qualifying round essay - debate centraldebate.uvm.edu/dcpdf/ippf_sample_essays.pdf ·...
TRANSCRIPT
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Qualifying Round Essay
Wood River High School 1250 Fox Acres Road Hailey, Idaho 83333
Phone Number
For the International Public Policy Forum
On the topic:
Resolved: NATO military operations in Afghanistan are not justified.
Composed by: Student Name Student Name Student Name
On our honor, we pledge that we have received no unauthorized assistance on this work.
Submitted by: Coach’s Name Phone Number E-mail Address
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Negative Case
Little progress can be made by merely attempting to repress what is evil. Our great hope
lies in developing what is good. –Calvin Coolidge
Afghanistan has been riddled with conflict, destruction and terror almost incessantly. From
the reign of Alexander the Great to the fiasco of British Imperialism to the tyranny of the
Taliban, this nation has seen nothing save violence and poverty. Though rehabilitation of this
country will certainly not be easy, it is necessary from both a moral and a logical standpoint. It is
imperative that Afghanistan be rehabilitated; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) is the only organization capable of such an undertaking.
It is with the following three contentions that the negative argues against the resolution: 1)
NATO is uniquely qualified, both in organization and in means, to be in Afghanistan; 2)Unlike
with previous occupations, NATO aims to make Afghanistan self-sufficient and stable—
militarily, socially, economically, and politically; and 3) NATO's operations in Afghanistan are
critical in the global fight against terrorism, namely by eliminating a major breeding ground for
terrorist operations and setting an example to the world on how terrorism will be dealt with in the
future.
NATO's Unique Qualifications
Organization:
Founded in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, also known as the North
Atlantic Alliance, is currently comprised of 28 member countries, who uphold the principle that
"an attack against one or several members is considered an attack against all." (NATO). This was
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first invoked following the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C.
NATO’s response to the attacks culminated in their takeover of the International Security
Assistance Force, or ISAF. The ISAF works with the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan to make the country a safe and sustainable place, specifically by “reducing the
capability and will of the insurgency, support[ting] the growth in capacity and capability of the
Afghan National Security forces (ANSF), and facilitate[ing] improvements in governance and
socio-economic development.” (NATO).
NATO not only works with the twenty-eight member countries but also with other
nations, so ISAF forces currently hail from the militaries of 47 different countries(NATO). the
multinational nature of NATO/ISAF is the most important quality it possesses. It demonstrates
that the operations in Afghanistan are of importance to the global community. Success or failure
there will alter the future of the world. The global interest of Afghanistan proves the necessity of
military operations there. Because operations are endorsed by forty seven nations, it shows that
success in Afghanistan is not only in the best interest of one country, but in the best interests of
the world.
Resources:
In conjunction with the unparalleled global perspective and insight of NATO, they also lay
claim to the majority of the world’s military defenses. NATO includes in its membership the top
defense spenders in the world: the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy.
They alone account for fifty-eight percent of global defense spending. The combined defense
spending of all of NATO’s members, however, account for a staggering seventy percent of
worldwide defense spending. These figures show that NATO is unmatched in resources, and
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therefore is, by a landslide, the best equipped organization for military operations in
Afghanistan.
In addition to the massive amounts of capital available to NATO, it also has the best
possible leadership. ISAF is headed by the United States’ own General David Petraeus, former
commander general of the multinational force in Iraq, and most recently, former head of Central
Command, which manages all US military operations in the Middle East (BBC). General
Petraeus also quite literally wrote the book on counterinsurgency techniques for the US military.
According to BBC news, “General Petraeus is a masterful political general. He is highly
articulate and adept at judging and communicating with an international audience.” General
Petraeus mirrors perfectly the high levels of global insight of NATO, while carrying with him the
experience he gained by leading operations in Iraq and throughout the Middle East in his
previous positions.
No other group in the world has the infrastructure, resources, or ability to accomplish what
NATO can. NATO, and subsequently ISAF are the only organizations qualified to be stationed
in Afghanistan, and are singularly equipped for success in fighting terrorism. It is by this, and
nothing else, that terrorism in the Middle East can be confronted on a military, social, economic
and political level.
Unlike with previous invasions, NATO aims to make Afghanistan self sufficient.
Afghanistan has been invaded scores of times. From Alexander the Great to the Soviets,
nations have tried and failed in Afghanistan, giving it the nickname The Graveyard of Empires.
However, we can be certain that NATO will not fall trap to this for two main reasons:
NATO is not an empire.
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As the negative asserted before, NATO is a collaboration of more than 28 countries,
whose goal is to uphold democratic values and rid the world of terrorism. NATO is not looking
for personal gain in Afghanistan; they are looking to establish domestic and global security and
stability. Because NATO is by definition NOT an individual empire looking to invade and
exploit Afghanistan, it is unfair to compare them to the scores of failed invasions before them.
Their inherent differences from the previous invasions can be seen as a mark for the justification
of their operations in Afghanistan. NATO is acting out of concern for global security and
altruism in regards to rehabilitating Afghanistan.
NATO will make Afghanistan safe, stable, and ultimately self-sufficient:
Militarily:
One of NATO’s main goals is ensuring the stability of Afghanistan both in the present
and the future. They will accomplish this in the following ways. First, they are eliminating the
currently insurgent Taliban as a threat. ISAF is accomplishing this by working with the Afghan
National Security forces in conducting security and stability operations, disarming illegally
armed groups, facilitating ammunitions depots managements, and providing post-operation
assistance (NATO). By the aforementioned, the ISAF is systematically eliminating the threat of
the Taliban. General Petraeus said “Forces [are] working to take away the sanctuaries and safe
havens that the Taliban [has] established over the years.” (Radio Liberty). Through eliminating
the safe locales, disarming the insurgency, safely and securely managing legal firearms, and
providing assistance after completion of operations, NATO will hack the Taliban’s roots in
Afghanistan into oblivion.
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Additionally, the ISAF is working to ensure the future stability and self-sufficiency of
Afghanistan, specifically by assisting in the development of Afghanistan’s own security forces,
the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Known as the NATO Training
Mission Afghanistan, or NTM-A, the objective is to train the forces until they can function on
their own, and to “increase the capacity of Afghan security forces.”(NATO). When
Afghanistan’s own forces prove capable of protecting the country alone, they will be handed the
reins. This is what separates NATO’s operations from previous occupations--their presence is
inherently impermanent.
Socially:
The reign of the Taliban saw some of the world’s most egregious human rights
infractions in history. The Taliban believed in the strict enforcement of Sharia Law—that is, they
strove to recreate exactly the time when the Prophet Muhammad walked the earth—in social
life, politics, and of course religious practices. Sharia law, however, was incredibly oppressive
and inhumane, especially in regards to women. Under Taliban rule, women were not allowed to
work outside the home, or even leave the house without a mahram (close male relative) and a
Burqa. In a nutshell, women were banned from doing anything outside the home while not in the
presence of a mahram. Violation of the law brought incredibly cruel punishments, including the
hacking off of limbs, or in many cases execution. Nor did men escape restrictions to personal
freedoms; for example, males were required to wear beards, and short hair covered by a turban.
Most forms of music, art and recreation were banned, and all non-Muslim minorities were forced
to wear badges identifying themselves as such. These are only a smattering of the unjust
restrictions imposed by the Taliban—the list goes on and on.
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As a direct result of removing the Taliban as a ruling power and instating the Karzai
Administration, the quality of life for the Afghan citizens has increased dramatically. Since the
overthrow of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan has seen democratic elections, millions of girls
have enrolled in school, literacy rates have climbed dramatically, women have been allowed to
participate equally in society—they even have been elected to represent their fellow citizens in
Parliament (Una Vera). These are real time advantages of NATO’s presence in Afghanistan, and
they will be exponentially advantageous throughout Afghanistan’s future.
Economically:
What made Afghanistan so susceptible to the harboring of terrorist activity was the
general abject poverty of its citizens, due to the lack of economic infrastructure. Powerless were
the people to object to the tyranny of the Taliban and therefore, the terrorist activity of Al
Qa’ida, because the two shared common beliefs and goals. Furthermore, a large amount of
economic activity was the cultivation, production and sales of illicit drugs, namely opium. At
one point, Opiate production in Afghanistan accounted for a staggering 93% of the world’s
supply (UN). However, as a result of the counter-narcotics operations of NATO, opium
production is down 22%from peak, with 20 of the 34 provinces cultivation free (UN).
In addition to removing opium cultivation and production as a significant portion of the
Afghan economy, NATO is working to build a free market economic structure in Afghanistan.
NATO’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs, are designed to “extend the authority of the
central government into the countryside, provide security, and undertake projects (such as
infrastructure development and the delivery of basic services) to boost the Afghan economy,”
according to the Congressional Research Service. A result of one of these projects was the
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discovery that Afghanistan has massive deposits of lucrative materials such as gold and lithium
with an estimated total value of more than one trillion dollars (NY Times). With the
implementation of economic infrastructure, Afghanistan has seen consistent and major positive
growth in GDP. Afghanistan currently has the fastest growing GDP at 22.5% (CIA World
Factbook).
Politically:
Afghanistan currently enjoys a stable government supportive of democratic values under
the Karzai Administration. However, strides are still being made to ensure long term success.
