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RAF Bomber Command's ‘Target for Tonight’ (1941)K.R.M. Short aa University of HoustonPublished online: 15 Sep 2006.

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Hiswrical ffournal of Film, Radio and Tde~ion, VoL 17, No. 2, 1997 181

RAF Bomber Command's "Target for Tonight" (1941)

K.R.M. S H O R T , University of Houswn

This article includes a microfiche supplement (inside rear cover) from the production files of Target for To-night, as well as the 'book-of-the-film' Target for To-night, an illustrated 32-page pamphlet (6d) written by Daily Express reporter Paul Holt and published by Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, in 1941. The film's dialogue is reproduced as an appendix to this article.

Here was a new genre in the cinema: a fact, a fragment of actual life which still held the emotional tremor of fiction...semi-fictional documentary. (I)ilys Powell, 1946/7)

July 1941 represented something of wur de force for the recently expanded and reorganized Air Ministry Directorate of Public Relations [1]. Between the 7th and 28th of July, Air Commodore Sir Harold Peake and his staff arranged for the previewing and distribution of Ferry P//ot (Crown Film Unit [CFU], 35 rain), Target for Tonight (CFU, 50 rain) and The Pilot is Safe (CFU, 8 rain) [2]. By the end of September, Peake's directorate had six films on exhibition and had cooperated in the production of fifteen commercial films, led by the MoI-sponsored 49th Para~d (Ortus, dir. Michael Powell, 1941) and Twentieth Century-Fox's Hollywood production of A Yank in the RAF (1941, Henry King, dir.). The directorate's PR-1 Branch had also provided cooperation for twenty-one other films currently in production. An increased appetite for publicity (along with the need for training films, some of which were secret in nature) had led the Air Ministry, shedding its previous dependence upon the Crown Film Unit, to set up the RAF Film Production Unit late that summer [3].

H a r r y Wat t and the Royal Ai r F o r c e

Target for Tonight, undeniably the most important RAF documentary film of that year, was written and directed by Harry Watt of the Crown F'~-n Unit, successor to General Post Office [GPO] Film Unit [4]. Wart's introduction to the RAF had been through Squadron 992 which he directed and scripted the previous year. Air Vice-Marshal O.T. Boyd, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Balloon Command, had come to the GPO Film Unit early in the autumn of 1939 asking for a film which would raise the sinking morale of his Territorial' airmen. Those citizen volunteers, who manned the balloon barrages that protected Britain's urban centers from low flying German bombers, lacking conviction in their part of national defense, were deserting their units. Watt, in his readable 1974 autobiography Don't Look at the Camera, complemented Boyd on his

0143-9685/97/020181-38 �9 1997 IAMHIST & Caffax Publishing IAmited

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182 /~ R. M. Short

far=sightedness because, in Wart's opinion, 'it was at least a year later before the Services got even an inkling of the value of propaganda' [5]. Watt, unsurprisingly, was not party to the Air Ministty's commitment to the use of all means of propaganda to further its mission and there is little reason to doubt that Boyd's visit to the GPO was the direct result of an Air Ministry decision to deal with his Command 's discipline problem. What is remarkable is that Boyd went himself, rather than sending a deputy. Assigned to the job by GPO unit producer Alberto Cavalcanti, Watt soon found himself sympathizing with the Territorials.

It was a ghastly job. Balloons were boring things to start with, lunging around at the end of their cables like elephants that have had bad news, liable to break away in the middle of the night and have to be chased across the countryside, and the sites themselves were often in the dreariest and most inaccessible places.

Watt found his story when a Luftwaffe bomber force attacked the Royal Navy fleet, unprotected by a balloon barrage, in the Firth of Forth at Rosyth, Scotland on the afternoon of 16 October 1939. During the attack two Scottish RAF auxiliary squadrons, Nos 602 and 603, shot down two Heinkel (He.) 111 two-engined bombers, the first German aircraft to be downed on British soll since 1918. Damage to the Royal Navy ships was light, but to protect against subsequent attacks Air Vice-Marshall Boyd immediately ordered a balloon squadron transferred from Beclfordsh~ to Scotland. Watt followed them all the way, while preparing to reconstruct the raid itself based on a BBC radio programme which had interviewed all of the eye witnesses. Extraordinarily, the RAF painted Luftwaffe swastikas on two-engined RAF aircraft to stand-in for the attacking Heinkels in the reconstruction of the rind in Squadron 992 (GPO, 1940). The twenty-five minute film, remembered for its 'racy language', was released at the end of April and was almost immediately withdrawn. The fall of France and the disaster of Dunkirk apparently rendered its message irrelevant [6].

By 1 April 1940 the GPO Film Unit had been incorporated into the Ministry of Information (MOO. Four and a half months later, on 19 August, former London Films writer and producer Ian 'Dal ' Dalrymple was brought in to replace Cavalcanti (who had moved to Ealing Studios) as the unit 's producer [7]. In mid-May Harry Watt and his crew had been sent to the channel port of Dover where they had filmed the remnants of the British Army as it arrived from the Dunkirk debacle. Concentrating on the town of Dover, then under German bombardment from France, The Front Lane (GPO, 1940) was, as Watt recalled, 'finished in a hurry, as they all had to be in those days.' This seven-minute documentary film was followed up by Watt with one of the most memorable films of the period, London Can Take It (GPO, 1940, 10 rain) featuring the American war correspondent for CoRi,'r's Magazine Quentin Reynolds as the narrator. Watt followed on producing War and Order (GPO, 1940, 12 rain) on the training of auxiliary police, as well as a memorable sequel to London Can Take It, Chrismms Under Fire (Crown, 1941, dir. Charles Hasse, 5 min) which presumed that the Luftwaffe would bomb on Christmas, 1940, which exceptionally, it did not [8]. I t was shortly after this that Watt claimed to have had his 'best idea of the war. '

Target for Tonight--the b e ~ n n ; n g s

The thirty-four year old Watt recalled going to his masters at the Ministry of Information's Films Division [9] and asking if he could make a 'hitting back film',

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RAF Bomber Command's "-Target.for Tonight" (1941) 183

instead of these interminable 'taking it' efforts. With British bombs already failing on Germany, it would be a matter of recording the RAF's success. The MoI agreed and Watt, probably in early October, went to the Air Ministry where he met Wing Commander (W/C) W.T.S. 'Bill' Williams, head of PR=I's Film Section, Directorate of Public Relations. PR=I was charged with all publicity issues involving newsreels, documentary and feature movies. Watt 's recollections of three weeks of long drinking binges with the Wing Commander ( 'one of my most unfavourite characters') on company=time obviously are not recorded in the Air Ministry and Ministry of Information documentation relative to the making of what would eventually become Target for Tonight [10].

Watt retrospectively attributed the 'stupendous success' of Target for Tonight to its actually showing 'how we were taking the war into the heart of the enemy, and doing it in a very British, casual, brave way.' His idea, however, was not without precedent. Two years before The Lion Has Wings: an epic of the Royal Air Force (London Films, 1939), dismissed by Watt as 'a ghastly, bloody film,' had as its centerpiece a fifteen-minute section reconstructing the famous Kiel Raid, Bomber Command 's first attack against German targets. Arguably Alexander Korda's film, produced by Watt 's new boss Ian Dalrymple, succeeded for exactly the same reason as Watt 's claimed for Iris own Target for Tonight [I 1]. Watt eventually headed for RAF Mildenhall to research a Bomber Command station.

The proposed film on Bomber Command makes its first appearance in the Ministry of Information's remaining files in early November 1940 when John Betjeman at the Ministry of Information received an Air Ministry memo proposing a two-reel twenty=minute film. The MoI determined that its importance justified the expenditure of s Just as Air Vice=Marshal Boyd initiated the production of Squadron 992, Watt 's claim of sole inspiration is open to question for this film may also have been an Air Ministry initiative. The following is an undated and unsigned early outline possibly eminating from within Films Division for submission to its director.

Bomber Command Film

The Air Ministry has proposed that a film be made immediately on the Bomber Command of the RAF. They assure us that they are anxious for such a film to be made as soon as possible and would co-operate in every way and provide the fullest facilities to the G P O Film Unit.

The film would be a documentary of about two reels in length. I t would begin by tracing the rise of the RAF after its post-Great War dormant period, and the policy advocated and encouraged by Lord Trenchard of making the bomber side strong and making the RAF a vital striking and offensive force, as distinct from the purely defensive idea of some theorists of the time.

The soundness of Lord Trenchard's judg~nent was amply proven when the Germans occupied almost the whole of the northern European coastline and the British blockade became extremely difficult to maintain. The weak link in the Nazi war was essential war supplies. I t became Bomber Command 's job to smash industrial Germany.

To become a bomber pilot or navigator nowadays needs an extraordinarily thorough and complicated training. And the fusing together of the crew's work is one of the essentials. So all through the dreary winter of 1939, during the long false security of the defensive era, the bomber command was practicing for what it knew must come soon-- the offensive phase. No matter what the

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184 /C R. M. Short

propaganda results of the leaflets raids were, they taught the bomber command personnel their job. And they taught them to find their way around the skies of Germany in any weather and arrive unerringly at their selected target.

And now they are reaping their reward. Night after night, in all weather conditions, our bomber squadrons rise into the sky and drone nnerrin#oy to some essential economic target in Germany. The Bomber Command is cutting the arteries of the enemy. And everything is done according to a long term and carefully prepared plan. The one word that can never be applied to British bombing is haphazard. Every bomb has its mark worked out for it perhaps weeks in advance.

The bombing raids are not only confined to the night. With the occupation of France, close targets are available for daylight raids.

The film would end with a reconstructing of such a raid and show our major striking weapon actually on the job, and illustrate the combination of planned efficiency on the ground and team work in the air that makes the Bomber Command of the RAF the most effective striking force in the world.

The outline's emphasis on presenting a Bomber Command raid (final paragraph) in a historical context, including crew training, suggests that it was not written by Harry Watt. It was (using Watt's description from another context) 'a factual resume of the long term policy,' which was not unlike the RAF prescription for the earlier The L/on Has W/ngs. The odds are that this document also incorporated an earlier outline prepared at the Public Relations Directorate offices in Whitehall [12].

On 12 November, Watt reported to W/C Williams that the MoI had #oven its approval for the preparation of the film. Dalrymple was to meet with Williams to 'discuss the best approach to the subject.' Proposed as director for the film, the 'very keen' Watt, stressed that he wrote at[ of his own scripts and was sure that 'we can get out a film both worthy of the Bomber Command and excellent propaganda. ' The documentation relative to the film comes almost entirely from the Mol ' s Films Division and the GPO Film Unit/Crown Film Unit, that is to say from the perspective of Watts and Dalrymple, rather than W/C Williams and the Air Ministry. Among Wart's surviving research material was an article from Aeronaut/cs Magazine (Oct. 1940, vol. 3. no. 3) examining three of the most notable bombing attacks in history. I t dosed with a quote from Winston Churchill, dated 20 August 1940.

All hearts go out to the fighter pilots whose brilliant actions we see with our own eyes day after day, but we must never forget that all the time, night after night, month after month, our bomber squadrons travel far into Germany, find their targets in the darkness by the highest navigational skill, aim their attacks, often under the heaviest fire, often at serious loss, with deliberate, careful precision, and inflict shattering blows upon the whole of the technical and warmaking structure of the Nazi power.

The file also contained a clipping on 'How our Night-Bomber Pilots are trained.' 'Flights' were made on the ground using a simulator comprised of a screen at the end of room. The mock aircraft contained controls and instruments; 'everything is here except the smell of the petrol. ' The 'flight' was run on a fast clock and included dinghy drill; bombs were dropped from a height of eight feet. Although appropriate to the "Bomber Command Film' scenario previously cited, Watt was not interested in anything but a bomber raid [13].

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RAF Bomber Command's 'Target for Tonight" (1941) 185

The project developed slowly. Permission was granted by the Imperial War Museum to use about 200 feet of film from its extensive holdings for the new production and Watt was now on the circulation list for Air Ministry Bulletins. The PR Directorate assigned Fit. Lt. D.N. 'Derek' Twist of its Press Section to coordinate WaR's access to RAF aerodromes. Twist, according to Watt, was a 'charming fellow,' and before the war 'something in the film business.' Twist, in fact, had been a film editor at Gaumont British before the war and counted amongst his credits Alfred Hitchcock's classic spy thriller The Thirty-nine Steps (Gaumont British, 1935). Twist, who may have known Dalrymple at Gaumont British, later was appointed to head of the new RAF Film Production Unit with the rank of Squadron Leader. Neither WaR's recollections, nor the surviving Mol documentation make it possible to provide an accurate chronology of WaR's pre-production efforts. Based on MoI ' s project approval of 12 November, the assumption is that Watt began work, with Twist as his nursemaid, in mid-November spending the next three-four weeks gathering material. Initially, he was taken to Bomber Command Headquarters, near High Wycombe (thirty miles northwest of London on the A40), only a few miles from where he lived with his wife and son after their evacuation. Watt then realized (somehow assuming that the Luftwaffe knew as much) 'why our windows and doors kept getting blown in.' Moving on to RAF MAIdenhall, he began 'the long journalist-cure-detective work necessary to get a really authentic script.' Watt claimed to have read over two or three (his recollections vary) thousand pilot raid reports, most of which offered liRIe but the most basic information on take-off and landing-times, along with descriptions of the flak, fighters and the bombing of targets. The few descriptions by pilots with 'perhaps, literary aspirations' gave him some 'exciting or memorable moments ' - - i t was a 'very exciting but horrifying experience.' WaR drank gin with the officers, beer with the sergeants and 'mammoth mugs of tea with the maintenance crews in the dispersal huts. ' During that period, he lived with the station commander and attended every OPS (Operations) briefing for No. 149 Squadron, sitting behind its commander, Wing Commander J.A. 'Speedy' PoweU, WaR then joined station personnel in the Operations Room 'sweating it out ' until the aircraft returned f ~ m the mission [14].

By 15 January 1941 the documents signaled the transformation of the GPO Film Unit into the Crown Film Unit which 'embodied in the Ministry of Information and rank directly as a Government department. ' On 21 January WaR wrote to Government Films Advisor Sidney Bernstein noting that there was now the first "very rough dry outline for the Bomber Command film.' A copy of the script had already gone to W/C Williams, with whom Watt had also spoken about using March of T im material. The MoT had turned over footage to the Air Ministry which had been shot with PR-1 support probably for two recent issues) Britain's R,4F (vol. 7) no. 2, October 1940) and Uncb Sam----the non-belligerent (vol. 7, no. 4) January 1941). The Air Ministry had no objection to CFU using the material or for it to be used for 'our Air Force film. ) Williams was not prepared to give it to MoI for fear that it would then be given it out 'to all and sundry, including the newsreels' which doubtless would have angered the donor. Watt was not to use any of this footage. Although fully involved in making the Bomber Command film, Watt also lobbied hard to be allowed to cover the threatened German invasion of Britain: 'a great deal of spot material we could cover which never could be obtained again.' He wanted permission to organize a fully equipped film unit ready to go immediately on the job covering the invasion. This memorandum, written like a true journalist (even if he did not recognize it), has an ironic ring to it, considering the perilous state of the nation: ' I f we could arrange that such a unit would

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186 /C R. M. Short

get a call immediately if danger threatened we might be able to obtain a terrific scoop' [15].

