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process safety and environmental protection 8 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 113–120

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Process Safety and Environmental Protection

journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate /psep

uantitative evaluation of precautions on chemicalanker operations

zcan Arslan ∗

aritime Transportation and Management Engineering Department, ITU Maritime Faculty,4940 Tuzla, Istanbul, Turkey

a b s t r a c t

Large quantities of liquid chemicals are carried by chemical tankers all over seas. Chemical cargoes have different

properties and chemical tankers are complex ships that are designed to carry different types of chemical cargoes.

Carriage of chemical cargoes contains different hazards both for human life and marine environment. There are

several cargo operations that are regularly done on chemical tankers such as loading, discharging, inerting, washing

tanks, sampling, and freeing gas. These operations constitute their own risks. Therefore, risk assessment has become

a critical issue in maritime industry. The present investigation of this study is attempting to examine the priorities of

precautions that are taken by chemical tankers before, during, and after cargo operations. Analytic hierarchy process

(AHP) is used for prioritizing the precautions in order to clarify the risk assesment option that will be used for pro-

active approach to prevent marine casualties. The main aim of this study is to identify an appropriate management

tool to increase the level of safety for chemical tankers during cargo operations at a terminal by using the results of

AHP application.

© 2008 The Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Safety; Chemical tanker; Risk assessment; AHP; Maritime; Transportation

. Introduction

arge quantities of liquid chemicals are transported by tankerhips. There are several weaknesses and threats that arencreasing risks of chemical cargo transportation by shipsArslan and Er, 2008). Chemical cargoes have different proper-ies, and many of them represent a health and safety hazard,hich is a critical issue for the tanker industry (Karimi et al.,

002). Chemical tankers are under several risks that may occururing the loading, traveling, and unloading. Care should beaken to minimize this risk as far as practicable in each cargoandling case, based upon the best knowledge and technologyn the construction and equipment of the ship and the prop-rties of the cargoes that the ships intend to carry (Altuntas,997). Chemical tankers are complex vessels that are designedo carry different types of chemical cargoes. Some cargoeseed heating, some need refrigerating/freezing, some muste kept under inert conditions, some need to be carried in

tainless steel tanks, and some are flammable, explosive,r give off noxious vapor (Hanninen and Rytkönen, 2006).

∗ Tel.: +90 505 713 47 54; fax: +90 216 395 45 00.E-mail address: arslano@itu.edu.tr.Received 22 January 2008; Accepted 30 June 2008

957-5820/$ – see front matter © 2008 The Institution of Chemical Engioi:10.1016/j.psep.2008.06.006

These properties require careful consideration during thecargo planning process and loading. Cargo loading plan ver-ification needs to be made regarding the chemical ship type,tank coating compatibility, compatibility with other cargo, andthe environmental controls required during transportation. Inaddition, the venting requirements, monitoring equipment,vapor detection, compatible fire protection medium, densitylimitations of the product in relation to the holding tank con-struction, and pumping requirements are important criteriafor safe cargo handling and navigation of ship (INTERTANKO,2006).

In this study, analytic hierarchy process (AHP) methodis used for identifying and prioritizing the safety and envi-ronmental precautions’ taxonomy that should be used bychemical tanker operations. Section 2 of this study describesthe safety and environmental chemical liquid transporta-tion hazards. Section 3 illustrates brief berthing and cargooperation procedures. Section 4 describes the AHP, Section 5describes the AHP Application results and Section 6 illustratesthe case applications.

neers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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114 process safety and environment

2. Hazards associated with the transport ofbulk chemicals

2.1. Health hazards

Many chemicals irritate or toxic effect on the skin or on themucous membranes of the eyes, nose, throat, and lungs inthe gas or vapor state (Altuntas, 1997). Impacts of chemicalson health hazards are rated as following:

• “0”: no likelihood of producing injury;• “1”: minimum hazard. These chemical threshold limits are

above 500 ppm.• “2”: some hazard. These chemical threshold limits are

100–500 ppm.• “3”: moderately hazardous chemicals. These chemical

threshold limits are 10–100 ppm• “4”: severely hazardous chemicals. These chemical thresh-

old limits are below 10 ppm.

