quantitative risk assessment for - welcome to...

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Quantitative Risk Assessment

For

Conducted by

Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd. (An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Company)

Chennai, India www.cholarisk.com

December 2014

COROMANDEL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

Fertilizers Plant, Kakinada

QRA Study Report for CIL Fertilizers, Kakinada

Document ID QRA/SR/CIL/14-15/01

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DOCUMENT HISTORY

S. No. Document Identification Revision Comment/Nature of changes No. Date

1 QRA/SR/CIL/14-15/01 00 24-12-2014 Preparation of original document

Prepared by

Reviewed by Approved by

Dhivya V Arul Arasu K

Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd

Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd

Coromandel International Limited, Kakinada

Disclaimer

This report is for the sole use by Coromandel for the purpose for which they have claimed it is required.

We are not responsible to any other person/party for any decision of such person/party based on this

report. It is hereby notified that reproduction, copying or otherwise quoting of our report or any part

thereof other than the aforementioned purpose, can be done only with our prior permission.

The report cannot be used or relied by Coromandel for any other purpose or any other third party for

any purpose whatsoever and we will not be liable which Coromandel may incur on this account

including in tort (including but not limited to negligence) arising out of or in connection with this Report.

This Report is not intended to identify all hazards which may exist nor is it intended to be an exhaustive

review of all possible eventualities. The recommendations for risk improvement contained in the report

are purely advisory and the decision and responsibility for implementation rests with Coromandel.



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Cholamandalam MS Risk Services gratefully acknowledges the co-operation received from the

management of Coromandel International Limited, Kakinada during the study. The CMSRSL team in

particular would like to thank the all the team members of Coromandel who had extended their

support and help throughout the study.



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALARP : As Low As Reasonably Practicable

ATM : Atmospheric

BLEVE : Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

CIL : Coromandel International Limited

CMSRSL : Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd

CPR 18E : Commissie voor de Preventie van Rampem [Committee for Prevention of Disaster]

HAZOP : Hazard and Operability study

HSE UK : Health and Safety Executive, UK

IS : Indian Standard

IR : Individual Risk

LFL : Lower Flammability limit

LOC : Loss of Containment

OISD : Oil Industry Safety Directorate

QRA : Quantitative Risk Assessment

SR : Societal Risk

UEL : Upper Flammability Unit



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TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ....................................................................................................................... 3

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................... 4

CHAPTER 1 ...................................................................................................................................... 11

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 11

1.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 12

1.2 SCOPE OF STUDY ................................................................................................................. 12

1.3 ABOUT THE CONSULTANTS ................................................................................................. 13

1.4 METHODOLOGY ADOPTED .................................................................................................. 13

CHAPTER 2 ...................................................................................................................................... 15

FACILITY DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................................... 15

2.1. FACILITY DESCRPTION .............................................................................................................. 16

CHAPTER 3 ...................................................................................................................................... 17

INTRODUCTION TO QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT .................................................................. 17

3.1 OVERVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT ........................................................................................ 18

3.2 RISK CONCEPT ..................................................................................................................... 18

3.3 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE ........................................................................................... 19

3.3.1 SOFTWARE USED .......................................................................................................... 20

CHAPTER 4 ...................................................................................................................................... 22

RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................ 22

4.1 QRA METHODOLGY ............................................................................................................. 23

4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS AND RELEASE SCENARIOS ................................................... 24

4.3 FACTORS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS ...................................................................... 24

4.4 TYPES OF OUTCOME EVENTS............................................................................................... 27

4.5 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS ........................................................................................... 28

4.5.1 SOURCE STRENGTH PARAMETERS ............................................................................... 28

4.5.2 CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS............................................................................................ 28

4.6 SELECTION OF DAMAGE CRITERIA ....................................................................................... 29

4.7 PROBABILITIES .................................................................................................................... 31

4.7.1 POPULATION PROBABILITIES ....................................................................................... 31



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4.7.2 FAILURE / ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES ........................................................................... 32

4.7.3 WEATHER PROBABILITIES ............................................................................................ 34

4.7.4 IGNITION PROBABILITIES ........................................................................................... 36

CHAPTER 5 ...................................................................................................................................... 38

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................... 38

5.1 SCENARIOS........................................................................................................................... 39

5.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS .................................................................................................... 40

5.2.1 SUMMARY OF JET FIRE ................................................................................................ 42

5.2.2 SUMMARY OF LATE POOL FIRE .................................................................................... 44

5.2.3 SUMMARY OF VAPOUR EXPLOSION ............................................................................ 44

5.2.4 SUMMARY OF BLEVE ................................................................................................... 46

5.2.5 SUMMARY OF FLAMMABLE GAS DISPERSION ............................................................. 46

CHAPTER 6 ...................................................................................................................................... 49

RISK ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................ 49

CHAPTER 7 ...................................................................................................................................... 54

RISK CONTROL MEASURES .............................................................................................................. 54

7.1 PROPOSED RISK CONTROL MEASURES AS PER PRE-FEASIBILITY REPORT ............................. 55

7.2 RISK ACCEPTANCE ................................................................................................................ 56

7.3 RISK CONTROL MEASURES SUGGESTED ............................................................................... 57

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................... 60

8.1 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 61

CHAPTER 9 ...................................................................................................................................... 62

ANNEXURES .................................................................................................................................... 62

Annexure 1: Event tree analysis ...................................................................................................... 63

Annexure 2: Individual & Societal Risk contours ............................................................................. 63

Annexure 3: Google image of CIL plant, Kakinada .......................................................................... 63



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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Details of LOC scenarios and their risk level ............................................................. 8

Table 2: Damages to human life due to heat radiation ........................................................ 30

Table 3: Effects due to incident radiation intensity .............................................................. 30

Table 4: Damage due to overpressures ............................................................................... 31

Table 6: Inputs to software and summary of outcomes ....................................................... 40

Table 7: Jet fire results ........................................................................................................ 42

Table 8: Vapour cloud explosion results .............................................................................. 44

Table 9: BLEVE results ......................................................................................................... 46

Table 10: Flammable gas dispersion results ......................................................................... 46

Table 11: Accident event frequency .................................................................................... 51



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Coromandel International Ltd (CIL) intends to conduct the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study for the proposed installation of mounded LPG bullets for obtaining EC amendment in its Fertilizers plant located in Kakinada. Based on the data provided by the client for the study, potential scenarios, which can cause significant consequences like fire, explosion etc were identified, and the consequences of the scenarios were assessed using PHAST v6.7 software and the risk levels were evaluated using Phast Risk v6.7software, developed by DNV.

Table 1: Details of LOC scenarios and their risk level S.

No. Scenarios Individual Risk per avg. year

Societal Risk per avg. year

Storage Tanks &Tank Truck 1. Leak of LPG tank truck 5.29E-10 4.97E-10 2. Rupture of LPG tank truck 1.24E-07 1.24E-07 3. Leak of LPG mounded bullet 3.61E-09 3.11E-09 4. Rupture of LPG mounded bullet 7.41E-07 7.98E-07 5. Leak of LPG vaporizer 9.75E-09 9.19E-09 6. Rupture of LPG vaporizer 2.22E-08 2.24E-08

Pipelines & Unloading Arm 7. Leak of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 5.50E-08 5.12E-08 8. Rupture of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 5.83E-09 5.06E-09 9. Leak of LPG Compressor suction line 1.33E-09 1.21E-09 10. Rupture of LPG Compressor suction line 8.02E-09 7.89E-09 11. Leak of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 1.93E-09 1.78E-09 12. Rupture of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 1.35E-08 1.32E-08 13. Leak of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 9.90E-09 9.22E-09 14. Rupture of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 5.89E-08 5.86E-08 15. Leak of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 2.01E-08 1.89E-08 16. Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 2.66E-07 2.68E-07 17. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 5.70E-07 7.02E-07 18. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 3.13E-07 3.56E-07 19. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 6.90E-08 6.51E-08 20. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 1.95E-07 2.22E-07 21. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 1.23E-07 1.17E-07 22. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 3.36E-07 4.06E-07 Legends:

With reference to the risk acceptance criteria specified by HSE, UK in IS 15656:2006 - Code of Practice on Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis it is observed that the risk levels of the proposed installation of

Unacceptable ALARP Acceptable



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LPG mounded bullets in Coromandel Fertilizers plant are in acceptable region. The risk levels are expected to be remaining within these acceptable limits if all the control measures recommended in this report are implemented in addition to the existing risk control measures.

The following risk control measures are recommended in addition to the existing risk control

measures to maintain the risk levels within acceptable region:

SOP to address the operations pertaining to LPG receipt. Checklist to be prepared and records maintained for the same.

Fire water adequacy study to be carried out for the proposed LPG storage and handling facility

Integrity of the water sprinkler system pipeline to be ensured

Earthing /bonding of LPG handling pipelines to be periodically checked for integrity and continuity.