Watt did not get permission for his invasion crew and, happily, Hitler 's Operation 'Sea Lion' never left French shores. However, Wart's script almost immediately ran into difficulty with Squadron Leader John Lawrence, PR- I ' s staff officer assigned to Bomber Command Headquarters. Lawrence's only experience in film making, according to Watt, was a 'dreary exposition of "How the Times Works," in six reels, called The Thunderer.' Writing to W/C Williams on 29 January, Lawrence had criticized Wart 's dramatic concentration on an unlikely event or "hot' target, rather than presenting what he understood was intended; a 'generalized picture or summary of the work of Bomber Command. ' 'The whole point of a documentary film,' opined Lawrence, 'is to be able m describe in an exciting and interesting fashion a routine succession of events.' Bomber Command would be 'only too glad, to help Watt and suggest episodes which might 'bring out the essential character of the work of the Bomber Command. ' What would have really angered the volatile Watt was the suggestion by Lawrence that he had taken 'a short cut along the primrose path of fiction'. Copied by Williams, Watt replied to the letter on 7 February. Watt told Williams that it was his understanding that he was to make a 'prestige film of Bomber Command, not a factual resume of the long term policy.' Taking issue with Lawrence's remarks about documentary, Watt said that a film 'must always choose the high=lights of a subject. It is a dramatic medium. ' The ball was now firmly in Williams' court and Watt told him that he needed to deal with Lawrence and it had to be done immediately [16].

Target for Tonight--fi!rnln~ begins

Watt had his way, providing a twenty-seven page script for 'A Target is Bombed ' on 27/28 February. This was followed on 1 March, with the completed script for what was still known as 'the Bomber film'. Its central thrust was presenting a 'democratic service at war, without regimentation or pomposities. ' The 334-scene script still required technical vetting by the RAF. RAF Mildenhall ( 'Mildenton, ' later 'Millerton') had already been chosen as the bomber station for the film. Although both Lawrence and Dalrymple had given their approval, Lawrence recommended that Air Vice-Marshall Peck, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, should also approve it before forwarding the script to Air Marshal Sir Richard Pierce, DSO, AFC, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) Bomber Command, recommending the making of the film. Bomber Command would then alert Station Commanders for the required facilities and personnel. Watt stressed that he did not see that film making would 'in any way impede the essential work of the RAF', particularly since he had worked with the Services and could guarantee working in with the Service routine thus obviating any disruption [17].

Receiving RAF technical clearance, Watt proceeded to cast the film with very clear ideas about what he wanted; no professional actors, for starters. When at the GPO, he had been loaned out temporarily as a director by John Grierson to the new British unit of the March of Time. It was on a story about the onerous extra taxation of the tithe levied by the Church of England on farmers that Watt, using local farmers, staged for ' the first time a dramatic reconsmaction of a contemporary event...in British documentary, ffthe March of Time could be ranked as such' [18]. After returning to the GPO, Watt directed Night Mail (GPO, 1936) where he devoted a great deal of effort to achieving an unself=conscious performance from the GPO's railway postal sorters,

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RAF Bomber Command'* "Target for Tonight" (1941) 187

the film's stars [19]. The postal sorters and other characters had to get on with their usual jobs and say a few lines, as the W H Auden verse, Benjamin Brirten's music, highly creative editing and the clacking of the rafts carried the film's pace.

Wart's next project The Saving of BillBlewitt (GPO, 1936), however, demanded sustained dramatic action from his amateur actors, including the real Bill Blewitt. Wart described how he found his 'actors' in dramatized documentaries, which would become his hal lmark-- 'you look for the extroverts, the bullshit merchants, the boring life-and-soul-of-the-party boys. They are natural hams, but if you then wheedle and bully them down to some sort of naturalness, they're actors.' Alberto Cavalcanti summed up Wart's contribution to d o c u m e n t ~ . 'Harry Wart put the sweaty sock into documentary. ' Watt wanted the stars of his 'bomber film' to be the same airmen who serviced and flew the bombers, along with the officers who planned the raids and, at the very top, the leaders of Bomber Command, including the AO C-in-C of Bomber Command, Air Marshal Sir Richard Pierce. These amateur actors were so good that Var~ty could not believe that they were real airmen; a tribute to Wart's skill as a caster and director. The film's opening statement, in part, would tell audiences: 'This is the story of a raid on Germany--how it is planned and how it is executed. Each part is played by the actual man or woman who does the job---from Commander-in-Chief to Alrcrafthand." Watt may have wanted to use the names of those RAF men and women, as he had in the case of Bill Blewirt. They would not be named, nor had they been two years earlier in The L~)n Has l~ngs. The reasons given then still applied. The Air Ministry was not prepared to allow flyers' names to credited because of the possibility of reprisals if they were later captured. Air Minister Sir Kingsley Wood had also provided another reason for not identifying individuals. As paraphrased by London Films publicist John Ware, Wood had indicated that 'individuals do not carry out these daring adventures, but that is the work of the Royal Air Force; the team spirit.' Sir Richard Pierce, however, was subsequently identified in the book-of-the film [20].

By mid-March the length of the projected film had doubled to four reels forty minutes, as did the budget to s [21]. There were also discussions concerning the film's propaganda content. The MoI ' s J.B. Williams and Arthur Elton, Films Division's head of production, toyed with the idea of incorporating shots of 'planes from America, ' possibly the eagerly anticipated four-engined Boeing B-17C or Flying Fortress heavy bombers. Designated the Fortress I by the RAF, the twenty aircraft which arrived in May 1941 were formed into No. 90 Squadron based at Polebrook. A formation of Fortress Is, at a 'fantastic height,' would spearhead the 'heaviest daylight attack yet ' on the German battleship Cr~isenau (one of the targets of Nos 149 and 9 Squadrons, 4 September 1939) at Brest on Thursday 24 July 1941, only a matter of days before the premier of Target for Tonight. The idea was rejected, although the reasons for such an insertion were sound. On the one hand it would have pleased American audiences and, on the other, it furnished proof of the newly pledged support of the United States via Lend Lease even before its entry into the war that following December [22].

Watt and his film crew, comprised of Jonah Jones and Julian Spiro, headed for RAF Mildenhall in the second week of April prepared to realize a script which, in Wart's words was 'utterly straightforward, just the choice of a new small target, the selection of a squadron to bomb it, and the adventures of one bomber, "F for Freddie", during the raid.' His documentary footage featured, as had The L/on Has W/ngs director Michael Powell's, No. 149 Squadron equipped with two-engined Vickers-Armstrong Wellingtons. By early summer 1941, the squadron was equipped with Mark IC aircraft

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188 K . R . M . Short

with Fraser-Nash powered nose and tail turrets and beam guns. Watt recalled that 'we desperately tried to get shots of bombing, but the [film] stock wasn't fast enough. We put cameras on bombers time and again, but they flew too high and we couldn't get it.' He did get some outstanding flying footage of F-Freddie flying amongst strongly lighted cumulonimbus cloud tops set above thick cloud cover, probably accentuated by the use of filters.

Senior Bomber Command H Q officers and RAF Mildenhall officers would perform their accustomed RAF roles for the camera. Watt picked Squadron Leader Charles 'Pick' Pickard of No. 311 Squadron (based at nearby RAF Honington) as the captain or 'skipper' of the aircraf~ Pickard, accordln~ to Wart, was 'a large blond, easy-going individual, older than the others at twenty-four, and, as a flyer, as mad as a hatter.' Pickard would play Squadron Leader ~Dickson', skipper of F-Freddie, his second pilot was Pilot Officer [P/O] 'WoUart', Sergeant 'Macpherson' was the navigator/ bomb-aimer, Warrant Officer ~I.~e' was, the wireless operator and the crew was completed by the front and rear gunners, Sergeants 'Bell ' and 'Harrison. ' Wart's intention, within the limits of his casting pool, was to balance the six-man crew geographically (excluding the Welsh and the Northern Irish). One-half the crew was English--pilot, co-pilot and wireless operator. The critical crew job of navigator was filled by a Scot and the two gunners, apparently Australian and Canadian, represented the Commonwealth. Class-wise there were two officers (pilot and co-pilot), one warrant officer and three sergeants. "Remarkably, considering that S/L Pickard commanded Bomber Command's only Czechoslovakian-manned squadron (No. 311), Wart did not include a Czech flyer in his representative Wellington crew. A Canadian sergeant, N-Nuts navigator, figured at the end of the mission briefing scene bantering with Macpherson, F-Freddies' navigator, over whether 'Jock' knew the difference between Hanover, a German target, or Hampton Court, a sixteenth-century royal palace west of London. Other actors included the pilots and navigators featured in the Crew Room scenes, P/O W. Sooner, P/O P.F. Dingwall, Hying Officer 11. Bicknell, P/O N.S. Dunkerton, P/O J.R.L. Dunn and P/O W.E.G. Wand. Of that group only P/O Wand was currently operational and flying with No. 149 Squadron [23]. Key players at RAF 'Millerton,' included the Group Captain/Station Commander, the Wing Commander ('W/C Powell), S/L 'Wilson'--the Intelligence Officer and the Meteorological [Met] Officer. Only two women, WAAFs, appear in the film, one as a RAF photographic interpreter and the second, an assistant to the Met Officer (in mufti) [24].

The exteriors, including the aircraft sequences, finished, Wart moved back to London because filming the interiors required a studio with adequate facilities. The Crew Room (crew changing room) sequences were shot on one of the smaller sound stages at Elsttee Studios, but W/C Williams failed to deliver the thirty or more personnel required as the background to the foreground dialogue of the crew. Julian Spiro hired a bus, collected the AC2s (with the promise of five shilllr~gs and a free lunch) they required off the nearby Uxbridge High Street, fitted them out into flying gear and the filming began. The replica of Bomber Command's Operations' Room 'much enlarged, and with double the number of bomber squadrons mentioned around the wall than in fact Britain possessed' was created on a full sound stage at Denham Studios. Bomber Command A O C-in-C Air Marshall Sir Richard Pierce, after a great deal of persuasion, agreed to play himself, but only would promise one hour. Watt described in amusing detail the arrival of Pierce and his entourage, as well as problems with a squeaky chair on the set. Three hours later, the filming was finished and Pierce,

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tL4F Bomber Coraraand's 'Target for Tonight" (1941) 189

despite the chair, had turned in a highly creditable performance, Watt recalled waiting for three weeks for W/C Williams to produce a 'clapped out ' Wellington bomber fuselage ready for dismantling in order to get the fights and cameras inside. The officers waited it out at London's Strand Hotel [25]. What finally arrived at Denham was a brand new Wellington fuselage, so they tore it up. However, the aircraft's cockpit turned out to be equipped ('on the side by the instruments was a little box') with a 'top-seeret radar device' (conceivably the new top-secret navigational aid code-name "Gee'), including a self-destructive charge. Watt blamed Williams for the unnecessary and expensive time-lag, as well as for the security breach, although the latter problem was probably not his fault, but someone else far down the chain of command [26].

The editing now began with the inflexible mid-summer deadline, set by Government Films Advisor Sidney Bemstein, ominously close. Sound recordist Gordon Hales assisted film editor Stewart McAllister, cutting day and night, as he battled to meet the deadline. It was a 'very, very tight schedule; and McAllister himself, through his sheer sweat and persistence, not giving up, not flapping, got it finished in time' [27]. The film) still without a firm tide, had crept up to six r e e l s - - ~ minutes. Ian Dalrymple provided the following production details: Harry Watt and Jonah Jones did the aerial shots and Wart photographed most of the take-off scenes and wrote the 'script based almost exactly on what happens.' Jonah Jones did the entire film. Teddy Catford operated synchronized camera and photographed certain exterior shots. Julian Spiro was the unit manager, but addi'tionally directed quite a bit of the exterior material notably the fog scenes and landing. Smart McAllister cut the picture and sound, while Gordon Hales---laid a 'good many of the sound effects takes and worked like a black for the last ten days.' Ken Cameronmrecorded dialogue effects and music. Budge Cooper was the continuity girl. Edward 'Teddy' Carrick reconstructed sets and was responsible for the 'most ingenious model work.' Dotal Wright handled studio and practical arrangements. Leighton Lucas, who was in the RAF, specially composed and scored music for the film. The Army Film Unit, using its 'trick camera operated by its own staff" provided the German Anti Aircraft material, including the firing of the Bofors gun with crews in German helmets. There was also 12 feet of German newsreel material in reel 4. 'Dal' did the mixing. Mills Bros (Model Engineers) Ltd supplied the model trains and accessories so effectively blown up at Freihausen. CFU also donated s to the Royal Air Force Central Band which had recorded the Leighton Lucas music (tide, incidental and end) for the soundtrack at Warner Bros' Teddington Studios on Friday I 1 July. One guinea (.~1. ls~Ding) was paid to the Sound Film Music Bureau to cover the nominal world rights license required for recording a snippet of 'Bless 'em All'. Without factoring in the studio overheads, the cost of the film was up to s [28].

Wart's story was, as he noted, 'utterly straightforward.' It opened with an Avro 652A Anson flying over Bomber Command Headquarters and dropping films by parachute from the day's reconaissance flights over German targets. After the photographs were processed, intelligence officers spotted the expansion of a major oil storage facility at Freihausen on the Rhine River. Although Bomber Command was to send its main force elsewhere, Air Marshall Pierce, from his operation's center, selected a Wellington squadron from RAF Millerton to hit the Freihausen target. The orders went down to the group through to the stations where the planning was completed, squadrons alerted, the aircraft readied and bombed-up. The crews, including pipe-smoking officers, were briefed by the Station Commander, Wing Commander, Intelligence Officer and Met Officer. After F-Freddie's crew was introduced, the crews left the briefing room,

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190 arc R. M. Short

FIG. 1. Denham Studio set recreating Bomber Command Operations Room at High Wycombe. Air Marshall Sir Richard Pierce, C-in-C of Bomber Command (sitting in the Wart's 'squeaky' chair) with his deputy, Senior Air Staff Officer Air Vice Marshall Sir Robert Saundby, reviewing inteJl/gence reports. Note the wall-sized squadron disposition chalkboard on the right which multiplied the actual number of bomber squadrons to mislead the enemy as to the RAF's actual strength. #91162 Reproduction of publicity still

by BFI Stills, Posters and Designs.

donned their flying gear and were trucked out to their respective aircraft. One by one the heavily ladened aircraft took off into the gathering dusk, turned out over the North Sea and fixed their respective courses to target. After covering the several hundred miles to target, F-Freddie broke through high cloud and the crew spotted the marking fires set by the first aircraft of the attacking force. F-Freddie was taken into a glide by its skipper and its bombs were dropped, the last one hitting dead center. The film's perspective, until now British, was radically altered as audiences saw the German anti-aircraft gunners fixing at the attacking bombers and the British bombs hitting and destroying the oil dump and railroad sidings. As F-Freddie pulled up from the attack it was hit by enemy ground fire, wounclln~ the wireless operator and damaging the Wellington's port engine. F-Freddie struggled home in the darkness, with cut-backs to the anxiously waiting station personnel. Finally the British coastline was spotted through the 'dirty yellow stinking fog' coveting the landscape. The skipper gave his crew the choice of a landing or bailing out; they chose to take their chances with a landing on the fog-shrouded aerodrome. The last of the squadron to arrive, F-Freddie's crew was de-briefed after landing and the intelligence officers, after another long night, headed for the mess and bacon and eggs. Watt ended the film with a reprise of the German target being blown to smithereens [29].

