The Red Arrows closed the commemorative events in London in a Vulcan formation, representing the contribution of the Vulcan bomber to the 1982 con ict.

See The Vulcan bomber in action OperationBLACK BUCK, Page 8

FOREWORD

A notable victory for Air Power

Sir Peter Squire GCB DFC AFC DSc FRAES

At the outset of Operation CORPORATE, it was diffi cult to see how the Royal Air Force could play a major role because of the vast distances involved and the lack of suitable mounting bases. Before the Argentine invasion took place, our capability would have amounted to no more than fl ying Hercules transport aircraft into Port Stanleys short and reportedly unsuitable runway, with but a few lightly armed troops. There was little off-runway parking space and insuffi cient fuel available to recover the aircraft, even if we had sent them. The nearest base, to which we had access, was Wideawake Airfi eld on Ascension Island, some 3,900 miles away across open ocean, and approximately only halfway between the UK and the Falklands.

Hence the operation to recover the Islands was at fi rst perceived as being largely a Royal Navy / Royal Marines operation. Indeed, it was of course initially hoped that the presence of the Task Force would be suffi cient in itself to cause the Argentine forces to withdraw. In the event, however, we became involved in a full scale joint operation, which involved both

amphibious landings and an extensive land campaign with all the demands for air support that they entailed. However, when considering the campaign, the initial perception is important.

In the time it took to assemble the Task Force and then for it to transit south to the combat zone, our intentionally NATO-oriented air force acquired, or in some cases re-acquired, the ability to project effective air power over these enormous distances. Thus many of the aircraft, which subsequently became involved, required modifi cation and the time available was put to good use; ingenuity and an outstanding response from our British-based aircraft industry, plus some timely assistance from our friends notably the US provided us with the capabilities which, in the end, enabled the Royal Air Force to make an important contribution to the success of the operation.

At the start of the crisis, the fi rst requirement was to build the airhead on Ascension, a small volcanic island catering for just over 1,000 residents, whose airfi eld was used to handling just two or three aircraft per week.

1

It lacked fuel, water and aircraft parking areas and yet, in only a few weeks, it was able to handle movements equal at times to the worlds busiest airports. Had Ascension Island not been available, the job of repossessing the Falkland Islands and South Georgia would undoubtedly have been very much more difficult. Indeed, it might have proved militarily impossible.

From the outset, RAF transport aircraft delivered a constant stream of men and freight for trans-shipping by helicopter to the vessels of the Task Force, which had been assembled in haste, often with loading incomplete, because not all of the equipment required was immediately available. Recognising the vital importance of Ascension Island, steps were taken to defend it. Initially Harriers, supported by a mobile air defence radar, provided some air defence cover. Subsequently the Harriers were replaced by Phantoms, while elements of the RAF Regiment were deployed to provide ground defence against a possible attack by Argentine Special Forces.

The distance of the Falklands from the UK, and more particularly from Ascension, dictated the use of in-flight refuelling for almost all operations mounted into the South Atlantic. In order to permit even long-range aircraft to operate in-theatre, meant equipping them for receiving fuel in flight. The equipment on the Vulcan had not been used for more than 10 years because of the aircrafts purely European role, for which it had adequate range. This had to be activated and the crews trained. The Nimrod in-flight refuelling installation was designed, installed, tested and cleared for use in just three weeks, and permitted the mounting of long-range surveillance operations right down the Argentine coast. The two squadrons of Victor tankers were very heavily committed in support of these operations.

The most dramatic and highly published of the long-range operations was undoubtedly the Vulcan bombing attacks on Stanley airfield. An early appreciation showed that the major threat to the Task Force was from the air and, with only two carriers and a limited number of Sea Harriers, it was only possible to deploy a quarter of the combat

aircraft strength possessed by the enemy. However, their aircraft were older, less capable and, although operating only 350 400 miles from their bases, were short on combat endurance over the Falklands. This handicap would be remedied if they could use Port Stanley as a forward operating base for refuelling and re-arming their combat aircraft.

The Argentine forces had to be denied, therefore, the use of Port Stanley for the operation of fighter bomber aircraft and, since the limited number of Sea Harriers had to be preserved for the air defence of the Task Force, the Vulcan offered at the outset of the campaign the only option with any reasonable statistical chance of penetrating and cutting the runway with the weapons available. This it achieved on the first raid and, although the Argentine forces were able to maintain a limited airlift with transport aircraft some 30 sorties in all no high performance aircraft ever used the Port Stanley runway and, since that was the foremost aim, the Vulcan and subsequent Harrier counter-air effort can be seen to have been successful.

Moreover, that initial raid against the runway on 1 May, which heralded the opening of active hostilities in the campaign, had a most salutary effect upon the enemy. Not only must it have dented the morale of the Argentine forces on the Islands but, more importantly, it showed the Junta that the Royal Air Force had the capability to attack targets on the mainland itself. It is now known that their Mirage III air defence fighters were redeployed away from the southern airbases after 1 May to defend Buenos Aires plus air and naval targets in the north, and this accounts for the fact that the subsequent attacks by fighter bomber aircraft did not have fighter escort. Had they done so, it would have posed a far more difficult problem to the Sea Harriers, which accounted for the bulk of enemy aircraft shot down, and drove many others to jettison weapons and head for home.

Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft were the first combat aircraft to become involved in CORPORATE; they commenced operations from Ascension on 7 April, following the invasion by Argentina five days

2

on Port Stanley and, with the prevailing ground conditions and lack of roads, support helicopters became the primary means of movement and re-supply. Indeed, the scale of helicopter support was unprecedented in the experience of British Forces and it put great strains on the refuelling organisation, which had not been scaled to match this rate of tasking, and much of this vital equipment had been lost with the Atlantic Conveyor. Moreover, that one Chinook was the only means of moving some of the larger items of equipment. Consequently, there was a lack of forward refuelling sites and this cost much vital on task time. Nevertheless, over the next four weeks, that one Chinook carried over 1,500 troops, 1,600 tons of stores and equipment and 650 prisoners of war more than a whole squadron of Sea Kings over the same period and so earned the praise of ground forces. Throughout the campaign, the air defence of the Task Force remained the primary role of the Sea Harriers, supported by ship-borne weapons systems. Sea Harriers flew over 1,100 air defence sorties and, whilst scoring 27 claimed kills, suffered no losses in air-to-air combat. The Royal Air Force made a small but significant contribution to the Sea Harrier effort. One in four of the pilots to fly with those two high scoring Naval Squadrons were RAF; indeed the first Argentine aircraft shot down were destroyed by RAF pilots flying RN Sea Harriers.

In the final analysis, it was a notable victory and important lessons were learned or re-learned about the capabilities of Air Power and the need for strategic reach. At every level, both military and civilian, individual ingenuity ensured that equipment effectiveness was optimised to the nature of the conflict; indeed, more so than many would ever have considered possible. Above all, however, it was the quality of our people sailors and merchant seamen, soldiers and airmen that won the day. Their ability, through physical fitness, mental toughness and thorough training, to adapt to the conditions and cooperate together in battle, gave a decisive advantage.

earlier. Effective surface and sub-surface surveillance of enemy naval forces was of great importance to the Task Force. This was a formidable, indeed at the outset a seemingly impossible task with the distances involved and the great expanse of ocean to be covered. The Nimrods normal radius of action was some 1,900 miles but, by the end of April, the hastily fitted air-to-air refuelling capability enabled them to provide direct support to the Task Force right down to the Falklands and to monitor shipping in the inshore areas off the South Argentine ports.

Owing to the relatively few numbers of Sea Harriers available, and the worst case predictions on potential losses in combat, the RAF was directed to make available GR3 Harriers as attrition replacements. Following considerable modification, including most importantly the fitting of an air-to-air missile capability, six aircraft were sent south via Ascension, where they embarked in Atlantic Conveyor for passage to the Total Exclusion Zone. On arrival, they cross decked to HMS Hermes not, in the event as attrition replacements but as reinforcements and rightly committed to the attack role, both as a Task Force asset as well as in close support of the Land Component. Over the next seven weeks, operating from both Hermes and the Forward Operating Base at Port San Carlos, they carried out the full gamut of offensive and reconnaissance missions before going ashore in early July, to operate from Stanley primarily in the air defence role.

No record of the Falklands War would be complete without mention of support helicopter operations. The Royal Navy provided the majority mainly Sea Kings and Wessex of the 160 helicopters, which were in theatre at the height of the land battle. The Army Air Corps provided Scout and Gazelle light helicopters and, after losing three Chinooks, which sank with the Atlantic Conveyor, the RAF contribution was but one solitary Chinook, which happened to be airborne at the time the Exocet struck.

