Radicalisation in the UK: What are the drivers behind some British Muslims becoming

violently radicalised?

Understanding reasons behind an individual’s gravitation towards violent radicalisation and extremism is an issue that continues to be debated today. More often than not, perspectives of this phenomenon insofar as it relates to Muslim communities, are from an external/outsider perspective. Increasingly, insider perspectives emanating from grassroots practitioners are being acknowledged in view of their experience in recognising and tackling violent extremist propaganda.

Jihadi Constituencies?

McCants, W, Brachman, J & Felter, J; ‘Militant Ideology Atlas: Executive Report’ Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, November 2006, p.10

Case studies: Zacarius Moussaoui (aka 20th 9/11 bomber) and Richard Reid (aka the Shoe Bomber) When examining these individuals’ lives it becomes clear that they gravitated inwards towards the ‘Jihadi’ violent extremist constituency. In the case of Moussaoui, his cognitive openings began after he had progressed from the more cultural and wider Muslim constituency and had gravitated towards the Islamist one. The nature of these constituencies is such that they are predominantly Ikhwani / Muslim Brotherhood and, therefore politicised in their understanding and application of Islam. In the case of Reid, he entered the Salafi constituency after completing his prison sentence in Feltham. Due to time constraints, a discussion on Salafism and whether it correlates with extremist ideology has to be limited. Suffice it to state that extremists, like Omar Bakri, Anjem Choudhary etc. started claiming they were Salafi due to an inability to defend their previous flawed and rejected doctrine based on Hizbut Tahrir’s extremist ideology. They retain the violent extremist ideology but have attempted to portray this as being part of Salafism which is contrary to the latter’s theological and methodological foundations. In any event, the time it took Reid to gravitate towards extremist constituencies is markedly quicker than it took Moussaoui.

The former government’s PREVENT strategy, while attempting to address violent radicalisation and extremism by empowering Muslim communities to tackle them at grassroots have, according to some sources, contributed towards alienating significant segments of the same population by aligning itself with the usual suspects who fail to reflect the realities at grassroots, i.e. anger at Foreign Policy etc. This may have actually caused a pendulum effect across the continuum provided below:

Liberal Extreme

• Failure to adequately address Muslim concerns

• Lack of knowledge based decisions

• Reliance more upon intellect than Islamic edicts and rulings

• More concerned with public perception and position with higher authorities etc.

• Self appointed and often not representative of Muslim masses

Passivism / Inaction

Moderate perspective

• Addressing Muslim concerns within context of Islamic law (Sharia) and common law

• Action relative to what is required

• Contact with bona fide, experienced & knowledgeable scholars

Measured / balanced response

Fanatical Extreme

• Imbuing emotional responses from its followers

• Propelling them to react/respond physically

• Urgency of reaction / response

• Instilling uncontrollable hatred/resentment towards own society & those who do not subscribe to their view

• Misinterpretation / distortion of religious texts to justify extreme beliefs

•Terrorism

Misplaced Activism / Reaction

Secular Extreme(Positive effect/input) (Revivalists) Political

Extreme

(Negative effect/input)

Muslims and non-Muslims

Salman Rushdie Irshad Manjit

(Muslim activist)

Sufi Barelwi

MCB

MAB

Political theologians: (Prof.Yahya

MichotTariq RamadanYusuf Qardawi)

Salafis

H.T/Al -Muhajirun

Al QaidaQuilliam Foundation

IHRC

The above model provides a more detailed illustration so far as identifying movements, groups and their perceived effectiveness in relation to the bipolar perspective of extremism highlighted earlier in figure 3. The following supposedly reflected the socio-political environment in 2005. Quilliam Foundation did not exist at this time and was therefore subsequently added more recently:

1.Al Qaida: At that particular stage, i.e. up until 2005, (when this workshop was convened), the movement’s interest in the political climate in Britain was heightened to an extent that infiltration into opposition parties and groups etc. was considered a significant strategy to cause further disruption among which subsequent terrorist attacks could be launched;

2. At the other end of the continuum, secularised (and what has increasingly become liberal) input was considered negative or, unhelpful during that period;

3. Muslim Council of Britain (MCB): This organisation was not considered by the Muslim communities to be close enough to the actual problem of home grown terrorism and violent extremism. However, the government chose to promote its positive relations with MCB prior to invasion of Iraq. These became tenuous following MCB’s subsequent criticism of the government’s foreign policy in reference to Iraq, Palestine and the US lead ‘war on terror.’

4. Muslim Association of Britain (MAB): Some academics assert that initially this group was among the few entities to have effectively tackled Al-Qaida. It was an organisation that had gained significant credibility due to its stance regarding the Palestinian issue.

5. Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC): Again, a few academics considered this organisation to be an effective and credible entity in the field of countering violent extremism;

6. Salafis: Arguably, Salafis remain among the most influential and effective groups that have the experience and expertise to effectively counter violent extremist propaganda and its protagonists.