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ReqF Bomber Command's 'Target for Tonight" (1941) 191

FIG. 2. Air Marshall Sir Richard Pierce, C-in-C of Bomber Command (left), and Air Vice Marshall Sir Robert Saundby select the target for tonight on Denham Studio set. #129796 Reproduction of publicity

still by BFI Stills, Posters and Designs.

Based on the film, Watt seemed to have found nothing in the Operation Record Books [ORB] and intelligence reports (appendices to the ORBs) which would have increased the film's dramatic intensity. On the other hand, he may have made a conscious decision to ignore any highly dramatic and heroic moments he found in his reading of the ORBs, choosing rather to stress the routine business-like activity of a nightly life and death situation of Bomber Command's raiders. Watt had an outstanding ear for reproducing the idiomatic language of ground crew and aircrew, of officers and ranks. His use of coUoquial speech, such as 'Bob's your uncle,' laced with occasional mild swearing, such as 'Good Lord, ' 'Hell's bells,' rested easily on the tongues of his amateur actors. The common epithet 'bloody' was absent, doubdess since it was not allowed by the British Board of Film Censors. The script's humor was obvious, as was Watt's recreation of common occurrences, such as members of the ground crew betting a 'tanner' or six pence with one another on the target for that night. There was also F-Freddies' co-pilot in a flap over the whereabouts of his fl~ng helmet ( 'Oh my God, where's my helmeL~ Where the Devil's my helmet?'), while another flyer shouted at the 'cluck' who stole his flying boots and gets them thrown in his face. Evidence of Wart's dry understated humor emerged as the rear gunner alerted his skipper at the beginning of the attack to searchlights and flak to starboard. Dickson replied: 'My God, so there is, the natives appear hostile!'

The film's realism was predicated on the filming of normal activity at Mildenhall; aircraft taking off and landing, taxing and finally being serviced and armed. The aerodrome's ground and air crew went about doing their jobs before Wart's camera,

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192 K~ R. M. Short

FIG. 3. Operation briefing with Station Commander Group Captain F.J. Fogerty addressing crews; ~r Commander 'Speedy' Powell stands at left, arms akimbo; the Intelligence Officer S/L "Wilson' is seated at the rear. #91161 Reproduction of publicity still by BFI Stills, Posters and

Designs.

officers and airmen doing their jobs on the director's cue. One armorer swapped out the 0.303 gun barrels in F-Freddie's rear turret, while another at the bomb dump wrote down the squadron's bomb-load requirements, using an un-armed 500 pound bomb (suspended on a lift) for a desk. Watt sought out powerful images and saw the possibility of creating others; that of the 'bomb-desk' may, in fact, have been contrived. The only casualty suffered by Dickson's crew was the wireless operator who suffered a leg wound. Macpherson casually volunteered that shock was the reason that the injured man felt cold and that he himself had suffered the same when he fell off his bike. Waiting for F-Freddies" return, the Station Commander (Group Captain) and the Wing Commander go out into the fog straining to hear the engines of the approaching aircraft. When an Aircraftman bursts out a door singing 'Bless 'era all,' the Wing Commander shouts 'Shut up you bog-rat[ Stand still!' Arguably realistic. Watt and editor McAllister did an exceptional job in blending the documentary footage with the soundstage footage, particularly in and out of the Wellington bomber. The only obvious lapse in the film's reality comes as it changes perspective to that of the Germans on the ground and the destruction of the target itself, although the model work was well done [30].

Associated British Film Distributors (ABFD) was offered the film at the so-called Standard Contract (30% for MoI and 70% for distributor) for three years from 1 July 1941. On 11 June a copy of the script was sent to Ben Henry of ABFD; the title had

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RAF Bomber Command's "Target for Tonight" (1941) 193

FIG. 4. Pilot Ot]icer 'Wollatt' the co-pilot, in control of 'F=Freddie', returning from the mission. #I 18704 Reproduction of publicity still by BFI Stills, Posters and Designs.

been changed from 'A Target is Bombed ' to 'Bomber Command. ' Five days later the title was 'Night Bomber, ' but by the end of June it was back to 'Bomber Command ' [31].

Target for Tonight p r e m i e r e s

On 9 July Jack Beddington, head of MoI Films Division struck an agreement with W/C Williams that the film's title should be either `Target for To-night ' or 'Target for Tonight ' . Finally on 16 July the title was firmed up and Jack Griggs of MoI Films Division notified Horace Williams, ABFD's Publicity Manager, that it would be 'Target for Tonight-- three words,' although the hyphen in 'to-night' usually will be re-added by film reviewers. On 22 July the MoI sold the first British serial fights to the script to the Daily Express for a 'quite short feature and no more than 250 words of dialogue.' No sum was given. The newspaper ran the series, according to Watt, as `The greatest Story of the War, ' which was subsequently published as a booklet, reproduced here in microfiche [32]. Another aspect of the Air Ministry's Public Relations Directorate publicizing of Bomber Command was the publication of a book entitled Bomber Command: the Air Ministry account of Bomber Command's offensive against the Axis, September I939-ffuly, 1941 ff tMSO, 1941, 128 pp.) 'Issued for the Air Ministry by the Ministry of Information' at 1 shilling and six pence. This heavily illustrated book's text and photographs stressed the 'growing mastery' and 'growing might (caption for photograph of US-built 13-17 Fortress I) ' of the RAF [33].

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194 K~ R. M. Short

On Thursday 24 July the RAF Film Projection Unit flew to RAF Mildenhall to present Target for Tonight to the station personnel prior to the London premiere. Three shows were given at the local cinema at 1100, 1400 and 1530 hours. The airmen were paraded for each show and all houses were full. The station's close connection with the picture promised a highly critical audience, but Target for Tonight reportedly was received with enthusiasm. The following Tuesday (29 July) it was screened at Air Nlinistry's Air Council Room for senior officers and members of Air Staff unable to attend the premi6re (along with a 'Russian film,' probably the latest Soviet newsreel). Two shows were given at Fighter Command Headquarters (31 July) with audiences which included the Commander in Chief and all officers free to attend: 'All applauded vigorously at the end of each performance. ' Two shows were done for staff officers at Bomber Command H Q - - m a n y seeing it for second time (1 August), followed by f o u r shows the next evening for non-commissioned officers and ranks in the Village Hall, Maphill. On the 5th of August, the Whitehall Recreation Club for Civil Servants was the venue for a show of Target for Tonight and a film on the Polish units of the RAF, lYVhite Eagle. After that Target for Tonight went to Wyton, Polebrook, Oakington, and other stations, with shows every night for RAF station personnel. Significantly, Target for Tonight was an enormous hit in the RAF itself [34].

I t had also been arranged on 24 July to send a copy of the film to Chequers, the Prime Minister's official residence in Buckinghamshire, for screening over the weekend. Included was a copy of the latest Russian newsreels, apparently the same shown at the Air Ministry. Sending the films via l o r d Beaverbrook, Bernstein suggested "that Target for Tonight would make a big difference after Marlene Dietrich,' doubtless referring to Dietrich's Seven Sinners (Universal, 1940) which had been the first film to be shown at Chequers back on May 14th [35]. Churchill 's guests that weekend included two personal representatives of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins and Averell Harriman, along with journalist Quentin Reynolds, narrator of London Can Take I t and Christmas under Fire. Reynolds recalled [36]:

Churchill led us upstairs to a motion picture projection room where Mary [Churchill Soames] and her mother [Clemmie Churchill] were already waiting. The film we saw was Target for Tonight. Enveloped in his cloud of cigar smoke, Churchill was as tense as any movie fan when things looked bad for the bomber that was over Germany. He chuckled when its bombs hit their target.

Churchill 's reaction had been quite different to Orson WeUes' Citizen/Cane, which he had seen on 20 July at Ditchley. Reportedly, he was so bored that he walked out before the end. The prime minister's decision, however, may have reflected his respect for the newspaper baron William Randolph Hearst, on which the film was loosely based and with whom Churchill had enjoyed good relations, personal and financial. On 31 July, l o r d Beaverbrook wrote to Bernstein in appreciation saying thank you for 'those excellent films you sent me. I am most grateful. Target for Tonight is a picture which must move and interest audiences not only in this country but wherever it is shown. I t gives an impression of the courage and determination of the bomber crews which can never be effaced.' He concluded ' In my view, the Americans will be fascinated by it ' [37].

The Press Show at the Cambridge Theatre set up by the MoI came close to disaster because it was scheduled after one of the Hollywood studios was showing its most recent release and offering flee drinks, the latter particularly hard to come by in

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RAF Bomber Command's "Target for Tonight' (1941) 195

wartime. Thus, Watt, his crew, a 'couple of Ministry chaps, and an elderly usherette' found themselves alone in the theatre at 12.30, the time set for the screening. Ten minutes later the 'rather flushed' critics began to arrive and after stalling as long as possible, Watt rolled the film. Daily Express editor Arthur Christiansen (described by Watt as his 'friend and mentor ') arrived late, but asked to have the film run ~ o m the beTnnlng and everyone stayed to see it again. What Watt had thought to be 'an understated and unemotional account of an average air raid...honest and well made ' turned out to be, perhaps not a 'cinematic revolution,' but a film which attracted unexpected critical acclaim and tremendous audience popularity [38].

The next morning The Times announced: 'Here the British cinema shows itself aware of the demands of the people in this country and of our friends in America and other parts of the world for a film which give the war from our side.' The review praised Target for Tonight for lacking 'the flourishes and rhetoric of propaganda, ' while recording how the RAF's Bomber Command was fighting its part of the war. Impressed by the film's following of the experts themselves planning the raid, the reviewer stressed that, although their manner was casual, their professionalism was 'a healthy corrective to the idea that raids are just a matter of sending off a number of aeroplanes with vague orders to bomb Germany. ' The strength of the film, which by implication demonstrated the spirit which guided the men of Bomber Command, was in its 'incidenuds'---'the markings on the blackboard' and "unexpected comment from the crew." Finally, although other films had "flung bits and pieces of our work in the air and on sea and land vividly on the screen, here is a record set down in something more than cinematic shorthand, and an inspiring record it is.' Graham Greene was equally taken with the film, 'the most notable success of the year. ' For Greene, the film presented a dreadful world, which a few years previously would have seemed as 'fantastic to us as [Walt] Disney's enormous whales and fantasy sharks.' Contrasting Target for Tonight to the 'almost aesthetic blasphemy' of Disney's new animated film Fantasia, Greene stressed that the men from the station commander down to the lowest aircraftsman had carried out 'their difficult and dangerous job in daily routine like shop or office workers." He continued: 'Everything is natural, there is none of the bombastic language, the bragging, and the threats that characterize the German film Baptism of Fire. What we see is no more than a technical exercise...' [39]. William Whitebait (writing in the New Statesman) had complained earlier that no British film director appeared capable of answering Baptism of Fire. Well , ' Whitebait continued, 'Harry Watt 's film is an answer. I t has come pat on time, and should do us a world of good in America and the neutral countries.' Whitebait also took the opportunity to complain of the orders being given in ' the upper-class accents which seem horribly catching in the RAF' [40].

Greene claimed that the film had had an enormous success, but then, reflecting current Air Min~try propaganda, he concluded that 'its release has coincided with the notable change in the air war, with our growing supremacy extending day and night further and further across the Channel. ' In fact this was a carefully contrived Air Ministry illusion. In early 1941 a BBC broadcast, based on an Air Ministry release, claimed that the Skoda munitions works at Pilsen had been heavily bombed; Czech agents, however, confirmed that on the night of the raid, the nearest RAF bombs had fallen over fifty miles from the city. A study based on camera recordings of bomb releases over targets indicated that over the Ruhr only ten per cent of the R A P s bombers were within five miles of the aiming point [41].

Target for Tonight's premiere on 24 July at the Empire Theatre, Leicester Square h a d been arranged for the Royal Family, the Air Council and Air Ministry, although on the

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196 K. 17. M. Short

night the Royal Family was represented soley by the King's youngest brother, Air Commodore, the Duke of Kent. Targ~for Tonight began its West End run the next day as the second feature behind Mickey Rooney's Andy Hardy's t'n'~a~ Seo~tary (MGM). This was the theatre where The Lion has l~ngs: an epic of d~ Royal Air Forcs had its premi&-e almost two years before. Craumont British also screened the film at a second of its West End theatres, Craumont's Haymarket Theatre [42]. One of the interesting side effects of the film, wrote Watt, was that a comedian had only to look at a pretty chorus-girl and say ~rarget for Tonight ' to get howl of laughter and round of applause. An insecticide manufacturer also printed a picture of an enormous bed-bug and printed ~rarget for Tonight ' beneath it [43].

Target for Tonight goes to A m e r i c a

I.zrd Beaverbrook's suggestion that the Americans would be 'fascinated' by the film reflected the Air/V~listry/IViinistty of Inforn~tion strategy of using the film to influence American public opinion. Looking eastwards, a new ally had joined Britain as the result of Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union at the end of June 1941 and the recently arrived Soviet War (Purchasing) Commission in London already had requested a print of Target for Tonight which had been forwarded to Moscow. On 3 August Minister of Information Brenden Bracken ordered that a copy of Target for Tonight be flown to New York and another to Moscow, as a present from the MoI respectively to President Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Sralln. The MoI proceeded to give Sidney Bemstein the responsibility of selling Watt's understated Target for Tonight to a major American distributor. With Britain's two leading producers, Alexander Korda and Herbert Wilcox, already in Hollywood, Bemstein was an obvious choice. A major British theatre chain owner (Granada Theatres L~d), he personnUy knew Hollywood producers like Walter Wanger, Jesse Lasky, David Selznick, Darryl F. Zanuck and studio owners Jack and Harry Warner. Bernstein, who had accepted the post of Government Films Advisor in July 1940 at the invitation of the then Minister of Information Duff Cooper, also had the experience of having been involved in two of Harry Wart's recent short MoI propaganda films, London Can Take It (GPO, 1940) and Chr/stmas under F/re (CFU, 1941), both of which had been successfully distributed by Warner Bros [44].

Fortunately, Bernstein did not have to worry about gaining an exhibition certificate from Hollywood's Production Code Administration; the climate had dramatically changed since Alexander Korda had taken The Lion Has Wings: an epic of the Royal Air Forc~ to America two years before. At that time, Frances S. Harmon, Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) President Will H. Hays' executive assistant, regretted that the film had been presented to them 'because we fear, as an avowedly propaganda picture, bearing our Seal of Approval, we are establishing a precedent, which may arise to give us serious difficulty later on' Korda had to accept a foreword which noted that the film was made with the full cooperation of the Royal Air Force and that: 'The management of this theater trust that after seeing this film its patrons will be better able to contrast life in neutral America with life in the belligerent countries of Europe' [45].

