questions for u.s. john kerry on the interim deal between the p5+1 with iran on nuclear weapons!!!

8/13/2019 Questions for U.S. John Kerry on the Interim Deal between the P5+1 with Iran on nuclear weapons!!!

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Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 1

INTRODUCTION:

This list was first developed for the members of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee. Since members of Congress

have other committees and other countries to research, we thought it would be expedient for them to have detailed,

researched questions provided. Congresspersons and their staff rarely have time for extensive analysis whereas, in

contrast, we have studied developments daily. Members of Congress, their staff, members of the media, other

publications, and even the State Department, are welcome to use our materials as stated here.

QUESTIONS FOR SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY ON IRAN:

1. The Joint Plan of Action mentions the facilities at Arak, Natanz and Fordow. Does it name any otherfacilities? (Source A)

2. In your interview with Margaret Brennan on CBSs Face The Nation on November 23, you said We will beinside the Fordow enrichment facility thats built into a mountain, a secret facility. Were going to get into

that. Are you telling me, were not better off being able to get in and see whats happening? Of course we

are. (Source B)Why is the Joint Action Plan limited to only two of Irans underground enrichment facilities?

Do the words, Qom, Parchin or Isfahan appear in the Joint Plan of Action? The new location at Ardakin?

3. The UNs IAEA published a list of Irreducible Elements to an Interim Agreement with Iran, which stated Iranmust permit inspection at all enrichment sites, not just two of them. Why did you disregard the IAEAs

advice? (Source X)

4. According to Reports by the UNs IAEA, Iran repeatedly refused access to IAEA officials to inspection atParchin. (Source C) Do you have any information to show that Parchin has been inspected since January

2012? Where does this agreement address Irans refusal to allow IAEA Inspectors to inspect Parchin?

5. Is the US absolutely certain that Iran does not already possess a nuclear weapon? What about a dirty bomb?

6. Does the US know how much of 20% UF6 has, and where it is located? How can we know if Iran has kept

their agreement to dilute all uranium 20% and over, if we dont know how much and where it is located?

7. It was reported that Yellowcake is used to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at Iran's Isfahan UraniumConversion Facility, on February 3, 2007. (Source D) When was the last time the Isfahan Uranium

Conversion Facility was inspected by the IAEA? When was Isfahan inspected by the IAEA?

8. Where in the Joint Plan of Action has Iran has specifically agreed to allow IAEA access to Isfahan and Parchin?David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security stated on the PBS Newshour that the site

at Parchin has not been inspected since 2005. Since the IAEA was denied access to inspect Parchin, why

doesnt this agreement set deadline for inspections? Isnt this agreement to inspections meaningless without

any time table and deadlines? What about Ardakan? (Source E)

9. Cameras are already fixed at the location of Natanz and Fordow without the agreement. Why does theinterim agreement disregard the recommendation by the IAEA to add cameras at the facilities at Isfahan,

Qom, Parchin and new facilities into this agreement?(Source G and Source X)

10.The most recent IAEA Report, under the heading Possible Military Dimensions, stated that Since 2002, theAgency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence about the possibility of existence

in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related organization, including activities related to the development of a

payload of a missile. (Source G) Where in this agreement does it address discovery and determining

whether a location is an undisclosed nuclear facility?


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11. In the past, problems in foreign policy have occurred due to the difficulty in obtaining information. On April9, 2013. Mohammad Davari of Agence-France Presse reported that US intelligence was surprised when

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines. (Source F)

(The mines in Saghand city operate 350 meters underground and are within 120 kilometers (75 miles) of the

new yellowcake production facility at Ardakan, in the central province of Yazd, Iranian state television said.)

How would the Administration improve surveillance of Iran to ensure compliance in the region?

12.The Iranian TV report on April 2013, said the Ardakan facility had an estimated output of 60 tons ofyellowcake, which is an impure state of uranium oxide later fed into centrifuges for enrichment. (Source E)

Where in the Joint Plan of Action does it state that the IAEA will inspect the mining facilities?

13.Without inspectors at the mining facilities, how could you be 100% certain that yellow cake was not divertedto a non-disclosed location for enrichment?

14.On 7/13/2013,The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) said it had documents proving the existence of apreviously unknown underground nuclear facility in Iran, is under construction for nuclear research and

development. MKO said the new facility, near the town of Damavand, is part of an extensive network of

underground tunnels and facilities Iran has been working on since 2006. (Source E)Where in the Joint Plan

of Action does Iran agree to permit inspection of suspected newfacilities? Who decides which new facilities

are inspected? How will new facilities added be determined?

15.Mark Fitzpatrick, a former non-proliferation expert at the US State Department who directs the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program, has commented that this Joint Plan of Action does not increase the

frequency of IAEA inspections. Is that correct? Is it correct to say that the Joint Plan of Action does not

contain an agreement on how frequently the IAEA inspectors will inspect the facilities? Does it contain any

deadlines or a time table for inspection? (Source H & I)

16.The Joint Plan of Action needs substantial inspection and verification to be a successful deterrent of nuclearweapons in Iran. What additional resources are needed for additional inspection and verification?

a. Would the IAEA add an additional inspection team? Would any Americans be a member on the IAEAteam to ensure we receive correct information?

b. How many staff members are on the Iran Desk at the State Department? How many speak Farsi?How many speak Arabic? What is your plan to meet the needs caused by this agreement and how

many Farsi-speaking staff wiIl be added at the State Department?

c. In general, how will US intelligence increase their surveillance? Defense and the CIA have stated inthe past that they have difficulty recruiting staff which is fluent in Arabic or Farsi. Will this staffing be

increased? Will electronic surveillance increase?

17. Iran is the only country operating a nuclear power plant that does not belong to the Convention on NuclearSafety, negotiated after the 1986 nuclear disaster in Chernobyl which contaminated wide areas and made

160,000 Ukrainians homeless. (Source L) Why doesnt the Joint Action Plan require Iran adhere to the

Convention on Nuclear Safety?

18.According to Prince Turki al Kabeer Saudi the undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for SaudiArabia, Saudi Arabia is concerned about the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr. He stated,A leakage from aplant at that location could bring an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, point ing out that it is

located less than 300 kilometers away from Saudi shores, across open water." (Source M) Doesnt the

location of the Bushehr pose extra risk?

19.Since the U.S. military has 35,000 troops and numerous allies in the Persian Gulf Region, who are within 15 to40 minutes downwind from the Iranian nuclear plant at Bushehr, should safety of that plant be a greater

consideration than usual? Since 35,000 Americans could be killed by an accident at the Bushehr Nuclear


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Plant, why doesnt this Joint Action Plan at least require an initial safety inspection of new power plants?

Why dont we insist they adhere to the Convention on Nuclear Safety? (Source J)

20.The IAEA is also concerned with the safety of nuclear plants. For example, they are currently monitoringsafety in Fukishima, Japan. The current Bushehr Nuclear Plant sits within a few miles of an earthquake fault,

and since the Joint Action Plan, Iranian President Rouhani announced adding a second plan at Bushehr.

Should additional IEAE inspections be required after earthquakes, seismic activities, explosions and fires at

nuclear facilities? (Source K)

21.On April 9, 2013, 39 Iranians in Bushehr were killed by an earthquake. Considering how earthquake pronethe area is, for the safety of our American troops and Persian Gulf states, isnt the least we could do is to

insist they build their nuclear power plants in a less earthquake prone part of Iran? (Source L)

22.Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, told the a nuclear-armed Iran or a conflict over its programwould both destabilize the region. (Source M)U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a Senate

Appropriations Subcommittee, A nuclear armed Iran with a deliverable weapons system is going to sparkan arms race in the Middle East and the greater region. (Source N) Since this agreement permits Iran tocontinue enriching uranium, is stopping a nuclear arms race in the Middle East still a high priority to the US

State Department?