After the San Carlos landings, it quickly became clear that many of the wheeled vehicles could not be used in the advance

3

FRONT COVERThe 25th anniversary of the end of the Falklands conflict was commemorated across 8,000 miles and five times zones, in London and the Falkland Islands on Sunday 17 June 2007. (Photographed by Sergeant Mick Howard, RLC)

Inset pictures, left to right:The Vulcan bomber in action Operation BLACK BUCK, page 8A South Atlantic sojourn, page 16Chinook Bravo November, page 14

The official RAF website: http://www.raf.mod.uk/downloads/sota.htmlThe Ministry of Defence Freedom of Information Website: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FreedomOfInformation/PublicationScheme/SearchPublicationScheme/SpiritOfTheAir.htmThe Defence Intranet: http://defenceintranet.diiweb.r.mil.uk/DefenceIntranet/Library/BrowseDocumentCategories/OrgsRollHist/RoyalAirForce/ChiefOfAirStaff/SpiritOfTheAir.htmPlease note that the inaugural Issue of Spirit of the Air can be found on the: RAF Heritage website: http://www.raf.mod.uk/heritage

Spirit of the AirRAF IMTTPSt Georges CourtFloor 1, Zone A2-12 Bloomsbury WayLondon, WC1A 2SHTel: 0207-305-2166Mil: 96305-2166Fax: 0207-305-4145

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All rights reserved. Crown Copyright

EditorJay Myers

Designed ByHarvey GraingerDave MitchinsonJohn Griffi thsPauline Aquilina

Volume 2 Number 4 2007

Hazel Rice

hazel.rice510@mod.uk

jay.myers420@mod.uk

Managing Editor

1 Foreword: A notable victory for Air Power 6 News from the News 8 The Vulcan bomber in action Operation BLACK BUCK12 Victors at Ascension14 Chinook Bravo November16 A South Atlantic sojourn 18 The fi rst operational C-130 air-to-air refuel in the South Atlantic 24 Nimrods, Ascension Island and the Falklands confl ict27 Conundrums of leadership in the RAF from the Falkland Islands campaign30 Bomb disposal in the Falklands 34 The RAF Regiment on Operation CORPORATE37 RAF Familiarisation Training Programme 38 Airspace matters: No 1 Air Control Centre Ops in Afghanistan40 Flight safety with Wg Cdr Spry 42 Book reviews 44 Falklands prize Quiz46 Reader survey: The results48 Air Talk

6NewsNewsNewsNewsNewsNewsNewsNews from the News

Flypast brings curtain down on events

By Steve Willmot

Longest RAF bombing mission

Military aircraft flew over London on Sunday 17 June 2007 bringing to a close official commemorative events held to mark the 25th anniversary of the end of the Falklands conflict. Aircraft and aircrew from the three Services represented all of the squadrons that took part in the campaign for the Falkland Islands in 1982. As they flew over Buckingham Palace for the commemoration, they were reviewed by HRH The Prince of Wales, HRH The Duke of York and the Prime Minister. The 27 fixed-wing aircraft included Hawks representing the Royal Navy Sea Harriers and RAF Harriers, the Red Arrows flying a Vulcan formation to represent the contribution of the Vulcan bomber, and the new Typhoon fighter representing the 29 (Fighter) Squadron Phantom jets that provided air defence over Ascension Island. The 22 rotary-wing aircraft included several Sea Kings, Merlins, and Joint Helicopter Commands Chinook, Lynx and Apache attack helicopters.

Five Typhoons form part of the flypast over Buckingham Palace (Allan House)

Tribute to a fallen hero The remains of World War II RAF fighter pilot, Flight Lieutenant Desmond Ibbotson, have been laid to rest in a special rededication ceremony in Assisi, Italy, nearly 63 years after his death. He was born in Harewood near Leeds and died at the age of 23. Ibbotson, who shot down 11 (confirmed) enemy aircraft and survived being shot down by the enemy three times, was tragically killed in a test flight when his Spitfire crashed close to Assisi in November 1944. For his courageous flying in combat, Ibbotson received a Distinguished Flying Cross in 1943. The reinterment ceremony, included personnel from the Queens Colour Squadron of the RAF, and Desmond Ibbotsons family. The ceremony also had special meaning for the inhabitants of Assisi as it took place on the anniversary of the liberation of the town by Allies in 1944. Flt Lt Desmond Ibbotson as a young man (RAF)

Veteran pilots, who took part in the longest bombing mission in the RAFs history during the Falklands conflict, have been reunited after 25 years. On 1 May 1982 Operation BLACK BUCK carried out the first of many successful missions to destroy the Argentine air and air defence assets. This included a hastily planned raid that saw Port Stanley airfield put out of use before the UK forces retook the Islands. Vulcan and Victor crew members met at RAF Waddington and are pictured in front of the delta-wing Vulcan XM607 the actual aircraft that spearheaded the raids which is now on display there. Squadron Leader Dick Russell, a Victor pilot and one of just a few experts in Victor-Vulcan air-to-air refuelling (AAR), was selected to fly as advisor on board XM607 during the operation. I was told I had just 12 days to train up Vulcan flight crews in the art of AAR techniques before we were deployed and I was told to go along so they could learn while the actual mission was underway!

Left to right: Former Squadron Leaders Hugh Prior, Dick Russell, Bob Tuxford, Derek Aldred and Tony Wright (Alan Chandler, AC Photographic)

7Royal Tea at Bentley Priory World record bid for charity

His Royal Highness Prince Charles and HRH The Duchess of Cornwall joined veteran aircrew from the Battle of Britain at their spiritual home at RAF Bentley Priory in London on 15 June. The former stately home was identified in 1936 by Commander-in-Chief Fighter Command, Air Chief Marshal Lord Dowding, as his headquarters from which he master-minded the Battle of Britain. More than 20 veterans from the Battle chatted about their experiences to Prince Charles and his wife Camilla over tea as part of the BBFAs annual summer gathering. Guests were then treated to a spectacular Spitfire and Hurricane display from the RAF Coningsby-based Battle of Britain Memorial Flight. Wg Cdr Vivian Snell of 501 Sqn, RAF Kenley, was 22 when he was shot down after destroying a German Bf 109 towards the end of the battle. He baled out and watched his Hurricane crash into a field at Brenchley near Tonbridge in Kent. As he chatted to the Prince he pointed out his caterpillar tie, which aircrew are entitled to wear if their lives are saved by a parachute. Sgt Tony Pickering also flew Hurricanes from 501 Sqn. On September 11 he was shot down by a Bf 109 and baled out, landing in the Guards Depot in Caterham. He said: I couldnt believe the soldiers were prodding me with bayonets after I landed but then I realised it was because I was dizzy and unable to talk clearly. Also it was so hot that summer none of us wore much more than a shirt with no rank or markings. No wonder they thought I was German. Once it was sorted out I was given a large glass of whisky by the Colonel, who ordered his personal car to take me back to Kenley. I was flying again the next day.

Prince Charles and the Duchess of Cornwall chat with Air Commodore (retd) Pete Brothers, Chairman of the Battle of Britain Fighter Association (RAF)

The RAF has helped charity fundraiser Polly Vacher to launch her bid to set a world record for landing at the most airfields in the UK in a two-month period. During the journey, aviatrix Polly hopes to raise thousands of pounds for Flying Scholarships for the Disabled (FSD) a charity that promotes air mindedness and personal achievement among the physically disabled. Polly plans to land her Piper Dakota at all of the 206 airfields in the UK (17 of them military) that feature in the official manual of British airfields, Jeppesen Bottlangs Airfield Manual. A Typhoon from 11 Squadron, flying as part of a training sortie, was on hand at its home in RAF Coningsby, Lincolnshire, to give her fundraising marathon a flying start. Polly hopes to fly each leg with a physically disabled passenger to promote FSD and raise funds for more scholarships.

Polly Vachers Piper Dakota alongside a Typhoon from RAF Coningsby (John Dunbar)

Aircraft tractors enhance capability The RAF has invested in new aircraft towing tractors that enhance ground handling and protect the environment at the same time by saving thousands of pounds on fuel. The RAF purchased 32 Large Aircraft Tow Tractors (LATTs) to move such heavy aircraft as the giant C-17 Globemasters and Tristar passenger jets. The tractors will be distributed across all RAF main operating bases including RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire, RAF Marham in Norfolk and RAF Kinloss in Scotland. Others will operate in the Falklands, Ascension Island, Akrotiri and Gibraltar.

As a modern airline pilot, I could jump into an Airbus A330 on Ascension Island, fi ll the tanks with up to 110 tons of fuel, programme the Flight Management Computer, align the Inertial Reference System (updated by GPS), fi re up the economical Rolls Royce Trent engines and cruise to the Falklands and back in comfort.

So why was it such a feat for a single Vulcan to cover that same route in 1982 and put just one bomb on the runway at Port Stanley?

The idea of using the Vulcan to mount an attack on the Argentine forces, which would require the support of the whole Victor tanker force, was the brainchild of the then Chief of Air Staff (CAS) Sir Michael Beetham, himself both a bomber and tanker pilot. However, his plan was met with much scepticism.

Why did it not seem feasible?

Range The Vulcan was designed for operations against the USSR, with a maximum range of about 2,500 miles. The round trip over the South Atlantic from Ascension to the Falklands and back was more than 7,000 miles. Although the Vulcan was equipped with an air-to-air refuelling (AAR) system, these had all been deactivated in 1967 and no crews had any experience of tanking.

Bombing accuracyAll the V-bombers (Vulcan, Victor, Valiant) were designed to carry a nuclear weapon and a large number of conventional bombs. The Vulcans bomb bay would hold 21 x 1,000lb HE bombs. However, by the mid-1970s it was decided that the Vulcan should no longer have a secondary, conventional role, and all such bombing would be left to Jaguars, Buccaneers, Harriers and later Tornados. Quite simply, the Vulcans bombing system was not accurate enough. Using the H2S radar, very little different from the one in the Lancaster, with an ancient analogue computer to work out the bomb release point, a gyro-compass system

to align the radar to true north, and little more than guesswork to determine the wind effect on the bomb as it fell, hitting the airfi eld, let alone the runway, would be quite an achievement!