By mid-summer 1941 one can discern a hardening MPPDA policy on Ministry of Information-produced propaganda films, as well as Hollywood films starring the RAF. Will Hays issued a press statement on 20 July noting the growth of 'informational,

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RAF Bomber Command's 'Target for Tonight" (1941) 197

educational and inspirational dements in pictures.' Seeking to deflect claims against Hollywood war-mongering by the outspoken isolationist lobby, Hays confirmed that the motion picture industry's responsibility in the 'present emergency' was to provide 'entertainment and recreation' which 'might be likened to machine tools necessary to bring human machinery to the height of its efficiency.' There was, he stressed, no place for film propaganda or backing any cause, 'however sincere.' The Production Code would hold the line [46].

Despite such public disclaimers, the MPPDA, under pressure by key industry leaders, had already chosen to support the British cause by continuing to grant PCA certification and distribute pro-British films produced by the Ministry of Information, such as Christmas under Fire which was nominated for an Academy Award in 1941's new category, Documentary. The implicit justification was that these were not propaganda films, but informational. The fact that the source of production was clearly acknowledged meant that audiences knew the source of the information or propaganda and thus could not be misled. Even more important, Warner Bros, Twentieth Century-Fox, Universal and United Artists, respectively led Harry and Jack Warner, Darryl F. Zanuck, Walter Wanger and Alexander Korda prepared to exploit the European war, while more or less supporting the British cause. Although Korda's That Hamilton IFoman CUA, 1941) would use the historical analogy of the Royal Navy's defense of the realm in the Napoleonic wars, the RAF's new Spitfires flown by American volunteers were Hollywood's new chosen heros. The tremendous box office appeal of the great World War I air sagas like I]~/ngs (Paramount, 1927), already had been successfully exploited by Warner Bros. with its own re-make of The Dawn Patrol (1930) in 1938. A war in the skies over a new Western Front would be fought with new aircraft, but the enemy was learing Hun of old.

One of London's shrewdest propaganda moves had been to form those 'Yanks,' who had gone to England to fly for the RAF, into the [American] Eagle Squadrons of RAF Fighter Command. Hollywood, not unexpectedly, grasped eagerly at the story and produced, with MoI and RAF support, A Yank in the RAF (Twentieth Century-Fox, 1941) written by Darryl Zanuck as Melville Crossman and Walter Wanger's Eagle Squadron (Universal, 1942)--on which Harry Watt briefly worked after the completion of Target for Tonightmled the way. The third "Yank in the RAF' film, International Squadron (Warner Bros, 1941), an updated re-make of Ceiling Zero (Warner Bros, 1935), was not listed by PR-1 as having had official British support, however it served the same purpose. Equally important for the British cause was the unqualified support now emerging from the magaT/rms of Heury Luce's Time Inc. and its New York-based film monthly The March of Time, particularly in its Britain's RAF [47].

Bemstein (carrying a projection print of Target for Tonight and probably a lavender for duplication) flew out of Prestwick, Scotland on 18 August 1941 seated in the bomb bay of an American-built RAF Liberator (I3-24) bomber for Gander, Newfoundland. He flew on to Washington, DC to confer with the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, and continuing on to New York. There he set up a luncheon meeting with the editors of the five American newsreel companies, gave a talk on wartime documentaries at the March of Time school of journalism and screened Target for Tonight for a group of the New York-hased motion picture studio heads. The New York executives reportedly were unimpressed. The reasons were much more complicated than Caroline Moorehead's suggestion that 'this bald tale of bombers, mumbled incomprehensibly in British voices, had nothing of the immediate appeal of London Can Tal~ It.' As a film of ten minutes London Can Take It was readily accommodated into a movie theater

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198 /C R. M. Short

prograra. Target for Tonight was fifty minutes long and was not long enough to run as a feature in its own right. I t was, therefore, condemned to run as a short second feature. Even with an additional twenty minutes in length, the MoI film could not have been expected to succeed at the American box office, lacking the essential appeal of Hollywood stars. Korda's team had consciously produced The Lion Has Wings as a seventy-five minute film, with the best international stars Britain could offer, to fill feature-film slots in theater programs. Wart's film had grown without any documented discussion as to how it would fit into commercial exhibition in the United States, much less Great Britain. On the other hand, Korda 's long standing dism"oution contract with United Artists had assured his film, at the very least, of limited distribution in the United States and Canada. Another concern of an eastern film industry executive would have been that Target for Tonight would replace one of the films that his studio had already in production, thus losing money. Finally, should his studio chose to distribute the MoI film, there was still the public opinion risk of his studio being accused of war-mongering by the articulate isolationist lobby [48].

Failing to arouse Sufficient enthusiasm from the distribution and exhibition end of the industry, Bernstein moved on the Hollywood where he counted on getting Jack and Harry Warner to distribute the film, as they had earlier done with London Can Take It. Warner Bros had already made a significant contribution to Target for Tonight providing facilities at their British Teddington Studios for recording the soundtrack. After the film was screened for the studio's department heads (also reportedly unimpressed), senior producer Hal B. Wallis, recommended that the soundtrack be redubbed for an American audience. Much of the success of London Can Take It for the American market had been attributed to the narration by Quenun Reynolds [49].

There was another very good reason why Bernstein had been counting on Harry and Jack Warner. One strong indication of their pro-British or, at the very least, anti-Nazi convictions, was that they had paid for the cost of distribution of London Can Take It, while turning over its gross receipts, $25,000 or s to the RAF Spitfire Fund. Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Aircraft Production cabled the Warners [50]:

The noble generosity of which you make us the beneficiaries fills me with gratitude. I know that in sending you my thanks I speak for all our people. The sympathy and understanding that is given to us by the American nation is a powerful influence in sustaining this fortress of freedom. And now, by your gift, you add the strength of a new American aircraft to the defences of our homes, our children, and the cause whose triumph all good men desire.

The Times of 17 September carried the MoI announcement that Warner Brothers Pictures Inc. had agreed to distribute Target for Tonight in the United States, Canada and Latin America. The MoI estimated that it would be shown in more than 12,500 cinemas [51]. At the end of 1941, PR- I ' s (Annual Progress Report, 1941) reported outstanding success for the film in North and South America. Within a week of being shown in New York during October, Target for Tonight had 2000 bookings by leading American circuits and the commercial distributors; the expectation was that some 12,000 bookings would be reached during the next three months [52]. The Hollywood trade journal Vat/cry previewed the film on 9 October in New York. Touting it as one of the 'must-see films of 1941' and ' the most realistic picture to come out of the current European war, ' the Var~ty reviewer proclaimed it as 'propaganda at its peak, a forthright documentary of RAF bombing activities...' The 'carry-on and casual spirit' was not overdone, but k was hard to believe that all of the cast actually were RAF

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RAF Bomber Gomraand's "Target for Tonight" (1941) 199

personnel 'because it's not reasonable to believe so many excellent actors got into this branch of the service' [53]. The HdlywoodReporter (14 October 1941) called it: ,One of

t h e most absorbing and spellbinding documentary pictures from the present war. ' Bemstein and Warner Bros had little to worry about in getting the film a Production Code Certificate. The only cuts demanded by the PCA were four uses of profanity: 'Hell of a party, ' 'By God, so it is,' ' I ' m damned glad to see it' and 'Hell of a great big fire' [541.

Bosley Crowther, senior film critic at The New York Times, reviewed Target for Tonight, then opening its first run at the Globe Theater on 17 October. While lauding London Can Take It and Christmas under Fire for conveying in 'graphic details a sense of the courage and strength of the British under fire,' Crowther was convinced that no film about the war to date could surpass nor equal Target for Tonight. Wart's 'fine and intelligent restraint,' as well as his simplicity, directness, and photographic artistry had produced both a 'brilliant motion picture and a splendid tribute to a wonderful bunch of men. ' The great strength of the film lay in what Crowther described as its "remarkable human detail'. Picking out one scene to demonstrate Wart's economy and ability to convey suspense and 'lurking fate, ' Crowther told his readers of the aircrews leaving the briefing room like 'prep school boys to play a game'; Watt held the scene until the room was empty. ' In that brief moment you feel the lurking fate which these young men have gone to face and a sense of their great but casual courage rushes over you. ' It was an exceptional film that even 'rushed' over Crowther, better known for sinking films; in this case, by his own admission, his pulse quickened and his heart was cheered [55].

Target for Tonight was successfully shown in the United States and throughout the British Commonwealth and Empire. A print was even sent to the Leeward Islands, but was lost by enemy action (apparently the ship was sunk). The American version of Target for Tonight won not an Oscar from Hollywood's Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences in 1941 as often cited, but a Special Award Certificate. The award was given 'To the British Ministry of Information for its vivid and dramatic presentation of the heroism of the RAF in the documentary film Target for Tonight.' Watt (who never saw the award) and the MoI were in good company for other Special Awards were given that year to Walt Disney and Leopold Stokowski for Disney's animated classical music-based Fantasia. This was the first year for an Oscar to be awarded in the new category of Documentary; somewhat ironically, its first Oscar winner was Churchill's Island, produced by John Grierson's Canadian Film Board [56]. Famed Hollywood evangelist Aimee Semple MacPherson, reportedly ran Target for Tonight during one of her meetings and then preached on the theme 'Jesus is our "Target for Ton igh t " ' [57]. Even without an Oscar, Target for Tonight was shown in over 9000 theaters to an audience of fifty million people in the United States alone. The film's final cost, including overheads, was s reportedly earning over s for t h e Treasury [58].

The film's usefulness did not end in 1941--42. In February 1945 a draft was prepared for a new forward for a French version of Target for Tonight to be shown in liberated France and a lip-synchronized version was released in Italy. Finally in early 1946 a copy was preserved by the Air Ministry for screening at the Staff College and as a permanent historical record. The importance of Target for Tonight as a historical document had been anticipated by British film critic C.A. Lejeune. Awed by the train of thought which 'that fine documentary film of the Bomber Command ' precipitated, she recognized Target for Tonight as new style history. I t was a film of fact, grim and laconic with real

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200 /C R. M. Short

men as actors. 'Our great-grandchildren,' she said, 'will be able to learn just how our airmen looked and talked and behaved in the battles of 1941: Such a document presented the study of history first-hand with a 'Liveliness hardly gained by a generation that learnt its facts from [J.R.] Green.' Certain, that first-hand observation would change 'some of our own ideas,' Lejeune regreted that she could not hear 'the still-circling impulses of Cromwell's shells, or the footfalls of Hannibal's battle elephants...and Hider painting a house.' Lejeune was right about the importance of this film's preservation [59]. Elizabeth Sussex, writing in 1977, suggested that Target for Tonight was 'not a film that stands up too well to the passage of time' but it was 'a landmark as the first of the feature length documentaries made during the war' [60].

Target for Tonight must be judged, however, in its own right and in its own time; applying those criteria, Target for Tonight was a fine piece of moviemaking by a very talented filmrnaker. It was also Harry Wart's swan song as a government documentary director. What Watt achieved in 1941 figuratively blew away audiences and critics alike with the realism of his camerawork and his unmatched skill in leading nonprofessional actors to authentic performances, immeasurably enhanced by the skilled cutting of Stewart McAILister. And yet the film was still largely artifice; Target for Tonight was not the real thing, including the compression of an eighteen-hour period into forty-eight to fifty minutes. It was still Lights, camera, action in a cut-open Wellington fuselage on a sound-stage at Denham Studios. Dflys Powell called Target for Tonight 'semi-fictional documentary;' it was 'a fact, a fragment of actual fife which still held the emotional t remor of fiction' [61].

The only way to surpass Wart's very considerable achievement was to film in the air attacking the enemy on real operations. Tha t was the challenge that former Hollywood director Lt. Col. William Wyler and his USAAF camera crews accepted in 1943--44, creating the ultimate statement of air war realism. Unhampered by night-operations, Wyler's answer was The M~mphis Bdle, the film record of an Eighth Air Force B-17 Flying Fortress on its final daylight missions over Europe before heading back to the United States. The flak was real; no trick cameras. These were real crews figh6ng real guns; there was no acting, just surviving or dying and it was all in color [62].

The authors of Tlte Factual Film claimed in 1947 that the release of Target for Tonight marked the beginning of a significant new genre, documentary features. Cavalcanti and Watt carried documentary methods into feature film production at Ealing Studios with such films as The ForemanFFem to France (1942) and Nine Men (1944). Other studios produced semi-fictional documentaries, including One of Our Aircraft is Missing (1942, British National), In Which We Serve (1943, Two Cities) and Millions Like Us (1943, Gaumont British). The Crown Film Unit continued its pioneering work with Coaetal Command (1942) and llTestern Approac~s (1944), while the Army and Air Force film units made their own important feature-length documentary contributions to portraying the global war. It was Harry Watt and Target for Tonight that, according to The Factual Film, first had graphically demonstrated the relevance of documentary methods for reproducing on the screen ' the realism which war themes. . .demanded' [63].

Aclmowledgemenm

I wish to acknowledge the permission kindly granted to me by the Controller of Stationery Office to reproduce the continuity, shooting script and footage and the dialogue for Target for Tonight and extracts from documents in the Public Record

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R A F Bomber Command's 'Target for Tonight' (1941) 201

Office. The publicity photographs from Target for Tonight are reproduced by the British Fi lm Insti tute Stills Posters and Designs; permission to reproduce the publicity photographs are by Controller of I-LM Stationery Office. The Paul Holt 's

'book-of-the-film, ' Target for To-night, is reproduced courtesy of Hutch inson & Co. Ltd. I also wish to thank my son Donald W. Short II for his selection of publicity photographs along with documentary research at the Public Record Office, the British Fi lm Insti tute and National Fi lm Archive. I cont inue to be indebted to Roger Smither and Brad King of the Imperial War M u s e u m who unfailingly respond to queries

compounded by my being five thousand miles from my sources. Finally, Rosemary C. Hanes, Reference Librarian at the Mot ion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division of the Library of Congress provided the information relative to the American

release of Target for Tonight.

Correspondence: K.R.M. Short, School of Communica t ion , University of Houston,

Houston , Texas, 77204, USA. Fax 713.743.2876; email krmshort@uh.edu

N O T E S

[1] The Directorate of Public Relations (PR) was formed in March 1940, taking over the control of the Press and Publicity Branch, A.I.4 and A.I.6(b). By November the Service Press Officers were converted into Public Relations Officers and year later the directorate had 210 employees, service and civilian. The directorate had four branches, PR-1 to PR-4. See Public Record Office, Kew (PRO), AIR (Air Ministry) 2/6354.

