putting the self in self-regulated learning: the self as
TRANSCRIPT
This article was downloaded by: [University of Birmingham]On: 09 January 2015, At: 09:24Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Educational PsychologistPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hedp20
Putting the Self in Self-Regulated Learning: The Self asAgent in Integrating Will and SkillBarbara L. McCombs & Robert J. MarzanoPublished online: 08 Jun 2010.
To cite this article: Barbara L. McCombs & Robert J. Marzano (1990) Putting the Self in Self-Regulated Learning: The Self asAgent in Integrating Will and Skill, Educational Psychologist, 25:1, 51-69, DOI: 10.1207/s15326985ep2501_5
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15326985ep2501_5
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of theContent. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable forany losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use ofthe Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST, Z(l), 5 1-69 Copyright o 1990, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Putting the Self in Self-Regulated Learning: The Self as Agent in
Integrating Will and Skill
Barbara L. McCombs and Robert J. Marzano Mid-continent Regional Educational Laboratory
As our knowledge of self-regulated learning increases, so does our understanding of its antecedents. Evidence is summarized within an integrative framework that highlights the importance of the self as agent to the initiation, development, and continuation of self-regulated learning processes and behaviors. Although a skill component can enhance self- regulation, it is not sufficient. Students' will or desire to engage in self-regulation is not only necessary, but primary. To generate the will for self-regulation, students must realize that they are creative agents, responsi- ble for and capable of achieving self-development and self-determination goals, and they must appreciate and understand their capabilities for reaching these goals. Self-regulation and the desire to enhance self-regulation capabilities then follows. An integration of skill and will is, therefore, necessary in interventions for promoting self-regulated learning. Implications for more holistic interventions are presented, along with further research that is needed on the self-as-agent framework.
During the past 10 years, considerable attention was focused on the phenomenon of self-regulated learning. As a result, much progress was made in (a) defining knowledge structures and processes that underlie students' abilities to be self-regulated learners and (b) recognizing the importance of both metacognitive and cognitive components. Along with this progress, however, there has been growing confusion about relation- ships between metacognitive, cognitive, affective, and motivational pro-
Requests for reprints should be sent to Barbara L. McCombs, Mid-continent Regional Educational Laboratory, 12500 East Iliff Avenue, Suite 201, Aurora, CO 80014.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
cesses. We believe this confusion is contributing to a limited paradigm for studying self-regulated learning and to a neglect of the critical role of the self as agent in (a) guiding the development of self-system structures and processes and (b) initiating and directing self-regulated learning. What is needed, from our perspective, is a focus on the self as generator of will and motivation to engage in self-regulatory learning processes and activities.
The purpose of this article, then, is to (a) clarify relationships between structures and processes found to be related to self-regulated learning and (b) explicate the role of the self as generator, or source, and the role of the cognitive system in relation to perception, affect, and behavior. The concept of metacognition plays a key role in understanding self as agent. Recognition of self as agent is essential to understanding how self- regulation occurs and to how it is orchestrated. We build on the work of McCombs (1989) who argued for the importance of the phenomenological perspective in helping us understand the primacy of self-phenomena, par- ticularly the "I" or volitional self, and for our recognition that self- regulation develops naturally with the development of the self. When self and cognitive system development are not bridged by metacognitive under- standing, self-system development is impaired. The consequence is a lack of the experience of volition and of self-efficacy, which inhibits self- regulation. Thus, interventions must bridge and link self and cognitive system functions. This bridge involves metacognitive awareness and under- standing as the path to helping students display the will and develop the skills for self-regulation.
In developing arguments for the self as agent in integrating will (under- standing and desire) and skill (ability), we begin with three definitions that are based on a body of research and theory. First, we define will as an innate, or "self-actualized" state of motivation, an internal self-generated desire resulting in an intentional choice that is (a) based on self-system awareness and values, (b) motivated by personal self-development and self-determination goals, and (c) integrally related to affect and mood. Second, we define skill in the domain of self-regulated learning as an acquired cognitive or metacognitive competency that develops with training and/or practice. And third, we define self-regulated learning as the outcome of choosing to engage in self-directed metacognitive, cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes and skills. Once initiated, will and self-regulated learning skills are reciprocally related, but will is primary in initiating self-regulation. Awareness, or a realization of self as agent, via the process of metacognition, produces self-efficacy and results in internal- ized goals for learning. This awareness also produces an experience of personal agency and competency. Skills are developed and used in support of these self-development goals; they are reciprocally influenced by self- beliefs, goals, and affective processes.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
THE SELF AS AGENT 53
NEED FOR FRAMEWORK THAT INTEGRATES WILL AND SKILL
Concept off Will and Self as Agent in Self-Regulation
For over 100 years, many psychologists and self-theorists have debated the extent to which one's creation of self-concept (and other associated self-belief systems) is primarily self-determined, determined by external social and environmental factors, or determined by the inherent nature of our human system and its operation. Although the dominant paradigm in psychology is skewed toward a deterministic perspective, there is a rich history and strong support for a phenomenological perspective (McCombs, 1989). For example, the work of James (1890) was largely based on this perspective, from which he identified a number of "I" processes, including awareness of one's (a) personal continuity over time, (b) distinctiveness from others, (c) agency over life events, and (d) volition.