Irritating vapors of chemical materials to the skin or themucous membranes of the eyes, nose, throat, and lungs arerated as follows:

• “0”: chemicals that are non-volatile.• “1”: chemicals that cause a slight smarting of the eyes in

cases of high concentration.• “2”: chemicals that cause moderate irritation.• “3”: chemicals that are moderately irritating or volatile.• “4” chemicals that are severe eye or throat irritants, vapors

that are capable of coursing eye or lung injury and thatcannot be tolerated even at low concentrations. (ISGOTT,2006).

2.1.1. Odour thresholdThe odour of a potentially dangerous vapor may be hiddenby another odour. In addition, a certain vapor is likely to pro-duce olfactory fatigue, which is a deadening of the sense ofsmell. For these reasons, the sense of smell alone is not areliable indicator of the presence or absence of a dangerousvapor. The smallest concentration is expressed in parts permillion by volume in air and is not an absolute value. It willvary between individuals and will vary from day to day for anyperson (Kunichkin, 2006).

2.1.2. Lethal dose: LD50 and LC50LD50 is a statistical estimate of the dosage necessary to kill50% of people over 10 months with in 48 h. It is usuallyexpressed in terms of the weight of poison per unit of bodyweight, most often as mg of chemical/kg of animal (mg/kg).The concentration of about 60 times LD50 is lethal to a per-son. LC50 is a concentration that, within 40 h is likely to kill50% of the test animal species. It is usually expressed as ml ormg of chemical gas of vapor/kg of animal (ml/kg or mg/kg) orppm. The values of LD50 and LC50 are a means of measuringthe lethal dose and judging the conditions. Thus, these valuesare substantially different from the TLV values in the purposefor using (IBC Code, 2006).

2.2. Fire hazards

Flashpoint, boiling point, flammability limit, and autoignitiontemperature vary between different liquid chemicals, whichtherefore have different fire characteristics. Thus, carriers

otection 8 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 113–120

need different fire extinguishing knowledge for every chemicalthat will be carried by chemical tankers. (IBC Code, 2007).

2.3. Pollution hazards

Water pollution hazards are defined in terms of human tox-icity, water solubility, volatility, odor or taste, and relativedensity. The air pollution hazards of chemicals are defined bythe emergency exposure limit (EEL), vapor pressure, solubilityin water, relative density of liquid, and vapor density. The reac-tivity hazard of a chemical is defined by reactivity with otherproducts including water and with the product itself (includ-ing polymerization). Marine pollution hazards are defined bybioaccumulation with attendant risk to aquatic life, taintingof seafood, damage to living resources, and hazard to humanhealth (IBC Code, 2007).

3. Berthing and cargo operation proceduresfor chemical tankers

3.1. Exchange of information before berthing

Before the tanker ship arrives at a berth or a terminal, inaddition to any advice on cargo to be loaded or discharged, itis recommended that prior information that could affect thesafety of the ship and terminal should be exchanged betweenterminal and ship. Information should be given from ship toterminal, such as the ship’s draft and trim at arrival; specificcharacteristics of the cargo any tank; valve or pipeline leaks onthe ship that could affect loading or unloading, or cause pol-lution; necessary repairs (if any) about ship that would causethe commencement of loading or unloading to be late; thestandards of size and bolt hole on the flanges at the manifoldconnections; the standards of size and bolt hole on the flangesat the vapor return line. Using certain information is essen-tial, such as availability of mooring equipment, details of anymooring plan and of any code of visual or audible signals foruse during mooring; knowledge about ship’s derrick, depth ofwater at berth and meteorological information (ISGOTT, 2006).

3.2. Agreement between ship and terminal

In order to maintain safe and secure cargo operation, a loadingplan should be agreed on by the ship’s officer and termi-nal representative, including the arrangement and capacityof the ship’s cargo line; venting system; shore’s cargo line andthe maximum allowable pressure of the ship/shore hoses orloading arms to be used during operation; loading rate andpressure; loading procedures; necessary precautions to avoidstatic ignitions; atmospheric conditions; ullaging method; sys-tem of cargo vapor return to shore installation; overflowcontrol information. (ISGOTT, 2006).

