QUARTERLY OUTLOOK3RD QUARTER 2020

2

CONTENTS 3RD QUARTER 2020

1. Editorial The Post-Covid World.

2. Macro perspective L, U, V, W, √: how would you like your economic recovery?

3. Fixed income Appetite for risk not weakening (as yet?).

4. Equities What comes after «Growth» versus «Value»?

5. Asset allocation Reserved for Banque Eric Sturdza’s clients

6. Performance

3

Our last quarterly outlook was drafted against a backdrop of a dislocated stock mar-ket environment, with the (extremely vola-tile) Standard and Poor’s index trading 45% below its current level. The anxiety-inducing environment and strict lockdown unleashed the imagination and the pens of strategists, journalists and commentators of every co-lour and creed, rivalling each other in their efforts to describe the “post-Covid” world.

Although we did not go so far as to engage in any pe-

rilous forecasts as to what the world would become,

we did state that people should buy while the market

was down. It would now appear that our position was

somewhat timid, however, given what was to follow,

with a rebound that has been historic not only in its

scale, but also in its speed. Analysis of the nature of

this rebound suggests that the markets replied to the

journalists’ questions with a dismissive flourish: the

post-Covid world will be nothing more than an acce-

lerated version of its pre-Covid self. Was that just pro-

vocation? A quick survey of the biggest winners in the

crisis in terms of additional stock-market capitalisation

confirms a familiar story, with Amazon coming in first

place (market capitalization up by $400 billion), fol-

lowed on the next two steps of the podium by Microsoft

and Apple with gains of $260 billion and $200 billion

respectively in market cap. It is indeed difficult to see

any signs of revolution there. In Europe, meanwhile,

ASML (manufacturer of semi-conductors) posted the

best performance on the Eurostoxx, as it already had

in 2019. As for the biggest losers, the situation was not

very different, with Covid doing little more than ac-

celerate the longstanding downward trajectories of JC

Penney, Europcar and Hertz.

This rebound in the markets has been orchestrated

in style by the central banks and governments, who

would appear to have been taking “accelerating the

pre-Covid world” as their leitmotiv. In order to coun-

ter the effects of the economy grinding to a sudden

halt, the central bankers delved into the measures

that had already been used in response to the 2008

crisis, only more quickly and in a bigger way, as if

2008 had just been a rehearsal, a smaller-scale trial

run. We will give two small examples and a graph

as an illustration, that of growth in M2 money stock.

There was an urgent need to increase money supply in

order to counter the slowdown in money circulation,

and that is exactly what was done, although on a scale

never before seen, as the graph clearly shows. Another

illustration is the European TLTRO, with €1,300 bil-

lion announced last week and the “favourable” rate

applied to Eurozone banks being cut to -1%. Many

other examples can be given and comparisons made:

the measures of the past three months have been the

same as those that got us out of the 2008 crisis, only

on steroids. The post-Covid world will therefore be

keeping low interest rates for quite some time, mar-

kets that are controlled by central bankers ever ready

to step in to help and, if history repeats itself, growth

investment which will continue to outstrip value in-

vestment… To correctly have guessed market trajec-

tories over the past few weeks, operators would have

been well advised to follow the tip Jeff Bezos some-

times gives to entrepreneurs: “think above all about

the things that are not going to change.”

Does that mean that the intellectual musings about

the post-Covid world are entirely in vain? Certainly

they are, if we are looking at just the next few weeks.

As the same causes tend to have the same effects, we

will simply go by the lessons from 2008 (markets stee-

red by central banks, inflation in asset prices without

real inflation increasing, etc.), especially as that stee-

ring has now been fine-tuned and aims to contain

1. EDITORIAL THE POST-COVID WORLD.

4

the very first signs of any upturns in volatility. For

example on June 11th, the Standard and Poor’s in-

dex stumbled and lost 5.9% in a single session. On

June 15th, the Fed declared that it was buying “in-

vestment grade” bonds and got equities straight back

on their upwards track. This episode is worth a clo-

ser look. Before any government intervention, the

market for the highest-rated bonds had essentially

returned to its highest level. It was far from being

in trouble. Since the intervention by the Fed, prices

have forged ahead to new highs: it is no longer a ques-

tion of stabilising the price of an asset that is under

selling pressure, but rather of putting out a message:

don’t you go trying to sell, because the all-powerful

hand of the Fed is there to buy.