Others also recognize the need for a different perspective in research and theorizing about the self. Kuhl(1986) argued that with the past 20 years of cognitive psychology, distinctions between emotional and cognitive pro- cesses have become blurred along with differences in information pro- cessing underlying these phenomena. Sorrentino and Higgins (1986) sug- gested a synergistic integration of cognition, motivation, affect, and behavior. Similarly, Hoffman (1986) contended that a paradigm shift that emphasizes motivational processes was needed.
Robinson (1987) further maintained that current psychological theories discount the importance of self-phenomena, particularly the explanatory value of "agency" in motivation and behavior. Authentic agency is said to be in operation to the extent that individuals self-select: and define those external influences that appear most nurturing of self. Howard (1986) also advocated am active agency model of self-creation through meaningful actions in pursuit of the agent's goals, plans, and intentions. In this view, human volition is a generative structure that is goal directed, purposeful, or teleological in nature-a structure that gives entities their causal force.
Also among those who have argued that the time has come to expand our understanding of human activity are Kihlstrom and Cantor (1984). They argued that we have treated the self as an object of knowledge and have had nothing to say about the self as knower. Identifying the self with the cognitive system is not defensible in that the self as knower is more than information processing. It monitors and controls the rest of the system and is the basis of our experience of phenomenal awareness and intentionality. In Kihlstrom and Cantor's view, the self responds to mental representations about self and situations in a process of reciprocal determinism. The self is
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
54 McCOMBS AND MARZANO
not quite a free agent. For Gergen (1984), agency can only be a real concept if it has autonomous organizing capacities. In Gergen's view, the term reciprocal interactionism better describes self-system operation than recip- rocal determinism.
In describing what a theory of self-determination can contribute to our understanding of self-regulated learning, Deci and Ryan (1986) posited that healthy self-regulation occurs when the self makes choices to initiate and regulate behavior in a self-determined fashion, based on an awareness of needs and/or feelings, and accompanied by the experience of choice. External regulation becomes self-determining autonomy to the extent that it becomes one's own and is done for one's own reasons. According to Deci and Ryan, transformation of external control to internal self-regulation is a natural process; self-determinism is a fundamental characteristic of the self.
Suarez, Mills, and Stewart (1987) more broadly argued that if we do not recognize the choice to selectively use our thought system, we operate unconsciously within the limits of that thought system. They stated, "Understanding, however, is a dimension that exists separate from the content of our biased thought system. This means that we cannot think our way to wisdom. . . . Understanding and insight involve seeing beyond our personal frame of reference" (p. 69). Thus, metacognitive understanding is not a process of intellectually constructing a schema that includes the role of self, but is an ongoing process of progressively deeper insights or realizations that, in turn, lead to an awareness, or conscious understanding, of self as agent. Out of this understanding, we see that the self as agent generates will through intentional choices that are guided by positive feelings or desires. Constructed self-knowledges and beliefs play a primary role in behavior only to the extent that we are not aware of our agential role in choosing how to view their influence.
A General Integrative Framework
First, we use the term selfsystem to refer to the person- as experienced by that person and represented as an organization of knowledge and pro- cesses - and the embodiment of structure and function. Second, we define the term selfas the dynamic director or overseer of information processing: . the formulator of intentions, the enactor of choices, and the generator of will or the desire to engage in skilled intellectual and behavioral activities. Third, with the self as central, the metacognitive, cognitive, and affective systems are more accurately described as subsystems operating in support of the self. They reside functionally under the control of the self as agent- under the control of the "I" - the experience of being and volitional agency.
We propose that within the self-system and each subsystem, knowledge relevant to that system has the potential of being stored in four functionally
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
TI-IE SELF AS AGENT 55
different categories: declarative, procedural, strategic, and teleologic knowledge. The first two categories are generally accepted by most current cognitive perspectives. The third category of strategic or conditional knowledge was introduced by Paris, Lipsom, and Wixson (1983) to differentiate higher level, metacognitive processes. The fourth category of teleologic knowledge, however, is one that can more fully describe and account for that aspect of human function that relates to individual purpose, meaning, and goals. Telelogic knowledge results in the realization of self as source. It results in true wisdom and understanding-in "know- ing" self. It is this category that we believe can account for willful, goal-directed actions of the "1"-the self as agent.