3.3. Safety precautions and emergency procedures

After berthing, the ship’s officer should contact the terminalrepresentative to provide the information on local safety reg-ulations, to agree on designated smoking spaces, to agree ongalley fire and cooking appliance limitations, to advise “WorkPermit” and “Hot Work Permit” procedures, and to presentand discuss ‘Ship/Shore Safety Check List’ that is identified

in Section 5 of this study. After berthing, the ship’s officerand the responsible terminal representative should agree onaction to be taken in case fire. Also, these persons should

protection 8 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 113–120 115

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Table 1 – Pair-wise comparison scale

Intensity ofimportance

Definition Explanation

1 Equal importance Two activities contributeequally to the objective

3 Moderate importanceof one over another

Experience andjudgment strongly favorone activity overanother

5 Essential or strongimportance

Experience andjudgment strongly favorone activity overanother

7 Very strongimportance

An activity is stronglyfavored and itsdominancedemonstrated inpractice

9 Extreme importance The evidence favoringone activity overanother is of tile highestpossible order ofaffirmation

2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate valuesbetween the two

When compromise isneeded

board and adequate supervision on the terminal andon the ship?

process safety and environmental

gree on a signal system that is indicating “Standby”, “Startoading” or “Start unloading”, “Slow down”, “Stop loading” orStop unloading”, “Emergency stop”, and any other necessaryignals. (ISGOTT, 2006).

. Method used in this study

his section of this study attempted to examine the prioritiesf precautions that are taken by chemical tankers before, dur-

ng, and after cargo operations. For this purpose, AHP is usedor prioritizing the precautions.

The AHP is one of the mathematical methods for analyz-ng complex decision problems with multiple criteria, and itan deal with qualitative attributes as well as quantitative. Its developed by Saaty (1977). By utilizing the AHP, factors cane weighted and rated quantitatively. AHP is used in manyelds, such as planning; selecting the best alternative; resolv-

ng conflicts; optimization problems with other techniques,uch as linear programming, fuzzy logic, quality functioneployment. (Vaidya and Kumar, 2006). Brad used AHP in 1986s a multi-objective methodology for selecting sub-systemutomation options (Brad, 1986). Braglia used AHP for analyz-ng multi-attribute failure mode analysis (Braglia, 2000), andeha and Ohta used AHP for evaluating of air transportationetwork (Ceha and Ohta, 1994). Cheng applied AHP with fuzzypproach for evaluating naval tactical missile systems (Cheng,997), and Ghodsypour and Brien applied AHP with linear pro-ramming for supplier selection problem (Ghodsypour andrien, 1998).

This study illustrates the pair-wise comparisons are carriedut within precautions that can be taken by chemical tankerhips by the master and chief officer who are experienced onhemical tankers more than 5 years, operation manager andafety manager of chemical tanker companies. The compari-on making group is consisting with five Unlimited Master andhree Chief Officer whom are experinced on chemical tankers;our Operation Manager and three Safety Manager of chemicalanker managing company whom have 5 years experience asell. The comparison scale vary from 1 to 9; 1/1 indicates equal

ntensity, while 9/1 indicates extreme or absolute intensity.he pair-wise comparison scale is indicated in Table 1.

In the pair-wise comparisons, the estimated intensitiesr priorities can be obtained using the pair-wise compari-on matrix as the input of the principal eigenvalue methodShinno et al., 2006).

The intention of this study is to develop strategy actionlan for ships, ship operators, ship management companies,nd seafarers through AHP with a view to make safer cargoperations at terminals in order to prevent the re-occurrencef marine casualties.

. Obtained results and considerations

n this study, precautions that should be taken by all chem-cal tankers were observed from the established ship/shorehecklist that is listed below in terms of clusters (ISGOTT,006). Then the factors are clustered in hierarchical structures shown in Fig. 1.

.1. Hierarchical structure of precautions

1 Berthing-related precautions:P1-1 Is the ship securely moored?

adjacent judgments

P1-2 Are emergency towing wires correctly positioned?P1-3 Is there safe access between ship and shore?P1-4 Is the ship ready to move under its own power?

P2 Personal and procedural precautions:P2-1 Is there an effective deck watch in attendance on

Fig. 1 – Hierarchical structure of precautions.

116 process safety and environmental protection 8 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 113–120

par

Fig. 2 – Pair-wise com

P2-2 Is the agreed ship/shore communication systemoperative?

P2-3 Has the emergency signal to be used by the ship andshore been explained and understood?

P2-4 Have the procedures for cargo, bunker, and ballasthandling been agreed?

P2-5 Have the hazards associated with toxic substances inthe cargo being handled been identified and under-stood?

P2-6 Has there been agreement regarding the emergency

shutdown procedure?

