rational desires

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Pleasurend llusionnPlatoJESSICA MOSS

Philosophynd PhenomenologicalesearchVol. LXXII,No. 3, May2006

UniversityfPittsburgh

Plato linkspleasurewith llusion, nd this linkexplains his rejection of the view that all

desires are rational desires for thegood. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections

betweenpleasure and illusion; theRepublic develops these into a psychological theory.One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions,but also incapable of the kind of

reasoning thatcan dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore thispart of the soul

(the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but ignores reasoning about what is

really good. Hence the new moral psychology of the Republic: not all desires are

rational, nd thus virtuedepends on bringing ne's non-rational desires under the con-

trol of reason.

Introduction

In the many, deception seems to come about on account of pleasure. For while it is not the

good, itappears to be. They choose thepleasant as being good, then,and avoid pain as being

bad. Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics 1113a33-b2)

Plato s suspicious fpleasure. e devotes hewholeofthePhilebus nd a

significantortionftheGorgiasto attacks n hedonism. e declares hat

"the oulof a true hilosopher...eeps wayfrom leasuresndappetitesnd

pains ndfears smuch s it an" Phaedo83b5-7) nddenounces leasure s

"evil's greatesture"Timaeus69dl).1Andevenwhen cknowledginghat

somepleasuresregood,andthat hegood life thephilosopher'sife) ssupremelyleasant, eholds hat hevery est ife the ifeof thegods is

a lifewith opleasuret all {Philebus 3b).2

Why s Plato o mistrustfulfpleasure,ndwhydoes he devote o much

attentiono thetopic? ome havetakenhisconcernwithpleasure o stem

from lainprudishness,rfromn excessive eactiongainst ontemporaryadvocatesfhedonism. y contrast, will argue hatPlato's suspicion f

1Translationsare mine unless otherwisenoted.

2

The apparent exceptionto Plato's

generalanti-hedonismis the

Protagoras,in which

Socrates gives an argumentbased on the premise thatpleasure is not only good, but the

good. It is a testament o the strongly nti-hedonistic endency of the other dialogues,however, that this passage of the Protagoras has generated so much interpretativedebate.

PLEASURE AND ILLUSION IN PLATO 503

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pleasureis systematic nd philosophical,and tiedto his most centralviews.

Pleasure is dangerousbecause it is a deceiver. It leads us astraywith false

appearances,bewitching nd beguilingus, cheating nd tricking s.3 In par-

ticular,tdeceives us

byappearingobe

goodwhen t s not.

This papertracesthedevelopment f the associationbetweenpleasureand

illusion through hreedialogues, theProtagoras, Gorgias, and Republic. I

arguethat this association explains why Plato's account of the desire for

pleasure thedesire for hings ua pleasant changesradicallybetweenthese

dialogues, and thereby xplains a moregeneral hift n his theoryof virtue

anddesirefrom heearly dialogues to the middle. While there re importantrefinementsf the association betweenpleasureand illusion in the Philebus

and Laws, a discussion of those dialogues lies outside the scope of this

paper.)In theearlydialogues,Plato arguesthat ll desires including he desire for

pleasure)are rationaldesires for the good. On this view of desire,vice is

merely matterfignorance boutgood and bad: once we learnwhichthingsarereallygood andbad,we can rely n our desires to lead us to virtue. n the

Republic, by contrast, lato arguesthat some desires,includingdesiresfor

pleasure understoodnow as belonging otheappetitive art f the soul),4 are

distinct rom nd can conflictwith rationaldesiresfor thegood. Correspond-

ingly, heRepublic rejectsthe ntellectualistmoralpsychologyof theearlier

dialogues: it holds thatvice is a matter f psychicdisorder, ot mere igno-rance,and thatvirtue an be achievedonlywhentheparts f the soul with the

wrongkindof desires are ruledbythe bestpart f thesoul, reason.Whydoes

Plato changehis view ofdesire nthisway? I will arguethat he is motivated

to do so byhisdeveloping thoughtsboutpleasureand illusion.

Iftheaccount offer s correct, hen, he association betweenpleasureand

illusion is central to Plato's thought.For the most part,however,the asso-

ciation has been littlenoted,and,where t has been noted,not well under-

stood.5The onlycontext nwhich the connectionhas been widely recognized

is Republic X, wherePlato seems to argue thatthe partof the soul thatdesirespleasure s thepartthat s deceivedby optical illusions. No satisfac-

toryaccount has been given of whyPlato would groupthese traits ogether

3 This s an accusation hat latomakesthroughouthedialogues.The soulis bewitched

(yoriTEuoiiEvr))ythebody nd tspleasuresPhaedo 81b3);peopleare bewitchedndcharmedKr|Xr)6evTes)y pleasureRepublic 13c -2, f.Rep.584a10); pleasure doeswhatever erwillwishesbymeansofpersuasionwith eceit TT6i0oT eto andiTis)"(Laws 863b7-ll). In thePhilebus,Protarchusalls pleasure"the greatest mpostor"(ctAa^ovtoTaTov,Phil.65c5).See section 11 or

xplanationnddefense f this laim.

ShoreyndGosling ndTaylornotice ome spects fpleasure'sdeceptions,utmainlyinconnection ith odily leasuresnthePhaedo (Shorey1903:28,Gosling ndTaylor1982: 86); Pricenotesa connection etweenpleasureand illusion, ut only in theTimaeusPrice1995:86).

504 JESSICAMOSS







here, owever,nd ndeedmanynterpretersavefoundheclaim bizarre. sAnnasputs t,"desire asnothingo do with ptical llusions."6 y tracingthe onnectionsetween leasurend llusionntheProtagorasndGorgias,

I providenaccounthatmakes ense fRepublicX's argument:show thaton Plato's viewthedesire or leasure oes, n fact, avemuch o do with

optical llusions.InSection, I show hat lato ssociates leasurend llusionn thePro-

tagorasnorderoexplainwhydesires orpleasureeadpeopleastray:whenwepursue armfulrvicious leasuresnstead fdoingwhat s good,wedoso becausewe havebeendeceived y llusions eneratedypleasantndpain-fulthings. ections I and II argue hat heGorgiasandRepublicexpandthis dea,with n importantevision.Whereasccordingo theProtagoras

rational alculation as thepowerto overcome he illusions nherentnpleasure, o thattheyno longer ffect ur desires, hese aterdialoguesdevelop n account fwhy hedesire orpleasures subject o illusion hatentails very ifferentiewof that esire. leasure ppears o be goodevenwhen t snot section I); onepart f our souls is inherentlyusceptibleo

illusion, nd mmune o thecorrectiveffectsfreasoning;hispart f thesoulthereforeesires leasuresgood, ndwhen hispart ules ur souls we

pursue leasuresection II). Furthermore,lthoughhispartof the souldesires leasure s good, ts ognitiveimitationsits nabilityo see beyond

appearancesrendertsdesires nfit o leadtheagent owardwhat s trulygood sectionV). OncePlatoadopts hisviewof thedesire orpleasure, e

rejectshe ntellectualistsychologyfthe arlier ialoguesnd thetheoryfvirtuet entails, ndin theRepublicdefines irtue s the state n whichreason ules he ower,nonrationalarts f the soul. SectionV traces he

historyfthe deathat leasureppears ood n laterGreek hought;n thelast ection indicate lato's viewson themetaphysicalspect fpleasure'sdeceptions.

I. Pleasureand illusion n theProtagorasIn order o understandheProtagoras' ccount fthedesire orpleasure,wemust istinguishwoviews fthis esiremplicitn thediscussion fpleas-ure tProtagoras 51bff.This is thepassage n whichSocrates, rguingfromhepremisehat leasuresthegood,maintainshat o one everfails o

dowhat e knowss bestbecausehe s"overcome y pleasure,"ndthatvir-tue sthereforematterfknowledge.7e directs is rgumentgainst opu-

6

Annas1981: 339.Why oes Socrates remise is rgumentnthe laim hat leasures thegood,whichhe

explicitlyontradictsnother ialogues, ncludingne considered oughly ontempora-neous, heGorgias 495e-499b)?1willnot address thisquestionhere,as it does not

directlyear nmydiscussionf thedesirefor leasure.








consequenton an actwilloutweigh hepains,she will become virtuous. The

verydesirethatnow leads her straywillthen ead her oward hegood.8

Whydo people make mistakesabout whichthingswill best gratifyheir

desires whydo we need an artof measuremento guide us in our choices?Andwhy, f the desireforpleasure s in facta desire for morepleasurethan

pain overall,do themanyfalselythink f it as a desire for mmediategratifi-cation?Plato answersbothquestionswiththeclaim that we are subject to

systematicllusionsaboutpleasures.

Things of thesame size appear toyour sightto be bigger fromnearby, and smaller fromafar,

don't they?... f then our well-being lay in this,doing and choosing the large things, voiding

and notdoing the small, what would appear to be our salvation in life? The art of measure-

ment,or thepower of whatappears [or "of appearance" (toO cpaivopevou)]? (Prot. 356c5-

d4)

Pleasantandpainful hings reanalogous to theobjects of vision: those that

arenear in time)appear arger han hose that re far way. Thus, while what

people reallycare about in desiringpleasure is gettingmore pleasure than

painoverall,"people who makemistakesconcerning he choice of pleasuresand pains make these mistakesthrough lack of knowledge... f measure-

ment" Prot. 357d3-7).9People pursuenearpleasuresin the mistakenview

that hey re overallgreater,ndthus eemto care only for mmediategratifi-cation nsteadofforwhat s truly ood.

Socrates insists,however,that this fault s perfectlyorrectable.The art

of measurement" theknowledge f how to judge the trueoverall pleasant-ness of differentptions, regardless f their mmediacyor distance "would

make the appearance ose its power aKupov hev av EiToiriaE toOto to

cpdvTaoLia)" (Prot. 356d7-8).10Once a person learns to judge that some

particularmmediately ratifyingleasurewill be outweighedby the pains to

8 For thisaccount to work, of course, it must be the case that virtuous acts yield more

pleasure thanpain in the ong run,while vicious acts do not; this s clearly an underlying

assumptionof theProtagoras. Irwin argues that Plato abandons this dea in the Gorgias

(Irwin 1995: 112-113). Irwin s certainly right hat Plato's view in thatdialogue is more

complex: thevicious person experiences pleasures that are more intense than the virtu-

ous person's (cf. Philebus 45a ff.),while the virtuousperson experiences a greater bal-

ance of pleasure over pain overall; thismakes a purely quantitativerankingof lives by

pleasure difficult r impossible. Nonetheless,Plato always holds onto a modified version

of the dea thatthe life of virtue s the mostpleasant life: see Republic 58Od-588a and

Laws 732e-734d.9

The analogy recursand is made moreexplicit at Philebus 41e-42a.10

How should we understand he dea that an appearance "loses itspower": does an illu-

sion for nstance,the llusion thatthe second

pieceof cake is

pleasant enoughto out-

weigh the pains thatwill follow on eating it actually disappear, or does this illusion

merely lose its power to affect our desires? The second alternative is more plausible,

althoughnothingPlato says here rules out the first. ee my discussion of Republic X in

section III below.








follow,she will lose herdesire forthatpleasure,anddesire thebetter ourse

of action nstead.11

It is importanto note thatSocrates' confidence hatthe illusions gener-ated

by pleasurecan be overcome

bythe

rightkind of

reasoningthe art of

measurement is directlyrelatedto his characterization f the desire for

pleasureas a desire for morepleasurethanpain overall. For on this charac-

terization esiresforpleasureare sensitive to, and ofteneven arise out of,calculations about therelative izes of pleasuresandpains. The apparently

intemperate edonistpursueswhatshepursues nthe belief that t will bringhermorepleasurethanpain,and toacquiresuch beliefs hewilloftenhave to

perform udimentaryalculations. ("The cake may make me sick lateron,"she might hink, but that discomfortwill be outweighedby the pleasureof

eating t " It is thiscalculation that makes herdesirethecake.) Furthermore,her desirewill also be sensitive to further alculations: if she comes to

believe that thediscomforts o followwill in factoutweighthe pleasureof

eating the cake, she will no longerdesire the cake at all. Her desiresfor

pleasureare thus like our udgments bout optical illusions, andunlike our

mereperceptions f them, in thattheycan be influenced y illusions but

thoroughlyorrected yrational alculations.

