IDSS, remarked that shipping is theheart of global trade. With increasing economicglobalisation and intensification of maritimetrade, eighty percent of world trade is currentlypushed by sea, supported by a massive maritimetrade network of 46,000 commercial vessels and1.25 million seafarers calling at 4,000 ports whileninety percent of general cargo is nowtransported in containers. Mr Desker noted thatas two of the world’s most important shippingnations, the stakes for Norway and Singapore inglobal maritime commerce are equally high.Norway is the 5

th largest, and Singapore, the 10

th

largest owner of merchant fleets by tonnage inthe world. Mr Desker emphasised that mega-hubs like Singapore, the second busiest in theworld, have become key container ports withconnectivity in a ‘hub-and-spoke system’ to theworld, which cannot be easily bypassed orsubstituted. Moreover these mega-hubs form thebackbone of the global integrated supply chaininvolving economies of both maritime andnonmaritime continental states.

Mr Desker further elaborated that continuingindustrialisation and trade, increasingregionalisation and economic integrationbetween Asia and Europe, will buttress the high

levels of maritime trade and shipping that passthrough maritime Southeast Asia whosegeography straddles the Indian and PacificOceans. In fact, the Straits of Malacca is the vitalsea-lane that bridges these two oceans and whichserves as the shortest route between three of theworld’s most populous countries - India, Chinaand Indonesia. The waterway carries an annualvolume of commercial traffic of more than50,000 ships, making it the world’s busiest. Morethan a third of global trade and two thirds of theworld’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade alsopasses through the Strait. By extension, thismakes Southeast Asia’s maritime security, intraditional and non-traditional terms, aninternational concern.

In conclusion, Mr Desker emphasised theimportance of the security of the world’s sea-lanes and the freedom of navigation to Norwayand Singapore as well as the internationalcommunity. Mr Desker further pointed out recentdevelopments in regional maritime security inthe form of the signing of the RegionalCooperation Agreement on Combating Piracyand Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia(ReCAAP) in April this year and the recentlaunch in September of the ‘Eyes in the Sky’initiative; a joint maritime air-patrol by the

OPENING REMARKS Mr Barry Desker delivering his opening remarks


littoral states over the Malacca Straits. Closingoff his introductory speech, Mr Deskerapplauded the rapid pace of collaborationbetween IDSS and NUPI over the course of theyear, which will culminate in the production ofa book with the aim of sharing their findings withpolicy-makers, scholars and analysts.

Reiterating the similarities between Norway andSingapore mentioned in Mr Desker’s openingaddress, Mr John Skogan, Senior Researcher,NUPI, added that both Singapore and Norwayare ‘small countries in a big boat’ with similarproblems and interests. Both countries aredependent on the sea and their shippingindustries. The security of waterways are thusof great importance to both countries. Mr Skogannoted that although Norwegian littoral waters arenot directly threatened by piracy, he likened theillegal fishing problem in northern Norwegianwaters akin to piracy. Mr Skogan also pointedout that although Norway has yet to suffer fromany terror attacks, Norwegian oil rigs on theContinental Shelf are potential terrorist targets.Mr Skogan concluded that although the physicaldistance between the 2 countries is great, bothSingapore and Norway share similar problemsand interests and thus there is much to gain fromjoint Singaporean-Norwegian cooperation.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Touching on the global importance of theshipping industry, BG Tay Lim Heng, ChiefExecutive Maritime and Port Authority ofSingapore, highlighted the fact that shipping isthe life blood of the global economy beingresponsible for the carriage of 90% of worldtrade. In today’s world where no nation can befully self-sufficient, every country is involved,at one level or another, in the process of sellingwhat it produces and acquiring what it lacks. Welive in a global economy, which cannot functionif it were not for ships and the shipping industry.BG Tay further mentioned that advances intechnology and management have allowedgeneralised transport costs in the shelf price ofconsumer goods to remain low. For example,shipping costs account for only around 0.8% ofthe shelf price of a DVD player and the typicalcost of transporting a 20-foot container from Asiato Europe carrying over 20 tonnes of cargo isabout the same as the economy airfare for a singlepassenger on the same journey.

Moving on to the challenges faced by theshipping industry, BG Tay noted that the shippingindustry is a complex and extremely volatilebusiness having gone through no fewer thanfourteen business cycles since the beginning ofmodern shipping in 1869. The ability to managevolatility in the shipping industry has thus alwaysbeen the primary concern of the shippingcommunity. However, the recent years beginningfrom 2003 have been termed by the shippingindustry as the ‘New Golden Age’ of shipping.This is because of the high current rate of growthat 4% and the strong performance by the Chineseeconomy that is expected to continue to fuel thisgrowth. This is reflected in the order books ofshipyards which totalled 223.3 milliondeadweight tons as at October 2005. On the otherhand, these huge order books have generatedconcerns by many in the industry that supplymight grow ahead of demand and trigger anotherdownturn in the business cycle. BG Tayremarked that be it a hard or soft landing, it is

Mr John Skogan delivering his opening remarks


without doubt that the cycle will run its courseand those who want to play in the game will haveto juggle with the considerations and risksinvolved and determine the best course ahead.

but we should be careful about striking the rightbalance between the need for security andefficiency.