In order to prevent the reintroduction of the Taliban as the ruling body, Afghanistan must
have a strong government that is not susceptible to a coup. This will be achieved through the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, who will “strengthen the institutions required to fully establish
good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights.” (NATO). Furthermore, these
teams are supported by the NATO Senior Civilian Representative, who promotes unity between
the provincial and national governments of Afghanistan. Once again, unlike previous
occupations of Afghanistan, NATO’s goal is to enable Afghanistan to be self sufficient. Once the
government of Afghanistan is stable and strong enough to operate on its own, it will be operating
on its own.
NATO's operations in Afghanistan are critical in the global fight against terrorism
Success in Afghanistan eliminates a major breeding ground for terrorism:
Prior to NATO’s presence, Afghanistan’s government, economy and social policy were
incredibly tolerant of the Islamic Extremist group Al Qa’ida. Because the Taliban and Al Qa’ida
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share the same fundamentalist religious ideology, Al Qa’ida was allowed to flourish within
Afghanistan’s borders during the Taliban regime, which led to them gaining power and
subsequently led to terrorist attacks such as those committed on September 11, 2001 in the
United States. Even if the citizens were privately against the government’s policies, they had no
power against them. The social policy of the Taliban prevented education of and extension of
human rights to the general civilians, and therefore left them woefully unequipped to change the
status quo.
However, because of NATO’s actions to build the government and economy, and to
establish democratic values that would protect human rights, Afghanistan will no longer be a
viable staging ground for terrorist activity. No longer will the climate of Afghanistan be even
remotely tolerant of either the Taliban or Al Qa’ida. To reiterate, democratic elections have
already taken place, millions of girls are enrolled in school, Afghan women are participating in
the society and government in Afghanistan, and the economy is becoming less and less
dependent on opium. NATO has created irreversible damage to the Taliban and Al Qa’ida
footholds in Afghanistan, and because they are creating stability and self-sufficiency in
Afghanistan, these footholds will never be re-established.
NATO’S actions set a precedent:
It is necessary to remember that the war on terror is not one defined by national borders,
or religion, or even ideology. Terrorism is, by definition, “the use of violence and intimidation in
the pursuit of political aims.” (Oxford). Terrorism is a tactic, and can be implemented by any
group. Currently, we are fighting against Islamic extremism. At some point in the future, we will
be threatened by terrorism again, by another faction of extremists. This, specifically, is why there
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is a moral imperative to strike down terrorism in the Middle East. It is integral to show potential
terrorists that their opposition cannot be simply “bled dry.” It is vital to show them that their
opposition can and will defeat them. As George W. Bush said in 2005, “We do not create
terrorism by fighting the terrorists. We invite terrorism by ignoring them.” If NATO’s military
operations in Afghanistan are withdrawn, it will set an example of failure and weakness. It will
show the entire world, including potential terrorists, that no force on earth can overthrow
irrational violence and fear mongering.
This must not happen. If NATO forfeits its many gains in Afghanistan, it will completely
invalidate the entire organization, as well as its member countries. No longer will their
impressive defense spending symbolize authority and capability, it will merely represent a
foolish waste of money and show that victory cannot merely be bought. Remember: a win in
Afghanistan transcends the quantitative aspects of the victory. Yes, a win means safety and
stability in the world, and also a better situation for the Afghans, but it also means much more
than that. It sets a paradigm for the future. No longer will it be thought that wrong can triumph
over right merely due to unconscionable and erratic violence, but that international cooperation,
democratic values and tenacity will succeed in the end.
Conclusion:
NATO’s military presence in Afghanistan is justified for both quantitative and qualitative
reasons. It is the only organization with the means, organization, and international perspective
necessary to successfully rehabilitate Afghanistan. Their main goal is not to permanently invade
and exploit Afghanistan, so they do not fall prey to the Graveyard of Empires pattern. Their goal
is to provide safety, stability, and self-sufficiency, so their presence improves the short term
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safety, and provides long term stability and self-sufficiency in Afghanistan’s military, social,
economic and political arenas. Unlike previous invaders, NATO’s goal is not ownership-they
merely want to help Afghanistan move into an era of independence and democratic values; and
ensure the safety of the world. Lastly, NATO’s military presence in Afghanistan is singularly
and irreplaceably important in the war on terror; it eliminates Afghanistan as a viable location for
terrorist activity and sets a paradigm for future fights against terrorism.
Martin Luther King, Jr. said, “We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the
vitriolic words and actions of the bad people, but for the appalling silence of the good people.”
His words continue to find validity today. NATO is justified, most importantly, because the
organization is not remaining silent in the face of wrongdoing. They are acting in the here and
now to ensure the welfare and security of both Afghanistan and the entire planet. Though they
are also justified in the tangible extrapolation of the situation, they are most justified in the fact
that they are upholding democratic values and human rights, for the bettering of the world and all
its inhabitants.
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Works Cited
"Afghan opium production in significant decline." United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
N.p., 2 Sept. 2009. Web. 27 Oct. 2010.
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/September/afghan-opium-production-
in-significant--decline.html>.
"Afghan, Coalition Forces Eliminate Taliban Senior Leaders in Badghis | ISAF - International
Security Assistance Force." ISAF - International Security Assistance Force. N.p., 3 Oct.
2010. Web. 27 Oct. 2010. <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/afghan-
coalition-forces-eliminate-taliban-senior-leaders-in-badghis.html>.
"Calvin Coolidge Quotes." Famous Quotes and Quotations at BrainyQuote. N.p., n.d. Web. 27
Oct. 2010. <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/c/calvin_coolidge_3.html>.
"Counter Insurgency." Headquarters Department of the Army. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Oct. 2010.
<www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf>.
"Discover NATO." NATO - Homepage. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Oct. 2010. <http://www.nato.int/nato-
welcome/site.html>.
"Nato Presence in Afghanistan is Improving The Lives of Its Citizens | Newsflavor." Newsflavor.
N.p., 7 Oct. 2010. Web. 27 Oct. 2010. <http://newsflavor.com/politics/international-
relations/nato-presence-in-afghanistan-is-improving-the-lives-of-its-citizens/>.
RISEN, JAMES. "U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan - NYTimes.com." The
New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. N.p., 13 June 2010. Web.
27 Oct. 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html>.
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Walsh, Declan. " UN horrified by surge in opium trade in Helmand | World news | The Guardian
." Latest news, comment and reviews from the Guardian | guardian.co.uk . N.p., 28
Aug. 2010. Web. 27 Oct. 2010.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/28/afghanistan.drugstrade1>. !
Elite 8 Round
Affirmative Constructive Essay
Silver Lake Jr./Sr. High School, Silver Lake, KS (Aff)
Vs.
Plano Senior High School, Plano, TX (Neg)
Upholding the Affirmative and writing the Constructive:
Silver Lake Jr./Sr. High School
For the International Public Policy Forum
On the topic:
“Resolved: NATO Military Operations in Afghanistan Are Not Justified.”
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Affirmative Constructive
The Affirmative team would first like to congratulate the Negative team for making the
prestigious Elite Eight round of IPPF competition and thank the judges who so graciously
dedicate their time and effort for the betterment of the world’s youth. Therefore, we begin with
the UN Yugoslavian Ambassador Vladislav Jovanovic's perception of the role of NATO in a
global world.
“The whole international community should react in the appropriate way in
condemning that action and requesting that NATO act and behave in line with international law,
and not as a wild and political and military alliance acting on its own and against the charter of
U.N.”
~ Vladislav Jovanovic, Yugoslavian Ambassador to the UN.
The Affirmative team agrees with Ambassador Jovanovic and strongly upholds the IPPF
Resolution: NATO operations in Afghanistan are not justified. NATO operations violate
international law, and consequently, cannot be rendered just. The Affirmative team would like to
make it known that NATO is not limited to the United States’ military. In order to most
effectively hold dialogue, the Affirmative will first define NATO operations, then present a
framework with which to debate the resolution, and finally examine why NATO operations do
not meet this framework.
Defining NATO Operations
According to a 2006 article from the Military Review, NATO defines its operations as,
“specific missions or tasks, which are usually limited by function, time, or location” (Toczek).
Additionally, the American Heritage Dictionary defines operations as, “A process or series of
acts involved in a particular form of work” (The Free Dictionary). Judges should note here that
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the term “NATO operations” is distinct from “NATO presence.” NATO may be present in a war
theater, but whether its specific operations are just or unjust is a separate issue. In this paper, the
Affirmative will argue that even if NATO’s military should be in Afghanistan, the specific tasks
they perform are conducted in an unjust manner.
The Means of Deciding Justification: International Law and its Importance
Five main sources contribute to the framework of International Law: the Geneva
Convention, the UN Charter, the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, the Rome Statute,
and international treaties. (Cornell University Law School LII). War conduct is considered just
or unjust by these means. As early as the Nuremberg Trials, the international community has
been in general agreement as to which practices are prohibited in warfare, as well as which
practices are permissive rights of states. This global framework even has the status of jus cogens
— legally binding for nation-states to obey (Institute for International Law and Justice). As such,
the Affirmative team utilizes fulfillment, or lack thereof, of international humanitarian law (IHL)
as the criterion by which to judge the resolution as either true or false. This framework is
superior to any other method of determining the justification of NATO operations in Afghanistan
for four main reasons. First, as previously discussed, it is customarily accepted in international
politics. Second, IHL, the law of war, has long been a tool of liberation for all peoples.
According to Marcus Raskin, Co-founder of the Institute for Policy Studies and Professor of
Public Policy at Georgetown, IHL prevents unethical policies, such as ethnic violence and
environmental destruction (Raskin). Upholding this framework will ensure that this progress is
not forsaken. Third, this criterion is uniquely applicable to the IPPF topic; NATO is an
international organization and, thus, is bound to an international system of jurisprudence
(NATO, “Founding Act”). Finally, international law is defined with specific clauses and
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principles. This provides the most concise framework for debating the topic. Any alternative
criterion would be inapplicable and difficult to debate. The Affirmative will contend that in order
for NATO operations to be considered just, they must comply with international humanitarian
law.