Reiterating the initial point: these observations related to an earlier political environment, i.e.2005. The trajectory of extremism in the UK has broadened since then as was witnessed with the Woolwich attack in May 2013. It is interesting to note that now – 2014 – very few of these groups or organisations have maintained effectiveness in challenging extremism.

Salafi communities

Vacuum where ‘hard to reach’ disenfranchised Muslim youth gravitate towards

Mainstream Muslim communities

Wider ‘host’ society, governmental and statutory bodies

Falling below the radar

Countering Terrorism in the UK: A Convert Community PerspectiveAnthony (Abdul Haqq) Baker, PhD student, Dept. of Politics, University of Exeter: 2005-9

Below the Radar: Lessons learned from losing community members to violent extremism Once Moussaoui and Reid had either been expelled or left Brixton Mosque following their violent radicalisation, no inter-community or social arrangements with statutory partners were in place to address or even monitor the degree to which these individuals had become extreme. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate both a community and societal framework of the threat posed by violent extremism to susceptible individuals:

The ‘hard’ end of interventions

Mainstream Muslim community initiatives dealing with conventional ‘softer’ interventions

Gravitational pull towards violent extremism/’Fanatical Extreme’

‘Liberal Extreme’/secular Muslim communities at the ‘softest’ end of interventions

Positioning of Muslim communities & intervention projects

Countering Terrorism in the UK: A Convert Community PerspectiveAnthony (Abdul Haqq) Baker, PhD, Dept. of Politics, University of Exeter: 2005-9

Recognising stages of development and vulnerability in Muslim youth The ability to engage with and determine the extent of young Muslims’ understanding of their religion is essential as part of a process to address potential pitfalls or vulnerability. Very few grassroots community groups are able to recognise stages of development among Muslim youth and provide tailored and measured programmes to cater for them. For example, during the founding or cognitive phase of development an individual may mistakenly be exposed to politicised teachings in an attempt to address his/her concerns about national/international events affecting Muslims, i.e. Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq. Politicised teachings of this nature are potentially explosive at this formative stage of development, especially when they fail to provide a correct contextualisation of religious understanding relating to such events. By adapting existing theoretical frameworks from other disciplines, i.e. management theory, to fit into more conducive social scientific models, the above mentioned stages can be illustrated more clearly.

A convert’s contextualisation and understanding of Islam moves forwards

and backwards

Founding Phase(Conversion)

Youthful Phase(Formative)

Adult Phase(Foundational)

Mature Phase(Reflective)

Figure 6: The life cycle of a convert’s post conversion process

The above model is basic in its depiction of converts’ conversion processes, however, it is useful as a framework to immediately identify stages of, not only converts, but 2nd/3rd generation Muslims’ development after cognitive openings in the Muslim constituencies highlighted above in figure 2. The following model (figure 7) is a more detailed framework within which to determine a religious/ideological development according to the degree of learning/inculcation received by individuals.

Founding

Youthful

Mature

Adult

Phases

Religious Development

Learning (Abstract)

Practice (Abstract)

Doing (Actualisation)

Interaction –(Actualisation)

Reflecting (Actualisation)

Data

Information

Knowledge

Wisdom

Understanding

Cont

ext

Novelty

Experience

Figure 7: Adaption of ‘The Continuum of Understanding’ model

 

•Data comes about through research, creation, gathering, and discovery.

•Information has context. Data is turned into information by organizing it so that we can easily draw conclusions. Data is also turned into information by "presenting" it, such as making it visual or auditory.

•Knowledge has the complexity of experience, which come about by seeing it from different perspectives. This is why training and education is difficult - one cannot count on one person's knowledge transferring to another. Knowledge is built from scratch by the learner through experience. Information is static, but knowledge is dynamic as it lives within us.

•Wisdom is the ultimate level of understanding. As with knowledge, wisdom operates within us. We can share our experiences that create the building blocks for wisdom, however, it needs to be communicated with even more understanding of the personal contexts of our audience than with knowledge sharing.

•Data and information deal with the past. They are based on the gathering of facts and adding context. Knowledge deals with the present. It becomes a part of us and enables to perform. However, when we gain wisdom, we start dealing with the future as we are now able to vision and design for what will be, rather than for what is or was.

Effective organisations like STREET, alongside communities and groups that continue to tackle extremism continue to be viewed with suspicion by the government on the one hand, inferring that they are complicit in their support or alleged pathway towards violent radicalistation. On the other hand, are the extremist protagonists and their supporters who accuse such entities of working covertly with the intelligence authorities to spy on Muslim communities.

Both positions continue to be baseless and without sufficient evidence; however, due to already established agendas on both sides, ignorance or a combination of the two, it is unlikely there will be any significant change in the short term.