Navigational accuracyAlthough considered good enough to go to war against Russia, at night and in cloud, the Vulcans position was plotted using an old fashioned (World War II) Ground Position Indicator (GPI). This centrepiece of the navigators panel would constantly click over the changes in Lat and Long, albeit with inputs of ground speed and drift from a modern Doppler system, and heading information from the Heading Reference System (HRS) a large gyro-compass system which automatically adjusted for magnetic variation. But errors build up in a GPI and the aircraft position needs to be constantly updated. Ideally, this would be done by transferring a radar fi x. In this, the two navigators, Nav Plotter and Nav Radar, worked together as a team to keep the aircraft on track. A good team, with the radar on and the GPI updated, could be trusted to steer the pilots down valleys in cloud or at night. But there would not be much to fi x on over 3,500 miles of South Atlantic Ocean. Shooting astro while refuelling might prove diffi cult!

VulnerabilityWe were trained to recognise and react to threats from Russian fi re control radars associated with SAMs and fi ghter aircraft. The rear end of the aircraft was full of jammers, specifi cally tuned to Russian radar frequencies, but we had little to counter the Argentine equipment. We were acutely aware that a low-level attack, even at around 400kts and 300 feet at night, would make the Vulcan a nice, meaty target for their radar-controlled Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns.

So what made it possible?What most impressed those involved during the fi nal build-up to the Falklands

8

The Vulcan bomber in actionOperation BLACK BUCK

By Martin Withers

and bank with maximum payload. A wonderful aeroplane.

The Nav Radars position was up-rated to bombing competition spec, with triple offset boxes enabling him to aim on a selection of radar returns during the attack, both to refi ne the aiming and, hopefully, to fi nd an aiming point close to the actual target to minimise error.

The Nav Plotters were given a piece of kit that would greatly improve the navigational accuracy. Carousel Inertial Navigation Systems were acquired and rather crudely plumbed into the aircraft we no longer needed the sextant!

The Air Electronics Offi cers (AEOs) also got a new toy. A Westinghouse ECM pod, borrowed from the Buccaneer, was slung under the starboard wing using an RSJ from the local builders merchants, itself attached to the Skybolt missile mounts. The frequencies used by Argentine forces had been discovered and these were pre-programmed into the jammer.

The type of attack, not low-level laydown using retarded bombs, but a pop-up attack, dropping from above 8,000 feet, was fi nally approved by the CAS. This would not only ensure a much larger crater from a freefall bomb, but gave more time for aiming and made the aircraft much less vulnerable. At this altitude we would, theoretically, be outside the range of the Oerlikons, and would be turning away from the airfi eld by the time the bombs exploded.

As a fi nal boost to the morale of the Vulcan captains, it was decided that a Victor refuelling instructor (AARI) would fl y

Confl ict (Operation CORPORATE), and of the war itself was the wonderful can-do attitude which pervaded everywhere. Nothing was too much trouble, normal peacetime rules and fi nancial constraints went out of the window, and common sense prevailed. Our engineers managed to fi nd parts to reactivate the AAR systems on the aircraft, and overcame problems of leaking probes and jammed fuel valves.

The bomb-racks and control systems, including the bomb selection mechanism (90-way), were miraculously found - they should have been thrown away years previously!

The nav teams were given a quick refresher course on the conventional bombing system, or in the case of my crew, Bob Wright (Radar) and Gordon Graham (Plotter), a slightly longer introductory course!

We trained hard, fl ying 11 times in 14 days equivalent to about four months work for a typical Vulcan crew in 1982!

The captains were taught the art of AAR. It was great sport. The Vulcan is a joy to fl y in formation, but why did they put that probe there? Unlike just about any other aircraft, the probe is not in view of the pilots line of sight during the fi nal stages of making contact with the basket.

We dropped live bombs at low level at night on Garvie Island (very dark and bumpy with big cliffs around), practised pop-up attacks for ballistic releases from around 8,000 feet, and had plenty of realistic night low level fl ying around the Scottish Isles. We really put the old Vulcan through her paces, fl ying beyond the original fl ight test parameters of speed

The type of

attack, not low-

level laydown

using retarded

bombs, but a

pop-up attack,

dropping from

above 8,000

feet, was finally

approved by

the CAS...

9

10

with each of us on the mission. The same enthusiasm was not shared by certain Victor pilots! Dick Russell, who had never even fl own as a co-pilot in his entire fl ying career, had been volunteered to come with me, taking off on the evening of his 50th birthday. His birthday present was to go to war for the fi rst time, sitting on his parachute in the dark, down the back of a Vulcan . . .

How did it work out?Ascension Island is some 3,700 miles from the Falklands, with no diversion airfi elds in between. While Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) was available to the Vulcan, it was only to be used as a last-ditch, emergency option.

For this reason, the whole mission plan involved providing enough fuel for all eleven Victors to take the Vulcan down, and a further recovery mission to send tankers to meet it on its way back. In total, on BLACK BUCK 1, this required 18 tanker sorties, 23 air-to-air refuellings (7 to the Vulcan) and a total of 635,000lb of fuel transferred.

There was no spare capacity in the formation and no reserve tankers. Fortunately, only one aircraft became unserviceable, the Primary Vulcan. My crew were airborne in the reserve bomber when we learnt that John Reeves aircraft would not pressurise. No Victor or its refuelling equipment let us down.

Only one out of all the refuellings did not go as planned. When we hit a storm around the ITCZ (Intertropical Convergence Zone), we had to close in from our relaxed loose formation position to maintain visual contact with the last two remaining Victors, only to observe them trying to transfer fuel while bouncing up and down in turbulence with the hose whipping around, making a join-up virtually impossible.

During this phase, the tanker attempting to fi ll up his tanks to take us on to the descent point broke the end off his probe. This should have meant aborting the whole mission, but with quick thinking, the two Victors switched roles and the receiver became the tanker and transferred as much fuel as he dared he now had no probe if he got the sums wrong!

The Victor which had now become the receiver, captained by Bob Tuxford, then took us to the descent point. There, at considerable personal risk, since it was not part of the refuelling plan, they left themselves without suffi cient fuel to get back to Ascension. Even so, they were still unable to give us all the fuel we wanted.

Unknown to us, the Vulcan was burning far more fuel than had been planned. No one had accurately assessed the consumption of a Vulcan cruising at levels and speeds to suit the heavy Victors. As we were constantly topping up to make a return to Ascension possible at all times, we remained close to maximum take-off weight, and fuel consumption was up by 50% as a consequence.

Up until the moment when Bob Tuxford turned north, leaving us about 5,000lb below the planned amount, we had no concerns about fuel, our gauges always looked very healthy. This was not the case for many of the Victors, who were religiously sticking to the plan and giving us all we asked for, as we stayed plugged in until the specifi c geographical points denoting the end of each bracket. At which point they would peel off rapidly and recover to Ascension on fumes. With no parallel taxiway at Ascension, Victors were landing, and then had no option but to taxi to the end of the runway while others landed behind luckily no ones brakes failed!

A Vulcan bomber drops its bombs during a training mission (MoD)

11

The attack phase of the mission was tense, but went like clockwork. We let down to low level about 250 miles from the target to stay below the cover of the Skyguard Early Warning (EW) Radar, and then seemed to fl y for ages at low level over the sea, aware of the moon glinting on the water, but little else. Pete Taylor (Co-pilot) was fl ying, Hugh Prior (AEO) was paying attention to his Passive Warning Receiver (PWR) with plenty of noise coming from the radars of our own fl eet, including fi re-control radars locked on we hoped they had received the signal informing them of our attack! Gordon Graham (Plotter) was watching his Carousel, in which he still did not have complete faith; Bob Wright (Radar) had nothing to look at because his radar had to remain switched off until just before starting the attack for fear of announcing our arrival to the EW radar operators. As for poor Dick Russell, he was simply regretting the day he ever set eyes on a Vulcan!

When we thought we had 40 miles to run, I took control and with full power popped-up to 10,000 feet to start the run in.

Our position was good. Bob found his main aiming point on the headland, and stuck with it, as other offsets he looked for did not show up clearly. As we approached the release point, all was very calm and steady. We could see some lights on the airfi eld through broken cloud, still a couple of miles away. Then, after shedding around 10 tons of bombs, we turned and climbed for home. The attack seemed successful but we would have to wait a couple of days for the score (sorry bombing competition lingo!). In the fi nal stages of the attack, one of the fi re control radars had locked onto us, but Hugh used the Westinghouse pod to jam it and broke the lock. I am glad that I didnt know at the time!

We were very short of fuel when we met up with the Victor off the coast of Brazil. I clearly remember that beautiful sight of a Victor turning in front of us with its hose trailing. Somewhat akin to fi nding a petrol station open at night when in a car with the fuel gauge on empty; but even better! No one has calculated whether we really could have made Rio if we had been unable to refuel.

We did have a few fraught moments as the probe leaked when in contact, and fuel fl ooded over the windscreen making it like fl ying in formation in a carwash, but we were able to take on enough fuel to get us home.