Onsite and offsite emergency response & disaster management plan should be developed for the proposed facility

MB Lal Committee Recommendations:

SIL (Safety Integrity Level) of the tank level control must be improved and independent overfill protection meeting the requirement of Part 1 of EN 61511 shall be provided. Ensure that all the instruments in the level control loop are SIL rated.

OISD recommendations:

OISD-Std-150: Design and safety requirements for LPG mounded storage facility

High level alarm should be set at not more than 85% level of the volumetric capacity of the vessel.

LPG bullet should have at least two Safety Relief Valves (SRV). The full flow capacity of each SRV on mounded vessel(s) should be minimum 30 % of the capacity required for an equivalent size of above ground vessel. Suitable gas detectors should be placed at critical locations in the LPG storage area such as near the ROVs, in inspection tunnel, inside the nozzle box enclosure (if provided) or dome connection, near water draining/ sampling points.

Audio-visual alarms showing the location of gas leakage should be provided on the control panel. First level alarm shall be set at 20% of Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) and second level alarm at 60 % of LEL.

Cathodic protection system should be provided maintained and tested as per Annexure 1 of OISD-Std-150.

Sub-soil water, rainwater or any other surface water should not be allowed to percolate in to the mound.

Provision should be made to monitor the settlement of the mound/ vessel by providing permanent reference points. A minimum of three reference points shall be provided to ascertain uniform/



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differential settlement and also identify possible vessel bending (One each near the vessel ends and one in the middle.)

In case of non-availability of flare system, the discharge from safety valve shall be vented vertically upwards to atmosphere without any intermediate valve on downstream side at an elevation of 3-meter (minimum) from the top of the mound or exposed nozzle whichever is higher for effective dispersion of hydrocarbons.

Hydrant (s)/monitor(s) should be located at a safe place and shall not be installed within 15 meters from the exposed portion facilities/equipment to be protected. Adequate coverage to unprotected portions exposed to thermal radiation including the top of the mound and product pipelines to be ensured.

Safety Relief valves should be tested and calibrated every year by a competent person.

Other OISD standards:

Periodical Inspection and thickness measurement are to be carried out for the storage tanks

Ensure that the Gas Monitoring System is calibrated and tested as per OISD-Std-153

Ensure fixed fire protection systems for the truck unloading area conforming to OISD-Std-117.

Inspection and Maintenance of Pipelines to be carried as per OISD 130. Following need to be adhered in terms of inspection frequency:

Pressure Testing – Once every year

Painting – Once in 5 years

External Inspection – Yearly



Conclusion

If all the existing risk control measures along with the additional risk control measures recommended in this report are implemented, the risks levels of the proposed installation of LPG mounded bullets/its associated pipelines in CIL Fertilizers plant are observed to remain within acceptable region.



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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION



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1.1 INTRODUCTION Coromandel International Ltd (CIL) intends to conduct the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study for

the proposed installation of LPG mounded bullets for obtaining EC amendment in its Fertilizers plant

located in Kakinada.

The purpose of the study includes the following:

To identify and assess those hazards and risks arising from their activities connected to the LPG bullets and associated pipelines that require management to comply with regulatory requirements, company policy and business requirements

To eliminate or reduce to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP) in terms of risk to human health, risk of injury, risk of damage to plant, equipment and environment, business interruption or loss etc.

1.2 SCOPE OF STUDY The main scope of the study is to carry out the QRA as per the Indian Standard (IS) 15656, Hazard

Identification and Risk Analysis - Code of Practice, including identification, screening and ranking of

various risk scenarios, consequence analysis of the various risk scenarios, and probabilistic assessment

of risks, recommendation and preparation of reports and relevant drawing showing damage and risk

contours.

The scope of the QRA is given below:

1. Study and identify the hazards and loss of containment events

2. Calculation of physical effects of accidental scenarios, which includes frequency analysis for

incident scenarios leading to hazards to people and facilities (flammable gas, fire & smoke,

explosion, overpressure and toxic gas hazards) and consequence analysis for the identified

hazards covering impact on people and potential escalation.

3. Individual risk quantification and contour mapping

4. Societal risk quantification and contour mapping

5. Hazard mitigation recommendations based on QRA

6. The Indian standard IS 15656: Code of practice – Hazard Identification and Risk analysis to be

adopted for this study.



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1.3. ABOUT THE CONSULTANTS CMSRSL is a joint venture between the Murugappa Group and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Group of

Japan. CMSRSL is an approved HSE consultant of Kuwait Oil Company. CMSRSL offers specialized and

innovative risk management solutions to clients in India and rest of Asia. CMSRSL has carried out

consultancy and training services to over 2500 units/locations of various organizations belonging to 32

industrial sectors including refineries and petrochemical units. In addition to industrial sector and

service sector located in Kuwait, India, Hong Kong and Thailand, the Ministry of Environment and

Forests, Government of India and insurance companies located in India, Sri Lanka and Singapore have

been engaging the services of CMSRSL to carry out a number of risk Assessment and specialized safety

studies. CMSRSL also carries out similar studies for companies like Kuwait Oil Company, located outside

India. The team members have wide experience in risk management studies and have carried out

studies for a number of industrial sectors including refineries located in India and rest of Asia.

1.4. METHODOLOGY ADOPTED Detailed data request for risk Assessment study was submitted to the client before carrying out site visit

to familiarize the site officials on the nature of information that would be collected during site visit.

During site visit, CMSRS engineer had made a brief presentation to the site officials on the objective,

scope, methodology and deliverables of the risk Assessment study. Subsequently, site visit was carried

out for the entire facility to identify the potential hazard scenarios.

Then Risk Assessment calculations based on the collected data have been carried out at CMSRS office

using PHAST Risk Micro v6.7 software. Finally, risk reduction measures have been suggested based on

the risk levels.

The above adopted methodology has been depicted in the form of flow chart below:



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Introduction to study

Site visit, data collection and discussion with engineers

Data input into Risk Analysis software

Consequence and Risk assessment of identified LOC scenarios

Risk presentation and Recommendations



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CHAPTER 2 FACILITY DESCRIPTION



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2.1. FACILITY DESCRPTION The existing facilities of CIL are located at Kakinada Rural Mandal, East Godavari District in Andhra

Pradesh. The existing plant is located at the intersection of latitude 16°59'19.18"N and

longitude 82°16'8.64"E. Samalkot-Kakinada Bypass is located at about 4.5 km.

CIL produces Di ammonium Phosphate, NPK, water soluble fertilizer and Sulphate of Potash

fertilizer with the production capacity of 19.25 MTPA.

CIL is proposed to install three number of 100 MT LPG mounded bullets in the existing facility. Currently

CIL is using Natural Gas (NG) as fuel in the existing facilities, which is being supplied by GAIL through a

100mm pipeline. NG is used in as fuel in the DAP Plant, Boiler House and Dryer. About 35000 Sm3/day

of NG is being consumed in the existing facility when the plant is operated at full capacity.

The following control measures are proposed to be installed at the LPG facility:

Installation of 3x100 MT LPG Mounded bullets with necessary passive and active safety systems as per OISD- 150 standard

LPG Truck Unloading Bay – vacuum type LPG unloading facility will be installed to avoid any spills and leakage of the LPG during the unloading operations.

Necessary excess flow check valves, Non-return valves and gas detectors will be installed on the LPG tanks to avoid any hazards during loading and transfer operations.

4 inch LPG supply line will be connected to the existing NG supply line with an isolation valve



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CHAPTER 3

INTRODUCTION TO QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT



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3.1 OVERVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT Risk Assessment is proven valuable as a management tool in assessing the overall safety performance of

the chemical process Industry. Although management systems such as engineering codes, checklists,

and reviews by experienced engineers have provided substantial safety assurances, major incidents

involving numerous casualties, injuries and significant damage can occur – as illustrated by recent world-

scale catastrophes. Risk Assessment techniques provide advanced quantitative means to supplement

other hazard identification, analysis, assessment, and control and management methods to identify the

potential for such incidents and to evaluate control strategies.

The underlying basis of risk Assessment is simple in concept. It offers methods to answer the following

four questions:

1. What can go wrong?

2. What are the causes?

3. What are the consequences?

4. How likely is it?

This study tries to quantify the risks to rank them accordingly based on their severity and probability.

The report should be used to understand the significance of existing control measures and to follow the

measures continuously. Wherever possible the additional risk control measures should be adopted to

bring down the risk levels.

3.2 RISK CONCEPT

Risk in general is defined as a “measure of potential economic loss or human injury in terms of the

probability of the loss or injury occurring and magnitude of the loss or injury if it occurs”. Risk thus

comprises of two variables:

Magnitude of consequences and;

The probability of occurrence.