23. If this agreement fails and Iran develops break out capacity, which other countries or groups would likelyobtain nuclear weapons or a dirty bomb? Hezbollah? Syria? Iraq?

24.Will the International Ban on the Export of Weapons to Iran be enforced? Will Russia guarantee they will notdeliver the S-300 Missile Systems and the related mobile land-based system designed to track multiple

aircraft to Iran, or any additional missile systems with a range greater than 1,000 miles? Do we have the

written assurance from China that they will not sell similar missile systems. (Source Z)

25. In 2011, analysts at the State Department concluded the continuation of Irans nuclear program would causeSaudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt to seek nuclear weapons. (Source O)Is this still the opinion of the US State

Department?

26.Previously, former national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, told the U. S. House of Representatives thatpermitting Iran to continue nuclear weapons development could lead to as many as 20 countries in the

region with nuclear weapons. (Source O) Are there other countries, in addition to Turkey, Saudi Arabia and

Egypt , which your analysis indicates would likely enter a nuclear arms race in the Middle East?

27.What weapons will the US furnish U.S. allies to re-assure them of their safety in these circumstances? In2007 Bush told then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel that he would order the bomb transfer in 2009 or

2010. When will the US honor its prior commitment to transfer the bunker busters to Israel? Doesnt the

six year wait prove that no country in the Middle East should ever rely on a promise by the US?

28.State Department cables posted by Wikileaks state that It is logical for the Saudis to step in as the physical'protector'"of the Arab world by seeking nuclear weapons. Do you agree that is a possibility? (Source R)

29.Are you aware that since 2009, when King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia warned visiting US special envoy to theMiddle East Dennis Ross that if Iran crossed the threshold, "we will get nuclear weapons"? (Source R)

30.On 6 November 2013, BBC News reported that a senior NATO decision maker told Mark Urban that he hadseen intelligence reporting that nuclear weapons made in Pakistan on behalf of Saudi Arabia are now sitting

ready for delivery. (Source R) Is this possible?


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31. In the early 1990s, unbeknownst to the United States, Saudi Arabia purchased36 CSS2 surface-to-surfacemissiles from China, which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads up to 3,000 kilometers. (Source P) Is it

possible that Pakistan has actually delivered Shaheen mobile ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, minus

warheads?

32. Israeli information to the BBC has stated - that Saudi Arabia is now ready to take delivery of finishedwarheads for its long-range missiles - that informs some recent US and NATO intelligence reporting. Israel, of

course, shares Saudi Arabia's motive in wanting to worry the US into containing Iran. (Source R) Can you

absolutely ensure this agreement with not increase nuclear proliferation in the Middle East?

33. Is it possible that instead of stopping Armageddon, your agreement with Iran is creating it?

34. In 2009, a Turkish Foreign Ministry official claimed that once Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Turkey will beforced to arm itself with a nuclear bomb.In a public opinion poll of Turkish citizens, only 8 percent claimed

that NATO could be depended on if Iran acquired nuclear weapons.(Source P) Is Turkey still dependent on

NATO to defend itself with nuclear weapons against a threat of nuclear war by Iran?

35.Ramazan Tas, a leading Turkish analyst , stated Turkeys decision to purchase the HQ-9, a Chinese ballisticmissile defense system, is a departure from Turkey being fully dependenct on NATO for defense systems,

(Source T) Does the State Department concure that Turkey may develop more independent defenses?

36.The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) says that Turkeys substantial infrastructure use to developnuclear power plants gives it a head start toward developing nuclear weapons. Would it be fair to say that

Turkey may enter a nuclear arms race between countries in the Middle East? (Source P)

37.The Joint Action Plan calls for the end of U.S. and E.U. sanctions on all exports of Iranian Petrochemicals.Isnt it true the Obama Administration has granted exemptions to 10 European Union countries and Japan,

since September 2012, without Congressional approval? (Source U) Then, on November 30, 2013,didnt

you announce immunity for China, India, South Korea and Turkey for their "additional significant reductions,"

as well as for Malaysia, South Africa, Singapore and Sri Lanka from those sanctions also? (Source V).

38.Under the Plan of Action, under Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iransdomestic needs using Iranian oil revenues held abroad, who will maintain all documents for humanitarian

transactions? Who will audit these transactions to ensure the expenses are for humanitarian trade?

39.What is the priority of the funds used? Funds held by which countries? Are the funds held by the samecountry that is selling them goods for their domestic needs the ones used?

40.Who has the authority to settle disputes on which goods and services are a humanitarian trade and whichfunds are used?

41.Will Iran be allowed to use those previously frozen funds for other countries? On December 13, 2012, Syria's

General Foreign Trade Organisation sought to buy 150,000 metric tons of sugar, 50,000 metric tons of rice,25,000 metric tons of flour and a range of other food using a credit line from Iran. (Source W)

(Source Documents follow)

SOURCE DOCUMENTS

http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/24/world/meast/iran-deal-text/index.html
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/24/world/meast/iran-deal-text/index.htmlhttp://www.cnn.com/2013/11/24/world/meast/iran-deal-text/index.htmlhttp://www.cnn.com/2013/11/24/world/meast/iran-deal-text/index.html


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A.Joint Plan of ActionPreamble

The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure

Irans nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or

develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result in a final

step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran

to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformitywith its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with

practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program. This comprehensive

solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This

comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by step process, and would produce the comprehensive

lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Irans nuclear

program.

There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including, among other things,

addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN

Security Councils consideration of this matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and

implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of

E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues

that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will

work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.

Elements of a first step:

The first step would be time-bound, with a duration of 6 months, and renewable by mutual consent, during which all

parties will work to maintain a constructive atmosphere for negotiations in good faith.

Iran would undertake the following voluntary measures:

* From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide for fabrication of fuel for theTRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%. No reconversion line.

* Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.

* Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (1),

Fordow (2), or the Arak reactor (3), designated by the IAEA as IR-40.

* Beginning when the line for conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% to UO2 is ready, Iran has decided to convert to

oxide UF6 newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period, as provided in the operational schedule of the

conversion plant declared to the IAEA.

* No new locations for the enrichment.

* Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its current enrichment R&D practices, which are not

designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.

* No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.

* Enhanced monitoring:


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- Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Irans plans for nuclear facilities, a

description of each building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in

specified nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on source material. This

information would be provided within three months of the adoption of these measures.

- Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40, to the IAEA.

- Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the reactor at Arak, designated by the

IAEA as the IR-40.

- Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification,

Interim Inventory Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of

access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.

- IAEA inspector managed access to:

centrifuge assembly workshops4;

centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and,

.uranium mines and mills.

In return, the E3/EU+3 would undertake the following voluntary measures:

Pause efforts to further reduce Irans crude oil sales, enabling Irans current customers to purchase theircurrent average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held abroad.

For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services.

Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on:

. Irans petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services. (5)

. Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services.

Suspend U.S. sanctions on Irans auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated services.

License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil aviation and associated

services. License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran as well as associated services. (6)

No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions.

No new EU nuclear-related sanctions.

The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain

from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.

Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Irans domestic needs using Iranian oil revenues

held abroad. Humanitarian trade would be defined as transactions involving food and agricultural products,

medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses incurred abroad. This channel would involve specified foreign

banks and non-designated Iranian banks to be defined when establishing the channel.

