published by the south african institute of international ... · sadc troika. the first opds troika...

SADC RESTRUCTURING:PROGRESS DESPITE DIFFICULTIES

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is ata critical stage of its development. It has embarked on anambitious internal restructuring exercise to improve its effi-ciency and tackle difficult questions of how to acceleratesocio-economic development and achieve meaningful, eq-uitable regional integration.

The SADC Barometer is a new quarterly SAIIA publica-tion intended to provide an independent and critical evalua-tion of progress on implementation of the various protocols,political and economic convergence and progress towardSADC’s economic and social development goals. The re-gion’s ability to reach these objectives will depend on howeffectively the restructuring exercise is executed. This first is-sue assesses the progress of that restructuring effort.

In 1999 SADC heads of state mandated the Council ofMinisters to conduct a comprehensive review of the opera-tions of SADC institutions and produce a set of recommen-dations for streamlining and focusing the organisation. TheReview of Operations Report was approved by the summitat its extra-ordinary meeting held in March 2001 inWindhoek, Namibia.

...continued on p.14

HDI Value & Rank/173AngolaBotswanaDRCLesothoMalawiMauritiusMozambiqueNamibiaSeychellesSouth AfricaSwazilandTanzaniaZambiaZimbabwe

GDP per capita (PPP $ )AngolaBotswanaDRCLesothoMalawiMauritiusMozambiqueNamibiaSeychellesSouth AfricaSwazilandTanzaniaZambiaZimbabwe

Adult Literacy %AngolaBotswanaDRCLesothoMalawiMauritiusMozambiqueNamibiaSeychellesSouth AfricaSwazilandTanzaniaZambiaZimbabwe

Life expectancy at birthAngolaBotswanaDRCLesothoMalawiMauritiusMozambiqueNamibiaSeychellesSouth AfricaSwazilandTanzaniaZambiaZimbabwe

Issue 1•March 2003

Published by the South African Institute of International Affairs with funding from NORAD

Development and Poverty Reduction in SADC?Development and Poverty Reduction in SADC?Development and Poverty Reduction in SADC?Development and Poverty Reduction in SADC?Development and Poverty Reduction in SADC?The regional indicators in the box on the right reveal that only twoSADC countries (Seychelles and Angola) improved their HumanDevelopment Index (HDI) ranking between 1992 and 2002.

In addition, SADC’s GDP annual average growth rate droppedfrom 3.1% in 2000 to 1.95% in 2001. SADC’s economic growth ratethus lags behind that of sub-Saharan Africa, which increased from3.5% in 2000 to 3.7% in 2001. To reach the Millennium Develop-ment Goals, which aim to reduce the number of people living inabsolute poverty by half by 2015, SADC needs to increase itsgrowth rate to the minimum target of 6%-7% a year.

Regional Indicators19920.2910.7630.3840.4730.3300.8210.2460.6110.8100.7050.5220.3640.4250.539

Rank16474143131157601671086295124147136121

20020.4030.5720.4310.5350.4000.7720.3220.6100.8110.6950.5770.4400.4330.551

Rank1611261551321636717012247107125151153128

199242.567.274.168.653.981.136.940.077.080.674.064.475.283.4

199246.564.952.060.545.670.246.458.871.062.957.552.148.953.7

1992751

5,120523

1,060820

11,700380

4,0205,6193,7991,700

6201,2301,970

20002,1877,184

7652,031

61510,017

8546,431

12,5089,4014,492

523780

2,635

200042.077.261.483.560.184.544.082.085.388.079.675.178.188.7

200045.240.351.345.740.071.339.344.772.752.144.451.141.442.9

ContentsSADC Says No For Now to Expansion ................. 2SADC Security Integration ..................................... 3Is There Convergence in SADC? ............................ 4Prospects for Angolan Chairmanship of SADC ...... 5AIDS turns SADC Food Crisis into Major Disaster .. 7Zimbabwe – A Dangerous Stalemate..................... 8SADC-Mercosur: South-South Co-operation........... 9Growth and Opportunity for SADC? ...................... 11SADC Free Trade ................................................... 12

solid ‘building blocks’ of Africanintegration.

2•March 2003•Issue 1•

SADC Says No for Now to ExpansionBy turning down Rwanda’s request tojoin the Southern Africa DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) in October 2002,the organisation signalled that it is seri-ous about consolidating and deepen-ing existing bonds between its memberstates. It wants to avoid, and where pos-sible resolve, some of the problemscaused by ad hoc expansion and du-plication of subregional organisationsin Eastern and Central Africa.

SADC placed a moratorium on newmembership when it adopted the Re-port on the Restructuring of SADC Insti-tutions on 9 March 2001. Yet, even be-fore that, Uganda’s interest in joiningin 2000 was similarly thwarted.Uganda and Rwanda suffered in partbecause SADC has failed to digest theDRC whose problems with Uganda andRwanda exacerbated political discordwithin the organisation.

At the Blantyre summit in August1997, heads of state were excited bythe DRC’s ‘great potential to cooperatewith SADC in key sectors such as en-ergy, water, tourism, transport and com-munications’ and ‘expressed optimismthat efforts… to usher in a new era ofpolitical stability and economic recon-struction would be successful’. A yearlater, the summit was expressing its‘deep regret’ at the outbreak of war inthe new member state.

Certainly security considerations arebeing reasserted on the SADC agenda.Agreement on a protocol establishingthe SADC Organ for Politics, Defenceand Security in 2001 and ongoing ne-gotiations on a mutual defence pacthave made governments more circum-spect about their security commitmentsto the subregion.

At the same time that SADC stoppedaccepting new members, there wassome rationalisation of overlappingmembership with the Common Marketof Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA). By 2001 Tanzania,

Mozambique and Lesotho had with-drawn from COMESA. But two-thirdsof SADC states remain members ofCOMESA.

The need for co-ordination betweenSADC and COMESA has been recog-nised and formalised through the crea-tion of a joint task force at the level ofthe two secretariats. However, difficul-ties remain for the AU, which has to en-gage with SADC and COMESA as theregional economic communities (RECs)of Southern and Eastern Africa, respec-tively. The New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (Nepad) is also meant tobe implemented through the RECs. Yetneither SADC nor COMESA corre-spond with the AU’s official demarca-tion of Southern and Eastern Africa.

In this context, it would be best forSADC, the AU and the Nepad initia-tive if membership to all the subregionalorganisations was limited, rationalisedand consolidated so that they couldperform their mandate effectively as

Comesa = dark greenSADC = light greenBoth = vertical lines

Kathryn Sturman is a senior researcher at theInstitute for Security Studies.

REGIONS OF THE AU:REGIONS OF THE AU:REGIONS OF THE AU:REGIONS OF THE AU:REGIONS OF THE AU:Southern Africa – 10 membersSouthern Africa – 10 membersSouthern Africa – 10 membersSouthern Africa – 10 membersSouthern Africa – 10 membersAngola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,Swaziland, Zambia, ZimbabweEastern Africa – 13 membersEastern Africa – 13 membersEastern Africa – 13 membersEastern Africa – 13 membersEastern Africa – 13 membersComoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia,Kenya, Madagascar, Seychelles, Soma-lia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda,MauritiusCentral Africa – 10 membersCentral Africa – 10 membersCentral Africa – 10 membersCentral Africa – 10 membersCentral Africa – 10 membersBurundi, Cameroon, Central AfricanRepublic, Chad, DR Congo, Burundi,Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Toméand Principe, Republic of CongoWestern Africa – 16 membersWestern Africa – 16 membersWestern Africa – 16 membersWestern Africa – 16 membersWestern Africa – 16 membersBenin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau; Liberia, Mali,Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,Sierra Leone, TogoNorthern Africa – 5 membersNorthern Africa – 5 membersNorthern Africa – 5 membersNorthern Africa – 5 membersNorthern Africa – 5 membersAlgeria, Egypt, Libya, Saharawi ArabDemocratic Republic, Tunisia

longer part of any of SADC’s leader-ship structures.

The Role of the OPDSThe Role of the OPDSThe Role of the OPDSThe Role of the OPDSThe Role of the OPDSThe role of the OPDS is to co-ordinatethe security policies of SADC membersin accordance with the goals of the Pro-tocol on Politics, Defence and SecurityCo-operation. The protocol has so farbeen ratified by seven member states(Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius,Mozambique, Tanzania and Namibia),with ratifications from Zambia and Zim-babwe reportedly in the pipeline. SA isstill held up by its time-consuming ratifi-cation procedure in Parliament. Withonly two more ratifications necessarybefore the protocol enters into force,there is a good chance that this will hap-pen by the next SADC summit in Au-gust/September 2003.

The protocol itself is a liberal andsound document. It endorses the Nepadvision of good governance, humanrights, democracy and the rule of lawas the road to lasting peace and stabil-ity in the region. However, the questionremains: will the OPDS rise to the chal-lenge, or will the protocol become an-other example of an excellent documenton African integration with little impacton practical policies? The Strategic In-dicative Plan for the Organ (the SIPO),which is supposed to be ready by the2003 SADC summit should clearly des-ignate what practical roles and dutiesthe OPDS should assume.

The Challenges AheadThe Challenges AheadThe Challenges AheadThe Challenges AheadThe Challenges AheadThe protocol sets out an ambitiousagenda that poses several challenges forthe OPDS, many of which arise from alack of capacity and expertise in the

SADC Security Integration: Where to Now?Although formed in 1996, the structureof SADC’s body for regional securityco-operation – the Organ on Politics,Defence and Security (OPDS) – was notformalised until the August 2001 SADCsummit in Blantyre, Malawi. At that sum-mit, the SADC heads of state and gov-ernment signed a Protocol on Politics,Defence and Security Co-operation andattempted to resolve the contentionaround the OPDS’s leadership structure.

The Blantyre summit solved threeproblems that had previously steepedthe OPDS in controversy. First, the OPDSwas brought firmly under the authorityof the SADC summit, with the chair ofthe OPDS from then on reporting di-rectly to the SADC summit. Second, thesigning of the Protocol provided a le-gal framework for SADC’s security in-tegration, making it clearer what themember states can and cannot do in thename of the OPDS.

Third, while Zimbabwe’s PresidentRobert Mugabe had headed the OPDSfrom its inception in 1996 to the 2001summit, the OPDS is now run by a lead-ership troika – following the same prin-ciple as the SADC chairmanship. As anattempt to distribute leadership of theorganisation broadly among memberstates, members of the OPDS troikashould not also be represented on theSADC troika. The first OPDS troika con-sisted of Zimbabwe as the outgoingchair, Mozambique as the chair andTanzania as the incoming chair. How-ever, a reshuffle took place at last year’sLuanda Summit – Tanzania became theincoming chair of the SADC troika, Mo-zambique continued as chair of theOPDS and Lesotho became the OPDS’snew incoming chair. Zimbabwe is no

•Issue 1•March 2003• 3

SADC region. For instance, while ef-forts are underway, it will be long be-fore SADC can boast a professional re-gional peacekeeping force. Similarly,conflict resolution mechanisms such asnegotiation and mediation require im-mense political will and patience, aswell as the development of skills, re-sources and structures. The Protocol’scall for arbitration mechanisms relieson a suggested SADC tribunal, whichso far has not become a reality.

While problems arising from a lackof capacities and skills are difficult toovercome, the political challenges fac-ing the OPDS may prove even moredaunting. The protocol includes bothtraditional state security goals andwider human security objectives. Whilesafeguarding territorial integrity andpolitical sovereignty is important, toostrong an emphasis on traditional statesecurity goals can be counter-produc-tive in a region where several regimeshave weak or untested democratic cre-dentials.

There is an important distinction tobe made between stability – the per-petuation of the political status quo –and security, a concept that has cometo incorporate human rights, democ-racy and the rule of law. Regime sta-bility can be maintained for a whilethrough force and repression, andgood governance and economic de-velopment need play no part. However,this sort of stability tends to finally eruptinto a political crisis since there is nopeaceful way for the population to ad-dress their grievances. Lasting securitymust incorporate regime legitimacy sothat the rights and needs of a country’spopulation are taken into account.

The protocol endorses this wider in-terpretation of security, but it is impor-tant that SADC, when formulating theSIPO, makes sure that the human secu-rity aspects of the protocol are put intopractical policies.

In January 2003 SAIIA started a two-year research project focused on theSADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS).

The project involves a comparative study of political and security integra-tion in Southern Africa, Europe and Southeast Asia, and two workshops for

stakeholders on fostering common values and goals to underpin politicalintegration and transforming these values and goals into concrete practices.

The researcher in charge of the SADC OPDS project is AnneHammerstad. She can be e-mailed at: [email protected] Anne Hammerstad is SAIIA OPDS Researcher.


OpinionSuccessful and sustainable regionalintegration requires political andeconomic convergence.