The results of risk Assessment are often reproduced as Individual and groups risks and are defined as

below.

Individual Risk is the “probability of death occurring as a result of accidents at a plant, installation or a

transport route expressed as a function of the distance from such an activity”. It is the frequency at

which an individual or an individual within a group may be expected to sustain a given level of harm

(typically death) from the realization of specific hazards. Such a risk actually exists only when a person is

permanently at that spot (out of doors).



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The exposure of an individual is related to:

The likelihood of occurrence of an event involving a release;

Ignition of hydrocarbon;

The vulnerability of the person to the event;

The proportion of time the person will be exposed to the event (which is termed 'occupancy' in

the QRA terminology).

The second definition of risk involves the concept of the summation of risk from events involving many

fatalities within specific population groups. This definition is focused on the risk to society rather than to

a specific individual and is termed Societal Risk. In relation to the process operations we can identify

specific groups of people who work on or live close to the installation; for example communities living or

working close to the plant.

3.3 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE

Hazard identification and risk assessment involves a series of steps as follows:

Step 1: Identification of the Hazard

Hazard identification is a critical step in Risk Assessment. Many aids are available, including experience,

engineering codes, checklists, detailed process knowledge, equipment failure experience, hazard index

techniques, What-if Analysis, Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

(FMEA), and Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). In this phase all potential incidents are identified and

tabulated. Site visit and study of operations and documents like drawings, process write-up etc are used

for hazard identification.

Step 2: Assessment of the Risk

Consequence estimation is the methodology used to determine the potential for damage or injury from

specific incidents. A single incident (e.g. rupture of a pressurized flammable liquid tank) can have many

distinct incident outcomes (E.g. Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE), Boiling Liquid Expanding

Vapor Explosion (BLEVE), flash fire, etc.)

Likelihood assessment is the methodology used to estimate the frequency or probability of occurrence

of an incident. Estimates may be obtained from historical incident data on failure frequencies, from

failure sequence models, such as fault trees and event trees or both. In this study the historical data



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developed by software models and those collected by CPR18E – Committee for Prevention of Disasters,

Netherlands (Edition: PGS 3, 2005) are used.

Risks arising from the hazards are evaluated for its tolerability to personnel, the facility and the

environment. The acceptability of the estimated risk must then be judged based on IS-15656 criteria

appropriate to the particular situation.

Step 3: Elimination or Reduction of the Risk

This involves identifying opportunities to reduce the likelihood and/or consequence of an accident

Where deemed to be necessary.

Risk assessment combines the consequences and likelihood of all incident outcomes from all selected

incidents to provide a measure of risk. The risk of all selected incidents are individually estimated and

summed to give an overall measure of risk.

Risk-reduction measures include those to prevent incidents (i.e. reduce the likelihood of occurrence) to

control incidents (i.e. limit the extent and duration of a hazardous event) and to mitigate the effects (i.e.

reduce the consequences). Preventive measures, such as using inherently safer designs and ensuring

asset integrity, should be used wherever practicable.

In many cases, the measures to control and mitigate hazards and risks are simple and obvious and

involve modifications to conform to standard practice. The general hierarchy of risk reducing measures

is:

Prevention (by distance or design);

Detection (E.g. fire and gas, Leak detection);

Control (E.g. emergency shutdown and controlled depressurization);

Mitigation (E.g. fire fighting and passive fire protection);

Emergency response (In case safety barriers fail).

3.3.1 SOFTWARE USED:

PHAST v6.7 and PHAST Risk Micro v6.7

The software developed by DNV is used for risk assessment studies involving flammable and toxic

hazards where individual and societal risks are also to be identified. It enables the user to assess the

physical effects of accidental releases of toxic or flammable chemicals.



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PHAST v6.7 is used for consequence calculations and PHAST Risk Micro v6.7 is used for risk calculations.

It contains a series of up to date models that allow detailed modeling and quantitative assessment of

release rate pool evaporation, atmospheric dispersion, vapor cloud explosion, combustion, heat

radiation effects from fires etc., The software is developed based on the hazard model given in TNO

Yellow Book as the basis.

The software is developed based on the various incidents that had occurred over past 25 years. CMSRS

has used the latest version of PHAST software for developing the consequences and risks for each

model.



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CHAPTER 4 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY



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4.1 QRA METHODOLGY

Recommendation to reduce the consequence

Yes

No

Define the Goal (Statutory, Emergency Planning, Consequence, Etc.

Location, Layout, Process Parameters

Hazard Identification

Quantification of Hazard

Select most Credible Scenario Select Worst Case Scenario

Estimate Consequence Emergency Plan

Estimate Effect of Damage

Is Risk Acceptable?

End

Estimate Frequency of Occurrence

Estimate Risk

Prioritize and Reduce Risk

Frequency Estimation



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4.2. IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS AND RELEASE SCENARIOS A technique commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider potential leaks and major releases

from fractures of all process pipelines and associated facilities. The containment is defined as one or

several devices, any parts which are permanently in open contact with one another, and which are

intended to contain one or multiple substances. A Loss of Containment is one containment system that

will not lead to the release of significant quantities of hazardous substance from other

containment systems.

The following data were collected to envisage scenarios:

Composition of materials stored in storage tanks/flowing through pipeline;

Inventory of materials stored in storage tanks/tank trucks;

Flow rate of materials passing through pipelines;

Storage tanks/pipeline conditions (phase, temperature, pressure);

Connecting piping and piping dimensions.

Accidental release of flammable liquids/gases can result in severe consequences. Delayed ignition of

flammable gases can result in blast overpressures covering large areas. This may lead to extensive loss of

life and property. In contrast, fires have localized consequences. Fires can be put out or contained in

most cases; there are few mitigating actions one can take once a flammable gas or a vapor cloud gets

released. Major accident hazards arise, therefore, consequent upon the release of flammable gases.

4.3 FACTORS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS In any installation, main hazard arises due to loss of containment during handling of flammable

chemicals. To formulate a structured approach to identification of hazards, an understanding of

contributory factors is essential.

Inventory

Inventory analysis is commonly used in understanding the relative hazards and short listing of release

scenarios. Inventory plays an important role in regard to the potential hazard. Larger the inventory of a

vessel or a system, larger is the quantity of potential release. A practice commonly used to generate an

incident list is to consider potential leaks and major releases from fractures of pipelines and

vessels/tanks containing sizable inventories.



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Parameters Potential vapor release for the same material depends significantly on the operating conditions. This

operating range is enough to release a large amount of vapor in case of a leak/rupture, therefore the

storage tank/pipeline leaks and ruptures need to be considered in the risk Assessment calculations.

Blast overpressures depend upon the reactivity class of material and the amount of gas between two

explosive limits. For example, LPG once released and not ignited immediately is expected to give rise to

a vapor cloud. These vapors in general have medium reactivity and in case of confinement of the gas

cloud, on delayed ignition may result in an explosion and overpressures.

Initiating Events

Both the complexity of study and the number of incident outcome cases are affected by the range of

initiating events and incidents covered. This not only reflects the inclusion of accidents and/or non-

accident-initiated events, but also the size of those events. For instance studies may evaluate one or

more of the following:

Catastrophic failure of storage tanks, tank trucks

Large hole (large continuous release)

Small hole (continuous release)

Leaks at fittings or valves (small continuous release)

In general, quantitative studies do not include very small continuous releases or short duration small

releases if past experience or preliminary consequence modeling shows that such releases do not

contribute to the overall risk levels.

Selection of initiating events and incidents

The selection of initiating events and incidents should take into account the goals or objectives of the

study and the data requirements. The data requirements increase significantly when non-accident –

initiated events are included and when the number of release size increase. While the potential range of

release sizes is tremendous, groupings are both appropriate and necessitated by data restrictions. The

main reasons for including release sizes other than the catastrophic rupture are to reduce the

conservatism in an analysis and to better understand the relative contributions to risk of small versus large

releases.

As per Reference Manual Bevi Risk assessment version 3.2, only the Loss of Containment (LOC) which is basically the release scenarios contributing to the individual and/or societal risk are included in the QRA. LOC scenarios for the installation are included only if the following conditions are fulfilled:



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Frequency of occurrence is equal to or greater than 10-9; and

Lethal damage (1% probability) occurs outside the establishment’s boundary or the transport

route.

There may be number of accidents that may occur quite frequently, but due to proper control measures or fewer quantities of chemicals released, they are controlled effectively. A few examples are a leak from a gasket, pump or valve, release of a chemical from a vent or relief valve, and fire in a pump due to overheating. These accidents generally are controlled before they escalate by using control systems and monitoring devices.

Below LOC scenarios are identified for the CIL, Kakinada.

