pure power boot camp v. warrior fitness boot camp, 08-civ-4801 (s.d.n.y.; dec. 22, 2010)

8/8/2019 Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 08-Civ-4801 (S.D.N.Y.; Dec. 22, 2010)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - XPURE POWER BOOT CAMP, INC., e t . a l . ,

P l a i n t i f f s , 08 Civ. 4810 (THK)- aga ins t MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDERWARRIOR FITNESS BOOT CAMP, LLC, e t . a I ,

Defendants .-X

THEODORE H. KATZ, United States Magistrate Judge.Pla in t i f f s /Coun te rc l a im Defendants ( "P l a i n t i f f s " ) brought t h i s

ac t ion seek ing damages and in junc t ive re I f f accusingDefendants /Counterclaim P l a i n t i f f s ("Defendants") of (1 ) s t e a l i n gP l a i n t i f f s ' business model, customers , and i n t e rna l documents, (2)breaching employee f iduc ia ry d u t i e s , and (3 ) i n f r ing ing P l a i n t i f f s 't rademarks , t r ade-d res s , and copyr ights . Defendants denyP l a i n t i f f s ' a l l ega t ions and br ing coun terc la ims, a l l eg in g (1)v io la t ions of the New York Labor Law, (2 ) v io la t ions of the StoredCommunications Act and the Elect ronic Communications Privacy Act,(3) at tempted sabotage by P l a i n t i f f s of Defendants ' bus iness , and(4) unauthor ized use of Defendants ' images i n v io l a t i on of New Yorkpr ivacy law.

P r e t r i a l discovery has been completed and presen t ly before theCour t a re th e p a r t i e s ' cross-mot ions fo r p a r t i a l summary judgment,

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Case 1:08-cv-04810-JGK-THK Document 165 Filed 12/22/10 Page 1 of 33


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brought pursuan t to Rule 56 of the Federa l Rules of Civ i lProcedure. Pla in t i f f s seek summary judgment on Defendants ' c la imsunder the Stored Communications Act ("SCAli) and the Elect ronicCommunications Privacy Act ("ECPA"). Defendants seek summaryjudgment on the same SCA and ECPA claims. For the reasons t ha tfollow, P la in t i f f s ' motion fo r p a r t i a l summary judgment i s grantedi n pa r t and denied in pa r t , and Defendants ' motion fo r summaryjudgment i s granted in pa r t and denied in par t . l

BACKGROUND

In 2004, Lauren Brenner ("Brenner" ) h i red Ruben Bell ia rd("Bel l ia rd") , and, in 2005, she hi red Alex Fe l l ("Fel l") , twoformer United Sta tes Marines, to work as " d r i l l i n s t ruc to r s n a tPure Power Boot Camp ("PPBC") , a phys ical f i tness center owned byBrenner and designed to rep l i ca te as c lose ly as poss ib le theexperience of t r a in ing a t a mil i ta ry boot camp. In l a t e 2007, somee igh t months before Fe l l was f i red and Bel l ia rd qui t h i s job a tPPBC, Defendants began making plans to open a competing f i tnesscenter . (See Supplemental Aff idav i t of Lauren Brenner, dated June6, 2008 ("Brenner June 6 Aff . " ) , a t 8 .) Shor t ly a f t e r leavingPPBC, Bel l ia rd and Fel l , toge ther with t h e i r g i r l f r i ends (and co-Defendants) Jenn i fe r Lee ("Lee") and Nancy Baynard ("Baynard"),

1 The par t i e s consented to proceed before t h i s Court ,pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636{c).2



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opened a competing f i tness center , Warrior Fi tnes s Boot Camp("WFBC") .

After Fel l and Bel l ia rd were no longer working a t PPBC,Defendants a l lege tha t Pla in t i f f s , on Apr i l 28, 2008, and fo raround one week t he r e a f t e r , accessed and pr in ted e-mails fromF e l l ' s Hotmail , Gmail, and Warrior Fi tnes s Boot Camp ("WFBC")accounts . 2 (See Aff idav i t of Lauren Brenner in oppos i t ion toMotion to Preclude Emails , dated July 10, 2008 ("Brenner July 10Af. " ) , 22; see also Ex. A, annexed to Declara t ion of DanielSchnapp, Esq. , dated July 1 , 2 0 0 8 , ("Schnapp July 1 Decl . " ) , E-mails 1-34; Transcr ip t of Oral Argument, dated July 18, 2008("Tr ." ) , a t 14 15.) Defendants a l l ege t ha t , over the same per iod,Pla in t i f f s also accessed Lee 's corpora te "Bold Food LLC/Bobby Flay"account ("Bold Food account") , based on login information containedin an emai l obtained from one of F e l l ' s personal accounts .Deposi t ion of Lauren Brenner, dated Mar. 4, 2009 ("Brenner Mar. 4Dep.") , a t 226, at tached as Ex. B to Declara t ion of Danie l Schnapp,dated October IS, 2010 ("Schnapp Oct. 15 Decl . " ) . )

Defendants ' Counterclaims make the same a l lega t ionsagains t El izabeth Lorenzi ("Lorenzi") and Cheryl Dumas ("Dumas")( toge ther , the "Third-Par ty Defendants") . (See Answer to AmendedComplaint, Third Par ty Complaint, dated July 29, 2009 ("Defs. 'Ans. and Counte rc l . " ) , a t 20-21.) However, Lorenzi and Dumas arenot named in the motions now before the Court.

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Defendants ' emai ls were access ib le because Fel l l e f t h isusername and password information s tored on PPBC's computers , suchtha t , when Lorenzi accessed the Hotmail s i t e , th e username andpassword f i e lds were automat ical ly popula ted wi th F e l l ' s logininformat ion. (See Aff idav i t of Elizabeth Lorenzi in Opposit ion toMotion to Preclude Emails, dated July 10, 2008 ("Lorenzi Aff .n) , ,6; Brenner July 10 Aff . , 25.) Brenner maintains t ha t she neverpersonal ly accessed any of the accounts , nor d id she i n s t ruc tanyone to access the accounts on her beha l f . (See CounterclaimDefendants ' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion fo rPar t i a l Summary Judgment (" PIs . ' Reply Mem. n ), a t 15.) Rather,Pla in t i f f s a l l ege t ha t Lorenzi and Dumas accessed the Hotmail,Gmail, and WFBC accounts , and then suppl ied Brenner with pr in tedcopies of the accessed emails . (See id . i Deposi t ion of LaurenBrenner, dated Apr. 23, 2009 ("Brenner Apr. 23 Dep.n), a t 231-33,at tached as Ex. K to Declara t ion of Matthew Sheppe, dated Sept . 24,2010 ("Sheppe Sept . 24 Decl . ") .) Brenner i s unsure of who accessedthe Bold Food Account. (See Brenner Apr. 23 Dep. a t 232.)