In SADC, the disparities betweenthe region’s biggest economy andpolitical heavyweight SA and theother 13 members are huge. SA ac-counts for almost 75% of the region’sGDP, more than 85% of intra-regional trade and more than 90%of intra-regional investment. A sig-nificant narrowing of this gap in themedium- to-long run is required forsuccessful regional integration. In thisrespect, SADC’s recent organisa-tional and structural reforms will havean impact only if SADC convergesboth politically and economically.

What are the chances that this con-vergence will occur? In economicterms, the trends observed through-out most of the 1990s were quite en-couraging. With the exception of afew cases – such as Angola and theDemocratic Republic of the Congo(DRC) (and later Zimbabwe) –budget deficits and inflation rates de-creased, external debt levels stabi-lised and economic growth ratespicked up. Only in terms of aid de-pendency did the differences be-tween countries such as Botswana,Mauritius, Seychelles and SA, on theone hand, and Lesotho, Malawi, Mo-zambique, Tanzania and Zambia,on the other, widen. With the turn ofthe millennium, economic trendschanged for the worse. Growth ratesplummeted in most countries, infla-tion rates and budget deficits rose,as did debt levels, despite debt re-duction efforts by many donors. To-day the disparities between SA andthe next most diversified economy –Zimbabwe – are more significant

Is There Convergence in SADC?than five years ago. At the bottom endof the economic scale, countries suchas the DRC, Malawi, Tanzania, Zam-bia and Zimbabwe fell even further be-hind. Only Mozambique was able torecord significant and sustainablegrowth.

A similar development occurred inthe political field. With the exceptionof Swaziland (an absolute monarchy)and the DRC (a de facto autocracy),the 1990s saw a trend towards demo-cratic multiparty systems. At the begin-ning of 2003 the rhetoric persists, butdevelopments in several countries pointto the following:• a steady deterioration of the rule of

law (Zimbabwe, Angola,Swaziland, Malawi, the DRC,Zambia);

• an increasing number of flawedelections (Zimbabwe in 2000 and2002, Zambia in 2001, Lesotho in1998) as well as increasing cases ofconstitutional tampering (Namibia,Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi);

• growing restrictions on politicalrights and civil liberties (Zimbabwe,Angola, Malawi, the DRC, Tanza-nia, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland);and

• widening social gaps, even in themore stable and prosperous coun-tries such as Botswana, SA andMauritius.However, the end of the civil wars

in Angola and the DRC, Lesotho’s suc-cessful election in 2002 and the pre-vention of an unconstitutional thirdpresidential term in Zambia are en-couraging signs for democracy. In gen-eral, however, the gap between coun-tries in the ‘democratic consolidationzone’ and the mere ‘electoral democ-racies’ and autocracies has widened

over the past few years. Increasingpolitical divergence is a strong indi-cator of crumbling internal legitimacyand stability, which in some SADCcountries, in turn, impedes economicrecovery and further integration.

The implications of these trends onthe regional integration exercise areclear and a number of action areasemerge.

Regarding political convergence:• ambiguities towards violations of

good governance principles and/or democracy must be avoided;

• deviant regimes must not be sup-ported;

• inter-state conflicts must be settledregionally; and

• an enforceable regional demo-cratic code of conduct should beagreed upon.On the economic side:

• the private sector must have a big-ger role to play in the formulationof sectoral policies and protocols;

• costs and benefits of regional inte-gration measures (protocols) mustbecome more transparent topolicymakers and civil servants;

• SA must avoid dominating (if notbulldozing) the much smallereconomies into submission; and

• the implementation capacity andresponsibility of the Secretariatmust be strengthened and ex-panded so that regional integra-tion can be accelerated.

Any opinions expressed are the responsibility of the individual authors and not of NORAD or SAIIA.© South African Institute of International Affairs

All rights reserved

Christian Peters-Berries is Project Managerof the National Initiative for Civic Education(NICE) in Malawi. He co-edited the Year-book on Monitoring Regional Integration inSouthern Africa I and II and has worked onSADC and regional integration for theKonrad Adenauer Foundation, GTZ and theGerman Ministry for Economic Cooperation.He has published widely on SADC.

Prospects for Angolan Chairmanship of SADCAngola assumed the SADC chairman-ship only months after its 27-year civilwar ended. What influence will it haveon the direction of SADC or on the keyissues affecting the region?

‘The main role developed by thechair will be to maintain the presenceof peace and democracy, and to re-duce and avert conflicts in the region,’says SADC’s national secretary basedin the Angolan Ministry of Planning,Beatriz Morais. However, she gives nodetails of how Angola plans to lead inthis role. In addition to being responsi-ble for the leadership of SADC, Angolais chairman of the Economic Commu-nity of Central African States (ECCAS),and is also a non-permanent memberof the UN Security Council.

When Angolan President JoseEduardo dos Santos outlined his visionfor SADC upon assuming the chairman-ship in October 2002, he articulatedthe organisation’s agenda with little de-viation from conventional SADC goals.He said that Angola would ensure that‘SADC launches a crusade against hun-ger, whether it is due to drought orarmed conflict’.

However, the devastation of war hasforced Angola to be more focused oninternal reconstruction than on externalrelations or SADC affairs – exceptwhere these affect its stability, such asthe peace process in the Democratic Re-public of Congo (DRC).

A Split Regional Personality?A Split Regional Personality?A Split Regional Personality?A Split Regional Personality?A Split Regional Personality?ECCAS was dormant for more than adecade due to lack of resources andthe fact that some of its 11 memberswere at war with each other. Even now,following its resurrection in 1998, thegroup’s members are still politically di-vided, obstructing its ability to becomea powerful regional bloc. Angola’s mul-tiple commitments in multilateral affairsreflect a central tension that character-ises its posture in SADC.

‘Angola has a split personality. There ...continued on p.6

•Issue 1•March 2003•5

is the central African reality of ECCASas a possible arena of foreign policy,for example, the development of theDRC ... and on the Southern African sidethere is SADC,’ says João Porto, a sen-ior researcher on Angola at the Institutefor Security Studies in Pretoria. ‘It is im-portant to bear in mind that Angola doesnot have much multilateral experience.Maintaining bilateral relations withcountries investing in the oil sector (thecountry produces 900,000 barrels of oila day) has been a priority and it didnot need SADC. But the end of the waris, perhaps, bringing in a new phase inAngola’s foreign policy.‘

‘Angola’s role as chair forces‘Angola’s role as chair forces‘Angola’s role as chair forces‘Angola’s role as chair forces‘Angola’s role as chair forcesit to be an active member ofit to be an active member ofit to be an active member ofit to be an active member ofit to be an active member ofSADC, participating in all theSADC, participating in all theSADC, participating in all theSADC, participating in all theSADC, participating in all themeetings and implementingmeetings and implementingmeetings and implementingmeetings and implementingmeetings and implementingprotocols ... before they wereprotocols ... before they wereprotocols ... before they wereprotocols ... before they wereprotocols ... before they werepaying lip service to it.’paying lip service to it.’paying lip service to it.’paying lip service to it.’paying lip service to it.’

Although Angola played an aggressiveunilateralist role in the last years of itsconflict, dispatching troops to Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC, and threaten-ing incursions into Zambia, the countrydoes not seem intent on pursuing an am-bitious diplomatic agenda in either ofthe regions to which it belongs.

Nevertheless, Angola seems to be amore committed SADC member nowthan in the past. ‘Angola’s role as chairforces it to be an active member ofSADC, participating in all the meetingsand implementing protocols ... beforethey were paying lip service to it,’ a well-connected African diplomat observes.SA’s ambassador to Angola, TonyMsimang, reinforces this impressionsaying: ‘For some time they were notplaying the role they ought to have...now all the responsibility of SADC ison their shoulders, giving them a senseof responsibility in the region.’

Despite this kind of rhetoric, Angolahad, by January 2003, ratified onlyfour of the 21 SADC Protocols, and it

still needs to ratify one of the corner-stones of economic integration in theregion, the SADC Protocol on Trade.More significantly, for both SADC andAngola, is the fact that Angola onlyadopted the Agreement Amending theTreaty of SADC when it took over thechairmanship in October 2002. Thatwas 14 months after the amendmentswere first tabled for signature in August2001.

Tense relations with eastern neigh-bour Zambia have improved since An-gola emerged from civil war and tookover the SADC chair, defusing disputesover Zambia’s alleged support forUNITA rebels.

Angola also has an interest in con-solidating bilateral relations with sev-eral SADC members, particularly SAand the Joseph Kabila-led governmentof the DRC. Angola has been heavilyinvolved in settling the last and perhapsmost difficult aspect of the war in theDRC, ending the tribal violence betweenethnic Hema and Lendu groups that con-tinues to plague the Ituri Region in north-eastern DRC. It played an important rolein facilitating the establishment of theIturi Pacification Committee, whichstarted work on 25 February 2003, tobring peace to the district and allow forthe withdrawal of the last Ugandantroops from the Congo. Luanda, forexample, hosted a mini-summit withforeign ministers from the DRC andUganda in mid-February 2003 to lookat the implementation of the Ituri agree-ment. It has played a pivotal role as afacilitator in this region since Angola,unlike Zimbabwe, has never directlyconfronted the rebels and is wary of fuel-ling ethnic conflicts (given its own ethnicdivisions). This means Angola – whileallied to Kabila – is not seen as a directthreat and is able to engage with all thearmed forces in the Ituri conflict.

‘Angola is not seen as the main en-emy and, as the least contested, it has

inclusive political order which allowsUNITA to be a real partner in ruling thecountry.

Conclus ionConclus ionConclus ionConclus ionConclus ionWhat this means is that Angola, asSADC chairman, is distracted by inter-nal reconstruction and willing to leavethe running of the regional body largelyto the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone,and its direction to the heads of state asa collective.

On most fronts, including SADC’srestructuring or intervening in the Zim-babwe crisis, Angola is not expected topursue a strong agenda or wield muchinfluence.

Apart from anything else, the weak-ened Angolan state does not have thecapacity to push SADC’s ambitious re-gional integration agenda, focused onfighting poverty and HIV/AIDS, consoli-dating peace and facilitating SADC’srestructuring process. Instead, Angolawill focus on peace and security andparticularly on conflict resolution in itsnorthern neighbour, the DRC, with whichit shares a long border. Supporting thepeace process in the DRC might becomethe only significant contribution thatAngola makes as SADC chairman.

Its regional influence has been lim-ited until now not only by the war, butalso by the colonial legacy of lookingto the north rather than the south for eco-nomic and political allies. And, unlessAngola gets its internal affairs in orderit will be making interventions from anunstable domestic base and this willundermine its impact on SADC.

But Angola, given its vast natural re-sources and military capability (withmore than a million soldiers fit for duty)has the potential to be a major regionalpower and is starting to define a rolefor itself on the regional and worldagenda. It is important that other SADCmember states actively engage Angola,specifically focusing on ways to inte-grate the country into the region, eco-nomically and politically.


Angolan ChairmanshipAngolan ChairmanshipAngolan ChairmanshipAngolan ChairmanshipAngolan Chairmanship ...from p. 5

an important role in stabilising the (Ituri)conflict, which is not on the agenda ofthe formal process. Kabila is comfort-able with Angola and so are Rwandaand Uganda,’ explains Jan van Eck ofthe Centre for International Studies atPretoria University. This is one way inwhich Angola, which has promised towithdraw all its troops from the DRC bythe end of the year, is advancing peacein the Congo.

Looking InwardsLooking InwardsLooking InwardsLooking InwardsLooking InwardsAngola’s ‘split regional personality’ isone reason why the country will not cre-ate a strong legacy of its year as SADCchair. A more important factor is theurgency with which Angola needs toaddress the domestic problems createdby its civil war.

Politically, the April 2002 ceasefiregave rise to steep political and eco-nomic demands on Angola’s govern-ment. The end of war is itself a majorbenefit, but most of Angola’s 13 mil-lion people are still waiting to see thedividends of peace.

One of the most immediate issues forlasting stability is for the government todeal seriously with the demobilisationof about 110,000 former UNITA sol-diers and their 350,000 dependants,most of whom are still quartered inabout 40 ‘family reception areas’.

Until now, the government has mostlyfailed to deliver the benefits promisedto ex-combatants in exchange for theirdemobilisation, such as skills trainingand kits with tools to make a living. Thepossibility of the reception areas beingused as UNITA power bases, with thepotential for their becoming a breed-ing ground for political unrest and re-lapse into war has led the governmentto set unrealistic deadlines for the dis-mantling of the camps.

Government and UNITA leadersneed to negotiate a way of meeting atleast some of the needs of rank and filemembers, say diplomats in Luanda.