Contrast the desire forpleasure understood s an impulsive desire for

immediate ratification.o calculation s required o generate uch desires.A

piece of cake strikes omeone as pleasant,and right way withoutneedingtoconsiderbeforehandwhatwouldensue from ating hecake,nor how much

pleasurethe cake would give her relative to any otherpleasant or painful

activity she desires thatpiece of cake. Likewise, herdesire s not sensitive

to subsequentcalculation: if she learnsthat the painfulafter-effectsf the

cake will outweighthepleasureof eating it she mightrestrainherself nd

decide nottogratify erdesire,but the desirewill remain. f she is ruledbysuch desires as themanyclaim to be when they act against theirbeliefs

about what s best Prot. 352d)- she will go forwhat strikesher as pleasant

evenwhen sherecognizesbetter easonsto abstain.To saythat n Socrates' accountthedesire forpleasuredependson calcula-

tion while on the many's account it does not is to say thaton Socrates'

account it is a rational desire while on themany's account it is irrational.

Measurement, ndmorebroadly alculation, s for Plato a paradigmatically

11It cannot be thatthe agent continues to desire (e.g.) the cake qua pleasant but is moti-vated by some other desire to eschew it, for this otherdesire would have to be a desirefor what is good in contrast o what s pleasant,and the many have conceded thatpleas-ure is the

only thing heyhink

good {Prot. 355a).Neither an it be that the

agentcontin-

ues to desire thecake qua immediately pleasant but is motivatedby a distinctdesire foran overall balance of pleasure over pain to eschew it,for the many have conceded thatall theycare about is the overall balance; they never desire things qua immediatelypleasant at all {Prot. 356a-c).

508 JESSICA MOSS







rationalctivity.12ntheRepublic latodefines eason s thepart fthe oulthatngagesncalculation, here his ncludesmeasurementRep.602el-2);the word tandardlyranslateds 'rational' AoyiaTiKOv literallymeans

calculative. urthermore,he

Republicholds that t is

throughalculation

thatreasongeneratests desiresRep. 439dl, see section V below). Thedesire or leasures Socrates resentst ntheProtagoraswould hus ountin theRepublic s a desire f reason. his is a very ifferentiewfromheonetheRepublic tselfwill present:here,hedesire orpleasures a non-rational esire elongingoa non-rationalart fthe oul.

Of coursewe expect significantifferencesetween he Protagoras'accountfthe esire or leasurendthatfother ialogues, ecause hePro-

tagoras'discussions basedon a premise hatPlato nowherelse accepts:

that leasures thegood.Furthermore,heProtagorasmplies hat hemanyonly ursuewhat hey hink leasant: heir oncessionhat hey hink oodonlywhatwillbringhem leasure,ogetherith ocrates'viewthat ll ouractions re npursuitfthegood, mplies hat, or hem t least,pleasuresthegenericbjectof desire.13his means hat hemoralpsychologyf the

dialogue annot istinguishetween esires orpleasurenddesires or ny-thing lse: theProtagoras mplies hat soldier hooses to go to war notbecausehe desires onor s distinct rom leasure,s in theRepublic,butbecause hehonorablection s morepleasantProt.359e-360a).These are

views hat itwell neither ith ommon ensenorwithPlato's own viewsin other ialogues; nemay husbe temptedo dismiss heentire iscussionofpleasurenthis ialogue s anomalous. onetheless,fwe stepbackfromthe dd contextftheProtagoras' iscussion, e seethat hedialoguemakesa compellingbservationbout leasureandone thatwill have serious on-

sequences or lato's aterhought):hat heres a special onnection etween

desiring leasurendbeing usceptibleo llusions.Close-at-handleasuresohave special ttractionhat elayednes lack,

andPlatohasexpressedhiswellby aying hathey eempleasanter,ust as

close-at-handbjectsseemlarger. he analogywithoptical llusionsmayseemso aptthatwe hardly otice hat t calls for xplanation.or notall

12 Note for xample he lose connectionetweenmeasurementnd science or knowledge(ETTiOTrmn)tProtagoras 57b4 ndPhilebus 5d5-e3.Socrates oesnot tate heview hatwe alwaysandonlypursuewhatwe think oodas

explicitlyn theProtagorass he doesatGorgias 68b-c r Meno77c-78b,but t s veryclearly mplied yhis defense f thepowerofknowledge o control ur actions. Forwhen ocrates laims hat if omeone nowswhat sgoodandwhat s bad,he wouldn'tbeprevailed ponbyanythingodo anythinglse other hanwhathisknowledgeom-mands"

Prot.352c4-6)that

s,he willdo what he knows to be

goodhe

clearlyassumes hat veryone as thedesire o do onlywhathe thinksood.He comes close to

saying his xplicitlyt Prot.358c6-d2: No one goes willinglyowardbad things ortowardhingshat e believes ad,nor sthis,s it eems,nhuman ature, owant ogotowardhingshat ne believes ad nstead f thingshat nebelieves] ood."








objects of desire workon us this way: someone who pursueswealthfor ts

own sake, for nstance,will easily recognizea smaller, immediategain as

less lucrative hana larger ne thatwill come only in five years. Nothingabout the nearness n time of the

firstmakes it seem largerthan it is, orlargerthan the second. (It may of course seem more attractiven another

sense,but think twould be fair o explainthisbysayingwith Plato that t

seems more gratifying,morepleasant).14The same is true of health,and

knowledge, ndmanyother hings ne might esire.Why then should desires

forpleasurebe differentwhyshould thesedesires,morethanotherdesires,be subjectto illusions of distance;why should pleasures,more than other

objectsofdesire,behave inthis ense likeobjectsof vision?

A quick (although mysterious) olution to this puzzle would be to claim

thatdesiringpleasure ust is a matter f perceiving ome sort of appearance;below I shall argue thatthis is preciselyPlato's account. But if desiring

pleasureis akin to perception, henSocrates' suggestion in the Protagorasthatthedesire forpleasure s sensitive to rationalcalculation s very likely

wrong.Reasoning can make optical illusions "lose theirpower"over a per-son's judgment,but notoverhervision:hereyeswill see thenearerobject as

larger ven when she knows that t is not. If desires forpleasure are really

analogous to perception, henwe should expect that reasoningcan make

pleasure-illusionsose their owerover a person's udgment, utnotover her

desiresforpleasure: she will still desire the nearer bject even when sheknows that she should not.15Moreover,we have empiricalreason to think

that omethingike thismaybe right. ocrates' argumentbout thepowerof

the art of measurement eems too optimistic:sometimeseven afterrational

deliberation hows us that n immediate leasure s tobe avoidedwe still feel

the pull of thatpleasure, ust as sometimeseven after alculation shows us

that the two lines in theMiiller-Lyerllusion areequal we still see one as

longer.No one makes this case about the desireforpleasure n the Protagoras.

But Plato himselfwillmake it,as I arguein the nextsections,in his charac-terization fthe appetites n theGorgias and laterdialogues. He will recog-nize thedesire forpleasureas a distinctively llusion-pronedesire,and will

offer xplanationsfor this susceptibility o illusion thatwill entail that it

cannotbe overcome, ndthereforehat hedesireforpleasure s not in facta

rationaldesire at all.

Compare Parfit: [Bjias toward thenear... applies mostclearly to events that re in them-selves pleasant or painful" Parfit1984: 160).For an interesting iscussion of thisparallel, put to very differentuses frommine, seePenner 1971.

510 JESSICA MOSS







Like the Protagoras, then,the Gorgias suggests a general correlation

betweendesiringpleasureand being susceptibleto illusion; unlikethe Pro-

tagoras, it also suggests xplanationsfor hiscorrelation.One explanation s

that llusions arepleasing,

oftenmorepleasing

than the truth.18 utimplicitin the description f flatterys another uggestionwith important onse-

quences forPlato's thought.We desire whatwe think ood (Gorg. 468b); but

what s pleasantappearsto be good,whether r not it is (see below). Peoplewho tendtopursuepleasurethusdo so because theyare deceivedby the illu-

sion thatpleasurequa pleasure is good because they fail to distinguish

appearancesfrom eality.Socrates introduces he idea that whatis pleasantis good in makinghis

distinction etweenknacks nd crafts.He arguesthat n thecase of bothbody

and soul there s such a thingas good condition eue£ia), and also such athingas merely pparentgood condition BoKoOaa EUE^ia, 464a3). Crafts

aim toproducethegood conditionof bodyand soul, while knacks aim onlytoproducetheapparent ood condition not what s genuinelygood forbodyor soul, but whatappears good whether r not it is so.19 In each case the

apparentgood statetheflatteringnacksproduce s a pleasant state.The case

ofpastry-baking,nd the craft fmedicinewhich t mitates,s moststraight-forward:medicine imstoproduce hegenuinelygood conditionof thebody,health;pastriesdo not ofcourse makepeople physicallyhealthy,but theydo

providephysical pleasure. Likewise, cosmetics gives us pleasing physicalappearances, ophistrygives the sophist a pleasing appearanceof wisdom,andrhetoric leases us by makingus appearto ourselvesto be wise. Peoplewho are takenin by appearanceswill believe that thepastry hefs pleasing

We can findan argumentfor thissuggestionin the Encomium ofHelen of Gorgias, the

dialogue's namesake. Here Gorgias not only describes rhetoric as deceptive but also

implies that tpersuades because we take pleasure in being deceived. He describes one

form of speech, divine incantations, s "bringers of pleasure and banishers of pain"which work by "enchanting, persuading and altering the soul through sorcery

(yorjTEiai)" (Helen 10). The incantations bring pleasure because (yap) they work

magic on us, and magic is deceptive. He also claims that"Whoever persuaded or per-suades anyone concerninganything oes so by moldinga false account (yeu5f) Aoyov)"(Helen 11). Wardy interprets he passage as follows: "now Gorgias' promise to retail

pleasure rather han known) truth see Helen 5] appears to reach disconcertingfruition

in the statement hatpersuasionresults from misleading pleasure induced by rhetorical

skill inimical to truth" Wardy 1996: 45). Of Gorgias' argument that Helen can't be

blamed forwhatshe did ifshe was a victimof persuasion, Wardy says "The implicationis that Helen mighthave enjoyed Paris' verbal seduction; in fact, it was precisely the

pleasure she took in his logos which caused her to yield Perhaps, in the last analysis,we who are persuaded are all more or less willingvictimsof persuasion" (Wardy 1996:

37).In

principletseems that

goodcondition and

apparentgoodcondition

mightoincide, but

Plato clearly does not have this kindof case in mind, "...what about a condition that

seems good, but sn't really BoKoOoav pev EUE^iav, ouaav 5' ou)?" (Gorg. 464a3-4).Here as elsewhere in thecorpus Plato uses words for appearance to connote mere, mis-

leading appearance, not the manifestation f reality.

