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Preface

I

This document is the iniHal instal1.:ment in the cor.tinued History

of the Joint Strategic Target Pla::ming Staf.:£'. It is concerned first

.rith the developnent of :problems in strategic target :pla.nning during

the 19505 and the evolution of :plans for the integ:ra~ion of the llctivl-

.ties of the various commands into one plan; second with t:1e organization

of: the Joint strategic Target P1a:l.D.ing Stat'=- at Reac.quarters SAC; and

~hird with the pre:pa.I:a.tion of the first Single Integrated Operation&l

Plan. In the pre~ation of this history the historian did research

in J8rFS files at Headquarters SAC and in tte files of the Joint Ch~efs

of Staff in Washington. Documents indicated as exhibits (Ex) are 0::1

file in the History & Research Div:.sicn, Di~ectm-ate of lni'ormation,

Headquarters SAC.

11

TABI,E OF Cm~ENTS

:Ba.ckground.. • • . • . • " • ... .. " . ,," • • • • • •• 1

---r-----------'JJ::O,"'-U;.u;J;l,.,kJ..J.!LLo...----.>..-"-----''___-'- .~.'___.!...---!..--'.'___."-~._.!.'____'.!.-.!..-!.~.~~.~._~_~__,__, _

5

30

• 18

. 28

. .

. . .. ..

. . . .. . .

iii

.. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . ..

.. . . . .. .. . . " .. ... ..

. . . " .. . ., .. . . . .. . . ., .. .Sumrna.!')" •

Footnotes

The Search fo~ More Effective Coordinatio~.

Prep3.yation of SIOP-6z.

Secretary of Defense Th~s Gates I, decision of 16 August 1960 to ./

establish a joint staff .at Hea.dCJ.UBrters strategic Air Command (SAC)

under the direction of Commander in Chief} SAC} brought together for

the first time a.ll elements of the armed services 'W'ith a stra.tegic nu~­

lear capability into one integrated operational ~lan.l 8ecret~y Gate~

....

......

considered the decision the most important .he had made in seven years

2in the Pentagon. Perhaps the m.s.gnitude of this action can be better

BaCk&!0Llnd. ,I

.lJNCLASS1FIEO

appreciated after a ravia." of the history of planning and coordination

activities ;for the stra.tegic nuclear offensive between 1952 and 1960.

(u)

Between the end of World War II and. the ,-oeginning of the Korean

Th~ l1ni~_ea. States Na.vy announced tn. 1952 tha.t all of its new B.t~" .. ' ..

~£CRET l UNCIJJSIF1Jji

eXisted in :Planning and executing the atomic offensive, but by the

War~ SAC had a. virtual monopoly on. the mea.ns of delivering atomic wea­

pons. The Joint Chiefs of staff (JCS) drew SAC fat'ces under its direct

'operational control in 1946' ana. strengthened theSE! bonds in sUDsequent

~rears by :pr~:Vent1ng u.eurp8.tion of control of SAC force~l' by theater COIll­

IllBLders.3 Therefore, during these yea.rs no coordination problems

ea:rly 19505 the situa.tion 'Wa.s changing because of a ':prolifera;tion of

'Weapons and delivery vehicles. +st

tack :p1.anea 'WEl:re ca];ab1e of carrying tactical atQ'.lli.c bcsnbs, and that

1t bad on band ~irr:::ra:f't capable of deliveripg Jarge 'Pmbs. Newly

activated tactical units in Europe and the Far East al.so·beclUUe able

to deliver small "lee.pons. Indeed, the Secretary of the Air Force .•

Thamas K. Finletter, announced that "nearly alll' USAF ccnnbat aircraft

were being modified to carry them. 4 The time 'WB.S also rapidly approa~h-

ing 'When the Sovi.et Union 'Would becone e. major atomic power. It e.x-

To meet this increa.sed. Soviet threat the JCB a.cted to gain more ,""-

direct control of the nation I s e:>..-pa.nding atm:l.c force. In March 1952

an ad hoc e-ommittee of t:!lat group examined existing P:r.ocl;l.dures for con-.i;rol and. coordination of: atonic operations and recQll!Ilended centraJ.iz.ing

them for maximum banbing effect and rri.ninrun: interference between forces.

The JOS agreed and established facilities for lateral coordinati.on of

planning called Jo:i.nt Coordination Centers (JCC) in Europe and the Far

East.* They vere war roam facilities for receipt, compilation, display)

reView; coordination, aDd relay of information concerning the :plans and

opera.tions ot a.tomic .forces fo'!' 'the benefit of the unified a.nd specified

c<XlJ.IDB.nders concerned and the JCS.**6 This was operational coordir.ation,

tha.t is, it took place after hostilities began. +&1

'* Buckinghamshire) United K:l.ngdQlj, and, Pershing Heights) '[!okyo,' o1a~n.

** In Europe, Cammander in Chi~:t' Na.VIil Forces Eastern At1a.D.tic and Med.1-­terranean (CINCNErM), CCJllIllallder in Chief United States Farces Europe(CINCEur). and CetrlllJ.!l.nder in Chief Strategic Air CcmmaIld (CIOOMe),and 1~ tbe Far East, Ccmma.nd.er. in Chief Pa9rtfc (CI:troPac)J COOlI'l'J,EU)der

in ~ef AJaaka (CIM:A.l)'. and CINCSAC. uriCLASS1FJlfl

2

Early exercises of the Joint Coordination Centers disclosed B. re-

to act as host for a conference of appropriate cOlOl1lB.nders to de'~e~ne

3

/

-

These fa.ctors were manage-.:l

UNCLASSIFiED

~i! SEC~T

Ho;.r successful. vas this InEl.chinery2 T::le magnitude of the :proolem

:periodic coord.ination of atomic war plans. With JCS approval these coo-

:mit an atcmic annex, Le., a target list, to his war plan and to coor-

conferences and a:pproved by the JOS were ':prepositioned with the Joint

claves became known. as World.-Wide Coordination. Conferences (wee). Tbey

,quirert.ent for Jlre-hostili-ties coordination of ccmmanders I atomic pl8,ns.

Accordingly, in 1954, the,JCS asked each appropriate commander to 6ub-

dinate it with theater commanders and CINCSAC. In 1955 SAC wa.s directed

This coni'erence failed to agree on Ilriything except the requirement :for

a methodology or "modus operandi II for defeat of .cemnnmist air :power.

Coordir.lB:tion Centers for o:peratj.onal coordination required by an exer-

ciee 0::.- the initiation of hostilities. . The totcil coorc1ination activity

pre- and post-hostliity, ""as kr..ow.c. as the atomic coordination machinery. 7

'Were held. each §upsequent year through 1958. Plans coordi,oatecl at these

probabJ,y can be awrecia;!:ed best by :recalling the caIlJ?lex problEillB of

generation} la.unch, mutue.l su:p.portJ a.nd ~im\.l!ll. bombing involved in

pre:P8:ring a single ccm:rnandls strike plan.

able because the ,",ork went OIl withih the tr8Illework of a ClEmon doctrine.

When coordination between canmands with different conceIlts) doctrines)

tr&llt1otLB, 'a.nct, techniques was attempted, the IJ1"obleIJ1B beca::ne formid­

a.ble. On the l'0sitive side" wo:r;j..d-wide conferences di~ ens.ble camranders

• TJ3P $ ~e Re:;:.

UNCLASSIFiED

to a.ppreciate more i'u11y each others ca.IJ8.bilities} tasks, objectives,

and plans. Target lists} forces, and strike timing were discu.ssed and

compared. Scme conflicts were a.voided. Yet the defects of.' the program

were clearly more evident- than j.ts successes, at least to SAC. The con-

ferences did not solve targeting conflicts; for example) in the 1957

and 1958 meetings duplications a~d triplications (two or more cammanQs

delivering -weapons to the same ta.rget) '\,TeTe n~t significa.ntly reduced.

Neither did they achieve mutual support cr ur.ity of strat~gic effort.

among the JOS camnanders. At the JCCs, operationa.l coordination proce~

dures de:pcnded upon a highly Bo];Jhisticated canmunications system. - Dx:-­

ing }ieacetime exercises the ccnmnmications tine la~ between sending and

receipt of messages tended to increase causing a backlog; under combat

conditi ODS the system I B efficiency 'Would be greatly Teduced. In each

of the exercises of the .ICC machinery f'ran 1958 through 1960 over 200

tilne over target (Tar) conflicts hig:llightecl the degree of conflict, in

existing .~~c-p,"j;~.oIJ--:p'lans • In. wartilte} with ilisrupted CClI.llIl!llI'..i ca.tions 1" : .... '.:

this could. l'esu1~ in needless loss of aircraft ana. c:::ews. A cailpa:rison

of target lists and sane conflict resolution were the net gains in four

yea.:ta 01' coordination ef1'~.8 Ge~ral N. F~ T.rining, Gha.irman of the

JOS) believed. one fundamenta.l principle had evolved frm these coordi-

nation a.ctivities~ " ••• atcmic operations Ill.UBt be pre-planned for

automatj~·.·.~~9.:UtJo~to the ma.ximum extent possible antl With minimum

re11aooe on :post..lI.Hour ~ammmica~ioDS.,,9 ~

• • .t' '.' •.: ~.',

4

.J:..f:"e'-p-'iSi..;iEilli'iie~~1!"'Err-----....llNCLASSJF1ED

The Search for More Effective Coordination

The, Defense Reorganization Act o~ 1958 (Fublic taw 85-599), passed

b;y Congress on 23 July 1958" seemed to oj?en new vistas for better cocr-

dination of the strategic offensive. President Eisenhower, in GU-tlin-

ing his plan to the Congress, em.phasized n ••• the vital necessity ot

complete unity in our strategic planning and basic o:peratior;8.~ direc­

tion. ,,10 It w.~ necessary that the Secreta..ry of Defense a.."ld the Join"i:i

Chiefs, have the authcri'ty to take action in these matters. The Air

Ferree, tradi.tionally in fa.vor of integration along :f'un~tiona.l l:i.nes,

2..1sup:POrted the President's program" a."J did the A:rmy. 'l'he Navy was

less entbUSiastic.12 {u)