MARITIME SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(PART I)

Speaking on the Contemporary Threat ofMaritime Terrorism: Technologies, Tactics,and Techniques, Dr Rohan Gunaratna, Headof the International Centre for PoliticalViolence and Terrorism Research, IDSS, notedthat the contemporary maritime terrorist threatthat we see today originated in October 2000.The threat evolved from one that is very muchlocalised to local insurgents to the attack againstthe USS Cole. The prelude to the USS Cole wasthe failed 4 January 2000 attack on the USSSullivans in Aden. In the USS Sullivans attack,the terrorist cells did not rehearse their operationsand the suicide boat sank without blowing upthe USS Sullivans. As a result of the failure, AlQaeda began to study methods of attackingwarships and commercial ships and madesignificant investment in this area of operations.Dr Gunaratna further mentioned that the Jihadistsstill maintained their capability to conductattacks from Yemen even after the USS Coleepisode. A case in point was the 2002 strike onthe French super tanker Limburg. The Jihadistswaited for a US warship, but due to flawedintelligence the said warship did not arrive, andthe Limburg then became the target ofopportunity. Hence most targets of the Jihadistgroups in the maritime sphere are now targets ofopportunity. In the Southeast Asian region, AlQaeda worked with JI to target ships both inSingapore and Malaysia and a budget of$160,000 was proposed by a regional Al Qaedaleader to Bin laden. Bin laden howeverquestioned the cost of mounting such attacks andthe project was abandoned. Dr Gunaratnacautioned that despite this initial setback, thethreat in Southeast Asia did not diminish and thecurrent environment in Southeast Asia is one thatis friendly for terrorist attacks, whereby terroristsare able to plan, prepare and execute their attacks.

On the issue of Maritime Security, BG Taypointed out that the maritime community had todeal with issues related to piracy, blockades, warsand rumours of war from time immemorial butthe events that occurred on September 11 gaveit a much wider scope and a greater sense ofimportance. A key consideration in these issuesis the element of cost. What are the costsassociated with maritime security, and who willbear the burden? BG Tay argued that the Straitsof Malacca and Singapore form a key maritimepassageway between Europe, the Middle East,Africa and East Asia and it is in the keen interestof the international community that the Straitsbe always kept open, secure and safe. BG Tayfurther mentioned that one of the areas thatgovernments should begin to engage each otheron, is in consequence management, that is howto respond to an attack that disrupts the globalsupply chain. BG Tay stressed that the economicsystem cannot afford to have ports shut downand cargo movement impeded in such a situation.Rather, we need to have a set of procedures thatwill enable trade to keep flowing, and in thusdoing, minimize the potential damage from suchan attack. BG Tay concluded by saying that thesecurity measures implemented thus far have nothad a huge impact on the efficiency of shipping,

BG Tay Lim Heng making his keynote address


He argued that if there was a lesson to be learnt,it is to hunt the terrorist organisations, not givethem the time to attack, thus making it difficultfor them to attack complex sophisticated targets.

In an attempt to dispel what he saw as the hypesurrounding maritime terrorism, Dr Gunaratnaurged for a deeper understanding of thephenomenon. He believes that we should viewmaritime terrorism as an extension of theterrorists’ land capabilities, which leftunchecked, would be extended to the sea. DrGunaratna added that the aim of maritime terrorattacks is to generate publicity and that in orderfor the operation to be known, almost allmaritime attacks are conducted in port or incoastal waters and there is no exception to thistrend. As terrorists’ capabilities do not remainstatic, Dr Gunaratna argued that there must be acontinuous threat assessment, andcountermeasures, be they offensive or defensive,and these must evolve with the changing threats.Dr Gunaratna further elaborated on Al Qaeda’sdevelopment of a UDT capacity as an extensionof their capabilities. Plans to set up divingschools to train terrorist divers were recoveredin Kandahar. However the same plansdemonstrated that Al Qaeda did not have anadvance capability in this field achieving only acommercial capability instead of a militarydiving capability.

of maritime terror attacks in Southeast Asia andpointed out that in both Thailand and Malaysia,there are currently no groups capable ofmounting maritime attacks although JI doespossess such a capability in Indonesia.Emphasising his point, Dr Gunaratna remarkedthat although Abu Sayef does heavily invest inmaritime operations, 75% of its members aremariners and thus it is only natural for Abu Sayefto mount such attacks. Dr Gunaratna furtherreiterated that Jihadist groups in Southeast Asiafrom the Southern Philippines to Indonesia usethe maritime domain largely for supportoperations such as movement of arms and notfor attacks. Dr Gunaratna thus does not believethat Southeast Asian Jihadist groups have thecapability to mount a USS Cole or Limburg typeattack. In his concluding remarks, Dr Gunaratnamade the point that the threat of MaritimeTerrorism in Southeast Asia is of low probabilityand medium consequence. He argued that dueto high importance of maritime routes, shippingwill still continue even if 10 ships are attackedtoday. In his opinion, we can only counter thethreat of maritime terrorism by developing abroad response instead of focusing on lawenforcement. We must shadow these terroristgroups to understand them and the response mustbe based on their capabilities. In other words,the response must not be driven by existingtechnologies but threat driven.