512 JESSICA MOSS







confectionsregood for hemGorg. 464d5-e2), and that theorator'sgratify-

ing counsels will benefit hem (Gorg. 459b3-4, 459b8-c2). These things

appearto be good, simplybecause theyarepleasant;when someone pleases

us,we thinkhe is

doingus

good.This is an idea that Plato holds onto until

theend: atLaws 657c he arguesthat wheneverwe are pleased,we thinkthat

we arefaringwell."20

In sayingthatflatterys concernedwithwhat eemsgood but s not, then,Socratesmeansthat t s concernedwithpleasure.The metaphysical ndethi-

cal chargesagainstflattery ltimatelymount o the same charge.Knacks are

mere mitationsfcraftsGorg. 464c7-dl), and thepleasurethey produce s a

mere mitationf thegood that rafts roduce.

According o the Protagoras, the illusions generated y pleasure can be

neutralized y a certainkindof rational ctivity, he art of measurement.21suggestedthat morepessimisticviewmaybe moreplausible. The Gorgiastakesno explicitstance on this question,but several passages suggest that

the illusion thatpleasure s good is veryhardto dispel. One cannot easilycorrect omeone who is under he llusion that harmful utpleasantthing s

good; one cannot asilyredirect erdesire forgood toward tsproper bjects.There are several nstances n thedialogue inwhichpeople rejector ignore

arguments hat omethings good, on theground hat thatthing s unpleas-ant. On my interpretation,hese are cases in which, because the thing is

unpleasant, tsimply ppearsbad to them just as a pleasant thingwill sim-ply appear good), and arguments o the contrary annot compete with the

appearances.Anexchangebetween ocrates and Polus providesa particularlyclear example. Socrates has arguedthat it is better o pay the penaltyfor

one's injustices han ogo free;Polus respondswith a graphic ist of painful

punishmentsGorg. 473bl2-c5). Socrates accuses him offailing o refute he

argumentGorg. 473d3), but themeaningof Polus' response s clear: he is

saying, How can youclaim that his s good,when can showyouthat t is

bad?" wherethedescription f thepains is meantto do the showing. Pun-

ishment s painful;thereforet just evidentlys bad. Polus believes he hasrefuted ocrates' claim.A secondexampleoccurs in Socrates' allegoryof the

pastrychefwho accuses the doctor of having harmed he children on the

20 Aswell s viceversa: aipopev otov oicbueBaeunpaTTeiv,kcuottotcxv aip<^>MEv.oiopeSa euTrpaTTeivu ,Laws 651 5-l.) (Forclear evidencethat aipeiv is here, s

usually,onnected ith leasurenSovrj), ee Laws658a10.)Compare lso Xenophon'sSocrates,who aysthatwe feelpleasure nd rejoice eu9paiveo0cu) whenwe believewe aredoingwell oionevoieu TrpaTTeiv)Memorabilia .vi.8-9), nd that thosewho

perceive hat hey re becoming etterive most leasantly"Memorabilia V.viii.6-7).Here

pleasures theblessedreward f thosewho are in

genuinelyoodcondition,ot

thedelusion f thosewho gnorantlyppear o themselvesobeso.The llusionsnquestionntheProtagorasndGorgiasdifferlightly,uttheir ffect sthe ame:bothdialogueshold that eoplepursueharmfulleasures r avoid beneficial

painsbecause heyretakennby llusions eneratedythepleasuresndpains.








grounds hathe caused thempain.The pastry hefdetails thepains thedoctor

causes (Gorg. 521e7-522a2). Socratesadds: "[if the doctor hould say] 'I did

all thesethings, hildren,n the interest f health uyieivcbs),' how great n

uproardo

youthink

udgeslike that

the children]wouldmake? Wouldn't it

be a greatuproar?"Gorg. 522a5-7). The doctor laims his work was benefi-

cial; the children hout him down. Because he painedthemtheybelieve that

he harmed hem,and theyare deaf to the claim that the pain was benefi-

cial that nthis ase pleasureand benefit ome apart.The same explanationunderlies heenormouspersuasive powersof rheto-

ric which both Socrates and Gorgias emphasize early in the dialogue. The

orator an convince thecitizenstoappointhimdoctorrather han a real medi-

cal man; in fact he can win such a contest gainstany craftsmanr expert,

even thoughhe has no knowledge f their rafts 456a-c). Why are doctorsandgenerals ndarchitectsowerlessto convince the citizens of what should

be obvious, thatthe orator s completely gnorant bout these craftsand

should be ignored?Because, as Socrates emphasizes throughouthedialogue,the orator'swordsplease the audience. The pleasurehe providesmakes the

audience think e does themgood, and arguments hathis advice is bad can-

notcompetewith hat ppearance.The dialogue thus uggeststhatthe belief thatpleasure s good (and pain

bad) is often mmune oargument. leasureappearsto be good, and for most

people, appearanceswinout over reasoning.22 ompare the beginningof thePhilebus, where nsteadof arguingthatpleasure and not knowledge s the

good, the hedonistPhilebus declares argument rrelevant: I think, and I

always will think, hatpleasurewinsaltogether"Philebus 12a7). Here Plato

nicely anticipates heattitude f Epicurus,who accordingto Cicero "denies

that nyreasonor arguments necessary o show whypleasure s to be pur-sued,pain to be avoided. He holds that we perceivethese things,as we per-ceive that fire s hot, snow white,honeysweet; it is unnecessary o prove

any of these thingswithsophisticated easoning; t is enough ust to point

Note that n the cases of both Polus and Callicles, however, Socrates does make some

headway in gettingthem to recognize the distinction etween pleasure and benefit.He

does so not precisely by argument,butratherby appeal to shame. In the conversation

withPolus, he getsPolus to admit thathe sometimes thinks thingk<jA6v, admirable, onthegroundsthat t is beneficial even if notpleasant,and thathe finds committing njusticeshameful,thoughdesirable in otherways (i.e. pleasant). In the conversation withCalli-

cles, he cites shameful pleasures and thereby gets Callicles to retracthis claim that all

pleasures are good. Whydo these appeals work, when argumentsthatrationallyappealto benefit e.g. Gorg. 466d ff.)do not? A promising nswer is thatpleasure is not the only

apparent good (and painnot the

only apparent bad).To the

rightkind of

person,what-

ever is aioxpov - ugly or shameful will appear bad, and whatever is kcxAov will

appear good. If this s right,Plato is demonstrating hat one appearance can be coun-

tered, fnotby argument, henby another appearance. See Moss 2005 for a fuller dis-cussion of thisclaim and of itsrepercussionsfor Plato's moralpsychology.

514 JESSICA MOSS







themut" De Finibus .30).Onecansimply ee that leasures good,thelinegoes;what eed ruse sthereor rgumentere?

On thisview, personwhopursues leasurewill seldom ayto herself,

'Thispleasanthing ppears ood orthisunpleasanthing ppears ad),butperhapshat s a mere ppearance;shouldbe opento argumentshat t isnot n fact s it appears." ather,hewill stopat theappearance:he will

accept t, hewillnot onsiderhat tmaybe a mere ppearanceor hink olookbeyondt,andwill thusbe deaf o argumentshat hallenget. Com-

pared o theProtagoras,hen, heGorgiasoffers morepessimistic iewabout eason's ower oovercomehe llusionsnduced ypleasure. oes the

dialogue ffernexplanationor his essimism?nepossible xplanationsthat eople ake leasure nthe llusion hat leasures good. t is pleasant

to believe hatnpursuing hat ratifiesou,you redoingwhatyoushouldbe doing ndgetting hat s goodforyou.The contrast etween hepastrychefspopularityndthe octor'sllfame orbetweenhe rators' uccess n

persuadingeople ndSocrates' ailures suggestshis view.Flatterymakesus feelgoodaboutourselves;heharsh ruth for nstance, ocrates' rgu-ments hatwe care aboutthewrong hings nd should redirectur livestoward irtue does not.Because he llusion hat leasures good is itself

pleasing,omeonewho tends o pursue leasurewill of course esist ettinggo of this llusion.

Thefinal ection f the ialogue,where ocratesmplies hat he ppetitesoccupy distinctocationnthe oul, ndthat temperateerson's ppetitesaredifferentn nature romhose fan ntemperateersonGorg.493a-494a),

gives hebeginningsfanargumentor second nd far trongereasonwhythe llusionhat leasuresgoodmaybe intractable.his argumentelies n

a theoryf moral sychologytwhich heGorgiasonlyhints: hat he oulisdividednto ifferent,onflictingources fbothmotivationndbelief. nthenext ection will how hat heRepublic evelops histheoryn sucha

way s toentail hat eopledominatedy heir esires orpleasurere unable

to ookbeyondppearances,nd hus annot epersuadedyreason. t is leftto theRepublic, hen, o develop viewonlysuggested ytheGorgias; n

so doing, heRepublicwillpresentn account fthedesire orpleasure adi-

callydifferentrom hatwesaw ntheProtagoras.23

23 The Gorgias seems in factto suggesttwo conflicting ccounts of the desire for pleasure.Socrates' argument hatwhatever we pursue we thinkgood (Gorg. 468b-c) entails that

thisdesire mustbe a species of the desire forthegood. The discussion of the appetites in

the conversation withCallicles, however(49

Idff.)

seems toimply

an account much

closer to that of the Republic: desires for pleasure are rooted in their own part of the

soul, do notaim at the good, and can conflictwithdesires for good. Irwin 1979 arguesthat heGorgias is internallynconsistentn this and relatedways. The account I offer in

section IV is intendedto reconcile theapparent nconsistencies.