We further posit that the self as agent consciously or unconsciously directs, selects, and regulates the use of these knowledge structures in support of personal goals, intentions, and choices. A realization of self as agent auto- matically leads to self-determined purposefulness. The self as agent can be defined as a generative, uncontaminated consciousness that is, by nature, goal directed, purposeful, or teleological in nature. It is not reducible, however, to the structures and processes that, in part, give rise to the experience of being that also defines the "I" dimension of self. This self- as-agent aspect of self is more than the sum of its parts and more easily defined by what it is not than by what it is. We propose that the self-agent operates at a higher level of consciousness, with the capability of overseeing, regulating, and understanding the operation of the whole self-system. Within the hierarchical organization of the self and its supporting subsystems, the knowledge structures (declarative, procedural, strategic, and teleologic) are differentially organized and developed as a function of the selective pur- posefulness of processing activities and the self s dynamic role in choosing particular processing activities at any particular point in time.
Because the self as agent can also be thought of as consciousness that directs more unconscious processes, it represents the control system that oversees and regulates overall system and subsystem functioning. From this perspective, the self's level of functioning can be placed on a continuum from self-determination to external determination. Synergistically and intimately related to this continuum of functioning is the operation of the affective system, such that mood and emotion reciprocally influence self-functioning, respectively, on a positive to negative continuum. The degree to which one chooses to be self-determining is a function of one's realization of the source of agency and personal control. In this view, the self as agent defines one's psychological health and functioning (Suarez et al., 1987).
As we try to understand our human nature and behavior, we must broaden our perspective and investigate the whole self-system operation, including a deeper understanding of how the overall system impacts on the
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
supporting subsystems. This does not mean we ignore work within each subsystem. Without a holistic perspective, however, we may choose less fruitful paths of investigation and come to misleading conclusions. In fact, we agree with Cziko (1989) that our scientific perspective should not be about predicting and controlling. Rather, it should be about describing, interpreting, and explaining individual behavior and intellectual or psycho- logical processes relevant to educational phenomena. What we offer, then, is a broader perspective that places the self-system, its qualities and operation, at the center of the human system, with the "I" self-directing, creating, and controlling self-development to varying degrees. Figure 1 provides a graphic description of the organization of the self-system and its supporting subsystems.
The combined, integrative functioning of the whole system gives rise to perceptions of self, perceptions of others, and perceptions of physical reality (see Figure la). These perceptions are colored by one's sense of self, understanding of system operation, and self-development - particularly the development of one's self-as-agent concept. These resulting perceptions, in turn, influence the degree to which the self as agent consciously chooses to direct and regulate thoughts, feelings, and actions. The concept of self as agent, therefore, is central to an understanding of self-regulated learning.
Metacognitive, cognitive, and affective subsystems support self-system operation in a dynamic process of reciprocal interactionism (see Figure lb). Because the declarative, procedural, strategic, and teleologic knowledge structures dynamically influence the metacognitive, cognitive, and affective subsystems, the self-schema can directly influence the operation of these subsystems. The self-system's structure is distinguished from these sup- porting subsystem structures, however, in that its teleologic knowledge base lies closest to our concept of agency-who and what we are-dynamically organized and supported by differentially developed metacognitive and cognitive processes. Self-system organization of teleologic knowledge in conjunction with the functioning of the total system (person) gives rise to the experience of being, the concept of self as agent, and the ability of individuals to generate will through purposeful choices.
The metacognitive subsystem is a set of capabilities for higher or clearer awareness of self as agent (executive processes and knowledge) that support evidence for the "I" or agency. As this evidence is recognized, it contributes substantially to the development of the overalI system-and particularly, metacognitive capabilities for self-awareness and self-reflection and strate- gies for executive control, conscious planning, and self-regulation. Sup- porting the metacognitive subsystem and self-system are cognitive subsystem capabilities - specific built-in and developed cognitive processes that assist in planning and goal-directed activities. Finally, capabilities of the affective subsystem-emotional processes and knowledge triggered by
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
THE SELF AS AGENT 57
,.? : ..:
Perceptions of Reality!.:?
"I' (Self as Agent or Knower)
/----.. /.-- -...
',+ Reciprical, Dynamic
"Me' (Self as Known) Metacognitive
Cognitive
Affective
Knowledge Structures:
Interac
'. - - .,.' ._ . ---. :.' Strategic EEZ l Dedarative Teleologic Procedural
Fig. lb
FIGURE 1 General self-as-agent framework.
self-system generated perceptions of self, others, and situations - provide the emotional context and tone for energizing action in support of personal self-determination and self-development goals.