.A.:rmed with increased authority over tbe deYelopnent and operati on

of new weapon systems given him by the reorgan1zation act,13 the Secre-

tary ot: Defense, then Neil McElro;jl"t examined :plans i'or the new Fleet

BalJ.istic Missile or Polaris;, then in developnent. In December 1958

he asked the Joint Chiefs :for their views on the future eI!!Ployment of14the system. ~

As spokesman for the Air Force, General 'l'hCXlJ88 D. White advocated f/

creation of a unified US Strategic Camnand) to encao.pass su-oordine.te

'UIlits from th§4i~ Force (heaVy and medium bombers and intermediate and..intercantinental ba.11iatic lniasHes) and the Navy polaris. With sp­

:Pl'oval ot the .TOS.. the CINCSAD 'Wcu1d develop the orga.ni2a.tion .so it

could be tunational by the time Po1a.:ris became ~rationa.1. Strategic

liB"!tfj P .5'8: Sf 1'JVlASS1FlID

5

;--'l'i\.,; , I"~ \" !i', II

V\l~\.r l;iilil' :i"

I "~ '\"Pi I:"I;:! ",!f." ,Id,t!

(11l H,

I, "Ii ,f,( ;':j

,i I'::

HI!1 I:\ '

,!,

lieved the entire investigation "as :PTema:cure. It WO'\.lld assign polaris

to the fleet and. ~ne, its c'()lllr.aIld structure later when it had "becane

a. :proven system.20 The }>1arine 0or:Ps favored 1D8kiug the JCS respOUflible

tar t:lelection of uu-gets .. a.t'ter 'Which the unified c~ndel's would.

existed.. in the JCS to 1'l'e"Vent undesirable duplicatiOns in strategic tar­

geting, planning, and wea.:P0nB employlIlent and the CNO believe6. it should

remain tb$J::'e.l9 The llrmy genercl1Y agreed wi"th "the Nav~h but it be·

Burke smr little neeti for change: inhis opinion coordination had been

"Working 'Ilell since the 1958 R~orge.n:i,zation A(;1; and integration of Po~

"la~B into the fl.eet would pose no tSU"geting Jlroo~ems. Assignment ~of

all.wea)?o'n S)"S"Cema -(:;0 e. single ca:nna.na.,. on the other hand, II ••• "rauld

disrupt and aJ:ter the 1J. S. defense organize-tior.. 1,18 Authori"'vy already

had earlier asked. -tha.t. Polaris be assigned to C<:Il1lll1d.nder in Chief, At­

lantic (CDIcIANT) and eventually ""to United states CO]llllB.nder in Chief,

~ope (USCIlilCELcr) and COlII:llB.nder ill Chief, Fa-cHic (c:INCPac).17 ACbr.iral

'?, 0I' 9[ srJtJELASSIFJID

, The Army~ Navy, a.."1d Marine Corps were in g~neral. 0PJ?osition to the

jected t.o integl"ating all strategic ve8.J?on systeI!lS into a single cam­

IlJEl,nd and recamnended rejection ct.' the. Air FOl'ce :Position.16 The NaVy

Air Force plan. Afuciral Arleigh :Burke, Chie::- of llava,j. OJ;leratio::lS, 00-

tu:re best suited for develo:pi~ Ill8Y..im:um ei'fective atCtllic offensive

15 'plans. ~

lieved a unified strategic command pro"vided tbe organizational stru.c-

ing services and assigned to the ne;; hcadq\1!l..---ters. General White "De-

~

UNCLASSIFIEDAir command ~ersonnel would be integrated with those of the pariicipat-

In his reply, General Twining rev.i.wed. the history of coo:rdina:t.ion

As a result of this 6.isagreement, a split liecision paper was -p::-e- •./'­

sented to the BeeDei'. 22 flJ.i;hough General White reported l-lr- McElroy

.',~ , '

f

!\

(3) control o:f strike forces. '!legarQ.ing the first, he inclined toward

to date ana concluded fl. • • not mucro more progress can "be achieved

under the present arrangements •••• tl25 He rejected modifications

to the existing machinery.. e.dvacating instead "fundamen.tal che.nges"

to the system. , The J)roblem divided into three categories: (1) tar­

geting policy, (2) de'Telopnent of integrated operati.onal plans, and

the Air Force counter :force :philosophy.. believing the ta.rget s;ystem

shoulit. include (in o:rdeI' of :priority) long range nuc.lea:r Q.eUveTY caJ?8.­

bilitYJ gOV'El~nt and. milita.ry control centers, 'War JllS,.king resources)

anq popu.la.ti on centers. After ado:ption of a targeting policy1 in t::te

TQf' 5[fr 8Rii. UNClASSIFiED

ing at lteadquaTters SAC 'left the SecDef' and. members of the JCB, h@ rtJ­2~

quested. t.he Cha.irman present his views on this problem. ~

target coordination procedures. In late July" ;following an EWO brief-

did not believe a c.ecision on command arrangements was urgent becal:Se

tbe system vould not become oFel'at.iona,l until late in .1960,23

there

was nO doubt that the Secretary intended 1:.0 press £or improvement of

~nd land atJ.9. :'leet missiles vhich would hav-;a greatcoordiTlation l'rOb­21

lems ana. be vu.J..nera'ble if c:ounnunications were destroyed. ~

carrJIllB.ndeJ:' 'Would. create a. "monolitbic" structure to control aircrai't

• ","" ...._•••'"!'._..;.............,.~"..;.:,;:;ii.~,.,

,.,,:.,

..d.L."

~ o-j

in .the fOTlll 0'1: e conooand' d.ecision, and enforced, would there be progresS

in the &:rea of target coordina.tion.27 ~

(SIC?) wouJ..d; in General Twining's wm-ds, " ••• :pTovide a sonnd. oasis

for necesSa.ry coo:rdination of ollerationa.l pla.ns of. local cCiQ1liS.na.ers

iJ'ith CINC~C'8 plen...26 OnJ.:y ai'ter d.ecisions on these issues were made,

sought the positiom; of 'the ser'Vice6 on the issues of targeting coor­

dine:tion "by :requestir..g answers to 16 Questions.28 luit.iaJ.~I an inter­

semce

ad 'hoc camnittee prepared a. reply to the. CluestiorL!'l.29 I.a.tcrJ

each service 'indivi~ual1y·preIl8-red. "their answers.30 .Jv!, in the issue

of' cOltllIll't-nd. aM contro~ of :PoJ.Ja.ris" a. wide d.ivergence ot opinion exiBted

between the eervices. :But no further a.ction "W'a.~ taken on the matter

Jrt. the t:LIJ1e be presented h1s view'S to the SecDef, the Chair.nan i.,.., ...

-'f 8 p _$ i: G-I£-t .

UNCLASSIfIED

interle:rence

woul.d "be "simFJified. ll The promulgation of a. na.tiona.l

strategic target list (NSJ:L) and s. single integrated operation!lJ. IJlan

On the t'hi.:rd. issue, the Chairman :reasoned. -'l.hat if the a.bove actions

were taken "the qu estion of O',J;?era.tional control and problems of DlL:..tual

o:Pera.tiOnaJ. c6::P<LbiHty it "Would be 'brought into the :'ntegrai..ed. plan.

~e-~lenned strategic·targets, but ~hen polaris develope~ a signi~icant

CINeSAC with its d.evelopnent. Na.val carrie:::'6 ~ou1.a. not be a.ssigned. any

an int.egrated o-perational :plan 'Was definitely needed. He W0\11d charge

sbould develop a. national, stra.tegic targeting system or list supject

to :review b;' J -2 (Intelligence). On t.p.e second. question) he believed.