The second presentation by Mr Anders C.Sjaastad, Senior Adviser, NUPI, touched onSoutheast Asian SLOC and Security Options.Mr Sjaastad highlighted the importance of theSoutheast Asian SLOCs to the economies of bothestablished and emerging Asian powers and itssignificance to the overall global economy.Hence all parties, whether littoral states, usercountries or other interested actors, willunanimously favour steps and arrangements thatwill safeguard innocent passage of commercialshipping through Southeast Asian waters.However differing national priorities, mistrust,lack of confidence and hidden agendas allcombine to make things difficult when it comesto drawing up and agreeing upon ways andDr Gunaratna does not foresee the proliferation

Dr Rohan Gunaratna making a point


means to achieve these aims. Mr Sjaastadstressed the point that for some of the littoralstates that can still remember their colonial past,the principle of sovereignty is sacrosanct and anyarrangement or action, which could be seen toundermine it, is taboo. Hence security inSoutheast Asia is commonly regarded to befirstly domestic, secondly bilateral/trilateral andonly thirdly multilateral, unlike in Europe wherethere is frequently a trade-off betweensovereignty and cooperation in order to enhancecommon security, these attitudes will severelylimit many potentially viable multilateralsecurity options and even infringe upon the useof bilateral arrangements.

conflicts rooted in unsettled or disputed bordersstemming from historical animosity, thepotentially most serious security challenges toSoutheast Asian countries are derived from thecomplex territorial disputes in the potentiallyresource rich waters of the South China and EastChina Seas. None of the countries big or smallare likely to compromise their claims in the SouthChina Sea in the foreseeable future and thatmakes the South China Sea issues alwayspotentially dangerous for Asia security. HoweverMr Sjaastad believes that apart from theterritorial disputes, all potential securitychallenges and conflicts in Southeast Asia can,in principle, be handled through a pragmaticapproach.

Finally, Mr Sjaastad discussed the varioussecurity options that are available. On a nationallevel, Mr Sjaastad noted that the ability to pursuea successful national security policy differsignificantly among the Southeast Asiancountries. While Malaysia has devotedsignificant resources to building up a nationalcapacity to police and patrol the Malacca Straits,Indonesia on the other hand lacks resources topay for any monitoring installations and is inneed of outside economic assistance. Moving onto bilateral security options, Mr Sjaastad noticedthat Asia is full of bilateral security treaties,arrangements and relationships, and it isfrequently difficult to correctly evaluate thesignificance of some of them. In the safeguardingof the Malacca Straits, Mr Sjaastad argued thatone can speak of a loose trilateral cooperation.Malaysia and Indonesia have the closestrelationship whereas Singapore is a more distantpartner especially when it comes to sharedinterests. However even the limits to Malaysian-Indonesian cooperation are demonstrated whendealing with the sensitive topic of ‘hot pursuit’.Mr Sjaastad further pointed out that when dealingwith potential multinational security options forAsia, the most striking absence is the lack ofavailable multinational security organisations.There exists neither an Asian collective defencealliance like the North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation (NATO) nor any collective security

Speaking on the security challenges, Mr Sjaastadremarked that unlike in Europe, traditionalmilitary threats still prevail in most of Asiaincluding Southeast Asia, and the use of militarypower to pursue political aims is still regardedas a state option. Furthermore newunconventional and asymmetrical threats havebecome prominent, widespread and imminent.As a result, military expenditure and the armedforces in parts of Asia have been substantiallyincreased. Mr Sjaastad reflected that this militarybuilt-up could also be partially attributed to thelack of cooperation between the armed forces ofthe Asian countries and of the limitations thatthe principle of sovereignty places on the ‘newly’independent countries. He added that apart from

Mr Anders Sjaastad delivering his remarks


organisation like the Organisation for Securityand Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Regardlessof what constructive role such institutions couldhave played in Asia’s future security equation,they are not vaguely visible on the Asian horizon.Mr Sjaastad concluded his presentation with theproposition that Asia with its lack of formalinstitutions and organisations should try to solveits many hot territorial disputes by reaching ameaningful compromise combined with anagreement for shared resource extraction indisputed offshore waters.

MARITIME SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(PART II)

Mr Joshua Ho, Senior Fellow, IDSS, openedthe second half of the public seminar with apresentation on The Security of Regional SeaLanes. Mr Ho started off by reiterating theimportance of Southeast Asian sea lanes to theglobal economy. He highlighted the fact that theamount of traffic carried by the Malacca Straitsmakes it the second busiest Straits in the worldand it is likely to be busier in the future as aresult of increasing trade flows and energydemands in Asia. He argued that since theseregional sea lanes are crucial for much of theworld’s transportation of oil and raw materialsand the conveyance of container traffic, the freeand safe navigation of commercial vessels inthese particular waterways have becomeimportant issues. Mr Ho predicted that due tothe heavy dependence on the sea as a mode oftrade and transportation, the importance ofregional sea lanes would only increase in thefuture. Mr Ho went on to list both piracy and thespectre of maritime terrorism as the main securitythreats to the security of regional sea lanes.