S. No. Scenarios Storage Tanks, Tank Truck

1. Leak of LPG tank truck 2. Rupture of LPG tank truck 3. Leak of LPG mounded bullet 4. Rupture of LPG mounded bullet 5. Leak of LPG vaporizer 6. Rupture of LPG vaporizer

Pipelines & Unloading Arm 7. Leak of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 8. Rupture of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 9. Leak of LPG Compressor suction line 10. Rupture of LPG Compressor suction line 11. Leak of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 12. Rupture of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 13. Leak of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 14. Rupture of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 15. Leak of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 16. Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 17. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 18. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 19. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 20. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 21. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 22. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare



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4.4 TYPES OF OUTCOME EVENTS Depending on the considered LPG LOC scenarios the following outcomes are expected:

Jet fires

Flammable gas dispersion (Flash Fire)

Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)

BLEVE

Jet fires

Jet fire occurs when a pressurized release (of a flammable gas or vapor) is ignited by any source. They tend to be localized in effect and are mainly of concern in establishing the potential for domino effects and employee safety zones rather than for community risks.

The jet fire model is based on the radiant fraction of total combustion energy, which is assumed to arise from a point slowly along the jet flame path. The jet dispersion model gives the jet flame length.

Flammable gas dispersion (Flash fire)

A flash fire is a sudden, intense fire caused by ignition of a mixture of air and a dispersed flammable gas. It is characterized by high temperature, short duration, and a rapidly moving flame front.

Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)

Vapor cloud explosion is the result of flammable materials in the atmosphere, a subsequent dispersion phase, and after some delay an ignition of the vapor cloud. Turbulence is the governing factor in blast generation, which could intensify combustion to the level that will result in an explosion. Obstacles in the path of vapor cloud or when the cloud finds a confined area, e.g. as under the bullets, often create turbulence. The VCE will result in overpressures.

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)

A boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) is an explosion caused by the rupture of a vessel containing a pressurized liquid above its boiling point.



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4.5 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS

In consequence analysis, use is made of a number of calculation models to estimate the physical effects of an accident (spill of hazardous material) and to predict the damage (lethality, injury, material destruction) of the effects.

Accidental release of flammable liquids can result in severe consequences. Immediate ignition of the pressurized chemical will result in a jet flame. Delayed ignition of flammable vapors can result in blast overpressures covering large areas.

The calculations can roughly be divided in three major groups:

a. Determination of the source strength parameters;

b. Determination of the consequential effects;

c. Determination of the damage or damage distances.

The basic physical effect models consist of the following.

4.5.1 SOURCE STRENGTH PARAMETERS

Calculation of the outflow of liquid vapors out of a vessel/tank or a pipe, in case of rupture. Also two-phase outflow can be calculated.

Calculation, in case of liquid outflow, of the instantaneous flash evaporation and of the dimensions of the remaining liquid pool.

Calculation of the evaporation rate, as a function of volatility of the material, pool dimensions and wind velocity.

Source strength equals pump capacities, etc. in some cases.

4.5.2 CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS

Dispersion of gaseous material in the atmosphere as a function of source strength, relative density of the gas, weather conditions and topographical situation of the surrounding area.

Intensity of heat radiation [in kW/ m2] due to a fire or a BLEVE, as a function of the distance to the source.

Energy of vapor cloud explosions [in N/m2], as a function of the distance to the distance of the exploding cloud.

Concentration of gaseous material in the atmosphere, due to the dispersion of evaporated chemical. The latter can be either explosive or toxic.



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It may be obvious, that the types of models that must be used in a specific risk study strongly depend upon the type of material involved:

Gas, vapor, liquid, solid?

Inflammable, explosive, toxic, toxic combustion products?

Stored at high/low temperatures or pressure?

Controlled outflow (pump capacity) or catastrophic failure?

4.6 SELECTION OF DAMAGE CRITERIA

The damage criteria give the relation between the extents of the physical effects (exposure) and the effect of consequences. For assessing the effects on human beings consequences are expressed in terms of injuries and the effects on equipment / property in terms of monetary loss.

The effect of consequences for explosion or fire can be categorized as:

Damage caused by heat radiation on material and people

Damage caused by explosion on structure and people

In consequence analysis studies, in principle three types of exposure to hazardous effects are distinguished:

1. Heat radiation due to fires - in this study, the concern is that of Jet fires and pool fires

2. Explosions

3. Toxic effects, from toxic materials or toxic combustion products.

In this study, “toxic effects are not applicable”.

The knowledge about these relations depends strongly on the nature of the exposure. Following are the criteria selected for damage estimation:



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Heat Radiation The effect of fire on a human being is in the form of burns. There are three categories of burn such

as first degree, second degree and third degree burns. The consequences caused by exposure to

heat radiation are a function of:

The radiation energy onto the human body [kW/m2];

The exposure duration [sec];

The protection of the skin tissue (clothed or naked body).

The limits for 1% of the exposed people to be killed due to heat radiation, and for second-degree burns

are given in the table below:

Table 2: Damages to human life due to heat radiation

Exposure Duration

Radiation energy (1% lethality), kW/m2

Radiation energy (2nd degree burns), kW/m2

Radiation energy (1st degree burns), kW/m2

10 sec 21.2 16 12.5 30 sec 9.3 7.0 4.0

Table 3: Effects due to incident radiation intensity

Incident Radiation (Kw/m2)

Type of Damage

0.7 Equivalent to Solar Radiation 1.6 No discomfort for long exposure

4.0 Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec. Blistering of skin (first degree burns are likely)

9.5 Pain threshold reached after 8 sec. second degree burns after 20 sec.

12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing etc.

37.5 Heavy Damage to process equipments

Reference: CCPS, Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis The actual results would be less severe due to the various assumptions made in the models arising out

of the flame geometry, emissivity, angle of incidence, view factor and others. The radiation output of

the flame would be dependent upon the fire size, extent of mixing with air and the flame temperature.

Some fraction of the radiation is absorbed by carbon dioxide and water vapor in the intervening

atmosphere. Finally the incident flux at an observer location would depend upon the radiation view



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factor, which is a function of the distance from the flame surface, the observer’s orientation and the

flame geometry.

As per the guidelines of CPR 18 E Purple Book:

« The lethality of a jet fire and pool fire is assumed to be 100% for the people who are caught in

the flame. Outside the flame area, the lethality depends on the heat radiation distances.

« For the flash fires lethality is taken as 100% for all the people caught outdoors and for 10% who

are indoors within the flammable cloud. No fatality has been assumed outside the flash fire

area.

« Overpressure more than 0.3 bar corresponds approximately with 50% lethality.

« An overpressure above 0.2 bar would result in 10% fatalities.

« An overpressure less than 0.1 bar would not cause any fatalities to the public.

« 100% lethality is assumed for all people who are present within the cloud proper.

Table 4: Damage due to overpressures

Peak Overpressure

Damage Type Description

0.30 bar Heavy Damage Major damage to plant equipment structure 0.10 bar Moderate Damage Repairable damage to plant equipment and structure 0.03 bar Significant Damage Shattering of glass 0.01 bar Minor Damage Crack in glass

4.7 PROBABILITIES 4.7.1 POPULATION PROBABILITIES It is necessary to know the population exposure in order to estimate the consequences and the risk

resulting from an incident. The exposed population is often defined using a population density.

Population densities are an important part of a QRA for several reasons. The most notable is that the

density is typically used to determine the number of people affected by a given incident with a specific

hazard area. Sometimes, population data are available in sketchy forms. In the absence of specific

population data default categories can be used.

The population density can be averaged over the whole area that may be affected or the area can be

subdivided into any number of segments with a separate population density for each individual

segment.

In this study, based on the discussions with CIL officials, the following population data were considered

for the study for the habitations located in the vicinity of the facility.



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Inside CIL plant facility :200

Outside CIL facility within 2 Km :

Name TRU Household Population

Vakalapudi (OG) WARD NO.-0071 (Rural MDDS CODE:587508) Urban 6308 23836

Ramanayyapeta (CT) Urban 7616 28369

Kakinada (M Corp.) WARD NO.-0002 – Sasikanth Nagar Urban 3484 13580

Kakinada (M Corp.) WARD NO.-0003 - Gudari Gunta Urban 4977 19145

4.7.2 FAILURE / ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES

The failure data is taken from CPR 18E – Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, developed by the

Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, Netherlands.

The impacts due to internal domino effects are not explicitly covered in QRA. An internal domino needs

to be considered only in case of a situation in which the failure of one component clearly leads to the

failure of another component. As the biggest vessel/ tank are considered for instantaneous failure the

impact due to internal domino effects are assumed to get covered in the analysis.

Event Tree Analysis

A release can result in several possible outcomes or scenarios (fire, explosions, unignited release etc.).