Cha.irman1s

o:r:inion

the cC!lIlIIlBJlder ):'esponsible for the strategic mission

dence that action 'Was neeo.ed. Re:presentatives to a coordination con-

T"ncmas S. Gates. The neT SeeDef gave early indications that he in-

=rol .5 e6RE'"

in the a:ress. o~ :P~7l;. _::rget detection,

. . UNLU1SSlF!£D

in the middle of June in. which the service :posi'tions were neelY dis­

cussed with the new Secretary,36 the Joint Statt prepared. a :ps-;per ex-

lI..eanwhile J the' issue remained, staJ.led at '~be roadblock c:r conflict- ,..

ing service ~ositions. On 6 May General Twining adVised the Sec:retary

sources l·~as ", • • fer beyond the cspability of coo:r.'dination cOT'..1'er­

ences. ,,33 The senior repl'esentative of CINCEur and CINCMC stated in

of resolving the ta.rget .coordinatio:n problem fell to his successor,

Secretary McElroy alao left office in December 1959; and the task /.-.-

ference at Supreme Hea.dquarters ~aQ. Po;.rers , Euro~ (SHAPE) agreed

that t.argeting of e. wide variet.y of wea':POl'lS ':rl.thout a 'lla.ste of re"

tended "to take action. On 20 January he told the Joint Chiefs that

he wished to discuss SM..17J.-59 (the split decision Polaris paper) at

the:i..~ convenience. 32 Events during early spring provided fresh evi-

that the Chiefs could not agree on a response to the 18 questions;

thei:&:' individual ~;ie....s were forwa::cded. 35 After a two-day discussion

diversified utilization} it a~pears that an efficient application of

the fore.e can only be accanplis:"led by ~ ~i.ngle a.uthority.34 ~

their memo to the JCS: "With the increased number of ioTea.pons and thei:r

during 1959, awaiting the completion of Study 2009, an optimum target

system. for general war 'being preJ,?al"ed for Presidential awrova1 ~31~

:panding on differences

;=t1p ;) C Iv i\ l.. I

UNClASSIFIED';)'7

pl.a.nning and cOOl'dination. J i The Joint Chief's were in a.greement tha.t

a basic targeting policy was needed to translate gui~ce contained in

Study 2009 and the President IS decision on the study ir:to workable in-

structions 1'01' unified -and specified carimande:rs, and t1l.a.t guidance WaB

needed f'or selection of t~rgets in a national target list,3B but they

di.ffered on what that policy should be.39 General Twining felt the

elements of -this diversity a.rose, :r:artially at least, fran endemic ~on-

ce:ptual dif:f'erences. He urged -tha-t the JCS not wait .for £. llperfec-::'

so~ut:lon. II To fit. action to the 'Word, he proposed a national. strategic

targeting ]?Olley.40 Service :positions went to the Sec:Def' as SM-696-60

on 20 Ju.ly 19£)0. ~

On lo AU5'Ust 1960oJ after :wer a year of cOrJEidera:tion by the J"CS

e:nd. -two 5ecrete.:ries of Defense, the issues of command and con·~rol of

strategic systems and stra.tegic target·ing became the subject of a SecDef

decision. It was a clea.r coo:pranise.1 indorsing nej.the:t' the Air Force

position favoring a ur.d.fied canmand) nor the Navy position that exist-

ing .res machinery couJ.d do the werk. Recognized by secretary Gates

was CnrCSAC1s ~ensive experience in strategic planni~. The individ­

. ua.l designated as CINCBAC, acting as the ager:t of the JCS, would col-

lect at E~adquartcrs SAC a team of f'.:x:perts f::::-aI'. all services to prepare

a. plan :for aU. U.8. forces canmd:t'ted to the imtial stra.tegic strike

effort.. CINCSACf S duiies as Director of stra.tegic Ta.rget Planning (nB:rp)

. . 41were an add.itiona,l and. separate rez:ponsibillty~ Op. 18 AuguBt Secre-

tary Ga.tes e,.Bsigned. 80S GepereJ. Power' a depaty :Rear Admiral (subse'luently

T)jWp s=r~il­

UNCLASSIFIEDp:'OIlloted to Vice Admiral) Edwa.rd N. P~ker, ari expert ill nuclear wea­

42 ..Lm.a.L':pons and,former head of the Defense Atonic Support Age.ncy. ,-:=JT

Qr·gal"-izn.tion

General. Pawer began immediateJ.:y to gather his inter-service staff ,!'

at Headqua..rters SAC. Actiol1E: to bring in new lJeoJ:lle and organize and

train them. in. SAC methods proceeded at a brisk pace and they constitl.:ted

the organizatioll l s lllain problems d:uxing the earlY,:forul""..llative months.

Time for :preparation of the first J:llan waG short; the SecDat rlanted it

done by ea.:rJ.:y December.43 Cu)

The organiza.tion was kep't as BInall aa :possible, with l!ll:I...ximum par~

ticipation of the eXisting SAC s'1..;aff,J but all aerv"laes participa.ted in

all aspects of :planning. Ccmmands involVed (SACEUR.• CDrCUJIT, CINCPac,. ,

CINell, and CHWNEIM) 'Were requestee. to send ~elll"esenta.tives to a 24

August :meeting a.t Offtttt .AF'B to discuss organization and. manning. 4.4

TbTee days later a. proposed orgal:d.zs.tional strllcture to :Perform the

:main 'Work assigned.~ i.e., pre:Paration o£ a. National strategic Target

List (Ns:rL) and a Single Integrated Opera-a'onal Plan (STOP), 'VraB pre..

~red and forwarded to the JCs. 45 (u)

The organizat:ron was divided into two general categories (see ...../

Chart next ;page). The first was the Office of the Direc-tcl'. Genera.~

Pcr.re-r, in llls. OB.;pacity as' Director of Stra.tegic Target Pla.nni.ng.. ha.d.. 46'

as his 1Z1iesion to: CU)

.LJ.

! .. .,"

:i l :

it/;;i ,.11;jl'l:,

iffIi:·[ t'I ,.

·11it:~ I:"1: Ii.iii .j,t .

,1H": i

i

JOINT srHATEGIC 'lIMGEl PLANNING STAFF

OFFt1lT AIR :FORCE BASE, .NEBRASKA

CINCIS~SENIOR LIAISONREPRESENTATIVES

SINGLEINTEGRATED OPERATIONl>L

PLAN DIVISION

--~._----------~-----~----------~--------------------

NA...'fTJ:ONALarRATEGIC 'r.AHGETLIm' DIVISION

l"-I

JCS Publication No.4) "Organiza.tion a.nd Ft.E'letions CIt' the .TeS}" 1 Dec 60......

-.,-'--------- ------"----- .-.

llNCLASSJFIED

a. Organize a Joint Strategic Ta.rget Planning staffconsisting of personne:L. from the various services:possessing the l"e@ired skills to' perform thetargeting and p1ar~ing functions. Cu)

b. Develop and maintain the 1'TSTL and'"'c.he SIOP forattack of the targets on the NSTL. (D)

c. Submit the NSPL and the SlOP to the Joint C"hie::'sof Staft' f"or review and. apprmral; highlightingI'0ints or difference wh:.ch be rea01ved duri:ngthe :preparation of the NS1L and the SIOP. (U)

...Also assigned to this office 'Was a deputy; ;.rho assumed the res:ponsibili-

ties of the Director in his absence and acted as his :principal assistant

and aansor on J EIrFS activities, and oIle l"c]resentative each fram the

Army, ITavy, Marine Corps, and. Air FOI'ce~ These service :representatives

se:rved as a personal stafi' ~o:r the o.:.rectcr a.l.d his d.eputy, represented.

their services in :policy :matters, and performed a liaison tanction.

They vere !lot in the canma.nd channel. Representatives frcrn u."lified

and speci:t"ied canme.nds supplying forces' to the SlOP and a JCB liaison

group were also attached 'to -the staff. T"lle CINC representatives (the

number assigned vas at -the discretion of their conrma.nder) Ftici})8,ted

in the llreps.ra.tion 6f the SlOP and. NEIrL. They were not integrated, into

the staff.. but 'Were directly responsible to their resJlective canmanders.

A JCS liaison group, an integre.J. part of the Joint Staff, JCS, assisted

the DSJ:P in interpreting .res guidance and informed the JOB end the Ber-

vices of prog;r:es~ in the J?repsration of the Nm'L and SlOP. The ClUe

and service representatives served as e. Policy CCJ:IJ11littee under the•

che.irma.nshi:p of the de:puty director. This committee reviewed a.nd.

UNCLASSiFIED

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Quested fo~ the above orga.pization was divided as follOW's: SAC re­

sou1'ces.- 140 ofi'icers;. 57 a.irmen, and 22 Civilians; kr!rrY - 10 officers;

SubseQ.uently.. as a result of the survey made or the NS£L Divisioolg

intelligence structu:re and the intelligence sUPIJort agencies of SAC

14

......

•

a:r 50 military spa.ces to be a.Cided to the 197 SAC military :persorJlel

On 1 SeJ>ten:.ber 1.960 -the .res approved the proposed organization,

off~ci~J" designating it the Joint St.rategic Target Planr.ing .Agency

(JSTPA),* and. the initial Joint Tab2.e of .Distribution (JTJ)) consisting

*' On 29 September 1960 the JCS redesignated the arga.m.:z;at1on as theJoint Strategic mget Planning staff. (f:M-957-60..· lIstrategicTarget PJ.euming, II 29 SelJ 60.) .. .

The initial Joint Ta.ble 0:£ Distribution (JTD) of 269 spaces re-

wark:iJlg in related areas. In One change, the JCS .sti)?UJ..a.-ted. tbo."::. the

deputy chief of the SlOP Division be a Navy officer in the grade of

:rea:r a.dmi.ral or captain.. 49 -f&f.

NavY - 29 officers; kir Force - 8 o~fice!'s; nr,d M3:r1ne CorDS ~ 3 offi­

cers .48 -fe+

gory consisted of the tvo :Pl"oduction units of: the Target Stn.ff--the

I~a:tional strategic Target List Division and the Single Int.egrated Oper­

ational P1Em :Division--wbich tC::lk their names frem the "Work they per­

formed. 47 eU)

sible. for a.funinistration and J;l€!l"sonnel supervision, The second cate-.

a:PJ.n'0ved policy; disagreements io1ent i.O the director fo'1: final decision.