III. Pleasure and illusion ntheRepublic

The desired and wished for s eitherthegood or the apparent good. Therefore the pleasant is

also desired: for t is an apparentgood. Some believe that t is [good], while to some it appears

so even thoughtheydo not believe that it is. For appearance-perception (9avTao(a) andbelief (S6£a) are not in thesame partof the soul. (Aristotle,Eudemian Ethics 1235b25-9)

In theRepublic, lato ntroduces newtheoryf desire.Now rational esirefor hegood s onlyone speciesofdesire,ndhas its source n a particularpart f the oul, he easoning art; here realso non-rationalesires, ootedin non-rationalarts f the soul. Where o desires orpleasure it n thisscheme? hold that heRepublic distinguishesesiresforpleasures uapleasures rom ther orts f desires desires or ruthndhonor, or xam-

ple,whichwhen

gratifiedieldheir wn

particularleasures,utarenot

properlyonstrueds desiresorpleasures and ssigns hese esires o appe-titeto £TTi6unr)TiK6v).TheRepublic ntroducesppetites thepartwithwhichwe "desirehepleasures f fooddrink,ex, and whateverthers reakin othem,"he companionfcertainndulgencesndpleasures"436alO-bl, 439d8);while hisfallsshort f theexplicitdefinitionf appetitessdesires or leasurehatwesee intheCharmides nd nAristotle, take he

underlyingiew o be the ame.)24

Plato defines ettiSumi'cus desires for pleasure at Charmides l67el-2, Aristotle atNiconiachean Ethics 1 1 1 bl7 and De Anima 414b5-6. There are two possible objectionsto the claim thattheappetitive part s well characterized as the pleasure-desiring part of

the soul. First, n Book IX {Rep. 580d ff.) Plato assigns each part its own pleasures; this

may be thought o underminethe claim thatdesiring pleasure is distinctive f appetite.But nonetheless there s a special connection between pleasure and appetite, which we

can account forby saying that ppetitepursues pleasure for its own sake, pursues things

just for thepleasure theybring.While Plato introducesthe appetitive part of the soul as

thepartdesiringand related to pleasures (436alO-bl, 439d8), pleasure plays no role in

thedefinition f theotherparts,nor do we even discover thattheyhave their own pleas-ures untilBook IX. Moreover, in describingthe democraticman in Book VIII (561c ff.),he ascribes to theappetitivesoul desires for a wide varietyof objects, including objects

associated withreason (the democratdabbles in philosophy) and withspirit the democ-ratmay have a whim for politics and military ffairs) (56 Id). This passage implies that

we mustdistinguishhispart of the soul not by the kind of thing t desires (e.g. sensoryindulgence), but ratherby how itdesires these things just for the pleasure they will

bring.See Cooper 1984: appetitesare those desires that have theirultimateorigin simplyin... the fact that the person in question happens to get a certain pleasure from doingthesethings, nd this ustifiesclassifying desires such as the democratic man's appetiteforphilosophy]... togetherwith thebodily appetites" Cooper 1984: 130).

Second, some object that pleasure is not precisely what appetite pursues. The

6Tn8unr)TiKOv s sometimes referred to not as the pleasure-desiringpart,but rather as

the part thatpursues mere "desire-satisfaction" (see e.g. Santas 2001: 144). However,this

suggestionis not

reallya

rejectionof the view of

appetitesas

pleasure-seeking.Desiring an object only because it will satisfy your desire for it amounts to desiringthe

experience of havingyourdesire satisfied,namely (on Plato's account) pleasure. This is

veryclear in theGorgias, wherethe claim thatpleasure is thegood (495d4) is treated as

equivalent to theclaim that ppetite-satisfactions thegood (491e-492a).

516 JESSICA MOSS







What motivates hischangeinPlato's viewofdesire, nd of the desire for

pleasure nparticular?n this ectionand thenext, shall arguethatPlato is

providingan explanationforwhat we saw hintedat in the Gorgias: that

although ll desiresare in some sense for the

good,when we

desirepleasurewe pursuewhatonly appearsgood, and are immune to reasoningabout what

is reallygood. The Republic explains this by assigningdesiresforpleasureto a partof the soul that acks the cognitive ability to see beyond appear-ances. In this section,I show thatthe Republic characterizesppetite,the

pleasure-desiring artof the soul, as illusion-bound. n the next section, I

showthesignificance fthisfactforPlato's theory fdesire.

Let us begin withPlato's distinction f the appetitive partof the soul

from herationalpart, n Book IV. Here he arguesfor a division of the soul

usingwhat s sometimes alled theprinciple fopposites:It's clear thatthesame thingwill not be willingto do or undergo opposite things n the same

partof it kcxt& toutov) and in relation o the same thing t the same time,so that f we dis-

cover thesethings thesoul's motivations),we will know that herewas not one thingbut many.

(Rep. 436b8-cl)

He applies theprinciple o show that when someone is thirsty ut does not

wish todrink, heremustbe two distinct orces t work withinhis soul (Rep.

439b3-5). What pushes the personto drink,Socrates says, is something

"unreasoningdXoyiaTov)and

appetitive, ompanionof certain

ndulgencesandpleasures" Rep. 439d7-8). Whatforbids im todrink s somethingdiffer-

ent: the resistance rises "out of calculation ek AoyianoO)" (Rep. 439dl),andhas its source in "the calculatingpartof the soul (t6...Xoyiotik6v...

TfjsMA/xnsVnamelyreason Rep. 439d5-6).This argumenthus servestodistinguishwodistinct, otentially onflict-

ingsourcesof motivation n the soul: thepartthat desirespleasure,and the

part hat alculateswhat s best. Recall the significance f calculationin the

Protagoras: only through heweighingandmeasuring f pleasures can the

illusions attending leasuresbe

dispelled.n the

Protagoras,where there s

no distinction etweenpleasureand goodness and no partition f the soul,

desiring leasure nd engaging n calculationare in no sense opposed. Now,

in theRepublic, the partthatcalculates is not concernedwith pleasurebut

ratherwithwhat is best,while thepartthatdesirespleasuredoes not calcu-

late. Plato putsthisemphaticallyby calling appetitedAoyiaxov (unreason-

ingor incapable of calculation)while emphasizingthe role of calculation in

forminghedesiresofreason.

In Book X, Plato again appeals to the principleof opposites to distin-

guish distinct ources in the soulfor

differentental states. This time the

states n questionare not motivationalbut cognitive:believing illusions on

the one hand, nd calculating hetruth n the other. n a passage that ncludes

examplesfamiliar rom heProtagoras,Socrates contrasts hesetwo states:

PLEASURE AND ILLUSION IN PLATO 5 17







The same magnitudeviewed fromnearbyand from far does not seem equal to us.... And the

same thing ooks bent when seen in water and straight ut of water....And are notmeasuring,

countingand weighingmost welcome aids in thesecases, so thatwhat appears bigger, smaller,

more numerous or heavier does not rule in us, but rather what has calculated (to

Xoyiod|aevov), measured or weighed? (Rep. 602c7-d9)

Now he applies theprincipleof opposites, arguingthat the experience f

optical illusions reveals two distinct arts f the soul:

And this calculating, measuring nd weighing] s the work of the rational (XoyiOTiKoG) partof the soul.... But often when this part has measured and has shown that some thingsare

greateror smaller or thesame size as others,the opposite appears at the same time about the

same things ....Didn't we say that t is impossible for the same thingat the same time to

believe opposite things bout the same things?....Therefore the part of the soul that believes

contrary o the measurements can't be the same as the part that believes in accord with the

measurements.... But surelythe part that trusts n measurementand calculation (Aoyiopcp) is

the best partof the soul.... Therefore what opposes it is one of the inferiorparts in us. (Rep.

602el-603a8)

Socrates is arguingthatreasoningbelongs to one partof the soul, while

belief nappearances belongsto another.When a rationalpersonperceives n

optical illusion,one partof hersoul believes that e.g.) the submerged tick

is bent;onlybecause another art f her,whichsees through he illusion, is

dominant n hersoul does she resistacting on this belief. The distinction

looks verylike the distinction f Book IV: cognitivedissonance is beingexplained bythe same mechanism s motivational onflict.Plato makes the

analogyexplicita few ines later:

Just s in the case of sight a person] took sides against himselfand had opposite beliefs in

himself t the same time about the same things, husalso in actions will he take sides and do

battleagainst himself. Rep. 603dl-3)

The questionarises,then: s Plato explainingboth motivational ndcog-nitive onflictwithreference o thesameparts f the soul? Both Book IV and

BookX

identify eason (to XoyiaTiKOv ) as one playerin the conflicts(Rep. 439d5 and602el). The partof the soul that n matters f action looks

to ouroverallgood is thesame part hat ncognitivematters ses calculation

to resist the power of appearances.But what is the "inferiorpart" that

opposes reasonin the cognitivecase, being taken n by the illusions? Is it

The claim that ne thing"rules in us (dpxeiv ev nplv)" recalls Book IV's definition fthe virtues s relations of rule between

partsof the soul

(Rep.441e

ff.).There a

personis wise, courageous, moderateand just when reason "rules" in him and the inferiorpartsare ruled; here a person is cognitivelyvirtuouswhen thecalculating partrules in himandthe llusion-believingpart s ruled.On the translation f thisproblematic entence see thefollowingfootnote.

518 JESSICA MOSS







either ppetite r spirit theparts distinguished romreason in Book IV- or

a combination fboth, r some otherpart ltogether?27We learn the answerby attending o the context of the passage. Plato

introduceshediscussion of optical illusions in order o make a point aboutappearances f anotherkind,those created y imitativepoets. His claim is

that ptical illusionsand the creations fpoets appeal to the same partof the

soul:

...the imitative oet instills bad constitutionn the private soul of each person, gratifying he

partof the soul that s foolish avor)Tcp) and doesn't distinguishgreater hingsfromlesser, but

thinks hat he same things re at one time argeand another imesmall. (Rep. 605b7-c3)

Furthermore,is description f imitativepoetry learly mplies that t is

dangerousbecause its illusions

appealto and

strengthenur

appetites,our

desiresforpleasure. The discussionof poetry ndsby warning hat"If youletin thepleasurable r)8ua|ievr]v)muse in lyric r epic poetry,pleasureand

27There is muchdisputein the iterature. ome come down in favor of appetite: see Mur-

doch 1977: 5, Reeve 1988: 127, 139, Penner 1971: 100-101, Annas 1981: 131. Others

think hatbothappetite and spirit re intended,althoughneithervery precisely (Adam1902 II: 406) or that ome new, unspecified part s here introduced Janaway 1995: 144).Othershave argued thatBook X posits a division withinreason itself:one part calculates,while another, nferior artof reason falls preyto illusion (Murphy 1951: 239-40, Neha-

mas 1982: 265). The evidence for this nterpretations a naturalreadingof lines 602e4-6:toutcp Be TToXXaKisMETprjaavTi kcu orinaivovTi me(£co -rra elvai r| eXaTTco

ETepa eTEpcov f\ ca TavavTi'a 9a(vETai ana TTEpi outo: "But [often] when this

part [reason] has measured and has indicated that some things re larger or smaller or

the same size as others, heopposite appears to it at the same time" (trans. Grube/Reeve,

emphasis mine). If we read the sentence thisway, it implies thatreason bothdoes and

does not believe in the illusion;the principleof opposites would thus force a division

within he rationalpartof thesoul. I thinkwe should resist this nterpretation, hich is not

onlyad hoc (there s no otherevidence in the Republic nor, so far as I can see, in anyother dialogue for this kind of division withinreason) but also stronglycountered byPlato's otherremarks n thepassage. Plato refers o the illusion-believingpart as "a partof us that s far from wisdom (9povr)OEcos)" (Rep. 603al2) and avor)Tov (not under-

standing,foolish,unreasonable,Rep. 605b8). Furthermore, e has introduced thispart ofthe soul as thepartover which imitative rt has power (see Rep. 603c), and, as I go on to

argue, the rest of his remarks in Book X, as well as those in the initial discussion of

poetry,myths nd other mimetic arts in Books II and III, make clear that imitation

primarily ffects the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul. Lastly, the association

between the desire forpleasure and susceptibility o illusion which I demonstrate n this

chapter should provide a substantive nswer to Nehamas' question "Why should our

desire tell us that he mmersed tick s bent?" (Nehamas 1982: 265). What, then,should

we do with theproblematic ines 602e4-6? Adam suggeststhat we understandTavavria

not as "'opposite appearances' in general,but the contraryin any given instance) of the

impressionformedwithout he aid of measurement" in which case Plato "merely saysthat he rational element takes the

oppositeview of an

objectfrom thatwhich is at the

same momententertained y the rrational lement"(Adam 1902 II: 408, 466-7). Lorenz

2006 argues compellinglyfor Adam's reading,and gives a detailed expositionof Book X

to supportthe view thatPlato is attributingome form f appearance-based belief to spiritand appetite.