Gone is the moral hazard and we are now experien-

cing “controlled markets” from which American

private investors are benefitting, buying up equities

with sometimes excessive enthusiasm. The risks of

bubbles forming in certain parts of the stock index

cannot be excluded.

There is one other point we must keep an eye on: given the scale of the measures rolled

out by the central banks and governments, are we sure that we are not going to end up seeing any consequences on inflation. There are two opposing views. The sceptics reas-sure themselves by drawing on experience: since there was no upturn in inflation post-2008, why should there be now when we are using the same weapons? Others, meanwhile, are alarmed by the sheer scale of the mea-sures and stimulus plans, which are quite unprecedented. To give just a single compa-rison: the Marshall Plan itself would have re-presented some $190 billion in today’s dol-lars, while the US post Covid budget deficit amounts to $3.7 trillion (source: Gavekal, CBO). It is too early to know for inflation, but the figures are indeed head-spinning. And as the market is offering some attrac-tive ways in via assets that benefit from in-flation. We have recently added a few (cheap) investments to the portfolio, a small quan-tity of TIPS (treasury inflation-protected se-curities) in our fixed income portfolios and some European cyclical stocks in our main-ly growth oriented portfolios.

GRAPH 1 : US MONEY SUPPLY GROWTH

Source : Bloomberg, FED, Banque Eric Sturdza

0

5

10

15

20

25

01.01.60

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01.01.15

01.04.16

01.07.17

01.10.18

01.01.20

1st Oil shock

2nd Oil shock Latam

Crisis

LTCM & Asian Crisis

9/11 GFC

EURSovereign

5

2. MACRO PERSPECTIVE L, U, V, W, √: HOW WOULD YOU LIKE YOUR ECONOMIC RECOVERY?

The lockdown period has been followed by a phase of gradual easing in restrictions through May and June, as the world economy came out of hibernation and activity began to resume. It provides the perfect opportu-nity to reflect on the likely profile of that recovery (L, U, V, W, √ or pretty much any other letter of the alphabet you might fancy).

With over 10 million people infected and almost

500,000 deaths, the world has not yet seen the back

of Covid-19. Despite the appearance of new clusters

in Beijing and Germany, the epidemic would appear

to be under control in Asia and in Europe. Things

are not so clear in Latin America, the new epicentre

of the pandemic, and in the United States, where

the increase in the number of new cases in the Sun

Belt states is causing concern. Then again, a certain

number of states in the south of the US did ease the

lockdown without introducing very strict restrictive

measures and it would certainly seem more accurate

to talk of an extension of the first wave, rather than a

genuine second wave. Although the Healthcare sec-

tor has made significant and rapid progress in defi-

ning the genome of the virus, hunting for treatments

(Chloroquine, Remdesivir) and coming up with vac-

cines (Moderna), an upsurge could nonetheless prove

to be problematic and a source of volatility.

-

50 000,00

100 000,00

150 000,00

200 000,00

250 000,00

13.01.20

20.01.20

27.01.20

03.02.20

10.02.20

17.02.20

24.02.20

02.03.20

09.03.20

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30.03.20

06.04.20

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27.04.20

04.05.20

11.05.20

18.05.20

25.05.20

01.06.20

08.06.20

15.06.20

22.06.20

5d Confirmed cases - Hubei 5d Confirmed cases - South Korea 5d Confirmed cases - Spain 5d Confirmed cases -Japan

5d Confirmed cases - USA 5d Confirmed cases -Brazil 5d Confirmed cases -F lor ida

GRAPH 2 : CUMULATIVE 5D NEW COVID-19 CASES

Source : Banque Eric Sturdza, Bloomberg, WHO

6

Citi China Economic Surprises Inde

-400

-300

-200

-100

0

100

200

25.05.16

25.07.16

25.09.16

25.11.16

25.01.17

25.03.17

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25.01.19

25.03.19

25.05.19

25.07.19

25.09.19

25.11.19

25.01.20

25.03.20

25.05.20

Citi US Economic Surprises Index Citi Euro Zone Economic Surpr ises Index Citi China Economic Surprises Index

GRAPH 3 : CITI ECONOMIC SURPRISE INDICES

Source : Citigroup, Bloomberg, Banque Eric Sturdza

Despite this, there is every chance that governments

will be quite reluctant to enforce a second lockdown,

given the economic, financial and social costs (unem-

ployment) of the first one, and its indirect impacts

on health (loss of health insurance, depression, etc.).