Also:part of the Office of the Di~ector was t~e Secretariat, respon-

~1F1fDHeadquarters) at the Chief of Nava1. OperatioL IS request} the DeJ.)uty

;

Director of JSTPS req'l.:ested 69 adMtio;::;a.l1Dilitar,f spaces) '\-lhien ,,,itb

:tbe excelltion of 5 ai:rmen fran th~ Air Force "Wer~ tone f\n'nished !Jy

the Navy and Arrrry. Forty of t~ese VE':re to be assigned to Readquarters

SAC Intelligence functions and 29 to the JS'.rPS.50

A...4;er review J the

JeS allIll'oved the interim augmentation of: 29 military IJersonnel and 3

civilian spaces) but iJ.isapproved the adCliticnal 40.51 ~

The organizati.on to prepaxe the first N5'TL and SIGP was assembled

in haste because the SeeDer had ordered the two dOCUlIlents cCl!!l.Jlleted by

J.4 Decembe:r 2960. Emllhasis had 'oeen :placed on aU9.u.iring the best

people f.:r-arn the services to do the job; not much a..""lSlysis had been

made of existing capability .ji'tt~in the SAC sta.:f'f. But .rith camplet:.on

ct.. th~ imtia.1 l'rsn and SIOP* the ?:::ganization could. 'pe adapted. for the

:fUture, i.e.) the work of kee.ping the dOC"Jments c'lll':!'ent. General Power

recCIl!lIIlE!o.ded a reductionj the non-BAC authorization "woUld. be reduced

fram 83 to 75 s:Paces and SAC :personnel in a dual funC"tion status wau.1d

be cut. from 219 to lll. He also asked that the number of permanent

reNeserr-ua.tiYes of th.e CINes be held. to a mhimum.52 ~

The A:rmy and. Navy did not agree. T:'1.e Chief' of Ra.vel Opcr'<1tio:n.s ~ ..

did not think it a.d.equa tely representea. all servi.ces at all levels, but

favored the ld:r Farce. Because the duties of the NSTL Division. concerned

:p:rilna::d~Y intelligence and taxget selec"vion,l in the Na.vyT S opio1on a.l1.

* The :preparation of these B.oc'\.llll.snts -.rill be treated '~ter in thishistory•.

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staffs did not provide :Precedent for assignmen:t of joir.t staff respon-

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II to provide the broadest a::1d nosi; eX}:'e:rt intelligence base whic"i

can be achieved to support tbe SlOP... 53 The krrny did net think the

hered to the composition of forces and weapons assigned to the plan.

as ArtIr'h Na.vy" Or Marine COl1?s (41 per cent). Although the D3J:P had

favor -the ItrOposal to reduc:e the number of the cn~c representatives,

The. DSTP argued that exist::'ng JCS guida.nce .for creation of joint J../

'-'t 5EC! &15 llNEfASSIFI[f)

ation of an intelligence paneJ., 'tfith representat.ives frau the CINes,

the services, the Joint Staff, and the Centra.:. Intelligence _li.gen~y,

the most efficient use of Sl?ace and technica.l eguipnent, and most ad-

He had not used forces submitted to the plan as a basis for represen­

tation; if' he had the Navy and. Marine Corps would :have been :red.uced by

one-ha..1.:f. In the docl.llll.ent 14 key positions out c£ 34 were id.ent:Lt'iec1

services should be e9.ually represented. Neither did Afunirel Eur:-{e

proposed manning. met the criteria. of a joi=rt staff, nor did it agree

sibilities to a specified. c~. He defended the JTD as representing

.his interpretation 'of JCS guidance: it was the most econcmical, nade

with maintaining SAC officers Vith ttvo jO"DS in key positions, except

far the DSJ!P. It recommended equal representation s.m.ong services il}

the NSI'L Division and proJ;lortional representation (based on commi7.~ed

forces) in the SIOP Division. 54- ~

:preferring instead to leave their appointment to the discretic:n of the

ccmmander concern~d. Injecting a ne!' feature} the eND recanmended cre-

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-1' or SEG l-H... I

the best qualified, would be chosen for these posts :rrespective of ser­

Vice.57

In the D$I'P's opinion, the guiding principle of the JSJ)PS or-

ganization "Was ".' • • that of service representation pro:portionel to

. ti:le serv:i.ce force~ involved. ,,58 The organization as submitted was ap­

proved by the JCS O!l 14, June. 59 (e)01)

Preparation of SIop-62

General Power,. in his capacity as D~P, was guided by the Uational

Strategic Targeting and Attack Polley (NBr.A?)) a J~S docUment 'Which .

formed the core of -this ,nati~n t s stra.tegic strike J.:lle.nr..in~J~~~';:.~"'"

obje~tivas of tn1a policy were to destroy or n~~traliz@ SinowSov1ct

:Bloc strategic strike forces and major :rd.2itarJ and gove!'nment control!

cerrt~s, and. to strike urban-ihdustrial cen't~:ts to achieve the leve?- i.~f ..des~ru~tion indica.ted in study 200i] T:'1ese obj'e~~i ves '~ere to' b~"';

accOl!lpl:ished by, integrating strategic .forces am directing them against

a lllin:imum. list of' targets. 60 ~

The first t~s:k'''O:f the J SI'FS after its organization W'as to d.etermine .-

'What targets l.!:ere t,o 'be a.ttacked. On 18 August General Power directed

his Diz'ectorate of Intelligence to -prepa:re a. prelimi:n.a.ry target list.

At'the init:!.a.l meeting ot the Sta.:f:: six days later Intelligence pre"

sented a working list, ~O~;fL,~~the l'Jatiom.l Strategic Target rata. :Base

(NS1lJll) of ab:E~.~g~ts:~1->\StelU'iJlg Committee headed by Adm.ir~

* rFran this list a team of e:x::perts :fran NSTL Division'~d the bINC~~:o.tuallY :prepaxed the final list&. -l

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delivering a weapon to each bCJ:lio release li:le vere det,e:::nined, e.. process

of II OJ)tiJn1.n:n. targeting" was entJ>loyea. in selectlng t~e nUGlber of' D3:Zs the:t

TOP SEG-R-E-+-

.:..:" M· .,

to ea.ch DGZ. An IfO::Ptimum !nixl' roz list) the best caubir..ation of types

of taxgets (militB.l"y an~ 1U'ban-iDtJ:U5triaJ..IJconsideri'.ng the m:cliber 0= 3:should be attacked and tne des:i.:red assu...-a.nce of delivery to be a?:p1i.ed

·TOP 5 E-b-R'-F-ET-I---

Afte::- the number of weapons available ~.nd the degree of assurance of'

desired clegree of destruction. The .results were verif'ied manun.Jly.

comprised the ~rSTL. After 8.Gsigning a relative 'Worth to the targets

:Basic to th.e pre:Pa'l."ation of the KSrL was the NSJ:DB) a cCR:lpilation

o';~;;:Sov.tet _gets o'i str~tegic SignifiCan~"l't'esenti:Jg t:,. Call­

bined knOW'ledge of U.·S. intelligence sources. 'By a process of refine-

ment the highest priority targe~s in this target data base eventually

*' Ii. can:p~a.x process o:t d.etermining the relative worth of potentialmilitary and urban-industrial'targets by ap~1ication of a point sys­teIll. This:ran.k1ng· vas 'the basis :rot" D:lZ developnent end DGZ ]1'1­ority. Eldsting SAC milltary a.nd u:rba.n~lndustria.l 'Weigbil:lg systemwas lIlbdit'ied in coordinstioo 'With CINe representatives. (l-Ul.nual)l'Target Weighing System, II 19 Dec 60, prepared by J'ffi:PS, J3-mSO;:rOM" ·Col :J. M. Phil:pott, Ch,7 N9J!L Div, JS'EPS, to ncr, "JS1'PSHistory:l 1J 9 Oct 6l, B-8060/.l..)

Erker insured. that the targeting needs of all the CINes wer'e satiGfiea.o

General Power wanted the final list to include only t.argets 'which had

been" -posi'tively :..~entified. and. located.6~

i.n the base -r>y means of a target weighing s~'stern,* the process of devel-

_~ing desired. ground zeros (~Z8L:.~~~::J[f~·~a;;~~~ns;ere' gro1,J.ped . \

/ into target isla.nds or grou.;ps of :prox::.mate installa~ion.s identii'ied as '

/ cCAnple:xes. C01llJlUter programming then s elected the optimumn1Wber and

! location of: DGZs Within the islands i-ihich when s-:ruC;lr. would. achieve the

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,B.O. 12958, as amendedSection 3.3(b)(5)

20

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,fOP SECRET

In the middle of September 1960 ;.:ork began OIl applying weapon. sy~-

* CINCL.A..'NT1 CINCPac, and C:NCSAC conmritted fcrces to the SIOP ar..d. theywere integra.ted directly ::nto the plan, llut BACh forces ••ere ~n­

eluded only on a coordinated basis. This came a1lout beca'l'-s.eof: thespecial nature of the c:cmmalld, i.e." it contained foreign as 'Well asU.S. :forces. '1'he SACEu:r f'orces are shcr.rn in the nIOI'; liaison be­~een USC1NCEt.u- ant. Js.rPS prod"IJ.cen. mutually satisfactory target covera.ge a.nd support. (Memo 'for All Ooncerned" JSTPS "MitlUtes of theNinth Meeting of' -the.Policy COIllmi:t-tee.. 11 .2J. Oct 60; Intel'vie""'1 R.Kipp~ Historian, with Lt Col F. N. Millen" Asst CINCSAC Re:p~ JSTPS,21 Mar 62; lOM, Col P. J. loog, .SACEur Senior Rep, JgfPSJ to :nx::m""Eeview of E1story of JgrPS,1t 15 }jar 62, :a..B256o) -fer'

POll system .Tere a.l.s<l determined.·and submitted. to the POl:i.cY COllllllj:t..tee

. 64-for ap:?roval. ~

COllcu:rrent 'With work on the target system, personnel of the ,srop L-"'"

Divis:i,.on and CINe l"cJ.lresentatives analyzed ca:Pabilities of forces sub..

mtted by the cINes 'pre:fl8,ratory to ap.pl-yi2J,g ~he5e forces to the target

system.* Only :o~ces ar~ capabilities eXis~ing in December' :960 were

considered in the 8101>-62. Rel1ab:'!..lity planning factors f'o~ each weB.-

tems gathered by SlOP Division to -the DGZs prepared by l'iSl'L Division.