pain will be kings in your city" (Rep. 607a5-6), and condemns imitative

poetry s "thepoetry hat ims at pleasure" Rep. 607c4-5). Many otherpas-

sages in Book X also suggestthat the illusions of poetry and thusopticalillusions as well

appealto the

pleasure-desiring,ppetitivesoul.28 These

passages specifythe kinds of pleasurewe take in the illusions poetry pre-sents. Plato claims thatpoetic imitationgratifies ur desires forstrong mo-

tions, nd he describesthesedesires as appetitive.29assages in Book III also

support he conclusion thatpoetry ppeals to theappetitive oul, arguingthat

imitativepoetry s dangerousbecause it makes people and cities intemper-ate that s, because itstrengthensheir ppetites.30

(In fact, here s some indication hat mitative oetry ffects pirit s well

as appetite.31he questionof the relationof spiritto poetry, nd to appear-

28 That according o BookX imitativeoetry ppeals to theappetitiveoul is widelyaccepted,evenamong hosewhodenyordoubt hat ptical llusion oes as well. SeeAnnas 1981:338,Ferrari 989:138,Nehamas 988:282,Reeve 1988: 230.The part f the oul that esires o remembermisfortunesnd to grieveover them s"insatiable" or hesethingsa-rrArioTcosxov>Rep-604d9): variations f aTrAriaTOSare used inconnectionwith heappetites t Republic442a7, 555b9, 562b6,562b 0,562c5,578al, 586b3, nd 590b8. Oddly, heword s also used once to characterizereason, t475c7.)Thepart fthe oulthathungers orthe atisfactionfweeping nd

sufficientlyamenting,eing by nature such as to have appetitesfor these things(6TTi8uneTv),s thepartthat s satisfied nd delighted y thepoets" (Rep. 606a4-7,

emphasismine);whenwe allow ourselves oenjoywatchingomeone else indulge n

such motion, e obtain leasureRep.606b4).Furthermore,lato describes hetype fcharacterhat ives nto xcessive motions nd that s naturallykintopoetic mitationas "irritablendmulticolored"ayavaKTr)TiK6v e kcuttoiki'Aov,ep.605a5). Earlierhe has usedtheword multicolored'everal timesn connection ith heappetites: odescribe hedemocrat,he characterwho is ruledby his appetitesRep. 561e5; cf.557c5-9, 558c5, 559d9), and to describe theappetites hemselves"a multicolored,multiheadedeast" Rep. 588c7-8)). (See also Rep.404e3.) A passage I quoted bovementionsppetitiveualitiesas well as anger)as thetargetsf poetic mitation:And

concerningexual desires ndanger nd all the ppetitiveesires ndpainsandpleas-ures n the oul....poetic mitation....urtureshese hings, ateringhem lthoughheyshouldwither,ndsets hem ptorule nusalthoughheyhouldbe ruled" Rep. 606dl-5,emphasismine).

Inoutliningisprogramfcensorship,ocratesaysthat nsultsmade orulerslikethoseat liad 1.225)should otbe heard yyoung eoplewhom ne wants omaketemperate,"althoughfthey ffer ome other leasure, hat'snothingo be wondered t" (Rep.390a4-5).He also condemns assages bout hepleasures ffood,drink nd sex as det-rimentaloself-controlevKpdTeia,Rep. 390b3). The style f poetry e rejects s badfor he ity themixed tyle,' nwhich hepoetnotonlynarrates ut lso imitateshecharactersi.e. speaks ntheir oices) s notonlydangerous ut lso offers hegreatestpleasures o gnoranteople: it sbyfar hemost leasanto childrenndteachers...ndthegreat rowd"Rep.397d7-8).Finally, ocrates ndGlauconagree that heir ensor-

ship sanexercise nmakinghe ity emperate:Withoutoticingtwe have beenpuri-fying gain he itywhichustnow we said was luxurious.That'sbecause we're being

temperateoco9povo0vtes)" (Rep. 399e5-7). Temperance ocoq>poouvr))is later

describeds "A kind f order nd themasteryf certain leasures nd appetites"Rep.430e6-7,cf.442a-d).AtRep. 604e2 and605a5 Plato peaksof imitationsf and for"irritable"ayavaK-tfjtikov) characters; his eemsto be an allusion o spirit,hepartthat xperiences

520 JESSICAMOSS







Ferrarinotes theanalogy in his excellentdiscussion of thispassage: he writes thatto the

rational person "the stickdoes still ook bent,the person still ooks tiny.... o too.... the

bereaved father....knows, as itwere, the true size of his bereavement when measured

against the fullness of a life. This knowledge will not stop himgrieving (the stick still

looks bent, hebereavement s stillpainful)....But this knowledge will prevent the imme-

diate reactionfromrulingor obsessing him" (Ferrari 1989: 133). See also White: "Ourvisual perspective,whichpaintingrenders, hows things s they appear froma particular

standpoint.... Similarly....tragedy hows us situations n thatmanner in which they pro-duce an immediateemotionalreaction,not as theywould be looked on by reason, that s,

as requiring a calculated and rational response designed to make the best of

them Moreover, ust as a preoccupation withappearances may prevent us fromcal-

culatingthefacts, o by succumbingto emotionswe maybe prevented from the calcula-

tion that s needed to improvethe situation" White 1979: 256). Murphy uggestsa similar

view: tragedy is analogous to painting nd optical illusion because it appeals to "our

carelessness and inattentionnd our readiness to ump to conclusions uncritically" Mur-

phy 1951: 241). Belfiore, in her analysis of Republic X, argues thatpain appears bad

(and pleasure good),and thatwhen we succumb

emotionallyto

poetrywe are uncriti-

cally accepting this appearance (Belfiore 1983).

ances and illusions moregenerally, s too broad to enter n here;my aim at

present s to make sense ofthewidely recognized ut mysteriousmplicationthat ppetitebelieves the llusions discussed inRepublicX.)

Just ike optical illusions, then, mitativepoetry ppeals to the unreason-ing (dAoyiOTov) part(s) of the soul insteadof to the part that follows

rational alculation \oy\o\x6%).t appeals to thispartby arousingand grati-

fyingour emotions and desires. Republic X thus implies that indulgingemotion s analogous to or even an instance f accepting appearances.32n

the discussion of imitative poetryPlato describes a reason-ledperson as

"measured" nhisgrief,33nd saysthat ucha personholds back from amen-

tationbecause he follows "calculation" (Rep. 604d5); these two remarks

remindus of reason's role in combatingoptical illusions (reason measures

and calculates at Rep. 602d-603a). The thoughts hat Plato here describes scalculationincludethe thought hat"it is unclear what is good and bad in

suchthings e.g. the deathofone's son]" (Rep. 604bl0-ll). The implicationis thatalthoughthe deathof a son certainlyppears to be bad, ust as the

stick nwater ppearsto be bent,reasondoes not simply acceptthis appear-ance. In desiring to grieve and lament, meanwhile, the unreasoning

(dXoyiaTov, Rep. 604d9) appetitive oul is passively giving in to theway

things appear, and it must be resistedby rationalcalculations about how

anger. There is also a directreferenceto anger at 606dl-5, quoted above. This passage

implies thatbothspirit nd appetite boththepartof thesoul that xperiences anger, and

the part associated with sex "and all the appetitive desires, pleasures and pains"- are

affectedby poetry.Books II and III also imply thatspirit s affected by poetic imitation:

theyoutlinea programof education thataims to mold the spiritby means of poetryand

otherarts.

MexpiaoEi, frompeTpia^eiv, Rep. 603e8: the word means "to be moderate," but the

remarks hatfollow encourage us to note the etymological connection withMETpeTv,to

measure."








things eally re.34 mitativepoetry ppeals to appetiteby presentingppear-ances (e.g. that he death of a son is bad) that ppetiteembraces as real; appe-titefails toquestion appearanceswithrespect o good andbad ust as it fails

toquestionappearances

withrespect

ofar ndnear.Thus Plato concludes the

passage with the explicit reference ack to optical illusions that I quotedabove: "the mitative oet ... gratifies]thepartof the soul that... oesn't dis-

tinguishgreater hingsfrom esser,but thinks hat hesame things re at one

time argeand another ime mall" {Rep. 605b7-c3).Thus Book IV's case of thethirstyman and Book X's case of optical illu-

sions do after ll dividethe soul into the same parts:a calculating,rational

parton the one hand,and a pleasure-desiring,rrational arton the other.35

When we see a straighttick nwater s bent,or a distant bject as small, it

is appetite hatbelieves the appearance.The Republic assigns to the appeti-tivepartof the soul not only the lowest kindof desire,but also the lowest

kind of cognitive power: imagination eiKaaia), a power of apprehending

onlyimagesand notreality.6Like theprisonersnthecave, appetitefails to

distinguish ow things refromhow they ppear.Itmaybe objectedthat his s too stark view ofappetite.After ll, Plato

does recognizethatsome appetites re necessary, nd even beneficial Rep.558d ff), nd have a positiverole inthe ust,well-ordered oul. They"do their

own work" Rep. 586e5-6)- satisfyingheirmoderate esires and in thepro-

cess supplying hebodywith he nourishmentt needs to sustain the activityof the soul, and supplyinga modicum of appetitive "wellbeing" arguablybeneficialto the soul itself.37f thepleasuresthat theseappetites eek is in

factbeneficial, an it be thatthese appetitesexercise owly EiKaaia? Can it

be that ven thesoul ofa philosopher, hewise, ust, well-orderedoul, is in

one of itsparts o cognitively ase?38

34 Anotherhoughtescribed s calculations that humanffairsre notworth reat eri-ousness" Rep.604bl2-cl): reason uts heman'spains nto erspective,s itdoes whenitcorrectsor ffectsf distance nmattersfsight.

Again, omit discussionf pirit.Thecognitive owers re listednBookVI, 51 d-e. Forargumentshat ppetite xer-cisesEiKaaia, see Reeve 1988: 139 andMurdoch 977:4-5.Plato aysthat he ppetiteor elicaciesoyov), whilenot ssential osurvival r evenhealth,maybe necessaryif toffers ome benefit egarding ellbeing ei/E^ia)" Rep.559b6).Platodoes not laborate is idea,butwe are clearly o understandhatnsomecases it s simply good thingoexperiencemoderate,uiet)appetitive leasures.Cer-

tainlyt s easiertodo philosophynd practice usticewhen one's appetites re notstarved or asicneeds compare hepassageon preparingor leep,at Republic 7 dff.); erhapst s eveneasier o do so when ne's appetitesrepositivelyontentI owethis bjection o JohnMcDowell and BenMorison.Reeve arguesthat ecessary

appetiteorrespondsotti'otis,

notEiKaaia,

and that hoseruledby necessary ppetiteexercise hishigher acultyReeve1988:97-98).He wishes o maptheparts f the oul

onto hefour ognitiveaculties escribednthedivided ine imilenRepublicVI; this san interestingroject, ut think eeve goes wrong n executingt.While Sidvoiashould urely e attributedoreason longwith orjois,he attributesttospirit, laiming

522 JESSICAMOSS







In fact think his s preciselyPlato's view. Necessaryappetitesunreflec-

tivelypursuewhat strikes hem as good, just as unnecessary ppetitesdo.