Affect, or emotion, in this paradigm acts as a signaling device to the self. The self as agent functions above, or outside of, the cognitive system. Within the cognitive system exist beliefs that make up self-concept, self-image, and conditional self-esteem (e.g., specific needs for approval,
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
58 McCOMBS AND MARZANO
dominance, achievement, etc.). Negative beliefs, at the level of cognitive structure, trigger, in turn, negative perceptions and emotions, resulting in both nonfunctional thinking and behavior.
Within this new paradigm, the self operates from a basis of unforced or self-actualized motivation: motivation that is intrinsic and does not include the importance of a "learned" or personal self-concept. The self, therefore, provides a foundation of unconditional well-being (i.e., a foundation for learning within the emotional context of innate enjoyment and satisfac- tion). This state of mind minimizes external stresses and allows for increased learning and motivation (cf. Suarez et al., 1987). In this respect, a student's affective experience of learning, or any other goal-oriented behavior, is a signal or measure of the degree to which he or she is functioning consciously from the level of self as agent, or from within a more limited state of awareness, that is, from within his or her learned cognitive system. The cognitive system, in the latter case, will generate stress and negative affect, due to the assignment of agency or cause to external circumstances or reinforcements (nonfunctional thinking).
A Real-Time Processing Framework
A useful aspect of our general framework is its power to explain an individual's variance in performance across homogeneous tasks. That is, an individual can perform quite well at one moment and quite poorly at another. Such behavior can be explained by translating the general frame- work into a real-time information processing model (see Figure 2).
According to Figure 2, within a given situation an individual is presented with tasks either explicitly or implicitly. The situation itself may be an explicit task, or may indirectly present the opportunity to perform certain tasks. In any event, Figure 2 relates to the period of time between the presentation of a task to its completion. According to the model, with a lack of understanding of self as agent, the student will initially filter perceptions of the task through cognitive structures to determine its relationship to self-goals and its possible effect on self-beliefs and self-evaluations. If no match with self-goals is found, the task is rejected by the individual as irrelevant. If the task is judged as a threat or detrimental to self-beliefs or self-evaluations, it is rejected as a high-risk situation. Once a task is rejected, the cognitive system considers other presenting tasks or engages in compensatory behavior that includes certain cognitive-processing activities. Although compensatory activities are engaged in to protect self-beliefs and evaluations and increase situational relevance to self-goals, they are con- tinually screened for relevance and level of threat and may, themselves, be rejected. Evaluation of tasks solely from the level of the cognitive system results in aversive emotions and unmotivated behavior, to the degree that
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
THE SELF AS AGENT 59
SELF-SYSTEM I - - - - - - - - - - - -7 I a 1 I I
I
'4 Presenting Task i OTHERS
I
FIGURE 2 Real-time self-as-agent processing framework.
the task is relevant to, or conflicts with, learned self-concept. If a task is accepted, the self as agent engages in the task with a sense of forced motivation and both positive and negative affect. The specific metacognitive- and cognitive-processing demands of the task are mediated by the positive affect and high motivation associated with the task's perceived value.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
60 McCOMBS AND MARZANO
Performance on a task, then, is not solely a function of the extent to which an individual possesses the necessary metacognitive and cognitive strategies. If a task is judged as irrelevant in terms of learned or conditioned goals or is perceived as a threat to self-beliefs and evaluations, it may be totally rejected or performed at a low level of efficiency, even if one possesses all the metacognitive and cognitive abilities necessary for the task. However, that same task, if judged later to be relevant, will be engaged in with a high level of intensity and positive affect. Given the necessary metacognitive and cognitive abilities, the individual will have success in the same task that was done poorly under the more negative self-system evaluation.
Overseeing the whole system of interpretation relative to presenting tasks is the self as agent-the self as "I." Operationally, this implies that at any point in time, the student can gain a recognition of self as agent. Once recognized, the self as "I" overrides the more automatic interpretation of the self as "me." Thus, although uncommon, the self as "I" can cast off the interpretations of the self as "me" and engage intensely in a task even though it is not related to self-goals and is a threat to self-beliefs and evaluations. This explains such illogical acts as the self as "me" sacrificing my life to save another's.
The structure and function of self, Harter (1988, 1990) offered a comprehensive theory of self-system structure, function, and development. She noted that current theories emphasize the self as a cognitive schema, constructed over time via interactions with one's changing capacities and socialization experiences (Harter, 1990). Most of this work has focused on the "me" categories people use to describe themselves. Because the "me" can be both descriptive and evaluative, however, work on both self-concept and self-esteem has emerged. Harter's own work focuses on self-esteem and how individuals evaluate themselves at domain-specific and global levels. Harter (1988) suggested that the I-self constructs the me-self by comparing competence evaluations in different domains with the importance of being competent in those domains, assessing the opinions of significant others, and then arriving at a global judgment about the me-self. Despite the discussion of various "I" processes that construct the "me," however, the self-as-agent structure is not elaborated in Harter's work.