~!l.e target system w.~ .diVided ~nto t"wO parts-those targets ea.st 0ill

TOP SECRET·

wea:pons available., which would accC!J1:plish objectives set dmm in the

N'Sl'AP) .Tas -thus develo:Ped.62 Upon cCOlpletion of the SIOP this list

. ~ontained.F043 DGZs (706 in "the USSR,,_China., _.European

sateiJ->tes"

~63~;i

iJmn.ed1ately, wel'e then targeted 'to take advantage of: the disTU.ption

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. E.O. 129.58, as amended. Section 3.3(b)(5)

2l

RESTRl STED DATA,

TO? SECRET

The JCS consti:-a;i.nts pOlicy reqt;.ixcd that:

a. Surface bursts ~n satellite areas be held to the mini:numdemanded by mili~a.rJ necessity. ffSil'Dr·

b. In :Russia and. Ch.ina.1 weaJ?OllS should be employed. to: ~EffiD)

(1) Reduce civ.i1 destruc.:~ion and casualt:i.es to the m:tni­IlIU!ll demanded by military neceSSity when :Pr:Lilal"Y und.ertakings apply.

Co. Surface burst weapons be liJIlited in critical areas to ins'that the expected dose J...imits set "by the JCS a.:t'e not exceeded.

(Sec V to JS'J:PS Rpt 1, "JCS Constraintz{ II to Memo for JCSt "FalloutConstI'aim Polley," 1'ron Dill'P, B-78376.)

** This was a :t;ol'.ce of 874 d.el1vel'y systems (1447 wea:ponB)G~a.C't1ngwi~hin 15 lllimJtes it loca.ted on~·xea. bases, and 1d""0 hours if mobil(carriers and Pola.r1s su.bmarines (E::.-1ef'ing, ltNSl'L and. SIOP P:t'e-sente:tion to seeDef," 1 Dec 60, cl II, B--TT67J. .. ) ~

*** Oonsisting or 1464. a1rcrett and missiles and 1976 weapons (Ibid'.).~ -

..a:9:9lication tea'lll.S were :f'ormed~ one :for each sector. {See Chart ne:>..-t

page) Theu work consiste:1 of studying air defenses.. selec.ting ~ac-

-"'-":""''"---------:---._._-_ __ .. '

rv~~o~ ~~s~ lor.gitude ana. those west of 1000 ,east longitude. Two force.,

,...-

tics, .determining attrition probability.., and stt:.dying weapons effects

and const:rain~s policy.*' A d.efinite tYJ)e aircraft Dr missile was t::len

assigned to a definite ta;rget. Alert 1'o:rceso}:~' react:'ng to tactical

~arning 'tofere integrated fb'st agaiut the highest .priority targets.6 .

__ 5 :Follow-on forces,. *** not maintained i'l."~ a condition to react

·TOP SEGRE'F-

,j~ ca.used by the alert strike, to increase :Probability of destruction ofI high }It'io:rity ta~get., and. to exp,md. ·the >lS1L eoveragiJ coOt'd:l.""ti",i~

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-Estimat.es

Force Application/Target Selectionf Recording1

SIOP-~fiBsion~ / NSTL-Targets~

SupportFunctions

-II I

TACItIeS FORCE CAPABILITY GAM I.I\UWCII DATA AIIfl.l.L!VTPN EFFECTS A'rrRSAC PAC IANT SAC PAC LAlff' N9l'L-l4aterials NSTL-Targets N&TL

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-TOP SE CRET

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fill'! I:t> III Ij

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Portions denied are S-FRCand thus outside ofISCAP's jurisdiction

for aircraft to 2500 to

For exam~e, forces av~ilable consisted of suchand 'Wea.:pons targeted,

st:rikes vras difficult because of the g:::-eat variety of delive:ry syst€:lI1S

yield; and CEPs ranged fram 300 to 3000 feet-, }

12, 000 teet for missiles, i ~, ~

[;he anne" ~ontained three a=ndl.ees: s,""ike -t1mi"", ~Or aircrart ";0"--'1mis~iles, a~rcraft and missile recapitulation by accountiDg line DUm; 1\

_be~, and .uore.i't and missile reoapitulation by targat =nber and. nc:zA :,.,J

unit" strike "timing foi' ind:!.v.i.duaJ. sarties was extracted from. the t,iming

sheets and integrated into t~e ind.ividual combat lllissicn "folders.67 ~-After the 'Work of' appJ.ying cCllllm:.tted forces to targets was com­

pleted, dalIlage asseSsed, and neaessary refinements and adjustments made)

tOP SECRET

Detailed. sou.Tee data sheets were :prepared on each sortie. They

conte.ined information onE~rgets by sortie, so....-tie entry pOiLt' on the

II-Hour Control Line (HHCL), tactics used, post-strike base or recovery

.area; ty:pe weapon delivered, and type Veh:f.Cl:] After f'urlher. d.ei;ailed.

flight :plarming, the cODl.:plete source data. program 'Was run tl-..rough SAC 's

704 com1JU,ter to ,tsolve time CN'er target ccnfli ct~, ·Strike tinrl.ng sheets

fo~ eacJ1 of: 16 o:Pt:ions became Armex .F* to the 810P-62 and. were del:ive:l.'ed

to the ~fied and specified ccmman~ Task force commande;s received

only those sheets directly rela.ted to their mission. At the ta.ctical

1!! divergent systema as the .R-52, the F-100, and the ATLAS and the :Mace;i

\ E~liaOi1itY fa.ctors varied fram B~ to .95 ller. cent :i.n aircl'afi to 38 to

\ . 75 per cent in missiles j YleaJlOns ~ied. trCllIl. in,

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These targets fell

intelligenceJ

Headquarters SAC for

operational cone epts j

attacked. in the SlOP.

of OP Sf:G REt-

It vas' a list of all Naticnal Stra:tegic Target

A minimum number of targets .rhose timely andassured destruction will accc..'Uplish the s:pecificobjectives set forth in. the NBrXP (this was theminimum NS'.rL). ~

Defensive targets necessarily struck in order tostrike the targets in (1) above. fB-t-

other targets Which the DSTP a."ld the CINes agreesh:m1.d 'be taken under attack and those ather in­stallations in the lmtional strategic Ta.rget llita

JEase signific~n~ly d8:lllGoged because of co-location.ts+ .

(l)

Data Base installations to be

r-;;; r8intoCree ge neral grour;s. 0

the NBrL was prod.uced.

On 1 December 1960 the SccDef~ JCS.., c~~~~ers of ULified and speci-~_-

tied commands ce:m:citting forces to -the BIOI'... and other high ranking mili-

enemy dei'elliJes; force application; assessment of s.ortie success, da:!lls.ge)

lUJ)U)

tary and ciy;i1ian 1eade~s, 32 in all, gathered at. 6 ....,.._.---"..._... .,. .

briefings on SIop-62. 9 .L~esente6. were the NSTL;

and ca.sualties; and. dissents to the plan.7° fs.~:,~~~

..:r-oP Sf CRH--

The cClm}>lete SIop-62 was a deta.iled pla."'1 of 'What ta:cg~s ",ere to

be attacked" by 'What ~orces, and in 'What n:.anne:r during the initial stra­

te.gic attaefgainst the Sino-SoViet B.1.oQrt supersed.ed. any conflict­

ing guidance contained in the J"oint Stra.tegic Capabilities Plan. Eight

ar~exes re~resented the key portions of the plan;

s,ponsib1llt1e fl and co:nmand .:relationships, a.tomic, Mncept of oJleration.s;

----------------'---~----------------

O,ption 1 "Was the alert option; only the aiert force could. be laimched.under this oondition.. Options 2 through 15 'Were based on :progressive~ly 1ncreasi:lg :preparation time frOll1 1 to 28 hO".n's. Option l6 waspredicated on a miniIlI'JIIl. o:f 28 hours :preparatio!l t.im~ for all forces(Appe:od:lx J. to Chall 10) Jffi:PS Planning Mazma1..1 1 A~r 61).

alert force could be launched under :positive control. FOllO'J-on forces

rese.rved the prerogative of :putting the plan into effect. Its mission

was to: 72 ~

c culd be beld and redirected before the execution message vi'as received

j

coordinating instructions~ strike timing) c~nications, and adminis-

trative pr,ocedures.71 f!he .res, acting under orders from. the President,

e. Destrooy or neutralize the Sino-Sovtet strategicnuclear capfbility and :primary rilitary andgoverrnrlent controls of m,ijor importance. ~

based on the amount of warning available.* strategic.A:ir Comm.a.....ulls

plan, howevar. Sixteen options for executing the .plan 'Were aW,dlable1

TOP SECRE~

and menned. sy.stem.s in the follO"";- on force could be recalled. even "When

airborne; lI'.obile forces (aircraft ca.rriers ar..d missile submarines) caul

launch frcm alternate positions; and fiXed missiles had dual targets.