Touching on piracy, Mr Ho remarked that whileworldwide piracy incidences decreased in 2004,attacks in the Malacca and Singapore Straits haveincreased by 50% over that of 2003. Howeverthe trend seems to be reversing somewhat as thenumber of attacks in the third quarter of 2005has dropped to about 40% of the 2004 figure.Mr Ho cautioned that although the motivations

of terrorists and pirates are fundamentallydifferent, much vigilance is still needed as piracyforms the background noise from whichmaritime terrorist attacks may materialise. Sincethe advent of containerisation, today’s ports haveevolved to become providers of completelogistics networks and much of the world’s highvolume mainline trade focuses on just a fewmega ports. The closure of these hub ports couldcause severe disruptions to inventory andproduction cycles and the hub ports are thereforepotential lucrative targets for terrorists. Mr Hoargued that attacks on shipping could cause shipsto divert from current sea lanes to a safer routeat an increased cost to the shipping industry.However there is no indication of such attacksbeing planned or conducted by the JI in themaritime domain and attacks by the Abu Sayaffgroup have mainly been on ferries confined tothe Philippines.

In the final part of his presentation, Mr Hodiscussed the various countermeasures that havebeen taken to protect the regional sea lanes ofSoutheast Asia. At a national level, Singaporehas increased both its patrol and surveillanceactivities, deployed armed naval security teamson more vulnerable vessels entering and leavingport, moved towards compliance withinternational measures like the ISPS code andAIS regimes and beyond ISPS; the tracking ofvessels below 300 GRT via harbour crafttransponder systems. Likewise Indonesia has

Mr Joshua Ho delivering his presentation


also increased its own patrols and taken measuresto improve its capabilities by upgrading its patrolassets, setting up Navy Control CommandCentres, creating Special Forces to respond tohijackings, and plans for the installation of aradar station chain along the Sumatran coast.Measures adopted by Malaysia include theinstallation of a string of radar stations, increasednaval presence in affected areas, the setting upof dedicated anti-piracy task force, providingprotection for softer targets like tugs and bargesand the formation of a Maritime EnforcementAgency. On the subject of bilateral measures,Mr Ho noted that there are currently quite anumber of coordinated patrols and jointsurveillance activities that are in place such asthose between Singapore and Indonesia,Malaysia and Indonesia, and between Malaysiaand Thailand. On the other hand, multi-lateralcountermeasures are limited and only starting totake shape in the form of the ‘Eyes in the Sky’initiative and the Malacca Straits CoordinatedPatrols (MALSINDO). Mr Ho concluded on theoptimistic note that with the recognition ofconcerns of the international community by thelittoral states, and the numerous individual,bilateral and multilateral measures that have beentaken, regional sea lanes will continue to be safefor international shipping well into the future.

as a Complicating Factor in CombatingCrime at Sea. In setting the parameters of hispresentation, Mr Stolsvik highlighted theproblem of ships registered in a state when thereis little or no connection between the ship andthe state, and that of the changing of nationalityfor the purpose of hiding the ship’s true identityin order to conduct criminal activity. The factthat thousands of ships are registered in stateswith lax maritime regulations that promote orpermit anonymity as a business advantage hasgiven rise to some concern. Mr Stolsvik notedthat such arrangements could cause problemswhen coastal states try to combat crime at sea.The fear is that terrorists, pirates or other criminalgroups would register a ship of convenience andthus being able to hide their true nationality andidentity when conducting the criminal activity.Mr Stolsvik remarked that the global economyis greatly influenced by the so-called offshoreservices provided by numerous states and

From left to right: Mr Anders Sjaastad, Dr Ralf Emmers, Mr JohnSkogan, and Mr Kwa Chong Guan

territories around the world. Besides shipregistration, some of the services offered bystates and semi-independent territories includepassports, banking licenses, identity cards,registration of cars, registration of companies,bank services and internet domain registration.Since the offshore services provided by the actualstate do not correspond with the place ofregistration and where the economic activity isconducted, the use of offshore services gives asense of ‘virtuality’. Mr Stolsvik warned that one

Mr Gunnar Stolsvik making his presentation

The next presentation was by Mr GunnarStolsvik, Legal Adviser, Norwegian CoastGuard, on the subject of Flags of Convenience


of the main problems of the flag state principleand flags of convenience is that often there existsa very weak link between the flag state and theship. In such cases there exists virtually nogenuine link between the state and the ship andthis weakness is much clearer when a request toboard a ship by the coastal or port state is leftunanswered by the flag state. However in MrStolsvik’s opinion, it will be utopian to changethe order of the sea, as there are strongeconomical and political reasons to keep thestrong position of the flag state.

On the other hand, Mr Stolsvik argued, it mustalso be possible to weigh these commercial needsagainst the need for security on the part of thecoastal and port state. In his view, there are threepossible approaches; the use of internationalpressure, the establishment of a net of bilateralagreements and as a last resort solution, todisregard the flag of the ship where there isclearly no genuine link between the state andthe ship. Mr Stolsvik believes that convincingflag states to tighten the control of their shipsmight not be possible without some form ofinternational pressure. Mr Stolsvik concludedthat when combating the negative effects ofconvenience it is perhaps best from a politicalpoint of view, to establish common globalrecommendations that flag states should followwith the implementation monitored by aninternational organisation such as theOrganisation for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD). Only where there issuspicion of proliferation of weapons of massdestruction or other serious criminal activityonboard a ship, or that such acts are beingplanned against other ships or offshoreinstallations, that one might, after concluding thatthe ship lacks any genuine link with the flag state,as a last resort solution, regard it as a statelessship and board it.