This was precisely the point made by Treasury Se-

cretary Steven Mnuchin when he stated that the

U.S. “can’t shut down the economy again”.

United States: economic momentum on the up, political risk too.

According to the Nowcast indicator published by

the Atlanta Fed, the snapshot annual-rate fore-

cast for GDP in Q2 comes out at -45.5%, a bru-

tal contraction that pushed the NBER to declare

that the United States entered into recession in Fe-

bruary 2020.

The measures to lift the lockdown are resulting in

a rebound in economic activity, with a sharper up-

turn in activity than was initially expected. Retail

sales were up by 16% in May, driven by revenge

shopping and the rise in the disposable income of

US households further to the federal aid and trans-

fers. Employment figures were also greeted with

stupefaction, with 2.5 million jobs created in May,

rather than the 7 million losses that were expec-

ted. Although the quality of the employment statis-

tics has been put into question and may be revised

sharply upwards in the months ahead, the tone has

been set and the markets made no mistake. This is

also confirmed by the rise in the economic surprise

indicators measuring the economic data that came

out above or below expectations.

Although the Healthcare sector has made

significant and rapid progress, an upsurge

of Covid could nonetheless prove to

be problematic and a source of volatility.

Despite this, there is every chance that

governments will be most reluctant to

enforce a strict lockdown again.

7

If we look a little more closely, this spectacular eco-

nomic recovery is not as surprising as all that. Take

account of the unprecedented support from the

Fed (see Graph 1) and the tax and fiscal stimulus

which, as a proportion of GDP, is equalled only by

the war effort during the Second World War. Af-

ter being one of the first countries to implement a

large-scale stimulus and support plan, the capacity

of the Trump administration for further initiatives

seems more limited today, with the prospect of the

elections in November and rising social tensions not

unlike those at the end of the 1960s.

Europe: a Hamiltonian moment

Alexander Hamilton went down in the history books

as one of the minds behind American federalism

and the introduction of federal funding of the lo-

cal states. As an illustration, an average of 3.5% of

GDP each year is transferred from the federal state

to the indivdual states (source: Tax Policy Center).

This is a mechanism that is cruelly lacking in the

European Union today.

On this subject, the European Commission stimu-

lus plan supported by Germany and France might

just turn out to be that Hamiltonian moment that

has long been waited for. As a reminder, this plan

endowed with €750 billion (of which €500 billion

in additional spending), representing 3.5% of EU

GDP, would be financed by federal issuance by the

European Union. This debt would be supported by

the creation of new resources at EU level (carbon

tax, digital tax, etc.) and the allocation of resources

would no longer necessarily be linked to Member

State contributions. In this respect, the target alloca-

tion of the Recovery & Resilience Facility, the main

support fund (€330 billion) for the regions most af-

fected by Covid, reveals the impact for the hardest

hit regions, in absolute terms and as a percentage.

0,00%

5,00%

10,00%

15,00%

20,00%

25,00%

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10,00

20,00

30,00

40,00

50,00

60,00

70,00

80,00

Italy Spain France Poland Germany Greece Portugal

Proposed allocation in Bln EUR As a % of GDP As a % of total

GRAP 4 : RECOVERY & RESILIENCE FACILITY – PROPOSED ALLOCATION

Source : Cahiers Verts de l’Economie, Commission Européenne, Banque Eric Sturdza

8

This is potentially a major turning point for Europe. Obviously, for that to be the case, the

European Commission, France and Germany, who

are supporting the project, will have to succeed in

overcoming the opposition of the “Frugal Four” –

the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Sweden.

On this point, the backing by Germany and the

success of the recent European Council meeting

are steps in the right direction.

Although the rebound in economic activity may have surprised market participants in the short term, it should also be remembe-red that these same participants had also been surprised by the shock caused by the lockdown. Over the coming months, econo-mic statistics are going to continue tracking this rebound in activity, but as we are re-minded by the forecasting institutes (and the IMF first and foremost), we will pro-bably have to wait until the end of 2021 at best for activity to return to its pre-crisis level. The economic recovery profile is the-refore probably closest to a U or √. The dif-ficulty of the exercise for investors resides in reconciling this U-shaped recovery with the more V-shaped recovery priced by the financial markets.