1~

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D1sagre~ents with certain SIcp-62 planning factors were prese~tedI

at the c:riefing by CINCLant's semo::, representati-.re to the JCS, Rear

AdniraJ. J. J. ;ryland. Although they had earl':er been resolved qy the

n8rp,75 by .res c.irection tr.ey 1;ere :pres~nted as ~rt of the Secllif brief-~-...:.

ing.76

First, Admiral Hyland objected -Co :wha.t he called thets;rps :policy

of justii'ying a. m.axiJ:rll.:m rather than a tJir.imum target list. Forces were

rigidly cOllllllitted to the SIOP as first. priority, giving tl::.e cClln.l!lEll1der

little latitucle in hitting other targets important tp him. Because of

g..udance that only srop forces 'would st.rike ~TS1'L targets, tlany -£heater

targets were ,placed on. i<he Ij.st "to. nake s-.rre they were struck. This

eJo..'})anded the target list beyond what CDrCIEnt believed to be specific

objectives of the NsrAP.TI The DsrP's c..ecisi.on hOod bee:l that e."'<:cess

forces should be used to increase "the assure-nee of' d~livery of high

priority targets rather than :for attacking ac.o.:i.tional targets not part

of the mnimum. NSl'L. 78 Second.> -:he Cn~CI.a.:nt Senior Representative dis-

agreed w;Lth the weather factors developed for the SlOP. He believed

the plar.. to use visual delivery aircra:ft to attack at random ti::nes to

be erroneous. He also disagreed with 'the ,Process of ave:.r;aging the good

daylight capability of tbese a~rcr~ft Vith their poor night c~pability.

i This resulted in a low assuraD.Ce factor which must then 'be raised by

"'----"

26

"

.:~

,=t,

",.'."

~.

--f-G-fL··5-H-R-H-

27

Because of

A delay of launching d.ue

~~though he agreed ~hat the specific

probability that a non-all-weather :nission wo,..ud be c8:P8.ble 0:: doing

ceniage figures vere promulgated which represented tbe probaDili~ies

percentage to use was a matter 0:: judgment, in his opinion the effort

that 'Weather and 'visibility conditicns in each aNa would permit target

plished successfully, bu~ the mi.ssion ~ould not be completed. as pl~~ed..

sized that. the weather factor 'Was an important one in dete....---m.ining the

caxrier mobili"ty, cOIlllnB.nders vere not required. to launch :iJmned:i.ately

upon receipt of tactical warniLg.79 C~neral P~~er ha~ earlier em)ta-

to weather might not :p:revent t:"le missicn from eventual.1y 'oeing accom-

the }ob assigned at any time durillg thE: year.

assurance factor used in SIop-62.

ident1f1catioLI by non-all"i-reath.er aircraft.* The ':percentaga ra.nged fran

38 to 54 per cent. 80 General Povler decided that in e;x:ecuting srop-62

Po'!' plCUll'l.ing purposes in sIor-62) for e. strike selected at randC!ll) }ler-

but if' it vas 'L"'li'a.-vorable individual CINes wOi.tld use a.1"ternate lauuch

81schedules. In his third dissent)' Admi=a1 Hyland disa,greed whh the

it: weather ~.;es ravore.ble nun-all-i;eather aircraft would go a.s scheduJ.ed.,

a~ eXlJense involved. in planni:r..g far highe:r than 90 pel' cent assurance

d gl t .. ,t . . d. 82of:. e1ivery 0::1 any sin e targe wa.s too great for the :::-esi.u. S ootaJ.r.e •

..------.

(iI .

t11Iif.~1fJ~'111 I

11l;J:\~ ,".~ .

i :! :

Ll~~ :

i ~E ::~ ;~ j

~ !1 I:! I

.1 lI :"* The equation vas -thus: the probability 0::. success is equal to the 1 i

reliability of' the weapon system times the enroute and. ta.;rget area ! isuxvivability ot the weellon system times the probability at correct.JJ ~ Itarget identi:fication for all-weather ail"c::;-aft. ..;

. I--. .., ~ I

~ I~ I

r:;;f same as if' the oxd.er had. c orne in daylight and good weather.

no ur..anim:!.ty of opinion, 'the Cllail"Illan pro:pose'd. a national strategic tar- f

IiI

i--.._- ..~

I','i

If;.J ~.

.­::,

.--'

The Single Integrate<1 Opel"atior.al Plan for 1962 :represented. a. unique

The S:LOP~62 was approved without major change by the JCB, SecDei',

ar.d the President on 2 December to be ef'fect.ive 1 April 1961.84. The

plan went :into ef'fect on that o.a.te. 85 +s1-

cf ::-ol"ce. .A:f.'ter lengthy tonsideration of the iss'J.e by the JCS pToul.:.cad

ailvancem.en~ in war :pla.IlDing. P~~iol' to its develop.nent" atomic targeting

was coordinated after the fect; nandicaplling Ir.utual support and econan~'

-1'"-O-P- -5 EG-R-Ef.

geting :policy. The Secretary of Defense accepted this plan and. directed

i it be used a.s gui.aa.n'~e by CDJCSAO in his :lew capE.city as Director of}~ Strategic Target 'Plar.:ning. In h:i.s 6.ec.:ision of 16 AUg11St 196o} the Sec-,"~ l'etary decided. a strat.egic ccmmand 'Wa.s not needed; "aui; nei1::';;:r did he,\ thil".k target p1anrUI'.g cou1.i De done within existing JCS ca];abilities.

\ He crec:ted the Joint Strat f3gic Target Planning Staff" responsible to _,< _

1 the JCS" but located /;It B:e~.a.qua.rters SAC. The JffrPS reFlaced. the Wcrld­

I Wide Coordination C_eren"e method of :Planning COordinationJ:1U"",,"

I o:pera.tio!lS.1. coordination ;'cl5' s-:;ill l'equired in the J;'ost E:-lioill' Ilha.s;1'l

1 ~ ~I

o:..~.. •

._-._.__._-_._-----

·.__._._._--_.~_ •._--..---_----------~---- .....--................

lear .strike coordination, but it was a beginning) a fO'l..'CldatioIJ. 'fo:: future

::

.'f·

Fi:'

----·ii.

1ir

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~

29

, I .....

SECREt --

See JCS 2056/251, "Coordina.tion of Atamic Operatior..e, II 11 }f2.y 61[Decision on stud.y by J-3], .:B--79820•. The total effect of SlOP onthe atanic cooJ:'dinat:ion system could not be accurately evaluateduntil afte~ cam~letion of the worla-Vide atomic exercise s~heduledf:or september 1961. -fsT

........... '1 -

t\

!)

!~

i\,

\fJI11

l~_._---1

1*II

development. ~

zationJ produ.ced the first trSl'L and SlOP in less tha.n i'o'Jr months. As

fran di:verse servi~e conceptsJ but they die: not interfere with .submis-

expected, the precess "las not completed without di:tl'erences arising

sian of the :final p4n to -the SecDel' on. 1 December and. its acceptance

at that til:J.e. The JSTPS was not a p3.:lC.cea :tor all 'the problems of nuc.-

;i1!'.

f1I

L,,!

.,.---

( ~ nuclear we::J Working With a short deadline, • nucleus at: SAC offi­

cers, assisted by officers 01' other services essig:led. to the new organi-

FOOTNOTES

7. 5:ist o~ SAC} J,an-Sun 57, PP 50-52; Hist of SP.C, JIL'1 58-JuI 59,P:P 33-47.

CM-38 0-59, Memo fer SeeDef, f:::"an Gen.N. 7. TvdniDg) Chairman) JCS)IITarget Coordina~ion and .Associa.ted P.roblems, It 17 Aug '59, enclo­sure to JCS 2056/131, 20 Aug 59.

President t s message to the Congress (COF/), 3 Apr ::;8) :E:x 18, Cr.a;JI. Hist of &-\C, Jun 58-Jul 59.

Hist of SAC, Sun 58-Jul 59} 'PI' 33-)~8; Intervic::w (on -La.:l,jereco:rde::-),Mr. S. R. Caywood, Historian, .,i-::;h Col E. C. Unger, Ch, Policy Br,DPL; Hg, SAC, l2-14 JuJ. 61.

Heari!lgs Before th.e C01!IIllittee on A;nn.ed Services, Rouse of Repre­senta-tives, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, "3eorganization of DOD,"No. 83, Pl' 6427, 6279 (Testimony of Cen T. D. Whi"te) U3A.F, ar.ldGen 1-5axwell Taylor, CofS, USA).

~') W 6344-6391 (1'estimol".Y of Adm Arleigo. R. Burke, CNO, USN).

Public Law 85-599, 6 Aug 58.

1'-1e:mo for Chairm.e.n.. JCS, from Ron D. A. Quarles) Actg SeeDef, "Con­cept of .Employment a.nd COl!I!Jland StructUl"e fo"i' :POLARIS Weapon System, II

24- Dec 58. This Cl.ooument became .res 1620/209, 5 Jan 59.