The following speaker, Dr Robert C. Beckman,Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, NUS,touched on the Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ASL)Passage in Southeast Asia. Dr Beckman startedoff his presentation by explaining the

Archipelagic States Regime as the regime thatallows archipelagic states to use straightbaselines joining the outermost points of theoutermost islands and drying reefs. Thesovereignty of the archipelagic state extends toits archipelagic waters, to the air space aboveand to the seabed & subsoil below. Howeverships of all states have the right of innocentpassage through the archipelagic waters whileships and aircraft of all states have the right ofarchipelagic sea lanes passage through and overarchipelagic waters on designated sea lanes andair routes thereby imposing certain limits on thesovereignty of the archipelagic states.Dr Beckman then moved on to the vital butthorny issue of the definition of the ArchipelagicSea Lanes. Dr Beckman brought to attention the

Dr Robert Beckman delivering his presentation

Indonesian proposal to the Maritime SafetyCommittee (MSC) in 1996, which was furtherreferred to the NAV Sub-Committee.Subsequently the United States and Australiamade submissions at the NAV Sub-Committeemeeting in 1997 in objection to the Indonesianproposal on the grounds that it did not containany east-west route. They argued that theIndonesian proposal should be considered a‘partial designation’ because it did not includeall normal routes used for internationalnavigation and that they continued to have theright of ASLP through routes normally used forinternational navigation. In 1998, the MSCaccepted recommendations of NAV Sub-


Committee on the procedures for the designationof sea lanes. Designation of sea lanes consideredas a routing measure was henceforth to be dealtwith by the MSC with assistance of NAV Sub-Committee. In 1998, Indonesia in consultationwith IMO and Governments of the United Statesand Australia, submitted a revised proposal toMSC. Indonesia confirmed that its revisedproposal was only a ‘partial proposal’. Therevised proposal was approved and adopted byMSC. However in 2003, the United States statedthat Indonesia had not properly designated itssea lanes because it had not provided 6 monthsadvance notice as required in the GeneralProvisions, and had not circulated the Englishversion of Regulation 37. The United States alsoadvised that it would continue to exercise rightsin all routes normally used for internationalnavigation.

Dr Beckman indicated that there is a lack ofagreement between Indonesia with Australia andthe US over the east-west route although it isnot clear from records what the exact nature ofthe disagreement is on the east-west route. DrBeckman believes that although the issue couldbe taken to a compulsory binding disputesettlement under 1982 UNCLOS, a negotiatedsettlement is much more likely. Although theregime established in Part IV of 1982 UNCLOShas been accepted by major archipelagic statesand major user states, the functions of the IMOand procedures for the designation of sea laneswere not spelled out in 1982 UNCLOS.However, they have been clarified as a result ofactions taken at the IMO with regard to the sealanes through Indonesia. In conclusion, DrBeckman suggested that the sea lanes throughIndonesia are likely to be finalised throughdiscussions and negotiations with interested userstates and that the designation of sea lanesthrough Indonesia would result in greatercertainty for the designation of sea lanes ofcommunications (SLOCs) through SoutheastAsia in general.

Dr Sam Bateman, Senior Fellow, IDSS, beganhis presentation on Building Good Order at Sea

in Southeast Asia: The Promise ofInternational Regimes, by asserting theimportance of international regimes in themaritime domain, which he described as the‘global commons’. Maritime security regimesare of necessity based on the framework providedby the 1982 United Nations Convention on theLaw of the Sea (UNCLOS). He also noted thatin the Politics of the Sea, interests often coincideas well as conflict. In Dr Bateman’s opinion,international regimes promise absolute ratherthan relative gains. In order to reap those benefitshowever, there must be a balance of interests inmaritime zones between coastal States and userStates and a need for compromises andcooperation.Dr Bateman went on to identify two problemareas for maritime security: (1) the existence ofconflict of security interests between user andcoastal states, and (2) the complexity in theimplementation of the United Nations

Dr Sam Bateman making his remarks

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).The UNCLOS, being a general convention, hadbuilt-in ambiguities and grey areas when it cameto application of its principles to specific regions.In place of general rule, there is a need to developspecific rules that is tailored to the regionalcontext. Another complication is also that theUnited States itself is not a party to the UNCLOS.Within Southeast Asia itself, the complexmaritime geography, conflicting sovereigntyclaims, uses and abuses of territorial sea straight


baselines, innocent passage of warships, transitpassage regime, ASL passage regime, rights andduties in the EEZ, and underdeveloped maritimecooperation are issues that impose limitations onwhat can be achieved. Different views have alsoemerged in East Asia over the rights and dutiesof coastal states in their EEZs vis-à-vis those ofother states. Dr Bateman remarked that the EEZremains a zone of tension between coastal statecontrol and maritime state use of the sea. On amore optimistic note, Dr Bateman pointed outthat the EEZ Group 21 that was convened hadthe aims of clarifying the rights and duties ofboth coastal states and user states in an EEZ andto provide a regional maritime confidence andsecurity building measure. The last meeting ofthe EEZ Group 21 in September 2005 reachedan agreement on Guidelines for Navigation andOverflight in the EEZ. The guidelines are non-binding in nature and may be generally regardedas reflecting the need for better understandingof the rights and obligations of states conductingactivities in the EEZ of another country.