* This channel could also enable:


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transactions required to pay Irans UN obligations; and,

direct tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students studying abroad, up to an agreedamount for the six month period.

Increase the EU authorisation thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed amount.

Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution*

The final step of a comprehensive solution, which the parties aim to conclude negotiating and commence

implementing no more than one year after the adoption of this document, would:

Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.

Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreements.

Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear-related sanctions, including steps on

access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy, on a schedule to be agreed upon.

Involve a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs,

with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched

uranium, for a period to be agreed upon.

Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40. No reprocessing or

construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.

Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring. Ratify and implement the Additional

Protocol, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Iranian parliament).

Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others, on acquiring modern light water power and

research reactors and associated equipment, and the supply of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed R&D practices.

Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian

nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Footnotes)

(1) Namely, during the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF6 into the centrifuges installed but not enriching uranium. Not

install additional centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with

centrifuges of the same type.

(2) At Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not increase enrichment

capacity. Not feed UF6 into the other 12 cascades, which would remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections

between cascades. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges

of the same type.

(3) Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not

commission the reactor or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or produce

more fuel for the reactor or install remaining components.


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(4) Consistent with its plans, Irans centrifuge production during the 6 months will be dedicated to replace damaged

machines.

(5) Sanctions on associated services means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to

the underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and

required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities.

(6) Sanctions relief could involve any non-designated Iranian airlines as well as Iran Air.

* With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the standard principle that nothing is agreed until

everything is agreed applies.

__________________________________________________________________________________________

B.Kerrys Interview on Iran Agreement with CBSs Margaret Brennan24 November 2013

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Spokesperson

November 24, 2013

Interview with Margaret Brennan of CBS's Face the NationJohn Kerry, Secretary of State

Geneva, Switzerland

November 24, 2013

QUESTION: What does this actually do to prevent building a bomb?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, a whole bunch of things. Number one, they dont have enough enriched material to be able to build a

bomb.

QUESTION: Yet.

SECRETARY KERRY: They will destroycorrect, as of now. They will have to destroy the higher-enriched uranium they have,which is critical to being able to build a bomb. Once theyve destroyed that, they only have a lower -enriched uranium. They are

not allowed under this agreement to build additional enrichment facilities. We will have restrictions on the centrifuges, which

are critical for enrichment.

QUESTION: President Obama said Israel and Saudi Arabia have a right to be skeptical. Are you skeptical that Iran will actually

comply with the deal theyve just signed?

SECRETARY KERRY: I think everybody has a right to be skeptical because there are indications that there are people in Iran who

have wanted to pursue a weapons program, that there have been secret facilities building some of those efforts towards that

program. And so theres lots of reason. Thats why we dont take anything at face value. Thats why you dont take it for gra nted.

QUESTION: But you dont believe those are the people who you just signed a deal with, those people who were seeking aweapon?

SECRETARY KERRY: We did arms control agreements with the great enemy, the Soviet Union. Weve done arms control

agreements in other parts of the world. You dont trust. Its not based on trust. Its based on verification. Its based on your

ability to know what is happening. So you dont have to trust the people youre dealing with; you have to have a mechanism pu t

in place whereby you know exactly what youre getting and you know exactly what theyre doing. And we believe we are at the

beginning of putting that in place with Iran.


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QUESTION: Irans Foreign Minister stood up there at the podium and said this takes the threat of force, military force, off t he

table. Does it?

SECRETARY KERRY: No, thats just not accurate. But he also said that they have a right to enrich, which is also not accurate. Now,

thats one of the reasons why we need to verify in this process. The fact is the President maintains, as Commander -in-Chief, and

he has said specifically he has not taken that threat off the table.

QUESTION: You dont see actual dismantling of some of the facilities either.

SECRETARY KERRY: Not yet. Thats accurate. Not yet. But you cant get everything in the first step. You have to go down the

process here. The fact is that what weve done is lock components of their program in place and actually roll some of them

backwards. The result of that is by destroying their 20 percent uranium stock, by limiting their 3.5 percent stock, by limiting the

centrifuges that can be constructed and where they go, by having intrusive inspection of a number of facilities weve never b een

in before. And we believe it now opens the door to our going into the larger, more comprehensive arrangement by which Iran

will have to prove that its program is really peaceful.

QUESTION: Well, Israels cabinet is already out there saying this is a deal based on deceit. I mean, how do you tell Bibi Net anyahu

that youre defused the threat when this is a wait-and-see period?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, its not its based on facts and its based on specific steps people have to take. Its based on an

intrusiveness into their program that we dont have today. Its based on a destruction of their uranium. Its based on a limi tation

on their stock. Its based on all kinds of things weve never had before. Even with the small amount of money being released to

them, Iran is going to lose $15 to $20 billion over the next months. This is an enormous price for Iran to continue to pay if they

dont live up to their word and prove to us that the program is peaceful.

So theres nothing built on trust. Were not sitting here pretending that Iran is going to suddenly turn over a new leaf. We have

to prove it. And our structure in this agreement, I believe, will adequately prove it.

QUESTION: Well, you say thats a small amount of financial relief, and thats just about $7 billion. But this is to a country that the

U.S. still considers to be the top sponsor of terrorism in the world.

SECRETARY KERRY: But --

QUESTION: So how do you control how they spend that money? Are you confident that its not going to go to the wrong places?

SECRETARY KERRY: What you have to do here is begin a process by which you can actually dismantle their program and prove

what it is or isnt doing. Were beginning in a place that will lock in their program where it is today with respect to critical

facilities. At the plutonium heavy-water reactor, they will not be able to commission it. And we will know that because we can

inspect it. Today we cant. That makes everybody safer. We will be inside the Fordow enrichment facility thats built into a

mountain, a secret facility. Were going to get into that. Are you telling me were not better off being able to get in and see

whats happening? Of course we are.

In each case where they have been able to enrich without our knowing exactly what theyre doing, we will now be able to have

greater inspection, greater knowledge, greater restraint. And that will expand the amount of time it would take for them to

break out and create a nuclear weapon. That makes Israel safer. That makes the region safer. And we believe it is the right thing

to do to put to test whether or not they will actually show the world they have a peaceful nuclear program.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you.

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C.U.S. "disappointed" by Iran-IAEA atom talks failureVIENNASat Jun 9, 2012 1:37pm EDT

(Reuters) - Lack of progress in talks between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency is disappointing and it shows

Tehran's continued failure to abide by its commitment to the U.N. nuclear watchdog, a U.S. envoy said on Saturday.

The IAEA and Iran failed at talks on Friday to unblock an investigation into suspected atom bomb research by the Islamic state, a

setback dimming any chances for success in higher-level negotiations between Tehran and major powers later this month.

The IAEA, a Vienna-based U.N. agency, said no progress had been made in the meeting aimed at sealing a framework deal on

resuming its long-stalled investigation.

Six world powers were scrutinizing the IAEA-Iran meeting to judge whether the Iranians were ready to make concessions before

a resumption of wider-ranging negotiations with them in Moscow on June 18-19 on the decade-old nuclear dispute.

"We're disappointed," Robert Wood, the acting U.S. envoy to the IAEA, told Reuters in an emailed comment.

"Yesterday's outcome highlights Iran's continued failure to abide by its commitment to the IAEA, and further underscores the

need for it to work with the IAEA to address international community's real concerns," he said.

The IAEA had been pressing Tehran for an accord that would give its inspectors immediate access to the Parchin military

complex, where it believes explosives tests relevant for the development of nuclear arms have taken place, and suspects Iran

may now be cleaning the site of any incriminating evidence.