This is because the actual outcome depends on other events that may or may not occur following the

initial release. Event tree analysis is used to identify potential outcomes of a release and to quantify the

risk associated with each of these outcomes. The sample event tree is shown below.



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Please refer Annexure 1 for Event Tree Analysis for all storage tank and pipelines.



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4.7.3 WEATHER PROBABILITIES

As per CPR 18E there are 6 representative weather classes:

Stability Class Wind Speed

B Medium

D Low

D Medium

D High

E Medium

F Low

Low wind speed corresponds with 1-2 m/s

Medium wind speed corresponds with 3-5 m/s

High wind speed corresponds with 8-9 m/s

Observations in the Pasquill stability classes C, C/D and D are allocated to stability class D. Wind speeds

below 2.5 m/s, between 2.5 m/s and 6 m/s and above 6 m/s are allocated to the wind speed categories

low, medium and high respectively.

Wind Speed A B B/C C C/D D E F

<2.5 m s -1

B Medium

D Low F Low

2.5-6 m s -1 D Medium E Medium

>6 m s-1 D high

The wind speed in each weather class is equal to the average wind speed of the observations in the

weather class.

For this study, as per the standard meteorological data available for the site, wind velocity varies

between

« 1.5 F (Where F denotes Stable Condition – night with moderate clouds and light moderate

winds; 1.5 denotes wind velocity in m /sec)

« 5.0 D (where D denotes neutral condition – little sun and high wind or over cast / windy

night;

In general the largest effect distance for release of substances is found with stable weather.



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Temperature and Relative Humidity: Based on Climatologically data from the Indian Meteorological Department, an average temperature of

30°C and relative humidity of 70% is found pre-dominant in Kakinada.

Wind rose Diagram



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4.7.4 IGNITION PROBABILITIES

Immediate Ignition Probability:

Immediate ignition can be considered as the situation where the fluid ignites immediately on release through auto-ignition or because the accident which causes the release also provided an ignition source. Immediate ignition probability is assumed based on the CPR 18E - Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, developed by the Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, Netherlands.

Probability of Immediate Ignition

Substance category Source term Continuous

Source term Instantaneous

Probability of direct ignition

Category 0 average/ high reactivity

< 10 kg/s < 1,000 kg 0.2 10 – 100 kg/s > 100 kg/s

1000 – 10,000 kg > 10,000 kg

0.5 0.7

Category 0 low reactivity

< 10 kg/s 10 – 100 kg/s > 100 kg/s

< 1,000 kg 1000 – 10,000 kg > 10,000 kg

0.02 0.04 0.09

Category 1 All flow rates All quantities 0.065 Category 2 All flow rates All quantities 0.01 Category 3, 4 All flow rates All quantities 0

Category 0(extremely flammable):

Liquid substances and preparations with a flash point lower than 0 °C and a boiling point (or the start of a boiling range) less than or equal to 35 °C.

Gaseous substances and preparations that may ignite at normal temperature and pressure when exposed to air.

For this study LPG is considered under Category 0.

Delayed Ignition Probability:

Delayed ignition is the result of the build-up of a flammable vapour cloud which is ignited by a source remote from the release point. It is assumed to result in flash fires or explosions, and also to burn back to the source of the leak resulting in a jet fire and/or a pool fire. Delayed ignition probability is assumed based on the CPR 18E - Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, developed by the Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, Netherlands.



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Probability of Delayed Ignition

Source type Ignition source Probability of ignition

Point source Adjacent process installation Flare Oven (outside) Oven (inside) Boiler (outside) Boiler (inside)

0.5 1.0 0.9 0.45 0.45 0.23

Line source high-voltage cable (per 100 m) Ship

0.2 0.5

Population source Households (per person) Offices (per person)

0.01 0.01



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CHAPTER 5 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS



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5.1 SCENARIOS

This section documents the consequence-distance calculations, which have been computed for the

accident release scenarios considered.

In risk Assessment studies contributions from low frequency - high severity effect as well as high

frequency - low severity events are distinguished. Following are the potential Loss of Containment

scenarios envisaged for CIL, Kakinada.

Below LOC Scenarios are identified for the CIL,Kakinada.

S. No. Scenarios Storage Tanks, Tank Truck

1. Leak of LPG tank truck 2. Rupture of LPG tank truck 3. Leak of LPG mounded bullet 4. Rupture of LPG mounded bullet 5. Leak of LPG vaporizer 6. Rupture of LPG vaporizer

Pipelines & Unloading Arm 7. Leak of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 8. Rupture of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 9. Leak of LPG Compressor suction line 10. Rupture of LPG Compressor suction line 11. Leak of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 12. Rupture of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 13. Leak of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 14. Rupture of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 15. Leak of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 16. Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 17. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 18. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 19. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 20. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 21. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 22. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare

QRA Study Report for CIL Fertilizers Plant,

Kakinada


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5.2. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

Sudden release of hydrocarbon can result in a number of accident situations. As large number of failure cases can lead to the same type of consequences,

representative failure cases are selected for this analysis. The failure cases are based on conservative assumptions and engineering judgment. Typically,

failure models are considered for 100% pipe diameter/catastrophic rupture of vessels for rupture and 10% leak (hole size max 50 mm) based on the

guidelines of CPR 18 E.

Table 6: Inputs to software and summary of outcomes

S. No. Scenarios

Inputs Outcomes

Quantity

(MT)

Pressure

(bar (g))

Temperature

(°C)

Tank

Height

(m)

Jet Fire Pool Fire VCE

Storage Tanks, Tank Truck

1. Leak of LPG tank truck 17.5 10 to 12 Ambient 3 Applicable NA Applicable 2. Rupture of LPG tank truck 17.5 10 to 12 Ambient 3 NA NA Applicable 3. Leak of LPG mounded bullet 100 10 to 12 Ambient 4 Applicable NA Applicable 4. Rupture of LPG mounded bullet 100 10 to 12 Ambient 4 NA NA Applicable 5. Leak of LPG vaporizer 1.25 10 to 12 Ambient 2 Applicable NA Applicable 6. Rupture of LPG vaporizer 1.25 10 to 12 Ambient 2 NA NA Applicable



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S. No. Scenarios

Inputs Outcomes

Flow rate

(m3/hr)

Pressure

(bar (g))

Temperature

(°C)

Pipeline

dia

Jet Fire Pool Fire VCE

Pipelines & Unloading Arm

7. Leak of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 4.4 12 Ambient 50NB Applicable NA Applicable 8. Rupture of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 4.4 12 Ambient 50NB Applicable NA Applicable 9. Leak of LPG Compressor suction line 4.4 14 Ambient 40NB Applicable NA Applicable 10. Rupture of LPG Compressor suction line 4.4 14 Ambient 40NB Applicable NA Applicable 11. Leak of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 4.4 14 Ambient 40NB Applicable NA Applicable 12. Rupture of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 4.4 14 Ambient 40NB Applicable NA Applicable 13. Leak of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 4.4 14 Ambient 50NB Applicable NA Applicable 14. Rupture of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 4.4 14 Ambient 50NB Applicable NA Applicable 15. Leak of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 4.4 12 Ambient 50NB Applicable NA Applicable 16. Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 4.4 12 Ambient 80NB Applicable NA Applicable 17. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 0.87 6 Ambient 80NB Applicable NA Applicable 18. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 0.87 6 Ambient 80NB Applicable NA Applicable 19. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 0.87 6 Ambient 80NB Applicable NA Applicable 20. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 0.87 6 Ambient 80NB Applicable NA Applicable 21. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 0.035 6 Ambient 80NB Applicable NA Applicable 22. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 0.035 6 Ambient 80NB Applicable NA Applicable

QRA Study Report for CIL Fertilizers Plant,

Kakinada


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5.2.1. SUMMARY OF JET FIRE

Table 7: Jet fire results

S. No Scenarios

Downwind Damage Distances in m 1.5F Weather

Condition 5D Weather

condition 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5

kW/m2 kW/m2 Storage Tanks & Tank Truck

1 Leak of LPG tank truck 31 24 21 27 21 17

2 Rupture of LPG tank truck NA NA NA NA NA NA 3 Leak of LPG mounded bullet 32 25 21 27 21 17

4 Rupture of LPG mounded bullet NA NA NA NA NA NA

5 Leak of LPG vaporizer 23 10 NR 23 14 8

6 Rupture of LPG vaporizer NA NA NA NA NA NA Pipelines & Unloading Arm

7 Leak of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 16 13 11 14 11 9

8 Rupture of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 26 20 14 27 22 18

9 Leak of LPG Compressor suction line 11 9 8 10 8 6

10 Rupture of LPG Compressor suction line 58 46 39 52 39 32

11 Leak of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 14 11 9 12 9 7

12 Rupture of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 67 54 45 60 45 37

13 Leak of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 17 14 12 15 11 9

14 Rupture of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 69 55 46 62 47 38

15 Leak of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 25 20 17 22 17 14

16 Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 107 84 71 96 72 58

17 Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 25 20 17 22 17 14

18 Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 67 53 45 60 45 36



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S. No Scenarios

Downwind Damage Distances in m 1.5F Weather

Condition 5D Weather

condition 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5

kW/m2 kW/m2 Storage Tanks & Tank Truck

19 Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 25 20 17 22 17 14

20 Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 70 56 47 63 47 38

21 Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 25 20 17 22 17 14

22 Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 62 50 42 56 42 34

Analysis:

Storage Tanks & Tank Truck

Maximum damage due to Jet fire radiations will be caused by Leak of LPG mounded bullet, at a 1.5 F

weather condition. The jet fire radiation of 37.5 kW/m2 (corresponding to 100% fatality) will reach

up to a distance of 21 m at 1.5F weather condition. The jet fire radiation of 12.5 kW/ m2 will reach

up to a distance of 25 m at 1.5F weather condition. The equipments within a distance of 25 m will be

subjected to major damage or piloted ignition of wood, melting of plastics & tubing etc is possible

within this distance. The pool fire radiation of 4 kW/ m2 will reach up to a distance of 32 m at 1.5F

weather condition. First degree burns may be caused for persons who are within 32 m distance.