P3 Equipment-related precautions on deck:

Fig. 3 – Pair-wise compar

ison of precautions.

P3-1 Are scuppers effectively plugged and drip trays inposition, both on board and ashore?

P3-2 Are unused cargo and bunker connections properlysecured with blank flanges bolted?

P3-3 Are sea and overboard discharge valves, when not inuse, closed and visibly secured?

P3-4 Are all cargo and bunker tank lids closed?P3-5 Has the operation of the P/V valves and high velocity

vents been verified using the check lift facility, wherefitted?

P3-6 Are hand torches of an approved type?P3-7 Are portable VHF/UHF transceivers approved type?

ison scale in verbal.

protection 8 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 113–120 117

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Table 2 – Priorities of precautions

P1 0.26828P1-2 0.01828P1-3 0.05430P1-4 0.04606

P2 0.19900P2-1 0.08771P2-2 0.02012P2-3 0.00916P2-4 0.02449P2-5 0.04711P2-6 0.01041

P3 0.12390P3-1 0.00980P3-2 0.01057P3-3 0.00843P3-4 0.01436P3-5 0.02794P3-6 0.01455P3-7 0.02421P3-8 0.01406

P4 0.04977P4-1 0.00565P4-2 0.01296P4-3 0.01190P4-4 0.00649P4-5 0.01278

P5 0.07029P5-1 0.01052P5-2 0.00552P5-3 0.03749P5-4 0.00447P5-5 0.01228

P6 0.09661P6-1 0.02002P6-2 0.01866P6-3 0.02208P6-4 0.01972P6-5 0.01613

P7 0.19215P7-1 0.05880P7-2 0.02171P7-3 0.01751P7-4 0.01930P7-5 0.01841P7-6 0.01601P7-7 0.02371P7-8 0.01668

Environmental 0.45442

process safety and environmental

P3-8 Are deck seals in good working order?4 Precautions out of deck:

P4-1 Are the ship’s main radio transmitter aerials earthedand radars switched off?

P4-2 Are electric cables to portable electrical equipmentdisconnected from power?

P4-3 Are all external doors and ports in the accommoda-tion closed?

P4-4 Are window-type air conditioning units discon-nected?

P4-5 Are air conditioning intakes that may permit theentry of cargo vapors closed?

5 Precautions about probable emergency situations:P5-1 Is there provision for an emergency escape?P5-2 Are all persons in charge of cargo operations aware

that discharge operations should cease and that theterminal should be advised in the case of failure ofthe inert gas plant?

P5-3 Are sufficient personnel on board and ashore to dealwith an emergency?

P5-4 Are ship emergency fire control plans located exter-nally?

P5-5 Are fire hoses and fire-fighting equipment on boardand ashore positioned and ready for immediate use?

6 Procedural precautions during operation:P6-1 Are smoking regulations being observed?P6-2 Are naked light regulations being observed?P6-3 Have measures been taken to ensure sufficient pump

room ventilation?P6-4 If the ship is capable of closed loading, has there

been agreement on the requirements for closed oper-ations?

P6-5 If a vapor return line is connected, has there beenagreement on operating parameters?

7 Condition of cargo system equipment:P7-1 Are cargo and bunker hoses/arms in good condi-

tion, properly rigged, and appropriate for the serviceintended?

P7-2 Is the appropriate tank venting system being used?P7-3 Has a vapor return line been connected?P7-4 Is the Inert Gas System fully operational and in a

good working order?P7-5 Have the fixed and portable oxygen analyzers been

calibrated, and are they working properly?P7-6 Are fixed IG pressure and oxygen content recorders

working?P7-7 Are all cargo tank atmospheres at positive pressure

with an oxygen content of 8% or less by volume?P7-8 Are liquid levels in P/V breakers correct?

The hierarchical structure has consisted of four clusters.he main cluster is the body of ship/shore check list; the sec-nd cluster consists of the precaution groups; third grouphich indicates sub items, is derived from a check list of

equirements; the last cluster is shows the personal and envi-onmental precautions’ weightings.

.2. Application of method and results

air-wise comparisons have beem done among each pre-

aution as shown in Fig. 2. ‘Super Decisions’ softwarewww.superdecisions.com) was used for computing the pri-rity of precautions (Super Decisions, 2008).