D. Iran unveils new uranium mines, production facilityAgence-France Presse

By by Mohammad Davari | Agence-France PresseTue, Apr 9, 2013 9:02 PM NZST

.Yellowcake is used to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at Iran's Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility, on February

3, 2007. Iran has unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only days after talks with

world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock

View Photo

.

Yellowcake is used to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at Iran's Isfahan Uranium

.Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili speaks to the press after talks on Iran's nuclear programme in the Kazakh

city of Almaty, on April 6, 2013. Iran has unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only

days after talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock

View Photo

.

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili speaks to the press after talks on Iran's

.Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspects centrifuges during a visit to the Natanz uranium enrichment

facility on April 8, 2008. Iran has unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only days after

talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock

.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspects centrifuges during a visit to the

.

Iran unveiled on Tuesday a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only days after talks with

world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock.


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President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hailed the advances and boasted of mastery over "the entire chain of nuclear

energy," while demanding that the work be accelerated.

The announcements come after talks between sanctions-hit Iran and six world powers on Tehran's nuclear drive

failed to produce a breakthrough in the Kazakh city of Almaty on Friday and Saturday last week.

The mines in Saghand city operate 350 metres (yards) underground and are within 120 kilometres (75 miles) of the

new yellowcake production facility at Ardakan, a city in the central province of Yazd, state television said.

The report gave few details about the Ardakan facility but said it had an estimated output of 60 tonnes of yellowcake,

which is an impure state of uranium oxide later fed into centrifuges for enrichment.

Iran says its enrichment activities are aimed at feeding a peaceful energy programme.

That work, in defiance of repeated UN Security Council demands, is at the heart of international worries, with

Western powers and Israel fearing the Islamic state is developing a capacity to build an atom bomb.

Diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution to the standoff have been under way for years, but to no avail.

Iran's latest meeting in Almaty with the P5+1 group of powers -- the Security Council's five permanent members plus

Germany -- failed to coax it into curbing its programme in exchange for the easing of some sanctions.

Ahmadinejad, under whose presidency the atomic programme has expanded rapidly, on Tuesday praised the

advances and urged nuclear scientists to step up their work.

"I demand you to speed up your work and without any interruption," he said, while claiming mastery over "the entire

chain of nuclear energy, one that no one can take it away".

"In the past, we depended on others to provide us with yellowcake but with the grace of God, (uranium) mines were

inaugurated one after another," he said referring to Iran's all but depleted 600 tonnes of yellowcake acquired from

South Africa in the 1970s.

Iran says it has now managed to replenish the stockpile from its raw uranium reserve of 4,400 tonnes, according to

official figures.

In December 2010 it announced the delivery of a domestically produced yellowcake batch from the Gachin uranium

mine, near the Gulf port of Bandar Abbas.

The discovery of the uranium mines in Saghand was announced almost a decade ago. But Western experts believe

they contain poor mineral deposits. Iran enriches uranium to both 3.5 and 20 percent levels in its Natanz and Fordo

facilities. Uranium purified at high levels can be used in a nuclear weapon.

On Tuesday, the state television also reported an electron accelerator was inaugurated on the occasion of Iran's

national Atomic Energy Technology day.

The Islamic republic is under a number of UN sanctions, reinforced by international punitive measures targeting its

vital oil income and access to global banking system.

The United States along with Israel, the sole but undeclared nuclear armed state in the Middle East, have refused to

rule out a military option to


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Yellowcake is used to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at Iran's Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility, on February

3, 2007. Iran has unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only days after talks with

world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock.

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili speaks to the press after talks on Iran's nuclear programme in the Kazakh

city of Almaty, on April 6, 2013. Iran has unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only

days after talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspects centrifuges during a visit to the Natanz uranium enrichment

facility on April 8, 2008. Iran has unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only days after

talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock

__________________________________________________________________________________________

E.Iran Denies Building New Nuclear FacilityIran's Foreign Ministry rejects a claim by an Iranian dissident group that an underground nuclear facility is

currently being built.

By Elad Benari, Canada

First Publish: 7/13/2013, 2:05 AM

The Iranian Foreign Ministry rejected on Friday a claim by an Iranian dissident group, the Mujahedin-e Khalq

Organization (MKO), which said a day earlier that it had documentation proving the existence of a previously

unknown underground nuclear facility in Iran.

The ministrys spokesman, Seyyed Abbas Araqchi, dismissed the claim as mere lies by the desperate group.

This report is by no means true and is denied [by the Islamic Republic of Iran], Araqchi was quoted by the Iranian-

based PressTV as having said.

The terrorist MKO has been so discredited that the publication of such stories by them is not worth a response, he

added.

MKO, whose members are in exile in Paris, said Thursday the secret facility is currently under construction, and will

be used for nuclear research and development, the group said, although it is not clear what specific work will be

done there.

The group said the new facility was about 50 kilometers northeast of Tehran, near the town of Damavand, and is part

of an extensive network of underground tunnels and facilities Iran has been working on since 2006. The group also

released satellite images of the site.

Western analysts who have seen the images told news agencies that while it was possible the facility could be used

for nuclear work, there was no direct evidence from the images that it would be used thusly.

Iran has held several rounds of talks with six major powers -- the U.S., China, Russia, Britain, France and Germany,

known collectively as the P5+1, about its nuclear program. Each round has ended without results.

The P5+1 is particularly concerned about Iran's enrichment to levels of up to 20 percent and wants it to shut the

Fordow fortified bunker where the sensitive activity is conducted. The group also wants Iran to ship out its existing

stockpile of 20-percent enriched material.

Iran recently elected moderate Hassan Rowhani as the countrys new president, but he stressed soon after his

election that Tehran would not consider halting the countrys uranium enrichment activities entirely.


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Irans Supreme Leader has blamed the West for the standoff over the Islamic Republics nuclear program.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said the standoff can be solved easily if the Western states stop their stubborn attitude.

(Arutz Shevas North American Desk is keeping you updated until the start of Shabbat in New York. The time posted

automatically on all Arutz Sheva articles, however, is Israeli time.)

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

F.US Not 'Blindsided' By Iran's New Uranium Mines?

US concerned after Iran unveiled new uranium production facility and two extraction mines; maintains officials

were not "blindsided".

By Arutz Sheva staff

First Publish: 4/10/2013, 10:24 PM

The United States reacted with concern Wednesday after Iran unveiled a new uranium production facility and two

extraction mines, maintaining, however, that it has not been "blindsided" by the news.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hailed the advances on Tuesday and boasted of mastery over "the entire

chain of nuclear energy" only days after talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear program ended in deadlock.

"They have continued to move forward, we are very concerned about what they are doing," a senior State

Department official told the AFP news agency on condition of anonymity.

The official acknowledged that despite intensive and "substantive" discussions in Almaty, Kazakhstan last week, Iran

had given no hint of the news.

"We weren't blindsided about it, because we are rarely blindsided about the things that they are considering. But

they did not specify that they were going to do this," the official said.

"They did specify that they were going to proceed forward and do everything they could to fulfill what they see as

their inalienable right," the official told reporters traveling with US Secretary of State John Kerry.

Kerry on Tuesday denounced the Iranian news as "provocative."

"To make any step that increases the rapidity with which you move towards enriched fissile material raises the

potential of questions, if not even threat," he told reporters at the end of a visit to Israel.