[2] INF (Ministry of Information) 1/210, F256/104, 7 June 1941. The working title of The/~ot/s Safe was 'Air Sea Rescue,' while those of Target for Tonight were 'Night Bomber' and 'Bomber Command.' Other documentary films featuring the RAF released in 1941 were Airwoman (GB Screen Services), Bri~in's RAF (The March of T/me), Raising Air Fighters (British Paramount News), Venture Advenvare (CFU), and Royal Observer Corps (Spectator), The Oramer Goes Aloft (Spectator). Other national units fighting with the RAF were featured in Polish Bomber's Holiday (Polish Film Unit) and New Zealand Has W'mgs (New Zealand National Film Unit). Additionally there were two films produced by the Colonial Film Unit for African audiences, The Royal Air Force and RAF Commentary. Several of the films were also distributed overseas. A film entitled 'Advance in the Desert' was scheduled for release on 30 June. Other films, including War Front (Strand) included air war stories; films about Air Raid Protection have not been included above. For production details and a brief description of the cited films see Frances Thorpe and Nicholas Pronay, British ~ Films in the Second World l~'ar. A descript/ve catalogue (Oxford, Clio Press, 1980). A useful summary of documentary films during the war is found in The Arts Enquiry, The Factua/Fffm. A survey (London, Oxford University Press, 1947), Chapter 8.

[3] AIR 2/6354; AIR 2/7430. [4] Writer and director Raymond Egerton Harry Watt, 'a lifelong Soclafist,' was born on 18 October

1906. The son of a colorful former Liberal MP, he later attended Edinburgh University, but left without a degree. During the 1930s he worked at the Empire Marketing Board's film unit, under the tutelage of pioneer documentary film makers John Grierson and Robert Flaherty. At the GPO Film Unit (later the Crown Film Unit), he worked with the gifted director and producer Alberto Cavalcanfi, along with Basil Wright, Smart Legg and Humphrey Jennings. Amongst Wart's best known documentary productions were Night Mail, London Can Take It and Target for Tonight. His 1937 production of The Saving of Bill Blean're for the Post Orifice broke new ground by using nonprofessional actors in fictional characters in a story based on fact, a style he repeated in Target for Tonight. Moving to Ealing Studios in 1943, his subsequent commercial feature films were mostly set in Africa (Nine Men, Where No Vuh~tes Fly, West of Zanzibar) and Australia (The Overlande~, Eureka Seock~te, The Siege of P/nchgut). During the 1950s he produced for Granada Television and appeared as the commentator in the Zoo T/me series. In 1974 he published an 'irreverent memoir' of his documentary period entitled Don't Look at the Camera (London, Elek,

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202 K: R. M. Shor t

1974). He gave innumerable interviews, one of which is incorporated in EliT=beth Sussex, The R/se and Fa~ of British Documogary (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973). He died on 2 April 1987. Appreciative obituaries appeared in The T/m~ (7 April 1987, p. 16), Daily Tdegraph (13 April 1987, p. 16), Indepou/og (14 April 1987; by Edgar Austey), The Scotsman (13 April 1987, p. 7; by Forsyth Hardy) and Var/ety (8 April 1987, p. 94). I am grateful to John Riley of the British Film Institute Library Services for providing me with copies of these and other obituaries of Wart. A list of his credits is provided in Ephraim Katz, The F//m Eno, doped/a (New York, Harper Perennial, 2rid edn, I994, p. 1435).

[5] Watt, p. 129. For the Air Ministry's early propaganda policy see ICR.M. Short, 'Screening the Propaganda of British Air Power:. From RAF (1935) to The Lkm has Wings: an epic of the Royal A/r Force (1939)' (Trowbridge, St~_~_'_~_s in War and F//m, Flicks Books 1997, in press).

[6] //n~/., pp. 130-134. Watt claims teat a 'facetious and truncated version of the film was shown in America as F/ying F_2epha~. The favorite scene referred to by Watt was of the two miners on the moors with their whippets chasing and killing hares, paralleled by watching the fighters chase and shoot down the German bombers. The Forth Bridge provided an extraordinary backdrop for the balloon barrage; the rail bridge was world-famous, in part, due to its prominent role in Alfred Hitchcock's The Th/rry-nine Steps (Gaumont-British, 1935). For the Forth Balloon Barrage see AIR 131109, AIR 13165. Balloon barrages continue to play an important role in air defense through to the end of the war when they were credited with the desu'uction of V-I flying bombs.

[7] fan Dalrymple, 'The Crown Film Unit, 1940--43' in Nicholas Pronay and Derek Spring, Propas Po_~__@2s and Film, 1918-1945 (London, 1992, pp. 209-220). Ian Murray Dalrymple (born 26 August 1903 in Johannesburg, South Africa, died 28 April 1989) was educated at Rugby and Trinity College, Cambridge. He entered the film industry as an editor in 1927, becoming supervising editor at Gainsborough Films and then head of the editing department at Gaumont-British under Michael Balcon until 1935, when he went to work for London Films. Dalrymple co-directed Storm in a Teacup (London Films, 1936) with producer Victor Saville, as well as ~ha,ing the screenplay credit. The choice of Dalrymple as GPO Film Unit executive producer, doubtiess had a great deal to do with the perceived success of The Lion Has l~'mgs. An Ep~ o f ~ RoyalA/r Force, released in 1939. Dalrymple left his post as Director of Production for the Crown Film Unit in 1943. See Short (1997) op. c/~., Chapter 6 and Sussex (1975), op. c~., passe.

[8] /b/d., pp. 134--142. Front Line is also cited as l~Ter-Front Line or Front Line-Dm~. A shortened version of London Can Take It (five minutes) was distributed in Britain as Britain Can Take It. A resentful Watt believed that Reynolds' had personally exploited London Can Take It by earning a great deal of money lecturing about it in America. Watt was pleased to learn fi~m this author that Reynolds, however, had donated his earnings to RAF charities. Unpublished interview with author, 6 June 1983. Watt inaccurately called War and Order (GPO, 1940, 12 min) Law and Order in his memoir (p. 145). The film's opening credits list Charles Hasse as director; with commentary by Lionel C~mlin; editor, Gordon Hales; camera, Eric Cross; sound, Ken Cameron; production and script are am'ibuted to Watt by Thorpe and Pronay (1980) op. ok., p. 66).

[9] Harry Watt provides another version of the making of Target for Tonight in Sussex, (1975) op. c/t., pp. 128--132. Sussex does not provide a date for the interviews. This author's later interview (1983) with Watt confirmed that his recollections were quite set and consistent with his published accounts. Sir Joseph Ball already had been replaced as Head of Films Division in December 1939 by Sir Kenneth Clark, who subsequently moved up to be Controller of Home Propaganda. Clark was succeeded in April 1940 by Jack Beddington, formerly Public Relations director for Shell Oil and a leading advocate and patron of the documentary film makers. Arthur Elton, de facw leader of the Grierson-less British documentary movement, was Films Division's Director of Production from January 1941.

[10] lb/d., 145f. Despite Watt's own admiration for fellow tipplers, he cbaeacterized W/C W'dliams as ine~cient, while 'saluting and bobbing and botTJ3m-kissing' the top brass from Bomber Command (Wart, 1974, op. c/:., p. 149).

[ 11] /b/d., pp. 152; Short,/oc. ok. Dairymple did not claim to have any major influence on the shaping of Target for Tonight,, see Sussex (1975) pp. 128f, where he refers to keeping 'muffled down as long as I thought things were going fine.' He does, however, list himself as responsible for the film's mixing.

[12] ~ 1/210, Bomber Command Film. This outline could have been associated with the note to John Betjeman from Fletcher 8 November 1940 ( D ~ 5/78) proposing a Bomber Command film.

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R,qF Bomber Gommand's "Target for Tonight" (1941) 2 0 3

[13] INF 5/78, Watt to Williams (noted here as PR-2), 12 November 1940. Using the Churchill quote on Bomber Command must have been tempting for a voice-over at the end of the film. Its rejection, as wall as the aircraft training sequence, was probably based on Watt 's not wanting to deflect the audience's focus from 'F-Freddie' and the operation itself.

[14] Watt (1974) op. c~., pp. 146t~ AIR 29/481, Operations Record Book (ORB) RAF No. 1 Film Production Unit; see Appendices A and B. The RAF Film Production Unit was set up on 17 July 1941; 'History of the Royal Air Force Film Production Unit ' (Spp.) held by Imperial War Museum Film and Video Archive. See also Keith Buckman, q 'he Royal Air Force Film Production Unit, 1941-45/ H':JFRT, 17(2) (1997), pp. 219-244, unpublished MA thesis, University of Westminster, London (1994). and Clive Coultass, Images for Ba~_ Bri~h film and the Second World War, 1939--1945 (London, 1989), pp. 57-60.

[15] ~ 5/78, 21 January 1941, Watt to Bernstein. [16] INF 5/78, 29 January 1941, Lawrence to Williams; also see the two page untitled and undated

historical summary of the development of the RAF and Bomber Command from 1917 to 1939. This document may have been written by Lawrence. Also see Watt to W'tlliams 7 February 1941 0 N F 5/78).

[17] INF 1/210; INF 5/78, 1 March 1941, Watt to Williams. 'Mildenton' was finally changed to 'Milletton' (Coultass inaccurately refers to 'Millington'), doubtless because the former name was considered to be too close to that of MildenhalL German Luftwaffe Staff Officers, led by Generals Milch, Stumpff, Udet and Wenninger, who had officially visited RAF Mildenhall in October 1937 (AIR 14/331) would probably have recognized the aerodrome and its massive hangers anyway. One gets the impression that RAF Mildenhall and No. 149 Squadron was somerhlng of a darling of the Air Ministry.

[18] The local farmers had mob'flized 'Flying Squad-type raids' against enforced sales of their goods by the Church. Watt also 'conned' some vicars and a deaf verger in filming this story. Watt was angered by the fact that Edgar Anstey, formerly at Shell, had gotten the job as the MoT's new permanent director for Europe. Richard de Rochmont, who wanted Watt to stay on, told him that Grierson, had warned him off. Grierson lied about the matter and Watt 's relationship with the 'little god' was never the same again (Watt, 1974, op. c/t., pp. 76f.).

[19] Watt (1974), op c/t., pp. 79-97. Grierson's refusal to give Watt directorial credit ( 'Produced by Basil Wright and Harry Watt ') for Night Mail also contributed to Wart's greatly increased sense of frustration (pp. 960.

[20] Watt (1974) op cir., pp. 83, 87ff, 92. Watt attributes his success with The Sam~ng ofB/n B/~g~tt to what Cavalcanti taught him about narrative filmmaking and the 'gentle art of faking' (pp. 104f.). Paul Swarm, T ~ Bt~tish Docuraentary Movoneng 1926-1946 (Cambridge, 1989, p. 163) uses the team 'social actors' for WaR's amateurs and suggested that it was a 'tenuous manner of linking story-documentary films and actual events.' Dai Vanghan, Portragt of an Ira~tible Man. The working life of St,~arr Mc.d~isr~r, FRm Editor (London, 1983, p. 24) considers Watt the 'father of that school of cin6ma v6rit6 which, eschewing reconstruction, elicits narrative and dramatic structures from spontaneously recorded footage.' Var~y (Wednesday, 15 October 1941). John Ware, The Lion Has W'mgs. The Epic of the Famous Karda FRm (London, 1940), p. 172. The RAF flyers were those in the documentary footage sequence returning from the Kiel Raid; the bomber aircrew in The L/on Has W'mgs were professional actors. The film's technical advisor, S/L HMS Wright appeared as a fighter pilot and at least one other unidentified operational flyer appeared in the film.

[21] INF 1/210. [22] INF 1/210, 13 March 1941, LB. W'flliams--[Arthur] Elton. The Tbnes (10 July 1941) reported

that the 'first consignment' of the order by the RAF (delivered in early May, but publicly anticipated since January) was not ready for operations until 9 July. The March of Time ('Vol. 7, No. 6) 'Uncle Sam--the non-belligerent' (British version--'America Speaks her Mind ' ) released in January 1941 claimed that 50 B-17s had already been delivered. For overly optimistic reports on the Fortress I and the attacks see The T/mea (10, 25, 26, 28 July 1941). After fifty-two sorties over Germany and northern France the aircraft were removed from Bomber Command's (No. 2 Group) Order of Battle. On its first daylight raid an American bomb-aimer could not come any closer to the target than three miles using the aircraft's Norden bombsight. Considered a failure as a high altitude day bomber, the RAF sent four of the surviving Fortresses to the Middle East and five to Coastal Command where their long range O,160 miles) made them ideal for North Atlantic reconnaissance. See A. Freeman, Fortress at War (Shcpperton, 1977, p. 120). Warner

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2 0 4 K: R. M . S h o r t

Bros-British released a film, approved by PR-I, in March 1942 called F/yhlf Fortmas. The RAF was also flying other American-built aircraft, including the two-engined Lockheed Hudson bomber, the Glenn Martin Maryland bomber, the Boston I, IT and IT[ (known in the fighter version as the Havoc), the Brewster Bt~ffalo Fleet fighter and the Vought-Sikorsky Chesapeake two-seat dive-bomber. The Flying Fortress in the B-17E configuration continued in RAF service in No. 214 (Federated Malay States) Squadron until the end of the war.

[23] S/L P. Percy Charles 'Pick' Pickard, later DSO, DFC (Serial Number [SR]. 39392) was the brother-in-law of Hollywood star Sir Cedrick Hardwicke. His Wellington-equipped No. 311 Sq~_dron had been formed in July 1940 from Czechoslovakian airmen that had been serving in France and flew their first operations in September 1940. Watt reported that Pickard wore the Czechoslovakia shoulder-flash after the Germans announced that they would shoot captured Czechoslovak airmen as spies. Pickard, by then a Group Captain and commanding No. 140 Wing of 2nd Tactical Air Force, was killed in action on 14 February 1944 piloting a Mosquito during the so-called Operation Jericho against Amiens Prison; his aircraft, ironically, was F-Freddie. See AleT~nder Hamilton's Wings of Night: the secret missions of Group Captain Charles Pickard, DSO and two bars, DFC (London, 1977). Officers who went to London for studio scenes, including their rank and serial numbers, were P/O W. Sooner (SR 82709), P/O P.F. Dingwall (SR 40688) F/O R. Bicknell (SR 40794), P/O N.S. Dunkerton (SR 87456), P/O J.R.L. Dunn (SR 86391) and P/O W.E.G. Wand (SR 84312). A search of the ORB of No. 149 squadron, as well as the Mildenhall Station ORBs, has failed to turn up any reference to the filming.

[24] 'Red Permits' (providing access to RAF Mildanha~) were issued for the Crown film crew on 10 April 1941 (INF 5/78). According to the Mildenhnll ORB (AIR 28/546), during Wart's autumn visit, the station commander was Group Captain A.F. James (SR 90894) and during the April filming it was Group Captain F.J. I~ogerty (SR 73679); the latter would have appeared in Target for Ton/ght. W/C J.A. Powell (SR 26122) (according to Watt 's physical description) was the No. 149 Squadron Commander. The Women's Al~rillary Air Force (W'AAF) had been formed in June 1939 with only five different trades open to recruitment. WAAFs were so successful at releasing men for more active duty that by the end of the war they performed more than seventy different jobs within the RAF, including Balloon Command, messes, RAF Home Communications, aircraft maintenance, and photographic work During the filming at Mildenhall (during which it got exceedingly hot), Watt was furious about being called up to London and hauled on the carpet by W/C W'dliams for entering the 'officers' mess at/vlfldenhall in open-necked shirts, without even a tie.' Watt provided a less angry version of the 'coat and tie' story to Sussex (1973) op. c/t., p. 130.