Maximum damage due to jet fire radiations will be caused by Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to

vaporizer, at a weather condition of 1.5 F. The jet fire radiation of 37.5 kW/m2 (corresponding to

100% fatality) will reach up to a distance of 71 m at 1.5F weather condition. The jet fire radiation of

12.5 KW/m2 will reach up to a distance of 84 m at 1.5F weather condition. The equipment within a

distance of 84 m will be subjected to major damage or piloted ignition of wood, melting of plastics &

tubing etc is possible within this distance. The jet fire radiation of 4 KW/m2 will reach up to a

distance of 107m at 1.5F weather condition. First degree burns may be caused for persons who are

within 107m distance.



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5.2.2. SUMMARY OF LATE POOL FIRE

Pool fire outcome is not applicable for LPG.

5.2.3. SUMMARY OF VAPOUR EXPLOSION

Table 8: Vapour cloud explosion results

S. No Scenarios

Maximum Distance at overpressure in m 1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition

0.03 bar

0.1 bar

0.3 bar

0.03 bar

0.1 bar

0.3 bar

Storage Tanks & Tank Truck 1 Leak of LPG tank truck 103 51 45 77 38 34 2 Rupture of LPG tank truck 316 63 36 299 60 40 3 Leak of LPG mounded bullet NR NR NR NR NR NR 4 Rupture of LPG mounded bullet 1665 525 489 1640 442 405 5 Leak of LPG vaporizer 103 51 45 76 38 34 6 Rupture of LPG vaporizer 490 145 130 464 122 104


7 Leak of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm

38 15 12 NR NR NR

8 Rupture of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm

79 39 34 62 27 24

9 Leak of LPG Compressor suction line 33 14 12 NR NR NR

10 Rupture of LPG Compressor suction line

142 58 49 62 27 24

11 Leak of Compressor discharge line to tank truck

34 14 12 NR NR NR

12 Rupture of Compressor discharge line to tank truck

298 151 135 247 126 113

13 Leak of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet

40 15 13 NR NR NR

14 Rupture of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet

302 152 136 262 136 123

15 Leak of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer

78 38 34 56 26 23

16 Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer

507 253 227 442 225 203

17 Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler

78 38 34 56 26 23

18 Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler

309 161 146 247 126 113



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S. No Scenarios

Maximum Distance at overpressure in m 1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition

0.03 bar

0.1 bar

0.3 bar

0.03 bar

0.1 bar

0.3 bar

19 Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer

78 38 34 56 26 23

20 Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer

319 163 146 265 137 123

21 Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare

78 38 34 56 26 23

22 Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare

290 149 135 226 114 102

Analysis:

Storage Tanks & Tank Truck

The maximum damage can be felt in case of Rupture of LPG mounded bullet, at 1.5F weather

condition. An overpressure of 0.3 bar can be felt up to a distance of 489 m at 1.5F weather

condition, Steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundation within this distance, and

it can also cause a lethality of around 50% for persons who are within this distance. An overpressure

of 0.10 bar can be felt up to a distance of 525 m at 1.5F weather condition; equipment within this

range can suffer repairable damages.

An overpressure of 0.03 bars can be felt up to a distance of 1665 m at 1.5F weather condition which

leads to shattering of glass etc.,.


The maximum damage can be felt in case of Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer. An

overpressure of 0.3 bar can be felt up to a distance of 227 m at 1.5F weather condition, Steel frame

building distorted and pulled away from foundation within this distance, and it can also cause a

lethality of around 50% for persons who are within this distance. An overpressure of 0.1 bar can be

felt up to a distance of 253 m at 1.5F weather condition; equipment within this range can suffer

repairable damages.

An overpressure of 0.03 bars can be felt up to a distance of 507 m at 1.5F weather condition which

leads to shattering of glass etc.



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5.2.4. SUMMARY OF BLEVE

Table 9: BLEVE results

S. No Scenarios

Maximum Distance at overpressure in m 1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition 0.03 bar

0.1 bar

0.3 bar

0.03 bar

0.1 bar

0.3 bar

Tank Truck 1 LPG tank truck 161.64 23.51 12.69 161.64 23.51 12.69

Analysis: The maximum damage can be felt in case of Rupture of LPG tank truck. An overpressure of 0.3 bar can be felt up to a distance of 12.69m, Steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundation within this distance, and it can also cause a lethality of around 50% for persons who are within this distance. An overpressure of 0.10 bar can be felt up to a distance of 23.51 m; equipment within this range can suffer repairable damages.

An overpressure of 0.03 bars can be felt up to a distance of 161.64 m which leads to shattering of glass etc.,.

5.2.5. SUMMARY OF FLAMMABLE GAS DISPERSION

Table 10: Flammable gas dispersion results

S. No Scenarios

Vapour Dispersion Distance in m 1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition

UFL LFL UFL LFL

Storage Tanks & Tank Truck 1 Leak of LPG tank truck 3.51 18.16 3.29 12.48

2 Rupture of LPG tank truck 4.98 10.12 5.42 17.96

3 Leak of mounded LPG bullet 4.56 11.44 3.40 6.55

4 Rupture of LPG mounded bullet 29.91 203.89 42.00 324.32

5 Leak of LPG vaporizer 3.50 18.11 3.28 12.45

6 Rupture of LPG vaporizer 10.73 90.61 7.84 52.92


5 Leak of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 1.77 7.49 1.69 5.80



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S. No Scenarios

Vapour Dispersion Distance in m 1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition

UFL LFL UFL LFL

6 Rupture of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 2.56 14.11 2.48 11.34

7 Leak of LPG Compressor suction line 1.42 6.09 1.37 4.80

8 Rupture of LPG Compressor suction line 4.75 25.76 4.47 13.81

9 Leak of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 1.51 6.47 1.45 5.07

10 Rupture of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 8.35 57.81 7.54 52.47

11 Leak of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 1.88 8.03 1.79 6.17

12 Rupture of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 8.56 59.43 7.71 54.41

13 Leak of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 2.81 13.38 2.65 8.95

14 Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 14.22 100.42 12.72 109.31

15 Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 2.81 13.38 2.65 8.95

16 Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 8.38 58.14 7.53 52.53

17 Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 2.81 13.38 2.65 8.95

18 Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 8.74 61.32 7.83 56.06

19 Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 2.81 13.38 2.65 8.95

20 Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 7.87 54.83 7.10 47.80

21 Leak of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 1.77 7.49 1.69 5.80

22 Rupture of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 2.56 14.11 2.48 11.34



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Analysis:

Storage Tanks, Tank Truck & Rail Wagon

In case of Rupture of Rupture of LPG mounded bullet, the LFL concentration is present up to a

maximum downwind distance of 324.32m at 5D weather condition and UFL concentration is present

up to a maximum distance of 42m at 5D weather condition. Presence of an ignition source may lead

to flash fire in this zone.

Pipelines, Unloading Arm & Hoses

In case of Rupture of Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer, the LFL concentration is

present up to a maximum downwind distance of 109.31 m at 5D weather condition and UFL

concentration is present up to a maximum distance of 12.72 m at 5D weather condition. Presence of

an ignition source may lead to flash fire in this zone.



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CHAPTER 6 RISK ANALYSIS



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6.1. RISK PRESENTATION

Individual Risk: The Individual Risk calculation can be done using the specific locations of the known sources at the

establishment. If the cloud is not ignited at the establishment, ignition is assumed to take place at

maximum cloud area, with cloud area defined as the foot-print of the cloud. If contour is not present

outside the establishment, e.g., the spill of a flammable liquid in a bund, and if the ignition does not

occur at the establishment, ignition is assumed not to take place.