___________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Seven loopholes favoring a nuclear Iran in deal signed by the world powersDEBKAfile Exclusive Analysis November 24, 2013, 4:51 PM (IDT)http://www.debka.com/article/23472/

The first preliminary nuclear deal the six world powers (US, Russia, China, UK, France and German) signed with Iran

before dawn Sunday, Nov. 24, at the end of a four-day marathon, failed to address the most questionable aspects of

Irans nuclear program, i.e. its clandestine military dimensions. The accord confined itself to aspects of uranium

enrichment and stockpiles. UN inspections were expandedbut not applied, for instance, to Irans concealed nuclear

sites - or even the Parchin military base where Iran is suspected of having tested nuclear-related explosions.
http://www.debka.com/article/23472/http://www.debka.com/article/23472/http://www.debka.com/article/23472/


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Israel, the Gulf States and others are therefore highly dubious of the deals capacity for freezing Irans nuclear

program where it stands today, least of all roll it back, as President Barack Obama claimed.

Debkafiles intelligence and military sources list seven of the most glaring loopholes in the first-step accord:

1. Parchin:This long-suspected facility remains out of UN oversight. President Obama and Secretary of State John

Kerry boasted after the signing that daily IAEA inspections will take place at Fordo and Natanz. However, cameras are

already fixed at both those facilities without an agreement, whereas Tehrans consistent denial of IAEA access to

Parchin is not addrfessed.

2. Secret nuclear locations: Under the heading "Possible Military Dimensions," the last IAEA report noted: "Since

2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear

related organizations, including activities related to the development of a payload for a missile.

The watchdog has received information indicating activities "relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive

device." This was further corroborated by new information obtained since November 2011.

Tehrans non-cooperation for investigating these findings is not mentioned in the Geneva interim accord, nor was it

addressed in the negotiations.

3. Dirty bombs: Iran doesnt need a full-scale nuclear bomb or missile warhead for attacking Israel. For decades,

Tehran has been working on perfecting hundreds of dirty bombs as part of its nuclear program, by adding plutonium

or enriched uranium to conventional bombs. These weapons are easy to make and easy to use. In the hands of

Hizballah or other Shiite terrorist organizations in Syria or Iraq, for instance, they could be used to strike Israel

without leaving a trail to Tehran. This peril too was ignored by the six powers in Geneva.

4. Rollback.While President Obama has presented the deal as a first step toward freezing or even rolling back key

aspects of Irans nuclear program. The fact remains that, so long as Iran is permitted to enrich uranium, even though

this is restricted to a low 5 percent grade, it is free to produce as much fissile material as it wants, whenever it wants.

This seems more like roll forward than roll back.

5. Enrichment.Obama and Kerry said the new deal does not recognize Irans right to enrich uranium. They were

contradicted by the Iranian president and senior negotiator as well as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. So

what is the truth? If Iran won recognition for this right, it blows the bottom out of the Non-Proliferating Treaty

because, in no time, all the signatories may start enriching uranium with permission from the big powers. Neither is

there any point in making Iran join the NPTs Additional Protocol for snap inspections.

6. Centrifuges.Iran has undertaken not to add new centrifuges to its enrichment facilities, according to President

Obama, but there is nothing to stop it from keeping up their production. In the six-month interregnum for

negotiating a comprehensive nuclear deal, Tehran wins time to turn out enough centrifuges to substantially expand

its production of enriched uranium.

9. A leap to breakout: Far from being static or in freeze, as the Americans claim, Iran is free to step up centrifugeproduction and boost its stock of 3.5 percent enriched uranium, thereby accumulating enough material to enhance

its capacity for producing enough weapons-grade uranium to break through to a nuclear bomb rapidly enough to

defy detection by the IAEA or Western intelligence until it is too late.

The first loophole appeared hours after the new accord was signed: Irans lead negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister

Seyed Abbas Araghchi, announced that his countrys enrichment rights had been recognized in the negotiations, after

which Iranian President Hassan Rouhani praised the supreme leaders guidelines for achieving world power

recognition of Tehran's nuclear rights.


15/41


However, Secretary of State John Kerry in his first appearance after the signing denied this concession had been

made. He said: The first step, let me be clear, does not say that Iran has a right to enrich uranium." Russian Foreign

Minister Sergey Lavrov lined up solidly behind the Iranian version of the accord, confirming world recognition had

been extended for Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy, including the right for enrichment.

Out of step with the celebratory mood in Geneva and Washington, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu warned that

the deal would not impede Irans capacity to gain a nuclear weapon. He challenged President Obamas words that

the deal was a historic achievement and called it a historic mistake, which would not obligate Israel. Israel, he said

stood by its right to self defense against a regime dedicated to its destruction. As prime minister, Netanyahu pledged

not to allow Iran to procure a nuclear weapon.

President Obama also announced that key aspects of Irans nuclear program will be rolled back against limited

sanctions relief and the release of deposits (nettng Iran $6-7 billion in revenue.) He said that no new centrifuges

would be activated for the enrichment process, work would stop at the Arak heavy water reactor and UN inspections

expanded to daily visits at the Natanz and Fordo enrichment plants to ensure that uranium is not enriched above the

5 percent permitted by the accord.

The core sanctions architecture will remain in place, Obama promised, pending a comprehensive solution to be

negotiated in the next six months, but no new sanctions would be imposed.

Lavrov summed up the four-day conference by saying: "Considering the whole body of circumstance, there are nolosers [in the Geneva deal], all sides are winners - a view seriously challenged by Israel, Saudi Arabia and most

other Middle East governments.

H. Mark Fitzpatrick, a former non-proliferation expert at the US State Department who directs the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, told Al-

Monitor in an email, We should be thankful to Albright and Walrond for dissecting the technology and doing the

math to show how Iran's continued advancements in centrifuge numbers and capacity bring them closer to being

able quickly to produce a nuclear weapon.

However, their analysis, Fitzpatrick said, assumes that the inspection frequency will not be changed if Iran gets

closer to 240 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium.

Read more:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/iran-nuclear-capacity-iaea-inspections-

centrifuges-enriched.html##ixzz2n5SAjonC

I. U.N. watchdog to press Iran for access in nuclear probeBy Fredrik Dahl

VIENNA Fri Jun 8, 2012 7:52am EDT

(Reuters) -Iran and the United Nations nuclear watchdog began a new round of talks on Friday in an attempt to seala deal to resume a long-stalled probeinto suspected atomic weapon research in the Islamic state.

The United States, European powers and Israel want to curb Iranian atomic activities they suspect are intended to

produce bombs. Tehran says the aims of its nuclear program are purely civilian.

World powers will be watching the IAEA-Iran meeting in Vienna closely to judge whether Tehran is ready to make

concessions before its broader talks with them later this month in Moscow on their decade-old nuclear dispute.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/iran-nuclear-capacity-iaea-inspections-%20centrifuges-enriched.htmlhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/iran-nuclear-capacity-iaea-inspections-%20centrifuges-enriched.htmlhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/iran-nuclear-capacity-iaea-inspections-%20centrifuges-enriched.htmlhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/iran-nuclear-capacity-iaea-inspections-%20centrifuges-enriched.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/places/iranhttp://www.reuters.com/places/iranhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/iran-nuclear-capacity-iaea-inspections-%20centrifuges-enriched.htmlhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/iran-nuclear-capacity-iaea-inspections-%20centrifuges-enriched.html


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The International Atomic Energy Agency will press Iran for an agreement that would give its inspectors immediate

access to the Parchin military complex, where it believes explosives tests relevant for the development of nuclear

bombs have taken place.

Iran has said it will work with the U.N. agency to prove that such allegations are "forged and fabricated".