3. Robert D. Little) A 1iistor~f of the .lir :force Atomic Energy Prog:ram,~lol III) :Part 2) 1> 333.

c:"'. Richard E. Stockwell, SoViet Ail" Power {Pageant Press, Inc., ?i''-~.),

:p 1; Robert D., Little; History 9f "thl:! Air Force P:tomjc Enel't,'Y Pro-gram, Vel III, Part 2, pp 299-300. ,

6. Tnid.,:p 335; History of' SAC} Jun 58-JuI 59, Vol. I} p 23.

1. JCS SM-810-60, '19 Aug 60 (B-76b4-3); T.IlE E} JCB SM-810-6o) 19 Aug6o} l-~erno :for Gen T. S. PCMe~) USAF, IlDirector of Strategic TargetPlanning} 't to fM-373-60.. 22 AU,g 60) Memo fc::: the SeeDef, "TargetCoordination ana Associated Problems, II (E-76643).

2. N.Y. Herald Tribune, 18 Aug 60.

4. Fred. B:a'll.1in: ~ al.) Ed..s., The Aircraft Yearbook for 1952, (LincolnPress, Inc., Ma.shington, D. c.) PI' 194), 188.

8.

9.

10.

il.

/..liJ

j!

v18. J"es 1620/254, Memo" eNO, US!.".l, to JCS, "Concept of' JfuI:ployment andCominand. StTUc.ture for the Polaris 'vleaJ;lon System)" 20 Apr 59.

JCS J.620/250, Memo, Co;fS USAF to JCB, "Command and Control ofSt.rategic Fo~ces, If 28 Apr 59; .Memo for SecDsf

1from CofS -JB..AY,

A.FM lB2-591 "Concept of Employrr.ent and Coomand st:::-u.cture ferPolaris System, II 5 May 591 1& 12, Cha.p I, Hist of 8ll.O) Jul-Dec59-

The positions of -the Army~ Navy, Z19.rine Corps, and Air FOl:'ce wentto the SeeDer as J"CSM-~71-59, 8 May 59-

Ltr, Gen T.• D. White) Cot'S USAF, to Gen T. S. Power, CI.UCl?AC, 8Jul 59, Ex: ~6" lUst Of SA.C~ Jul-Dec 59, Vo~ IV.

Appendix D to ,res 1620/257, "Ca.w~ndant 0:: the Marine Corps Viewson ConcEpts of Employment ar.d CamlllaIld BtructUl'e 1'or the Polarisivea.pon System)" 8 May 59.

lI~o" Brig Gen C. A. Randall, Mil Ass"C to SeeDef, ::or Chairman,JCS, "Concept of' ErnplO;Ylllent and. CCllllZland St.ruct~e for the Polaris,"30 JUJ. 59-

CM-380-59, Memo :fer SecD=;f f'::om Gen lil. F. Twining) Chairiuan) JCS""~argci. Coordination and. Associated .Problems, II 17 Aug 59, Enclo­sure to J"es 2056/131) 20 Aug 59.

~.

.116.

22.

21.

23.

24.,

20. Apper..dix.A to 3es l620/257, llViC'p" of CafS, USA) on Concept of:.!%:;Jloymerl't and Command Structure 'for the Polaris Weapon Sy.stem, ,e8 ?-fay 59.

:res 1620/254, Memo, CNO~ l1SN, to :res, nConc€pt o~ Employment andCommand Structure for the Polms Wea.pon System) II 20 Apr 59. TheNa.vy :position .,as sU:PJ:·oxted. by Re,pl'esen:'ative Dar..iel Flood (Dem,Fa.), in:fluential member of the Rouse Subcammi:ttee on OOD Ap::pro­priations (See Hearings Before the Su.bcU'll'Zlittee on DOD Apprcll:l.'i-

• atious", 86th Co~) 2nd Sess, .?art 2) pp 118-J25) •

....-1.7. :res 1620/223, ~.emo) CNO, USN, to J"es" nConcept of :E'mplo:rment andCOll1'l!and Btruct~e for Polaris "Heallon ,system, \I 22 .ran 59.

27. ~•

.28. CM-386-59, Memo for J'es; trom Gen N. F. :r-.tini..1g, Chail'ltlSn, JeS,"Target Coordi:oa.tion an.d Associated Problems, II 24 Aug 59. Also ./JCB 2056/~3lj..

25.

.~t/26.

........~.... .

............----.-..-_... ...._...

32

f!I

;

,iJ

IIi

(.

1

~

~,. I.,\

I;\,.\~ H

i r!1.~.

r·I';l:i"

I

Memo for Gen }lowe::.", nom Col L. D. Clay, Ch, DPLB, SAC, ~·~rategic

Command," 15 Jun 60.

Memo far the JCS, frOID. :Brig Gen C. H. Eisenhart.. CINCSAC Rep) andMaj Gen R. T. Coiner, CINeEur Rep, "NATO Coordination Procedures .. 11

14 Apr 60, Ex 19, Chap r, Eist of sp~C,· Jan-Jun 60. .

JC5M 193-60) Mf;alO.. JaS (signee. by ChairIi'..an) to SeQ-Del', "Pa.rget Cocr­dina:tion and. .Assoc:tatedlToblem.s, 11 6 May 6D.

usN Bureau of Pexsonnel Order 051664, 17 Aug 6D.

Nemo, Chair.ma.n... JCS for .res) "Target Ccordination and Associated:Problems)" enclosure to SM-682-60, 15 Jul 60.

Memo f'qr .~~e ,qha1:rmanJ JCS, frcm SeeDef, lfTarget Ooordination endAssociated Problems" II 16 Aug 60 (1)...76590); SM-B09...60, Memo for GenT. S. l\::r..rerJ USAF, f'rCll!l. JCS.) 1'Di:recto:r of Strategic ~rget Planning, II19 Aug 60.

35·

34.

42.

tJ'o.

33. Ltx) Cen T. S. Power} CINCS.t\.C, to Gen W. F. :;:'wining, Chairrnan, ,rGS,1 Jun 6o, EY.: 21.. Chap I} JIist of SA:::) Jan-Jun. 60.

Enclosure) Memo for Jes} "Tare:;et. Coordination and Associe.ted ?rob­lems~ II to 3GS .2056/137.. 3 Oct 59. Members of the ad hoc cOlc:mitteewere Maj Cen G. W. Martin, USAF; Brig Gen J. K. Woolnough, USAiRAdIn C. V. Rickets, USNj e.nd Brig Qen vi. J. VanHyzin, USMC.

Note to Control Div, JeSs fro:n Brig Gen lL L. 1Iillyard j Sec~ .Yes}"JCSM-171-59} 8 M.ay 59}· subject t CCllce:p:' of Employment and CommandSt:ru.c.tw·e ::"or the POLARIS Wea.pon System.. I" 20 .ran 6c.

91-340-60) Memo for Dir) Joint staff) from. Brig Gen H. L. Hill~a)Sec) JCS) "Target Coordination and Associated Pl'oblems)" II Apr 60.

JCS 2056/143, 22 Dec 59.

v-3T. JCB 2056/161, lIParget Coordi:uation and Associated Problem..<;, to 29Jun 60, forwarded to ~cDef' as enclosure to Memo, Twining to SecDef,same subject, as JCSb1 273"60 •.

..._----,.

f. ~ 38. Ibid ..~,t c/39. JC&~ 2Bo-6oJ Memo, JCS(signed by tr~e Chairman) to SecDe.f} ":Target;.Coordination and Associated Problems} II 7 Jul 60. The Air Forcei wou2d desienate CINCSAC as national strategic targetir.g authority;

but the Na\'Y and -che ·Marir.e Corps fa.vored <1esignating the Joint\ ~af'f' 'to do the job assisted. by the unif'ied and specif'ied corema.l1dsi a.nd ether a.gencies.

?.::,

;

",

---_ ..

ii!,l

33

"J

f.:;,!:

Interview (te.:pe xecorued), Robert M.' KiP.'P, and E. R. Caywood, 3is­tor-ians, With VAdIn E. N. Parker, IIDSl'P, 29 D~c 6l.

Memo for t,he Record, nStaff Meeting .18 Aug 60) II .Brig C'r€n S. J.McKee, Sec) JS'I'PS (n-78391j.

Msg" .res 989342, .res to D8:rP... 26 Jan 61, Ex: 6; JCS 2056/223, Memo)JCS to Sel:Ilef... 3 Mar 6J..... f01Wardcd as Jc,§f')]a-6~J 3 Mar 6J... The.A:t.r Force a.pproved of DSI:Pls manning Without change.

Msg, ])S'.rP 0997, D£Ir? to .res, n.s., 8 Fen 61.1 ,enclosure to .res2056)219,. 9 Feb 61.

:Memo for "'.;he JCS, "Pr0Jlosed Orga.nization and Manning Requirementsfor Strategic Target :Planning, Jr 27 Aug 60, from Gen T. S. Power,D&:rP, ~.

Tan A, "National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy, II to M~lloJThooas s. Gates, Sec~:f, to Chai:r.man, JCS, :'Target Ooordir.ationand AssO~iated Problems.. II 16.Aug 60 (B-y6590).