In conclusion, Dr Bateman emphasised that thelaw of the sea is a dynamic phenomenon andwhile the words in UNCLOS remain static, theirinterpretation will change over time. He believesthat the US is unlikely to become party toUNCLOS and regional practice in East Asia willplay a key role in shaping customary Law of theSea in the future. In doing so, state practice inthis theatre, under the influence of nationalisticdomestic politics and regional tensions, maydiverge from the orthodox, largely western viewof the customary law of the sea. Dr Batemanargued that none of this suggests that we need toamend UNCLOS and it would be extremelydifficult to obtain the necessary consensus in thecontemporary world anyway. Instead thechallenge in building an effective regionalmaritime security regime is to recognise thelimitations of UNCLOS and to negotiate aregional consensus on aspects of the Conventionthat are less than clear or where differences ofview exist.

In the final presentation of the public seminar,

Dr Ralf Emmers, Assistant Professor andDeputy Head of Studies, IDSS, spoke on theissue of Maritime Disputes in the South ChinaSea. Dr Emmers listed the Spratly Islandsclaimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, thePhilippines, Malaysia and Brunei, and theParacel Islands controlled by China since 1974but claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan as thehotspots. Dr Emmers believes that economic,political and strategic interests influence thedisputes. Dr Emmers pointed out that it isdebatable whether most of the Spratly Islandscan generate maritime zones since most of thedisputed features do not offer any legitimate basisfor claiming maritime jurisdiction. On the subjectof overlapping claims, Dr Emmers argued thatthe claims made by the parties could be separatedinto historical claims of discovery andoccupation and claims that rest on the extensionof sovereign jurisdiction under interpretations ofthe provisions of UNCLOS. As illustrations,Vietnam claims both Paracels and Spratlys basedon Discovery and Occupation while otherASEAN Claimants to the Spratlys rely more onExtension of EEZ and Continental Shelves thanon History.

On the strategic environment in the SouthChina Sea, Dr Emmers indicated that whilethe Chinese have used force on severaloccasions as a means of consolidating itsposition in the South China Sea (Against

Dr Ralf Emmers delivering his presentation


Vietnam for Control of Paracels in 1974, andthe Spratlys in 1988). China has, since 1995,been acting as the status quo power,accommodating with ASEAN but making noconcessions on sovereignty. On China’s powerprojection capabilities, Dr Emmers sawChina’s naval position in Spratlys as weak withlimited power projection capabilities. Hefurther argued that the Spratlys are too smallto sustain bases for further naval activities andin short, China cannot at this point impose anaval hegemony over the South China Sea. Atthis point in time, China still lacks thetechnology, the military capabilities and thepower projection to control the area militarily.However, China has a relative advantage overmost other claimant states with the build-upof its Southern Fleet, which is a particularconcern for Vietnam and the Philippines. DrEmmers elaborated that Hanoi has insufficientnaval capabilities and no ally tocounterbalance China while the Philippines isthe weakest party in the dispute. Havinglimited power to deploy forces, both Vietnamand the Philippines have instead relied onASEAN diplomacy and the negotiation of aCode of Conduct

Turning to the Declaration on the Conduct ofParties in the South China Sea, Dr Emmersviews the ASEAN-China Interim Accord ofNovember 2002 as a step in the right direction.Dr Emmers further commented on both thepotential benefits and shortcomings of such anaccord. While such a move contributes to theeasing of tensions in the South China Sea, theaccord is only a political statement short of abinding code of conduct and therefore unableto prevent territorial clashes or other conflicts.In conclusion, Dr Emmers noted that astrategic and diplomatic status quo exists, andthe disputes are still essentially a political,rather than a military issue. As such, in theshort to medium term, the risks of conflict aresmall although miscalculations or accidentsmay lead to limited confrontation. However,Dr Emmers cautioned that in the long run,peace could still be undermined if Chinaincreased its naval power projectioncapabilities, or there is proof of sufficient oilreserves for commercial usage in the SouthChina Sea islands. The proof of oil reservesand increased energy pressure in East Asiacould then force the Chinese to assert is claimsover the islands.