NATO’s Intention of Operations Violate International Humanitarian Law
Motive Disparity
NATO has violated international humanitarian law through its intentions behind the war
and its operations. The organization released the statement that partially attributed the reason
behind the invasion to humanitarian motives (Bush). However, as professors Noam Chomsky
and Gilbert Achcar explain, NATO did not even show intent for this initiative until several
weeks into the war. It was geared more towards power projection than giving aid (Chomsky and
Achcar). In fact, NATO bombings went beyond military targets as the initial reaction put about
7.5 million people at risk of starvation (Nichols and Gallagher). The latter action was known, as
they had ordered the elimination of truck convoys carrying food and other supplies to Afghan
citizens as the organization began the bombings (Chomsky and Achcar). The atrocities before
and as a result of the bombings were not in accordance with UN Charter, and NATO did not
seem to have much or any regard towards this violation (Davidson).
Democracy Promotion
NATO operations violate several facets of The Charter of the United Nations. Article 2
contends “...that all States take no action aimed at military intervention and occupation, forcible
change in or undermining of the socio-political system of State, destabilization and overthrow of
their Governments...” (Davidson). NATO’s mission of toppling the Taliban and instituting a new
government explicitly breaches The Charter.
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While infringing upon IHL, NATO operations have created a false sense of democracy.
The officials in all levels of the government are so corrupt that this new establishment is at times
labeled worse than the Taliban (Filkins). This has exacerbated to the point that the objective is
more about scaring the populace into voting for a certain candidate than representing the people.
As The Century Foundation Project contends, many Afghans believe, “...‘there are a lot of
people here who have the capacity to...represent the people. But the problem is that they do not
have the money or guns to secure these positions’....This situation has created a climate of fear
that explains why many are reluctant to discuss political issues publicly or to participate in
citizen action” (Theros and Kaldor).
NATO’s intentions toward democracy have been detrimental to the country. In fact,
The Islamic Peace and Reform Movement of Afghanis quotes the truth behind the consequences
of NATO’s irresponsible actions, “...occupation and support for a corrupt regime...have resulted
in incompetence in governance and lack of social responsibilities toward the common people...
the Afghan people have to pay an estimated $2.5 billion in bribes annually to government
officials” (The Islamic Peace and Reform Movement of Afghanis). The governmental system
NATO is trying to establish now is extremely ineffective and unpopular with the Afghan
population (Theros and Kaldor). Jeremy Scahill, a Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The
Nation Institute, further elaborates this contention. Scahill explains that imposing a governmental
system on a country leads to disappointing tragedy rather than success (Scahill).
In addition to NATO’s inability to establish a fair democracy in Afghanistan, NATO
has failed to improve women’s rights and protections. NATO’s claims of societal elevation of
women in the new Afghanistan “democracy” are unfounded because crimes have not been
diminished (Joya). Furthermore, Malalai Joya, Afghan politician and a former elected member of
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the Parliament, speaks to the media’s exploitation of women as an attempt to justify NATO
operations, “A Time cover story featuring the disfigured Bibi Aisha was a clear example of using
the plight of women as war propaganda. The headline ‘What happens if we leave Afghanistan’...
should have been ‘What happens while we are in Afghanistan’, because crimes of mutilation,
rape and murder against women are commonplace today” (Joya).
This external force to drive Afghanistan towards a democratic system has in fact
“helped rob Afghans of democracy” and allowed corruption to thrive (Kinzer). The greatest loss
comes from what could have happened absent NATO’s force-feeding of democracy, a clear
violation of IHL. Stephen Kinzer, former New York Times reporter and author, concludes that
NATO efforts have undermined the potential for a thriving democracy by forcefully
implementing a structure of democracy that does not tailor to the needs of the Afghanistan
populace (Kinzer). In addition, Afghanistan would have been able to “overthrow the Taliban
themselves” (Chomsky and Achcar) and create a flourishing democracy through grassroots
initiatives (Theros and Kaldor).
NATO’s Conduct of Operations Violate International Humanitarian Law
NATO has committed egregious war crimes while carrying out operations in
Afghanistan. These war crimes have resulted in offenses that consciously violate international
humanitarian law.
Private Military Contractors
NATO employs private military security contractors (PMSCs) to complete operations in
Afghanistan (Jalalzai). PMSCs are labeled as hired mercenaries (Salzman) who complete unjust
NATO operations when troop numbers are inadequate; these armed contractors are not
accountable for their actions (Gomez). “PMSC employees… shoot indiscriminately resulting in
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civilian casualties... have used forbidden arms or experimental ammunition prohibited by
international law” (Gomez). The hiring of mercenaries and their unjust operations are prohibited
by IHL, specifically under Protocol One of the Geneva Conventions because mercenaries have
motivation for private, material gain rather than the public good (Salzman).
Civilian Deaths
“The Geneva Convention Protocol 1 is an absolute prohibition against attacks and threats
of attacks on civilians... prohibits indiscriminate attacks... that will either strike military and
civilians objects without distinction or cause death and injury to civilians disproportionate to the
‘concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’” (Davidson). NATO operations in
Afghanistan have produced avoidable civilian casualties and refugee deaths due to deliberate
bombings of civilian ridden areas (Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission). Three
years ago, Louise Arbour, a top United Nations human rights’ officer, stated that the civilian
deaths had already approached “alarming levels” (The Sudbury Star). The most recent UN
documents on civilian casualties take stock of the past five years of the Afghanistan conflict and
number the deaths at around 7,000 (The Guardian, “Afghanistan civilian casualties: year by year,
month by month”). NATO operations encompass varied attacks including bombings, night raids,
and air strikes. Night raids, during which NATO soldiers ambush Afghan homes, have resulted
in the killing of citizens without successfully capturing insurgents, explicitly violating
international humanitarian law (Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission).
Unmanned aerial drones have been a preferred weapon for night raids and air strikes. Often
inaccurate when assigned targeted kills, these machines have resulted in 437 civilian deaths from
2006-2007 alone (Human Rights Watch). International humanitarian law forbids the use of
targeted killing, which Philip Alston, a New York University law professor and the U.N.’s
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special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, defines as, “the intentional, use of lethal force, by
States or their agents acting under colour of law against a specific individual who is not in the
physical custody of the perpetrator” (Alston). NATO uses drones, justifying their use as a means
to fight terrorism, and therefore blurs legal framework applying to IHL (Alston).
Torture
“Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions … prohibits [v]iolence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” (Human Rights News). Torture and
wrongful imprisonment are common methods used to fight the War on Terror by NATO forces.
Torture methods cannot be deemed necessary or justified because as President Obama explains,
“the ‘torture memos’ do not show that intelligence obtained using harsh interrogation techniques
could not have been discovered through alternate methods” (Lang). Bagram Air Force Base in
Afghanistan became a makeshift NATO detention center due to overcrowding (Golden). The
International Committee of the Red Cross has complained about the treatment of prisoners at
Bagram (Golden). Detainees are held in unsanitary conditions, have been imprisoned without
being charged for up to five years (Golden), and are not given the right to an attorney or allowed
to testify (Gebauer, Goetz, and Sandberg). This lack of basic liberties manifests itself in a
plethora of disturbing, inhumane abuses. A Jordanian citizen described the torture he faced while
in Bagram: “threatened with dogs, stripped and photographed ‘in shameful and obscene
positions’ and placed in a cage with a hook and a hanging rope… hung from this hook,
blindfolded… occasionally given hour-long ‘breaks’” (Goldenberg and Meek). This is only one
example of the disturbing trauma that Bagram prisoners must endure due to NATO’s disregard
for international humanitarian law.
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The Result of NATO’s Operations Violate International Humanitarian Law
NATO’s strategies have not only killed civilians, but have also created an unstable
environment for all future residents of Afghanistan. In the wake of NATO operations, Afghan
citizens will have an inadequate infrastructure. The UN Charter specifically bans such behavior:
The Charter specifically prohibits the use of force to topple foreign governments. It goes without saying that all national and International laws forbid the killing of non-combatants…the bombing and other use of force in Afghanistan will inevitably kill and injure large numbers of non-combatants. The October 11 edition of the Vancouver Sun reports 200 people in Afghanistan killed in US bombing raids including 4 United Nations employees…Mass killing of non-combatants is considered by the world community to be the most egregious of crimes. (Davidson)
NATO violated The Charter by bombing critical infrastructure within the borders of
Afghanistan. NATO attempted to remedy this through reconstruction efforts; however, the
violation is still clear.
Bombing
From the onset of operations, NATO extensively bombed Afghan cities and towns and
continues to do so in the present (RTE). For example, after failing twice to take Tarok Kolache, a
small village in Afghanistan, a NATO commander "just wiped it off the map" (Estes). In a futile
attempt to justify this behavior, NATO often claims insurgents are living in a specified city
before bombing it (Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission). This practice violates
the Charter of the United Nations (Davidson). In most cases, there “was contradictory
information as to whether the suspect who was targeted in the attack was really engaged in
insurgent activities” (Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission), but “even if the
accusations…were accurate he was of very limited importance and the military advantage of his
possible elimination cannot justify the collateral killing” (Afghanistan Independent Human
Rights Commission). In other cases, “The effects of airstrikes go beyond civilian deaths...where
!