Raynor and McFarlin (1986) defined the self in terms of a person's phenomenal self-descriptions (abilities, attributes, and self-images) of who he or she has been, is now, and is becoming. A general self-evaluative process is fueled by the motivation to find out and feel good about the self-images one has at particular points in time. For Raynor and McFarlin, self-esteem is linked to affective value (feeling good), self-concept is the level of possession of attributes, and self-system motivation is a multipli-
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
cative functilom of both information and affective value and whether one expects to experience that value. Furthermore, this view holds that people are both information seekers and information shapers, and that they are proactive rather than reactive in their information seeking. This definition of self is, however, still within the cognitive structure. A sense of agency is certainly implied but is not directly addressed in terms of the role of self as agent in self-system motivation.
Markus's work on possible selves also supports the view that self- structures hwe both affective and cognitive components (Markus & Ruvolo, 1990). The more elaborated one's possible self is in terms of semantic, imaginal, and enactive representations, the more our cognitive system motivates behavior and links thought and feeling to action. This view distinguishes between creatively and selectively constructed knowledge structures representing one's past, current, and future self. Self-concept mediates intrapersonal (cognition, affect, motivation) and interpersonal (social perception, choices, reaction to feedback) processes (Markus & Wurf, 1987). It is a schema- a structure and a process - that can represent the self as both known and knower. The self's role as agent, however, is not elaborated.
Self-processes in self-regulation. It is in the area of self-goals that links begin to be built between the self-system and self-regulated learning. These relationships are clarified by Connell and Ryan (1984) who discussed several styles of self-regulation. First, extrinsic regulation occurs when individuals are motivated by external factors (e.g., performance-oriented goal structures); this style puts students most at risk who are of poor motivation and psychological well-being. Introjected regulation occurs when individuals are motivated by a sense of guilt or shame, or by approving or disapproving voices of others in their heads; it is a style in which students see themselves as responsible for their behavior and liable for the outcomes of that behavior. Individuals with this style are motivated by valuing and being responsible for achievement; they take on external standards and goals as their own. Finally, the style of integration occurs when individuals are motivated by goals for self-identity and autonomy of functioning; it is the highest style of self-regulation, usually seen to emerge in late adolescence and adulthood.
In discussing self-regulation steps (goal setting, planning and strategy selection, monitoring behavior, judging the efficacy of behavior, and evaluating or reinforcing the self), Markus and Wurf (1987) contended that metacognition comes during the second step, but self-processes are partic- ularly important in the first step. Because theories sf self-regulation implicitly involve the dynamic, process-oriented aspects of self - the "I"- self-regulation may reflect the fullest involvement of the self in behavior.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
During self-regulation, the primary functions of self are said to be (a) providing a sense of continuity via influencing every aspect of the pro- cessing of self-relevant information, (b) regulating affect or defending self against negative emotional states via self-enhancement strategies, and (c) motivating individuals via commitments to future self-relevant goals.
Relationship of self-system to metacognitive, cognitive, and af- fective systems. Although much has been written on metacognition, there is confusion as to precisely what is meant by the term. Winograd and Paris (1989) contended that metacognition is the vehicle for understanding relationships between cognition and motivation because of the affective nature of metacognitive self-appraisal and self-management judgments and because these judgments make up the skill and will of metacognition. Understanding, or defining, metacognition as the process of realizing, more fully, the role of self as agent seems to contribute the most to our understanding of self-regulation. For example, Borkowski, Carr, Rellinger, and Pressley (in press) argue that metacognitive knowledge of strategies has a reciprocal relationship with associated motivational factors and relates directly to self-esteem and perceptions of control. They further interpret their results as indicating that attributions and self-esteem are integral parts of the metacognitive system. Failure to separate self from metacognitive understanding and cognition is the kind of conceptual confusion we are trying to clear up. From our theoretical perspective, metacognition is under the control of the self-system and not vice versa.
Confusions also exist in the literature on cognition. Although the term cognition is frequently used in discussions of metacognition, distinctions between the two are not clear. One can argue that cognitive operations differ from metacognitive operations in the degree to which they become automatic and require less-conscious control by the self-system. In the artificial intelligence literature, automatic operations have a specific form and are referred to as production systems (Anderson, 1983). Due to the automatic nature of cognitive operations, one might argue that the self- system and the "I" have little effect on cognition. Our working hypothesis here is that an increased realization of self as agent allows the "I" to become actively involved in consciously deciding which actions to pursue and in monitoring and evaluating thoughts, feelings, and actions. Thus, the self as agent - although not always in direct control of basic, "wired-in" cognitive processes and operations - can override the execution of cognitive struc- tures (e.g., productions, scripts, plans).