The emails obta ined by Pla in t i f f s provide a de ta i led pic tureof Defendants ' e f fo r t s to se t up the competing bus iness . Thecontent of many of the emai ls , por t ions of which are descr ibed ing rea te r de ta i l in an e a r l i e r dec i s ion of t h i s Court, provided thebasis for much of P la in t i f f s ' or ig ina l Complaint, inc luding,

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according to Pla in t i f f s suppor t fo r t h e i r a l l e g a t i o n s t ha t , whilestill employed a t PPBC, Defendants looked fo r and l eased spacepurchased equipment, copied and /o r s to l e PPBC customer formscustomer l i s t s , t r a in ing and i n s t ruc t ion mater i a l s , and f inal lYIt ha t Defendants so l i c i t ed and s to l e PPBC's customers , a l l inan t i c ipa t ion of es tab l i sh ing a competing bus iness . DefendantBel l i a rd a l so s to l e h is personnel f i l e from the PPBC f i l e s , andshredded the non-compete agreement he had s igned. See Pure P o w e ~ Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot CampI 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 553(S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Preclusion Decis ion") .

Approximately a week a f t e r gaining access to Defendants ' emailaccounts , Pla in t i f f s commenced an ac t ion in New York Sta te SupremeCourt . Pla in t i f f s simultaneous reques ted a temporary re s t ra in ingorde r ("TRO"), seeking , among other th ings , to prevent Defendantsfrom opening a competing bus iness . The s t a t e cour t determined t ha tP l a i n t i f f s ' non-compete c lause was unenforceable as draf ted , andallowed Defendants to open t h e i r f i t ne s s cen te r . (See Transcr ip t ,dated May 6, 2008 ("TRO Hr 'g") , a t tached as Ex. B to Declara t ion ofDaniel Schnapp, dated Oct. 24, 2008 ("Schnapp Oct. 24 Decl .") I a t28, 43.) However, the cour t d i rec ted Defendants to re tu rn ce r ta indocuments t ha t they had s to len from PPBC. (See a t 41-42.)Defendants then removed the ac t ion to t h i s Court .

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Defendants l ea rned t ha t P l a i n t i f f s had obtained t h e i r emailsthrough papers f i l ed in the s t a t e cour t proceedings . id . a t3.} On the bas i s of t ha t d isc losure , Defendants , who a t the t imewere aware only t ha t Pla in t i f f s had accessed t h i r t y - f o u r emai l ss tored in Defendan ts ' Hotmail , Gmail, and WFBC account s , f i l ed amotion with t h i s Court seeking an order prec luding th e use o rd i sc losure of sp e c i f i c emai ls obta ined by Pla in t i f f s from thoseaccount s .

In a Report and Recommendation, dated August 22, 2008, t h i sCourt recommended t ha t Pla in t i f f s be prec luded from using in th i sl i t i g a t i o n emails obta ined outs ide normal discovery procedures . 3The Court also recommended t ha t Pla in t i f f s re tu rn o r des t roy a l lcopies of emails t ha t con ta ined pr iv i l eged a t to rne y-c l i e n tcommunications. The Court concluded t ha t "Brenner accessed F e l l ' semails without au thor iza t ion , in what would be a v io l a t i on of theStored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2707, had a cause of ac t ionbeen brought pursuant to t ha t s ta tu te . , ,4 See Pure Power Boot Camp,

3 This ac t ion was or ig ina l ly re fe r red to t h i s Court fo rgenera l p r e t r i a l supe rv i s ion and Reports and Recommendations ond i spos i t ive motions, pursuan t to 28 U.S.C. 636(b) (1) (A), (B),and (C).

4 The Prec lus ion Decision assumed Brenner was respons ib lefo r the SCA v io l a t i ons . However, as w i l l be discussed in mored e t a i l in f ra , the Cour t ' s decis ion to prec lude the use ofDefendants ' emai ls in th i s l i t i g a t i o n was not pred ica ted onBrenner being personal ly re spons ib l e fo r access ing the emai l s .

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587 F. Supp. 2d a t 551. Th e Court fu r the r concluded t h a t "theevidence ind ica tes t ha t Brenner per iodica l ly accessed F e l l ' s emai laccounts and pr in ted emails a f t e r they had been del ivered" and,accordingly , " tha t Brenner did not access and p r i n t F e l l ' s emailscontemporaneous with t h e i r t r ansmiss ion . " See id . a t 557 58. Th eCourt , the re fo re , concluded t h a t Brenner d id not v io l a t e the ECPA.See id . a t 558. On October 23, 2008, a f t e r the des igna ted per iodfo r object ions to the Report and Recommendation had expi red withoute i t he r par ty reg i s te r ing an object ion , uni ted Sta tes Dis t c t JudgeJohn G. Koel t l adopted the Repor t in fu l l .

Subsequent to the Prec lus ion Decision, Brenner admit ted toaccessing somewhere between 200 250 emails from Defendants 'accounts . Addi t iona l ly , Brenner admit ted tha t , in add i t ion to theaccounts i de n t i f i e d in the Prec lus ion Decis ion , Lee ' s Bold Foodaccount had a l so been accessed . (See Brenner Mar. 4 Dep. a t 226.)Defendants a l so a l l ege t ha t Brenner admit ted to access ingDefendants ' emai l correspondence as it was exchanged, during theMay 5, 2008 TRO hear ing in s t a t e cour t . (See Schnapp Oct. 15 Decl .a t 2 .)

Brenner ' s tes t imony as to whether she accessed Defendants 'emai ls dur ing the TRO hear ing changed severa l t imes over the courseof her depos i t ion . In i t i a l l y , Brenner admit ted to reviewing emailsexchanged among the Defendants and t h e i r lawyer . (See Brenner Mar.

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4 Dep. a t 276-77.) Brenner immediately correc ted herse l f , ands ta ted tha t it was ac tua l ly her employee, Elizabeth Lorenzi , or herf r iend, Cheryl Dumas, who accessed the emai ls , which she knewbecause they "were wri t ing to me on the blackberry ."Later , during the same depos i t ion , Brenner again changed hertes t imony, t h i s t ime claiming t ha t Dumas was s i t t i n g next to herthroughout the hearing, and t ha t she never ins t ruc ted anyone toread Defendants ' emails during the s t a t e cour t hear ing. ( S e e i d . a t 297 302.)

In response to Defendants ' document reques ts , on February 23,2009, Pla in t i f f s turned over an add i t iona l 43 emai ls obta ined fromDefendants ' accounts . On March 23, 2009, Pla in t i f f s disc losed andproduced an add i t iona l 454 emails obta ined from Defendants 'accounts . The fol lowing day, Pla in t i f f s sur rendered an addi t ionalf i f t een emails obta ined from Lee 's Bold Food account . Whencombined with the or ig ina l 34 emails t ha t were the subjec t of thePreclusion Decision, 546 of Defendants ' emai ls were obtained byPla in t i f f s without author iza t ion . Pla in t i f f s explained tha t theycould not have produced these add i t iona l e m a i l sa n y e a r l i e r .a s Pla in t i f f s only obtained con t ro l of the emai ls a f t e r copies of theemails were l e f t by Dumas, the person P l a i n t i f f s a l l ege wasrespons ib le fo r pr in t ing them, with the doorman to Brenner ' sapartment bui ld ing , l a t e on the night of March I I , 2009. (See

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http:///reader/full/Seeid.athttp:///reader/full/emailsanyearlier.ashttp:///reader/full/Seeid.athttp:///reader/full/emailsanyearlier.as


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----

Le t t e r from Sher r i Eisenpress to the Court , dated Apr. 20, 2009, a t2; Brenner Apr. 29 Dep. a t 29 30.)