JCS SM.372-60~ Memo 'for -tbe SecDaf fl"Oll1 Oen N. F'. Twining, Chair­man, JCS, "Ta.rget Coordination and Associated Problems," 22 Aug 60,Tab A (B-y664-3); Nemo :for JGS frOln SecDef) "'rarge-;; Coordinationar~d Associated Problems," 1.6 Aug 60 (:B-76590); Hemo :for the Record,"Daily Progress Rpt on. Jf1J2r Activities, " Part I, :Brig GEm S. J.McKee, Sec, 24 Aug 60 (:B-770l0); Memo for JC3) from Gan T. S. PcY"er,DS'lP, "hoposed Orgnni zat1or..a.l Nanning Requirements • • . , Il 27 Aug60" E.2:; He:no :for Jes, from Cen T. S. '.Pow'ex) DSEP, nS'tatement o:f'Func'ti::lns ana JeiD 3,pecifications for Ke;>r Positions in J8rPS.. " 25J'uJ. 61> ~; JCs SM-.963-60, llTe~ of Reference for J'CSLG) .. 27Sep 60; Briefing.. 'NSJ:L and SIal' Briefing 'to Secref.. II "by JSTPS, 1Dec 60 (B-7T659). ,

48. Memo far J'es, from Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, "Proposed Orgam.zational.f;'J..9.l1r'..ing RequireJnents • • . ) II 27 Aug 60.. 1::::...1:-

49· Msg, 982265, J'es to D3~, 1 Sep 60.

50. Msg, 2161) WSl'PA to J'CS, 27 Sep 60, Ex 3.

51. Mag; 984249, Jes to J)ffi'P, 13 Oct 60.

52. Ltr) Gen T. S. ::PO'wer, DSl'P, tD Jes) "JSTPS Ivfan:power Requirementsand Organization.. II 9 Ja.n 6~, wit:r~ 2 AtCh, .Ex 4; Merna for the.Record, "Daily Progress Report on JSJ:p Activities, It P"<U't I

J:Brig

Gen S. J. McKeel Secretary} DS.rP) 24. Aug 60 (B-7'70J.0).

53. Msg... .res 98934.1, 26 Jan 61, Ex 2'51;..

"1

"I,i.~~

.............

I 43.I

I 44~

j

i4-5.[

Ii

I ' 46.I"jlIl 47.j

!~,I

r

~i"

..---_.-

.......-_._-"'iI

68. JBJ:PS Planning Manual, l A.pr 61, :p ll.

.'J-

,,...

.~

" ..

'-"'),.--/!

.'~.

"

........~

lisg) Jes 992409} JCS to DS.r.'?, n.s.; 22 lo-lar 61, Ex 7.

Ltr, Gen T. S. Power) nSl:p, to JOB, tlJSTPS Manpoy;er Requirementsand Organization,lI 27 Apr 61; wi"b 1 Atch, ~.

Memo for Admiral :f'erker, frOll! G€n Power, "JBI'PS Crgani.zatior: andTable at: Distribution BeC02lllIlendation to the Joint Chief's of Staff, II10 Jan. 61,~ •

SM-6511--61, Memo from JeS to DSTF, 'IJoint Strategic Targs::. Planni:ogStaff' .l>Ianpover Requirements ana Organization} to 14 Jun 61; See alsoMemo i'o:r JOS frCfIll Gen T. s. PO'iler, DS1!:P, "Sta~ement of Functionsand Job S:Pecifications :tc'ir Key PositiDns in JifrPS," 25 JuJ. 6J.,~.

:res SM-372-60, Memo .for the SecDai', from Gen N. F. T'vtining, Chai:t­lllB.u, JCS, "Target Coordination a.nd Associa~ed Problems, It 22 Au.g6o, Tab A (B-76643).

Memo" Vll.dm E. N. Parker, DDSJ:P, to IJSJ!P, nJSl:ps ~ogress ReportWeek Ending 2 Dec 60,'1 6 Dec 6o} Ex 11.-

65. Manual, ".rSTPS P~aD.ning Manual,:J 1 J):pr 61.. pp 77-91; Interview,E. Kipp, Historian, with Lt Col J. Ferris, DSllP?MF) 6 Sep 6l•

61. Memo :for the Recol'd, "Sta:f::" Meetir.:g of 18 Aug 61," Brig Gen S. J.Y:eXee, Sec, JS1:PS, 18 A.ug 60 (13-78391); Melt!o :for the Record.. ":Daily ~iProgress Report on .joint St:l:'ategic Target :Plarmi:ng ft.c'civitieS

J

n

Part I, .'Brig Gar. S. J. McKee, &c} 24 Aug 60 (:B....77010).

62. i-fu.::lllal} ltJBJ:PS Planning Mar.ual.. I' 1 Apr 61, pp 8-18; Interview,P.. Kip]?, Historian} 'With Cel W. A. Hussey.> USA, Dep Ch, NSJ:L Div,11. Sep 61. .

6,3. Brie:t.'ing, hNafL and SlOP Presentation to Beenef. II 1 Dec 60, by

JSl:FS.. Vol r (13-7765.9). .

64. Erie:t'ing, l1NsTL and SlOP Presentation to SeeDef, n 1 .Dec 60, Vol.r ,"(B-77659), and Vol IJ: (B-77671).

•66. ltJBI'PS Planr.ir..g Manu~l, If 1 Apr 61.

67. Inte:r:view.. R. KiP1lJ Historian, with Lt Col J. Ferris, !k.:>'"'.r?BvIT',6 Se]? 61; SIOP-62, A."1nex P (:a...n620) d.escriptioo. only.. not actUalAnnex F.

69. Records i'n nesen-tations and ProtOcol Sec, Off:ice Cots, SAC.Bee :ex: 10 :!:o'J:.' a. cCtn'p1ete list of participants.

j--'I 56.!{ 57.

..

58.

.'i'

59.;

..

60.

73. Memo, VAdm E. N. Parker.• DD8r.P, to Ch, srop Div and erNe Reps,"Integration of SACEUR Coordinated FOJ"ce.s in srOI'-63," 24 Ms.:!' 61)w/l Atch.

, -

-,l..fI

J .

1.r.~:"f

35

--~._- ......\i)ii!

:Memo) VAazn E. N. ~arker .. DDSl'P, to DSl:F} nJsrps 1'rogl.eas ::te:port WeekEnding 2 Dec 60,11 6 .Dec 60, Ex .u.; Meno, Gen T. S. J'mter, DSl'.P

J

toJaB, IlJCS NSJ:L/srOl'..63, n 16 Jan 61, E>c 12; Msg, JCS to Chairman~ JCSet a1., 3CS 987018, 9 Dec 60 (}j..m~ _ _

79- - :Eri.e.f'i~, -"WSTL aDd SIO.P Px-esentation to SeeDer," 1 Dec 60 (B-77659).

80•• Me!rLO, Gen T. s. FOITer, D....~p, to OINCLs.nt Senior Representative to,TSTPB, "Weathe.r Factor, z.:fethod cj:' A:p'p1:!.cation, \I 22 Oct 60; Manual,ItJ:"STPS Planning Manual, II I .Apr 60, Appendi..'{ V to Chap 7, P.P 40-4-1.

81. Bri.efing, "NSl'L-SIO.P .Presenta.t:to!"~ to SecDe::, " 2. .Dec 61, Vol II(B-77671j.

82. Ibid., Vol I (B-77659).

83. Atch 1, J"STPS Memo t:or Record, IIDisag:reements ResolVEa by DirectorlsDecislon," 31 Dec 60, to JSE:PS Memo for All Concern~d, "Minutes ot:Elev-enth Meet:Lng of Policy Canmdttee~ 1.Nov 60," 7 Nov 60.

84.

7~. SrOP-62~ 2 Dec 60' (B-77620).

72. -Change 1 -to SIOP-62) 7 Jun 61 (B-T7620-A). Cam]>lete SIOP .filed inSlOP Div-"'sion} JS1'PS, R:'l SAc.

74. Msg, B-79315, Dffi'P to JCS, .£±., 31 Jun 6~.

75. JSTPS Meno for 1_11 Ooncerned, "Minutes of Eleventh Hec.tiI.lg of thePolicy Committee, 1 -Nov 60, II 7 Nov 60, Atch I, JS"l':PS MeIno forRecord, "Dis~greemer.tsResolved by Director 1 s -Decision, II 31 Oct 60.

76. SM-8lo-oa, ~9 A.ug 60, Tao C to 8r.f-372-6o) Memo for SeeDer} fTClllJ.

Gen N. l?- -Xw-iJ;ling, Cha:i.:rznan> JCB, "Target Coo~dination ,:,nd Associ­ated hoblems, \l 22 Aug 60.

IT. l~STL and SloP 1':cesenta-tion to -the SeeDet) 1 .Dec 60 (13-77659).

78. Memo :foT .DWP> .:'rO'..It 11Adlr. J. J. EyJ.e.nd., CINCla:ntjNED:: .Repres~nt<ltiveto J"&:rFS, "NSTL and 8IOP," 21 O~t 60 (B-77246); J"S'l'PS Hemo :tor AllConcerned, IIY..i.nu.tes ot:' .Eleventh Meeting of <;he l'o;:Licy Can:mittee, 1Nov 60.. Atch 1, JSJ:PS Memo for Record, "Disagreements Resol--lT€d b;rD-l-rector IS DeciSion," 31 Oct 60.

I

1-'

,-.,.,

~

{ 85. Memo} VAdm E. N, Parker, rmSl:?) to DS1P) 11.rSfPS P.r-ogres5 Report tOri Week .Ending 31 Mar 61} II .4 Apr 61. _Ii ~.'