________________________________________________________________________________

Rapporteur: Ong Wei Chong


P U B L I C S E M I N A R P R O G R A M M E

Tuesday, 29 November 2005

0800 Registration

0900 Opening RemarksMr Barry Desker, Director IDSSMr John K. Skogan, Senior Researcher NUPI

0920 Keynote SpeechFuture Challenges to the Shipping IndustryBG Tay Lim Heng, Chief Executive, Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore

0945 Maritime Security in Southeast Asia (Part I)Chairman: Mr Kwa Chong Guan, Head of External Programmes, IDSS

Contemporary Threat of Maritime Terrorism: Technologies, Tactics and TechniquesDr Rohan Gunaratna, Head of International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, IDSS

Southeast Asian SLOC & Security OptionsMr Anders C. Sjaastad, Senior Adviser, NUPI

1030 Break

1045 Maritime Security in Southeast Asia (Part II)Chairman: Mr Kwa Chong Guan, Head of External Programmes, IDSS

The Security of Regional Sea LanesJoshua Ho, Senior Fellow, IDSS

Flags of Convenience as a Complicating Factor in Combating Crime at SeaGunnar Stolsvik, Legal Adviser, Norwegian Coast Guard

Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage in Southeast Asia: Developments and UncertaintiesDr Robert Beckman, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, NUS

Building Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia: The Promise of International RegimesDr Sam Bateman, Senior Fellow, IDSS

Maritime Disputes in the South China SeaDr Ralf Emmers, Assistant Professor and Deputy Head of Studies, IDSS

1230 End of Public Seminar


L I S T O F P A R T I C I P A N T S

1. Arabinda AcharyaAssociate Research FellowInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological UniversityBlk S4 Level B4Nanyang AveSingapore 639798Email: [email protected]

2. Sam BatemanSenior FellowInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological UniversityBlk S4 Level B4Nanyang AveSingapore 639798Email: [email protected]

3. Robert BeckmanAssociate Professor and vice-DeanFaculty of LawNational University of Singapore13 Law LinkSingaporeEmail: [email protected]

4. Jan Georg ChristophersenResearcherNorwegian Police University CollegeSlemdalsveien 5P O Box 5027 Majorstua0301 OsloNorwayEmail: [email protected]

5. Barry DeskerDirectorInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological UniversityBlk S4 Level B4Nanyang AveSingapore 639798Email: [email protected]

6. Ralf EmmersAssistant Professor & Deputy Head of StudiesInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological UniversityBlk S4 Level B4Nanyang AveSingapore 639798Email: [email protected]

7. Rohan GunaratnaHead of International Centre for Political Violenceand Terrorism ResearchInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological UniversityBlk S4 Level B4Nanyang AveSingapore 639798Email: [email protected]

8. Joshua HoSenior FellowInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological UniversityBlk S4 Level B4Nanyang AveSingapore 639798Email: [email protected]

9. Kwa Chong GuanHead of External ProgrammesInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological UniversityBlk S4 Level B4Nanyang AveSingapore 639798Email: [email protected]

10. Tay Lim HengChief ExecutiveMaritime and Port Authority of Singapore460 Alexandra Road#19-00 PSA BuildingSingapore 119963

11. Lawrence W. PrabhakarVisiting FellowInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological UniversityBlk S4 Level B4Nanyang AveSingapore 639798Email: [email protected]

12. Catherine Zara RaymondAssociate Research FellowInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological UniversityBlk S4 Level B4Nanyang AveSingapore 639798Email: [email protected]


13. Anders C. SjaastadSenior AdviserNorwegian Institute of International AffairsC.J. Hambros plass 2 DP O Box 8159 DepN-0033 OsloNorwayEmail: [email protected]

14. John SkoganSenior ResearcherNorwegian Institute of International AffairsC.J.Hambros plass 2DP O Box 8159 DepN-0033 OsloNorwayEmail: [email protected]

15. Gunnar StølsvikLegal AdviserNorwegian Coast GuardGrev Wedels plass 90151 Oslo, NorwayEmail: [email protected]

16. Christian Marius StrykenResearch FellowNorwegian Institute of International AffairsC.J. Hambros plass 2 DP.O. Box 8159 Dep. N-0033 OsloEmail: [email protected]