The pa r t i e s appeared before the Court on June 17, 2009, inconnect ion with a reques t by Defendants fo r sanc t ions , pursuan t toRule 37 of the Federa l Rules of C iv i l Procedure , re la ted to whatDefendants termed " P l a i n t i f f s ' i l l e g a l ac t ions and abuse of thediscovery process . 1/ The Court determined t h a t the add i t iona lemails would be sub jec t to the same preclus ion orde r t ha t appl iedto the i n i t i a l 34 emai l s obta ined by P l a i n t i f f s . Nei ther par tyobjec ted to t h i s dec i s ion .

Defendants f i l ed an answer to P l a i n t i f f s ' Amended Complaint onJu ly 29, 2009. {See Answer to Amended Complaint, Third Par tyComplaint, dated July 29, 2009 ("Ans. and Counte rc l . " ) . )Defendants ' Third-Par ty Complaint included counterclaims a l leg ing(I) t h a t P l a i n t i f f s and Third-Par ty Defendants v io la t ed the SCA andthe ECPA by access ing Defendants ' emai l withou t au thor iza t ion , (2)v io la t ions of the New York Labor law, (3) P l a i n t i f f s have at temptedto sabotage Defendants ' bus iness , and (4) unauthorized use ofDefendants ' images i n v i o l a t i o n of New York pr ivacy law. (See id .a t 17.)

P r e t r i a l scovery i s now complete , and the t r i a l in t h i sac t ion i s scheduled to commence on January 24, 2010.

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DISCUSSION

I . Standard fo r Summary JudgmentUnder Rule 56(c) (2) o r the Federa l Rules of c i v i l Procedure,

a motion fo r summary judgment should be granted " i f the p leadingsthe discovery and d isc losu re mate r i a l s on f i l e , and any a f f idav i t sshow t ha t there i s no genuine i s sue as to any mate r i a l f ac t andt ha t the movant i s en t i t l ed to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R. Civ. P. 56 (c) (2) ; see a lso317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 53 (1986) i Shannon v. N.Y. CityTrans i t Auth. , 332 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir . 2003). The burden ofdemonstra t ing the absence of any genuine d ispu te as to mate r i a lfac t s r e s t s upon the par ty seeking summary judgment. Adickesv. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 1 5 7 , 9 0 S. Ct. 1598, 1608(1970) i weinstock v. Columbia Univ. , 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir .2000). Once a proper ly suppor ted motion fo r summary judgment hasbeen submit ted, the burden s h i f t s to the non-moving par ty to makea su f f i c i en t showing to es tab l i sh the e s s e n t i a l elements of thecla ims on which it bears the burden of proof a t t r i a l . See Hayutv. Sta te Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 743 (2d Cir . 2003) i Peck v.Pub. Servo Mut. Ins . Co., 326 F.3d 330, 337 (2d Cir . 2003) ( c i t ingCelotex , 477 U.S. a t 323, 106 S. Ct. a t 2553) .

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In assess ing the record to determine whether there i s agenuine i s sue to be t r i ed as to any mater ia l fac t , courts arerequired to resolve a l l ambigui t ies and draw a l l permiss ib lefac tual inferences in favor of the par ty agains t whom summaryjudgment i s sought . See Anderson v. Liber ty Lobby, Inc . , 477 U.S.242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986) i McClellan v . Smith, 439F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir . 2006). However, the non-moving par ty mustput for th "speci f i c fac t s showing a genuine i ssue for t r i a l . " Fed.R. c iv . P. 56 (e) (2) . A summary judgment "opponent must do morethan simply show t ha t there i s some metaphysical doubt as to themater ia l fac t s . " Matsushi ta Elec. Indus. Co" Ltd, v. Zeni th RadioCorp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). Thenon-moving par ty may not re ly on i t s pleadings , mere a l lega t ions ,simple den ia l s , conclusory s ta tements , o r conjecture to crea te agenuine i s sue fo r t r i a l . See Anderson, 477 U.S. a t 256 57, 106 S.Ct. a t 2514; Guilber t v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir . 2007).Moreover, "[ t ] he 'mere exis tence of a s c i n t i l l a of evidence 1support ing the non-movant 's case i s . . i n su f f i c i en t to defeatsummary judgment. Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chem. Inc . ,315 F.3d 171, 175 (2 d Cir . 2003) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. a t252, 106 S. Ct. 2505).

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I . Stored Communications Act

The SCA provides t ha t "whoever i n t e n t iona l ly accesses withoutau thor iza t ion a f a c i l i t y through which an e t ron ic communicationse rv ice i s provided; or i n t e n t iona l ly exceeds an au th o r i za t i o n toaccess t h a t f a c i l i t y ; and thereby obta ins ... access to a wire o re lec t ron ic communication while it i s i n e l ec t ron ic s to rage in suchsystem s ha l l be punished . " See 18 U.S.C. 2701(a) . The SCAa l so c rea tes a c i v i l cause of ac t ion , a l lowing any person who i sthe vict im of a v i o l a t i o n of the SCA to seek damages from th ev io l a to r . 18 U.S.C. 2707(a) . The Court may assess asdamages "the sum of the ac tu a l damages su f fe red by th e p la in t i f fand any p r o f i t s made by the v io l a to r as a r e s u l t of the v io la t ion ,but in no case s ha l l a person en t i t l ed to recover rece ive l e ss thanthe sum of $1,000." 18 U.S.C. 2707(c) . Other appropr i a t e r e l i e fmay include a t to rne y ' s fees and l i t i g a t i o n cos t s and, \\ [iJ f thev i o l a t i o n was w i l l f u l o r i n t en t iona l , th e cour t may assess puni t ivedamages." 18 U.S.C. 2707(b) (3) ; 18 U.S.C. 2707(c) .