The onlydifferences that n the case of necessary ppetites, he appearances

ofgoodnessaretrue; nfact,we can simplydefine henecessary ppetitesasthosethathappento be constituted uchthatbeneficialthings appear good to

them.Comparethecognitive tateof theproducing lass inthe deal city,the

political counterpartf necessary ppetitesin the just soul. These crafts-

men necessaryfor hecity'ssurvivalandwellbeing,andthus tolerated are

no morecognitivelyadvanced hantheir ounterpartsn ordinaryities. The

idealcitydoes notencourage ts lowest class to do the kind of thinking hat

wouldtake them wayfrom mages and up toward ruth;39nstead t protectsthemfromharmfulmages thecensoredpassages of poetry hatglorify ust,

or make death seem terrible) ndreplacesthese with mythsand stories andmusicthatpresent ruth-likemagesof thegods and virtues. hese images are

like "useful drugs" administered y wise doctors {Rep. 389b): beneficial

because truth-like,utdrugsnonetheless,meant o be swallowed whole rather

thancritically xamined.Necessaryappetitesand the ideal city's craftsmen

have a limited set of truebeliefsabout what is good, but no awareness of

highergoods and no understandingf whytheirbeliefsare true;40nd while

truebeliefswithoutunderstanding ay be innocuous and even useful, theyare nonetheless, lato tellsus, blindand shameful hings.41

In theRepublic, then,the association betweenpleasureand illusion thatfunctionedlmost as a background ssumption ftheProtagoras is developedinto full-fledgedheory. he pleasure-seekingnd illusion-susceptible acul-

ties are separated ff from hegood-seeking ndreasoningfaculties;each of

thesepairs s now rooted n its own partof the soul. Various passages from

outside the Republic supportthis interpretation.irst, thereare passages

that t s thekind fthoughtneneeds oexercise norder osatisfy love of honor. omake his rgumentemust onstrueiavoia as "the ntellectualesourcesnecessary o

yield rue eliefs bout hevisibleworld" ibid. 96), which eemsto me a sharpdepar-ture rom lato'sconceptionf Sidvoia as thekind fthought athematiciansngage n,thoughthatmakes se ofthe visibleworldmerely s an imageof the ntelligibleRep.510d-e). f weassign piritti'otisnstead,s wemay urely o for latomakes tquiteclear hatpirits tiedtoperceptionnd the world f thecave thenwe cannot ollowReeve indistinguishingetween hecognitive aculties f necessary nd unnecessaryappetites:heresnothingeft verbut owly iKaoia. Theargumentsgivebelowshouldmake his ackofcognitiveistinctionompelling.The producinglass is deniedthe ntellectualducation eededto turn he soul awayfrom ecomingnd toward eing Rep. 521d3-4), ndeven, it wouldseem, the non-rational,musical" ducationhat he uxiliaries eceivesee 456d).CompareBobonich:Althoughroper rainingan ensurethat heSpirited artfinds

honorn fine

objectsnd that he

Appetitive artprefershe atisfactionf

necessarybodily ppetiteso the atisfactionfunnecessary ppetites, either art an be broughtto value theseobjectsbecause they ossesswhatreasonwouldrecognizeas genuinevalue" Bobonich 002:332-3).

41 506c6-7; he ontexts a discussionfbeliefs bout hegood nparticular.

PLEASURE ND LLUSIONNPLATO 523







wherePlato groups pleasurewith perception: ee e.g. Phaedo 65c,Theaetetus156b,andTimaeus69c-d.Perceptionesponds nlyto appear-ances,having oaccess tohow hings eallyre;theotherwiseuzzling on-nection etween

leasurend

perceptionn these

dialoguesecomes lear f

we take t that latoregardsesires orpleasures slavesto appearancesswell.42 econd,theTimaeusstates ppetite's ependencen images quiteexplicitly:

The partof thesoul thathas appetitesfor food and drink nd whateverelse it feels a need for,

given the body's nature43... does not] understandthe deliverances of reason... [or] have an

innate regard for any of them, but... [is] much more enticed by images and phantoms

(eiScbAcov Kai yavraoiiaTCAv) night nd day. Hence the god conspired with thisvery ten-

dency by constructing liver [as the bodily seat of the appetites].... so that the force of its

thoughts entdown from he mindmightbe stampedupon it as upon a mirror hatreceives the

stampsand returns isible images. (Tim. 70d7-71b5, trans.Donald J.Zeyl)44

Inthenext ection, will show howthe eparationf thepleasure-desir-ing facultyrom hereasoning acultymotivateslatoto abandon hePro-

tagoras'view hatll desires an nprincipleeadus towardhegood,andto

adopt nstead heview hat irtueanonly eattainedia the uppressionnd

masteryfourdesires or leasure.

IV. The desireforpleasure nd thedesireforgood

In thedialogues houghto pre-dateheRepublic,Socrates rgues hatwedesire nlywhatwe believe ood, venwhenwepursue leasure.45 heneverwe desire particularhing,wedesiretqua good;when omeone esiresharmfulleasure,herefore,hedoesso inthemistaken elief hat hat hingisgood.Accordingo a widely ccepted iew, ntheRepublic lato abandonsthisposition. nlyreasondesires hegood;thedesires f the owerparts fthe oul includingppetitive esires orpleasure are not concerned ith

Timaeus 69c-d also associates perceptionwithspirit thumos),which togetherwithappe-

tite omprises the nonrational soul in the Republic and later dialogues. As I mention nsection III, Republic X implies a connection between spirit nd illusion. It is certainly

plausible to see spiriteddesires for honor, glory, reputation,victoryand the like as

susceptible to thepower of appearance in various ways (in particular,as subject to bias

towardthenear, ust like desires forpleasure); however, it is also clear that Plato holds

spirit n muchhigher steem thanappetite.For some discussion of the relation of spirit o

appetitesee Moss 2005.

Clearly a reference to necessary appetites, supportingmy argumentthatthese too are

image-bound.^

In Coopered. 1997.

Protagoras 354c claims explicitlythatpeople pursue pleasure because they believe it

good.For the more

generalclaim thatwhatever we

pursuewe think

good,see

Gorgias468b-c, Meno 77c-78b, and Symposium205a ff. where thedesire for money, accordingto theRepublic a paradigm appetitivedesire, is specificallydescribed as a desire for the

good (205d)). A similarview of desire can be inferredfromApology 25e-26a and other

passages in theearly dialogues.

524 JESSICA MOSS







thegood.46 hefact hat he owerparts f the oul do not desire hegoodexplainswhymotivationalonflicts possible, ontraSocrates'positionnthe rotagorasndotherarly ialogues,ndwhy irtueanonly e achieved

throughsychicrder,he tate n which eason ules ndthe owerparts fthe soul obey.As Terencerwinputs t, onlyreason'sdesires re"good-dependent"only rational esireforx depends n the beliefthat x is

good while he esiresf ppetitere good-independent."47It is certainlyrue hat, ccordingo theRepublic, nlyreason'sdesires

canberelied pon o ead us toward he ood hence henecessityhat easonrule na virtuousoul), nd nagent's ppetitiveesires reoftenndependentofher rational art'sbeliefs boutgoodand bad (hence hepossibility fmotivationalonflict).s it righto say,however,hat nlyreasondesires

thegood?Does appetite esiretsobjectswithoutn any wayconceivingfthose bjects s good?Recentwork pposesthese onclusions: esses 1987,Carone2001 andBobonich 002 argue ompellinglyhat n theRepublic(and ater ialogues) latoretainshe Socratic" iew hat ll desires for he

good.I havethree easons orwishing o join this resistance o the orthodox

view.First,thatview entails radical iscontinuityetween heview ofdesire ttributedo Socratesn theearlier ialogues nd the ater,which oesbeyondwhat snecessaryormakingense fthedialogues;t evenattributes

radicalnconsistencyn the question f desire o a single dialogue, heGorgias.Second, t leavesno room forwhat haveargueds a well-sup-

ported iewthat oespreserveontinuityetween hedialogues nd within

theGorgias: that ppetite esires leasure ecause t appears o be good.Third, f Plato has rejectedhe viewthatdesire s good-dependentn the

Republiche is far rom lear bout aying o: hecertainlyeems to claimthatveryonelways esireshe ood 505d-e), ndtospeak ven fthe ppe-titive art fthe oulas desiringtsobjects ua good 555b, 562b);48mean-

while,the evidence hat heRepublicconstruesppetitess "bareurges,"

46 Here again I will concentrate only on appetites, leaving the question of spiritmostly o

one side. See Reeve 1988: 136-7 and Irwin 1995: 212 for argumentsthatunlike appeti-tive desires, spirit'sdesires involve the notionof goodness in some way. (Reeve also

argues thatnecessary appetites have a limitedconcept of the good, while unnecessary

appetiteshave none (Reeve 1988: 135-6).)4/

Irwin1977: 78, 117 192, Irwin1979: 218, 221, Irwin 1995: 208-9.4

One can read these passages as noncommittal n the question of good-dependence: per-

haps at 505d-e Plato means only thatwe pursue the good in virtue of our rational part;

perhapswhen he

speaksof the

oligarachicand democratic

appetite-ruled constitutionsetting ut money or freedom as good (555b, 562b) he means onlythat the civic analogue of the rational part in such cities, enslaved as it is to appetite,

regardsmoneyor freedom s good. But I would urgethat uch readings are unnecessar-

ily indirect.








devoid f all cognitiveontent nd nparticularlyevoid f thoughtsbout

goodness,s atvery est nconclusive.49Infact,fwe lookcarefullyt the rgumentshathavebeenmadefor he

claim that heRepublic

does not construeppetites

s desires orgood,

wefind gooddealofinconsistencyetween uthorsandsometimeswithin

single uthor'swork) s to what reciselys meant ythis laim.Onlythose

supportingheuntenablebareurge" iew ofappetite rgue hat ppetitennoway hinksf tsdesired bjects s good;elsewhere, e find nlydenialsthatppetiteonstruestsobjects s good n one or another f various om-

plex ways:as bestoverall,for nstance,r goodall things onsidered,r

morallyood.50

The evidence for this view comes from Book IV's example of the thirsty erson who

does notwish to drink,which Plato uses to establish the distinction etween reason and

appetites. "Thirst tselfwill never be an appetitefor nything ther than what it is for bynature,drink tself, nd hungerforfood.... - Each appetite s only for thatthingwhich it

is for by nature,while appetites for somethingthat is of such and such a kind have

something dded. ...Let no one then findus unprepared and disturbus, saying that no

one has an appetite for drinkbut for beneficial [xphotoO] drink.... because everyonehas appetites for good things tgjv aya6cbv]" (Rep. 437e4-438a4). This passage has

been interpreteds a direct denial of the Socratic claim that ll desires are for the good,and furthermores implying hat ppetite acks thecognitiveresourcesto desire anythingqua good (Cornford1941: 130, Irwin1995: 209-1 1, Reeve 1988: 135, and many others).But when we look at the wider context,the interpretation implydoes not work. Cooper

pointsout that ater n thedialogue desires forparticularkinds of food and drink are con-strued as appetites,and argues thatthebare, unqualified appetites presented in Book IV

are intendedonly as theclearest,simplestcases (Cooper 1984: 126-8, citing among other

examples thedesires of the democrat at Rep. 561c, and Rep. 437dl l-e2); Annas, amongothers, argues that later passages attributeto appetite far more complex cognitiveresources than the minimalones required for bare urges, so that the Book IV passageshould not be takenas the ast word on appetite Annas 1981: 129-30, citing Rep. 442c-d,

571c-572b, and 580d-581a); and Price pointsto several passages that clearly attribute

evaluative thoughts o appetite, ncluding thoughts bout what s "better" Price 1995: 50,

citing Rep. 442d, 554d, and 574d). (I am broadly sympathetic o Price's discussion of this

topic, at Price 1995: 49-52.) Bobonich uses these same passages to argue thatappetitedoes have a concept of thegood, namelyof what is good for t (Bobonich 2002: 243 ff).