!
"#
airstrikes hit villages, many civilians had to leave the village because of damage to their homes...
This has led to large numbers of internally displaced persons” (Human Rights News). Attacks
that kill and displace civilians without an acceptable military gain “are thus carried out with
excessive force and constitutes a violation of international humanitarian law” (Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission).
Destruction of Homes
“Pursuant to the Geneva Convention of 1949 (Geneva IV), Section 111, Article 53,
occupying powers are prohibited from destroying any civilian personal property unless it is
‘absolutely necessary’” (Kabul Press). NATO officers confirm “they routinely destroy Afghan
homes, businesses and other structures” (Kabul Press). NATO claims that the destruction is
justified by the presence of explosives, but the “ISAF has no verification process for its
suspicions. ISAF... uses air strikes and artillery to destroy homes, therefore it never knows
whether it made a mistake. It may be that 95% of the ISAF home destructions have been
unjustified” (Kabul Press). This wanton destruction of homes violates the Geneva Convention,
and thus a section of international humanitarian law.
The Failure of Reconstruction
After destroying much of Afghanistan, NATO spent billions trying to fix their mistake
(SIGAR). However, these operations have become ineffective and unable to remedy the
problems created by bombing. Reconstruction efforts are “at risk because of poor planning,
insufficient oversight, and the inability of the Afghan authorities to sustain them“ (SIGAR).
NATO often neglects to create a long-term reconstruction plan, wasting billions of dollars. “The
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan... intends to spend $11.4 billion... to
build... facilities.... Despite this considerable outlay of funds... CSTC-A had not developed a
!
!
""
long-term construction plan” (SIGAR). Specific programs contracted by NATO have been
plagued by corruption and failure. In the building of roads, "numerous layers of subcontractors
would take commissions off the top before using the last remaining dollar to lay the thinnest
layer of asphalt, resulting in roads that crumbled within months" (Theros and Kaldor). Other
issues become prevalent in the building of schools. "Many complained that schools built through
international development assistance lacked basic structural integrity, making them unsafe for
students and teachers" (Theros and Kaldor). NATO's efforts are poorly planned and executed,
and they are counterproductive to the wants and needs of the Afghan people.
Conclusion
The Affirmative team urges affirmation of the IPPF resolution based upon the conduct
of NATO operations. NATO operations are unjustified in Afghanistan due to unlawful intentions
and consistent violations of IHL, resulting in war crimes and destruction of the infrastructure.
International humanitarian law, which specifically speaks to war crimes, is the only applicable
criterion for measurement of justification. As an international actor, NATO is capriciously
operating in Afghanistan. The Affirmative agrees with Jovanovic that NATO should return to the
auspices of the United Nations and cease performing the actions of a rogue organization, similar
to that of the Taliban.
!
!
"#
Works!Cited
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“Afghanistan Civilian Casualties: Year by Year, Month by Month.” Guardian.co.uk. 10 August 2010. Web. 12 February 2011.
Alston, Phillip. "Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions." United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council. 28 May 2010. Web. 11 February 2011.
$%&'()&!*+,,-!*./.,.+0!12+34-!.0!%564+0.-3+0!7%,+&8.0679$!!The!Sudbury!Star9!:2'9!!;(!1+32!! %/+.,+',29!!:2'9!!"#!<2'&)+&=!#>""9!
Bush, George W. "Presidential Address to the Nation." 7 October 2001. Address. Web. 12 February 2011.
Chomsky, Noam, Gilbert Achcar, and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom. Perilous Power: the Middle East & U.S. Foreign Policy : Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War, and Justice. Boulder: Paradigm, 2007. Print
Davidson, Gail. "INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ILLEGALITY OF THE WAR ON AFGHANISTAN." DEFENCE of CANADIAN LIBERTY COMMITTEE/ COMITE de la LIBERTE CANADIENNE. 13 October 2001. Web. 12 February 2011.
Estes, Adam Clarke. "What 25 Tons of Explosives will do to an Afghan Village." Salon.com War Room. 20 January 2011. Web. 12 February 2011. !<.,?.0-@!12A32&9!!$B0-.C2!*(&&)D3E.-3+0@!+!F(--!(5!<+.34!.0!F2+C2&-9$!!The!New!York!Times9!!G!! H2D328'2&!#>">9!!:2'9!!"#!<2'&)+&=!#>""9!
“Founding Act.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 27 May. 1997. Web. 12 February 2011.
Gebauer, Matthias. Goetz, John. "Prisoner Abuse Continues at Bagram Prison in Afghanistan." Salon.com. 21 September 2009. Web. 12 February 2011.!
Goldenberg, Suzanne. Meek, James. "Papers Reveal Bagram Abuse." Gaurdian.co.uk. 18 February 2005. Web. 12 February 2011.
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"#
Golden, Tim. "Foiling U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan." The New York Times. 7 January 2008. Web. 12 February 2011.
Gomez, Jose. "Impact in Human Rights of Private Military and Security Companies’ Activities." UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries. 2007. Web. 11 February 2011.
“International law.” Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute. 19 August 2010. Web. 12 February 2011.
$%&!'()*+,-!.&*-&!*/0!1&234+!536&+&/7!32!829%*/,(:!!;829%*/,(7*/<!=36&4&,9/7>!*/0!5,),7*4>!?--@A*7,3/!BC!D3@/74,&(E!"FFEGGG!H34&,9/!$433A(:I!!Centre!for!Research!on!Globalazition:!H&J4@*4>!""E!KG"":!!L&J:!!"K!H&J4@*4>!KG"":!
Jalalzai, Musa Khan. “ANALYSIS: Private Mercenaries and the Afghan Army.” Daily Times. 2 February 2011. Web. 12 February 2011.
Joya, Malalai. "Any Hope I Had in the Ballot Box Bringing Change in Afghanistan Is Gone." . Web. 14 FebrGuardian.co.uk. The Guardian, 2 November 2010 uary 2011.
M,/N&4E!=7&A%&/:!!;O37,/9!234!H*,)@4&!,/!829%*/,(7*/:P!!Guardian.co.uk:!!KG!Q36&+J&4!KGGR:!!L&J:!"B!H&J4@*4>!KG"":
Lang, Brent. "Obama: Info Gained Doesn't Justify Torture - Political Hotsheet - CBS News." Breaking News Headlines: Business, Entertainment & World News - CBS News. CBS News, 29 April 2009. Web. 14 February 2011.
Nichols, Michelle. Gallagher, Paul. "Bread Harder to Deliver than Bombs." New.Scotsman.com. 08 October 2001. Web. 12 February 2011.
I?A&4*7,3/(!S!T&2,/,7,3/!32!?A&4*7,3/(!J>!7%&!H4&&!?/),/&!T,-7,3/*4>E!$%&(*@4@(!*/0!U/->-)3A&0,*:I!Dictionary,!Encyclopedia!and!Thesaurus!"!The!Free!Dictionary:!L&J:!"B!H&J4@*4>!KG"":
“Program in the History and Theory of International Law.” Institute for International Law and Justice. No date Available. Web. 12 February 2011.
"PRESS RELEASE: SIGAR RELEASES JANUARY 2011 QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS." The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan reconstruction.
January 2011. Web. 12 February 2011. !1*(V,/E!5*4-@(:!I1&S24*+,/9!'/7&4/*7,3/*)!W*X!234!7%&!K"(7!D&/7@4><!$%&!'/7&4/*7,3/*)!W*X!
32!1&-3/(74@-7,3/:I!Transnational!Law!and!Contemporary!Problems!Y"RRRZ<!F"#SK[:!.4,/7:!!
!
!
!
"#
"Requesting Quotes." Famous Quotes. Famous Quotes About.com, 2011. Web. 11 February 2011.!
!!$%&'$()!*+,-!!./012345!61714308!9:;40394:0<!3;=!4>5!431;4!:?!3!65095;308!<
05/@4341:;-A!!;8@!7$B-!!CDDE-!!F,G-!""!?,GHI$HJ!CD""-!!<K$LM%%) M (!M(!3NOL$(MPQ$(-R!!The!Nation-!!CC!!!S,H,'J-!!R3',HMK$TP!?$ %,U!F$H!+N!3QQHMQM+
;+V,'G,H!CD"D-!!F,G-!"C!?,GHI$HJ!CD"".!!"Summary of International and U.S. Law Prohibiting Torture and Other Ill-treatment of Persons in Custody." Human Rights News. 24 May 2004. Web. 12 February 2011. !4L,H+P)!6$HMW$!$(U!X$%U+H)!6$HJ-!!RYIM%UM(O!3NOL$(!/,$K,!NH+'!QL,!ZH+I(U!@[-R!!A!Century!! Foundation!Report-!!CDD\-!!F,G-!!"C!?,GHI$HJ!CD"".!
Toczek, David. "Knowing the Rules: Planning Consideration for NATO Operations." The CBS Interactive Business Network. January-February 2006. Web. 12 February 2011.
"United Nations Silent as US/NATO Forces Destroy Thousands of Afghan Homes." Frontlines 11. of Revolutionary Struggle. The Kabul Press, 5 December 2010. Web. 11 February 20
R2M+%$QM+(P!+N!1(Q,H($QM+($%!>I'$(MQ$HM$(!7$B!M(!3NOL$(MPQ$(!/H$KQMK,P!+N!9+(K,H(!$(U!5]$'[%,!9$P,P-R!!Afghanistan!Independent!Human!Rights!Commission-!!!;+!=$Q,!3V$M%$G%,-!F,G-!!"C!?,GHI$HJ!CD""-!