This Court prev ious ly held in i t s Prec lus ion Decis ion t ha t theaccess ing of Defendants ' Hotmail , Gmail, and WFBC accounts , donewithout au thor iza t ion , wa s a v io l a t i on of th e SCA.Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d a t 556. Because there were no SCAcla ims in th e case a t th e t ime, in the context of supervis ingp r e t r i a l discovery , the Court only concluded t ha t Defendants were

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en t i t l ed to an orde r prec luding the use of the e m a i l s . T h i s Courtfu r the r concluded t h a t the add i t iona l emails obta ined by Pla in t i f f swi thout au thor iza t ion would be t r ea ted in the same manner.Defendants now move fo r summary judgment on t h e i r SCA counte rc la im,arguing t h a t the Cour t ' s f inding t ha t Pla in t i f f s v io la t ed the SCAi s now the law of the case . Pla in t i f f s oppose Defendants ' motionby arguing t h a t Brenner never , in fac t , accessed the emai l accountsin ques t ion , nor did she i n s t ruc t anyone e l se to access theaccounts on her beha l f . (See P I s . ' Reply Mem. a t 16. ) Becauseth i s Court has a l ready determined t h a t the SCA has been v io la ted ,t ha t i s the law of the case . However, the re remains a mater ia lques t ion of fac t s u f f i c i e n t to de fea t a motion fo r summaryjudgment, as to who among the Pla in t i f f s and Third-Par ty Defendantsaccessed Defendants ' emai l accounts and, in doing so , v io la t ed theSCA.A. Law of the Case

"As most commonly def ined , the doc t r ine [of law of the case]pos i t s t ha t when a cour t decides upon a ru le of law, t h a t dec is ionshould genera l ly cont inue to govern the same i s sues in subsequents tages in the same case ." S Arizona v. Cal i fo rn ia , 46 0 U.S. 605,

5 A Repor t and Recommendation prepared by a magis t ra te judgeand adopted by a d i s t r i c t judge, c ons t i t u t e s the law of the casefo r a l l i s sues addressed in the repor t . See, e . g . , Bey v.I .B.B.W. Local Union N o . 3 , No. 05 Civ. 7910 (JSR) (MHD), 2009 WL

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618, 103 S. Ct. 1382, 1391 (1983). The pr imary grounds j u s t i f y ingrecons idera t ion of a prev ious decis ion are "an in te rvening changeof con t ro l l ing law, the a v a i l a b i l i t y of new evidence , o r the needto co r rec t a c l e a r e r r o r o r preven t mani fes t i n j us t i ce . 11 SeeAtlan t ic Airways, Ltd. v. N a t ' l Mediat ion Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255(2d Cir . 1992) (quoting 18 C. Wright , A. Mil le r & E. Cooper,Federa l Prac t ice & Procedure 4478, a t 790 (1981)) . "Appl icat ionof the law of the case doctr ine i s d i sc re t ionary and does not l im i ta cour t ' s power to recons ide r i t s own dec i s ions p r i o r to judgment. IIAramony v. United Way of America, 254 F.3d 403, 410 (2d Cir . 2001) iRSL Communications, PLC v , Bi l d i rc i , 649 F. Supp. 2d 184, 204(S.D.N.Y. 2009).

For purposes of applying the law of the case doc t r ine , cour t shave long recognized the d i s t i nc t i on between pre-discovery motions,based on an undeveloped record , and pos t -d i scovery motions fo rsummary judgment. See, e .g . , DiLaura v. Power Authori ty , 982 F.2d73, 76-77 (2d Cir . 1992) ( f indings made by a cour t fo r the purposeof in junc t ive r e l i e f are not the law of the case fo r subsequentl i t i g a t i o n on the meri t s ) i C i a l i t Health Servo V. I s r a e lHumanitarian Found. , 385 F. Supp. 2d 3 9 2 , 3 9 8 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.

73113, a t *1. (S.D.N.Y. Jan . 7, 2009) i Yash Raj Films (USA), Inc .v. Bobby Music Co. & Sport ing Goods. Inc . , No. 01 CV 8378(JFB) (CLB) , 2006 WL 2853874, a t *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept . 29, 2006).

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2005) (p re-d i scovery de te rmina t ion on a motion to dismiss not thelaw of the case fo r purposes of summary judgment) i Colonial TanningCorp. v. Home Indem. Co., 780 F. Supp. 9 0 6 , 9 1 1 -1 2 , (N.D.N.Y.1991) (pr ior ru l ing in context of a discovery dispute d id note s t a b l i s h law of th e case with r espec t to unre la ted i s sues whichcour t had merely assumed fo r purposes of address ing the disputes ,but which were not c r i t i c a l fo r re so lu t ion of the dispute ) .

Here, the par t i e s concede t ha t the Prec lus ion Decisioncons t i tu te s the law o f the case , bu t disagree as to whether theCourt should r e v i s i t i t s previous decis ion in l i g h t of what thePla in t i f f s descr as "newly discovered evidence" suppor t ing t he i rcontent ions . (See e .g . , Counterc Defendants ' Response toCounterclaim P la in t i f f s ' Rule 56.1 Statement , dated November 1,2010, 7) ("Admitted t ha t the Cour t ' s [Preclusion Decision]cons t i tu te s the law of the case, but denied t ha t the Court may notrecons ider t h i s ru l ing given the evidence adduced during discoverya f t e r the Cour t ' s ru l ing . " ) Pla in t i f f s contend t ha t , subsequent tothe Prec lus ion Decision, the discovery process revea led t ha tBrenner d id not , i n fac t 1 personal ly access Defendants ' emai laccounts , nor d id she i n s t ruc t anyone to access the emai l accountson her behalf . (See P I s . ' Reply Mem. a t 15. )

The Cour t ' s Prec lus ion Decision was de l ive red a t an ea r lys tage in the l i t i g a t i o n , well in advance of the complet ion of fac t

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discovery, and p r i o r to Brenner ' s depos i t i on . Indeed, a t the t imethe Court decided the d i scovery i s sues t h a t were the sub jec t of thedec i s ion , Defendants had ye t to br ing a counterclaim aga ins tP l a i n t i f f s a l leg ing t ha t they had v io la t ed the SCA and ECPA. Whileit i s t rue t ha t the Cour t found t ha t a v io l a t i on of the SCA hadoccurred , and based i t s dec i s ion to prec lude the use of Defendants 'emai ls in th i s l i t i g a t i o n on t h a t f inding, it was not c r i t i c a l tothe Cour t ' s dec i s ion t ha t Brenner was necessa r i ly the par ty whod i r e c t ly accessed Defendants ' emai l accoun ts . Never the less , a t thet ime of th e Prec lus ion Decis ion . Brenner d id no t di spu te t ha t shehad done so .

To the ex ten t t ha t the Cour t found in th e Prec lus ion Decis iont h a t Brenner pe rsona l ly v io la t ed th e SCA, it d id so pre l iminar i ly .in the context of deciding a discovery sanc t ion i s sue , not on th ebas i s of the subs tan t ive SCA claims t h a t a re presen t ly before theCourt . And, the f inding was made before there was an oppor tuni tyfo r p r e t r i a l discovery . Accordingly , t ha t f inding was not case-d i spos i t ive with r espec t to Brenner ' s l i a b i l i t y under th e SCA, andt ha t task remains fo r the ju ry . Accordingly , Defendants ' motionfo r p a r t i a l summary judgment on t h i s i s sue i s den ied .B. Damages Under the Stored Communications Act

P l a i n t i f f s argue t h a t Defendants claim only s t a tu to ry damagesunder the SCA, and t h a t they have fa i led to a l l ege o r of f e r any

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evidence of ac tua l damages. (See PIs . ' Mem. a t 3 .) Thus, theycontend tha t , in the absence of ac tua l damages, Defendants a re noten t i t l ed to s ta tu to ry damages. Defendants respond t ha t they havesuffered ac tua l damages as a consequence of Pl a i n t i f f s ' vio la t ionsof the SCA, and t h a t they have proper ly a l leged those damages int he i r Counterclaim. (See Counterclaim Pl a i n t i f f s ' Memorandum of Lawin Opposi t ion to Motion fo r Par t i a l Summary Judgment ("Defs. 'Mem." ) , a t 11 . ) In any event , Defendants argue, they are notrequired to prove ac tua l damages in order to secure s t a tu to rydamages.