The total fl ight time was 15 hours 45 minutes, and until surpassed in the Gulf War, was the longest bombing mission in the history of aerial warfare.

Was it worth it?Little credit is usually given to the effect of the BLACK BUCK missions (three bombing attacks and two Shrike (anti-radar missile) attacks). Most military historians fail to mention that BLACK BUCK 1 opened the UKs action against the Argentine forces.

The actual damage caused by all the attacks was small, but their effect was considerable.

Port Stanley airfi eld was denied to fi ghter aircraft for the rest of the war. But, possibly more importantly, Britain demonstrated an ability to attack the Argentine mainland, and for this reason, squadrons of Mirages were redeployed from the south to defend airfi elds and HQs in the north of Argentina. This signifi cantly reduced the numbers of fi ghter aircraft capable of operating over the Falklands, which could have supported their fi ghter-bombers, and made life very different for our aircraft.

After the Shrike attacks, all radars were turned off whenever any aircraft was seen approaching within about 40 miles, thereby denying the enemy a clear picture of what was going on in the air around the Islands.

The fi nal BLACK BUCK mission, on 12 June, two days before the fi nal surrender, will have been a further blow to morale, by demonstrating that while our ground forces may have been running out of supplies and munitions, Britain could continue to mount attacks from Ascension ad infi nitum.

XM607On all three bombing missions, the aircraft used was XM607 making it the only Vulcan to have dropped a bomb in anger. So, when you see this aircraft as the gate guardian at RAF Waddington, dont forget its unique place in history.

When we thought we had 40 miles

to run, I took control and with

full power popped-up to

10,000 feet to start the

run in...

12

It was a couple of days after the Argentine invasion that I fi rst read of it even then I couldnt get to grips with why a South American country had invaded islands which I presumed were somewhere to the north of Scotland. Confi dent there would be no role anyway for the Victor, I resumed my trekking in the Yorkshire Dales.

I returned to Marham to fi nd the Station in a whirl of activity: Vulcan pilots being trained to in-fl ight refuel for the fi rst time in 20 years, engineers working on a Maritime Radar Reconnaissance (MRR) capability for the Victor, and refuelling towlines being fl own to increase the number of tanker-qualifi ed Victor pilots. Separately, work was underway to enable Nimrod in-fl ight refuelling and, on 28/29 April, I fl ew to British Aerospace Woodford to trial a rapidly-installed refuelling probe on a Nimrod and, the next day, do it for real over the North Sea.

May 1982 was a crazy month. I fl ew the equivalent of three months normal fl ying 26 out of 31 days mainly on Nimrod and Hercules tanking sorties, but also two trips to Banjul in The Gambia, deploying Harriers to the naval Task Force. There, our accommodation bore the pit marks of the recent abortive coup and there was still a dusk-to-dawn curfew. Called from our beds one night with orders to fl y to Ascension as soon as possible, breaking the curfew and running the road blocks was an interesting experience, but capped when face-to-face with an agitated and armed Senegalese soldier woken from his sleep when my captain trod on him while trying to wake the ex-pat British Air Traffi c Controller!

Fresh out of the OCU (Operational Conversion Unit), I recall one or two of the old Victor hands casting doubt on the ability of me and other recent Victor arrivals to cope with the operational pace and challenge. At face value, their concerns were not entirely surprising, at that stage I had amassed a grand total of 320 fl ying hours; just 67 on the Victor. But I dont think we let anyone down which says much for our training, but also the ability of inexperienced people to rise to the challenge of operations.

Several equipment modifi cations were swiftly incorporated. The Lancaster-vintage H2S radar, notoriously unreliable Green Satin Doppler, single ADF (Automatic Direction Finder) and TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation), hardly left us well-equipped for the long-distance oceanic fl ights we were anticipating. But the UOR (Urgent Operational Requirement) process came to the rescue and aircraft were quickly equipped with Carousel Inertial systems or an Omega. The Carousel gyros were plonked on the aircrafts sixth seat plinth and covered with foam to make it a bit more comfortable for the crew chief to sit on! It was a case of all hands to the pumps; our SEngO (Senior Engineering Offi cer) was even caught one day cutting a hole in an aircraft to install another Omega aerial. We got briefs on how the kit worked, but not everything sank in it took me three fl ights with Omega to get it to work due to my switch pigs.

Arriving eventually at Ascension on 2 June, the fi rst things to strike you were the barren landscape, the jet noise and that

Victors at AscensionBy Air Cdre Tony Gunby

...the first things to strike you were the barren landscape, the jet noise and that the artificial lighting effectively made it permanent daylight...

13

the artifi cial lighting effectively made it permanent daylight. Our crew was billeted in Concertina City, a vast camp of portable cabins equipped with bunk beds and powered by a jet-engine generator which ensured that most of us got little sleep without the help of pills from the doctor.

Three days later we fl ew our fi rst trip: Cadbury 11 Airdrop Wilma II, refuelling a single Hercules on its mammoth round-trip airdrop to the Falklands. Each Hercules task was supported by three or four Victors transferring fuel between each other as they chased the Hercules which left Wideawake Field a couple of hours ahead. Timing and tracking to the same point in space, the Victors would eventually overhaul the Hercules, join and refuel in a shallow dive or toboggan. We were always on the edge between success and failure; the Hercules fl ying at its maximum speed and us just above the minimum required for our refuelling hose to work. Starting at around 20,000 feet, we would sometimes end up refuelling just a couple of thousand above the South Atlantic. Three days later, it was an 11-hour sortie for our crew the fi rst of two waves of Victors deploying one Harrier each to HMS Hermes. In radio silence, we transferred fuel within the formation any failure to refuel would have meant the Harrier trying to land on to container ships or ejecting alongside. After six hours, I keyed the radio to provide a heading and fl ight time to Hermes, turning tail for Ascension and leaving one very lonely Harrier pilot to fi nd his way to the carrier.

Between trips, we often spent time trekking the inhospitable volcanic landscape. Local features like Green Mountain, Comfortless Cove, Donkey Plain, English Bay, Devils Cauldron, and the Letterbox quickly became part of our vocabulary; as did the Exiles Club and Volcano Club where we

socialised. One of the weekly highlights was the USAF C-141 fl ight bringing in steaks for the American Mess Hall to serve. The fl ying itself was pretty boring, interspersed with brief periods of activity usually as our captains wrestled to make contact and take on fuel. But at least it provided an opportunity to write home Blueys and to read books. A few people even caught up with some sleep snuggled in their sleeping bags in the visual bomb aiming position beneath the pilots feet.

On 12 June, my captain fl ew the fi fth, and fi nal, Black Buck bombing mission, completing the in-fl ight refuelling in the Vulcan. The Black Buck story is told elsewhere, but it was an anxious wait for the rest of his crew until our captain arrived safely back at Ascension. The ceasefi re was quick in coming thereafter and after two months of non-stop action we were left wondering what next? Progressively, our forces at Ascension were drawn down and they made the long journey home, but the Victors were to stay in Ascension for almost three more years, refuelling the daily Hercules fl ights south.

So what do I take away from the Falklands experience? I offer three observations, as true today as they were 25 years ago:

First, when the chips are down, we excel in bringing ingenuity and innovation to bear. Todays UOR process is far more sophisticated, but the principles were already alive in 1982.

Second, our training is excellent and exposure to operations at an early stage in your career is a good thing.

And thirdly, never underestimate the ability of young people of all ranks and experience levels - to rise to the challenge of operations.

...when the chips are down, we

excel in bringing ingenuity and innovation to

bear. Todays UOR process

is far more sophisticated,

but the principles were already alive

in 1982

14

On 25 May 1982, Atlantic Conveyor which was transporting four Chinook helicopters was hit by an Exocet missile fired from an Argentine aircraft. The ensuing fire destroyed three Chinooks before Atlantic Conveyor sunk. Tragically, Captain North and 12 personnel died. Fortunately Chinook Bravo November was airborne and the sole surviving Chinook recovered to HMS Hermes.

On 26 May 1982, Bravo November was flown from HMS Hermes to the Falklands. Bravo November was met by a small detachment of 18 Sqn ground crew at Port San Carlos. Our detachment was commanded by Squadron Leader Dick Langworthy. On strength were one Chinook helicopter, two four-man crews, nine technicians and 10 airmen. All the spares, tools and servicing manuals had been lost aboard the Atlantic Conveyor.

This lone Chinook was the largest helicopter available to the British forces in the Falklands, capable of carrying about 10 tons. On 30 May, Bravo November was transporting ammunition to the guns in the forward positions, and returning Argentine prisoners (60 at a time) from Goose Green to Port San Carlos. However, that evening the SAS discovered that the Argentine army had withdrawn most of its troops from Mount Kent. After dark, three Sea Kings from 846 Squadron flew K Company of 42 Commando from San Carlos to Mount Kent, while Bravo November carried 28 men and two 105mm guns in her cabin with a third 105mm gun underslung. Flying close to the ground with the aid of night vision goggles, Squadron Leader Langworthy and I flew Bravo November from Port San Carlos to Mount Kent in a half-hour flight through occasional snow showers that temporarily reduced visibility to almost zero. Upon reaching Mount Kent, which we had been led to believe was relatively flat, we found a sloping peat bog flanked by stone rivers on either side. Bravo November landed the underslung gun without any trouble. When we tried to land to unload the two guns carried in the fuselage, Bravo Novembers back end sank into the peat so that the ramp could not be lowered. A new site was chosen and just as the guns were about to be unloaded by our crewmen Flight Lieutenant Tom Jones and Sergeant Gary Rogan, 22 SAS, covering the landing area, engaged a company of Argentine troops to the north-

Bravo November

Above: Atlantic Conveyor hit by an Exocet missile

Above and below: From the commencement of operations until the Argentine surrender, Bravo November moved 1,530 troops, 1,600 tons of stores and 650 POWs

Left: Wg Cdr Andy Lawless. His lone Chinook was the largest helicopter available to the British Forces in the Falklands

By Wg Cdr Andy Lawless

CHINOOK

15

east. Unloading the guns continued, despite the engagement and tracer fire flashing past. With the guns unloaded, Bravo November lifted off and started back to San Carlos, avoiding the enemy engagement.