!!!"90 Dead in NATO Bombing in Afghanistan." RTE News. 4 September 2009. Web. 12
February 2011.! !!!
Elite 8 Round Silver Lake High School v. Plano Senior High School
Negative Constructive
Plano Senior High School International Public Policy Forum
2010-2011 Topic:
“Resolved: NATO military operations in Afghanistan are not justified.”
“On our honor, we pledge that we have received no unauthorized assistance on this work.”
1
Justice is a complex moral concept. Applying it to the resolution requires consideration of
the variety of factors present in war. The affirmative, narrowing its arguments only to specific
NATO actions in Afghanistan, does not debate the full scope of the resolution – and the
framework of international law that they provide is outdated and incomplete. Following the 9/11
attacks, “the world community came to understand terrorism as an act of war,” mandating a more
modern interpretation of the international interactions (Maogoto).
That being said, violation of specific laws is not enough to qualify NATO military
operations as unjust, particularly when laws do not take the big picture into account. Such a
restrictive approach is better described as “truncated” than “concise.” Though law’s support of
ethical policies underlies the affirmative’s use of international law as a criterion for justification,
the black-and-white word of law neglects the full ethical implications of actions. Their reasons to
prefer this framework are flawed. First, the fact that international humanitarian law is accepted in
international politics means little ethically, as the international community once even accepted
immoralities like slavery, meaning IHL does not necessarily guard against all unethical policies,
disproving their second reason. Although international law may apply to NATO as per their third
reason, as an international organization, it does not provide an adequate criterion for evaluating
the justness for which the resolution calls. Finally, while it draws from moral principles, as the
affirmative points out, its ‘conciseness’ does not provide a holistic view of justice.
This debate should instead be weighed by the underlying ethical values of justice.
Although the affirmative may find this “difficult to debate,” it is preferable to a simplistic
alternative. Justice can be analyzed by breaking it down into its two commonly accepted facets.
The first is retributive justice, “the idea of seeking to balance an injustice by rectifying the
situation, or by regaining an inequality that the injustice overturned,” and the second is
2
distributive justice, involving “the distribution of benefits and burdens” (Blackburn). Meeting
either one of these two types of justice without overtly violating the other is sufficient for
justifying military operations.
The affirmative attempts to describe NATO military operations, but does not provide an
adequate definition pertinent to the debate. The idea of “military operations,” according to a joint
doctrine by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, includes not only direct tasks and operations of warfare
but also military operations other than war, known as MOOTW, which “focus on deterring war,
resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities… MOOTW may involve
elements of both combat and noncombat operations” (U.S.).
NATO military operations, including MOOTW, are indeed justified in the retributive and
distributive sense, and thus we negate the resolution that NATO military operations in
Afghanistan are not justified.
Just Intent
The affirmative’s point about intent seems misplaced within a framework of international
law – which is based on action, not intent – but NATO’s intent still proves righteous in the end.
The congressional research service reports that the UN, at the request of Afghan President
Hamid Karzai, asked for NATO’s participation in Afghanistan, calling upon NATO to disarm
militias, reform the justice system, train a national police force and army, provide security for
elections, combat the narcotics industry, and suppress the Taliban (Morelli). The alleged “power
projection” seems to be more opinion than fact, as at the very least, the facts the affirmative
provides are muddled if not misleading. Nichols actually explained that the military strikes were
followed up with a huge wave of international aid to help the millions who were already at risk
3
of starvation; the 7.5 million number was not due to air strikes, but three years of Afghan
drought (Nichols).
While the use of force may violate the UN Charter, an exception is made for self defense.
Ron Suskind, author of The One Percent Doctrine, reveals that in fact 9/11 “emerged from
Afghanistan” (Suskind). Since 9/11 originated in Afghanistan, NATO justly invoked the
principle of self-defense through Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which states “an armed attack
against any one or more of [the member nations] shall be considered an attack against them all”
(Mass). The international community “qualified the September 11 attacks as ‘armed attacks’
against the US, justifying the exercise of self-defense with quasi-unanimous statements of
support” (Maogoto). In fact, NATO was not only permitted to invade but had an obligation to do
so.
When addressing democracy, the affirmative never links a corrupt government to a
violation of international humanitarian law. There is no question that Taliban government was
more oppressive than the current one, but the most important difference between the two is that a
government undergoing democratization is open to change. Moreover, NATO is already taking
steps to decrease corruption by increasing oversight of transportation (“NATO”) and firing
corrupt policemen and other officials (Martinez). While NATO has aptly noted that it “won’t be
able to solve all the corruption problems in the next year,” this does not indicate a lack of effort
or concern on NATO’s part but simply a reality (Martinez). The affirmative’s assertions that
Afghanistan would have been able to overthrow the Taliban are speculative, and there is no proof
that it would have occurred. The Taliban government also fell in late 2001 (“The Rise”), before
NATO takeover, so NATO was not even involved in toppling the government; it was only
involved in building a new one.
4
Just Conduct
While Protocol One states, “A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a
prisoner of war,” the US, a member nation, never ratified it and mercenaries do not serve a
combatant role (International). Rather, “their work is defensive in nature” (Higgins). PMC’s are
responsible for defending Karzai and other notable politicians, defending supply chains, and
defending US government areas, as well as “communications and intelligence, logistical support
and battlefield training and planning” (Khan). Furthermore, affirmative’s speculation is
irrelevant because most of these PMCs are not customers of the US or NATO, but are owned by
Afghanistan. While Gomez in 2007 pointed out the United Nations’ issues with PMC’s, the
United Nations now supports PMCs because they are a necessity (Lynch).
Unfortunately, civilian deaths are a part of any legitimate war. Yet, as the affirmative
notes, they are only illegal if “disproportionate to the ‘concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated’” (Davidson). The affirmative provides examples of how civilians are killed but
never shows the advantage is disproportionate. In fact, the civilian deaths are necessary
consequences of operations to fight terrorist networks and Taliban injustices, preventing more
suffering in the future. Furthermore, the affirmative’s Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission evidence notes that targeted killings are only illegal if they specifically target
innocents, which they do not (“Violations”). Their Alston evidence corroborates that drones are
legal in armed conflict. Their greater precision than traditional weapons actually helps to avoid
civilian casualties (Alston).
Regarding NATO’s treatment of prisoners, the affirmative fails to note that NATO has
rectified past wrongs. The resolution questions whether NATO operations are justified, meaning
they must be evaluated in the present. The affirmative themselves note that Obama is against
5
torture, which has facilitated a phase-out of such techniques. Military leaders now “believe that
running a transparent prison is critical to ending the armed conflict in Afghanistan and hope the
openness will end the Taliban's use of the Bagram prison as a source of propaganda.” In the
summer of 2010, the United States made monumental changes to Bagram, including visitor
centers, HD TVs, recreation facilities, huge cells, modern medical equipment, sanitary
conditions, open air conditions, good food, and detainee reviews that release 50% of inmate and
help them be transported home (Gomez).
Just Results
Civilian casualties do not preclude NATO’s justification. Most civilian casualties are
actually due to insurgents – 80% in 2008 (Cook) – and fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda is
meant to reduce terrorism and oppression, preventing future death and suffering. The deaths that
do occur, then, are so difficult to weigh that focus must be on the “intention to avoid harming
civilians,” (Walzer 137) rather than immediate numbers. This is now prioritized in NATO’s plan.
As of April 2010 they have revamped their strategy to “focus on protecting the population, rather
than on holding terrain or targeting the enemy” (Fick).
NATO’s destruction of homes is simply necessary, as “forces are encountering empty
homes and farm buildings left so heavily booby-trapped by Taliban insurgents that the
Americans have been systematically destroying hundreds of them,” as well as “denying Taliban
insurgents hiding places and fighting positions” to actually improve security for civilians in
Afghanistan. NATO is mainly destroying “vacant houses and farm buildings so heavily rigged
that soldiers have started referring to them as house-borne improvised explosive devices.” In
villages that were occupied, NATO not only got permission from owners to destroy property, but
6
also compensated them for it (Shah). The affirmative’s claim that up to 95% of home destruction
is unjustified is pure speculation.
Finally, their claim that reconstruction is failing is not at all connected to NATO. Their
main source, SIGAR, only monitors US reconstruction efforts and does not cover the scope of
the debate. The cited incidents of failed reconstruction attempts are remotely linked to NATO, as
Theros and Kaldor referred to the practices of nongovernmental organizations receiving
international aid money. As far as reconstruction goes, NATO meets success with Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Helmand Provincial Governor Mohammad Gulab Mangal
explained that the people “appreciate PRT contributions to the villages through security, the
distribution of alternative crops, installation of bridges, the digging of wells, and building
schools and clinics…Successes are happening." (“Provincial”). Nonetheless, NATO military
operations are still a work in progress; just because they have not created a perfect society in
Afghanistan does not deny exponential improvements through reconstruction.
Retributive Justice
On the basis of retributive justice and the 9/11 attacks, NATO military operations are
justified, “using military action in Afghanistan to rid the country of those who have brought
injustices first against their own country's people, and then against [The United States]” (Carr).
Since 9/11 originated in Afghanistan, NATO justly invoked Article 5 in 2001, yet the United
States refused NATO assistance until 2003 (“Timeline”). Prominent American political
philosopher Michael Walzer underscores “that 9/11 was a kind of declaration of war by a non
state organization… the war in Afghanistan was a justified response” (Walzer 2006). Not only
7
was it was not a war of aggression, but 9/11 was a sufficient cause for justified military
operations.