[25] Watt (1974) op. c~., pp. 148ff. Watt said that he brought his 'air-crew to London, ' which included the officers for the Crew Room scenes. Watt was under instructions not to 'pay them extra' but 'they naturally needed pocket money. ' S/I., Pickard was not listed as being in London with the other officers but he had to have been present for most of the Wellington sequences shot at Denhnm. There is no record of where or how the airmen were billeted in London for the filming of the aircraft's interior sequences. There were problems later (INF 6/335) justifying the hotel expenses (s ld) to the accountants, particularly those of the four officers who brought their wives along at MoI expense. Watt claimed (Sussex, 1973, op. c~., p. 130) that he waited three weeks for the Wellington fuselage. A reproduction of Edward Carrick's original design for the Bomber Command Operations Room is found in Sussex (1973, op. r p. 129. It has the authentic feeling for an underground site which is singularly lacking in the economy version which had to be used for the film.

[26] 'Gee' was developed at the Telecommunication Research Establishment by R.J. Dippy. Using three high-powered pulse-ttansmitters (a 'master ' and two 'slaves') sited 100 miles apart 'Gee' signals laid down a grid (G for grid) over western Europe, with a range of 300--400 miles from the tr~_n~mjtters providing accurate aircraft location within 2 miles over a range of 350 miles. Although not fully operational until March 1942, one of two Wellingtons of No. 115 Squadron aircraft carrying a prototype had been shot down over Hanover on the night of 13 August. Highly effective as a navigational device, particularly homeward bound, it continued to be used, although ,jammed by the Germans, until the end of the war. It would have been extraordinary if Watt 's Wellington had been 'Gee ' equipped.

[27] Vaughan (1983), op. dr., p. 80f. [28] INF 1/210, 7 September 1941, Dalrymple to Bernstein. Dalrymple provided this summary to

Bernstein on 7 September in response to an inaccurate Da//y Express blurb. The final cost figures are found in ~ 6/335 and INF 1/210. Watt provided the rough estimate of s per day to shoot at Denham and Ehtree.

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R A F Bomber Command's 'Target for Tonight" (1941.) 205

[29] The option of bailing out probably was only available while they were over the North Sea, since the chance of the bomber crashing into residential areas, such as nearby Ely, was h/gh. In addition to the bombing of the target, another place where Watt and McARister arguably lose touch with reality was when they have the attacking aircraft periodically diving back into the thick cloud banks which were part of the cloud formations shot for the flight to the target. The film's opening and dosing credits were superimposed on the stern view of a parked Wellington bomber, rec~lllng Dalrymple's use of a similar background image in the The L/on Has l~'mgs, in that instance, a Spitfire being readied for action.

[30] Watt (1974) op. c~., pp. 146--147. Watt would have been reading the Squadron ORB for the two Wellington squadrons stationed at Mildenhall, Iqo. 149 Squadron (AIR 27/1000) and lqo. 9 (AIR 27/125). These squadrons were part of lqo. 3 Group, not as in the films No. 33 Group; an obvious example of Wart's calculated ezaggeration (a doubling of the digit, in this case) of the size of Bomber Colvmand; see the introduction m the film where he warns the audience about misleading the enemy about RAF strength. During his first visit to Mildenhall in the autumn of 1940, Watt may have chcr, en to sit behind the squadron commander so that he could watch the faces of the aircrews. The winter weather was severe that December and bomber operations did not really begin again until the weather moderated in mid-January, when Hanover's U-boat component factories were heavily hit. Unfortunately, the question of why F-Freddie's mission was so hum-drum did not occur to the author until after the death of Harry Watt.

[3 I] INF 6/335. Watt recalled that 'F for Freddie' was also considered for the film title. Roger Manvell (F~m, London, 1950, rev. edn, p. I10) commenting on the success of Targstfor Tonight noted: 'Exhibitors paid this film the supreme compliment of critiching the distribution agreement between the Ministry and the Exhibitors Association.' The MoI (The Factua/Fdm, p. 76) had signed an agreement with the Kinematograph Renters' Society of which all the principal British disu'ibutors were members, l~dms Division screened for the Society any short or feature films considered commercial. Distribution was undertaken on a normal commercial basis by one of the dism'butors in ram, the order being decided by ballot. Ben Henry's Associated British Film Distributors, according to Basil Wright, was very much more sympathetic to British documentaries than other distributors, of which only Night Ma~ really made them money (Sussex) 1973, op. c/t., p. 97). Up to December 1943, forty-three British official films had been distributed according to this system.

[32] INF 1/210, 16 July 1941, Griggs to Williams. One precedent for such publ/cation had been set by Brl t~ Can Take IL The book of the film. A photographic recorde~ in aid of the kome~, Commentary by Quentin Reynolds, Introduction by Douglas Williams (London, 1941). A much more elaborate book had been published on The L/on Has IV'rags.

[33] There were similar Mol/Air Ministry publications on Fighter Command and Coastal Command. [34] AIR 2/6354. Officer pilots of No. 149 Squadron saw the film at a different screening from the

large number of sergeant pilots. The rank of officer was reserved for those with public school or univershy backgrounds and they, whether pilots, gunners or whatever, shared the same mess. The noncommissioned officers ('NCOs), including the sergeant pilots and warrant officer pilots, went m another mess. Air Commodore Ililfe Cousins (Brian Johnson, and H.I. Cozens, Bombers. The we~Tn of total v.~', London, 1984, pp. 187f.) claimed, in his experience, that this class system did not produce friction, adding that many sergeant pilots later were commissioned. NCO aircrew carried the minimum rank of sergeant. Conlmss (p. 59) cites the very poor response m the film by soldiers at Donnington Depot, an army ordn~_nce camp near Weflin~on. When two of the three local cinemas showed the film in the same week, one as the main feature and the other as a second feature, Len England surveyed the troops on 27 September 1941. Nine out of ten were disappointed and actual audience reaction was poor. See Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, Box 8/A ('Fdms). The soldiers complained of the unreal blitz scenes and tick from the air and insufficient action~

[35] INF 1/210, 24 July 1941. Marlene Dietrich co-starred with John Wayne in Se~,n Simmers;, her latest film, The Flame of New Orleans (Universal, 1941) opened 10 July at London's Leicester Square Theatre. Churchill's secret weekend residence was Ditchley, in north Oxfordshire, only using Chequers on overcast weekends, lest it be bombed by the ~ e . See K.R.M. Short and D.J. Wenden, Winston S. Churchill: film fan,/FJFRT, II (1991), pp. 197-214).

[36] Quentin Reynolds, ~ e n t m Reyno/ds by Q u e n ~ Reyno/ds (London 1964) p. 207. Visitors to Chequers seldom got m bed before midnight, in part due m the usual film show after dinner. Churchill, a confirmed Tdm fan,' had not attended a movie theatre since 6 June 1940; the Chequers film projection room had been set up on 24 May 1941.

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2 0 6 /C R. M . Shor~

[37] John Colville, The Fringes of Power. Dozoning Street DiarY, 1939-1955 (London, 1985), p. 496. Colville thought C/t/zen Kane 'deplorable'. When taken m task by Kathleen Harriman who thought it 'wonderful'. she said the fact that 'we did not, revealed to her much about the English

�9 people.' Colville replied saying that the fact 'Americans did, revealed to [him] nothing about Americans.' INF 1/210, 31 July 1941, Beaverbrook to Bernstein.

[38] Watt (1974) op. c/t., pp. 151-152. It is interesting the Ch~ t l ansen took such an interest in documentary films. He was reported by Watt (Sussex, 1973, op. c~., p. 1270 as being first supporter of London can Take/t, describing it as ' the greatest war film that's ever been made; ' the rest of Fleet Street followed with high praise.

[39] The date of the press screening would have been on 23 July, as The Tbne.s review appeared the next morning;, the film's premich-e was on the 24th and the West End run began on the 25th. Graham Greene's Spectator review of 14 August 1941 is found in David Parkinson, ed., Mornings in the Dark. The Graham Greene fdm reader (London, 1993, pp. 519-522). Bap~'m of Fire (Feaertaufe) released in 1940, documented the Luffwaffe's role in the defeat of Poland; see ICR.M. Short, ed., Catalogue of Forbidden German Feature and Short Film Productions Held in Zonal Film Archives of Film Section, Information Services Division, Control Commission for Germany (BE) (Trowbridge, Wilts, 1996, p. 50).

[40] N ~ Statesman, August 1941. Coultass (p. 59) also pursued the question of the 'upper-class' or 'Oxford' accents because they were mentioned in Len England's Mass-Observation report. Coultass personally did not find the accents 'too intrusive.' To the author's less tutored ear, the most obtrusive 'plumy' accent was that of the Wing Commander played by W/C J.A. Powell. Coultass thought that ' the station commander 's (Group Captain F.J. Fogerty) voice had noticeably northern inflexion.' He also raises the question, based on the England M-O survey, of whether the film had been oversold, thus making it impossible to fulfill audience expectations. W'dliam Whitebait, noting the 'jaunty quietness' of the men, called Target for Tonight 'our best propaganda film since the war'.

[41] R.V. Jones, Most ~%cret War (London, 1978, p. 21). Air Commodore Cozens (1984, pp. 171if) also provides a personal account of how the mounting of RAY night raids were much more informal than later in the war. Cozens (Station Commander of RAF Hemswell from 1943-44) said that the HF test transmissions from the W/T operator to the Watch Office, as in Target for Tonight, in fact had been monitored by the Germans providing them early warning as to the timing and size of British raids.

[42] INF 1/210. Sidney Bernstein also had a memo from Jack G~iggs, Films Division, dated 31 July 1941, indicating that the Air Ministry had taken over the organization of the film's premi~xe, which pleased Ganmont British= However, there were no tickets for Dalrymple, Watts, the Crown Film Uni t or its guests. The forty-year old Duke of Kent was 'killed on active service' when his RAF Sunderland flying boat crashed in northern Scotland on route m Iceland, 25 August 1942.

[43] /bk/., pp. 152. Watt 's recalled that the film ran at 'three large West End cinemas simultaneously.' He also enjoyed (Sussex, 1973, op. c~., p. 132) when going to a nightclub, at least on one occasion, the spotlight was put on him and the comp~e announced that he was the maker of Target for Ton/ght, which was followed by three bottles of champagne.

[44] The T/rues, 4 August 1941. Alexander Korda had flown to the United States in late 1939 on behalf of the MoI to arrange for dism~oution of The Lion Has l~mgs: an epic of the Royal Airforce. Korda was locked in for the dism~ution of all his films by United Anists, of which he was a partner, Wilcox worked at RKO.

[45] The full Production Code Adminiswation statement was: 'This film was made with the collaboration of the British Royal Air Force under actual war conditions in England. It presents the point of view of the British people in the present conflict and discloses their hope and plans for the defense of their native land. The management of this theater trust that after seeing this film its patrons will be better able to contrast life in nenu-al America with life in the belligerent countries of Europe.' See Short (1997), op. c~., Chapter 5.

[46] The New York T/rues, 21 July 1941. [47] Waroers also produced F/y/ns Fo r t r~ (1942) at its British Teddington Studio, with RAF facilities;

exceptionally for Warners, it ran 102 minutes but was sharply cut for US distribution. For the two most significant forays of Jack and Harry Warner into pro-British film politics see The Sea Hawk (1940) and They D~d ~ The/r Boot, On (1941). The March of Time language was cautious, but the implications of British support were clear, whether describing the RAF, the Royal Navy or the courageous British people,

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R A F Bomber Command's 'Target for Tonight" (1941) 2 0 7

[48J Caroline Moorehcad, Sk/ney Bon.cdn. A/n~graphy (London, 1984) pp. 131-136. A lavender was a contemporary version of a fine-gsaln positive from which duplicate negatives could be struck. The original negative was on two separate rolls, one for the sound and one for pictures; a combined negative has both sound and picture printed.

[49] /b~. p. 134. Moorehead claims that the film was 'redubbed;' it remains to be seen what modifications were made to the American version. Bemstein's record of the trip also included his contribution to the production of MGM's Mrs Min/ver and Walter Wenger's Eagle Squadron. The reference to Harry Warner screening a film Co. 133) about a 'Presbyterian minister' actually was One Foot in Heaven. The film, produced by Jack Warner and Hal B. Wallis, was the real-life story of Willlunl Spence~ a Methodist minister. Interestingly, nothing was said about Warner Bros own l ~ a / S q u a d r o n , which was one of the first RAF films and starred Ronald Reagan. The Has W/ngs had been retracked with Lowell Thomas as the narrator for the American version.

[50] The T/me.s, 13 January 1941. The gift was conveyed via Mr Milder, managing director of Warner Bros in London. It is more than likely that the s was part of the blocked profits fi'om their British interests. The exchange rate quoted is just over $4 to l pound sterling. This transaction was confL,'med in a letter from Quentin Reynolds to Walter Wanger, 3 March 1941, Wanger Papers 18/16, Wisconsin Historical Society. Reynolds thought that the money had been given to British War Relief, but significantly he suggests that Wamers had not locally (Hollywood) publicized the gift.

[51 ] This is probably the source of Charles Oakley's--- UVh~ We Came In; seventy years of the Bri.rish film indum-y (London, 1964) cited by Watt (1974) op. dr., p. 152.

[52] AIR 2/7430. [53] Vari~, Wednesday, 15 October 1941. The film is listed at 48 minutes, two minutes shorter than

the British release. Also noteworthy was that the story was credited to Harry Watt and B[udge] Cooper; Cooper is otherwise credited only for continuity. There was no reference to an American commentator and from the comments in the review, the RAF men themselves could not have been dubbed.

[54] Production Code Administration flies--Ta~,et for Ton~ht; Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, Los Angeles.

[55] The New York Time.s, 18 October 1941. Interestingly, The L/on Has W'mgs had also opened at the Globe Theater.

[56] Robert A. Osborne, 65 Years of d~ Oscar:. the official history of the Academy (New York, 1994). The Best Picture of 1941 was Twentieth Cenmry-Fox's Welsh coal-mining drama How Green i~'as My VaRey, with the best actor award going to Gary Cooper in Sergeant York and best actress to Joan Fontalne for Alfred Hitchcock's Suspido~ Target for Tonight had not even been nominated for a Documentary Academy Award, although WaR's Chrumau under F/re had been nominated by the Academy.

[57] Watt (1974) op. ~ . , p. 153. [58] BW 63/3, USA/l , 3 August 1942, British Information Services Report, No. 178. INF 1/199 is the

source for 9,000 American theaters. The British Library of Information was the source for the statistics; final cost figures l]qF 1/210.