As Bravo November departed at low altitude, we ran into a dense snow shower and lost all visual references. If Bravo November had climbed to safety she could have been shot down by Argentine surface-to-air weapon systems. Bravo November descended and hit something, we were unsure if we had been hit by enemy fire. Bravo November had actually hit the surface of Estancia Creek, one of the creeks west of Mount Kent, at about 100mph. The impact threw up spray which flooded the intakes of the two engines which then lost power. Simultaneously, the hydraulic power controls failed, making it impossible to control the helicopter. I jettisoned my door in case Bravo November started to sink. We both heaved on the collective levers and as the engines wound back up again Bravo November lifted and cleared the water. In the back of the helicopter, Tom Jones lost his helmet and had been about to jump from the helicopter believing it to be breaking up. Gary Rogan had beckoned to him to put on another helmet and by the time he was on the intercom, learnt that the helicopter was climbing and passing 1,500 feet.

Bravo November set course for San Carlos and then I informed the rest of the crew that when I jettisoned my door all the maps and codes to prevent us from being shot down by our own forces had been lost out the door. Bravo November approached San Carlos with all its lights on and hoped that the Rapier missile defences would realise that no Argentine aircraft would dare to fly lit up. We stepped out of Bravo November and a careful inspection revealed little damage apart from my missing door and damage to the fuselage and the rear-loading ramp.

On 2 June, Bravo November was commandeered while it was airlifting Argentine prisoners from Goose Green. Our other pilots, Nick Grose and Colin Miller, flew two companies of paratroops from Goose Green to Fitzroy to seize the settlement as it had been confirmed that the Argentine troops had pulled out. Scout helicopters led Bravo November and its cargo of 81 paratroops. The Scouts left 10 minutes before Bravo November and reconnoitred the immediate area. Despite being overloaded and encountering poor visibility, the Scouts met Bravo November about five miles west of Fitzroy and led her into land. The paratroops were landed and Bravo November returned to Goose Green to pick up a second load, this time of 75 paratroops which were landed near Fitzroy.

On 8 June, Bravo November assisted rescue operations when the Welsh Guards were bombed at Bluff Cove and flew many wounded to the field hospital at Ajax Bay. Two days later Bravo November flew 64 injured in one lift from Ajax Bay to the hospital ship SS Uganda. Bravo November continued bringing supplies and ammunition forward to support the advance on Port Stanley until the Argentine surrender on 14 June 1982.

From the commencement of operations until the Argentine surrender, Bravo November moved 1,530 troops, 1,600 tons of stores and 650 POWs. Bravo November hauled its loads until it was reinforced on 15 June 1982, when four more Chinooks arrived aboard the Contender Bezant the day after the white flag was raised in Stanley. On reflection, a job well done by every member of our detachment. Thank you Bravo November for looking after us.

A SOUTH ATLANTIC SOJOURN

By Sqn Ldr Tony Harper

I fl ew further in my life in the fi rst few months of 1982 than ever before or since. I also went to war. In March 1982, I spent a very pleasant three weeks fl ying Harriers from Tromso in Norway. On 13 April, I fl ew a jet from RAF Wittering to Goose Bay in Canada and then on 3 May I fl ew another aircraft from St Mawgan to Ascension Island. The only difference between the three journeys was that I did not fl y straight back from the fi nal destination, but kept going to the Falklands on the SS Atlantic Conveyor. Thus began my South Atlantic adventure.

Nine pilots and six Harrier GR3s from No 1(F) Squadron RAF joined HMS Hermes (known as Mother by the Fleet Air Arm pilots and as the Rat Infested Rust Bucket by the RAF) as attrition replacements for the Sea Harriers (SHARs) on both HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. Fortunately, the Sea Harrier losses, whilst still signifi cant, were not as bad as anticipated and we were quickly re-roled into our primary tasks of BAI (Battlefi eld Air Interdiction) and CAS (Close Air Support) whilst the SHARs fought the air superiority battle. Initial actions were part of the softening up of the Argentine ground and air forces on the Islands and after our troops landed, we were used in closer support tasks for the ground forces.

The most signifi cant action in which I was involved was probably that of the evening of May 28, when Pete Harris, Jerry Pook and I attacked artillery which was pinning down 2 Para in open ground on the approach to Goose Green. The Paras attack had stalled and we were called in to put the artillery out of action. It was a calm clear evening. The target area was obvious from some way out as there was a lot of smoke overhead.

Peter and I ran in and delivered our cluster bombs along the artillery line, followed by Jerry with two pods of rockets. Last week I fi nally met someone who was on the ground there that evening and he confi rmed that our attack was the fi nal move in what had been a nasty and costly engagement that day. Following our intervention the Paras managed to move into Goose Green and took the Argentine surrender.

Other signifi cant events included several short notice attacks on Stanley airfi eld in attempts to catch the Argentine Air Force on the ground. It was an exciting place to visit as there were strong AA (Anti-Aircraft) and SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) defences.

We operated the Harriers either from the deck of HMS Hermes (an adventure in itself getting safely from the Ready Room to the aircraft across a moving deck often humming with noise and activity), or from the forward airstrip at Port San Carlos.

This strip was built by the Royal Engineers on the side of the hill overlooking Port San Carlos water. It was known colloquially as Syds Strip, after Sqn Ldr Syd Morris, who was in charge of the RAFs smallest airfi eld. It was very basic although we ate royally, courtesy of the local farmer and his family. We waited here on call, ready to take off in support of the ground forces. Unfortunately, communications were so bad that we often waited in vain all day before returning to Mother for overnight retasking. The fl ying from the deck was fairly easy, once the techniques had been acquired and launching off the ski-jump was exhilarating. Landing back on was also straightforward and much easier than landing on the small pads we used on deployed fi eld sites. Entertainment was

16

Right: Port Stanley airfi eld through a Harrier bombsight

Above: Syds Strip

provided by the three tins of beer we were each rationed to daily, whilst listening to the First Lieutenant giving a summary of each days actions over the evening pipe. (Later, amusement was caused by watching the First Lieutenant finish his game of bridge in the wardroom, so that one could erect ones camp bed and get some sleep on the wardroom floor.)

When peace was declared on 14 June, we were quickly despatched ashore to fly from Port Stanley airfield whilst the Rat Infested Rust Bucket set warp speed for Portsmouth. The RAF Harriers remained as the air defence fighter in the Falklands for over a year afterwards and we all had a second chance to visit the Islands, for a few more months away from home.

I went back to the Islands on a Staff Ride last year and visited many of the places where I had arrived somewhat faster and more aggressively in 1982. My overwhelming impression is one of a place and people at peace. It made 1982 seem so worthwhile.

Left: 1 (F) Squadron pilots taken on the Atlantic Conveyor circa 8 May 1982. From L to R: Sqn Ldr Peter Harris, Flt Lt Jeff Glover, Flt Lt Mark Hare, Flt Lt John Rochfort, Sqn Ldr Jerry Pook, Wg Cdr Peter Squire, Sqn Ldr Bob Iveson. Sitting the author

Right and above right: HMS Hermes

Right: Port Stanley airfield (first GR3 ashore)

17

Oh. Wouldnt it be great to have a nice, safe job like being on a front-line fi ghter squadron! The line was delivered by Flt Lt Bob Bumper Rowley, the co-pilot of RAF Hercules, registration number XV200, as it slowly taxied past the two Quick Reaction Alert F-4 Phantom fi ghters parked just off the edge of Runway 14, Wideawake Airfi eld, Ascension Island early on the morning of 17 May 1982. Across the cockpit, in the Captains seat, I smiled and gave both aircraft a wide berth as I gingerly moved past them in the darkness.

Just behind us, our Flight Engineer, Flt Sgt Steve Slug Sloane, wiped the grit from his eyes and passed his last fuel reading to Flt Lt Jim Cunningham, who duly completed his Navigators log and placed it in his bag. As the aircraft came to a halt on its parking slot, my Loadmaster MALM Mick Sephton opened the door, stepped down on to the tarmac and gratefully fi lled his lungs with the fresh, salt-laden Island air. I called for the Shut-Down Checks and, as the propellers of the Hercules slowly wound to a halt and the allpervading noise faded, I extracted my aching body from my seat, stretched stiffl y and refl ected inwardly on what my crew had just been through in the lead up to our record-breaking fl ight of 24 hours and fi ve minutes from Ascension to the Falkland Islands and return.