The Court concludes t ha t Defendants a re estopped fromasser t ing t ha t they have suf fe red ac tua l damages.

i . waiver of Actual Damages"Where a par ty assumes a ce r t a in pos i t ion in a l ega l

proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining t ha t pos i t ion , he may notthe reaf te r , simply because h is i n t e r e s t s have changed, assume acontrary pos i t i on , espec ia l ly i f it be to the pre judice of thepar ty who has acquiesced in the pos i t ion formerly taken by him."New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749, 121 S. Ct. 1808, 1814(2001) (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689, 15 S. Ct. 555,558 (1895) ) . A par ty may be estopped from pursuing a claim where:"1 ) the par ty to be estopped makes a misrepresenta t ion of fac t tothe othe r par ty with reason to bel ieve t ha t the other par ty wil l

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re ly upon i t ; 2) and the o ther par ty reasonably r e l i e s upon i t ; 3)to he r det r iment ." Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assoc. , 274F.3d 706, 725 (2 d Cir . 2001). "Equi table es toppel i s proper lyinvoked where th e enforcement of the r i gh t s of one party would workan i n jus t i c e upon the o ther pa r ty due to the l a t t e r ' s j u s t i f i ab l ere l iance upon the former ' s words o r conduct . II Apollo TheaterFound., Inc. v. W. I n t ' l Syndicat ion, No. 02 Civ. 10037 (DLC) , 2005WL 1041141, a t *17 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2005).

During h is depos i t ion , Fel l was asked by P la in t i f f s ' counselto descr ibe what damages he had su f fe red as a r e s u l t of the SCA andECPA vio la t ions . Deposi t ion of Alex Fe l l , dated Aug. 26, 2009("Fe l l Dep.") , at tached a t Ex. C to Decl. of Matthew Sheppe, datedSept . 24, 2010, a t 263.) On the advice of counsel , Fe l l re fused toanswer, cla iming a t torney-c l ien t pr iv i lege . (See a t 264.)P l a i n t i f f s ' counsel sought to compel Fel l t o answer, and thepa r t sought a ru l ing from the Court on the i s sue . (See id . a t265.) The Court sought c la r i f i ca t ion from Defendants as to whetherthey cla imed s t a tu to ry or ac tua l damages. Defendants ' counselconfirmed t ha t Defendants were "cla iming s t a tu to ry damages."

id . a t 268.) Th e Court found, on the bas i s of Defendants 'representa t ion t ha t they sought only s t a t u t o ry and pun i t ivedamages, t ha t Fel l had no r e levan t in format ion to convey aboutac tua l damages, and, accordingly , t ha t he d id not have to respond

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to the ques t ion . (See id . ) P la in t i f f s ' counsel immediately soughtto C fy whether the Cour t ' s f inding was pred ica ted onDefendants ' claim t ha t t he i r damages were l imi ted to s ta tu torydamages. The Court asked Defendants ' at torney d i rec t l yi f Defendants were "only cla iming s t a tu to ry damages," to which herep l i ed "my counte rc la im only cla ims s t a tu to ry damages. I read itto you verbat im I don' t see anyth ing in here t h a t ' spersonal damages per se ." a t 2 6 9 - 7 0 . ) On t ha t bas i s ,P l a i n t i f f s ' counsel agreed t ha t ques t ions on the i s sue of ac tua ldamages no longer needed to be pursued. (See a t 2 7 0 . )

Having represented to i f f s and to th e Court t ha t theyclaimed only s t a tu to ry damages,6 and having objected to producingdiscovery on actual damages, which the Court sus ta ined on the bas i s

Defendants ' r ep resen ta t ions t ha t they were only seekings ta tu tory damages, Defendants cannot now, on the eve of t r i a l ,change course and argue t ha t they have, in fac t , suffered ac tua ldamages. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (2) (A) ("If a p a r t y . fa i l sto obey an orde r to provide o r permi t discovery . the cour tIwhere the act ion i s pending may i s sue fu r the r j u s t order s . They

6 Defendants argue t ha t the depos i t ion ques t ion was d i rec tedto Fe l l in h is ind iv idua l capaci ty . ( Defs . ' Mem. a t 12.)However, it i s c l e a r from a review of the depos i t ion t r ansc r i p tt ha t Defendants represented t ha t the sought onlys ta tu tory damages. Fel l Dep. a t 269 70 . )

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may inc lude the fol lowing: . ( i i ) proh ib i t ing the d isobedientpar ty from support ing or opposing des igna ted cla ims . or fromin t roduc ing des igna ted mat te rs in evidence") i Fed. R. Civ. P.37 (c) (1) ("If a par ty Is to provide informat ion . . as requiredby Rule 26 (a) or (e) , the par ty i s not al lowed to use t ha tinformat ion to supply evidence a t a t r i a l " ) .Defendants ' representa t ion tha t they were not c la iming actualdamages, and t h e i r fa i lu re to i t emize and produce in p re t r i a ldiscovery evidence of ac tua l damages, bars Defendants from cla imingt ha t they are en t i t l ed to actual damages.

In any event , Defendants have provided no competent evidenceof ac tua l damages on which a ju ry could make such an award.Conclusory a l l ega t ions t ha t Defendants have su f fe red harm, withoutmore, do not create a genuine i s sue of mater ia l fac t su f f i c i en t tosurvive a motion fo r summary judgment.

11. Sta tu to ry DamagesPla in t i f f s contend t ha t because Defendants have not suffered

actual damages, they are not en t i t l ed to s t a tu to ry damages underthe SCA, and t ha t , accord ingly , Pla in t i f f s are en t i t l ed to summaryjudgment on Defendants ' SCA cla im. (See P l s . ' Mem. a t 12.)Defendants respond t ha t ac tua l damages are not necessary in orde rto recover s t a tu to ry damages under the SCA. (Defs . ' Mem. a t 6,1 0 . )

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In support of t h e i r argument t ha t s t a tu to ry damages under theSCA are recoverab le only when a par ty has su f fe red ac tua l damages,Pla in t i f f s c i t e to the only f edera l appe l l a t e decis ion to haveexamined i s sue in depth. See Van Alstyne v. Elec . Scriptor ium ,

560 F. 3 d 199, 204 - 06 ( 4 h C r . 2009). Following a juryverd ic t , the d i s t c t cour t in Van Alstyne awarded th e p la in t i f fdamages which cons is ted so le ly of s t a tu to ry damages, puni t ivedamages, and a t to rne y ' s fees . Th e Fourth Circu i t reversed andremanded, holding t ha t s t a tu to ry damages under the SCA are onlyrecoverab le where a p la in t i f f has a l so su f fe red ac tua l damages.The Van Alstyne cour t r e l i ed on Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 124 S.C t. 1204 (2004) , where the Supreme Court held tha t s ta tu torydamages under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, e t seq . , are notrecoverab le absen t ac tua l damages. The Van Alstyne cour t reasonedtha t the re levant provis ions of the SCA and the Privacy Act weree s s e n t i a l l y i de n t i c a l and, accord ing ly , t ha t a s t ra ightforwardt ex tua l ana lys i s of the SCA mandated the same r e s u l t as t ha treached by the Supreme Court in Doe.