Furthermore, the Taliban and al-Qaeda were inextricably intertwined, making
suppressing the Taliban a necessary NATO goal. Walzer notes that the Taliban “was not merely
harboring the terrorists who had attacked us, but was in active partnership with them,” since they
“provided al-Qaeda with all the benefits of sovereignty, most importantly with a territorial base
where they could bring recruits, open training camps, and prepare these recruits for action around
the world” (Walzer 2004). Intervening in Afghanistan, NATO was aptly targeting those
responsible for 9/11. Although US-led efforts made great strides in driving out al-Qaeda from
Afghanistan, it was still “a potent force in Afghanistan” in 2004 and had “not been driven out of
the country” (Nickerson). Additionally, al-Qaeda was “financing the Taliban insurgents in
Afghanistan,” necessitating targeting both groups with NATO military operations starting in
2003 (Nickerson).
The fact that the “war” against terrorism is a preventive one also justifies invasion of
Afghanistan. Walzer furthers, “If we can prevent further attacks, if we can begin to roll up the
terrorist cells, that will be a major victory. And it is very, very important, because ‘successes’
like September 11 have energizing effects; they produce a rush of recruits and probably a new
willingness to fund the terrorist networks” (Walzer 138). Preventing the growth of terrorist cells
right now is essential because allowing them to proliferate would mean a much larger and more
costly conflict in the future.
NATO military operations are the necessary response to terrorist attacks on a NATO
member nation. The attack on the Taliban insurgency and al-Qaeda upholds retributive justice,
and continue today to rectify the situation in Afghanistan.
8
Distributive Justice
When the Taliban’s reign ended, Afghanistan’s citizenry had the worst standard of living
in the world (Harley). In 2003, when the new Afghan government took control, the annual per
capita GDP was less than $200. The infant mortality rate was ranked last in the world at 165 per
1,000 live births. Only 10 percent of children attended school, none of which were girls.
(Campbell). Macroeconomic estimates indicate improvement in Afghanistan’s economy since
NATO intervention. In 2009, even during a recession, its economy grew by 22% and inflation
largely stabilized (Shuster). Furthermore, through NATO assistance, “85% of Afghans now have
access to basic health services” (Cook). If NATO can create a stable and safe Afghanistan, more
economic growth will follow (Fick). This domino effect will further improve standard of living
across the board, and finally get Afghans into legal employment sectors and away from the
opium farms that finance the Taliban and al-Qaeda and into sustainable industries. (Whitaker).
Furthermore, NATO makes democratic institutions more accessible to Afghan citizens in
a variety of ways. First, it has allowed for increased political participation: the cornerstone of
democracy. Unlike in previous years, the government did not ban any political parties, other than
the Taliban. Over 90 accredited political parties were registered with the Ministry of Justice
(“Afghanistan”).
On the other hand, the Taliban has used intimidation and scare mongering in order to stop
people from participating. According to Human Rights Watch, in the south and southeast, anti-
government forces opposed to the elections managed to drive down participation to nearly a third
of registered voters. A Taliban spokesman declared that all parliamentary candidates were high
9
priority targets, and in 2005 antigovernment forces killed seven parliamentary candidates, two
parliamentarians-elect, and at least four election workers (“Afghanistan”). The climate of fear the
affirmative mentions is actually caused by the Taliban. Under the Taliban in early 2001, an edict
was announced that all Hindus were required to wear yellow identification badges, a flashback in
Western minds to the oppression of Jews in Nazi Germany. With international pressure and the
invasion that toppled the regime, the edict was prevented from being implemented (United
States).
Second, the Bonn Agreement and NATO’s involvement in creating Afghanistan’s
Constitution have bolstered human rights in the nation and established a legitimate judicial
system. The almost endless list of new rights promised to the Afghan citizens include no allowed
discrimination, innocence until proven guilty, prohibition of torture, the right to a trial, freedom
of expression, freedom of press, freedom of speech, and the right to protest (Islamic Republic).
Additionally, it is only the influence of foreign agents that mitigates human rights abuses in
Afghanistan, as Barack Obama “calling [a law legalizing the rape of one’s wife] ‘abhorrent’
influenced Afghanistan’s government to alter the language of this law, signifying how “NATO
and the United States political pressures can impact the respect of civil liberties” (Yamasaki).
Yet to ensure full liberty, the Taliban must still be rooted out in certain regions. The
constitution provides for freedom of assembly and association; however, this right is restricted in
practice. Increased Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other antigovernment activity, particularly in the south
and east, has forced UN agencies and NGOs to temporarily cancel or curtail activities at times
during the year. (“Afghanistan”). Furthermore, the internationally created Bonn Agreement,
which sanctioned the creation of the interim government in Afghanistan, has finally brought a
justice system in Afghanistan that meets international standards. This is in accordance with
10
Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law, and Afghan traditions, meaning that it
takes into consideration both Afghan culture and democratic norms. (“Agreement”). Yet, rooting
out the Taliban is the only way to maximize the potential of this judicial reform. “Many
municipal and provincial authorities relied on some interpretation of Islamic law and traditional
tribal codes of justice. In major cities, courts primarily decided criminal cases, although civil
cases were often resolved in the informal system. In rural areas local elders and shuras were the
primary means of settling both criminal matters and civil disputes; they also sometimes allegedly
levied unsanctioned punishments. Some estimates suggested that 80 percent of all cases went
through the shuras, leaving many vulnerable to violation of their legal rights, as customary
shuras or ‘jirgas’ did not adhere to the constitutional rights of citizens and often violated the
rights of women and minorities” (“Afghanistan”).
Relieving Afghans from the oppression of the Taliban is necessary for distributive
justice, because an innocent civilian population has been subjected to unfair and unjust burdens.
Since NATO operations seek to improve their condition and they have made the necessary steps
in the right direction, they uphold the principle of distributive justice.
11
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!
Elite 8 Round
Affirmative Rebuttal Essay
Silver Lake Jr./Sr. High School, Silver Lake, KS (Aff) Vs.
Plano Senior High School, Plano, TX (Neg)
For the International Public Policy Forum
On the topic:
“Resolved: NATO Military Operations in Afghanistan Are Not Justified.”
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Affirmative Rebuttal
“Despite a century of efforts to fashion international laws regarding the conduct of
warfare, might always manages to triumph over the rule of law and ‘victors’ always seem to
decide what is justice.” (Kabul Press). NATO is ignoring the very foundational laws upon which
it was built. The judges should vote Affirmative based on two main reasons: 1) NATO
operations violate International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and 2) true justice requires, first and
foremost, the framework of law. It is only within IHL that specific actions and purposes can be
evaluated. The ends of NATO operations cannot justify their means.
Defining Operations
The Affirmative is willing to concede the Negative’s contention that NATO military
operations include “military operations other than war,” or MOOTW, as well as the specific
tasks associated with war (Toczek). However, NATO presence is neither a task nor a MOOTW.
The Affirmative contends that NATO actions and presence are separate issues; therefore,
Negative must win that the way in which NATO accomplishes its tasks is justified.
The Means of Deciding Justification
While the Negative disputes IHL as a framework, they provide no evidence to prefer their
method of deciding justification. Unfortunately, at this point in the debate, it is too late to explain
the importance of distributive and retributive justice. The Affirmative will contend that IHL is
the only applicable criterion for this debate for reasons of its specificity to international modern
military operations. This is the only way to determine what is justified rather than an
unsubstantiated, two-pronged notion of justice.
Affirmative Criterion
Negative’s responses contrary to international law are inadequate. It is true that the
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international community once accepted slavery, but as Marcus Raskin writes, “international law
continues as an instrument for the violated...seeking moral, political and social recompense”
(Raskin). He describes IHL as the forum through which the oppressed may change the system
(Raskin). Slavery existed in the absence of IHL and the presence of the notions of "retributive
and distributive justice." This represents the consequences of a world without specific statutes of
an international law. Thus the Affirmative’s first and second reasons to prefer are still valid. In
relation to the Negative’s argument that IHL is “truncated” and not “adequate” for evaluating
justness, the Affirmative has two responses: 1) the opposition does not have an advocate stating
that distributive or retributive justice is applicable to an international organization; IHL is best in
this regard (NATO,”Founding Act”), 2) IHL is also uniquely applicable in evaluating the
justification of military operations. In the past, the contemporary laws of warfare have
effectively prosecuted instances of unjust war-fighting (Pictet, “Development and Principles of
International Humanitarian Law”). Unless the Negative’s framework can boast the same
empirical effectiveness, the judges should default to IHL. The Affirmative’s final reason to
prefer is conciseness. Retributive and distributive justice are vague principles. What constitutes a
“benefit” or a “burden” (Blackburn)? Any organization using their might will justify its actions
by claiming benefits and ignoring burdens. The only objective and paramount framework is IHL,
which is grounded in specific treaties and agreements (Cornell University Law School LII).
Negative Criterion
First, the opposition's vague notions of retributive and distributive justice are only viable
insofar that IHL is upheld at the same time. Rene Uruena, who holds an LL.M. (laudatur) in
international law, contends, “Distributive justice through international law is not mere rhetoric
or wishful thinking. However, it does require thinking of international law as a norm, a language
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and a platform for mobilization” (Uruena, “Distributive Justice through International Law?”).
The Negative’s support of distributive justice is commendable. However, it is possible for
NATO to facilitate this justice without violating IHL. The means by which NATO has tried to
attain distributive justice is the problem. Second, IHL is the ethical safeguard concerning the
Negative’s idea of retributive justice. In the absence of this framework, retributive justice
collapses to cyclical violence bent on revenge (Maiese).