Personal 0.54558

Scale, which is indicated in Table 1, is used to makepair-wise comparison between alternatives and the simpleintensity of importance illustration is mentioned in Fig. 3.

The results of AHP computation is summarized in Table 2.According to the results of berthing-related precautions, per-sonal and procedural precautions, and checks about conditionof cargo system equipment are more important criteria thatwill mitigate potential risks during cargo handling. Therefore,the weighting of second cluster in respect to the third clusteris shown in Fig. 4.

Similarly the weighting of the third cluster is shown inFig. 5. According to the results, the following items are pro-posed. Securely mooring of the ship is the most important

precaution to mitigate risks at the terminal. Maintainingeffective deck watchkeeping and understanding the potential

118 process safety and environmental pr

Fig. 4 – Percentage of precaution groups’ priorities.

After a chemical tanker discharged the cargo cyclohexane thatwas waiting for a pilot, the chief officer entered the cargo tank

Fig. 5 – Priorities of precautions.

hazards about carried cargo are the two important precau-tions among personal and procedural precautions. Providingenough personal precautions both on board and at the ter-minal in case any emergency situation, keeping cargo andbunker hoses/arms in good and appropriate condition, andproperly rigging them are other important precautions to mit-igate potential risks during cargo operations.

Fig. 6 indicates the overall analyzed results of precautions’weighting rates in regard to the percentage that the precautionis related with personal safety and environmental protection.According to the results, precautions that are taken by chem-ical tanker ship and the terminal are related to more personal

safety in the means of occupational health and safety thanenvironmental awareness.

Fig. 6 – Percentage of environmental and personalprecautions.

otection 8 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 113–120

5.3. Practical strategies for risk mitigation

Taking into account the AHP computation results mentionedin the previous subsection this study, the following prac-tical results are suggested. The human-related precautionsweightings are more than equipment-related precautions.This result directly signifies the importance of the humanfactor engineering including ergonomics. Consequently, theprecautions that are offered in this study will directly focuson how knowledge and skills of officers and crew mem-bers should be developed. In advance, situational awarenessis the key factor to breaking the error-fault chain, so crewmembers should share their knowledge, skill, and aware-ness with all. Workloads of chemical tanker crews are morethan those of any other ships, so an adequate number ofqualified officer and a rating should be employed on board.Efficient workload management is extremely important onchemical tankers because fatigue is responsible for manyhuman errors. The ergonomic aspects should be taken intoaccount while designing pipelines, pumps, pump rooms, load-ing/discharging units, and onboard accommodation places.Equipping chemical tankers with fully automated loading andunloading systems and monitoring systems will have an effi-cient risk reducing strategy.

6. Case study and results

6.1. Case-1: fire at manifold area

A “flash” fire aboard a chemical tanker happened after fin-ishing discharge operation at cargo manifold connection arearesulting in two injuries. The incident occurred at 11:15 a.m.and the ship was due to sail that day. A flash fire occurred atthe vessel’s manifold area while shore and ship staff were dis-connecting cargo arms. As a result, two crew were injured. Atabout 11:15 a.m. there was a sudden ignition at the manifoldarea. This ignition produced a flash fire. There was an imme-diate response to the alarm by the ship’s crew. and the firewas extinguished in few minutes. Thus, the fire was caused bythe ignition of spilled oil that sparked used equipment frommanifold connection area. A contributory factor of the inci-dent could have been the incorrect fitting of the coupling andusing unsuitable equipment.

6.2. Case-2: entering unsafe cargo tank

Fig. 7 – Comparison between general results and casestudies.

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process safety and environmental

or controlling purpose under the supervision of pumpmanf the ship. When the pumpman saw that the chief officerad fallen into the cargo tank, he informed other crew onoard and immediately entered into the cargo tank. The chieffficer and the pumpman were taken from the cargo tank,ut they died at hospital. It was understood that the nitro-en in cargo tank was coming from a vapor return line thatonnected with the vessel and remained in the tanks as blan-eting. After examination, it was determined that the victimsid not realize that they had breathed nitrogen (Arslan and Er,

008).