Iranian envoy Ali Asghar Soltanieh smiled but declined to comment to reporters as he entered the IAEA's

headquarters in the Austrian capital for his meeting with senior agency officials. Both Iran and the IAEA say

significant progress has been made on the so-called "structured approach" document that would set the overall

terms for the IAEA's investigation.

But differences remain on how the IAEA should conduct its probe, and the United States said this week it doubted

whether Iran would give the U.N. agency the kind of access to sites, documents and officials it needs.

"I'm not optimistic," Robert Wood, the acting U.S. envoy to the IAEA, told reporters on the sidelines of a meeting of

the U.N. agency's governing board. "I certainly hope that an agreement will be reached but I'm not certain Iran is

ready."

Mark Hibbs, a nuclear proliferation expert of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said he "strongly

doubted" there would be a final agreement on Friday. "There are a number of issues that have not been resolved,"he said.

Western skepticism was reinforced by defiant remarks by Soltanieh, who accused the U.N. body on Wednesday of

acting like a Western-manipulated spy service and said Iran's military activities were none of its business.

The Iranian envoy said Iran would "not permit our national security to be jeopardized", suggesting it might limit the

scope of the U.N. inspectors' investigation.

A European diplomat said Soltanieh's remarks signaled Iran would be in no mood to compromise in Friday's Vienna

talks.

Western officials, who suspect Iran is dragging out the two sets of talks to buy time for its nuclear program, say the

value of any deal will depend on how it is implemented.

POSITION OF STRENGTH?

The European Union said the IAEA should be free to conduct its probe in an open way and not be forced to close

areas of inquiry prematurely, suggesting this may still be a bone of contention. "The Agency must be able to revisit

areas as their work progresses and as new information becomes available," the 27-nation EU said in a statement to

the IAEA's 35-nation board.

The IAEA's immediate priority is gaining access to the Parchin military complex southeast of Tehran, where it

believes Iran built a steel vessel in 2000 for high explosives tests and may now be cleaning the site of anyincriminating evidence.

Iran says Parchin is a conventional military facility and has dismissed such suggestions as "ridiculous."

Diplomats and analysts say Iran may offer the IAEA increased cooperation as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with

world powers, which resumed in April after a 15-month hiatus and are to continue in the Russian capital on June 18-

19.


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Those talks are aimed at defusing tension over Iran's nuclear program that has led to increasingly tough Western

sanctions on Iran, including an EU oil embargo from July 1, and created fears of a war in the region.

Full transparency and cooperation with the IAEA is one of the elements the world powers - the United States, Russia,

France, Britain,China and Germany - are seeking from Iran. But they also want Iran to halt its higher-grade uranium

enrichment, which Tehran says it needs for a research reactor but which also takes it closer to potential bomb

material.

For its part, Iran wants sanctions relief and international recognition of what it says is its right to refine uranium.

"Parchin access is not among the key concessions that the six powers are seeking from Iran in Moscow," said nuclear

proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank in London.

"They are focused on confidence-building measures that would limit Iran's ability to make a sprint for a nuclear

weapon."

(Editing by Andrew Heavens)

__________________________________________________________________________________________

J.US to Maintain 35,000 Troops in Persian Gulf RegionTASNIM NEWS AGENCY

News ID: 213511

Date: 2013/December/07 15:52

TEHRAN (Tasnim)The United States is committed to maintaining a 35,000-strong force in the Persian

Gulf region regardless of a nuclear deal with Iran, Pentagon chief Chuck Hagel said Saturday in Bahrain.

The United States has an armada of ships and aircraft in place and "will not make any adjustments to its

forces in the region -- or to its military planning-- as a result of the interim agreement with Iran," said Hagel,

according to a prepared text of a speech.

In a trip meant to reassure Persian Gulf Arab allies worried about America's diplomatic opening with Iran,

Hagel enumerated a list of US weaponry and resources that will remain deployed in the region.

"We have a ground, air, and naval presence of more than 35,000 military personnel in and immediately

around the Persian Gulf," he said, according to the text released in advance of his speech in Manama, AFP

reported.

The military footprint includes 10,000 US Army troops with tanks and Apache helicopters, roughly 40 ships

at sea including an aircraft carrier battle group, missile defense systems, advanced radar, surveillance

drones and warplanes that can strike at short notice, he said.

"We have deployed our most advanced fighter aircraft throughout the region, including F-22s, to ensure

that we can quickly respond to contingencies," Hagel said.

Speaking at an annual security conference in Manama organized by the International Institute for Strategic

Studies, Hagel also noted investments in minesweeper ships and a $580 million construction project for the

US Fifth Fleet headquarters, the naval command in Bahrain that oversees vessels across the Middle East.___________________________________________________________________________________
http://www.reuters.com/places/chinahttp://www.reuters.com/places/china


18/41


K.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said construction will soon start construction on a second nuclear power plant in the

country's southwest Bushehr province, Iranian Tasnim news agency reported.

The firstnuclear power plant is in operation in Bushehr province, and the construction of the second one will soon kick off ;

development of new atomic power plants in the country will start in earnest and there will be nuclear reactors in most parts

of Bushehr province, Tasnim quoted him as saying.

In reference to therecently-signed deal in Genevawith world powers on the Islamic Republic's disputed nuclear program,

Rouhani said the airs in the international arena were less tense. However, the Iranian president stressed that "our enemies

and rivals will not give up their hostility and rivalry."

Under the Nov. 24 interim accord, Iran agreed to curb its nuclear program in exchange for limited sanctions relief. The

agreement - reached after more than four days of negotiations between Iran and the United States, France, Russia, China,

Britain and Germany - was designed to buy time for negotiations on afinal settlementof the decade-old nuclear dispute.

Amid the third round of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers in November, senior Iranian nuclear

officials spoke of plans inTehran to construct two new nuclear power plantsin the near future, Iran's semi-official Fars news

agency reported.

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has put construction of the second and third (nuclear) power stations on its

agenda due to the governments programs and the emphasis laid by the President (Hassan Rouhani), Fars quoted AEOI

Deputy Chief Hossein Khalfi as saying.

The Bushehr site is located in a highly seismic area on Iran's Gulf coast and began operations in 2011 after decades of

delays.

The site is capable of holding six power reactors and Tehran has identified 16 sites elsewhere in the country suitable for

other atomic plants. The Russian-built plant is estimated to cost some $11 billion over four decades, making it one of the

world's most expensive plants.

Reuters contributed to this report.

L.Quake hits near Iran's nuclear city Bushehr, 37 deadBy Yeganeh Torbati and Marcus George

DUBAI Tue Apr 9, 2013 6:40pm EDT

Damaged houses are seen in the earthquake stricken town of Bushehr in Iran April 9, 2013. A powerful earthquake

struck close to Iran's only nuclear power station on Tuesday, killing 30 people and injuring 800 as it devastated small

villages, state media reported. REUTERS-Mehr News Agency

(Reuters) - A powerful earthquake struck close to Iran's only nuclear power station on Tuesday, killing 37 people and

injuring 850 as it destroyed homes and devastated two small villages, Iranian media reported.

The 6.3 magnitude quake totally destroyed one village, a Red Crescent official told the Iranian Students' News Agency(ISNA), but the nearby Bushehr nuclear plant was undamaged, according to Iranian officials and the Russian company

that built it.

"Due to the intensity of this earthquake, this tragedy has deepened and we have seen the destruction of many

homes in the region, the deaths of 37 people and more than 850 injured," the governor of Bushehr province,

Fereydoun Hassanvand, told Mehr news agency. Many houses in rural parts of the province are made of mud bricks,

which have been known to crumble easily in quake-prone Iran. Some 700 homes were destroyed, Hassanvand said.