However, as recognized by the maj ty of f edera l cour ts tohave examined t h i s i s sue subsequent to the Doe decis ion , thePrivacy Act and the SCA are d i f fe ren t s t a t u t e s , with d i f f e r e n tpurposes, and they penal ize d i f fe ren t behavior . See Ie . g. ,Freedman v. Town of Fa i r f i e ld , N o . 3 : 03CV01048 (PCD) , 2006 WL

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2684347, a t * 3 (D. Conn. Sept . 19, 2006) ("Doe i s dubious au thor i tyfo r the propos i t ion t ha t Sect ion 2707 (c) does not mean what itprov ides , recovery of 'minimum s t a tu to ry damages of $1,000. 'ff); Inre Hawaiian A i r l i n e s , Inc . v. Konop, 355 B.R. 225, 230 (D. Haw.2006) ("Notwi ths tanding the s imi la r language found in the tw os t a tu t e s , the o v e r a l l s t ruc tu re o f the [SCA] and i t s l eg i s l a t i veh i s to ry d i f f e r from the Privacy Act such t ha t the hold ing in [Doe]i s not d i r e c t ly appl icable to th e [SCA] ff ) ; Cedar Hi l l Assocs . ,Inc . v. Paget , No. 04 C 0557, 2005 WL 3430562, a t *3 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 9, 2005) (c i t ing to the l eg i s l a t i ve h i s t o ry of the SCA indetermining t h a t Doe i s i napp l i cab le to the SCA) .

Indeed, the p la in t i f f in Doe, who hoped to recover s ta tu torydamages desp i te h i s f a i l u r e to a l l eg e ac tua l damages, c i ted toSect ion 2703(c) of the SCA as evidence t h a t Congress does indeedpermi t the award of t rue l i qu ida ted damages remedies . See Doe, 540u.S. a t 626, 12 4 S. Ct. a t 1212. When provided with theoppor tun i ty to confirm t h a t the language in Sect ion 2707(c) of theSCA, t h a t i s i d e n t i c a l to t h a t of the Privacy Act, also proh ib i t sthe recovery of s ta tu tory damages in the absence of ac tua l damages,the Supreme Court major i ty chose in s tead to r e j e c t the h i s to ry ofthe Stored Communications Act as not r e levan t , d i s t ingu ish ing theSCA as a "comple te ly sepa ra t e s t a t u t e [] passed well a f t e r thePrivacy Act. ff The d i ssen t in Doe went even fu r ther ,

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exp l i c i t l y c i t i ng to Sect ion 2707(c) as one of severa l s t a t u t e st ha t "have been unders tood to permit recovery of the $1,000s ta tu tory minimum desp i te the absence of proven ac tua l damages./I

id . a t 639-640, 124 S. Ct. a t 1219-20 (Ginsburg, J . ,dissent ing) .

Thus, Defendants need not a l l ege ac tua l damages when a p la inreading of the s t a t u t e , and the l eg i s l a t i ve his tory as soc ia ted withthe s t a t u t e , make it c l e a r t ha t Congress in tended tha t damagesunder sect ion 2707(c) be a t l e a s t $1,000 per v io l a t i on . See H.R.Rep. No. 99-647, p. 74 (1986}("[d]amages [under 18 U.S.C. 2707(c)] include ac tua l damages, any l o s t pro f i t s but in no casel e ss than $I,OOO"}; see also Hawaiian Air l ines , 355 B.R. a t 231;Cedar Hi l l Assocs . , 2005 WL 3430562, a t *3. Defendants areaccordingly en t i t l ed to the s t a tu to ry minimum of $1,000 p ervio la t ion of the s t a t u t e , whether o r not they have su f fe red ac tua ldamages.

iii. Number of Viola t ions of the Stored Communications ActPla in t i f f s argue t ha t any vio la t ion o f the SCA should be

measured on a per-account bas i s or , in the a l t e rna t i ve , on a per-day bas i s . (See P I s . ' Mem. a t 18.) Defendants contend tha t ,because Pla in t i f f s accessed 546 separate e lec t ronic communicationswhile in s torage on the e lec t ron ic communication providers '

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systems, Pla in t i f f s committed 546 independent v io la t ions of theSCA. Defs . ' Mem. a t 19.}

The SCA i t s e l f provides litt guidance as to whether thes t a tu to ry minimum should be awarded fo r each v io la t ion , s ta t ingonly t ha t " in no case s ha l l a person en t i t l ed to recover rece ivel e s s than the sum of $1,000." 18 U.S.C. 2707 (c) . There i ss imi la r ly little case law and no l eg i s l a t i ve his tory to shed l i g h ton whether the minimum s t a tu to ry award should be mult ip l ied by thenumber of v io la t ions or , for t ha t mat te r , what dis t inguishesd i s t inc t and independent v io la t ions of th e s t a t u t e from a s ing le ,cont inuous v io l a t i on . However, the SCA i s c l e a r as to whatcons t i tu te s a vio la t ion of the Act. The SCA provides punishmentfo r anyone who \I i n t e n t iona l ly accesses without author iza t ion afac i l i ty through which an e lec t ron ic communication se rv ice i sprovided and the reby obta ins access to a wire or

[[e lec t ron ic communication while it i s in e lec t ronic s torage .See 18 U.S.C. 2701(a) . (emphasis added) .

Clear ly , each accessed email cannot c ons t i t u t e a separatevio la t ion of the Act, as the SCA spec i f i ca l l y t a rge t s theunauthorized access of an e lec t ron ic communication f a c i l i t y . Theaccess of the s tored communication i s a necessary element of thev io la t ion , not an independent vio la t ion unto i t s e l f . Defendantsargue t ha t the Prec lus ion Decis ion al ready es tab l i shes tha t "a

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person vio la te s the SCA i f she accesses an e t ron ic communicationserv ice or obta ins an e lec t ronic communication while it i s still ine lec t ron ic s torage, without au thor i za t ion . " Pure Power Boot Camp,587 F. Supp. 2d a t 555 (emphasis in or ig ina l ) . However, in thePreclusion Decision, the Court d id not purpor t to decide the numberof t imes the SCA was vio la ted , only t ha t someone did fac tvio la te the SCA. Pla in t i f f s would have vio la ted the SCA byaccessing an e lec t ronic communications f ac i l i t y and secur ing as ingle emai l in e lec t ronic s torage, but it does not follow tha teach email accessed in the f a c i l i t y c ons t i t u t e s an independentvio la t ion of the SCA.