With the war over, there is a desper-

ate need for greater government serv-ice delivery to the population – 60% ofwhom live below the poverty line. Onethird of the population remains dis-placed and about 1.8 million dependon food aid.

The government’s $358 million De-cember 2002 budget – almost matchedby foreign aid which accounts for about13% of Angola’s GDP – does not yetoffer proof that it has a sense of urgencyabout eliminating these problems. Onlyone percent of the budget has been setaside for health services – which havebeen destroyed by decades of fightingand about 0.67% (only about $2.4 mil-lion) has been allocated for education,in a country where 80% of children haveno access to proper schooling.

While combating corruption,While combating corruption,While combating corruption,While combating corruption,While combating corruption,the government also needs tothe government also needs tothe government also needs tothe government also needs tothe government also needs toshape a new inclusive politi-shape a new inclusive politi-shape a new inclusive politi-shape a new inclusive politi-shape a new inclusive politi-cal order.cal order.cal order.cal order.cal order.

‘We are calling for macroeconomicstabilisation: for inflation to be broughtunder control, for a redistribution inspending to health and education, fortransparency and accountability to im-prove and for the publication of basicsocio-economic data,’ says Carlos Leiteof the International Monetary Fund (IMF)in Luanda.

International pressure for rooting outcorruption and getting governmentbooks in order is mounting. However,in a country recently ranked as one ofthe world’s most corrupt by Transpar-ency International, cleaning up govern-ment accounting and eradicating cor-ruption is a vast task. A leaked IMF re-port stated that $1 billion went missingfrom Angola’s coffers in 2002 alone.Taking into account the 2003 govern-ment budget referred to earlier, thismeans that, for every $1 spent, $2 dis-appear into the Bermuda triangle be-tween the presidency, the state oil com-pany and state bank.

While combating corruption, thegovernment also needs to shape a new Claire Keeton is a freelance journalist.

crisis, as well as the rainfall situationacross the region. They have also beenadvising affected member states on me-dium- and long-term measures to assistfarming populations to recover. Thesemeasures include the promotion of re-gional irrigation potential, developinga regional food reserve facility, pro-moting trade in agricultural commodi-ties, the distribution of agriculturalstarter-packs consisting of seeds andfertilizers, as well as subsidised farminputs and tillage equipment. The FANRhas also been advising member stateson the issue of genetically modified or-ganisms (GMO) and has urged them toadopt a clear position on GM food aid,as well as developing their GMO test-ing and monitoring capacity.


AIDS Turns SADC Food Crisis Into Major Disaster‘HHHHHIV/AIDS is the most fundamental un-derlying cause of the Southern Africancrisis. Combined with food shortagesand chronic poverty, HIV/AIDS be-comes more deadly,’ warned two UNspecial envoys in January 2003 aftervisiting four of the eight Southern Afri-can countries experiencing a food crisis.

UN special envoy of the UNsecretary-general for HIV/AIDS inAfrica, Stephen Lewis, and UN SpecialEnvoy for Humanitarian Needs inSouthern Africa, James T. Morris, issuedthe report following a week-longmission to Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia andZimbabwe.

The UN noted that HIV/AIDS com-pounded problems of drought and gov-ernment agricultural mismanagementbecause it drew a large amount of la-bour out of agriculture. Not only hasthe disease made many adults too sickto work, it has also forced other healthypeople to leave the fields to care forsick relatives.

Whilst humanitarian organisationshave responded quickly to the food cri-sis, and a possible famine has beenaverted, the envoys said the need forfood aid in the crisis-affected countrieswas likely to continue into 2004, givenpoor harvests and ongoingvulnerabilities at individual householdlevels.

More than 18 million people in eightSouthern African Development Commu-nity (SADC) countries — Angola, theDemocratic Republic of Congo (DRC),Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe —have been receiving food aid from hu-manitarian agencies since a $611mUN/SADC appeal for emergency foodand other assistance was launched inJuly 2002. By January 2003, the inter-national community had donated$779.8million, with the biggest con-tributors being the European Union, theUS and the UK.

Zimbabwe has been hardest hit by

the food crisis and the World Food Pro-gramme (WFP) estimates that 7.2 mil-lion people (more than half the popu-lation) are vulnerable. Food productionhas dropped to about one-third of pre-vious years’ levels and the crisis is be-ing exacerbated by the high prevalence(34%) of HIV/AIDS in the country, aforeign exchange shortage, growingunemployment and political instability.The UN envoys said Zimbabwe’s cur-rent policies, particularly on the landreform process, were hampering high-potential agricultural areas from yield-ing at maximum capacity. They also

said the policies were preventing thesupport of programmes aimed at thecountry’s long-term recovery.

In all the affected countries, HIV/AIDS has exacerbated the food crisis,resulting in reduced agricultural produc-tivity, increased demands on a declin-ing working population for food pro-vision and raised vulnerability of alarge section of the population to de-clining nutritional levels. For example,in Malawi – where 3.3-million people(or 30% of the population) have beenreceiving food aid – 16% of the popu-lation has HIV/AIDS. The UN agencieshave called for the introduction of la-bour-saving agricultural practices (aswell as crop diversification) to enhanceand sustain nutritional levels, particularlythose of people living with AIDS.

The table above details the dimen-sions of the food crisis in SADC. In

Mozambique, where the food crisis islocalised in the southern part of thecountry, about 3% of the population (or590,000 people) has been affected.Angola and the DRC, whilst not includedin the July 2002 UN/SADC consoli-dated appeal, have been receiving foodaid from UN agencies to alleviate foodshortages caused by their civil wars. TheWFP is feeding 1.8 million people inAngola and 1.4 million in the DRC.

The SADC Secretariat, and the Food,Agriculture and Natural Resources(FANR) directorate of the Secretariat,in particular, have been monitoring the

% ofpopulation

being assisted153

30303

252550

Peoplereceivingfood aid1.8 million1.4 million650,000

3.3 million590,000270,000

2.9 million7.2 million

18.3 million

SADC Countriesreceivingfood aidAngolaDRCLesothoMalawiMozambiqueSwazilandZambiaZimbabweTotal

Food aid requestedto April 2003

(in metric tonnes)340,000180,00036,000

240,00048,00020,000

150,000600,000

HIV/AIDSprevalence rate

in 20025.5%5%

31%16%13%33%22%34%

DIMENSIONS OF THE FOOD CRISIS IN SADC

AIDS prevalence rates of the adult population. Source: WFP

Peter Farlam is Publications Manager at SAIIA.

OOOOOnce one of the best prospects of suc-cess in Africa, Zimbabwe is at thecrossroads. It may still succeed, butequally has every chance to wreakhavoc not only on itself but on the en-tire Southern African region. How-ever, despite abundant evidence, theregion, especially key players suchas SA, appears unsure about thethreat Zimbabwe poses to its stability.

Months after President RobertMugabe’s contested re-election andthe imposition of targeted sanctionsby the EU and the US, Zimbabwe islocked in a political stalemate.

Mugabe and his ruling Zanu-PFhave hung onto power despite inter-national sanctions and a debilitatingeconomic crisis at home. But their sur-vival strategy appears to be runningout of steam and looks incapable ofproviding a sustainable solution to theworsening foreign exchange, fueland food shortages in the country.

Main opposition leader MorganTsvangirai and his Movement forDemocratic Change (MDC) have sofar survived severe repression by thegovernment. But they appear to havereached the limit of what they can doto force the government to change.

How best to break the political im-passe and resolve the country’s deep-ening economic crisis is unclear. How-ever, if the current negative trends arenot reversed soon, there is a realchance that Zimbabwe’s political, so-cial and economic institutions will col-lapse, leaving the country a failed state.

The signs of a far worse humani-tarian disaster in Zimbabwe are al-ready beginning to emerge. On 27February 2003 the US-based Fam-ine Early Warning Network(FEWSNET) warned that Zimba-bwe’s food crisis will continue into2004 because of poor rains and dis-rupted agricultural productioncaused by government land reforms.

‘Given the poor harvest prospects

Zimbabwe – A Dangerous Stalemateand anticipated low stock levels, Zim-babwe will need to import between930,000 tonnes and 1.3 million tonnesof maize to meet the pre-harvest defi-cit for 2003-04,” said FEWSNET. Theagency recommends that the govern-ment co-ordinate its use of all five portsin the subregion to allow timely importsto avert a potential famine. However,Zimbabwe cannot import much grainon its own mainly because it has virtu-ally no foreign currency.

Meanwhile HIV/AIDS, which iswreaking havoc in the entire region,is exacerbated in Zimbabwe becausethe public sector is collapsing afteryears of underfunding and misman-agement.

Given the geographical position ofZimbabwe at the heart of SADC, theimpact of its escalating crisis will ex-tend beyond its borders:• At the very least, the crisis will

destabilise Zimbabwe’s immediateneighbours, particularly SA, Bot-swana and Mozambique, by driv-ing thousands of refugees fleeinghunger or any possible political up-heaval into these countries.

• Instead of fostering more free move-ment of people and goods in thespirit of SADC, governments will in-stead create more barriers to stemthe flood of refugees. Already thereare rumblings between Harare andGaborone over the influx of Zim-babwean immigrants to Botswana.

• Meanwhile, Zimbabwe and Zam-bia have quarrelled over claims byLusaka that Zimbabwean goods —cheaper because of Harare’s con-troversial exchange rate — areflooding the Zambian market. SomeZimbabwean goods remain bannedfrom Zambia in stark contrast to at-tempts to achieve greater economicintegration and co-operation.

• The entire regional tourism industrycould soon lose out to internationalcompetitors.


Opinion• Foreign capital and investment will

soon find other worthwhile desti-nations than SADC rather than as-sociate itself with a state which is,rightly or wrongly, accused ofabusing human rights and under-mining democracy, the rule of lawand property rights.As University of Zimbabwe politi-

cal scientist Masipula Sithole says:‘Given its pivotal position, Zimbabwehas the potential to destabilise SADCboth economically and politically ona much wider scale.’

The most immediate question is:What should SADC do to diffuse theZimbabwean crisis before greaterdamage is inflicted on the region’spolitical and economic integration,human rights, democracy and goodgovernance? Without SADC involve-ment, there is very little hope ofachieving meaningful change in Zim-babwe. Only through dialogue andnegotiation between the contendingpolitical forces in Zimbabwean canthe crisis be resolved.

SADC, and especially the region’seconomic powerhouse SA, shouldtake more resolute action to press theMugabe government as well asTsvangirai and the MDC to resumethe inter-party negotiations aban-doned last year. The objective of in-ter-party dialogue must be to reachan all-party pact that provides aframework and a schedule for therestoration of the rule of law, imple-mentation of transparent and just landreforms and a return to legitimacythrough the holding of presidentialand parliamentary elections underconditions agreed to by all.

If the region so wished, it couldeasily pressurise both Mugabe andTsvangirai into meaningful and pro-ductive dialogue.

Abel Mutsakani is a journalist in Harare andpresident of the Zimbabwe IndependenttJournalists Association.

SADC-Mercosur: South-South Co-operationWhile each regional integration initia-tive is unique, the strong similaritiesbetween SADC and Mercosur make fora useful comparative analysis.

Both SADC and Mercosur share com-mon challenges and problems associ-ated with their respective levels of de-velopment and their status in the globalpolitical economy. Mercosur, which ismade up of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguayand Paraguay (Chile and Bolivia areassociate members), has a populationof about 210 million people, whileSADC’s combined population from 14countries is approximately 190 million.Their land surface areas are also com-parable, with Mercosur covering closeto 12,000km2 and SADC coveringnearly 9,300km2.

However, these similarities do notextend to economic strength as SADC’sGNP is in the region of $185 billion,one sixth that of Mercosur. Other keyfigures such as FDI and trade (both in-tra- and inter-regional) place Mercosurin an infinitely more favourable posi-tion than SADC. In terms of stages ofintegration, Mercosur finds itself at a farmore evolved level of integration thanSADC. Although not without its prob-lems, Mercosur is formally recognisedas a customs union with a common ex-ternal tariff. SADC only has a free tradearea agreement, which is in the proc-ess of being implemented. The crises inthe DRC, Angola and Zimbabwe havedampened hopes of closer integration.The lack of progress in implementingregional integration initiatives emanatesfrom the lack of pragmatism in the origi-nal rules of membership in SADC.

While SADC chose an ambitiousdevelopment, economic and politicalintegration agenda, it has struggled tomake much progress across this broadfront. In contrast, Mercosur, with onlyfour members, opted for a narroweragenda, allowing it to record sub-stantial progress and achieve fargreater levels of integration in a


relatively short time.There are a number of reasons for

Mercosur’s success. Firstly, Mercosurhas only four permanent members andtwo associate members. This makesmanaging the integration process fareasier and decisionmaking far lessbureaucratic. Secondly, it has focusedon achievable objectives, using theskills and facilities available, insteadof establishing large complicated in-stitutions. Thirdly, at the centre ofMercosur are the principles of liberaleconomic practice and political de-mocracy. An increase of 300% inintra-regional trade between 1990-96 stimulated substantial confidencein the Mercosur process with wide-spread support shown by governmentinstitutions, business and civil soci-ety alike. Finally, the integration proc-ess was not confined to a few gov-ernment officials signing agreementson behalf of their respective countries.A broader cross-section of govern-ment departments and the privatesector were included in the processin a consultative role.