9

3. FIXED INCOME THE APPETITE FOR RISK NOT WEAKENING (AS YET?)

The Fed calms the euphoria

On the occasion of the FOMC on 10 June and then

again in front of Congress a few days later, Jerome

Powell explained American monetary policy. It was

a high-stakes exercise for the head of the Fed but he

came through it masterfully. His view was that people

should not give in to excessive pessimism and scare

tactics, in order to avoid triggering a general panic,

but that things should be put in the correct perspec-

tive, pointing out that Wall Street had been getting

somewhat ahead of itself since the 23rd March. Powell

explained in particular that the latest encouraging

statistics (including the almost-miraculous employ-

ment figures) were not yet sufficient cause to declare

victory and that the advocates of a V-shaped recove-

ry, headed by the Trump administration should re-

main reasonable. The Fed’s zero interest rate policy

will therefore be maintained until 2022. Instruments

that were introduced recently will be used according

to needs (which continue to be considerable for the

moment). Although we did see an attempted rise in

long-term rates in the form of a bear steepening at

the start of the month, they returned to their equi-

librium level at around 0.75% for the 10-year rate.

The beginning of June was complicated for the US

longer-term rates as, in addition to a returning ap-

petite for risk driving a movement to sell, there was

a lot of primary market activity to be absorbed at a

time when the Chinese were continuing to shed a

part of their Treasuries reserves.

Fears of a second wave then emerged at the end of

the month. That kind of news combined with very

high levels could well result in a bigger correction.

That would mean that credit spreads, which had

eased in spectacular fashion, might start growing

again through the summer. In our opinion, it would

not be the beginning of a violent bear market on

spreads, but of a return to something a little less exu-

berant, and which might just offer us some invest-

ment opportunities.

Bond strategy and tactics

In this context, what strategy should be adopted? It

might be more a question of tactics as our view of the current market levels is that it would be best to follow the old saying that “it is urgent to do nothing.” It would seem risky to give up al-

together on pure duration investments. Treasuries

can still be very useful and TIPS are no doubt an op-

tion not to be ignored (they held up very well in mid-

June’s mini-correction). Credit spreads, to which we

reduced our exposure after an impressive rally, are

in mid-stream just now. The behaviour of equities in

coming weeks might just open up some windows of

opportunity on hybrid corporates, which had beco-

me horribly expensive at the end of June. Today, we

have shed some credits but are ready to reinvest in the

event of a correction, as our pure-duration nominal

rates / real rates position has not really changed. We

cannot entirely rule out the risk of a second wave or

perhaps the (more likely) risk that the markets might

play at scaring themselves with the idea that it could

happen. For the longer term, we are increasingly at-

tracted to emerging market investment grade credit.

They have suffered more than their European and

American counterparts, have been rising again since

the end of March (although not spectacularly) and are

not lucky enough to feature in the shopping lists of

the Fed and the ECB. It may be a bit early for such a

strategy, but it is no doubt a growth driver to be consi-

dered for the final quarter of this year and for 2021.

10

4. EQUITIES WHAT COMES AFTER “GROWTH” VERSUS “VALUE”?

Amid news of better than anticipated eco-nomic indicators in the U.S. and more evi-dence of direct support by European go-vernments, equity markets in June initially posted a strong rebound in cyclical “value” stocks, likely supported by individual inves-tors looking to participate by snapping up stock in companies left behind in the April-May rebound. While the second half of the month reversed some of this spike, these dynamics supported the reemergence of a familiar discussion: has the time for “va-lue” stocks finally come?

Few topics have garnered as much attention in the

past years as the “value versus growth” debate. In-

deed, the notion that various measurable firm cha-

racteristics such as a company’s size, valuation,

historical outperformance, cyclicality size, could

contribute to a better understanding of its risk and

future performance was a key development in fi-

nancial markets, eventually leading to Nobel prizes

and the launch of many hedge funds. At the time, a

central finding was the persistent outperformance

of “value” stocks, i.e. companies with significant

net assets (book values) in comparison to price of

their publicly-listed stock. In a world where physi-

cal assets such as factories, machinery, inventory,

office buildings played the central role in genera-

ting revenue and profits, but in which output de-

pended heavily on the economic cycle, the stocks of

companies valued cheaply in relation to their assets

tended to do well in subsequent periods. Arguably,

a key insight behind this market opportunity was

the notion of reversal to the mean in a company’s

ability to generate value.