Pla in t i f f s re ly on the cour t ' s analys is in HawaiianAirl ines in support of the propos i t ion t ha t where an account i saccessed mult ip le t imes in short success ion, it would l ike lycons t i tu te only a s ingle vio la t ion of the seA. See HawaiianAir l ines , 355 B.R. a t 232 (holding t ha t it might be appropr ia te toaggregate i n t rus ions t ha t funct ional ly c ons t i t u t e a s ingle v i s i t ) .Similar ly , "vio la t ions t ha t were s i gn i f i can t l y separated in t imeand t ha t accessed d i f fe ren t informat ion would c lear ly c ons t i t u t eseparate vio la t ions of the Act en t i t l ed to separate s ta tu toryawards. " See

The Hawaiian Air l ines cour t had al ready considered, andul t imate ly ec ted , the idea t ha t Congress in tended the

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Here, there lS no evidence in the record to sugges t t ha tP l a i n t i f f s did , o r were able to , ga in access to Defendants ' emai laccounts outs ide of the day per iod from Apr i l 28, 2008 to May6, 2008. Moreover, the re i s no evidence ind ica t ing the number oft imes Defendants ' emai l f ac i l i t i e s were accessed over th e nine-dayper iod . A review of the emails accessed by Pla in t i f f s i nd ica testha t the vas t major i ty of them are dated p r i o r to Apr i l 28, 2010,and so would have been ava i l ab le to Pla in t i f f s upon t h e i r f i r s tin t rus those emai1s obta ined from P l a i n t i f f s ' subsequenti n t rus ions would have been smal l in number r e l a t i ve to the numberof emails t ha t Pla in t i f f s had a l ready accessed . 546 Emai ls ,a t tached as Ex. D to Schnapp Oct. 15 Decl .) Nor i s the re anya l l ega t ion tha t the emails were accessed by any means o ther thanthrough th e use of misappropr ia ted passwords. Accordingly, becausethe per iod over which Defendants ' emai ls were accessed wasr e l a t i ve l y shor t , and because there i s no evidence ind ica t ing thenumber of t imes each account was accessed, the Court concludes t ha tit i s appropr ia te to aggregate the i n t rus ions with respect to eachindiv idual account and f ind t ha t the re have been four independentv io la t ions of th e SCA one v io l a t i on fo r each unauthorized access

s ta tu tory minimum of $1,000 to be a t o t a l sum award regardless ofthe number of i n t rus ions in v io l a t i on of th e SCA. See HawaiianAir l ines , 355 B.R. a t 232.

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of an e lec t ron ic communications f a c i l i t y , which al lowed access toe lec t ron ic communications while still i n e l ec t ron ic s to rage .C. Puni t ive Damages

Defendants seek puni t ive damages fo r P l a i n t i f f s ' v io la t ions ofthe SCA. Defs . ' Mem. a t 13. ) p l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t ,because they have a l ready been sanc t ioned fo r t h e i r conduct, therei s no bas i s pun i t ive damages. P I s . ' Mem. a t 15 16.)P la in t i f f ' s o catalogue a range of Defendants ' behavior which,Pl a i n t i f f s argue, should b ar Defendants from recover ing pun i t ivedamages under the Dclean hands" doc t r ine . (See id . a t 16 17.)

The SCA provides t ha t in the case of Dwil l fu l or in ten t iona l"v io la t ions , the cour t may asse ss pun i t ive damages." 18 U.S.C. 2707 (c ) i Wyatt Tech. Corp. v. Smithson, No. CV 05-1309(DT) , 2006 WL 5668246, a t *11-12 (C.D. Cal . Aug. 14, 2006) (awardingpuni t ive damages to a coun ter c la imant under the SCA, because thep la in t i f f accessed the de fendan t ' s pe rsona l emai l on a pr iva tefore ign se rve r , monitored th e persona l email , and d id not obta inthe de fendan t ' s au th o r i za t i o n t o do so ) , r e v ' d on o th e r grounds,34 5 F. App 'x 2 3 6 ( 9 h C r . 2 0 0 9) . However, because the Court i sunable to determine as a mat te r of law which par ty accessedDefendants ' emai l accounts , and the surrounding c i rcumstances ,t he re i s no bas i s upon which to decide whether pun i t ive damages areappropr ia te as a mat te r of law.

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D. Costs and Attorneys ' FeesDefendants seek to recover cos t s and a t to rneys ' fees . (See

Defs . ' Mem. a t 16.) Sect ion 2707 (c) of the SCA provides t h a t " [ i] nthe case of a success fu l ac t ion to enforce l i a b i l i t y under t h i ssect ion , th e Court may assess th e cos t s of the ac t ion , t oge the rwith reasonable a t to rney fees determined by th e cour t . " See 18U.S.C. 2707 ( c ) ; 2 0 0 6 WL 5 6 6 8 2 4 6 , a t *12(awarding a t to rneys ' fees for v io ions of the SCA). However,even i f the Cour t were inc l ined to award cos t s and a t t o r n ey s ' fees ,it could not do so on the b as i s of the presen t motion. Defendantsmust f i r s t e s t a b l i s h which par ty o r p a r t i e s v io la t ed the s t a t u t e ,and the cos ts and fees incurred in l i t i g a t i n g the i s sue .Defendants have submi t ted no evidence i nd ica t ing th e ex ten t oft h e i r cos ts and fees , and it w i l l be up to the ju ry to determinewho among the P l a i n t i f f s and Third Par ty Defendants v io la t ed th eSCA. Accordingly , Defendants ' motion fo r summary judgment on cos t sand a t t o r n ey s ' fees i s denied.

* * *

To sum up, the Cour t i s unable to determine, as a mat te r oflaw, which of the ie s named in Defendan ts ' counterclaim i srespons ib le fo r th e v io la t ions o f the SCA su f fe red by Defendants .As Defendants have moved fo r summary judgment only with respect toP l a i n t i f f s , and no t the Thi rd-Par ty Defendants named Defendants '

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counterc la ims, Defendants ' motion fo r p a r t summary judgmentaga ins t Pla in t i f f s must be denied. The Court f inds , however, t ha tfour vio la t ions of the SCA were committed, and t ha t the appropr ia teaward fo r each vio la t ion i s $1,000, fo r a t o t a l of $4,000. TheCourt fu r the r f inds t ha t Defendants are estopped from al leg ingac tua l damages and, accordingly, P la in t i f f s ' motion for pa r tsummary judgment with r espec t t o ac tua l damages i s granted .

ly , because the Court i s presen t ly unable to determine whichof the par t i e s named in Defendants ' counterc la im i s l i ab l e fo r thefour vio la t ions of the SCA, the determination of pun i t ive damages,costs , and a t to rneys ' fees i s premature.I I . The Electron ic Communications Privacy Act

The ECPA provides fo r cr iminal sanct ions and a c i v i l cause ofact ion aga ins t persons who \\ in tercept" e lec t ronic communicat ions. 8The s t a t u t e def ines an " in tercept" as the "aural or otheracqu i s i t ion of the contents of any wire, e lec t ronic , o r ora lcommunication through the use of any e lec t ronic , mechanical, or

8 18 U.S.C.A. 2515 provides ;Whenever any wire o r ora l communication has beenin tercepted , no pa r t of the contents of such communicationand no evidence der ived therefrom may be receivedevidence any t r i a l , hear ing , or o ther proceeding o rbefore any cour t , grand jury , depar tment , of f i ce r , agency,regula tory body, l eg i s l a t i ve committee, or o ther author i tyof the United Sta tes , a Sta te , o r a p o l i t i c a l subdivis ionthereof i f the d isc losure of t ha t information would be invio la t ion of t h i s chapter .