That affect is related to metacognition, and cognition has been recog- nized for years. Piaget (1954), for example, stated that affective structures are "isomorphic" with intellectual structures. Some level of affect influences the development of cognitive knowledge structures and is intimately tied to
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
information processing and behavior. But what is the nature of affect? Mandler (1983) stated that affect is not a discrete attribute; rather, it is always present in varying degrees. Raynor and McFarlin (1986) argued for an integrative framework for describing the role of the cognitive and affective systems in motivation, with the self-system determining action. In their view, self-system development is related to the development of self-consciousness. As the latter capacity develops, a strong self-system may or may not develop, depending on whether individuals are motivated to feel good and tot know more about themselves. In our view, if external circumstances rather than self are perceived as agent, affective values are weakened. There will be little motivation for self-system development, the self-system will have little impact on behavior, self-consciousness will be minimal, and action can be accounted for primarily by behavioral-system functioning.
In summary, research reveals the interactive, reciprocal, and even isomorphic relationships between the cognitive and affective systems, and the overseeing and controlling role of the metacognitive and self-systems in human functioning. It is the conceptual separation of the functions of the latter two systems in general, and particularly in self-regulation, that is critical to a d.eeper understanding of self-regulated learning. Further, it is the agential role of the self as "I" that is essential to this understanding.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROMOTING SELF-REGULATED LEARNING
To promote the development of self-regulated learning, our self-as-agent framework suggests that interventions be directed at two dimensions: the learner and the learning environment. In the learner dimension, the focus must be on developing students' (a) understanding that they are creative agents with the power of choice (will) and (b) metacognitive and cognitive information processing strategies (skill) for meeting personal self- development and self-determination goals. In the learning environment dimension, the focus must be on designing (a) programs that equip significant others (teachers, administrators, parents) with the ability to maintain relationships and quality interactions that create climates of positive socioemotional support; and (b) structures and content that fit the information, self-assessment, and goal needs that facilitate students' posi- tive self-development. Thus, in the will domain, interventions focus on students' metacognitive awareness and understanding and on adults' roles in creating positive affective climates that lead to valuing learning and being motivated to pursue self-development goals; in the skill domain, they focus
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
64 McCOMBS AND MARZANO
on self-regulation strategies and the structure of schooling (content, pro- cess).
Design of Learner Interventions
Although the need for interventions to address both the self and metacognitive systems is being recognized (e.g., Borkowski et al., in press), we believe that the will component of this intervention must first address the distinction between self-beliefs and self-functioning (agency). It must explicitly recognize that the self is the active agent in the development of the metacognitive system and that the use of the metacognitive system results in self goals.
Will component. In part, as Connell and Ryan (1984) suggested, interventions need to let students know how both the self as agent and the cognitive system operate, what alternative strategies and skills can help them be successful, and what they can expect as a result of applying these strategies. This type of intervention provides choice and support for autonomy that can lead students to understand that self-regulated strategies are the most fruitful. The will component helps students see the power of their choices-the power of the self as agent.
McCombs (1984, 1988) argued that motivational training also needs to combine metacognitive, cognitive, and affective learning strategies, that is, attention to students' beliefs of competency and control as well as metacognitive (e.g., self-assessment, planning, monitoring), cognitive (e.g., problem solving, decision making, higher order thinking skills), and affective (e.g., goal setting, managing affect, generating positive expectan- cies, and self-images of success) skills and strategies.
Skill component. The implications of the centrality of self as agent for the skill component are profound. Skill instruction cannot be thought of as separate from that which deals directly with the self, that is, skill interven- tions must directly reference the self-system and the self as agent. As a step in this direction, Marzano (in press) and Marzano et al. (1988) developed a "dimensions of thinking model" that can involve the self-system in any learning situation: (a) thinking that establishes and maintains the context for learning, (b) thinking that facilitates initial information acquisition, (c) thinking that facilitates knowledge development and change, and (d) thinking that renders learning higher order in nature.
To address these dimensions, interventions must emphasize learner perceptions and awareness of the self s role in establishing a perceptual base conducive to skill development. In addition, given that the most profound knowledge change occurs when students are engaged in meaningful tasks,
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
skill interventions must necessarily engage learners in an inquiry as to what they find meaningful. Students need to be asked to explore goals that would be motivating to them. Classroom tasks and skill instruction would then be planned around the accomplishment of these goals. Finally, critical think- ing, creative thinking, and self-regulation assume the active involvement of self as agent. If these dispositions are fostered as part of skill instruction, the net effect should be the development of learners who are willing and able to take control of the educational process.