Adam offers plausible interpretationf the Book IV passage which allows thatappe-titesdo think f their bjects as good: indenyingthat thirst s always the desire for gooddrinkSocrates means to deny only thatthirsts always the desire for "drink which is in

realitygood;" Socrates does notdeny that thirst s always the desire for "drink which

desire thinksgood" (Adam 1902 I: 250). On Carone's reading,thepointof the passage is

thatdesires are individuatedby their characteristic objects, where this s consistentwith

everydesire being a desire for tsobject qua good; she cites important arallels betweenthe Book IV passage and theuncontroversially ocratic Charmides (167c ff.) in supportof herreading Carone 2001: 118-120).Hence Irwin sometimes defines good-dependent desires as ones dependent on beliefs

about "the final good" or "what is best over all" (Irwin 1977: 78, 191), although his

examplessometimes assume a weaker notion of the

good (ibid. 117, 184);Cornford

treats hethought hat n object is good as "a moral udgment" to desire something s

good is todesire it as morallygood, and to have the normativethought hat "the desire

oughtto be satisfied" Cornford1912: 260-261, n.2); Penner denies only thatappetite has

thoughts bout "thegood, all things onsidered" (Penner 1971: 97); while when Murphy

526 JESSICA MOSS







Certainly here s an important ifference etween the way reason con-

ceives of its objects of desire and the way appetitedoes and betweenthe

desireforpleasureas presentedntheProtagoras and this same desire as pre-

sented n theRepublic but this differences not best expressed s a differ-ence betweendesiresthat nvolve thoughts bout goodnessand those that do

not. In this paper I have provided way of distinguishing etweenreason'sand appetite'scognitive capacitiesthat can also, I now suggest, help us to

understandhedifference etween heir esires.Appetitivedesires are different

in kind fromreason's not because they lack all concernforthe good, but

rather ecause appetite ails todistinguish etween whatmerely ppears goodand what s trulygood that s, because it is stuck at the cognitive evel of

e'lKaaia, imagination.

Recall the distinction etweentwo views of desire implicit in the Pro-tagoras: desire as rational, risingout of calculation and sensitive to subse-

quentcalculation Socrates' view) vs. desire as nonrational,ndifferento cal-

culation and respondingmerely o howthings ppear the many's view). The

Republic finds place in the soul for each kind of desire.The rationalpart

employs calculation to counteract he effect f appearanceson its beliefs

(Book X), and its desires arise "out of calculation" (Book IV). Appetite,meanwhile, s dXoyiaTov, unreasoning: tneither alculates norchanges its

beliefs in responseto calculations; thereforets desires too will be non-

rational, nsensitive o calculation.51We can point to two ways in which this cognitivequality renders ppe-tite's desires not literally good-independent,ut very deficient ndeed as

desires for hegood. First, s RepublicX emphasizes,appetite's insensitivity

speaks of reason as the only part that desires the good he means that t is the only partthatdesires euSaipovia (Murphy 1951: 29), or that schews "anythingwhich on general

grounds,everything elevanthavingbeen taken intoaccount, we consider bad" (Murphy1951: 46-47). Murphyeven allows that n Book IV the appetitive soul desires drinkqua

good, so long as "good" is understood s "good 'of its kind,'" by which he means pleas-ant (Murphy 1951: 45); thus his view turns ut to be veryclose to thatof Price, who says

that itwill fit he same phenomena to say thatappetite aims only at pleasure and takesno interestn thegood, or that t dentifies hegood withpleasure" (Price 1995: 50).Itmayseem a problemfor Plato's claim that heappetitivesoul is aAoyioTov and that ts

desires do not arise out of calculation (Rep. 439d) thathe characterizes thispart of the

soul as money-loving n Book VIII. For as he describes it,the desire for money seems to

arise out of one formof calculation: the means-endreasoningthat ells us thatmoney will

procuremore pleasures. Perhaps this s not the case: see Lorenz 2004: 111 for an argu-ment that ppetitedesires money non-instrumentally,s a "direct source of pleasure." Or

perhaps Plato does not include means-end reasoning as a form of calculation, althoughhe does not tell us why:he maythink f calculation proper s concerningonly the choice

of ends. At any rate,appetite's desire formoney is compatible withits inability o ques-tion

appearances: moneystrikesus as

goodbecause it can

procurepleasant things,ustas

particularpleasant things pastries,for instance) strike us as good because they give us

pleasure. Appetite needs some empirical beliefs in order to form even its simplestdesires; plausibly,theexperience-based belief thatmoneyprocures pastries is not cogni-

tivelymorecomplex than theexperience-based belief thatpastriestastegood.








to calculation makes its beliefs ntractable,nd this will apply to its belief-

dependent esiresas well. Appetite cceptsappearances:because a submergedstickappearsbent, ppetitewill continue o believe that t is benteven when

theagent's

rationalpart

has calculatedotherwise.Likewise,

because apleas-ingdrink ppears good, appetitewillcontinue to believe that t is good even

when the agent's rationalparthas calculated otherwise and thus will con-

tinue to desire t. This is of courseprecisely hephenomenonwe saw at work

inseveralexamples from heGorgias: because pleasureappears good, a cer-

tainkindofpersonbelieves thatpleasure s good, and is immuneto reason-

ingthat uestionsthis ppearance.Now we can understandhatkindof personas one whose soul is ruledby appetite.

On this understanding,ppetitedoes desirethingsqua good: it desires

pleasures ust because it takesthemto be good. Because appetite s separatefrom he rationalpartofthesoul both in its desires and its beliefs,however,a person may continueappetitivelydesiringa particular leasure qua goodeven while rationallybelievingthatpleasurebad. Note that,while denyingIrwin's characterizationfappetites s strictly ood- ndependent,his nterpre-tationdoes agreewithwhat believe to be themain point of Irwin's distinc-

tion and the view most interpretersave intendedn claimingthatappetitesare not desires forgood. For on my interpretationppetitivedesireswill be

independent f the gent'srationalbeliefs about thegood, and thereforende-

pendent f the gent's beliefsaboutthegood insofar s the agentis identifiedwithher reason.52

There is also a secondway inwhichappetite'scognitive imitationsmake

its desires deficient s desiresfor hegood. The Republic characterizes eason

notmerely s thinkingboutwhat s good, butas thinkingboutthe good in

complex ways. Reason is "thepartthat has calculatedabout the better nd

worse"{Rep. 441cl-2); it "has within t knowledgeof whatis advantageousfor ach part nd for hewhole" {Rep. 442c6-7); it"has foresight n behalf of

the whole soul" {Rep. 441e5). To have thoughts ike this,one mustengage

in some fairly ophisticated ormsof thinking.One must make comparativejudgments,or consider complex object as a whole while also consideringeach of itsparts, rprioritize etween differentartsof the soul, or calculate

the ong-term gainsttheshort-termonsequencesofan action. I suggestthat

when Plato describes reason's desires as arising kXoyiajioO (out of calcula-

tion),he has precisely hesetypesofthoughtnmind, nd thathe thinksthis

kind of calculation is valuable because only by engagingin it can one dis-

5 Vlastos uccinctlyormulates hat have called the "mainpoint" f thegood-depend-

ent/good-independentistinction ithout

ny ppealto the

conceptfgoodness:

hesaysthatntheBook V passage uoted bove {Rep. 437e-438a), which omehave taken o

show that ppetitesre good-independentesires, lato wants ocall attentiono thefactthatwe maycrave at timesforms f gratificationnacceptable o our reason"(Vlastos1991:87).

528 JESSICAMOSS







cover what is trulygood just as only by engaging n calculation of other

kindscan one discover the relative izes of objects at differentistances,or

thetrue hapeof a submerged tick.

Furthermore,uch

thoughtsre

clearlyunavailable to a partof the soulthatforms ts beliefssimplyon the basis of appearance.An object cannot

simplyappear to have good long-term onsequencesthaton balance out-

weigh tsshort-termrawbacks, r to be well-suited o thenature f the soul

considered s a whole (as when reason thinks that something s "advanta-

geous"); to have thesethoughts, ne must at some point have engaged in

some formof calculation.53 herefore, hile appetitemay desirethingsqua

good, it can neverhave thekindofthoughtsboutgoodness thatreasondoes.

Reason is well-suited o rule the soul not merelybecause it desires what it

thinksgood, but because it can reasonin ways that allow it to figureoutwhat is in factgood, and thereby evelop desiresfor what is trulygood.

Republic VII makes this point vividby making knowledgeof theForm of

the Good the culminationof a long, rigorousphilosophiceducation. "Who-

ever is unable to distinguish he Form of theGood by means of a rational

account (tco Xoycp), isolating t from ll otherthings,surviving ll refuta-

tion...knows neither he Good itself nor any other good' {Rep. 534b8-c5,

emphasismine).Only bygrasping heFormcan one know whichthingsare

truly ood, and onlybyworking hroughmathematics, stronomy nd dialec-

tic can one come toknowtheForm;thereforenly a partof the soul able toengage in very sophisticated hought the rationalpart) or perhapsa part

sufficientlyeceptive o the thoughtsof such a part (spirit) can reliably

guide itsdesireswith ruebeliefs bout thegood.54On my reading, hen, ppetite oes desire thingsqua good, but its desires

arehighly eficient esiresforgood,desiresthat annotbe reliedupon to lead

us toward the good because they are insensitive to the kind of

thought rational alculation that s alone suitedto discern hegood. This

wayofmakingthe distinction etween reason's and appetite'sdesiresavoids

thedisadvantages f makingthedistinctionn termsof good-dependencendgood-independence hat mentioned bove: it offers coherent ccountof the

natureof appetite's desires, and also preservescontinuitywithin Plato's

Although perhaps after ne has habituallyengaged in such calculations objects can sim-

ply appear to one to have such complex characteristics. Aristotle's view of virtue as a

quasi-perceptual capacity,and his insistence that even the virtuousperson pursues what

appears good to him see Nicomachean Ethics 1 114a32) implysuch a view.