It seemed a long time ago, yet it was barely 46 days since that fateful day, 2 April 1982, when it all began . . .

All personnel of No 47 Squadron, RAF Lyneham, were eagerly looking forward to the Easter weekend and a well-earned break after a particularly busy exercise period. The news of the Argentine invasion had not made much of an impact. After all, the Falkland Islands were over 4,000 miles from any usable airfi eld; well outside the operating range of the C-130 Hercules aircraft and thus unlikely to have any impact on our activities. However, others had different ideas.

Two of our fi ve crews were hastily detached to Ascension Island, to begin a steady programme of parachute re-supply drops to the ships of the British Task Force as they steamed steadily southward. Simultaneously, the remaining three crews began an intensive programme of mission rehearsals and developing the new techniques that would be required to meet the operational plans being developed at the Northwood HQ of Operation CORPORATE as the task to re-take the Falkland Islands had been named.

New equipment such as Inertial Navigation Systems and Night Vision Goggles arrived daily and were fi tted, trialled and tested. To increase the range, four ex-Andover aircraft fuel tanks were mounted in the cargo compartments of several aircraft and experimental trial fl ights of over 12 hours were commonplace. In three weeks, we completed a trials and training programme that would have taken almost two years in peacetime.

Towards the end of April, it became apparent that our main job was going to

The first operational C-130 air-to-air refuel in the

South AtlanticBy Squadron Leader (then Flt Lt) Harry Burgoyne AFC RAF (Retd)

All photographs courtesy of AHB (RAF)

18

be the re-supply of the Task Force which, by then, was at the extreme range of the Ascension-based Hercules, even those fi tted with the auxiliary fuel tanks. A means of further extending the range of the aircraft to the 4,000 nautical miles required had to be quickly evolved and the answer was Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR).

The necessary extra equipment was fi tted to a Hercules in record time and, on the morning of 6 May, The Boss and I, plus a composite crew, assembled in a briefi ng room at the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment, Boscombe Down, to prove the system and learn how to conduct AAR operations under the tutelage of Test Pilot Sqn Ldr John Brown.

Five days later all was complete. In that time, we cleared the Hercules to refuel from a Victor tanker aircraft at weights above 155,000lb (the normal maximum take-off weight of the C-130) on four and three engines. Two-engine AAR had been attempted but had proved impossible at the extreme weights involved; but I vividly recall my excitement at fl ying the aircraft for the fi rst time in my 10 years on the Hercules with two engines actually shut down!

Already an experienced RAF Qualifi ed Flying Instructor, and with all of four trips and fi ve hours experience under his belt, Max Roberts was nominated as the fi rst Hercules AAR Instructor and set about teaching AAR to other pilots and forming what would become the Lyneham Tanker Training Flight. Meanwhile, my crew hopped on a VC10 and detached to Ascension Island to start re-supplying the task force using our newly acquired, but unrefi ned, skills.

On our arrival at Ascension on the morning of 14 May, Wideawake airfi eld

appeared initially to be a scene of total chaos. Apron space was at a premium with Victors, Nimrods, VC10s, Hercules and even a visiting USAF C-141 apparently shoehorned into their parking slots whilst overhead a never-ending stream of buzzing helicopters went about their business.

The predatory shape of a lone Vulcan bomber parked just off the runway seemed to preside over this hive of activity and its Shrike anti-radar missiles slung menacingly under the wings, only added to the sinister image. It was hot, dusty and the noise level was ear shattering.

After extracting our bags from the VC10, we were driven the three miles over the stark volcanic plains of Ascension Island and up the winding hill road to the relative calm and marginally cooler surrounds of the bungalow in Two Boats settlement which would be home for the next few months.

Pilot, Flt Lt Jim Norfolk and Navigator, Flt Lt Tom Rounds had already fl own several long-distance sorties to the Task Force and passed on a wealth of knowledge and experience regarding naval procedures, weather and, especially, the techniques of operating the Hercules at its limits.

On 15 May, I was asked to report, with my crew, to the Air Transport Ops at the airhead where we were briefed on our fi rst AAR mission. This was to be an airdrop of eight parachutists and 1,000lb worth of stores to a ship, the RFA Fort Austin, at a position approximately 60 miles north of Port Stanley airfi eld.

The drop was scheduled for mid-afternoon of the following day which, since transit time would be almost 13 hours, meant a take-off time of 0230, less than 12 hours ahead. Time had suddenly become very much of the essence!

Because our overstretched ground crew were working all out to unload and refuel the constant stream of transiting aircraft, it was left to the aircrew to prepare our aircraft. My Air Loadmaster (ALM)

Far right: Hercules being refuelled

Right: Hercules dropping supplies

19

Mick Sephton and Flight Engineer, Slug Sloane, aided by two other ALMs, Pete Scott and Roy Lewis, departed to start the lengthy process. Fuel tanks were fi lled, aircraft equipment checked, survival suits, life jackets and parachutes transferred from another Hercules and the 1,000lb load prepared and carefully rigged for parachuting. At the same time the pilots and navigators started fl ight planning.

Three hours later, as the sun sank behind Green Mountain, preparations were complete with the exception of the all important fuel and AAR plan. As nearly all the Victors were still airborne, re-fuelling a Vulcan en route to attack the Falklands, we had no way of knowing how many tankers would be available for our task until some hours later. My Navigator, Jim Cunningham, volunteered to stay in the AAR planning cell and complete the planning, thereby allowing the rest of the crew to return to Two Boats to catch what sleep we could.

Back at Wideawake, the crew rushed through an intelligence brief and then rejoined Jim Cunningham at the fl ight planning tent who had worked throughout the evening to complete his work. With Jim Norfolks help, and the experience he had gained on his previous fl ights, I managed to work through the aircrafts performance manual and calculated all the required speeds for our expected take-off weight.

Unfortunately, as this weight was above the maximum weight shown in the various performance graphs, those speeds had to

be extrapolated and were, in fact, nothing more than educated guesses. What I did know was that if we lost an engine during the take-off, the remaining three engines would be unable to produce enough power to keep us fl ying and would, therefore, be taking us directly to the scene of the crash! However, Jim Norfolk assured me that he had already made several take-offs at this weight and I was confi dent that the aircraft wouldnt let us down.

It was a strangely quiet atmosphere as we completed our mission briefs, walked out to the aircraft and set about our individual pre-fl ight tasks. Survival suits were unpacked, parachutes checked, fl ak jackets issued and everything positioned ready for immediate use. I went into the freight bay to check on progress and was immediately struck by the lack of space. The four Andover fuel tanks fi lled the main cargo area, while the boxes containing the parachutists equipment fi lled the ramp area. The chemical toilet that normally sat there had been removed and now sat in the middle of the freight bay between the forward and aft fuel tanks and offered no privacy to anyone who might have cause to use it. The eight troopers had found space in the webbing seats adjacent to the fuel tanks and were trying to create an area that might offer some comfort during the 13 hours that they were going to be on board.

As the last few minutes before departure ticked away, there was little of the normal friendly banter; everyone seemed engrossed in their own little world, all pre-occupied with their individual thoughts. However, at the appointed time, the familiar ritual of the pre-start checks concentrated minds, the sleeping Hercules was slowly nursed into life and, with a Good Luck from the Air Traffi c Controller,

Left: Hercules-to-Hercules refuelling during tanking trials

Far left: Internal view of a Hercules tanker

20

we were cleared for taxi and take-off.

As I released the brakes, I noted the time as 0220 and wondered when we would be back in Ascension, but those thoughts quickly vanished as the aircraft gathered speed. As I anticipated, the take-off roll was much longer than normal but in answer to my tentative pull on the control column, XV200 rose slowly into the warm night air. I had never fl own the Hercules this heavy before but the aircraft seemed to behave as normal; the only really noticeable difference was that everything seemed to be happening a little slower than usual.

I wanted to have plenty of speed in hand before attempting any manoeuvring at this weight so, following a long period of acceleration, I slowly eased into a gentle turning climb and, as the aircraft settled on course, the Southern Cross appeared off the nose, clearly visible among the myriad stars twinkling in the deep purple-black of the night sky.

Having stabilised in a cruise-climb at just under 16,000 feet, the next few hours passed fairly routinely although the crew were kept busy with hourly fuel calculations and checks. ALM Mick Sephton opened the galley and, amazingly, produced freshly made egg and bacon sandwiches which were gratefully received and swiftly despatched. Dawn broke around 0600 and this, combined with copious amounts of hot, sweet coffee,

restored the energy levels in preparation for the airborne refuel.

During the six-hour transit, we burned off about 30,000 pounds of fuel which allowed us to climb to just over 22,000 feet and as we approached the re-fuelling point I noted with some relief that area was clear, apart from some cumulo-nimbus clouds far below. They wouldnt be a factor or so I thought!

As I pondered the job ahead of me, I was roused from my reverie by the harsh intrusion of the radio call from the approaching Victor. Having taken off from Ascension some time after the Hercules, the much faster tanker had gradually closed the gap and was now only fi ve miles behind. My Co-pilot, Bob Rowley made a radio call in reply and after confi rmation that all was ready, the delicate airborne ballet of air-to-air refuelling began.