Violations of IHL
All violations previously discussed are still valid points, but the Affirmative will focus on
the five most egregious instances of NATO’s actions. Furthermore, these violations are also
reasons that NATO is undermining retributive and distributive justice.
Destruction of Homes
“Pursuant to the Geneva Convention of 1949 (Geneva IV), Section 111, Article 53,
occupying powers are prohibited from destroying any civilian personal property unless it is
‘absolutely necessary’”(Kabul Press). With mutual agreement that NATO destroys homes, the
question of necessity presents itself. These home destructions are stipulated violations of IHL
for three main reasons. First, destruction of homes counters the military goals of NATO;
secondly, private residences do not pose a threat; and finally, NATO’s system of recompense
cannot be used as justification.
The Affirmative contends that destroying homes contradicts “Petraeus’s
counterinsurgency strategy, which calls for respecting property” (Shah). Even the local populace
“complained that the demolitions have gone far beyond...necessary” (Shah), demonstrating
NATO’s clear disregard for personal property in this instance.
Although ISAF forces declare a threat, neither suspicions nor tips “constitute such
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necessity...Homes cannot be destroyed just because they might...pose a risk” (Kabul Press).
Frequently, claims are exaggerated or just false. NATO’s assertions cannot justify leveling
neighborhoods (Shah). As cited previously, 95% of demolitions were unjustified (Kabul Press).
This percent comes from several factors: ISAF air strikes and artillery bombings entail no
verification process, there are no preliminary searches, and the “evidence” is rumor (Kabul
Press).
Negative’s deeming that “permission” and “compensation” justify this action is wrong,
because these “retributions” are not enough to meet Article 53. NATO’s actions should still fall
within the boundaries of IHL. Furthermore, NATO’s idea of “permission” is calling citizens;
when that fails, they just destroy the house (Shah). In a country with 12% of the population
having phones (Brummitt), these efforts are piecemeal. The failing ISAF efforts are innumerable,
“10,000 homes...destroyed, but only 200 claims filed, with only 50 having been paid” (Kabul
Press). NATO’s compensation only covers 50% of the damages (Noori and Porter). Additionally,
to Afghans, “compensation is just kicking dirt in our eyes” (Shah). Absent IHL, Negative’s
notion of justice cannot be achieved for the Afghan populace.
Democracy Promotion
Although NATO entered the conflict in 2003, they have fully incorporated the unjust
operations that the United States used at the beginning of the war. The U.S. is the main portion
of leadership for NATO operations in Afghanistan (Morelli). Therefore, those goals, such as
toppling the Taliban, are violations supported by NATO.
The U.S. violated international law when they overthrew the Taliban government
(Davidson) by instigating destabilization when their “air strikes in Afghanistan paved the way
for the regime to be toppled...” (“The Rise”). These NATO supported actions caused starvation
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due to the halt of foreign aid to the region (Nichols and Gallagher).
The Negative claims that stopping corruption will take time (Martinez). However, in this
case, NATO is incapable of solving the problems. The Negative uses information from NATO
which is biased, and their indictments of Affirmative evidence are unfounded. The “democracy”
NATO has tried to enact is “worse than the Taliban” (Filkins). The government built by NATO
has been handed from the people (Theros and Kaldor) and into the hands of the corrupt (The
Islamic Peace and Reform Movement of Afghanis).
Reconstruction contractors owned by NATO constitute a part of their corrupt operations
(Theros and Kaldor). Corruption in regards to “reconstruction” is growing as new contracts are
made (Theros and Kaldor). NATO troops are also failing in other sectors. NATO forces have not
increased women's rights, rather NATO ignores the use of the “the plight of women as war
propaganda” (Joya).
Despite the fact that the Taliban was oppressive, NATO operations have made the
situation worse. Separate from stifling key grassroots initiatives (Theros and Kaldor), the
opportunity for being “open to change” has been lost (Kinzer) because NATO has externally
forced “democracy” (Scahill). The Afghanistan people would have been able to overthrow the
Taliban of their own volition (Chomsky and Achcar), and the grassroots approach would have
proven much more successful (Theros and Kaldor).
Civilian Casualties
The Negative team attempts to explain NATO operation casualties as necessary to
prevent future suffering. This argument can be disproven as current Taliban members are
showing extreme resistance (Hyder) and the operations are proving to be unsuccessful (Hussain).
Afghanistan casualties due to NATO operations have increased civilian deaths, as a report
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indicates that over 200 innocent civilians were killed during only a two-week period, February
13th to February 27th of this year (Hyder).
Night Raids
Night raids have been unsuccessful, resulting in casualties, and are increasing
dramatically. “There were nearly 20 each night over the past three months” (Graham-Harrison).
NATO troops often gain false leads from informants due to the heavy pressure on informants to
keep information flowing which results in numerous night raids that are deadly and without
purpose (Graham-Harrison). Night raid operations by NATO troops are disproportionate,
violating international law. No military advantage is occurring while civilian casualties continue
to spike and the number of Taliban members killed or captured continue to be slim to none.
Drones
The Negative team cites Alston as saying aerial drones are legal in armed conflict.
The Affirmative team has multiple responses. First, aerial drone strikes are simply
assassinations, not armed conflict, because the attacks are one sided as no members of the
Taliban fire back at drones or the NATO troops operating them. Secondly, Alston never supports
the use of drones, speaking out against their violation of international law. “The number of
killings by unmanned drones has escalated significantly, even as critical questions remain about
who is being targeted, on what legal basis, and the measures the U.S. is taking to ensure that its
attacks are lawful” (Alston, “Alston says drone attacks on Pakistan-Afghanistan border may
violate international law”). Thirdly, NATO forces have refused to specify who has been killed
and for what reasons, blurring the legal framework of IHL (Alston, “Promotion and protection of
all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to
development, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
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executions”).
Conclusion
NATO operations are not justified in Afghanistan. Retributive and distributive justice
cannot stand as divided criteria. Operations must fall within the bounds of international law or
risk becoming mutated and corrupt. The NATO operations in Afghanistan have violated
international law on countless occasions, resulting in death, starvation, destruction, and lack of
rights. The Affirmative team stresses that international law is the only applicable statute to
provide the necessary framework to determine the justness of international military operations by
an international organization. The Affirmative concurs with the introductory author in
concluding, “Obeying the rules of war is not simply a moral imperative; it almost always makes
good military sense. The irony in Afghanistan is that... NATO may also be destroying its own exit
strategy.” (Kabul Press)
! "
Works Cited Alston, Phillip. "NYU Law - News: Alston Says Drone Attacks on Pakistan-Afghanistan Border
May Violate International Law." New York University School of Law. 30 Oct. 2009. Web. 08 Mar. 2011.
Alston, Phillip. "Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions." United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council. 28 May 2010. Web. 11 February 2011.
Blackburn, Simon. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994. Print. Brummitt, Chris. "Cell-phone Use Booming in Afghanistan - Technology & Science –Wireless -
Msnbc.com." MSNBC.com. 28 Aug. 2007. Web. 07 Mar. 2011. Chomsky, Noam, Gilbert Achcar, and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom. Perilous Power: the Middle
East & U.S. Foreign Policy : Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War, and Justice. Boulder: Paradigm, 2007. Print
Davidson, Gail. "INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ILLEGALITY OF THE WAR ON
AFGHANISTAN." DEFENCE of CANADIAN LIBERTY COMMITTEE/ COMITE de la LIBERTE CANADIENNE. 13 October 2001. Web. 12 February 2011.
Filkins, Dexter. "Inside Corrupt-istan, a Loss of Faith in Leaders." The New York Times. 4
September 2010. Web. 12 February 2011. “Founding Act.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 27 May. 1997. Web. 12 February 2011. Graham-Harrison, Emma. "NATO's Afghan Night Raids Come with High Civilian Cost Top
News Reuters." Reuters.com. 24 Feb. 2011. Web. 07 Mar. 2011. Hussain, Zahid. The Scorpion's Tail: the Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan and
How It Threatens America. New York: Free, 2010. Print. Hyder, Akhtar Ali. "Afghanistan Civilian Casualties Spike; Officials Say 200 Killed in 2-week
Period." Surgardaily.com. 27 Feb. 2011. Web. 07 Mar. 2011. “International law.” Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute. 19 August
2010. Web. 12 February 2011. Joya, Malalai. "Any Hope I Had in the Ballot Box Bringing Change in Afghanistan Is Gone."
Guardian.co.uk. The Guardian, 2 November 2010. Web. 14 February 2011.
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Kinzer, Stephen. “Voting for Failure in Afghanistan.” Guardian.co.uk. 20 November 2009. Web. 14 February 2011.
Maiese, Michelle. "Retributive Justice." Beyond Intractability - More Constructive Approaches
to Destructive Conflict. May 2004. Web. 07 Mar. 2011. Martinez, Rachel. "Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan Will Take Time." NATO Training
Mission - Afghanistan. NATO Training Mission, 3 June 2010. Web. 01 Mar. 2 2011. Morelli, Vincent, and Paul Belkin. NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance.