Societal Risk: The Societal Risk calculation can be done using the specific locations of the known sources at the

establishment and outside the establishment. The distribution of ignition sources in the

establishment should be known or can be anticipated. If only a few (weak) ignition sources are

present, there is a probability that the ignition of the cloud will not occur.

For calculating the frequency to be applied for modeling the following factors are taken into

consideration and multiplied with the basic failure frequency to calculate the calculated failure

frequency:

1. Blocking systems : The blocking systems are used to limit the released quantity following a LOC. A blocking system

consists of a detection system (e.g. gas detection, hydrocarbon detection, etc combined with shut-

off valves). The shut-off valves can be closed automatically or manually. Blocking systems are further

classified into Automatic, semi-automatic and non-automated (Manual) system. Semi Automatic

blocking system has been considered for this study.

2. Fire suppression systems The fire protection systems and fire fighting facilities which are used to restrict fire, the various

factors affecting the fire protection systems are:

« Response effectiveness (i.e. the system is responsive to a specific scenario)

« On-line availability (i.e. the system is online at the time of the emergency)

« Operational reliability (the system functions properly at the time of emergency)

3. Human Intervention / Intervention by operators

4. Ignition probabilities



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Table 11: Accident event frequency

S. No. Scenarios Basic failure frequency (From CPR18E database)

Calculated failure frequency (From Event

tree Analysis) Storage Tanks & Tank Truck

1. Leak of LPG tank truck 5.00E-07 3.92E-08 2. Rupture of LPG tank truck 1.00E-05 1.23E-06 3. Leak of mounded LPG bullet 1.00E-05 5.54E-07 4. Rupture of LPG mounded bullet 5.00E-07 8.60E-08 5. Leak of LPG vaporizer 1.00E-04 1.11E-06 6. Rupture of LPG vaporizer 5.00E-06 5.54E-08


7. Leak of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 4.87E-03 2.71E-05

8. Rupture of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 4.87E-04 2.71E-06

9. Leak of LPG Compressor suction line 1.25E-04 1.38E-06 10. Rupture of LPG Compressor suction line 2.50E-05 2.77E-07

11. Leak of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 1.25E-04 1.38E-06

12. Rupture of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 2.50E-05 2.77E-07

13. Leak of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 3.75E-04 4.15E-06

14. Rupture of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 7.50E-05 8.30E-07

15. Leak of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 3.25E-04 3.60E-06

16. Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 6.50E-05 7.20E-07

17. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 1.40E-03 1.55E-05

18. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 2.10E-04 2.33E-06

19. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 1.11E-03 1.23E-05

20. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 1.67E-04 1.84E-06

21. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 2.00E-03 2.21E-05

22. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 3.00E-04 3.32E-06



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Risk Summary

S. No. Scenarios Individual Risk per avg.

year Societal Risk per avg.

year Storage Tanks & Tank Truck

1. Leak of LPG tank truck 5.29E-10 4.97E-10 2. Rupture of LPG tank truck 1.24E-07 1.24E-07 3. Leak of mounded LPG bullet 3.61E-09 3.11E-09 4. Rupture of LPG mounded bullet 7.41E-07 7.98E-07 5. Leak of LPG vaporizer 9.75E-09 9.19E-09 6. Rupture of LPG vaporizer 2.22E-08 2.24E-08


7. Leak of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 5.50E-08 5.12E-08

8. Rupture of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm 5.83E-09 5.06E-09

9. Leak of LPG Compressor suction line 1.33E-09 1.21E-09 10. Rupture of LPG Compressor suction line 8.02E-09 7.89E-09

11. Leak of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 1.93E-09 1.78E-09

12. Rupture of Compressor discharge line to tank truck 1.35E-08 1.32E-08

13. Leak of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 9.90E-09 9.22E-09

14. Rupture of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet 5.89E-08 5.86E-08

15. Leak of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 2.01E-08 1.89E-08

16. Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer 2.66E-07 2.68E-07

17. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 5.70E-07 7.02E-07

18. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler 3.13E-07 3.56E-07

19. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 6.90E-08 6.51E-08

20. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer 1.95E-07 2.22E-07

21. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 1.23E-07 1.17E-07

22. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare 3.36E-07 4.06E-07

Refer Annexure 2 for individual & societal risks for the above mentioned LOC scenarios.



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With reference to the risk acceptance criteria specified by HSE, UK in IS 15656:2006 - Code of Practice on Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis it is observed that the risk levels of the proposed installation of LPG mounded bullets in CIL Fertilizers plant are in acceptable region. The risk levels are expected to be remaining within these acceptable limits if all the control measures recommended in this report are implemented in addition to the existing risk control measures.

Legends:

Unacceptable ALARP Acceptable



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CHAPTER 7 RISK CONTROL MEASURES



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7.1. PROPOSED RISK CONTROL MEASURES AS PER PRE-FEASIBILITY

REPORT The following LPG safety systems will be considered while designing the storage facility:

1. Design and safety requirements for LPG mounded bullet are implemented as per OISD-Std-150.

2. LPG Mounded bullets are provided with necessary passive and active safety systems as per OISD-STD- 150 standard.

3. Fire Safe ROV will be provided on first flange on liquid line (s), vapour outlet and re-circulation lines from the vessel either from bottom or. No other flanges will be provided up to ROVs.

4. All vents and drains will be routed to an emergency flare system.

5. Minimum two different types of level indicators and one independent high level switch is proposed be provided.

6. Fire detectors based on heat detection through thermal fuses/quartz bulbs/ EP detectors will be provided.

7. At least four gas detectors will be installed and set for the 0.5*LEL (0.8%).

8. In the event of gas detection all ROVs on the affected vessel and LPG Pumps will trip.

9. Fire detector on each exposed portion of vessel will be installed; water sprinklers and deluge system will be automatically operated upon fire detection.

10. Water sprinklers/deluge system shall be provided for the LPG tank to avoid over heating of the content in case of small external jet fires.

11. At least one approved portable B:C rating dry chemical fire extinguisher may be installed near the tank

12. A warning sign or notice of minimum size of 800mm x 600mm shall be permanently and legibly displayed at the front of the installation.



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7.2. RISK ACCEPTANCE

In India, there are no defined criteria for risk acceptance. However, in IS 15656 – Code of Practice for

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis, Annexure E summarizes the risk criteria adopted in some

countries. Extracts for the same is presented below:

RISK CRITERIA IN SOME COUNTRIES

Authority and Application Maximum Tolerable Risk

(Per Year)

Negligible Risk

(Per Year)

VROM, The Netherlands (New) 1.0E-6 1.0E-8

VROM, The Netherlands (Existing) 1.0E-5 1.0E-8

HSE, UK (Existing Hazardous Industry) 1.0E-4 1.0E-6

HSE, UK (New Industries) 1.0E-5 1.0E-6

HSE, UK (Substance Transport) 1.0E-4 1.0E-6

HSE, UK (New Housing Near Plants) 3 x 1.0E-6 3 x 1.0E-7

Hong Kong Government (New Plants) 1.00E-5 Not Used

To achieve the above risk acceptance criteria, ALARP principle was followed while suggesting risk

reduction recommendations



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7.3. RISK CONTROL MEASURES SUGGESTED

The following risk control measures are recommended in addition to the existing risk control measures to maintain the risk levels within acceptable region:

SOP to address the operations pertaining to LPG receipt. Checklist to be prepared and records maintained for the same.

Fire water adequacy study to be carried out for the proposed LPG storage and handling facility

Integrity of the water sprinkler system pipeline to be ensured

Earthing /bonding of LPG handling pipelines to be periodically checked for integrity and continuity.

Onsite and offsite emergency response & disaster management plan should be developed for the proposed facility

OISD recommendations:

OISD-Std-150: Design and safety requirements for LPG mounded storage facility

High level alarm should be set at not more than 85% level of the volumetric capacity of the vessel.

LPG bullet should have at least two Safety Relief Valves (SRV). The full flow capacity of each SRV on mounded vessel(s) should be minimum 30 % of the capacity required for an

Unacceptable region

10-4 Per annum

Risk cannot be justified

The ALARP or tolerability Region (risk is undertaken Only if a benefit is Desired)

Tolerable only if further risk reduction is impractical, or the cost is not proportionate to the benefit gained

Broadly acceptable

Region

10-6 Per annum

Negligible risk

Risks closer to the unacceptable region merit a closer examination of potential risk reduction measures



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equivalent size of above ground vessel. Suitable gas detectors should be placed at critical locations in the LPG storage area such as near the ROVs, in inspection tunnel, inside the nozzle box enclosure (if provided) or dome connection, near water draining/ sampling points.