[59] D,IF 1/210; 22 February and 23 July 1945, 15 March 1946. C.A. Leieune, Observer (July 1941, BFI Clippings). Lejenne based her ~ight into fancy' on the popular science magazine view that no sound was ever lost. Thus if there was a way of inventing a suificiently sensitive machine which could tap into and record the sounds and images of the past, much could be learned. She also said that a copy of the film should be sent to Washington or elsewhere for preservation suggesting a rather pessimistic view of Britain's immediate future. Historian Dim Richard Green (1837-1883, q.v. Dg'n~mary of National Bwgraphy) was the author of influential and widely.read Short H/story of the English Peapk (1874) and The Making of England (1882).

[60] Sussex (1973) ap. dr., p. 128. [61] Dilys Powell, "Films Since 1939,' in Since 1939. Ballet, Films, Music, Painting by Arnold L.

Haskell, Dilys Powell, Rollo Myers, Robin Ironside (London, 1948), p. 70. Although the book was published in 1948, the four titles had been issued as separate brochures in 1946/7 by Longmans Green & Co. l a d for the British Council. Dilys PoweU's 'semi-fictional documentary' is the most accurate label for this geme. The estimate of eighteen hours is based on an early morning reconnaissance flight to produce the photographs and a six hour flight for the raid itself, with the aircraft returning around midnight.

[62] Wyler's last film before joining the Air Force had been the Academy Award winning anglophilic Mrs Miniver (1942). Wyler was credited as producer, scriptwriter and co-photographer for The

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208 / ~ R. M . Shor t

Memphis Be& (1944). It must be remembered that the film was cut from not one, but several missions, thus having a degree of artifice of its own. The fact that he made a second feature-length documentary on the airwar in Europe, Thunderbo/t (1945, co. director with John Sturges), often is overlooked. After screening The Memphis Belle at an Open University Summer School some years ago, the high level of realism communicated by the film was brought home to the author by a serving RAF Phantom jet fighter pilot. He noted that in the midst of the film his palms had begun to sweat, something that never happened except when he was flying.

[63] The Facma/Ft~bn, p. 102. Michael Powell, one of the directors of The L/on Has i~mgs, went back to the Wellington raider theme in One of OurAircrafl is Missing (1942, British National) which he directed and co-wrote with Emetic Pressburger.

D o c u m e n t and F i lm S o u r c e s

The main sources for this study are found at the Public Record Office, Kew, in the AIR (Air Ministry) 2/6354, 2/7430, INF (Ministry of Information) series, including INF 1/56, 1/57, 1/58, 1/81, 1/199, 1/205, 1/210, 1/252, 1/460, INF 5/78, 5/81, INF 6/335, and BW (British Council) 63/3. Production files for Target for Tonight (Crown F'dm Unit Film no. 209) are located INF 6/335. The script is dated 22 July 1941 and is marked as the ' l s t Show Copy'; it passed censorship the same day and was so annotated.

The first two documents reproduced from in the microfiche supplement, 'Continuity--Shot List and Original Footage' (nineteen pages), 'Library Footage' (two pages), are found in INF 6/335. Paul Holt 's adaptation of Harry WaR's scenario for Targa for To-Night (London, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1941), the third document, is fi'om the author's personal collection. The booklet is printed in sepia tone apparently to illustrate the fact that the story took place mostly at night; illustrations appear to be frame enlargements.

Reference (viewing) prints and archival (preservation) copies of Targ~ .for Tonight are held by London's Imperial War Museum, as well as the National Film and Television Archives. Air Operations (CFU 209a) was extracted from Target for Tonight and is also preserved by the Imperial War Museum. The Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division of the Library of Congress has a 35mm reference print of the American release (Warner Bros, 1941) of Target for Tonight. Additionally, the division holds two 16mm prints. Copy one is listed as an archival positive and copy two, a reference print. The Library of Congress catalogue cards suggest that both of 16mm prints are of the British version; the first being 'probably a gift from the British Ministry of Information' and the second (B_ecd: 11-66) was 'probably a purchase from the Imperial War Museum.' The National Archives II, College Park, Maryland also holds copies of the film.

Targafor Tonight is available on video cassette in PAL and 1WI'SC as part o~'an IWM series through DD Video, 5 Churchill Court, 58 Station Road, North Harrow, Middlesex HA2 7SA, ~ Fax 44.181.863.0463.

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R A F Bomber Command's "Target for Tonight" (1941)

Appendix--Target for Tonight:. Dialogue

Targa /or Tonight (RCA)

Produced by Crown F'flra Unit

(Mark) With the full cooperation

of the Royal Air Force

(Music by the Royal Air Force Central Band)

4.

209

Photography Jonah Jones E Cafford

Sound Editor Ken Cameron S. McAllister

Unit Manager

J. Spiro Construction ConKnuity

E. Carrick B. Cooper 5. Script and Direction

by Harry Watt

6. This is the story of a raid on Germany--how it is planned and how it is executed. Each parr is played by the actual man or woman who does the job--from Commander-in Chief to Aircrafthand.

7. In order, however, not to give information to the enemy, all figures indicating Strength have been made deliberately, misleading.

F.OJF.L 8. (Roller Title) Note on Organisation

BOMBER COMJMAND controls a series of Groups---each of which has a number. Each Group controls a series of Stauons--each of which has a name... Each S ~ has two or more Squadrons attached---each aircraft being known by an index letter,.. The film mainly concerns the crew of F for Freddie, attached to Millerton Station in 33 Group of Bomber Command.

Photographic Room 1st Aircraftman: 2nd A/C: 1 st A/C:

2nd A/C: Main Photographic Room

Squadron Leader. Examine~. S/L: Examiner:. S/L: 1st A/C: S/L: I st A/C:

Target for Tonight Dkdogue

H6w are they coming along? Oh, I not too bad---quite a decent negative. Righto. Get them along to the Squadron Leader as soon as they are done. Right.

Many aircraft on that aerodrome? Five flJ52's and quite a lot of 109%. Oh, good. Well, let me see it, will you, when it's finished? Yes, sir. Thank you. Prints from the last sortie, sir. Thank you. What are they like? Very good, sir. Thank you very much, that's fine. This looks pretty good. I really think we have got something

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210 /C R. M. Shor t

Hying O~cer. SR~

Hying O~cer.

F/O:

this time. Donald, would you get me the Freihansen file, please? Certainly, sir. You know, this is most interesting. They've done a most tremendous amount here--it 's a colossal installation now. Let's have a look at that file. Thank you. Remember we saw it about three months ago, quite a small little place, nothing much happening, just a wood here, where you can see just small sidings and an empty wood; practically no traffic, no barges and norhint,. But now look at it. Quite different. Greatly extended sidings; oil tanks along a row by this railway line; pipe lines coming out of the wood, where there are more installations comin~ to these barges in the river. It's very big. It certainly is a peach of a target, isn't it sir? It 's just what the C. in C. must have. Now look--if you will write the analysis, I'll get on with the Intelligence Report for him. Certainly, sir. Thank you very much

BOMBER COMMAND HEADQUARTERS Air Vice Marshal: Good morning. The Met. Officer confirms the good weather

C. in C:

Con~'ollcr. A.V.M.: C. In C: Con~"oller:.

A.V.M.: C. in C:

Conu'oller: A.V.M.: C. in C: Controller:. C. in C:

forecast for tonight, sir. Right, then we'll go ahead with our maximum effort. Controller, warn all groups to carry out operations IC tonight. Yes, sir. There's a rhin~ here I think you ought to see, sir. Yes? Bomber Command to all Groups. Targets for tonight. Maximum effort tonight. Town 434. GermAny; target, naval docks and barracks. I will repeat that. Max-lmum effort tonight. Town 434, Germany; target, naval docks and barracks. What do you think of these Freihansen photographs, sir? I think they are excellent. Let's go and have a look at the map. Controller, get me AOC 33 group. Yes, sir. That's the spot, sir. Here. You are through to AOC 33 Group sir. That you Maitland? I've just been looking at the photographs of Freihausen. They confirm just exactly what we thought. I want you to divert one squadron on this target tonight, an experienced squadron which will go in low...that's it...I'll send you the photographs immediately. Thank you.

GROUP HF_ADQUARTERS A.O.C.: Controller-.

A.O.C.: Controller:. Controller:. A.O.C.:

Give me all Stations Yes, sir. Stand by all Stations for the AOC. I 'm putting you through now. 434. That's Kiel, isn't it? Yes, sir. You are through, sir. Maximum effort tonight on Kiel. Objective, naval docks and barracks. I want every available aircraft on this target. Have you got that? Right. In addition, Millerton to provide one squadron to attack the new off storage and tankers at

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R A F Bomber Command's 'Target for Tonight" (1941) 211

M I H ~RTON AERODROME Group Captain: A/C: G.C: A/C:

Ist Intelligence Officer.

G.C.:

Ist I/O:

2nd I/O:

CREll~ ROOM Squadron Leader Dickson:

Pilot Officer Woollatt: S/L Dickson: P.O. Woollatt: Canadian Sergeant:

1Vtac: Canadian Sergeant:

Mac: Cansdlan Sergeant:

FLYING FIELD Mac: 1st A/C: 1st A/C: 2nd A/C: Ist A/C: 3rd A/C: 1st A/C:

3rd A/C: 1st A/C:

GROUP CAPTAIN'S OFFICE Group Captain:

Wing Commander:

G/C:

W/C:

Freihausen. Freihausen. You can get fell details and photographs from InteRigence. That's all.

Right sir. Get me the Intelligence Room, please. Very good, sir. Ask the Wang Commander to come in. Yes, sir. Hello Intelligence Room---the Group Captain wants you. Yes, sir, Freihausen, sir. It's on the Rhine, sir. (Solo voce)--The old man, J'mamy. Yes, sir, It 's on the right bank, about 15 miles north of Freiburg in the Black Forest. Oh yes, I knew that. What I want is target information, the latest target maps, any photographs showing the new oil tanks and storage. Briefing is at 14.30 hours. Got it? Very good sir. (To 2nd Intelligence Officer) That's our next objective--briefing at 2.30. What's it got that Harem hasn't goO

Well, that's a good thing. I haven't been off the ground for a week. It's all very well for you--I had a party tonight. Well, that's saved you a headache. Thank you very much That's a fine thing! That's the second time N. for Nuts has been washed out. If you were a better navigator, you'd go off now. Listen Jock, who was it didn't know whether they were over Hanover or Hampton Court? That's a joke! Ah! Joke, my eye!

Nobby, here's your plug and lead. Right, thank you. Operations tonight fellows. How you do you know? Oh, I get around--I get all the jam. Hey, Curly, what's the odds today? Wait a minute and I'll tell you, Kiel, Wilhelmshaven and the Channel ports, two to one; Galsenkirschen seven to one; Hamburg and Cologne eight to one. All others tens. I'll have a tanner on the Charmel ports. OK You're on.

You can see it's a reasonable target to spot, seeing that we've got the moonlight and these water landmarks. But anyway, I should send your two best men first with incendiaries, In that case I'll send in Phillips and Anderson first, they're my two best. Yes, that will do very well. The rest had better have H.E's. These tanks look as if they have heavy concrete tops. And it's no good trying to draw their fire. They won't open up on you until they are sure you have found the target. No, I don't suppose, they will, sir. There's bound m be an awful lot of stuff around there--there always is round that type of target. It's mostly light flak at that.

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2 1 2 / ~ R. M . S h o r t

G/C:

W/C: G/C:

W/C:

BOMB DUMP Corporal: Armaments Officer:

Corporal: A.O.: Corporal: A.O.:

Corporal:

A R M O U R Y Armoury Aircraftman: Sergeant:

A/C: Sergeant:

F, -Y~O FIm~D 1st Aircraftman: 2nd A/C: 1st Aircraftman: Meterological Officer:.

Met.Assistant: Met. Officer:.

Met. Assistant:

IFING COMMANDER'S OFFICE Wing Comm~nder: S/L Wilson:

W/C:

W/C:

S/L:

BRIEFING ROOM Wing Commander.

Sergeant: W/C:

I think we had better have a delayed action bomb in each bomb load. They won't be able m get near the place after that. Very good, sir. You'd better send O'Reilly last to make sure. He's mad enough for anything. Yes, very good, sir.

MorninFo sir, Morning Corporal. Here's today's orders: A and B flights m be operational. C for Charlie and R for Robert incendiaries, The rest, four 500s and one thousand pounder. What time take-off, sir? Around 7.30. Very good. Oh, er, there's a camera on U for Uncle, that'll mean a flash bomb. Very good, sir.

What 's the target, Serg? Search me, boy--I don' t know. Have those barrels for F. for Freddie gone over yeL~ They've gone over Serg. OK,

Which turret do these gun barrels go, Jimmy, front or rear? They go rear turret, stm, 19 be down in a minute. OK. One hundred and thirty one point six, nineteen point six, one three one point five, eighteen point five. Wind is 22 miles an hour at three hundred and nine degrees. Visibility 12 miles. Three tenths of cumulus clouds at 3,000 feet. Right.

Come in. Good morning, Wilson. Good morning, sir. Here's the information about tonight's target. Good. Have we got sufficient dope on it, do you think? Oh, I think plenty with the photograph, sir. Good. Right, well r l l see you at the briefing this afternoon then. Yes, sir.

Sit down please. You are on to a new target tonight~Freihausen. It 'll be roughausen by the lime we're through with it. I t isn't as funny a s you seem to think. Sergeant Calder. Happens to be an extremely important target. There's one thing first, crew of F for ]Freddie, Dickson, you're Captain. I want you to take Lee as wireless operator tonight and not Cafford. Bad luck Cafford. So the crew will be Dickson, Woonatt, Macpherson, Lee, Bell and Harrison. The rest are unchanged. How for your actual objective. As you will see from your target maps it looks like an unimportant railway siding. In actual fact as you will see from photographs, it is the

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RAF Bomber Command's "Target for Tonight" (1941) 2 1 3

S/L Wilson:

W/C: P/O: W/C:

Phillips: W/C:

O'ReillT. W/C:

Armament Officer."

W/C: Met. Officer.