Design of the Learning Environment
Never in the history of American education has it been more important to address the needs of the whole student. Students in today's schools-from kindergarten through high school-are increasingly the products of dys- functional families, experiencing little parental involvement and emotional /
support, economic and social impoverishment, minimal educational sup- port, and negative ethical and cultural models. This means that the experience of schooling must attend to the self, metacognitive, cognitive, and affective dimensions. To support students in these areas, interventions must address the design of (a) learning experiences and instructional materials and (b) a context of socioemotional support in which each individual student is valued and appreciated for his or her unique set of talents and skills. Without attention to the critical dimension of context, students are not freed up to function at higher levels of consciousness that can lead to optimum learning and self-development.
Will component. The context of socioemotional support students will thrive within can best be provided by teachers, with additional support by peers. For teachers to provide this support, the whole person concept applies to them as well. They need to be valued and supported in their role; they need attention paid to self, metacognitive, cognitive, and affective dimensions in their education and teaching practice. Teachers need help to develop abilities for dialoguing with students and maintaining relationships that validate students' worth and significance, open them up to their unique self-possibilities, and encourage the development of personal responsibility and self-control.
In the area of instructional procedures, students need opportunities for choice and active participation in decision making as well as for autonomy and group problem solving. In the area of instructional design, students need materials and activities that arouse curiosity via their self-relevance, novelty, surprise, and challenging levels of ambiguity, uncertainty, and difficulty. Concern with the motivational dimensions of learning tasks would be expected to not only stimulate students' curiosity and creativity,
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
but also their will to engage in self-regulated learning processes and activities. In addition, school restructuring efforts need to attend to classroom goal structures (noncompetitive vs. competitive) and goal orien- tations (learning vs. performance goals) that foster the development of adaptive and positive motivational patterns (e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988).
Skill component. First, because the self-system, by definition, in- cludes goals, interventions that attempt to develop metacognitive and cognitive skills must do so in such a way as to be meaningful from the learner's perspective. This speaks against the isolation of metacognitive and cognitive strategies into sets of discrete skills presented in isolation. This was the emphasis in many highly structured skills approaches to teaching reading in which the cognitive components of the reading process were taught in a drill-and-practice, hierarchical fashion with the learner focusing on a specific skill or set of skills until reaching mastery.
Second, stated negatively, the environment cannot reinforce meta- cognitive and cognitive skills by threatening self-beliefs and evaluations. This speaks against the use of grades or tests to norm students-evaluate them in a comparative manner. In effect, norm-referenced testing and normative grading practices negatively impact metacognitive and cognitive skill development for students who characteristically do poorly on tests and grades. Rather, student evaluations can be used in both formative and sumrnative ways. If students evaluate their own work, their self-beliefs and evaluations will not be threatened. Furthermore, Marzano et al. (1988) noted that frequent use of student self-evaluations can enhance the devel- opment of critical and creative thinking.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Within each of us is a part of our being that transcends our physical and psychological systems and their operation. It is our sense of self - our spirit of being, agency, and will. The self as agent, as the basis of will and volition, can be thought of, in part, as a generative structure that is goal directed, purposeful, or teleological in nature. Out of this generative and self-determining structure, our experience of being is supported. It may not be scientifically observable, measurable, or predictable, It does, however, consciously or unconsciously define who we are, what we think, and what we do.
As such, researchers need to address (a) the impact of socioemotional support on self-system structures and processes and the development of will to learn and self-regulated learning skills; (b) reciprocal relationships
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
THE SELF AS AGENT 67
among affect, intellectual functioning, and level of realization or insight regarding self as agent as they relate to students' use of self-regulated learning skills; (c) school design, instructional parameters, and curriculum issues that ca.n lead to optimal self-development, motivation, and learning for students with different needs; and (d) alternative research paradigms and methodologies for assessing self-system structures and processes, and studying the role of self-phenomena in motivation and self-regulated learning.
Our research agenda as educational psychologists is not to prove that the self or spirit of being, agency, and will exists. Our job, rather, is to study and define its operation and in so doing, discover how best to tap the resources of that inner spirit, and rekindle goals for positive growth that motivate learning and self-development. As we work in this direction, we will discover how to promote that will, to free up positive affect, and to develop the belief systems and skills that contribute to self-regulated learning. In so doing, we will take a major step toward improving students' development and the quality of schooling and learning outcomes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Roger C. Mills for significant contributions to the clarification of the importance of metacognitive awareness and conscious understanding of the self as agent - versus a more limited awareness from within our learned cognitive system-to an in- creased understanding of self-regulated learning. We are also grateful to Jo Sue Whisler for her conceptual and editorial assistance in the final preparations of this manuscript, particularly for her assistance with the graphic representations of the self-as-agent model.
REFERENCES
Anderson, J . (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Borkowski, J . G., Carr, M., Rellinger, E., 62 Pressley, M. (in press). Self-regulated cognition: Interdependence of rnetacognition, attributions, and self-esteem. In B. F. Jones & L. Idol (Eds.), Dimensions of thinking and cognitive instruction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Connell, J. P., &Ryan, W. M. (1984). A developmental theory of motivation in the classroom. Teacher Education Quarterly, 11, 64-77.