Following the UK trials, it had been established that the AAR would have to be conducted at a minimum speed of 230 knots but the fully laden Hercules would be unable to maintain this speed in level fl ight. Therefore, the refuel would have to be done in a descent to allow both aircraft to maintain the required speed and ideal refuelling position about 20 feet apart.

The slim, elegant shape of the Victor swiftly overtook the ungainly Hercules, stabilised itself just forward of the Hercules right wing and, on Rowleys command, both aircraft began a gradual

Right: Aircraft atAscension Island

21

descent of about 500 feet per minute. Trying to keep my control inputs to a minimum, I carefully manoeuvred into a line astern position about 20 feet behind the Victors trailing refuelling hose and began my hook-up run. Under Bobs calm directions, and with the engineer monitoring the engines, the two giants slowly closed until the refuelling probe on top of the Hercules and the Victors dancing basket were only 10 feet apart.

AAR has been described as trying to spear a rolling doughnut and this was no exception. Time and again, I edged my aircraft forward but each time failed to get the probe into the basket. Although I was getting frustrated with my inability to fi nd the target, I had to put that aside and keep on trying but I was conscious that valuable fuel was being used up and the formation was getting lower and lower. Finally, as we passed through 17,000 feet and with my self-induced pressure becoming almost unbearable, at the sixth attempt a successful contact was made and fuel began to fl ow.

Transferring the required 37,000lb of fuel took 30 minutes and, towards the end, it was a real touch and go situation. By that time, both aircraft had descended to around 2,500 feet and we were dodging around the cumulo-nimbus clouds that I had assessed earlier as not being a problem!

Just maintaining contact in the turbulent, low-level air was proving very diffi cult and I knew that if I accidentally disconnected early I would not have the power to reconnect and the mission would be lost. Luckily, the tanker Captain was on top of his game and skilfully led us around the worst of the big clouds and showers. After what seemed like an eternity, Flight Engineer Steve Sloane announced that the refuel was complete. With an enormous feeling of relief, I eased back on the power and, with a soft clunk and a slight spray

of fuel from the refuelling basket, a clean disconnect was achieved.

I watched as the Victor completed a sweeping turn away from us and eased back northwards to Ascension and then noticed that Bob had steadied our aircraft and that the compass needle had settled once more on south, towards the Falklands Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ).

To avoid detection by the Argentine radar on the hill overlooking Port Stanley, the descent to the Fort Austin was initiated about 250 miles north of the Falkland Islands. The specially devised Combat Entry Checklist was completed to set the aircraft up in its best fi ghting confi guration and, as the Hercules levelled at 2,000 feet, the paratroop doors were opened and our two army despatchers from No 47 Air Despatch Regiment checked in on the intercom from their observation positions.

Conditions were not ideal. It was a grey, foreboding day with a cloud base of about 2,500ft, and a visibility of about 6km which decreased markedly in the widespread, squally showers. It was bitterly cold and as Bob Rowley established contact with the Royal Navy, the sea temperature was reported as two degrees.

Luckily, the wind speed was just within limits for the drop and as the parachutists were wearing immersion suits it all looked reasonable. As we homed towards the ship, our hastily-installed, primitive, hand-held Radar Warning Receiver chirped and squeaked indicating that several radars were illuminating the aircraft although, thankfully, no fi re-control radars had lock-on.

I spotted the Austin about two miles out, riding on a grey sea and with its recovery boat already in the water. This part of the mission turned out to be straightforward and went almost exactly to plan. With minimum delay, the parachutists were despatched on the fi rst run and the stores on the second and, as we turned back north into the gathering dusk, a faint voice on the radio confi rmed that all the parachutists were safe and that the stores were on board Fort Austin.

Left: Hercules at Port Stanley, 1982

22

By the top of the climb, darkness had descended and a new problem had arisen. Unforecast headwinds had developed, seemed likely to continue for some time and, as this had fuel implications, a solution was required. It was Jim Cunningham who offered a possible way out using a technique borrowed from sailing ships tacking. Jim suggested that instead of applying drift to our heading we should allow the aircraft to be blown east by the wind and then turn hard into it until track was regained.

I thought it sounded a bit strange but the alternative options of ditching in the Atlantic Ocean short of Ascension or diverting to the South American mainland were not terribly inviting, so I elected to give it a try. Amazingly, it worked and, thereafter the procedure was repeated until the wind eventually abated about two hours later.

As we continued the 11-hour night fl ight back to Ascension, seats were swapped and meals eaten but more to combat encroaching fatigue than from hunger. Games were devised but we discovered that there is a limit to I Spy. Meanwhile, the BBC World Service continued to provide hourly updates on the overall progress of our operation to restore the Falkland Islands to their rightful inhabitants.

About an hour out from Ascension, it seemed that the most demanding and potentially hazardous portions of the fl ight had now passed and we allowed ourselves to relax. However, this air of calm was shattered when Jim Cunningham announced that he had a contact on the radar at our 10 oclock position about fi ve miles distant!

Our intelligence briefs had mentioned the remote possibility of an Argentine Air Force Boeing 707 being equipped with air-to-air missiles and sent out on patrol. Indeed, we had heard a rumour that this aircraft had already intercepted a reconnaissance fl ight by one of our own aircraft, although on that occasion nothing further had developed.

I acquired a visual sighting almost immediately and confi rmed it as a group of lights that appeared to be an aircraft in a left bank and turning towards us. I was

well versed in fi ghter evasion techniques and immediately disengaged the autopilot, reduced the power and started a high bank angle, high G turn towards the threat.

Jim Norfolk had shot forward to my side and it was his timely intervention that avoided a possible catastrophe as he identifi ed the lights as a string of refuelling Victors on climb out from Ascension. What had appeared to my very tired eyes as an aircraft in a turn was, in fact, a mass formation of tankers setting out on another BLACK BUCK mission which had not been known about when we had been briefed some 27 hours earlier!*

Following these hair-raising few minutes, the approach and landing were straightforward by comparison. However, fatigue ensured that everyone monitored everyone else very closely as XV200 fi nally touched down on Wideawakes runway some 24 hours and fi ve minutes after take-off.

I was given the news by the Ascension Ops Offi cer that things hadnt changed greatly in the time that we had been away all the bars were shut and transport was unavailable. At 0300, the only way back to our accommodation at Two Boats was to wait until a vehicle was available or to try hitchhiking back up the hill.

Oh well, I thought, never mind. Im pretty sure that some of the other crews would still be around in the bungalow putting the world to rights over another Irish coffee and the most wide-awake drunks in the South Atlantic would, no doubt, have ensured at least one beer was waiting in the fridge. Wouldnt they? . . .

*Historical Note: As a result of this incident, widely separated arrival and departure routes

were devised and used thereafter.

Below: Mess block at Two Boats

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24

I still jog occasionally in a disreputable tee shirt bought for 50 cents in 1982 and emblazoned with the Ascension Island logo. This says a lot for the durability of the shirt, but also brings back memories of the seven weeks I spent at Ascension during Operation CORPORATE. Travel to Ascension was via a VC10 freighter flight, sleeping on 10,000 cans of Newcastle Brown destined for the troops in transit to the South Atlantic. Only 9,998 arrived!!

At the time I was based at RAF Kinloss, commanding the only squadron equipped with the updated Nimrod Mk 2 maritime patrol aircraft. Throughout April 1982 we had undertaken contingency planning for a possible deployment to a third-party country in support of the Falklands conflict.

Thus it was not a complete surprise on landing back from a sortie on 20 April to be met by the Station Commander with instructions to fly two hours later to London for a pre-deployment brief at the Northwood headquarters. The brief was sketchy, but assumed (correctly) that the Nimrod Mk 2 would soon replace the Nimrod Mk 1 detachment that had been despatched earlier to Ascension Island to provide surveillance ahead of the fleet as it deployed south. That night I was on my way.

Ascension IslandAscension Island is a volcanic rock in the South Atlantic with about 1,000 residents and limited facilities that welcomed, but was overwhelmed by, up to 1,000 British military for the duration of the campaign. The Nimrod detachment consisted of between two and five aircraft, with available ramp space dictating numbers. At first there was little support infrastructure but, as one of the first to arrive, the detachment had acquired the only air conditioned working accommodation, usually used by USN P-3 Orion aircraft. Domestic accommodation was desperately cramped but adequate for the aircrew and improved when the US Rangers appeared with a small village of pre-fabricated buildings. The enormously committed and professional ground crew of some 50 people were less fortunate and were billeted in tents some three miles from the airfield. Fortunately, the resident Americans provided excellent food. Transport was non-existent, but within a day or so, the ground crew had located an abandoned American lorry that was soon roaring around the island in a cloud of black smoke, fuelled by a mixture of aviation fuel and oil. We also bought two civilian cars, and I still await a bill for $400 paid from a co-pilots imprest for the Squadron Commanders Mini.

NIMRODS, ASCENSION ISLAND AND THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT

Ascension Island is a volcanic rock in the South Atlantic with about 1,000 residents and limited facilities

By David Emerson

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The AircraftThe Nimrod Mk 2 that first deployed to Ascension was equipped with a sophisticated submarine detection and tracking system, an adequate Electronic Support Measures suite and the new Searchwater radar for the detection, tracking and (in ideal conditions) long range identification of snorkling submarines and shipping. It carried torpedoes and also air-droppable SAR equipment. The normal crew of 12 was soon enhanced and, amazingly, within three weeks the aircraft possessed infrared flares for self-defence and an in-flight refuelling system to allow 24-hour long-range sorties. As the conflict progressed, the aircraft was also equipped with 1,000lb bombs, a new torpedo, Sidewinder air-to-air missiles (for both self-defence and to confront the Argentine Boeing 707 recce aircraft never again sighted), and the Harpoon air-to-surface anti-shipping missile. Unfortunately, the major sensors of the aircraft depended on the accuracy of the closed-loop navigation system that did not prove up to the task on the longer range sorties. Oh for GPS!