W/C: Signal Sergeant:

S/L Wilson: W/C: Group Captain:

site o f a large oil dump. It 's very well hidden amongst the trees, bu t there ' shouldn ' t be very much d i~cuhy in find/rig its position. And your job tonight re'lads is to find it and destroy it. N o w Squadron Leader W'dson will describe the target to you and I'll say some more afterwards. Put out the fights. This is your target. Oil storage at Freihausen. There are indications of considerable storage in the wood. Here and here. But the important feature is the accumulation o f oil waggons on the siding and barges on the river. The river, you will see fi'om your target map, runs away to the Nor th when it gets off the picture; the c~mal z'tms from East to West for about three miles. I suggest that you make your bombing run parallel to the canal from East to West and that will bring you straight up to the target. Other landmarks are the railway to the south of the canal with the bridge over the river half a mile south o f the target. You can get your target maps from the clerk outside the door afterwards. Any questions? Would it be O K to go in low tonight, sir? I 'm coming to thar~ Phil/ips and Anderson, you are full o f incendiaries tonight. You will take off quarter o f an hour before anybody else and your job is to definitely locate the target and set the wood on fire. Right, sir. Take your t ime about it because the others will be following you up. Tha t ' s no reason for the rest of you to bomb the first fire that you come to. You must definkely locate the target before you bomb. After all even an Anderson can make mistakes. O'Reilly, you go in last and make sure. O K I'll do that, sir. Good man, but remember the trees are very high around the target. The method of attack for the rest of you I'll leave to individual Captains. As soon as the Hun knows that you've found the target you will get the usual plentiful supply of flal~ So it's no good expeetin__~ an easy passage because you won't get one. Remember, don't risk aircraft unnecessarily. Your main object is to bomb the target and then to bring your aircraft back safely. What's the Armanent Officer got to say? Not much, sir. You will find your bomb load written up there. One of the bombs in each aircraft is a delayed action. That is, with the exception of the C and R. Er, you don't need to worry about that, it 's being taken care of in the section. Right, what 's the weather man got to tell us this time? The weather should be favourable. Cloud increasing across the Nor th Sea but with breaks in it. Good visibility. Navigational winds north-west at 30 miles an hour at all heights. Risk o f fog at base aerodromes towards dawn. The charts you can see upsmir* afterwards. Th~nk you. H o w about signals? Wireless Operator , will get their call signs for tonight from me in my Office. And don ' t forget as you are well over the other side you can usually get your bearing from Basle if you are stuck. That all sir? Yes, I think that 's the lot. Do you wish to say something sir? Yes. Well chalm , no doubt about it we've got a good one for tonight. It should be fairly easy to find and with those water

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214 / ~ R. M. Shor t

W'keless Operator. S/L Dickson: Rear Ounner: S/L: Rear C ~ ne~. Dickson: Macpherson: S/L. Dickson:

CREIF ROOM I st Pilot Officer. 2nd P/O: I st Pilot Officer: 2nd P/O: Ist P/O: 2nd P/O: 3rd P/O:

Woollatt: Macpherson: Another navigator: Maqpherson: Another P/O: WoolMtt: P/O: Woollatt: Navigator:. Macpherson:

Another Navigator. Macpherson:

Another Pilot:

Another P/O: Dickson: Macpherson: W/O: Woollatt: Front Gunnc~. Rear Gunne~. Dickson:

FLYING FIELD Lorry Driver:.

C R E W ROOM Aircrafunan: Woollatt:

FLYING FIELD Dickson: 1st Aircraftman: 2nd A/C: 3rd A/C:

landmarks and the fight you should manage a good run up. Go in and flatten it, and good luck to you.

(end of briefing) I'll go along and get the call signs and signals skipper. OK We're going to have a look at the guns, sir. Alright, but don' t be late. OK sir, we'll be in the crew room on time. Where's that Scotch navigator? Coming sir. We'll go along and have a look at that course.

Ah, just the man I want. You owe me half a crown. Listen, I can't pay my mess bill, let alone you. Well, neither can I. Oh alright. See me after the trip. Righto! Yon would remember that. Hey, some cluck's pinched my boots! Come on, pull your finger out. Where's my boots? Thank you. We had the hell of a party. Then we see a big cone of searchlights over here. Hm. But, I shouldn't let it worry you. What did you do? Oh, being a gantleman, I turned the other cheek. She's a bit hefty, isn't she? She is. Oh, I see. And you will probably see our other lads giving the Channel ports a bashing. Hm. But on the whole you will probably have a pretty clear run right into the target. I'll give you a good long run up then you'll have plenty of time to see the target. There'll be no need for a dummy run. Yes, OK. All from F for Freddie here? I 'm here anyway. Here sir. I 'm here Skipper. OK sir. OK sir. Well, that's a change anyway.

Tell 'em it's here.

It 's here. Oh my God, where's my helmet? Where the Devil's my helmet? Ah, there you are.

Right, start her up. Contact port. Contact port. Contact starboard, sir.

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R A F Bomber Command's "Targa for TonigM" (1941) 215

FLARE PATH CARd VAN W/C: Flare Path Officer: W/C: F.P.O.: W/C: Operator:, W/C:

Control: (Intercomm.)

W/C: C Charlie aircraft: Ontercornm.)

W/C:

Flare Path Officer: W/C:

A for Apple aircraft: (Intereomm.) W/C: (Imereomm.)

B for Beer aircraft: (Intercomm.)

W/C: (Intercomm.) F for Freddie aircraft: Ontercomm.)

W/C:

Good evening. Good evening, sir. All set.) All ready, sir. Good show. Anybody come through yet? No not yet. Not yet? Right. Thank you. Right transmit please, Hullo Control, hullo Control, are you receiving me? Over. Hullo flare path, Control answering, I am receiving you well, over. Right, transmit please. OK. Hullo flare path, C. Charlie calling flare path. May we taxi up and take off, may we taxi up and take off?. Over. Right, transmit please. Hullo C Charlie, hullo C Charlie. Path answering, path answering. Yes, you may taxi up and take off, you may taxi up and take off. Over. C for Charlie, air borne sir 19 hours 35 minutes. Thank you. Transmit please. Hullo Control, hullo Control. Path here, C Charfie took off 19.35. Over. (~ntercomm.) Hullo Control, hullo Control, path calling. R Robe~ took off 19.38, R Robert 19.38. Over. A Apple calling flare path. May we taxi up and take off?. Hullo Control, hullo Control, path calling. A Apple took off 19.41. Over. Hullo flare path, hullo flare path. B Beer calling. B Beer cailln~ My we take off, may we take off?. Over. Hullo Control, path calling. B Beer took off 19.46. Over. Hullo flare path, hullo flare path. F for Freddie calling. F for Freddie calling. May we take off. May we take off?. Over to you. Hullo F Freddie, hullo F Freddie. You you may take off. Off you go, off you go. Over.

COCKPIT OF F FOR FREDDIE AIRCRAFT Dickson: OK chaps, here we go.

FLARE PA 27-1 CARH VAN Flare path officer. F for Freddie off 19.51, sir. W/C: ThAnk you.

F FOR FREDDIE AIRCRAFT IN THE AIR Dickson: Rear Gunner. Dickson Ontercomm.) Front Gunner: Dickson: Macpberson: Dickson: Ontercomm.) Wireless Operator:. Dickson: Woollatt: Dickson: Dickson:

Macpherson:

Dickson:

Hullo rear gunner, can you hear me? I 'm O K Skipper. Hullo front gunner, can you hear me? OK Skipper. Hullo Mac. Gone to sleep yet? No, I have not. Hullo operator, everything OK? Well it seems m be all here, sir. Hullo second pilot, ready to do some oil pumping? That ' s all a second pilot's for. Well, that 's akight. Freitmusen, here we come. HuLlo Mac. Where are we now, as though you're likely to know? I can' t find where we are. We are coming to Marlmthe, famous for its breweries, you know. Good old Mac. (Intercomm.) Let's go down and smell its breath. Hullo everybody, let me know if you see anything.

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216 K . R . M . Shor t

Rear Gunner. Dickson: Macpherson:

Dickson: Macpherson: Dickson: Rear Gunner:. Dickson: Front Gunner (Intercomm.)

FREIHAUSEN, A.A. B A T T E R Y German A.A. Batzery Officer. German A.A. Gunner:. ~ Officer. German Gunner. German Officer: German Gunner.

F FOR FREDDIE I N THE AIR Macpherson: Dickson: Front Gunner: Dickson: 0mercomm.) Macpherson: Dickson: Macpherson:

Dickson: Macpherson: Dickson: (Intercomm.) Wireless Operator:

FREII-Ld USEN A.A. B A T T E R Y German A.A. Offmer.

F FOR FREDDIE I N THE A I R Dickson: Macpherson: Dickson: Macpherson: Dickson:

MIr.LRRTON AERODROME Station Wireless Operator. Group Captain: W/O:

Group Captain: Map Sergeant:

G/C: Map Sergeant: Group Captain: WIC: G/C:

F FOR FREDDIE I N THE AIR Rear Gunner.

Hullo Skip, searchlights and flak to the starboard quarter. My God, so there is, the natives appear hostile! Hullo Skipper, the mrget's about 50 miles up river. I suggest we make a sweep and approach it down the river. We'll see the ca_n,l better then. Over to you. OK. I can see the canal as plain as my face. OK I'll turn round and check up. Any signs of life? Not a rhin~, Skip. I wonder where Andy is, he was going to light us in. There go the incendiaries!

Alarm. Achmng! Elf drei vier~el! Elf drei viertel. Heute, ein und dreisisch. Heute, ein und dreisisch. Feur. Feur.

He's over the target. I can see the siding. OK stand by. I 'm going in, in a glide. Can I straf the flak Skipper? Yes, OK. Let go the thousand pounder last Mac. Bomb doors open. Bomb doors open. Left, left, steady, Right, steady, steady at that.. .Bombs gone...I got a bull's eye with the last one. Good man! Bag of nuts or a cigar? Oh, I think I'll just have sandwich. Hullo operator, will you send the 'target bombed' signal? OK sir.

Feur.

OK chaps, don ' t worry, everything's alright. Anybody hurO The wireless operator's copped it. Badly? No ~I don' t think so, only in the leg. OK (to P.O. Woollat~). You take her over, will you? She seems to be OK. Make height but don' t flog her.

An interrapted message from F for Freddie, sir. This all we've got? Yes, sir, it suddenly stopped after giving the 'target bombed' signal. Oh, alright. (To Map Sergeant) Well, how is it coming? Er, C for Charlie and R for Robert are on their way back, sir. Several other aircraft have bombed the target. Oh, good. Better mark F for Freddie over the target. Very good, sir. (to ~ m g Commander) Hullo, seen this? Hm, not so good, sir. Might be wireless failure perhaps. Let 's hope so.

I can't get nothing on the set, sir, it's dead.

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R A F Bomber Coramand's "Target for Tonight" (1941) 217

Wireless Operator. Dick, son: Woollatu Dickson: Woollatt:

Dickson: Woollatt: Dickson:

MILLERTON AERODROME Station Wireless Operator. Group Captain: Wireless Operator:.

Flare Path Officer. ( I n t e r com. )

Group Captain:

F FOR FREDDIE IN THE AIR Macpherson:

Dickson:

Macpherson: Macpherson: (Intercomm.) Maepherson:

MILLERTON AERODROME W/C:

Group Captain

Stadon W/O: W/C:

W/O:

F FOR FREDDIE IN THE AIR Dickson:

Macpherson: Dickson: (Intercomm.) Macpherson:

MILLIqRTON AERODROME Wing Commander:. Group Captain: W/C: G/C:

W/C:

Aircraftman: Oinging) W/C: Group Captain: W/C:

G/C:

Let me try, sir. No, you keep quiet. We'll manage without it. I say Skipper, here a moment. What's the trouble? Oil pressure dropping on the port engine and I can't make any height. Losing any? No) but I can't make any. Alright, I'll take over. You go back and look after the wireless operator.

Nothing from F for Freddie. I 'm afraid, sir. Afraid he is getting a bit late. How is the weather holdin# Not so good I think, but I'll go and find out. Hullo flare path. Control calling. How is the weather please? Over. Hullo Control. Path answering. Visibility is now down to 500 yards. The mist is thickening. Over. Hm. I was afraid of that.

Hullo Skipper. I've got a sight. We are about half way to Harwich. OK. If I can keep her from losing any more height, then Bob's your uncle. Don' t forget about our balloons. Mac. Don' t worry, I'll not forget the balloons. And how is the invalid? Oh, he's fine. But feeling awful cold. It's the shock I expect. I had the same when I fell off my bike.

Oh, well sir, they are all down now except F Freddie of c o u r s e .

Alright. Call up the Observer Corps and see if they can give us a line on him. Yes alright, sir. And tell all aerodromes to be prepared to fight up immediately in case a Wellington comes over. Yes, sir.

That, gentlemen, is good old England. And I must say I 'm damned glad to see it. Do you see what I see Skipper? And what do you see my young Scottish friend? Fog, dirty, yellow, stinking fog.

Hullo, sir. Come on, let's get out and have a look at the weather-- Good idea. - -And get a breather at the same time. HelPs bells, just look at this muck. Hope Dickson gets a move o n .

He's probably got engine trouble of course, sir. Wait a moment, sir. Is that an aircraft? Bless 'em Shut up you bog-rat! Stand still! That's one alright. Must be F Freddie in that case, sir. I'll go straight down to the flare path. Right--ol

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2 1 8 K . R . M . Shor t

FLARE PA 27-1 CARA VAN Wing Commandew. Akight, I'll take over. Thank you.

F FOR FREDDIE AIRCRAFT IN THE AIR Dickson: Pay attention everybody. We are over the aerodrome but I can

see practically nothing. The port engine's very rough. We could make a bit of height and jump out, or we could have a stab at landing. Let 's try it, sir. I 'd go in and land, sir. Try a landing, sir. Have a crack at it sir. I 'm all for landing. OK. Keep your fingers crossed.

Rear Gunner:. Macpherson: W'n~less Operator. Front G~nne~. Woollatt: Dickson:

FLARE P A T H CARd VAN Flare Path Officer, W/C: F.P.O.: 1st Flight Sergeant: 2nd Flight Sergeant: 3rd Flight Sergeant:

Coming in now sir. Right, put the flood light on--quickly. Right sir. Put the chance-light on. Light the flares. Light the flares.

F FOR FREDDIE LANDS SUCCESSFULLY Woollatt: Go and get an ambulance, will you? The operator's copped it.

INTELLIGENCE ROOM S/L Wilson: (Intelligence Officer) Dickson: S/L Wilson:

Macpherson:

Front Gunner:. Rear Gunner. Woollart:

Macpherson: S/L Wilson: Woollart: S/L W'flson:

(a short while later) S/L Dickson:

S/L Wilson: Dickson: S/L Wilson:

Come in Dickson, I hear you made a nice landing. I hope we haven't kept you waiting, sir. Good Lord, no. Come and sit down. Well how did you get on? Well, we did a low level attaok. We were over the target at 23.34; bombs were dropped at 23.53. The first four bombs, I 'm afraid, fell short of the target, but, er the last one was, er, a direct hit. Yes, that was a big one. Yes, that was a smasher--right on to it. Caused a Hell of a great big fire. Buckets of smoke. Visibility, oh, 50 miles away. Nearer 90, I should say. What colour? Oh, dullish red with black smoke. That sounds like oil alright.

I 'm afraid I didn ' t see very much. I was rather busy at the time. Right. Well that seems to be all. Good show. Goodnight. Good night. (after picking up telephone) Group Intelligence please. Intelligence Millerton speaking. Tonight's operations: the objective was reached and heavily bombed. Large fires and explosions were seen. All our aircraft returned. I'll send you details in the morning. Good night. (To another Intelligence Officer) Well, old boy, how about some bacon and eggs?

K R . M . Short, Professor of Commu~'_~_L,~ and Adjunct Professor of History, University of Houston, was the founding editor of The Historical Journal of Film, Radio, and Television. He is currently co-editor, with Garrh Jowett, of the Cambridge Univeni W Press St, uties in the History of Mass Commtmicatiom. He edited .yohn F. Kdson's Catalogue of Forbidden German Feature and Short Film Productions (Tmmbn2/ge, Flicks Books in Association toirh the Imperial War Museum, 1996).

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