In terms of relations betweenIn terms of relations betweenIn terms of relations betweenIn terms of relations betweenIn terms of relations betweenSouthern Africa and Mercosur,Southern Africa and Mercosur,Southern Africa and Mercosur,Southern Africa and Mercosur,Southern Africa and Mercosur,the focus has now moved tothe focus has now moved tothe focus has now moved tothe focus has now moved tothe focus has now moved todiscussions around a freediscussions around a freediscussions around a freediscussions around a freediscussions around a freetrade agreement between thetrade agreement between thetrade agreement between thetrade agreement between thetrade agreement between theSouthern African Customs Un-Southern African Customs Un-Southern African Customs Un-Southern African Customs Un-Southern African Customs Un-ion (SACU) and Mercosur. Inion (SACU) and Mercosur. Inion (SACU) and Mercosur. Inion (SACU) and Mercosur. Inion (SACU) and Mercosur. Inmany ways, this is a more logi-many ways, this is a more logi-many ways, this is a more logi-many ways, this is a more logi-many ways, this is a more logi-cal approach.cal approach.cal approach.cal approach.cal approach.

SADC’s path has been very differentand has not necessarily delivered onprior expectations. SADC has shapedits institutions loosely on the EU, but ithas tried to skip the more than 50 yearsof slow consensus building that allowsEU institutions to work. SADC must bemore pragmatic about integration. Itshould investigate ways in which to in-crease intra-regional trade and im-prove interaction between various

roleplayers – from government to theprivate sector – in an effort to improvethe real deliverables within SADC.

In terms of inter-regional relations,establishing broad-based SADC-Mercosur relations would be a benefi-cial first step towards developing theregion’s international agenda morepragmatically. Such a relationshipwould be more equal, with greater reci-procity between the partners, unlikethose pursued with the North.

Unfortunately, due to SADC’s lack ofcohesion and the fact that its regionalintegration arrangements are still poorlydeveloped, very little has materialisedfrom the second-track discussions onSADC-Mercosur relations that took placein the mid to late 1990s. In terms of re-lations between Southern Africa andMercosur, the focus has now moved todiscussions around a free trade agree-ment between the Southern African Cus-toms Union (SACU) and Mercosur. Inmany ways, this is a more logical ap-proach. Considering that both are rela-tively well-established customs unions,they will be able to negotiate on moreequal terms.

To date, economic crises and politi-cal instability within Mercosur, as wellas poor management and lack of gov-ernment-business interface during theprocess in SACU, hindered any seri-ous progress. Nevertheless, strong po-litical will expressed by both sides per-sists and in 2002 officials vowed to setright what had now been coined the‘long process, with little progress’. Thesesame officials have recognised the bi-lateral potential of a free trade agree-ment, which would not only provide sub-stantial market access, but would cre-ate co-operative and collaborative op-portunities in a variety of industries. Themultilateral, strategic and extra-regionalbenefits (in initiatives such as theCotonou Agreement and the Free TradeAgreement of the Americas) have also


SADC Reports & PublicationsSADC Reports & PublicationsSADC Reports & PublicationsSADC Reports & PublicationsSADC Reports & PublicationsThe following SADC Sectoral Reports for 2001/2 have been released:••••• Culture, Information and Sport Sector••••• Regional Drug Control Programme••••• Gender Sector••••• Health Sector••••• Human Resources Development Sector••••• Employment and Labour Sector••••• Transport, Communications and Meteorology Sector••••• Tourism SectorSADC Today, January 2003 is available on the SADC website

been identified and place the proposedSACU-Mercosur agreement into abroader global context. Such an agree-ment could be utilised by both sides toincrease their bargaining power inmultilateral forums such as the WorldTrade Organisation, UN, G-77 andothers. It would be a practical exampleof a South-South partnership aimed atbringing a greater awareness to theneeds of developing nations.

The economic reality of a SACU-Mercosur trade agreement has been acomplicated barrier to overcome be-fore a partnership can be developed.Both SACU and Mercosur are made upof developing countries experiencingsimilar challenges and drawbacks as-sociated with globalisation. Both regionsare eager to lure trade and investmentfrom Northern countries and both pro-duce similar goods at the same time ofthe year, leading to direct competitionin a variety of product categories. Moreimportantly, there is little complemen-tarity between their markets.

In spite of these economic obstacles,there are definite areas of opportunitywaiting to be exploited through tradeco-operation. Representatives from bothSACU and Mercosur have realised thatan overarching free trade agreementwill not be possible, but instead are pur-suing a more pragmatic processthrough a sector-by-sector approach.Business and chambers became increas-ingly involved in the process. During2002 a number of business delegationsfrom SACU travelled to South America

in search of opportunities. Mercosuralso sent its first combined trade del-egation to SA in July 2002 as an indi-cation of its commitment to bilateral re-lations. Other government delegationsfrom SA have been to the Mercosur re-gion in recent months and the secondofficial round of trade talks between thetwo customs unions took place in Preto-ria at the end of 2002. With rumoursof fast-tracking the process, a thirdround of talks is to be held in SouthAmerica before the middle of 2003.

SACU-Mercosur relations finally ap-pear to be taking shape. The Mercosurgroup is reciprocating firm commitmentshown by the government and otherstakeholders in SA and concessions arebeing carved out in anticipation of anagreement sometime in 2003. Thiswould, however, depend on the re-establishment of political and economicstability within Mercosur (particularly inArgentina). SACU would need to con-solidate the participation of otherstakeholders such as the chambers ofbusiness and trade unions, who havelargely been neglected until recently, inorder to develop a more realistic andpragmatic process of regional integra-tion. More importantly, SA needs toclear up the confusion that has been cre-ated by its unilateral negotiations anddiscussions with Mercosur. The renego-tiated SACU Agreement, which wassigned in October 2002, requires thatmembers of the customs union no longerenter into trade negotiations unilater-ally. Although SA-Mercosur negotia-tions preceded the new SACU Agree-

ment, they cannot proceed without sig-nificant revision.

Once a SACU-Mercosur tradeagreement is finalised, there is alwaysscope to expand it to include the rest ofSADC. The establishment of the South-ern African Free Trade Area (SAFTA)has provided SADC members with aperfect opportunity to ‘piggyback‘ theprogress already made between SACUand Mercosur, thus fast-tracking the ul-timate goal of a SADC-Mercosur agree-ment and a transatlantic FTA.

However, the implementation of theSAFTA has been plagued by difficul-ties and the formation of a customsunion is not scheduled until 2015. Untilsuch time as the barriers between SADCand SACU have been lowered, otherSADC countries are likely to suffer un-der, rather than benefit from, SACU-Mercosur relations. A SACU-MercosurFTA would threaten the smaller local in-dustries in non-SACU SADC countries.In many instances, sheer volume, bettertechnology and greater productivitymake South American companies muchmore competitive than their SouthernAfrican counterparts. In addition, thefree access of goods from Mercosurinto the South African market coulderode the preferential access that someSADC countries presently enjoy.Limiting access to their main exportmarket could seriously damage alreadyfragile industries in non-SACU SADCcountries.


SADC- MercosurSADC- MercosurSADC- MercosurSADC- MercosurSADC- Mercosur ...from p. 9

SADC contact details:Private Bag 0095

Gaborone, BotswanaTel: +267 3951863Fax: +267 3972848/

581070Web site: www.sadc.int

E-mail: [email protected]

Lyal White is the Anglo American Chairman’sFund Latin America researcher at SAIIA.

Growth and Opportunity for SADC?‘We are on the road to success’ saysRobert Zoellick, America’s top tradeofficial, about African exports toAmerica. He was in Mauritius in Janu-ary 2003 for an annual meeting withAfrican ministers and experts on the fu-ture of trade under the provisions of theAfrica Growth and Opportunity Act(AGOA). Passed by Congress twoyears ago, the act is in force until 2008and at the Mauritius conference, the USpledged to extend it further. It allowsfor 38 eligible African countries to ex-port most of their goods, tariff-free, tothe US.

Though the signs are good, AGOAis only just beginning to make an im-pact on African economies. The theorybehind it is attractive: lower tariffs makeit easier to sell goods across the Atlan-tic, so African export revenues willgrow; investors will flock to producegoods in African countries, and jobswill be created. Trade, rather than aid,will help to reduce poverty in Africa. Asimilar logic lies behind trade agree-ments between parts of Africa and theEuropean Union.

Africa still gets less than 1%Africa still gets less than 1%Africa still gets less than 1%Africa still gets less than 1%Africa still gets less than 1%of American foreign investmentof American foreign investmentof American foreign investmentof American foreign investmentof American foreign investmentand less than 2% of globaland less than 2% of globaland less than 2% of globaland less than 2% of globaland less than 2% of globalforeign investment flows.foreign investment flows.foreign investment flows.foreign investment flows.foreign investment flows.

AGOA praise-singers listed plenty ofevidence of putative success. Exports ofnon-fuel goods from participating coun-tries grew by half in the two years toJune 2002. Some countries in SouthernAfrica have done particularly well. Inthe first seven months of last year, tinyLesotho sold $142 million worth of tex-tiles and clothing to the US. Americanofficials say that 11 new factories havebeen built in the kingdom and eight oth-ers have been extended because ofAGOA exports. SA is doing well out ofsales of manufactured goods, such ascars and car parts. A yarn factory willbe built in Mauritius, so textile produc-

ers can source cotton within the region.Anerood Jugnauth, the Mauritian

prime minister, believes ‘AGOA couldturn out to be the growth engine in Af-rica’. The act has generated an extra$78 million of investments on his tropi-cal island, he says. Namibia creditsAGOA for an extra $250 million ofrecent investment there; Uganda andKenya claim an extra $20 million and

$12.8 million, respectively.All that is small beans of course: Af-

rica still gets less than 1% of Americanforeign investment and less than 2% ofglobal foreign investment flows. Someeconomists estimate that Africa as awhole will only achieve poverty-reduc-ing growth rates of between 6% and 7%once it gets additional annual investmentworth more than $60 billion. So farprogress under AGOA barely balancesout the cost of disinvestment in Zimba-bwe and Côte d’Ivoire.

Investment may flow faster if compa-nies see that money can be made inAfrica over the longer term. The Ameri-can delegation to Mauritius includedbusinessmen, such as a man fromBoeing, who was sniffing out new cus-tomers and trading opportunities. Com-pany stalls at a trade fair in Port Louis’sFree Port were staffed by traders whocraved ongoing preferential treatmentby America.

The extention of AGOA may tempt

textile producers to look further afieldin Africa – but only to where there ispolitical stability. Delegates at the fo-rum were chastened by a sorry tale fromMadagascar: booming textile exportsunder AGOA created 100,000 newjobs there by December 2001; all werelost after six months of political conflictand mass protest early last year. Barelya quarter of them have been recreated.


Of all the industries eligible forAGOA, textiles excited the most inter-est among delegates. Analysts keenlypointed out that in almost every poorAsian country that became middling-to-rich in recent decades, the textile in-dustry played a significant role. The rea-son? It is labour intensive and rapidlypasses wealth to the skilled poor (espe-cially women).

But textiles and clothing are a minorpart of the general story. Of the $4.8billion of AGOA exports in the firstseven months of 2002, only $900 mil-lion were non-fuel items. And beforeevery African trade minister decides thata clothing factory is the secret to suc-cess, he or she might note that prefer-ential treatment on textiles will probablynot last much longer. Though AGOAwill survive a few more years, Ameri-can tariffs on Asian textile exports arelikely to be cut by 2004/5. That meansAfrica’s special treatment will be,


TOTAL USIMPORTS

200229.7

321.568.1

280.48.2

57.44,236.0

26.3114.5

25.37.8

TOTAL USIMPORTS

200121.1

217.271.8

275.17.1

37.84,429.5

23.765.027.215.6

COUNTRY

BotswanaLesothoMalawiMauritiusMozambiqueNamibiaSouth AfricaSeychellesSwazilandTanzaniaZambia

%CHANGE

41%48%-5%2%

16%52%-4%11%76%-7%

-50%

USAGOA*

(including GSP)imports 2001

1.2129.6

35.454.0

5.30.1

923.24.2

14.80.90.8

USAGOA*

(including GSP)imports 2002

4.6318.0

46.9114.3

5.91.7

1,342.60.0

81.31.30.1

%CHANGE

275%145%

33%112%

12%746%

45%100%450%

44%-89%

AGOA IMPORTS

All figures in US$ ‘000. Source: US International Trade Commission


relatively, less attractive than today evenif AGOA is extended.