Decades later, sources of value creation have tran-

sitioned towards an “idea economy” where the pri-

macy of physical output has been replaced by ena-

bling information-led efficiency, sometimes based

on evasive intangible assets (e.g. Facebook’s network

effect). Recognition of this evolution has shifted the

outperformance to digitally native companies contri-

buting to the new wave of productivity growth. The

key insight was likely that key competitive advan-

tages would endure and be reinforced rather than

revert to the mean.

Coincidentally, Growth stocks were largely repre-

sented in investor’s portfolios and the covid epide-

mic shed more light on this phenomenon. Market

participants including day-traders were encouraged

to bid “growth” stocks to new records, pushing the

disconnect between “growth” and “value” to le-

vels not seen since the year 2000. Has “growth”

reached the point where its current valuation has

caught up to its potential, and future returns natu-

rally come down?

Has “growth” reached the point

where its current valuation has caught

up to its potential, and future returns

naturally come down?

11

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20

Growth vs. Value (rhs) Russell 1000 Growth Russell 1000 Value

GRAPH 5 : RUSSELL 1000 GROWTH & VALUE - PERFORMANCE DIFFERENTIAL

If successful investment philosophies are based on an insight not properly recognized by the market valuation, one potential ave-nue might well be a richer, more contextual approach to analyzing value and growth, better taking into account competitive advantages,

intangible yet key strategic assets, governance, en-

vironmental footprint, etc to invest in attractive com-

panies at an underappreciated price. If so, this could

be especially positive for the right active managers

either for fundamental stock-pickers choosing

to concentrate their alpha on a limited number of

stocks and less researched segments (Small & Mid-

Caps for example) or for systematic based mana-gers using sophisticated economic value approaches

on wide stock universes. This dual approach is highly

valuable in private investor’s portfolios.

Valuation is an important determinant of future returns, but naïve measures of va-lue have been deceived by the technological transition of the past years. In today’s mar-ket conditions, a refined, more holistic ap-proach to investing should be favored. Could this be the dawn of a new era for active ma-nagement? WIRECARD’s fraud and collapse are also a good reminder of the importance of the Governance factor in the ESG analy-sis and that the inclusion in an index is ne-ver a guarantee of success

12

6. PERFORMANCE

EQUITIES IN LOCAL CURRENCIES

BONDS, CURRENCIES AND COMMODITIES

Source : Bloomberg, Banque Eric Sturdza, 29.06.20

HANG SENG INDEXMSCI CHINACSI 300 INDEXNifty 50MSCI EMMSCI EM LATIN AMERICAMOEX Russia Index

Source Bloomberg, Banque Eric Sturdza, 29/6/20

Source Bloomberg, Banque Eric Sturdza, 26/11/19

Equities in USD 0,3%

4,2%

2,7%

5,6%

5,3%

6,9%

2,3%

2,5%

-0,9%

7,0%

5,8%

7,8%

6,3%

7,6%

6,8%

6,4%

1,2%

36,5%

42,2%

28,3%

39,9%

26,3%

25,0%

23,3%

24,7%

19,9%

31,7%

12,0%

24,4%

16,4%

35,5%

31,1%

36,5%

22,8%

-31%

-20%

-33%

-34%

-35%

-34%

-23%

-34%

-25%

-30%

-23%

-18%

-14%

-37%

-32%

-53%

-26%

-5%

14%

-13%

-8%

-17%

-17%

-5%

-17%

-10%

-8%

-14%

2%

0%

-15%

-11%

-35%

-9%

-60,0% -40,0% -20,0% 0,0% 20,0% 40,0% 60,0%

S&P 500 INDEX

NASDAQ 100 STOCK INDX

STXE 600 € Pr

DAX INDEX

CAC 40 INDEX

FTSE MIB INDEX

SWISS MARKET INDEX

FTSE 100 INDEX

TOPIX INDEX (TOKYO)

MSCI AC ASIA PAC EX JAPN

HANG SENG INDEX

MSCI CHINA

CSI 300 INDEX

Nifty 50

MSCI EM

MSCI EM LATIN AMERICA

MOEX Russia Index

YTD 31.12 to 23.3 Since 23/3 MTD

NAMEGlobal AggregateBBG US TreasuryCorporate (USD)US Corporate High YieldPan-Euro CreditPan-European High YieldEM USD AggregateEuro SpotBritish Pound SpotSwiss Franc SpotJapanese Yen SpotEUR-CHF X-RATEGold Spot $/OzCOPPER FUTURE Sep20WTI CRUDE FUTURE Aug20