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o ther device ." 18 U.S.C. 2510(4). Vir tua l ly every f edera lappe l la te cour t to have considered th e i s sue has held tha t an" in te rcep t" under the ECPA must occur s imul taneously witht ransmiss ion . Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Ins . Co., 352 F.3d107, 113 (3d Cir . 2004) (co l lec t ing cases ) . The reasoning behindthese dec is ions i s based on the d i s t i nc t i on in the s ta tu torydef t i ons of "wire communication" and "e lec t ron ic communication, IIthe l a t t e r of which does not include e lec t ron ic s torage. SeeUnited States v. Ste ige r , 31 8 F.3d 1039, 1048 (11 th Cir . 2003) iBailey v. Bai ley , No. 07 11672, 2008 WL 324156, *4 (E.D. Mich.2008). This d i f fe rence in de f in i t i on " indica tes Congress ' i n t e n ttha t one could ' i n t e rcep t ' a wire communication in s torage, butcould not ' i n t e rcep t ' a s imi la r ly s i tua ted e lec t ron iccommunication. II See Ste iger , 318 F.3d a t 1048 (c i t ing SteveJackson Garnes, Inc. v. United Sta tes Secre t Service , 36 F.3d 457(5 th Cir . 1994)) .

This Court , applying the de f in i t i on of " in tercept" accepted bymost cour ts t ha t have examined the i s sue , concluded in thePrec lus ion Order t ha t Brenner d id no t v io l a t e the ECPA. See PurePower Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d a t 557 58. P l a i n t i f f s argue,

9 Th e USA Pa t r io t Act 209, Pub. L. No. 107 56, 209 (1) (A) 115 St a t . 272, 283 (2001) , amended the de f in i t i on of"wire communication" to e l iminate e lec t ron ic s torage from thede f in i t i on of wire communication.

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under the doctr ine of law of the case, t ha t t h i s Court shouldadhere to i t s or ig ina l ru l ing . Defendants argue t ha t , subsequentto th i s Cour t ' s Prec lus ion Order, Defendants discovered newevidence j u s t i f y ing the r econs idera t ion of the Cour t ' s previousru l ing . Spec i f i ca l ly , Defendants contend t ha t Brenner ' s depos i t ionrevea led t ha t "Defendants ' emails were s to len contemporaneouslywith t h e i r t ransmiss ion on the day of the hear ing before the NewYork State Court . 1/ (See Defs . ' Mem. a t 19.) Defendants argue t ha tth i s newly discovered evidence warrants r econs idera t ion of theCour t ' s decis ion t ha t Pla in t i f f s d id not v io l a t e the ECPA. (Seeid . ) Pla in t i f f s again argue tha t Brenner never accessedDefendants ' emai ls .

Even accep t ing the s t ronges t fac tua l and l ega l arguments infavor of Defendants t ha t Brenner ' s admi t tedly confused depos i t iontes t imony sugges ts , Defendants cannot e s t a b l i s h a v io l a t i on of theECPA. Defendants essen t i a l l y make the same argument they made inthe previous motion before t h i s Court , when they contended t ha t"Brenner 's access to F e l l ' s emai l was 'contemporaneous ' i f itoccurred during some undef ined, shor t per iod of t ime a f t e r the e-mail had been de l ivered ." Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp.2d a t 557. Defendants did not then, nor do they now, of fe r anyau thor i ty in suppor t o f t ha t propos i t ion . Ins tead , they al legeonly t ha t Brenner, or her assoc ia t es , accessed and read emails

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rece ived by Defendants a t , or very near , the t ime the messagesar r ived in Defendants ' accounts . Simply put , Defendants argue theyhave discovered new evidence which they bel ieve suppor t s thea l l ega t ion t ha t the i n t e rva l between the de l ivery of the emai l toDefendants ' accounts , and the subsequent access by Pla in t i f f s , wasshor t e r than Defendants i n i t i a l l y be l i eved . (See Defs . ' Mem. a t1 9 - 2 0 . ) Defendants argue, so le ly on th e bas i s of t h i s inc reasedtemporal proximi ty , t ha t P l a i n t i f f s ' access of Defendants ' accountscan now be considered an access e lec t ronic communications"contemporaneous with t h e i r t ransmiss ion" and, accord ing ly , an" in tercept ion" in v io l a t i on o f the ECPA.

This Court found in the Prec lus ion Decision t ha t emai lmessages t ha t had a l ready been de l ivered to Defendants ' accountswere "previous ly s to red e lec t ron ic communicat ions. 1/ Pure PowerBoot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d a t 557. This Court went on to hold t ha tthere was no evidence t ha t the emails were in tercepted a t the samet ime they were t ransmit ted , and t ha t the evidence ind ica ted ins teadt ha t the emails were accessed a f t e r they had been de l ivered .id . The law of the case , and, as discussed, the law in thema jor i ty of the cour ts to have examined the i s sue , i s t ha te lec t ron ic communications cannot be in te rcep ted fo r purposes of theECPA a f t e r they have been de l ive red , a t which po in t they become"s tored communications" regula ted by the SCA. See Pure Power Boot

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Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d a t 557 58; Hal l v. Ear thLink Network, Inc . ,396 F.3d 500, 504 n . l . (2d Cir . 2005); Fraser , 352 F.3d a t 113-14;Ste iger , 318 F.3d a t 1048 49; Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d a t 46162; = = = = ~ , 2008 WL 324156, *4.

Because Pl a i n t i f fs d id not access Defendants ' e lec t ron iccommunications contemporaneously with t h e i r t ransmiss ion , they d idnot v io l a t e th e ECPA. Accordingly, P l a i n t i f f s motion fo r summaryjudgment with re spec t to Defendants ' ECPA cla im i s gran ted .

CONCLUSION

For the reasons s e t fo r th above, the Court gran t s in p a r tDefendants ' motion fo r p a r t i a l summary judgment, concluding t h a tthey have es t ab l i s h ed four v io la t ions of th e SCA and are en t i t l edto s t a t u t o ry damages in th e amount of $4,000, with the l i ab l e par tyto be determined a t t r i a l . The Court a l so gran t s P l a i n t i f f s 'motion fo r p a r t i a l summary judgment, concluding t ha t there has beenno v i o l a t i o n o f th e ECPA. In a l l o ther r espec t s , th e motions a redenied.

So ORDERED

THEODORE H. KATZUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated: December 22, 2010New York, New York33


pure power boot camp v. warrior fitness boot camp, 08-civ-4801 (s.d.n.y.; dec. 22, 2010)

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