What are the prospects for SouthernAfrica? For most Africans agriculture isthe means to bigger incomes: if farmproduce can be sold to American buy-ers, prices for cash crops, such as cof-fee, tea, fruit and vegetables, might rise.But sales of these in America are beingblocked by sanitation rules, not tariffs,though Zoellick says help is at hand. Hesays a regional trade office has beenopened in Botswana to advise agricul-tural exporters on how to get goods intoAmerica. In return, America is puttingheavy pressure on southern Africancountries to accept and use geneticallymodified crop strains.

Five members of the Southern Afri-can Development Community (SADC)expect AGOA to be an irrelevance tothem within two or three years. SA,Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia andSwaziland, which make up the South-ern African Customs Union (SACU),have begun talks with Zoellick’s teamfor a permanent free trade agreement.That should get Swaziland out of a tightspot – it is on the verge of being bootedout of the AGOA deal because of alle-gations of misrule and human rightsabuses in that kingdom.

But special treatment of SACU mem-bers has put some noses out of joint.Prega Ramsamy, the executive secre-tary of the SADC secretariat, seemedannoyed that non-SACU countries arekept out of the free trade deal. How-

ever, there is no way a country such asZimbabwe, which is already excludedfrom AGOA because of PresidentRobert Mugabe’s disastrous misrule andrepression, could hope to take part insuch talks. New American sanctions onZimbabwe’s leaders reflect a determi-nation to isolate Zimbabwe despiteSouth African reluctance.

Now the proposed free trade dealwith SACU threatens to widen an al-ready large gulf between prosperingmembers of SADC and the rest. Thatmight eventually be lessened if SADCdelivers on plans for its own free tradearea by 2008, but the chances of thatare very slim indeed.

Growth and Opportunity forGrowth and Opportunity forGrowth and Opportunity forGrowth and Opportunity forGrowth and Opportunity forSADC?SADC?SADC?SADC?SADC? ... from p.11

SADC Free Trade: The Outstanding IssuesWWWWWhen SADC signed its Trade Protocolin 1996, it seemed clearly the most or-ganised and advanced of Africa’s re-gional economic communities. Sincethen, SADC has completed much of thenegotiations needed to bring a regionalFree Trade Area (FTA) to life. But thepace of change in trade has acceler-ated, and it threatens to leave SADCbehind.

Nine members of the Common Mar-ket of Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA) have launched a preferen-tial trade area – even though overlap-ping membership with SADC remainsunresolved. SA struck a separate tradedeal with the European Union and nowthe Southern African Customs Union(SACU) is preparing to create an FTAwith the US.

SADC Executive Secretary, PregaRamsamy, in January 2003 called formember states to use the planned 2004mid-term review meeting to bring for-ward the 2012 deadline for abolishingall internal tariffs to 2008. ’We are nowsaying the time-frame should be revis-ited in light of what is happening in ...continued on p.13

Adam Roberts is Johannesburg bureau chieffor The Economist.

Africa and the world at large. TheAmericans are now talking about a freetrade agreement with SACU countries.This could marginalise SADC becauseSACU is at an advanced level of devel-opment,‘ he said.Accelerating the timetables under whicheach nation pledged to lower their tar-iffs for fellow SADC members promisesto be a formidable political task. Thishas been made more difficult by theeconomic melt-down in Zimbabwe andlingering sentiments among many mem-ber states that the existing SADC tradepact favours SA.

However, timetables are not the onlycontentious problems facing SADCtrade. Here is an overview of some keyunfinished business on the free-tradeagenda.

Non-Tariff Barriers to TradeNon-Tariff Barriers to TradeNon-Tariff Barriers to TradeNon-Tariff Barriers to TradeNon-Tariff Barriers to TradeAmid growing global enthusiasm forfree trade, Africa has made significantprogress. The IMF classified 75% of thecountries in sub-Saharan Africa as hav-ing ’restrictive‘ trade policies in 1990.Today it defines only 14% as such.

Tariff levels average 19% across Africa,which is still higher than the 12% aver-age in the rest of the world. As a result,it is often easier for Africa to trade withthe rest of the world than with itself.

Tariffs may be the easiest obstacle tomeasure, but other issues arguably havea larger impact. In SADC, non-tariffbarriers (NTBs) are the most significanthinderance to regional trade, limitingmarket access and driving up transac-tion costs through a variety of means.The most important NTBs in SADC in-clude:

Transportation::::: Poor roads, badlymaintained rail networks, shortages ofrail rolling stock and inefficient, obso-lescent ports drive up transportationcosts and increase the time it takes toget goods to markets. One World Bankstudy found African international freighttransport costs to be 2.6 times higherthan transport costs in other regions. Thecost of shipment from Addis Ababa toAbidjan can be 3.5 times the cost ofthe same shipment from Tokyo toAbidjan. Airplane travel and freight are



SADC Free TradeSADC Free TradeSADC Free TradeSADC Free TradeSADC Free Trade ... from p. 12

also significantly more expensive withinAfrica.

Customs, licensing and border pro-cedures::::: Despite the creation of a Sub-Committee on Customs Cooperation in1999, the paperwork, insurance re-quirements, import-export licensing andcustoms clearance procedures in SADCare still complex and time consuming.Different procedures at border crossingsdelay the movement of goods, tying upmore time, vehicles and staff in transit.SADC has agreed on standardisedforms for customs clearance, verifica-tion of origin, road freight manifests,transit inspection reports and producerdeclarations, but the agreement has notbeen implemented. Many ports andborder posts require a 100% inspec-tion of goods, which results in delays ofhours or days. Presently, this problemis particularly acute at the Beitbridgeborder post between South Africa andZimbabwe where delays frequently ex-ceed 10 days.

Many cumbersome border proce-dures are driven by a focus on collect-ing all possible revenue rather than bya trade facilitation philosophy. How-ever, the poor quality of customs ad-ministration means that corruption fre-quently subverts the goal of revenuecollection. A selective sampling proc-ess could deter cheating while speed-ing up trade and lowering costs. Theslow pace of government licensing andgranting of work permits and visas fur-ther impedes trade and investment.

Telecommunication: Communicationrepresents a significant business ex-pense and remains unreliable andcostly, despite significant expansion ofcellular telephone networks in recentyears. According to the InternationalTelecommunications Union, the waitingperiod for a new fixed-line telephoneaccount is 1.4 years in Mauritius, 7.2years in Zimbabwe, 7.4 years inSwaziland and more than a decade inTanzania, Mozambique, Malawi andLesotho. The cost of an international call

within Africa can be 250% of one inEurope, according to the UN EconomicCommission for Africa.

Lack of market intelligence::::: The lackof reliable market and firm-level datamakes development of competitivestrategies more difficult. Exploiting theSADC market requires finding whole-salers, distributors, lines of credit, busi-ness licensing requirements and a vari-ety of business services in the targetmarkets. While big players can affordthe costs of building dedicated officesin other SADC countries, the process isprohibitively difficult for small busi-nesses. To partially address this issue,SADC has formed an Industry andTrade Information System. However,the system is so far ineffective. A keyissue is the failure of national govern-ments to generate accurate, timely sta-tistical trade information. Much of whatis generated disagrees markedly withdata from the UN, World Bank andother international organisations.

Trade finance and insurance::::: Find-ing credit for trading or investment op-erations remains difficult in much ofSADC, particularly for small or newfirms. Interest rates are high and creditinsurance is expensive. Exchange ratestability, taxes and repatriation of prof-its also affect trade flows. These issueshave not yet been addressed at the re-gional level.

Sanitary and Phytosanitary meas-ures::::: The dismantling of some of theremaining NTBs in the agricultural sec-tor depends on the harmonisation ofsanitary and phytosanitary measures inSADC member states. These standardsremain a greater problem for smallbusinesses and governments without thefinancial resources to overcome sani-tary testing, packaging and pest- anddisease-control hurdles.

NTBs remain problematic becausethe issues associated with each arehighly particular and difficult to resolvein a single set of trade talks. A greatdeal could be achieved through harmo-nising procedures and standardising

forms and requirements. However, sub-stantial action on some issues, such astransport and communications, will re-quire major investments to which manySADC states have been unwilling orunable to commit.

Several relevant SADC agreementsalready exist, but have yet to be fullyimplemented. These include the Proto-col on Transport, Communications andMeteorology, the memorandum of un-derstanding (MOU) on Standardisa-tion, Quality Assurance, Accreditionand Metrology, and the MOUs on Mac-roeconomic Convergence and Taxa-tion.

The role of business and businessassociations in highlighting the impactof these impediments to intra-regionaltrade to the relevant ministries is impor-tant. The interface between businessand government in policymaking proc-esses needs to be developed at bothnational and regional levels to ensurethat intra-regional trade is facilitated.SADC member states are expected toconsult with the private sector within theirown constituencies before proceedingto regional negotiations. In practice thisis not happening effectively.

Even more difficult to handle, from aregional development perspective, is thedifferent levels of support that wealthiercountries – particularly SA and Bot-swana – are able to offer their compa-nies to help them overcome financingor market intelligence barriers. SA hasfar more resources and programmesaimed at industrial development, pro-vision of loans, loan guarantees andmarket intelligence – all of which fur-ther extends its comparative advantagesover other SADC states.

Rules of OriginRules of OriginRules of OriginRules of OriginRules of OriginTo prevent SADC manufacturers frombeing flooded by cheap foreign-madegoods and protect local industry, thetrade protocol relies on rules of origin(ROOs) that vary for different types ofgoods. The objective was not to create


SADC RestructuringSADC RestructuringSADC RestructuringSADC RestructuringSADC Restructuring ...from p.1


SADC’s New Sectoral Structure

It identified the following main institu-tional weaknesses:• The SADC structure lacked adequate

resources and did not have a cen-tralised and co-ordinated manage-ment system.

• The lines of management authorityand accountability were unclear.

• SADC lacked appropriate mecha-nisms capable of translating the highdegree of political commitment intoconcrete programmes.

• SADC lacked synergy between theobjectives and strategies of the SADCTreaty, on one hand, and the exist-ing SADC Programme of Action(SPA) and the institutional frame-work, on the other.

• SADC failed to mobilise significantlevels of the region’s own resourcesfor the implementation of the SPA.

• SADC was over-dependent on for-eign donors, who supplied more than80% of the finances for the SPA, com-promising its stability.The report recommended centralis-

ing the management of the regionalagenda, rationalising costs and im-proving synergy between national andregional objectives. Broadly, the restruc-turing unfolded around three majoractivities:

• the geographical clustering of 19Sector Co-ordinating Units (SCUs)and two Commissions into four di-rectorates at the SADC headquartersin Gaborone, Botswana;

• the formulation of a Regional Indica-tive Strategic Development Plan(RISDP) to provide SADC memberstates, institutions and policymakerswith a coherent and comprehensivedevelopment agenda on social andeconomic policies for the decade2003-13; and

• the creation of SADC National Com-mittees (SNCs) to ensure stakeholderparticipation in the organisation’sprocesses and to fill the void left bythe transfer of SCUs out of offices inthe various member states.This article assesses progress in these

three main areas of restructuring, basedon an examination of publicly availablematerial and extensive interviews withmembers of the Secretariat and otherdiplomats. It concludes with an assess-ment of the state of regional integra-tion in Southern Africa and the majorcomplications in restructuring.

From Sectors to DirectoratesFrom Sectors to DirectoratesFrom Sectors to DirectoratesFrom Sectors to DirectoratesFrom Sectors to DirectoratesThe history of the Southern African De-velopment Co-ordination Conference(SADCC) was clearly reflected in

SADC’s institutional arrangements.SADCC had a decentralised structure.Each member state bore responsibilityfor one or more SCU, hosted within itsown civil service. Although 1999 is of-ten cited as a watershed for SADC re-structuring, the seed for reform wasplanted as early as 1993.

The allocation of SCUs was matchedto countries’ national interests and com-petencies, with, for example, Botswanagiven custodianship of the agriculturalresearch and livestock sectors and Zim-babwe taking responsibility for food,agriculture and natural resources. By1990 a moratorium was placed on thecreation of new sectors. This was to haltthe unmanageable proliferation of ac-tivities and to increase the efficiency ofexisting sectors. The moratorium wastemporarily lifted when SA and Mauri-tius joined in 1994 and 1995, respec-tively. However, the two latecomers toSADC, the Seychelles and the Demo-cratic Republic of Congo (DRC), whichjoined in 1998, were never assignedsectors.