Cziko, G. A. (1989). Unpredictability and indeterminism in human behavior: Arguments and implications for educational research. Educational Researcher, 18(3), 17-25.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1986). The dynamics of self-determination in personality and
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
68 McCOMBS AND MARZANO
development. In R. Schwarzer (Ed.), Self-related cognitions in anxiety and motivation (pp. 171-194). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. L. (1988). A social-cognitive approach to motivation and personality. Psychological Review, 95, 256-273.
Gergen, K. J. (1984). Theory of the self: Impasse and evolution. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental psychology (Vol. 17, pp. 49-115). New York: Academic.
Harter, S. (1988). The construction and conservation of the self: James and Cooley revisited. In D. K. Lapsley & F. C. Power (Eds.), Self, ego, and identity: Integrative approaches (pp. 43-70). New York: Springer-Verlag.
Harter, S. (1990). Developmental differences in the nature of self-representations: Implica- tions for the understanding, assessment, and treatment of maladaptive behavior. Cognitive Therapy and Research. (Special issue on representations of the self in emotional disorders: A cognitive behavioral perspective)
Hoffman, M. L. (1986). Affect, cognition, and motivation. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (pp. 244-280). New York: Guilford.
Howard, G. S. (1986). Dare we develop a human science? Notre Dame, IN: Academic Publications.
James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Kihlstrom, J. F., & Cantor, N. (1984). Mental representations of the self. In L. Berkowitz
(Ed.), Advances in evperimentalpsychologv (Vol. 17, pp. 1-47). New York: Academic. Kuhl, J. (1986). Motivation and information processing: A new look at decision making,
dynamic change, and action control. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (pp. 404-434). New York: Guilford.
Mandler, G. (1983). The nature of emotion. In J. Miller (Ed.), States of mind, New York: Pantheon.
Markus, H., & Ruvulo, A. (1990). Possible selves: Personalized representations of goals. In L. Pervin (Ed.), Goal concepts in psychology (pp. 21 1-241). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: A social psychological perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299-337.
Marzano, R. J. (in press). Creating a new instructional paradigm through the teaching of thinking. In B. F. Jones & L. Idol (Eds.), Dimensions of thinking and cognitive instruction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Marzano, R. J., Brandt, R. S., Hughes, C. S., Jones, B. F., Presseisen, B. Z., Rankin, s.'c., & Suhor, C. (1988). Dimensions of thinking: A framework for curriculum and instruction. Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.
McCombs, B. L. (1984). Processes and skills underlying continuing intrinsic motivation to learn: Toward a definition of motivational skills training interventions. Educational Psychologist, 19, 199-218.
McCombs, B. L. (1988). Motivational skills training: combining metacognitive, cognitive, and affective learning strategies. In C. E. Weinstein, E. T. Goetz, & P. A. Alexander (Eds.), Learning and study strategies: Issues in assessment, instruction, and evaluation (pp. 141-169). New York: Academic.
McCombs, B. L. (1989). Self-regulated learning and academic achievement: A phenomeno- logical view. In B. J. Zimmerman & D. H. Schunk (Eds.), Self-regulated learning and academic achievement: Theory, research, and practice (pp. 51-82). New York: Springer- Verlag.
Paris, S. G., Lipsom, M. Y., & Wixson, K. K. (1983). Becoming a strategic reader. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 8, 293-316.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child (M. Cook, Trans.). New York: Basic Books.
Raynor, J. O., gi: McFarlin, D. B. (1986). Motivation and the self-system. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (pp. 315-349). New York: Guilford.
Robinson, D. N. (1987, August). What moves us? A note on human motives. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, New York.
Sorrentino, R. IM., & Higgins, E. T. (1986). Motivation and cognition: Warming up to synergism. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Ed.), Hnndbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (pp. 3-19). New York: Guilford.
Suarez, R., Mills, R. C., & Stewart, D. (1987). Sanity, insanity, and common sense. New York: Fawcett Columbine.
Winograd, P., & Paris, S. G. (1989). A cognitive and motivational agenda for reading instruction. Educational Leadership, 46(4), 30-36.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
9:24
09
Janu
ary
2015
本文献由“学霸图书馆-文献云下载”收集自网络，仅供学习交流使用。
学霸图书馆（www.xuebalib.com）是一个“整合众多图书馆数据库资源，
提供一站式文献检索和下载服务”的24 小时在线不限IP
图书馆。
图书馆致力于便利、促进学习与科研，提供最强文献下载服务。
图书馆导航：
图书馆首页 文献云下载 图书馆入口 外文数据库大全 疑难文献辅助工具