Compare Carone: "[O]nly reason can know what is actually good for the overall well-

being of theperson,and can thusoppose the lower partsof the soul, which have at most

narrow-minded eliefs about whatsimply appears'

to begood

to each of them"(Carone2001: 120). Lesses argues thatonlyreason can have "all things onsidered" views about

what is good, and thattherefore The non-rationalparts are especially liable to be mis-

taken about whether what they pursue really is good since they,unlike reason, are not

equipped to answer questions about thenatureof what is good" (Lesses 1987: 151).








account fdesire. urthermore,ndvery mportantly,hiswayofmaking hedistinctioniestogetherhecognitivendethical ttributesfthe ppetitivepart f the oul.Morallynd ntellectually,ppetitesre stucknthe ealm f

appearances.he

partf the soul thatdesires

leasures a slave to how

things ppear,ndthis reventstnotonlyfromxercisinghehigher indsofthoughthence he dea that heappetitiveoul exercisesnlythe owestkind fthought,iKaoia), but also from xperiencinghehigher indofdesire.55

V. Pleasure as apparentgood: a brief ubsequenthistory

Beforeoncludingwish to note, n supportfmy nterpretationf Plato,theprevalencef the dea that leasures an apparent ood n theworks f

philosopherserymuch nfluencedy Plato: Aristotle,picurus, nd theStoics.I havealreadyndicatedristotle'sositionn the twoepigraphsbove.

He explainswhypleasures an objectof desire y calling t an "apparentgood" 9aiv6nEvov dya66v) (Eudemian thics 1235b25-9; ompare eMotu Animalium00b29 andNicomachean thics1155b25-6).For Aris-totle,s for lato, he ppearancehat leasuresgoodcontains nelementfillusion: Inthemany, eceptioneemsto comeabouton account fpleas-ure.For while t s not thegood, t appears o be. Theychoosethepleasant

as beinggood,then, nd avoidpain as beingbad" {NicomacheanEthics1113a33-b2).56

Epicurus' iew f the elationetween leasure,ppearance,ndgoodnessis very lose to the one I haveattributedo Plato, but withdiametricallyopposed ignificance.orPlato,the pparentoodness fpleasures a dan-

gerous llusion. For Epicurus, leasure ndpain,57longwithperceptionsandpreconceptions,recriteria ftruthDiogenesLaertius .31).Whatdoesthismean?Thatustas whateverppearswhite o us, in thatweperceivet

Price draws an analogy thatpoints n thisdirection,althoughhe does not follow up theconsequences for appetite: "What differentiatesSocrates' position [in the early dia-

logues] is thathe aimed all desires not ust at thegood taken ndefinitely, ut at long-term

happiness (eudaimonia) as conceived rationally if often foolishly) by the agent. Again,belief and truth rovide a helpful analogy: all beliefs aim at truth,ndeterminately on-

ceived.... but some beliefsmay irrationallydentify ealitywith appearance, while others

take realityto be captured not by looking but by measuring" (Price 1995: 51). See also

Annas: "We can see in an impressionisticway that desire is associated with what is

'subjective', that s, what appeals immediatelyto the person regardless of whether it is

confirmedby intersubjective tandards, nd thatreason is associated with what is objec-tive... based on what can be judged to be the case afterreflection" Annas 1981: 131).For Aristotle,however, tturns ut that here s

somethingfter ll correct in the

appear-ance thatpleasure is good, just as more generally there is, on Aristotle's view far more

than on Plato's, something fter ll correct n appearances. For good discussion of Aris-

totle on theapparent good see Segvic 2002.The two TraSri Diogenes Laertius X.34).

530 JESSICA MOSS







as white,mustreally e white, o too whateverppears oodto us, in thatwe takepleasuren it,mustreally e good."Frompleasurewe begin verychoice nd very light,ndto itwe comeback,discerningll good bythis

feelings bya yardstickKavovi)" (DL X.129). "Pleasures to be pursued,painto be avoided....W]eperceivehese hings,s we perceive hatfire s

hot, nowwhite, oneyweet" De Finibus.3O).58tis on thebasis of such

argumentshat picurus stablishes is doctrinehat leasures thehighestgood.

TheStoics, ikePlato, reat leasures a merely pparent ood."Pleasure

projectspersuasiveppearancecpavTaoia] that t is good,"59ut n truthvirtuelone s good,whilepleasure s at best indifferentut"preferred."60Moreovern their iscussionsfpleasures a passion,61hey ake the con-

nectionetweenleasurend pparentoodness artherhan lato everdoes,using he dea ofapparentoodnessoproviden analysis fpleasure. leas-ure s (in part) heappearance-basedelief hat omethings good:someonewhopossesses omeq>aiv6|ievovaya66v, andassents o theappearancethat t is good,experiencesleasure.62ut suchappearancesre not to be

trusted:hewiseperson ever ssents o them ndthereforeever xperiences

pleasuretall.Thus he deathat leasure ppears ood,which haveargueds implicit

inPlato'sworks, ecomes tandardoctrinen aterGreek hought.Moreover

these ther hilosopherssethe dea ustas Platouses it,on myaccount: oexplainwhywepursue leasure,nd even nEpicurus' ase toargue hat

indoing owe act n some ensewithoutheguidance f reason.

58 This imple edonisms ofcourse omplicatedyEpicurus' istinctionetween oodnessand choiceworthiness:ll pleasures, ua pleasures, re good,butbecause some lead to

pain,not ll should e chosen DL X.129). Gosling nd Taylor provide compellinginterpretationfEpicurus' iewthat leasures a criterionf truth,n which pleasure

is consciousnesshat ne'spsycho-physicaltructures operatings it hould, r (equiva-lently)n a way appropriateo it" Gosling ndTaylor1982:404). Here we findthe

sameclaim hat attributeo Plato n theGorgias, utwith hecharacteristicpicureantwist: orPlato, leasure s a misleadingppearanceof bodily r psychic ue^o (goodcondition);or picurus, leasures solidevidence hat ne sdoingwell.

Galen,De PlacitisHippocratistPlatonis, .5.23-24, araphrasingosidonius.w DL VII. 102

To bedistinguishedrom leasures an experience r sensation. he sage may experi-encepleasurableeelings,utwill not akepleasure nthem willnot, hat s,assent othefalseappearancethat hey re good.Fora briefbut lluminatingiscussionf this

distinction,eeLong ndSedley1987Vol.1:421.

Stobaeusdefines ppetiteETn6uMi'a)s

beingfor the

apparentgood ((pcuvonevovaya06v), andpleasure s what riseswhenwegettheobjectofourappetiteStobaeusEclogae 11.88.17-19);Adronicusdefines pleasure as "...a fresh opinion(56£aTTpoo9aTos) that goodis present..."Adronicus, n passions ); compareCicero:"laetitia pinio ecens onipraesentis..."Tusculan isputationsV.14).

PLEASURE AND ILLUSION IN PLATO 53 1







VI. Pleasure and thecave

I beganbyclaiminghat he ssociation etween leasurend llusion layscentral ole nPlato's moral sychology.ow we have a complete icturef

that ole:Platobeginswith heSocratic iew that ll desires,ncludingesires or

pleasure,rerational esires or hegood.He notes n theProtagoras hatwhenwedesire leasurewe arepeculiarlyusceptibleo thepower f illu-

sion,butnonethelesslaims hat ur desires or leasurere n fact ational,sensitive o calculation. ncehebegins o offerxplanationsor heconnec-tion etween leasurend llusion, erejectshe deathat esires orpleasureare rational. ence hemorepessimistictance f theGorgias:reasonwilloften ail opersuadeomeone hat he ppearancehat harmfulleasures

good s false.Hence lso theexplanationfferedorthispessimismn theRepublic:that n us which esires leasures notonly prone o illusions,but also (contra heProtagoras)mmune o the kind freasoninghat an

dispel hem. herefore,latoconcludesn theRepublic,desires orpleasurearevery eficientsdesires or ood. llusion-boundesires,ike those f the

appetitiveoul, are desires orwhat ppears good,but thesedesiresgnorethe gent'smore eliable houghtsboutwhat eallys goodandthus annotleadthe gent oward irtue.

OncePlatohasacknowledgedhe xistencendmotivationalower f this

kind fdesire, e movesfrom ocratic ntellectualistoralpsychologyofull-blownivided-soulsychology.ome parts f us do notengage n rea-

soning, nd areprisonersf illusion;thesepartswill alwayshave faultybeliefs boutwhat s good, ndtheir esireswill lead us astray. virtuous

persons one whogets hese arts nder he ontrol freason.The illusionsinherentnpleasure,he llusions hat ead us intovice,will only"lose their

power" ver personwhen he llusion-believingart f her oul has cededitsownpower ndhas submittedothe ule freason.

Oncewerecognizehemportancefthe ssociation etween leasurend

illusion o Plato's ethics ndmoral sychology, e should lso be able togive unifiedccount fPlato's moremetaphysicalomplaintsboutpleas-ure. have nmind, ornstance,assages n which lato associates leasurewith erceptionPhaedo65c,Theaetetus 56b,and Timaeus69c-d), rguesthatpleasures ontologicallynferioro thegood (Phaedo 60b-c,Gorgias495e ff. ndPhilebus53c ff.),63r accusespleasuresf impedinghe oul's

The Philebus rgues hat leasures a becomingndnot being,whilegoodis a being:thiswould eem oputpleasurenthe owerhalfofRepublicVI's divided ine, eaving

goodat the

top.The Phaedo holds hat

leasuresalwaysaccompaniedbypain,

whiletheGorgias rgues hat leasurendpain an coexistwhilegoodand badcannot): hesetwoargumentsmplyhat leasure s ontologicallympure nd unstablecomparethe

argumentsnRepublicndPhaedothatworldlyhings,nlike orms, uffer romwhat ssometimesalledthe compresencefopposites")

532 JESSICAMOSS







progressoward ruthPhaedo81b-c nd83c-d). fwe studyhesepassages,suggest, ewilldiscover set of coherentharges gainst leasurehat urnon ts ssociation ithppearance, hereppearances now understoods an

ontological ealm istinctrom nd nferioro thereal world f theForms.Pleasure eceives s by appearingo be real althought is not, nd further-more ymakinghephysical, erceptibleorld ppear o be realalthoughtis not;whenwedevote urselveso pleasure,we accept counterfeitealityandfail oseekout he rueworld hat iesbeyond ppearances.64

Thus nthecaveallegoryfRepublicVII, thebondswhichkeeppeopleprisonern thecaveare "thebonds f kinshipwithbecoming,whichhavebeen astenedo [a person'snature]y feasting,reed,ndother uchpleas-ures ndwhich, ike eadenweights, ull itsvisiondownwards,"wayfrom

the ealworld,heworld f theForms nd boveall others heFormof theGood.65 hilosophyeeksto free s fromhecave; pleasures eepus fast.

Philosophy akes sstrive or hegoodandthe ruth;leasure ricks s withits illusions,making s contentwithwhatmerelyeemsgood,and what

merelyeems eal.

64Arguments in Republic IX (583b-587e) and the doctrine of false pleasures in the

Philebus (36c-50e) refine the view thatpleasure itselfbelongs to the realm of appear-ance: while truepleasures are ontologicallyrobust, nd worthhaving, most thingspeopledesire as pleasures are notonly ontologically inferior ntitiesbutare in fact only appar-

entpleasures, notreally pleasant at all. A full studyof Plato's treatment f pleasure will

have to account for thismodification.65

Rep. 519a9-b3,trans.Grube/Reeve.

I owe thanks o many people forveryhelpfuldiscussion of this material nd commentson

earlier drafts. I am particularlygratefulto James Allen, David Berger, JohnCooper,Matt Evans, Simon Keller, Alexander Nehamas, Kieran Setiya, and mostespecially Cian

Dorr.


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