Source Bloomberg, Banque Eric Sturdza, 29/6/20

0,9%

0,2%

1,8%

0,9%

0,9%

1,9%

2,4%

1,3%

-0,4%

-1,1%

-0,2%

0,2%

2,5%

10,4%

10,8%

-2,9%

7,8%

-10,0%

-19,8%

-6,7%

-19,8%

-13,3%

-4,3%

-12,9%

1,9%

2,4%

-2,7%

2,4%

-25,4%

-57,1%

6,1%

1,0%

16,5%

19,8%

6,0%

17,2%

14,8%

4,8%

6,5%

-3,4%

-3,3%

1,2%

14,1%

28,0%

39,6%

3,0%

8,9%

4,9%

-3,9%

-1,2%

-6,0%

-0,5%

0,3%

-7,2%

-1,6%

-0,9%

-1,5%

16,8%

-4,5%

-31,9%

-80,0% -60,0% -40,0% -20,0% 0,0% 20,0% 40,0% 60,0%

Global Aggregate

BBG US Treasury

Corporate (USD)

US Corporate High Yield

Pan-Euro Credit

Pan-European High Yield

EM USD Aggregate

Euro Spot

British Pound Spot

Swiss Franc Spot

Japanese Yen Spot

EUR-CHF X-RATE

Gold Spot $/Oz

COPPER FUTURE Sep20

WTI CRUDE FUTURE Aug20

YTD Since 23.03.20 31.12 to 23.03 MTD

13

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strument. This document does not contain any recommendation per-

sonal or generic and does not take into account the investment ob-

jectives, financial situation or needs, or knowledge and experience

of any persons. This document does not contain any offer or any

solicitation to purchase or subscribe to any financial services or to

participate in any financial strategy in any jurisdiction. It does not

constitute an advertisement or an investment recommendation or a

research or strategy recommendation. Moreover, it is provided for

informational and illustrative purposes only and does not contain fi-

nancial analysis. This document mentions and presents benchmarks

which may only be used for comparison. The information provided

must not be relied on and must not be the only source to make a de-

cision about financial investments. It is also not a legal or tax advice,

or any recommendation about any kind of financial services and is

not intended to constitute any kind of basis on which to make a de-

cision on a financial investment. Banque Eric Sturdza SA is not re-

sponsible and may not be held responsible for any loss arising from

decision taken on the basis of the information provided in this doc-

ument or for any liabilities arising from such decision. Although all

due diligence has been performed to ensure that this information is

accurate at the time of its publication, no guarantee is given regard-

ing its accuracy, exhaustiveness or reliability. The information pro-

vided may change, even immediately after publication and there is

no obligation to provide an up to date information at any time. Fur-

thermore, the information provided in this document do not intend

to provide all the legal and necessary information on financial in-

struments or on issuers. Other publications from Banque Eric Stur-

dza SA may in the past or in the future reach different conclusions

from the information contained in this document. Furthermore, the

present document and the information provided do not in any way

engage the responsibility of Banque Eric Sturdza S.A., its affiliated

companies, or its employees.

Information on risks

Investments are subject to a variety of risks. Before taking any deci-

sion of investment or entering in any transaction, any investor should

request detailed information on the risks associated with the decision

of investment and with the financial investment. Some type of prod-

ucts are in general bearing higher risks than others but general rules

cannot be relied on. It is remembered that past performance is not

a reliable indication of future results and that historical returns and

past performance as well as financial market scenarios are not relia-

ble indicator of future performance, significant losses remaining al-

ways possible. The value of any investment depends also on the fact

that the base currency of the portfolio is different from the currency

of the investment subject to the foreign exchange rates. The exchange

rates may f luctuate and adversely affect the value of the investment

when it is realized and converted in the base currency of the portfolio.

Distribution information

This document is not directed towards specified jurisdictions or to-

ward specific person or entity resident in a specific jurisdiction and

doesn’t constitute any act of distribution, in jurisdiction where such

publication or such distribution is contrary to the applicable law or

regulation or would be contrary to any mandatory license require-

ment. This document is provided for the sole use of its recipient and

must not be transferred to a third person or reproduced.

.

Contributors Marc CraquelinEric Vanraes Pascal PerroneDavid HaynalEdouard Bouhyer

Sent to press on 25/06/2020