17. Enok NygaardAmbassadorNorwegian EmbassyEmail: [email protected]

18. Lise NordgaardFirst SecretaryRoyal Norwegian EmbassyEmail: [email protected]

19. Michael KohSenior ManagerMINDEFEmail: [email protected]

20. Ensley TanSenior OfficeMINDEFEmail: [email protected]

21. Yvonne GrawertResearch Officer, Political - Economic SectionAustralian High Commission

22. Mark JerrettDefence AdviserAustralian High Commission

23. Nigel J. RaceCommander Royal Navy Liaison Officer andAssistant Defence Adviser, British HighCommission

24. Dai BingAssistant to DAEmbassy of PRC

25. Gilles BonavitaDefence AttacheFrench Embassy

26. Lee Sang DaeDefence AttacheEmbassy of the Republic of Korea

27. Francisco N Cruz JrDefence AttachePhilippines Embassy

28. Yury ZolotarevDefence AttacheThe Russian Embassy

29. Bengt JarvidDefence AttacheEmbassy of Sweden

30. Charles Rivers ClevelandUS Defense & Naval AttacheUS Embassy

31. Joe BrummundSpecial AgentNCIS, Singapore

32. Chan Beng SengSea TransportMinistry of Transport

33. Chang Li LinHead, Public AffairsInstitute of Policy Studies

O t h e r P a r t i c i p a n t s


34. Bernard LimDeputy DirectorSecurity, Ministry of Transport

35. Lim Li WeiHQ Republic of Singapore Navy

36. Ng Li Sa,Assistant DirectorSea Transport, Ministry of Transport

37. Julie S. SeckelSenior AnalystNCIS Singapore

38. Teresa TenorioSenior AnalystNCIS Singapore

39. Fabian TeoHQ Republic of Singapore Navy

40. Alex DuperouzelManaging DirectorBackground Asia Group

41. John Fawcett-EllisGeneral Counsel & Regional ManagerINTERTANKO, Asia

42. Marcus HandSoutheast Asia EditorLloyd’s List

43. Ragnar E HansenRegional ManagerDet Norske Veritas Pte Ltd

44. Kenneth KeeManaging DirectorPetroships Pte Ltd

45. Steve LaddRegional DirectorRaytheon’s Integrated Defense Systems (IDS)

46. Kenneth MarshallINTERTANKO, Asia

47. Sumathy PermalResearcherMaritime Institute of Malaysia

48. Teh Kong LeongExecutive DirectorSingapore Maritime Foundation

49. Stephen WeatherfordDirector of OperationsMaritime SecurityGlenn Defense Marine (Asia) Pte Ltd

50. Mark WomersleyManager Environmental Systems, BMT

51. T.S. Ramadas RaoAsia EditorFairplay Ltd

52. Donald UrquhartCorrespondentThe Business Times

53. John HarrisonManager (Research)ICPVTR, IDSS

54. Bouchaib SilmResearch AnalystICPVTR, IDSS

55. Michelle TeoCommunications & Conference Coordinator, IDSS

56. Bobby ThomasResearch Assistant, IDSS

57. Jenny FeiInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

58. Horta LoroInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

59. Chairul Fahmy HussainiInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

60. Lee Soon Tat ChristopherInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

61. NadËge OrbanInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

62. Stephanie ThengInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies


The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies(IDSS) was established in July 1996 as anautonomous research institute within theNanyang Technological University. Itsobjectives are to:

• Conduct research on security, strategic andinternational issues.

• Provide general and graduate education instrategic studies, international relations,defence management and defence technology.

• Promote joint and exchange programmes withsimilar regional and international institutions;organise seminars/conferences on topicssalient to the strategic and policy communitiesof the Asia-Pacific.

Constituents of IDSS include the InternationalCentre for Political Violence and TerrorismResearch (ICPVTR) and the Asian Programmefor Negotiation and Conflict Management(APNCM).

RESEARCH

Through its Working Paper Series, IDSSCommentaries and other publications, theInstitute seeks to share its research findings withthe strategic studies and defence policycommunities. The Institute’s researchers are alsoencouraged to publish their writings in refereedjournals. The focus of research is on issuesrelating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications forSingapore and other countries in the region. TheInstitute has also established the S. RajaratnamProfessorship in Strategic Studies (named afterSingapore’s first Foreign Minister), to bringdistinguished scholars to participate in the workof the Institute. Previous holders of the Chairinclude Professors Stephen Walt (HarvardUniversity), Jack Snyder (Columbia University),Wang Jisi (Chinese Academy of Social

Sciences), Alastair Iain Johnston (HarvardUniversity) and John Mearsheimer (Universityof Chicago). A Visiting Research FellowProgramme also enables overseas scholars tocarry out related research in the Institute.

TEACHING

The Institute provides educational opportunitiesat an advanced level to professionals from boththe private and public sectors in Singapore aswell as overseas through graduate programmes,namely, the Master of Science in StrategicStudies, the Master of Science in InternationalRelations and the Master of Science inInternational Political Economy. Theseprogrammes are conducted full-time and part-time by an international faculty. The Institutealso has a Doctoral programme for research inthese fields of study. In addition to these graduateprogrammes, the Institute also teaches variousmodules in courses conducted by the SAFTIMilitary Institute, SAF Warrant Officers’ School,Civil Defence Academy, Singapore TechnologiesCollege, and the Defence and Home AffairsMinistries. The Institute also runs a one-semestercourse on ‘The International Relations of theAsia Pacific’ for undergraduates in NTU.

NETWORKING

The Institute convenes workshops, seminars andcolloquia on aspects of international relations andsecurity development that are of contemporaryand historical significance. Highlights of theInstitute’s activities include a regular Colloquiumon Strategic Trends in the 21

st Century, the annual

Asia Pacific Programme for Senior MilitaryOfficers (APPSMO) and the biennial AsiaPacific Security Conference (held in conjunctionwith Asian Aerospace). IDSS staff participatein Track II security dialogues and scholarlyconferences in the Asia-Pacific. IDSS has

ABOUT IDSS


contacts and collaborations with manyinternational think tanks and research institutesthroughout Asia, Europe and the United States.The Institute has also participated in researchprojects funded by the Ford Foundation and theSasakawa Peace Foundation. It also serves asthe Secretariat for the Council for SecurityCooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP),Singapore. Through these activities, the Instituteaims to develop and nurture a network ofresearchers whose collaborative efforts will yieldnew insights into security issues of interest toSingapore and the region.

public seminar on maritime security in southeast asia...6 idss-nupi public seminar on maritime...

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