Rouhani: Iran to start building 2nd nuclear plant in BushehrIranian president says "there will be nuclear reactors in most parts of" Gulf coast province.
http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Nuclear-deal-between-Iran-and-six-world-powers-reached-in-Geneva-332785http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Nuclear-deal-between-Iran-and-six-world-powers-reached-in-Geneva-332785http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Nuclear-deal-between-Iran-and-six-world-powers-reached-in-Geneva-332785http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Washington-Post-White-House-omitting-facts-about-Iran-nuclear-deal-333491http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Washington-Post-White-House-omitting-facts-about-Iran-nuclear-deal-333491http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Washington-Post-White-House-omitting-facts-about-Iran-nuclear-deal-333491http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Iran-planning-to-build-2-new-nuclear-power-plants-official-says-332765http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Iran-planning-to-build-2-new-nuclear-power-plants-official-says-332765http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Iran-planning-to-build-2-new-nuclear-power-plants-official-says-332765http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Iran-planning-to-build-2-new-nuclear-power-plants-official-says-332765http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Washington-Post-White-House-omitting-facts-about-Iran-nuclear-deal-333491http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Nuclear-deal-between-Iran-and-six-world-powers-reached-in-Geneva-332785


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Across the Gulf, offices in Qatar and Bahrain were evacuated after the quake, whose epicenter was 89 km (55 miles)

southeast of the port of Bushehr, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. The early afternoon shock was also felt in

financial hub Dubai.

The Russian company that built the nuclear power station, 18 km (11 miles) south of Bushehr, said the plant was

unaffected. "Personnel continue to work in the normal regime and radiation levels are fully within the norm,"

Russian state news agency RIA quoted an official at Atomstroyexport as saying.

Iran informed the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency that there was "no damage to the Bushehr Nuclear

Power Plant and no radioactive release from the installation", an agency statement said.

One Bushehr resident said the quake shook her home and the homes of her neighbors but they were not damaged.

"We could clearly feel the earthquake," Nikoo, who asked to be identified only by her first name, said. "The windows

and chandeliers all shook."

While initial fears about nuclear fallout receded, nearer the epicenter the rescue efforts ramped up into the night in

search of survivors and to feed and house hundreds of residents who were traumatized by at least 16 aftershocks.

A Red Crescent official told ISNA that 20 people had been saved by rescue teams searching through the rubble.

Reports in Iranian media spoke of landslides destroying buildings and crowds gathering in the town of Dashti from

outlying areas in search of help. Military officials said army and police units had been deployed to maintain order.

Water and electricity lines were severed and communities stayed in the streets because of the threat from

aftershocks.

Iran's most powerful authority, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, offered his condolences to the victims and urged authorities

to extend all efforts to save lives and help the afflicted.

Tuesday's quake was much smaller than the 9.0 magnitude one that hit Japan two years ago, triggering a tsunami

that destroyed back-up generators and disabled the Fukushima nuclear plant's cooling system. Three of the reactors

melted down.

Iran is the only country operating a nuclear power plant that does not belong to the Convention on Nuclear Safety,

negotiated after the 1986 nuclear disaster in Chernobyl which contaminated wide areas and made 160,000

Ukrainians homeless.

Western officials and the United Nations have urged Iran to join the safety forum.

REPEATED WARNINGS

Tehran has repeatedly rejected safety concerns about Bushehr - built in a highly seismic area - that began operations

in September 2011 after decades of delays.

Iran sits on major fault lines and has suffered several devastating earthquakes in recent years, including a 6.6

magnitude quake in 2003 which flattened the southeastern city of Bam and killed more than 25,000 people. In

August more than 300 people were killed when two quakes struck the northwest.

A report published last week by U.S. think-tanks Carnegie Endowment and the Federation of American Scientists said

that "ominously" the Bushehr reactor sits at the intersection of three tectonic plates. "Iran's sole nuclear power

plant is not at risk of a tsunami similar in size to the one that knocked out the electricity and emergency cooling


20/41


systems at Fukushima. But, repeated warnings about the threat of earthquakes for the Bushehr nuclear plant appear

to have fallen on deaf ears," the report said.

The quake happened on National Nuclear Technology Day when Iran's leaders celebrate the technological advances

they say will reduce the country's reliance on fossil fuels, leaving more of its abundant oil for export.

Israel, Gulf Arab states and many Western countries fear Tehran is seeking a nuclear weapons capability and the

Islamic Republic is under international sanctions aimed at forcing it to curb some of its atomic work.

Iran denies it wants nuclear arms and says its atomic work is for electricity generation and other peaceful uses.

(Additional reporting by Fredrik Dahl in Vienna, Regan Doherty in Doha, Steve Gutterman in Moscow; Writing by

Robin Pomeroy; Editing by Michael Roddy and Jon Hemming)

M. Iranian Nuclear ambitions are evilDuring a meeting with Dutch and Russian Ambassadors inRiyadh,Prince Turki al Kabeer SaudiUndersecretary for Multilateral Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that "ifIrantried to

produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit

the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians."[12]

Prince

Turki also raised concerns that "the United States will negotiate a grand bargain with Iran without

consulting Saudi Arabia is a concern we have heard often in recent weeks. Saudi Arabia is also

concerned about the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr. A leakage from a plant at that location could

bring an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, pointing out that it is located less than 300

kilometers away from Saudi shores, across open water." The Russian Ambassador Gibinvish, respondedthat Iran's wants to enrich uranium as it fears being attacked by Israel or the United States and also a sign of

Iran's desire to establish its "supremacy" in the region. Prince Turki interjected: "And we cannot acceptIranian supremacy in the region. We are okay with nuclear electrical power and desalination, but not with

enrichment." He said that the prospect of Iranian enrichment raises troubling questions about theirmotivations for doing so: "they do not need it!"

[12]

"US embassy cables: Saudi official warns Gulf states may go nuclear".The Guardian(London). 28 November 2010.

____________________________________________________________________________________________

N. UK Telegraph8:40AM BST 04 Apr 2012Hillary Clinton warns nuclear-armed Iran would be 'destabilising'

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned Tuesday that a nuclear-armed Iran or a conflict over its programme would

both destabilise the region as she pressed Tehran for clear commitments in forthcoming talks.

Hillary Clinton warns nuclear-armed Iran would be 'destabilising' Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton speaks atthe NATO Allied Command Transformation headquarters in Norfolk, Va.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton speaks at the NATO Allied Command Transformation headquarters in

Norfolk, Va. Photo: AP Photo/Steve Helber

As Israel voiced growing impatience over Iran, Clinton credited US sanctions with inflicting pressure on the Islamic

republic but she warned of a tough road ahead as Tehran prepares to meet with six major powers.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riyadhhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riyadhhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riyadhhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contents_of_the_United_States_diplomatic_cables_leak_(Saudi_Arabia)#cite_note-ReferenceB-12http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contents_of_the_United_States_diplomatic_cables_leak_(Saudi_Arabia)#cite_note-ReferenceB-12http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contents_of_the_United_States_diplomatic_cables_leak_(Saudi_Arabia)#cite_note-ReferenceB-12http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contents_of_the_United_States_diplomatic_cables_leak_(Saudi_Arabia)#cite_note-ReferenceB-12http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contents_of_the_United_States_diplomatic_cables_leak_(Saudi_Arabia)#cite_note-ReferenceB-12http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/189229http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/189229http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/189229http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contents_of_the_United_States_diplomatic_cables_leak_(Saudi_Arabia)#cite_note-ReferenceB-12http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contents_of_the_United_States_diplomatic_cables_leak_(Saudi_Arabia)#cite_note-ReferenceB-12http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riyadh


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"There is no clear path. We know that a nuclear-armed Iran would be incredibly destabilising to the region and

beyond. A conflict arising out of their program would also be very destabilising," Clinton said. "There is no way to

balance this. You have two very difficult paths here," Clinton told a dinner in Norfolk, Virginia, where she was on a

day trip to visit the only Nato command in the United States.