Audio-visual alarms showing the location of gas leakage should be provided on the control panel. First level alarm shall be set at 20% of Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) and second level alarm at 60 % of LEL.

Cathodic protection system should be provided maintained and tested as per Annexure 1 of OISD-Std-150.

Sub-soil water, rainwater or any other surface water should not be allowed to percolate in to the mound.

Provision should be made to monitor the settlement of the mound/ vessel by providing permanent reference points. A minimum of three reference points shall be provided to ascertain uniform/ differential settlement and also identify possible vessel bending (One each near the vessel ends and one in the middle.)

In case of non-availability of flare system, the discharge from safety valve shall be vented vertically upwards to atmosphere without any intermediate valve on downstream side at an elevation of 3-meter (minimum) from the top of the mound or exposed nozzle whichever is higher for effective dispersion of hydrocarbons.

Hydrant (s)/monitor(s) should be located at a safe place and shall not be installed within 15 meters from the exposed portion facilities/equipment to be protected. Adequate coverage to unprotected portions exposed to thermal radiation including the top of the mound and product pipelines to be ensured.

Safety Relief valves should be tested and calibrated every year by a competent person.

Other OISD standards:

Periodical Inspection and thickness measurement are to be carried out for the storage tanks

Ensure that the Gas Monitoring System is calibrated and tested as per OISD-Std-153

Ensure fixed fire protection systems for the truck unloading area conforming to OISD-Std-117.

Inspection and Maintenance of Pipelines to be carried as per OISD 130. Following need to be adhered in terms of inspection frequency:

Pressure Testing – Once every year Painting – Once in 5 years External Inspection – Yearly





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Conclusion

If all the existing risk control measures along with the additional risk control measures recommended in this report are implemented, the risks levels of the proposed installation of LPG mounded bullets/its associated pipelines in CIL Fertilizers plant are observed to remain within acceptable region.



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CHAPTER 8 REFERENCES



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8.1. REFERENCES

« IS 15656:2006: Hazard identification and risk analysis - Code of Practice

« Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment CPR 18E (Purple book), Committee for the

Prevention of Disasters, Netherlands (Edition: PGS 3, 2005)

« Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures - Centre for Chemical Process Safety, American

Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, 1992.



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CHAPTER 9 ANNEXURES



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Annexure 1: Event tree analysis

Annexure 2: Individual & Societal Risk contours

Annexure 3: Google image of CIL plant, Kakinada

Proposed LPG Bullet

Dryer area

Boiler

Flare stack

QRA Study for CIL, Kakinada Page 1 of 23

ANNEXURE – 1: Event tree Analysis

Document : QRA Study for Coromandel International Limited,

Kakinada

Consultant : Cholamandalam Ms Risk Services Limited (CMSRSL)

Month/Year : December, 2014


1. Leak of LPG tank truck :( 10mm Leak)

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition

Hydrocarbon Detection &

isolation

Fire protection system

Delayed Ignition

Explosion Probability

Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 1.60E-08 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 4.00E-09

Yes 0.4 6.14E-09

5.00E-07 Yes

0.04

Success No 0.8 0.6 9.22E-09 No No 0.96 3.69E-07 0.96

Yes 0.4 1.54E-09 Yes 0.04 Failure No 0.2 0.6 2.30E-09 No 0.96 9.22E-08

Event Outcome

Controlled Jet/Pool Fire

Uncontrolled Jet/Pool Fire

VCE

Flash Fire Unignited Release

VCE Flash Fire Unignited Release


2. Rupture of LPG tank truck

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 7.20E-07 Yes 0.09

No

0.2 1.80E-07

Yes 0.4 2.62E-07

1.00E-05 Yes

0.09



Event Outcome

Controlled BLEVE/ Jet/Pool Fire

Uncontrolled BLEVE/Jet/Pool Fire

VCE




3. Leak of LPG mounded bullet: 10mm Leak

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 3.20E-07 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 8.00E-08

Yes 0.4 1.23E-07

1.00E-05 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome

Controlled Pool/Jet Fire

Uncontrolled Pool/Jet Fire

VCE




4. Rupture of LPG mounded bullet

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 3.60E-08 Yes 0.09

No

0.2 9.00E-09

Yes 0.4 1.31E-08

5.00E-07 Yes

0.09



Event Outcome



VCE




5. Leak of LPG vaporizer

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 3.20E-06 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 8.00E-07

Yes 0.4 1.23E-06

1.00E-04 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




6. Rupture of LPG vaporizer

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 1.60E-07 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 4.00E-08

Yes 0.4 6.14E-08

5.00E-06 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




7. Leak of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 7.79E-05 Yes 0.02

No

0.2 1.95E-05

Yes 0.4 3.05E-05

4.87E-03 Yes

0.02



Event Outcome



VCE




8. Rupture of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 7.79E-06 Yes 0.02

No

0.2 1.95E-06

Yes 0.4 3.05E-06

4.87E-04 Yes

0.02



Event Outcome



VCE




9. Leak of LPG Compressor suction line

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 4.00E-06 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 1.00E-06

Yes 0.4 1.54E-06

1.25E-04 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




10. Rupture of LPG Compressor suction line

Initiating Failure Frequency

Immediate Ignition

Hydrocarbon Detection & isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome Frequency

Yes

0.8 8.00E Yes 0.04

No

0.2 2.00E

Yes 0.4

2.50E-05 Yes

0.04

Success No 0.8 0.6 No No 0.96 1.84E 0.96

Yes 0.4 Yes 0.04 Failure No 0.2 0.6 1.15E No 0.96 4.61E

Event Outcome Frequency Event Outcome

8.00E-07 Controlled Pool/Jet Fire

2.00E-07 Uncontrolled Pool/Jet Fire

3.07E-07 VCE

4.61E-07 Flash Fire

1.84E-05 Unignited Release

7.68E-08 VCE

1.15E-07 Flash Fire

4.61E-06 Unignited Release


11. Leak of Compressor discharge line to tank truck

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 4.00E-06 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 1.00E-06

Yes 0.4 1.54E-06

1.25E-04 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




12. Rupture of Compressor discharge line to tank truck

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 8.00E-07 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 2.00E-07

Yes 0.4 3.07E-07

2.50E-05 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




13. Leak of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 1.20E-05 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 3.00E-06

Yes 0.4 4.61E-06

3.75E-04 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




14. Rupture of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 2.40E-06 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 6.00E-07

Yes 0.4 9.22E-07

7.50E-05 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




15. Leak of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 1.04E-05 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 2.60E-06

Yes 0.4 3.99E-06

3.25E-04 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




16. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 2.08E-06 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 5.20E-07

Yes 0.4 7.99E-07

6.50E-05 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




17. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 4.48E-05 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 1.12E-05

Yes 0.4 1.72E-05

1.40E-03 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE





Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 6.72E-06 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 1.68E-06

Yes 0.4 2.58E-06

2.10E-04 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




19. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 3.55E-05 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 8.88E-06

Yes 0.4 1.36E-05

1.11E-03 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




20. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 5.33E-06 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 1.33E-06

Yes 0.4 2.05E-06

1.67E-04 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




21. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 6.40E-05 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 1.60E-05

Yes 0.4 2.46E-05

2.00E-03 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE




22. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare

Initiating Failure

Frequency

Immediate Ignition


isolation


Delayed Ignition


Event Outcome

Frequency

Yes

0.8 9.60E-06 Yes 0.04

No

0.2 2.40E-06

Yes 0.4 3.69E-06

3.00E-04 Yes

0.04



Event Outcome



VCE



QRA Study for CIL Page 1 of 23

ANNEXURE – 2: IR & SR CONTOURS

Document : QRA Study for Coromandel International Limited,

Kakinada

Consultant : Cholamandalam Ms Risk Services Limited (CMSRSL)

Month/Year : December, 2014


1. Leak of LPG tank truck

IR: 5.29E-10 per avg year

SR: 4.97E-10 per avg year

Considering the quantity of release, population distribution, weather condition & other process parameters Societal risk values for this scenario are negligible. Hence no FN curves are found.


2. Rupture of LPG tank truck




3. Leak of LPG mounded bullet





4. Rupture of LPG mounded bullet




5. Leak of LPG vaporizer





6. Rupture of LPG vaporizer





7. Leak of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm




8. Rupture of LPG unloading Hose / LPG Unloading Arm





9. Leak of LPG Compressor suction line





10. Rupture of LPG Compressor suction line





11. Leak of Compressor discharge line to tank truck





12. Rupture of Compressor discharge line to tank truck




13. Leak of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet





14. Rupture of LPG pipeline from tank truck to bullet




15. Leak of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer




16. Rupture of LPG pipeline from bullet to vaporizer




17. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to boiler




19. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer




20. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to Dryer




21. Leak of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare




22. Rupture of LPG pipeline from vaporizer to flare



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