As early as 1993, SADC memberstates recognised the need for a revi-sion of the organisation’s decentralisedorganisational set-up in a documententitled A Framework and Strategy forBuilding the Community. According tothat report, SADC was to follow a ‘de-velopment integration’ approach thatwould require much deeper economicco-operation and integration thanSADCC’s approach of mere project co-ordination. Criticism of the sectoral ap-proach was taken much further by thetheme document, entitled Managementof Regional Co-operation, for the 1994consultative conference. The documentidentified significant differences in man-agement and capacity in different SCUs,which reflected resource endowment inthe different SADC countries. Accord-ing to the report, in some countries pro-visions had been totally inadequate fortasks to be performed, with, for exam-ple, staffing only on a part-time basis.

SECTORSECTORSECTORSECTORSECTOR DIRECTORATEDIRECTORATEDIRECTORATEDIRECTORATEDIRECTORATE DATE ESTABLISHEDDATE ESTABLISHEDDATE ESTABLISHEDDATE ESTABLISHEDDATE ESTABLISHED

August 2001

December 2001

December 2002

September 2002

Crop Production; Food, Agri-culture and Natural Re-sources; Agricultural Researchand Training; Livetock Produc-tion and Animal Disease Con-trol; Inland Fisheries; MarineFisheries and Resources; For-estry; Wildlife, Environmentand Land

Industry and Trade; Financeand Investment; Mining

Transport, Communicationsand Meteorology; Energy;Tourism

Legal Affairs; Human Re-sources Development; Em-ployment and Labour; Cul-ture, Information and Sport;Heal th

Infrastructure andServices (IS)

Food, Agriculture andNatural Resources(FANR)

Social and HumanDevelopment andSpecial Programmes(SHD & SP)

Trade, Industry, Financeand Investment (TIFI)


SADC RestructuringSADC RestructuringSADC RestructuringSADC RestructuringSADC Restructuring ... from p. 14


The inaugural meeting of theIntegrated Committee of Min-isters (ICM) finally took placeon 5 March 2003 in Luanda,Angola. It was preceded by ameeting of Senior Officials on3-4 March 2003. It adoptedRules of Procedure and con-sidered the draft Regional In-dicative Strategic Develop-ment Plan (RISDP). The ICMwill meet again in May and July2003 .

The ICM has been man-dated by Summit to overseethe work of the Directoratesat the Secretariat. It is an um-brella policy organ for allSADC Programme of Actionactivities and reports directlyto the Council of Ministers.As per Summit decision, atleast two ministers from eachmember state are expectedto attend the ICM meetings.

These factors made it ‘difficult for theSecretariat to pull a common manage-rial thread across these units, principallybecause of the national status of theSCUs’.

However, SCUs were to retain theirrole in regional co-ordination for sometime to come. They were believed toserve the political aim of strengtheningcommitment towards the body by cre-ating a feeling of ownership of SADCand its programme of action in mem-ber states. Furthermore, the personal-ised nature of the SCUs, which followedfrom their location within national ad-ministrations, meant that it was difficultfor heads of state to admit failure, evenwhere it was apparent. The result wasa lack of honesty about the efficiencyof the sectoral approach and a generalperception that although change wasimminent, it was not yet pressing.

The issue of restructuring was shelveduntil 1995 when it was revealed that ofthe 470 projects under the SCUs, only22% by number and 12% by value weretruly regional in character. The Councilof Ministers ordered a review of theSADC Programme of Action and theZimbabwean consultancy, Imani Devel-opment, prepared the report that waseventually published in 1997. The re-port contained two reform options, amodest rationalisation to 12 sectors,and the suggestion that activities begrouped into five clusters, roughly cor-responding with the current directoratesand chief directorate. According to thereport, the latter arrangement wouldhave the following advantages:• answers to regional problems would

be generated by regional debateand analysis involving allstakeholders;

• policy decisions would be arrived atby a process of consultation and en-dorsed by the political leadership; and

• truly regional programmes would beplaced at the centre and would crosssectoral boundaries.Although the report was deemed to

contain sound advice and useful find-ings and recommendations, states couldnot reach consensus on a choice be-tween the two options. Despite the re-port being carried out by consultantsfrom SA, Malawi and Zimbabwe, somestates branded it as South Africa-biased. The process was further ham-pered by the failure of member statesto hold national workshops to discussthe issues before the recommendedNovember 1997 deadline.

Debate resumed in earnest when thesummit in 1999 ordered another reviewof SADC operations. Clearly, SADCleaders could no longer ignore the lackof performance in some SCUs, the ab-sence of centralised management andother problems associated with thesectoral approach, which were seriouslyhampering progress on SADC’s mostimportant integration and developmen-tal goals. This time around the Reviewof Operations Report was approvedby the summit at a meeting in March2001 in Windhoek, and an ambitioustimeframe for restructuring was agreedupon. A Review Committee consistingof, SA, Botswana and Malawi (theSADC troika: outgoing, current and in-coming chairs of SADC) plus the chair-man of the SADC Organ for Politics,Defence and Security, Mozambique,was established to oversee restructuring.

Some difficulties were experiencedin the transition from sectors to directo-rates based at the SADC Secretariat inGaborone. However, the last directo-rate was established, on schedule, byDecember 2002. The Study on the Au-diting of Assets, Programmes andProjects in Sector Co-ordinating Unitsand SADC Institutions, which forms amajor cornerstone of the centralisationprocess, was also completed within thestipulated time and was tabled beforeCouncil in September 2002. The reportreveals that just more than 400 projectshave been approved, and that almost40% of the required funding has beensecured. Some of the projects that weredeemed to be truly regional, or had

insufficient funding, have been movedto the appropriate directorates at theSecretariat. Most projects, however,remain under national control for now.

However, while most documentationand administrative functions have beentransferred to the Secretariat buildingand temporary offices at the Zimba-bwean High Commission in Gaborone,most of the directorates remain severelyunderstaffed and under-resourced.

According to the Review of Opera-tions Report, a Study on the New SADCOrganizational Structure (popularlyreferred to as the Job Evaluation Study)would determine the staff level, grad-ing and salary scale of employees. Itwas to commence in September 2001and be completed in December 2001.It should, thus, have been completedshortly after the phasing out of the

The Integrated Commit-The Integrated Commit-The Integrated Commit-The Integrated Commit-The Integrated Commit-tee of Ministerstee of Ministerstee of Ministerstee of Ministerstee of Ministers



commissions and the beginning ofSCUs. Similarly, recruitment and re-deployment of staff, and staff devel-opment and training should havestarted in June 2001 and September2001, respectively, to be concludedconcurrently with the establishment ofthe last directorate in December 2002.Because these deadlines were not met,SADC was left to set up a complex or-ganisation effectively without any hu-man resource plan.

The March 2003 SADC Council ofMinisters meeting ordered theMauritian consultancy De Chazal DuMée to expedite the process and presenta final report to the review committeeby the end of March 2003. Accordingto reports, work of the consultancy has

been obstructed by their limited termsof reference, which allowed them to in-terview only regionally-appointed per-sonnel at the Secretariat. Not even sec-onded personnel were to be consulted.This has made it difficult for them towork out a clear assessment of the re-quirements of the Secretariat and ofsuitably-qualified individuals in differ-ent SADC states.

In the meanwhile, most of those inthe service of the directorates are onsecondment from their host govern-ments (and still on their national pay-rolls) or on contract with one of thedonor countries. Not all member stateshave lent staff, leading to complaintsof over-representation by some coun-tries. Because the Job Evaluation Studyis not complete, there is no clear

assessment of skills required within thenewly-formed directorates, whichfurther complicates the work of the or-ganisation. The use of seconded staffalso presents problems with regard torequired skills and expertise. The Di-rectorate for Trade, Industry, Financeand Investment (TIFI), for example, re-cently lost a trade expert (from Tanza-nia) and a trade lawyer (from Lesotho)— they were recalled by their homegovernments to be redeployed to Ge-neva. Presently, only the chief director,Dr Themba Mhlongo, has a permanentappointment. Another negative effect ofthe incomplete Job Evaluation Study isthat permanent staff members at the Sec-retariat have no job security as it is un-clear how the transitional phase will beaddressed.

SADC RestructuringSADC RestructuringSADC RestructuringSADC RestructuringSADC Restructuring ...from p. 15

SADC Tribunal

Directorate of Trade,

Industry, Finance &Investment

Sub-committees

SADC NationalCommittee

TROIKA

Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence &

Security

SUMMIT

KEY: Reporting Relationship Functional Relationship

Directorate of Infrastructure

Services

Directorate of Food, Agriculture & Natural

Resources

Directorate of Social and Human

Development & Special Programmes

Integrated Committee of Ministers

ICT & Library Services

Administration & Support Services

Legal Affairs

Finance

Internal Audit

Public Relations

Statistics

Department of StrategicPlanning, Gender &

Policy Harmonisation

Council of Ministers

Deputy Executive Secretary

Executive Secretary

Standing Committee of Senior Officials

OrganSADC Tribunal

Directorate of Trade,

Industry, Finance &Investment

Sub-committees

SADC NationalCommittee

TROIKA

Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence &

Security

SUMMIT

KEY: Reporting Relationship Functional Relationship

Directorate of Infrastructure

Services

Directorate of Food, Agriculture & Natural

Resources

Directorate of Social and Human

Development & Special Programmes

Integrated Committee of Ministers

ICT & Library Services

Administration & Support Services

Legal Affairs

Finance

Internal Audit

Public Relations

Statistics

Department of StrategicPlanning, Gender &

Policy Harmonisation

Council of Ministers

Deputy Executive Secretary

Executive Secretary

Standing Committee of Senior Officials

Organ○

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In order to ensure a realistic ap-proach to the actual financial implica-tions of the clustering process, all of theabovementioned activities should havepreceded the 2003/04 budget ($15million) for the SADC Secretariat, whichwas adopted at the March 2003 Coun-cil of Ministers meeting in Luanda, An-gola. This budget does not yet makeprovision for the recruitment of a staffcomplement of about 134 and the needto construct a new building to host theenlarged Secretariat. Neither does itprovide for the implementation of theRISDP. A review of the budget is, there-fore, scheduled to take place once theJob Evaluation Study is complete andthe RISDP has been accepted.

The Regional Indicative StrategicThe Regional Indicative StrategicThe Regional Indicative StrategicThe Regional Indicative StrategicThe Regional Indicative StrategicDevelopment PlanDevelopment PlanDevelopment PlanDevelopment PlanDevelopment PlanThe Regional Indicative Strategic De-velopment Plan (RISDP) became a thornin the side of the restructuring process.Initially intended for completion by De-cember 2001, the RISDP should define:• SADC’s vision, mission and strategic

objectives;• the shared policy framework re-

quired to achieve these objectives;• the policy reforms and programmes

necessary to achieve the set socialand economic targets;

• a quantification of the economic andsocial development targets to allowfor the effective monitoring of SADC’sactual performance;

• linkages among the social and eco-nomic development targets, in orderto reveal the co-ordination and har-monisation required betweenSADC’s sectoral policies; and

• where appropriate, macroeconomicpolicy convergence targets.The RISDP was to be drawn up by a

team composed of experts from SADCmember states. Countries were slow insending representatives and the draft-ing process failed to get off the ground.The deadline for completing the RISDPwas extended to June 2002. By Sep-

tember 2002, a year after the processwas to begin, only eight countries hadsent representatives and there was stillno progress. By the October 2002Luanda summit, the RISDP was still un-finished and the deadline was extendedagain. The summit identified ‘difficul-ties in identifying experts; lengthy con-sultations and recruitment processes; theheavy workload and inadequate staff-ing at the Secretariat’ as the main im-pediments to progress. The summitmandated the Troika to guide and ex-pedite the development of the RISDPand finalise the process by May 2003.

The drafting of the RISDP was sup-posed to be an inclusive and consulta-tive process, with the wide-ranging ac-tive involvement of all member coun-tries and civil society (as defined in Ar-ticle 23 of the Amended SADC Treaty).National and civilian input was to bechannelled through two experts fromeach country on the drafting commit-tee, and through open lines of commu-nication between SNCs, the Secretariatand the drafting committee. This pro-cess presupposed the existence of well-functioning, inclusive and committedSNCs. Yet, by September 2001 (whenthe RISDP drafting process was scheduled to start), none of the SADC mem-ber countries had set up their nationalcommittees. Only Seychelles — a coun-try that has played a rather inconsequen-tial role in SADC and is being sanc-tioned by the organisation for non-pay-ment of its membership contributions —had a committee dealing specificallywith SADC affairs that could fulfil thefunctions of an SNC. It is unclear howheads of state (at the Windhoek meet-ing) could not have been aware of thepotential difficulties of constituting thesecritically important national bodies.