Clinton, who travelled over the weekend to Turkey and Saudi Arabia, voiced concern that a nuclear-armed Iran would

trigger an arms race in the region.

"We're going to be looking for a way to try to convey the legitimate fears that people in the region have about what

comes next. Because if Iran were ever to get a nuclear weapon, the countries in the region are going to buy their way

to one as well," Clinton said.

______________________________________________________________________________________

O. In 2009, Brent Scowcroft, the former national security adviser to presidents Gerald Ford and GeorgeH. W.Bush, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, If Iran is allowed to go forward, in self-defense or for a variety

of reasons we could have half a dozen countries in the region and 20 or 30 more around the world doing the same

thing just in case.1

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, A nuclear armed Iran with a

deliverable weapons system is going to spark an arms race in the Middle East and the greater region.Former Bushadministration official John Bolton told the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, IfIran obtains nuclear weapons, then almost certainly Saudi Arabia will do the same, as will Egypt, Turkey and

perhaps others in the region, and we risk this widespread proliferation even if it is a democratic Iran that possesses

nuclear weapons.http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/15/turkey-and-bomb

_______________________________________________________________________________________

P.A Nuclear Iran: The Spur to a Regional Arms Race?By Avner Golov and Amos Yadlin for Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)

5 April 2013

After describing Tehrans strategic rationale for developing a nuclear program and assessing its ability tobring it to fruition, Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov then explore one of the many alarming scenarios that couldresult from a nuclear capable Irani.e., a regional arms race.One of the main arguments for stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, beyond the direct danger of its usingthem or transferring them to terrorist elements, is that Irans possession of a nuclear military capability will underminethe nuclear nonproliferation regime and spur the nuclearization of other states in the Middle East. The Obamaadministration has voiced this argument to justify its opposition to Irans nuclear program.[1]Other analysts, however,contend that Irans development of a nuclear bomb will not lead to a regional arms race,[2]as Irans three chief rivalsin the region, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, lack the economic and technological capabilities and the necessarymotivation to develop nuclear weapons. This argument, which lessens the gravity of the Iranian threat to the region,implies that statements by senior Saudi, Turkish, and Egyptian officials, whereby an Iranian bomb would propel theirgovernments to achieve a balance of power among the states, should be ignored.

In our assessment, the conclusion that a nuclear Iran would not lead to an arms race is based on an inadequateanalysis of the relevant countries and their motivation and ability to acquire nuclear weapons once Iran has obtainedthem. This flawed analysis results from an approach suited to the old Middle Eastbefore Iran acquired a nuclearbomb, before the rise of Sunni political Islam as a result of the upheaval in the Arab world, and before the UnitedStates lost some of its regional influence, a trend that will only intensify if Iran succeeds in acquiring military nuclearcapabilities in spite of the US policy of prevention.

An examination of Middle East states that are likely to develop a military nuclear program requires a look at four keyfactors: motivation and strategic rationale; the states ability to bear the economic burden of a military nuclear program;the infrastructure and technological capability required for developing nuclear weapons; and the political constraints
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/15/turkey-and-bombhttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/15/turkey-and-bombhttp://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?id=162351&contextid774=162351&contextid775=162349&tabid=1454238763#_ftn1http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?id=162351&contextid774=162351&contextid775=162349&tabid=1454238763#_ftn1http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?id=162351&contextid774=162351&contextid775=162349&tabid=1454238763#_ftn1http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?id=162351&contextid774=162351&contextid775=162349&tabid=1454238763#_ftn2http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?id=162351&contextid774=162351&contextid775=162349&tabid=1454238763#_ftn2http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?id=162351&contextid774=162351&contextid775=162349&tabid=1454238763#_ftn2http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?id=162351&contextid774=162351&contextid775=162349&tabid=1454238763#_ftn2http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?id=162351&contextid774=162351&contextid775=162349&tabid=1454238763#_ftn1http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/15/turkey-and-bomb


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that would influence and perhaps dissuade them from acquiring military nuclear weaponsmainly relations with theUnited States and commitments to the nonproliferation regime. A look at these four factors with respect to threeregional powers reveals that the possibility of a regional arms race is not low at all.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabias leaders state openly and explicitly that a nuclear Iran will force them to act to maintain the balance ofpower. Turki al-Faisal, who served as head of Saudi intelligence and as Saudi Arabias ambassador to Washington,claimed that the Gulf states must acquire nuclear power if the efforts fail to persuade Iran to give up its

nuclear program.[3]Dennis Ross, President Obamas former envoy to the Middle East, even quoted the threat heheard from the Saudi king during a meeting in April 2009: If they get nuclear weapons,we will get nuclearweapons.[4]Documents published by WikiLeaks reinforce this statement.

Strategic Rationale

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran are based on rivalry and hatred that has existed for many years between theShiites and the Sunnis and between the Arabs and the Persians. The suppression by the Saudi Wahhabi regime of theShiite minority, which lives in the countrys eastern oil region, is emblematic of relations between the Wahhabi streamof Islam and the Shiites.

This religious and ideological rivalry compounds the conflict of interests between the two states, which seek to expandtheir influence in the region and export their respective ideologies: the Shiite revolution for Iran, and Wahhabism forSaudi Arabia. Furthermore, Iran has long threatened Arab aspirations to expand Arab control in the Middle East and

south central Asia. Therefore, Saudi Arabia, which aspires to lead the Sunni Arab bloc, sees Shiite Iran as a majorthreat to its interests in the region. Irans entry into the nuclear club will force the Saudi royal house to attain a strategicbalance of power. Indeed, Saudi officials have of late deviated from former practice and begun to work overtly to foilthe Iranian nuclear program by pressuring Western countries to act against Iran and by increasing their oil output as analternative to Iranian oil, in order to tighten the sanctions on Tehran.

Economics and Resources

Saudi Arabia is a regional and even world economic and financial power. It is the largest oil exporter in the world, it isthird in the world in foreign currency reserves, and it has the largest economy of the Arab states. In April 2010, theSaudi king ordered establishment of a nuclear city at a cost of over $100 billion. The declared goal of the project is toexamine all aspects of nuclear development.[5]The scope of this project illustrates that the economy of oil-rich Saudi

Arabia would enable it to build a nuclear program if it wished. Furthermore, the resources that the royal house could

allocate for such a venture, if deemed necessary, could greatly shorten the process of advancing the project.

Technolo gical Infrastructu re

Saudi Arabias capabilities in the nuclear realm are not clear, and there are some hints that Saudi Arabia hasattempted to develop an independent nuclear program for military purposes. After his defection to the United States,for example, the first secretary of the Saudi Arabian mission to the United Nations claimed that in the early 1970s,Saudi Arabia established a military nuclear program.[6]While Saudi Arabia cooperates with the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA), it is not a signatory to the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),which mandates rigorous and frequent testing of non-nuclear states or states whose nuclear activity is limited. Inaddition, Saudi Arabia has never relinquished its right to enrich uranium independently.

However, Saudi Arabia also has alterna