Rep. no. 7-5700. Congressional Research Service, December 3, 2009. Print. Noori, Shah, and Gareth Porter. "Residents Of Razed Afghan Village Dispute U.S. Case For
Destruction — Global Issues." Global Issues : Social, Political, Economic and Environmental Issues That Affect Us All — Global Issues. 18 Feb. 2011. Web. 07 Mar. 2011
Pictet, Jean. Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law. Dordrecht, Neth.:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1985. Print. Raskin, Marcus. "Re-framing International Law for the 21st Century: The International Law of
Reconstruction." Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (1999): 513-28. Print. "The Rise and Fall of the Taliban PRI.ORG." PRI: Public Radio International. Public Radio
International, 15 July 2009. Web. 01 Mar. 2011. Scahill, Jeremy. "America's Failed War of Attrition in Afghanistan." The Nation. 22 November
2010. Web. 12 February 2011. Shah, Taimoor, and Rod Nordland. "NATO Is Razing Booby-Trapped Afghan Homes." New
York Times 16 Nov. 2010: n. page. Web. 27 Feb. 2011. The Islamic Peace and Reform Movement of Afghanis. “Afghanistan: Sovereignty and Military
Occupation 46 Countries, 155,000 Foreign Troops." Centre for Research on Globalazition. February 11, 2011. Web. 12 February 2011.
Theros, Marika and Kaldor, Mary. "Building Afghan Peace from the Ground Up." A Century
Foundation Report. 2005. Web. 12 February 2011. Toczek, David. "Knowing the Rules: Planning Consideration for NATO Operations." The CBS
Interactive Business Network. January-February 2006. Web. 12 February 2011. Urena, Rene. "Distributive Justice through International Law?" Melting Law. 24 Sept. 2010.
Web. 07 Mar. 2011
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"United Nations Silent as US/NATO Forces Destroy Thousands of Afghan Homes." Frontlines
of Revolutionary Struggle. The Kabul Press, 5 December 2010. Web. 11 February 2011.
Elite 8 Round Silver Lake High School v. Plano Senior High School
Negative Rebuttal
Plano Senior High School
International Public Policy Forum
2010-2011 Topic: “Resolved: NATO military operations in Afghanistan are not justified.”
“On our honor, we pledge that we have received no unauthorized assistance on this work.”
1
The affirmative is mistaken in asserting that presence is separate from military
operations. NATO presence in Afghanistan is predicated on its invasion – which is a military
operation. Having a military presence is an operation itself. When including MOOTW in the
definition, the debate encompasses NATO presence.
Though Raskin may be an IHL supporter, the affirmative does not validate his claim that
IHL supports justice. They explain no way in which the oppressed could use it to ‘change the
system.’ The ‘empirical effectiveness’ the affirmative claims is also irrelevant. The resolution
does not call for action or empirical results; it asks for an evaluation of justness. While IHL is
uniquely applicable in evaluating legality, this is insufficient to prove the resolution – each of the
laws must then be explicitly connected to the ethical concept of justice. Instead of adding a layer
of obfuscation to the resolution and muddling the nature of true justice, it is much clearer to
judge the debate in terms of the ethical concepts involved. Anything else is a truncated view of
the resolution.
This is especially important considering that IHL changes with time; interpretations of
justice through IHL alone can be muddled with laws from inappropriate contexts. In fact, the
laws cited by the affirmative are from before “September 11, [when] the US response and the
international community’s approval of the military action represent[ed] a new paradigm in
international law relating to the use of force” (Maogoto), and they provide an outdated viewpoint
that can result in contradictions or obstructions of justice.
While the affirmative relies on unwarranted claims by ‘advocates’ to qualify their
framework, the negative does not need one to connect justice to NATO. Justice and its associated
concepts are principles; they are applicable to everything, and the resolution calls for them to be
applied to NATO.
2
The broad applicability of the principles of justice does not make them unsuitably vague
for this debate. The “benefits and burdens” distributive justice entails “var[y] with judicandum
[the actor being evaluated] and context” (Borchert). They clearly include the livelihoods and
rights of Afghans in a debate about NATO in Afghanistan.
Arguing that meeting IHL is required to uphold distributive justice is entirely wrong. The
affirmative only backs up this claim with Urueña, who actually argued it was merely possible for
IHL to effect change – in Colombia. Urueña himself states, “distributive justice… implies
priorities and moral choices, an eye for detail and consequences. International law, admittedly,
fares quite low in either and all of these categories” (Urueña). Even advocates seem wary of IHL
as an agent of justice, as Urueña wrote, “maybe the legal language is not up to the task, but
maybe it is. There is much to be wary of” (Urueña).
The affirmative misinterprets the application of retributive justice. While the rule of law
may be a method states use to prevent cycles of revenge, their own Maiese notes that “the idea
that wrongdoers should be ‘paid back’ for their bad deeds need not lead to a demand for
primitive vengeance… Retribution can therefore be seen as vengeance curbed by outside
intervention and the principles of proportionality and individual rights” (Maiese). Once again,
justice is not founded on law – it is founded on principles.
Actions can be considered just if they uphold at least one type of justice without violating
another. NATO military operations, in this case, uphold both, and therefore the negative
contends that NATO military operations in Afghanistan are justified. The negative will show
first how affirmative arguments fail to hold true in either framework, and, second, how NATO
military operations meet the essential criteria for justification, and are therefore justified
regardless of arguments about law.
3
Homes
In this argument, the affirmative highlights flaws within IHL. They argue NATO must
avoid civilian deaths at all costs while also stipulating that NATO disrespects property by
destroying homes. This puts NATO in a double bind, either protecting the “house-borne
improvised explosive devices” (Shah) at the expense of human lives or protecting civilians by
destroying abandoned homes. Lives naturally take priority and mandate the destruction NATO
would otherwise avoid. If verification is ever lacking, it is because “searching empty homes was
often too dangerous,” risking troops’ lives. Furthermore, the affirmative ignores the extremely
important detail that most destruction is to “vacant houses and farm buildings” (Shah). It is
immoral to beg the question when lives are on the line.
Shah’s article, which the affirmative extensively cites, is actually mostly favorable
towards the destruction. It “has widespread support among Afghan officials and even some
residents, and has been accompanied by an equally determined effort to hand out cash
compensation to homeowners,” only unfavorable to a minority of residents (Shah). The claim
that 95% of destructions are unjustified is far from a ‘statistic’ – it is pure speculation with no
evidence. The affirmative then misquotes Shah again, as NATO did not get permission only
when villages were “completely empty” (Shah). The claim that only 50% of destruction is
compensated for is only true for one small village: Tarok Kolache (Noori).
Deaths
The Taliban would kill innocents regardless of NATO. Civilian deaths are only illegal if
“disproportionate to the ‘concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’” (Davidson). Since
the anticipated advantage aims to prevent many future deaths from terrorism and oppression, it
remains both legal and justified. The affirmative also failed to refute key arguments: Civilian
4
deaths are so hard to weigh that the “intention to avoid harming citizens” (Walzer 137) is
enough, and the new NATO strategy focuses on “protecting the population, rather than on
holding terrain or targeting the enemy (Fick), as 80% of these casualties were not due to NATO
in 2008 (Cook).
The affirmative’s example of night raids as excessive neglects the concept that “more
than 80 percent of recent raids ended without a shot being fired” (Graham-Harrison). It is also
false that they have met with minimal success; they have actually “begun to put heavy pressure
on the Taliban and change the momentum in the war in Afghanistan.” In fact, “1,572 operations
over three months…resulted in 368 insurgent leaders killed or captured, and 968 lower-level
insurgents killed and 2,477 captured” (Shanker).
Drone strikes are another failed affirmative attempt to extrapolate from a small example
that overall military operations are unjustified. The Taliban’s inability to attack back does not
make drones unjust, but effective. Even the affirmative’s Alston says “critical questions” remain
and that drone attacks “may violate international law” (Alston NYU). His report notes that as
“drones have greater surveillance capability and afford greater precision than other weapons,
they can better prevent collateral civilian casualties and injuries” (Alston Report). Alston
“acknowledged that [targeted killings] may be lawful in the limited context of armed conflict”
(Alston NYU).
Justice in Afghanistan
While the affirmative addresses the basic principles of retributive and distributive justice,
not once do they mention the specifics addressed in the negative constructive.
NATO military operations clearly uphold not just retributive justice but also international
law through Article 5, which is conceded by the affirmative. Since 9/11 was an armed attack
5
against the US that originated from Afghanistan, NATO military operations are justified as a
response of self-defense. Due to the Taliban funding of al-Qaeda and the presence of the group,
NATO operations meet the criteria for retributive justice, and attacks on both the Taliban and al-
Qaeda fall under its scope (Nickerson). Furthermore, operations in Afghanistan are necessary to
prevent the growth of terrorist cells thereby decreasing the potential deaths (Walzer).
NATO met distributive justice through efforts to improve the conditions of Afghanistan, as it
significantly improved the economy (Shuster), broadened health care access (Cook), and
promoted a better standard of living (Whitaker). Contrary to the affirmative’s assertions, the
current government of Afghanistan, though not perfect, is definitely more democratic than the
Taliban government, and the affirmative’s own source notes a recent poll that found that “90
percent of the Afghan people preferred representative government, while only 6 percent called
for the return of Taliban rule” and that Afghans have “fears of a premature withdrawal of U.S.
and NATO forces” (Theros). The Bonn Agreement and NATO’s influence in creating the
constitution have increased Afghans’ rights (Islamic) and created a system in which democratic
ideals and Afghan culture are prominent (“Agreement”).
In ignoring the boons NATO has brought, the affirmative commits the converse of the
fallacy it warned against – claiming burdens while ignoring benefits. The fundamental justice
that NATO has proven itself to uphold is the true crux of this debate.
6
Works Cited
“Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of
Permanent Government Institutions." Washington Post. The Washington Post Company,
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