Various consultants were ap-proached to assist in the RISDP draftingprocess, but when results failed to ma-terialise, the drafting was left up to thealready overburdened Secretariat. Asa result, countries and civil society pro-vided minimal and unco-ordinated inputs.

A final draft of the RISDP was sent tomember states for comment only a fewweeks before the Regional Workshopwas held from 12–13 February 2003.This left states with inadequate time toscrutinise the document and the techni-cal requirements it contained. The meet-ing was apparently fraught with disa-greements — mostly around the allo-cation of resources; the targets set; im-plications for national policy-making;and problems around the formulationprocess. Mainly because of the lack ofsubstantial input from member states,targets for social and economic integra-tion and development in the region werein many instances regarded as unreal-istic and insensitive to regional reali-ties.

Despite hopes that the revised RISDPdocument would be approved by theMarch 2003 Council meeting, the de-cision was deferred to the summit meet-ing in August/September 2003. Theworking document that was presentedto the Council of Ministers at their re-cent meeting was found to require fur-ther revision. National and regionalworkshops to discuss the document willhave to be held before a final versioncan be presented to the heads of statein August/September. In order to fa-cilitate this process, the mandate of theReview Committee (which had by nowgrown to also include members of thecurrent SADC troika: Angola and Tan-zania) was extended to the end of De-cember 2003.

A particularly significant and unprec-edented development in the RISDPprocess was a session to discuss thedocument with SADC’s International Co-operating Partners (ICPs) on 13 Febru-ary 2003. At this meeting, the draftRISDP was officially presented to theICPs and comments were invited. TheICPs echoed all of the complaints raisedin the regional workshop, but expressedparticular concern over the lack of refe-rences to and co-ordination with theNew Partnership for Africa’s Development



SADC Council MeetingSADC Council MeetingSADC Council MeetingSADC Council MeetingSADC Council MeetingThe SADC Council of Ministersmeeting was held in Luanda, Angolaon 9-10 March 2003. Among otherissues, the Council considered forapproval, the budget of the Secre-tariat for the 2003/04 financial yearand the Budget Outlook Paper whichseeks to provide guidelines for thebudget in the medium-term, consid-ering the region’s macroeconomicperformance, factors that influencethe performance from the regionaland international perspectives, and toprovide expenditure ceilings. Theagenda for the Council meeting in-cluded regular items such as:• a review of the status of the mem-

ber states contributions;• a review of the implementation of

Council decisions including aprogress report on the ‘Implemen-tation of the Restructuring ofSADC Institutions’ and a reportfrom the Integrated Committee ofMinisters; and

• special reports on the operationa-lisation of the African Union,Nepad, the Africa Growth andOpportunity Act meeting, whichwas held in Mauritius in January2003 and the Berlin Initiative, aframework for political co-opera-tion between SADC and the EU.


(Nepad) and the African Union (AU)and the lack of a clear developmentparadigm.

While a significant departure fromSADC’s characteristically closed andexclusive modus operandi, the ICPworkshop was still perceived by manyparticipants as insufficient, and waseven described as an endorsement ex-ercise, rather than a consultative work-shop.

Against this background, the RISDPprocess presents a paradox that willhopefully not define SADC’s future.When drafting policy, SADC heads ofstate explicitly claim to want to involvestakeholders in policymaking and im-plementation processes. In some in-stance, they even task the Secretariat toattempt to do so. Yet when work actu-ally begins, little attention is given todetail, and there is insufficient manage-ment oversight to ensure such partici-pation. Rhetoric has not translated intoreality nor been matched by clearlydefined consultation strategies andopen channels of communication. Thispoints to a crucial issue that SADC re-structuring failed to address — bothbefore and after the restructuring therewas little or no effective monitoring ormanagement oversight of the Secre-tariat and its work.

SADC National CommitteesSADC National CommitteesSADC National CommitteesSADC National CommitteesSADC National CommitteesAccording to the SADC Treaty, a SADCNational Committee is to be createdaround the pre-existing SADC NationalContact Point in every member coun-try. Every SNC should aim to solicitnational level input into the formulationof SADC policies, strategies and pro-grammes of action. SNCs should alsointeract with the Secretariat on a regu-lar basis, while overseeing the imple-mentation of SADC Protocols at home.This implies a rather elaborate nationalstructure, which requires a permanentsecretariat and significant resource al-location to carry out mandates effi-ciently. The composition of SNCs should

reflect the core areas of integration andco-ordination. As such, subcommitteesthat include the private sector, non-gov-ernmental organisations and workers’and employers’ organisations should becreated in the areas of political affairs;trade, investment, industry and finance;food, agriculture and natural resources;infrastructure services; and social andhuman development.

According to official reports, SNCshave, by now, been created in all ofthe SADC countries, except for the DRC.In many they were launched with greatfanfare — part of a publicity exerciseurged by the Secretariat. However, thelevel at which they operate varies fromvirtual standstill to moderate activity.Even in the regional powerhouse, SouthAfrica, the required subcommitteeshave not been established officially be-cause of bureaucratic red-tape and le-gal procedures. Few countries havemade budget allocations in support ofregional initiatives, such as the SNCs.

A workshop (long overdue) to dis-cuss members states‘ experiences withsetting up SNCs is being organised forJune 2003. However, without an offi-cially-mandated independent audit ofthe status of the SNCs — their composi-tion, activities and requirements in thevarious SADC countries — it will bedifficult to assess their value and func-tioning and to address outstanding is-sues. The need for an independent studyinto the effectiveness of the SNCs is evi-dent from their failure to play a role inthe formulation of the RISDP. Presently,member states provide the SADC Sec-retariat with infrequent reports on thestatus of their SNCs. SADC ministersalso report on the status and function-ing of SNCs to the quarterly Councilmeetings. Because these reports are notopen to public scrutiny — and becauseof the limited capacity of the Secretariatto conduct investigations — it is difficultto verify information contained in them.Thus, member states report to theircounterparts on the status of their SNCs,and there is no external accountability.

While the Secretariat is responsible forcollecting and collating reports and pro-viding support to the SNCs, they canonly make recommendations to SNCsand have no power to compel countriesto comply with the requirements set outin the SADC Treaty. (With the SADC Tri-bunal not yet functional, other heads ofstate do not yet have recourse to a legalinstrument for enforcing complianceeither.)

According to the Secretariat, requestsfor some physical equipment, such ascomputers and office supplies, havebeen received from some SNCs and




donor funds have been made availableto support their establishment. However,a clear assessment of the skills and train-ing required is lacking. Although ca-pacity constraints in some of the smallerand poorer SADC states are clearlysignificant, the main factor in determin-ing the success and inclusivity of nationalcommittees is political will.

Within the restructured SADC, SNCsare meant to play an important role inaligning national policies with regionalobjectives. The draft guidelines thathave been drawn up for the composi-tion and functioning of SNCs are, how-ever, vague and still allow memberstates to determine the level of involve-ment of stakeholders and the lines ofauthority within their own national com-mittees. The role of parliament and par-liamentary oversight in relation to SNCsis also not addressed in the draft guide-lines, while the lines of authority and ac-countability between SNCs, the Secre-tariat and other structures remain un-clear.

If these issues are not urgently ad-dressed, SNCs face the danger of be-coming legitimising institutions on pa-per with little or no actual influence overthe policymaking process at the highestlevel. The important role that SNCs aresupposed to fulfil with regard to the im-plementation of protocols may also fallby the wayside. Of the 21 protocols andthree Memoranda of Understandingsigned by SADC states since 1993, only13 have been ratified by the requiredtwo-thirds of members. Implementationat the national level is not guaranteedthrough the ratification of a protocol,and it is important that clear lines ofauthority are established between SNCsand other SADC institutions. To functioneffectively, SNCs need to have accessto the highest levels of decision-makingwithin each state and during the SADCSummit and Council of Ministers meet-ings. Their composition and function-ing also need to be public, with themaximum possible level of oversight by

national legislatures.

Variable Geometry orVariable Geometry orVariable Geometry orVariable Geometry orVariable Geometry orFirst Gear?First Gear?First Gear?First Gear?First Gear?The experience of the European Union(EU) in applying ‘variable geometry’ toregional integration is often held up asan example to other regions. Variablegeometry refers to the arrangement inthe EU whereby nations which have com-plied with a set of economic and politi-cal requirements are integrated moreclosely sooner than the ‘slower’ or lessdeveloped members, who join themonce they are able.

While the Common Agenda of SADCacknowledges the importance of theconcept of variable geometry, it seemsthat little thought has been given to whatthis really implies within SADC. As aresult, integration has largely pro-gressed at the pace of its slower mem-bers. This has led many to speculateabout the enlargement of SACU as thefast-moving ‘core’ of SADC, with whichother countries would have to catch upas best they can. The issue of variablegeometry ought to be addressed moresubstantially in the RISDP and throughrestructuring. A more centralised man-agement system with longer-term stra-tegic planning might be a more fittingvehicle for distributing cross-sectoraldevelopment activities to the areas theyare most needed, and to where they canprovide most benefit to the region as awhole.

Two factors will be significant in de-termining the form and speed of re-gional integration. Firstly, memberstates continue to jealously guard na-tional sovereignty. SADC’s developmentintegration approach and its treaty,however, demand increasing politicaland economic convergence. This im-plies that states will have to always con-sider the regional agenda when craft-ing domestic policy. In some instances,states may have to entrust certain pow-ers to regional institutions and empowerthose institutions sufficiently to carry outtheir mandate efficiently. This will mean

a dilution of sovereignty. Countries‘ re-luctance to concede any sovereignty isretarding progress to closer integration.

Secondly, nine of the 14 SADC coun-tries are also members of the CommonMarket for Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA), where economic integra-tion is proceeding much more rapidlythan in SADC. Nine countries withinCOMESA launched an FTA in 2000 andaim to create a customs union with com-mon external tariffs in 2004. Four ofthese, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia andZimbabwe, are SADC countries. As acountry cannot belong to two customsunions simultaneously, countries withoverlapping memberships will soon haveto choose one or the other organisa-tion. Multiple memberships have bothintra- and extra-regional implications.Under the Cotonou Agreement, the EUwill set up Economic Partnership Agree-ments with regions in Africa. Countrieswill not be allowed to exploit the con-cessions on offer under more than oneregional arrangement. Similarly, theAU and Nepad foresee working withsubregional organisations as their build-ing blocks. SADC very closely corre-sponds to the AU’s demarcation of re-gions, according to the Abuja Treaty(see K. Sturman’s article in this issue).

Tanzania recently withdrew fromCOMESA, and other countries are un-der pressure to do the same. Apart frompolicy implications, membership to somany different organisations puts con-siderable strain on the limited adminis-trative and diplomatic capacity of manyof the smaller states in the region.

Conclus ionConclus ionConclus ionConclus ionConclus ionWhile it has taken almost 10 years forthe restructuring process to begin, headsof states have made some unprec-edented concessions on a number ofissues and adopted a very ambitioustimeframe for implementing the reforms.There is certainly momentum in termsof regional integration. The sources ofthis renewed commitment are varied,



but include the following:• Mozambique and SA have played

increasingly active, assertive roles inpushing for reforms. As the countrythat provides 20% of SADC’s totalbudget under the revised member-ship contribution formula, SA hasvery high stakes in forcing reformsand more transparent and standard-ised financial accountability.

• Donors have exerted significant di-rect and indirect pressure on SADCto centralise and rationalise manage-ment and activities. Although the re-structuring exercise is intended to re-duce SADC’s dependence on exter-nal funding, the organisation is stilldependent on the goodwill of donorsfor many of its non-core activities,and is, therefore, compelled to payattention to the requests of its ICPs.

• External trade agreements, such asthe Cotonou Agreement, are furthercompelling countries in Africa to or-ganise themselves to exploit oppor-tunities on offer under Regional Eco-nomic Partnership Agreements. Morerecently, talk of imminent US–SACUnegotiations has added urgency tothe restructuring efforts.

• Member states are increasinglyaware that the way in which SADChas been functioning has not deliv-ered optimal results, particularly re-garding food security, water man-agement and regional security/con-flict resolution.The restructuring of a regional or-

ganisation is not an easy or quick proc-ess. Plans for restructuring were overlyambitious and sometimes poorly con-ceived, resulting in the setting of unre-alistic timeframes. As many deadlineswere missed, criticism mounted, and theefforts lost some credibility. The failureto build in adequate measures for moni-toring their plans also made it difficultfor both the Secretariat and the SADCsummit and council to act quickly toaddress backlogs and get the processback on track.