The Flying TasksThe Nimrod was employed on a variety of challenging tasks although these were, understandably, not visible in PR terms. The main tasks and one or two personal memories of incidents that come to mind include:

Long range in-flight refuelled surveillance sorties

From 10 May, Nimrod Mk 2 aircraft with an in-flight refuelling capability were available at Ascension Island. It had taken three weeks to design, modify and test the aircraft and to train the crews. Long range sorties were commenced in support of the deploying fleet and from 15 May these included patrolling areas off the Argentine and Falkland coastlines. The main purpose

The Nimrod was employed on a variety of challenging tasks although these were, understandably, not visible in PR terms

of these latter sorties was to check for any sign of Argentine Navy activity, and thus the routing during the six-hour low-level on-task period attempted to cover likely exit points for surface vessels and submarines from Argentine ports. The sorties lasted up to 20 hours, requiring support from a total of seven Victor tankers, with two refuelling points outbound and one just after climbing up from the patrol area when homebound. Not surprisingly, the Victor crews were somewhat wary when feeding their new and inexperienced charges and I remember many cries of too close back off. The sorties were all within Argentine air defence cover and that too kept everyone alert and the adrenalin flowing. Some occurrences were also somewhat bizarre, including the sight of the still blazing lights of Port Stanley as we flew by on the night before the re-invasion occurred.

Search and rescue and support sorties

In some ways the SAR and Support missions were the most exciting, although the holding of an aircraft at Ascension

Some were less fortunate and were billeted in tents some three miles from the airfield

The Nimrod detachment consisted of between two and fi ve aircraft, with available ramp space dictating numbers

on a one-hour standby throughout the campaign for SAR duties, was less than stimulating. This contrasted with the demands of escorting deploying Harriers and the SAR cover provided for all non-Nimrod long-range sorties launched from Ascension. In the case of the Vulcan sorties, the Nimrod also acted as shepherd by guiding the returning Vulcan to its waiting Victor tanker using the Searchwater radar. In particular, I remember with absolute clarity fl ying beside a returning Vulcan that broke its probe as it attempted to refuel, followed by an Oh s**t, thats us for Brazil from its pilot. We accompanied the Vulcan to about 100 miles from the Brazilian coast where we monitored the R/T exchanges with an increasingly alarmed air traffi c controller, and then reported the diversion to the UK authorities as we turned for Ascension and our own tanker. However, my most vivid recollection of these sorties was of listening to the R/T exchanges during the fi rst Vulcan mission, when the Victor crews totally reorganised the complex refuelling programme as unserviceabilities threatened the mission. An incredible performance by the Victor crews who were, in my view, the real unsung heroes of the RAF contribution to the campaign.

Protecting Ascension Island

Throughout the period of the campaign there was a concern that the Argentine forces might attempt an attack on the critical re-supply base at Ascension. Nimrod aircraft fl ew daily surveillance sorties covering an area out to 150 miles from the Island and reported shipping and the position of the ever present Soviet AGI (intelligence gathering) vessel.

Refl ectionsWith the passage of time the Nimrod involvement has tended to take on a rosy glow the fl ying was challenging and different, and no one was hurt physically. Of course there were problems and some peacetime procedures were to be found wanting. The learning curve was steep for the crews who adapted remarkably well with, for example, fi shing fl eets operating in Argentine waters complicating the surface picture both with their large numbers and also their radar transmissions that were in some cases remarkably similar to those of Argentine warships. We had to remember that an ill-considered report could result in a vital SSN (submarine) being diverted to investigate. Certainly, my seven weeks based at Ascension was a unique experience that affected my subsequent service career and life in general.

As a postscript, some seven years later I, at last, set foot on the Falkland Islands when escorting the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fieldhouse. We toured all those sites with names that had become familiar to the British public in 1982 and appreciated the kindness and gratitude of the Falkland Islanders. However, my lasting memory is of standing beside the Admiral, with tears fl owing down his face, as we looked at the War Memorial in Port Stanley that recorded those who had died in the confl ict. David, that was all down to me he said, to which I responded, No Boss, if its down to anyone its the politicians. For many it was a nasty, bloody and tragic war.

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Leadership

In 1982, Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire was OC 1(F) Sqn and faced many challenging fi rsts to allow the Air contribution to the Falklands campaign to provide its full capability. Each of these will have provided a leadership challenge alongside all the normal leadership challenges that arise within a squadron going to war. I have taken two extracts from the 1(F) Sqn diary to illustrate a leadership point; the rest of the diary has been published on the Web1 and provides more background for those interested.

To set the scene, part of 1(F) Sqn is embarked on the Atlantic Conveyor, a civilian

transport ship, en route to the Falklands, contemplating moving the Harriers from the ship, on which they were being transported to the Falklands, on to the Royal Navy aircraft carriers ready for operations.

9 MayI fly in a Wessex of 848 NAS to look at deck operations with various wind conditions and to assess the best direction to the vertical take-off (VTO) which we will have to carry out in the transfer to the CVS (aircraft carrier). It concerns me that no one will have flown for two weeks prior to this important and possibly tricky sortie.

Conundrums of leadership in the RAF from the

Falkland Islands campaign

By John Jupp

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RAF GR3s and Sea Harriers aboard HMS Hermes

Just nine days later but much further south, and with considerably worsening weather in general, the transfer takes place.

18 May Hermes and Invincible close with the amphibious group in order to effect the transfer well out of range of the enemy. In the end only four GR3s make it as two are unserviceable; Self, Pook, Harris and Rochfort. The VTO is straightforward although Steve Brown in a Sea Harrier does a 40-degree VTO and almost crashes as is the landing on. Harper remains on Atlantic Conveyor and Rochfort returns to bring the remaining two aircraft when serviceable. The long process of cross-decking of troops, remaining pilots and squadron stores will take hours.

On arrival on Hermes, I am introduced to Cdr Air2 (Robin Shercliffe) and the Captain (Lin Middleton). This is followed by briefi ngs on deck procedures after which the captain orders three aircraft to get airborne. It is now 1800 and it will be dark in 2 hours and I am the only one to have received all the briefi ngs Bob Iveson and Jerry Pook have joined in halfway through. I persuade Cdr Air that it would be unwise but he is subsequently overruled and at about 1900 we are told to man up. We brief to do a 2v1 combat but although ready to start by 1915 we are held from doing so. The FINRAE3 is not available and so our only reliable instruments will be head down. At 1945 I change the brief to singleton CCAs (carrier-controlled approaches) to land and at 2015 we are stood down. Just as well by this time it was well and truly dark. Not ideal conditions for ones

fi rst carrier launch on standby instruments! It has not been a pointless exercise for I have been able to mentally adjust from a peacetime to operational environment.

That evening the ships commander (John Locke) invites me to his cabin for a drink. There he tells me in confi dence of the captains aversion to the RAF. He warns me of the diffi culties which may lie ahead.

What is clear from these diary entries is that clear, logical and well thought out arguments are necessary for operations, but not suffi cient. It is vitally important that leaders understand the people they have to deal with, the internal politics of the situation and are able to make the most of the hand they are dealt. This is the intent of the RAF Leadership Attributes of Emotional Intelligence and Politically (and Globally) Astute4. Emotional Intelligence is about understanding yourself and others so that you can infl uence them better. Dealing with offi ce politics is not Machiavellian; it is a vital part of any leaders job to infl uence those about him or her for the better accomplishment of the mission and the protection of his or her people. In being politically astute in this manner, it is also vital to act in a morally responsible way and remain true to the RAFs core values5.

What is also clear from these extracts is the need for a leader to network with a wide variety of people to gain their trust so that communication moves beyond the realm of ritual and clich, information and facts to those hugely important areas of feelings and emotions as well as ideas and judgements. To the Commander of 1(F) Sqn in 1982, it was manna from heaven to know that the feelings of the Captain of Hermes towards the RAF were of aversion. He could then act accordingly to ensure the successful conclusion of his tasks with the minimum of risk to his men. Who would tell him of that aversion without reposing huge trust in him? Trust is only gained by successful communication between the people involved, alongside such factors as whether the parties feel secure, how similar they are and how well aligned are their interests. Those wishing to be trusted must also behave with benevolent concern, capability and integrity6. Above all though, it is good communication that is important.

It is vitally important that leaders understand the people they have to deal with, the internal politics of the situation and are able to make the most of the hand they are dealt

RAF GR3s aboard the civilian transport ship Atlantic Conveyor

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The following extract by Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire is from the RAF Leadership Anthology and demonstrates the effect of good communication.

As a good leader you do not have to be a great orator but the ability to communicate is vital. When serving in the Falklands War, I saw a number of different styles, some hugely more effective than others. For example, the Captain of the ship in which I was embarked for seven weeks, did not speak to the ships company once in that time, despite having a