Table 3 – Obtained Results from Cases

General Case-1 Case-2

P1 0.26828 0.03224 0.00000P1-1 0.14964 0.01623 0.00000P1-2 0.01828 0.00242 0.00000P1-3 0.05430 0.01232 0.00000P1-4 0.04606 0.00127 0.00000

P2 0.19900 0.21360 0.16320P2-1 0.08771 0.04324 0.04362P2-2 0.02012 0.06243 0.01624P2-3 0.00916 0.00310 0.00640P2-4 0.02449 0.00920 0.03232P2-5 0.04711 0.09332 0.06400P2-6 0.01041 0.00231 0.00062

P3 0.12390 0.25018 0.08862P3-1 0.00980 0.01604 0.00460P3-2 0.01057 0.08132 0.03136P3-3 0.00843 0.02836 0.01640P3-4 0.01436 0.10892 0.02160P3-5 0.02794 0.00883 0.00164P3-6 0.01455 0.00326 0.00240P3-7 0.02421 0.00225 0.00198P3-8 0.01406 0.00120 0.00864

P4 0.04977 0.00000 0.00000P4-1 0.00565 0.00000 0.00000P4-2 0.01296 0.00000 0.00000P4-3 0.01190 0.00000 0.00000P4-4 0.00649 0.00000 0.00000P4-5 0.01278 0.00000 0.00000

P5 0.07029 0.08225 0.14232P5-1 0.01052 0.00112 0.01024P5-2 0.00552 0.00112 0.04215P5-3 0.03749 0.03264 0.08024P5-4 0.00447 0.00525 0.00720P5-5 0.01228 0.04212 0.00249

P6 0.09661 0.16146 0.18262P6-1 0.02002 0.04240 0.00357P6-2 0.01866 0.08548 0.00640P6-3 0.02208 0.01032 0.01624P6-4 0.01972 0.00966 0.10360P6-5 0.01613 0.01360 0.05281

P7 0.19215 0.27027 0.42324P7-1 0.05880 0.14984 0.12601P7-2 0.02171 0.06265 0.10360P7-3 0.01751 0.03232 0.08667P7-4 0.01930 0.01454 0.07270P7-5 0.01841 0.00630 0.02484P7-6 0.01601 0.00210 0.00628P7-7 0.02371 0.00162 0.00232P7-8 0.01668 0.00090 0.00082

Environmental 0.45442 0.24325 0.11250Personal 0.54558 0.75675 0.88750

ection 8 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 113–120 119

6.3. Results of AHP application

Pair-wise comparisons have been done among each pre-caution that should be taken before each case that isdescribed in Section 5 of this study. ‘Super Decisions’ software(www.superdecisions.com) was used for computing the pri-ority of precautions and the following results were obtained(Fig. 7 and Table 3).

7. Conclusion

It is clear that the hazards associated with the carriage of liq-uid chemicals in tankers are more complex and dangerouswhen compared to other types of ships. Due to the nature oftransportation, operation of tankers is more complex than theoperation of other ship types; therefore, working on a tankerrequires extra knowledge, skills, and precautions. The opera-tion of chemical tankers causes more incidents and accidentswhen compared to other types of ships as a direct result of thebehavior of the chemicals being carried.

The aim of this study is directly concerned with theutilizing analytic hierarchy process identification to showthe importance of precautions on reducing casualties dur-ing cargo operations that have not been used in the riskmitigation approach yet. Therefore, the originality of thisresearch appears in the following manner. Potential risksshould be identified with observing the frequencies of inci-dents and with observing the consequences in case theaccident/incident happens. After observing the frequenciesand consequences, the risk can be monitored. In maritimeindustry, accidents and incidents are generally the results oferror-fault chains, and many times it is difficult to identify thefrequencies of accidents and incidents because of secrecy andinadequate history records.

Accidents and incidents occur in the maritime industry inspite of the latest navigational technologies and strict precau-tions. This study proposes that the use of the AHP method is anacceptable basis for analyzing the precautions that are devel-oped to guard against to potential dangers during chemicalcargo operations for observing the frequencies and conse-quences. Therefore, an appropriate management tool can beconsidered to increase the level of safety for chemical tankersduring cargo operations at a terminal by using the results ofAHP application. Then, strategy making could be designedto minimize accidents, incidents, and defects for shipboardoperations. Well-operated cargo operations enable a chemi-cal tanker ship safer and more profitable. It is clear that if theimportance of precautions is understood well, the safety of theworking environment will be improved for both occupationalhealth and safety and environmental protection.

Acknowledgement

The author gratefully acknowledges supports and data that isgiven Sener Petrol Maritime Company during preparation ofthis study.

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