Searching for an institutional solutionto problems without actually address-ing the inherent political sources of thoseproblems has been the other major fail-ure of SADC states. Significant manage-ment and accountability weaknesseswithin the organisation are, thus, notovercome by the restructuring exercisein itself. The Job Evaluation Study needsto produce clear mechanisms to ensuremanagement performance accountabil-ity at the Secretariat and also withinSNCs. Furthermore, SADC needs toconstitute itself in such a way as to avoidreliance on the consultants who did thecore work of the restructuring. One ofthe overt objectives of the whole proc-ess has been to mobilise (human) re-sources within the region. However, thishas not yet been achieved.

Decision-making remains centralisedat the very top. Instead of resolving mi-nor issues at the appropriate level, prob-lems get kicked back to the SADC sum-mit or council, resulting in further bot-tlenecks and delays. This problem hasbeen compounded by the failure ofSADC to honour the commitment itmade in the amended SADC Treaty toincrease the number of summit andcouncil meetings. Instead of meetingonce a year, the summit is now sup-posed to meet twice — in February andAugust/September. In addition, coun-cil meetings are meant to increase infrequency from two a year to four.Although the Council of Ministers metin March 2003, it never held a meetingin November 2002. It remains to beseen whether the planned May 2003Council meeting will take place. The

next summit meeting is scheduled totake place in August/September 2003.

An assessment of the restructuringprocesses needs to look at the overallpicture, as well as the detail. While theprocess has unfolded less smoothly thanplanned, it is not a failure. The founda-tions are good and SADC has betterprospects than ever to realise its poten-tial. But a number of issues, notably ac-countability and transparency, remainunresolved. It would be inappropriateto measure SADC’s success against anorganisation such as the EU, which took50 years to consolidate integration.There is a need for SADC leaders to berealistic and focus on what they canachieve and for them to apply the re-quired political will. Excessive focus ongrand designs will damage SADC’sability to reach obtainable goals. Moreimportantly, SADC leaders must over-come their fear of public criticism, as itprecludes accountability and transpar-ency and is detrimental to the organi-sation’s goals.

A further positive step would includesome serious efforts to build trust in theregion. Trust is necessary not onlyamong the political elite, but also be-tween the political elite and civil soci-ety. In addition, states need to expeditethe implementation of the protocol es-tablishing the tribunal so that they canhave mechanisms for putting pressureon non-performing states.


Gina van Schalkwyk is the SADC Researcherat the South African Institute of InternationalAffairs and editor of the SADC Barometer.

Contact DetailsContact DetailsContact DetailsContact DetailsContact DetailsGina van Schalkwyk

SADC ResearcherSouth African Institute of International Affairs

PO Box 31596, Braamfontein, 2017, South AfricaTelephone: +27 (0)11 339 2021

Fax: +27 (0)11 339 2154E-mail: [email protected]



SADC Free TradeSADC Free TradeSADC Free TradeSADC Free TradeSADC Free Trade ...from p. 13

unnecessary obstacles to trade, but manyof the rules of origin already agreed toconstitute a significant barrier to SADCtrade.

Frank Flatters, a researcher on SADCtrade and professor emeritus at QueensUniversity, Canada, notes that the ROOsare in many cases so restrictive that alarge amount of trade will not qualifyfor the lower tariffs under the protocol.’SADC rules of origin will hinder re-gional economic integration and, atbest, have no impact on global com-petitiveness of regional producers. Theywill make SADC irrelevant for the mostdynamic, internationally competitivemanufacturers in the region. In manycases rules of origin have been designedto undo the trade creating effects of tar-iff liberalisation.‘

Many ROOs began as fairly simplerequirements designed to block so-called ’screwdriver operations‘ in whichcompanies import essentially finishedproducts and simply repackage orrelabel the goods as locally made. Inmany trade categories a simple rule of35% local content applied. However, ina variety of special sectors the ROOswere made too stringent.

In a recent study on the SADC ROOs,Flatters noted: ’For regionally-orientedgarment production, the restrictiveSADC rules of origin will achieve the

opposite of what is intended. Theyhinder rather than promote regionalvertical integration…And they imposeconditions on garment producers thatcannot be met even by South Africangarment makers when producing fortheir own highly protected domesticmarket.‘

At South African insistence, theROOs for free trade in garments onlyallow duty-free trade in garments thatare made from SADC produced tex-tiles, which are made from regionallyproduced yarns. Even South Africangarment makers rely extensively on for-eign fabric for fulfilling internationalexport orders. A key problem is thatSA‘s tariff and industrial strategy at-tempts to protect the whole supplychain, including domestic makers of fi-bre, spinners of yarn, weavers of fab-

ric and assemblers of garments. Tryingto force garment makers to use highlyprotected local fabrics and yarns, whichare thus not cost-competitive on theworld market, effectively forces garmentmanufacturers to choose between serv-ing the local or SADC market and themuch larger world market. Compound-ing the problem is the lack of local pro-ducers of many high-quality yarns andfabrics that can only be sourced exter-nally. Given the often limited quantitiesand qualities of local goods on themarket, producers note that flexibilityin choosing suppliers is a critical com-ponent of competitiveness at all stagesof production.

One reason clothing and textilemanufacturing is so contentious is itssheer size in proportion to total manu-

Total Manufacturing EmploymentClothing and Textile EmploymentSADC CountryAngolaBotswanaLesothoMalawiMauritiusMozambiqueNamibiaSouth AfricaTanzaniaZambiaZimbabwe

Clothing and Textile Total Manufacturing Employment in Southern Africa, 1998

Source: ‘Textiles & Clothing in SADC: Key Issue and Policy Perspectives’, Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town,Policy Brief No. 01/P20, December 2001

3002,1009,368

10,50073,573

5,1001,000

136,8248,0007,800

18,200

51,00025,75017,50046,000

110,00058,00018,225

1,460,00063,50059,000

139,000

SADC-EU Relat ions: Looking Back and Moving AheadSADC-EU Relat ions: Looking Back and Moving AheadSADC-EU Relat ions: Looking Back and Moving AheadSADC-EU Relat ions: Looking Back and Moving AheadSADC-EU Relat ions: Looking Back and Moving Ahead. The South African Institute of InternationalAffairs (SAIIA). For copies, e-mail [email protected]

Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Volume 2Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Volume 2Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Volume 2Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Volume 2Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Volume 2, an annual publication produced bythe Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU), and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) will be available byMarch 2003.

Copies can be obtained from: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS)PO Box 1145WindhoekNamibiaTel: +264-61-225568Fax: +264-61-225678E-mail: [email protected]

Other publications on SADC

Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit(NEPRU)PO Box 40710WindhoekNamibiaTel: +264-61-277500Fax: +264-61-277501

extent to which SADC countries replacenon-SADC suppliers with those fromSADC, who pay low or no duty. In aWorld Bank report, Jeffrey Lewis mod-elled this revenue effect based on threescenarios of the final FTA structure. Theresults for each country varied in thedifferent scenarios, but assuming SADCeventually adopts an FTA with no inter-nal tariffs, the deal would cause an 11%loss of total government revenue forZimbabwe, 7% for Malawi, 6.2% forZambia, 0.1% for SA and 5.4% forMauritius. Because the revenue impactis far less for SA, which is already eco-nomically better off, it will re-inforcetensions over the gulf between the coun-try and other SADC states.

Conclus ionConclus ionConclus ionConclus ionConclus ionIt is clear that there is far more to a well-functioning free trade area than simpleremoval of tariffs. Structurally, SADC,like much of the rest of Africa, has manyprocedural and operational issues thatmake it far easier for member states totrade with the rest of the world thanwithin the region. For the SADC TradeProtocol to achieve its goal of contrib-uting to greater trade, greater job crea-tion and vertical integration of its manu-facturing base, leaders will have to fo-cus attention and political capital onbringing down non-tariff barriers. Fo-cusing only on internal SADC demandto propel development will fail withoutfocus on improving the region’s globalcompetitiveness by reducing a widerange of business costs in SADC. Thusleaders must address overly restrictiverules of origin, deficient infrastructure,the lack of harmonisation in trade pro-cedures and inefficient customs admin-istration.


SADC Free TradeSADC Free TradeSADC Free TradeSADC Free TradeSADC Free Trade ...from p. 21

facturing employment. In many coun-tries it is the largest single manufactur-ing employer. For example, 66% ofmanufacturing employment is in cloth-ing and textiles in Mauritius, 55% inLesotho and around 13% in Zambia,Zimbabwe and Tanzania. However, ifthe informal garment sector is included(usually small family sewing operations),the sector is significantly larger. In Ma-lawi an estimated 30,000 people workin the informal clothing sector com-pared to the total formal-sector cloth-ing and textile employment of 10,500.

ROOs can have dramatically differ-ent impacts on different countries. Forexample, SA is the only substantialwheat producer in the region, withSADC being a major net importer.However, recently proposed ROOs af-fecting the milling and baking industrywould require 30% SADC-grown wheat(down from earlier proposals of 70%).As a result, the ROO will likely blockduty-free trade in baked goods frommost SADC members, except SA. Insimilar fashion, ROOs create tensionbetween SA and other economies be-cause the country has a more developedeconomy with more producers of localinputs. For example, South Africa minesmetal, processes it, produces wire ca-ble from it and plastics for insulation. Incontrast, a Zambian electrical cable firmmay have to rely on imported metal,wire or insulation. Hence a ROO de-manding local content in electrical ca-bling can heavily favour SA.

Trade Patterns in SADCTrade Patterns in SADCTrade Patterns in SADCTrade Patterns in SADCTrade Patterns in SADCAlthough the trade protocol makes pro-vision for SA’s tariffs against SADCimports to be lowered faster than thoseof other SADC states, trade patterns re-main notably skewed. SACU (particu-larly SA) exports far more to the non-

SACU SADC countries than they importfrom them: SACU exports to SADC in2000 were R13.9 billion compared toonly R1.7 billion in SACU imports fromSADC. In percentage terms, SACU’stotal imports from SADC have increasedby 7.9% from 1991 to 2000, whereasexports from SACU to SADC have in-creased by 10% over the same period.

...there is far more to a well-...there is far more to a well-...there is far more to a well-...there is far more to a well-...there is far more to a well-functioning free trade areafunctioning free trade areafunctioning free trade areafunctioning free trade areafunctioning free trade areathan simple removal of tariffs.than simple removal of tariffs.than simple removal of tariffs.than simple removal of tariffs.than simple removal of tariffs.

SA‘s dominant economic position hasbeen a fixture of the region for a longtime. However, the acceleration of free-trade and the decline of manufacturingin non-SACU countries have raised sig-nificant political tensions that could workagainst negotiations to eliminate NTBsor further accelerate the timetables to-ward the final SADC FTA and customsunion. Access to the SACU markets re-mains a strong concern on the part ofthe non-SACU SADC countries as theysearch for markets for their productsand services; and their exports to SACUcountries are concentrated in relativelyfew sectors.

Another issue that has received littleattention but, has potential to increaseanxiety regarding the SADC FTA, is theimpact lowering of customs duties willhave on national budgets, many ofwhich are heavily dependent on cus-toms revenue. For example, Mauritiusrelied on import duties for 28.7% ofgovernment revenues (based on 1996figures). The comparable 1996 figuresfor other countries include 17.8% forZimbabwe, 26.1% for Tanzania, 16.3%for Malawi, 3.6% for SA and 11.7%for Zambia.

The exact revenue impact of a SADCFTA will depend on the proportion ofimports from non-SADC states and the

Ross Herbert is the Africa Research Fellow andNEPAD project manager at SAIIA.

To receive the SADC Barometer directly by e-mail, contact the editor atTo receive the SADC Barometer directly by e-mail, contact the editor atTo receive the SADC Barometer directly by e-mail, contact the editor atTo receive the SADC Barometer directly by e-mail, contact the editor atTo receive the SADC Barometer directly by e-mail, contact the editor atS A D C B a r o m e t e r @ s a i i a . w i t s . a c . z aS A D C B a r o m e t e r @ s a i i a . w i t s . a c . z aS A D C B a r o m e t e r @ s a i i a . w i t s . a c . z aS A D C B a r o m e t e r @ s a i i a . w i t s . a c . z aS A D C B a r o m e t e r @ s a i i a . w i t s . a c . z a


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gniteeMeettimmoCscitsitatSCDASlaunnA yaM9-6 iwalaM

gniteeMsretsiniMfolicnuoCCDAS enuJ/yaM ABT

)eettimmoCytiruceSdnaecnefeDetatS-retnI(CSDSIehtfogniteeMlaunnA tcO/yaM euqibmazoM

)CDPSI(ycamolpiDdnascitiloPetatS-retnI voN/yaM aibmaZ

noitneverPtcifnoCrofsmetsySgninraWylraEehtfoweiveR yaM ABT

:etisbewCDASehtmorfdeniatboebnacsliatedrehtruF.ecalpgnikateblliwsgnitemeettimmoc-busdnaeettimmocrehtoforebmunA tni.cdas.www

published by the south african institute of international ... · sadc troika. the first opds troika...

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