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7 June 2012 Master's Thes1s 25July2011-15June2012 4 . TITLE AND SUBTITLE 68. CONTRACT NUMBER
TI1e New Guard: A Service Equivaleol Force
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LTC .James E. Scalf. USA
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Jomt Advanced Warfighting School 7800 Hampton BLVD.
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Th1s thesis proposes that the National Guard is a service-equivalent force and requires expanded authorities to develop capabilities for its dual-role mission. The paper provides an in depth analysis of the historical role of the militia and the subsequently the National Guard. It examines the debates and issues that underpin the current defense force struc ture and makes specific recommendations for the f uture development and ro le of the National G uard.
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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL
THE NEW GUARD: A SERVICE-EQUIVALENT FORCE
hy
James E. Scalf
LTC, Tennessee Army National Guard
THE NEW GUARD: A SERVJCE-EQUTV ALENT FORCE by
James E. Scalf
LTC, Tennessee Army National Guard
A paper submiued to the Faculty or the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign
Planning and trategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or lhe Department of Defense.
This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in foolnotes.
Thesis Adviser: Name
Approved by:
,---
Signp
7 June 2012
Signature: -7--_,~'5>2":=--_2 _ _ ?_,_- _ __ _
Col. John Paul, Thesis Advisor
Signature: -~~~~-""'-'..._...._.'-----~-----\\.--Dr. Vardell Nesmith, Academic Advisor
1
Signature:~~ d -zt-Col. J effrey J . Waechter, Committee Member
Signature: Cf~& 14J~ James B. Miller, Col, USMC, Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I wish to acknowledge the contribution. and acrifice my family has made to give
me an opportunity to serve and most especially, the many indulgences of my wife-Paui,
who has c;;een far too much worse and not near enough beuer of me. I also would like to
acknowledge the many leaders who have patiently mentored me through year . . These
leaders have given out of the abundance of their knowledgt: and experience to a"''\ist me as I
have succeeded through the ranks. The writing of thi s document would not have been
possible w ithout the encouragement and guidance of Col. John Paul. He patiently waited for
me to work i t out and always inspired me to do just a little more to make it that much better.
La. t but not least, 1 will alw<tys have to thank Morn. She gave me a hunger to learn when I
was young and has nurtured it ever ince.
Ill
DEDICATION
This is ded icated to tho~e who have "rode with tbe Regiment" and fo r tho, c who
<:Ontinuc to ride.
I V
TABLE OF CONTENTS
lNTRODUCTlON ................ .... ..... ...... ....... .. .. .. ........... ..... .......... ........................................ . I CHAPTER I: The Role of the Mil ilia ... ......... ... .......... .. ....................... .. ............................ 6
The Colonial Militiu ...................... ............ ............... ... ......... ... ......... ................................ 6 The Origin. of the American Mili ti.a .. .. .................. .......... .............. ........ ....... ....... ........ 6
Jamesto\vn Set tlement. .... ...... ...... ........... .... ................................... ... ......... ..... ........... 6 The New England Militia ... ....... ....... ... ..... .... ... .. .. ........ .... .......................... .. ...... ........ 8 Con1pulsory Service .................................................................................................. 9
The Evolution of the American MiJjtia ............................. .. ... .. ...................... ... ......... !! The Mjnuternen System ...... ......... ... .. .. ... ......................... ... .......... .. ......................... !!
The Role of the Mi litia in Revolution .... .. .......... ...... .................................................. 12 The Battle of Lexington and Concord ..... .............. .. .. .... ... ..................................... l 2 The New England Anny ..... ................ ...... ..................... .. ........... ............................ 16
The Continental Arn1y ........ .... ....... ........ ...... ...................... .. ............ ............. .. ............ 16 The Birth oftbe Arn1y ............................................................................................. l6
The Con. titulionaJ Mili tia ........... .. .. .. ............ ...................................... .. .......... ......... ...... 18 Dual Military Sy ·tern .. .................. ...... ......................................................... ..... ......... 18 Federali~t versu. Ami-Federalist .................................. ... ........................ .... ........... 18 Washlngton' Senti1nent. .................................. ............. ......................................... 20 Constitutional Compromise .. .... ....... ...... ...... ...... .. .... ..... .. ... .......... .... .. ... ... .. ........ .... . 22
Militia Reforn1 ........ ...... ........... .. .......... ..................................................................... 23 The Knox Plan ..................................... ....... ...... ... .. .. .... ....... ... ......... ................... ..... 23 The Militia Act or 1792 ..... ..... ......................... ............ ... .... ............... ..................... 24 The "Es ential Pillar·· .. ............................................................................................ 25 The War of 18 12 ............................................ .... ........................... ..... .... ........ ......... 27 Ct~ lhoun · Expandable Army Plan ...... ... ....... ........................... ....... .. .. .................... 29
CHAPTER 2: The Rise of the National Guard .................................................... .. ........... 3 1 The Volunteer Militia .................. ...... ......... .............. ... .......... ... ........... .............. ............. 3 1
The Derni!.'>c of the Enrolled Militia .................... .. ............. .......... ... ..... .......... .. ........... 3 1 Manife~t De ·Lin y ..... .... ......... ..... ......... ... ............. ....... ................................ .... .......... 3 1 Volunteer Cornpnnics .... .. .. ... .. .. .. ..................... .. ......... ......... ......... ............. .. .. .. ........ 32
Civi l w,u· and Recon truction .................................................................................... 35 The Emergence of the Regular Army ............. .. ........... .. ............. .. ............ .. ............ 35 Recon truction ........... ............ .... ........ ... ...................................................... ............ 38
v
The Great Railroad Strike of 1877 ............ ......................... ..................................... 3Y
Strikebreaker · .......................... .... ... .. .. .... ..... ...... ... ......... ... .. .................................... 40
The Pos~e Comiratus Act of 1878 .................. ........................................................ .40
The Legislati ve Battle ................ ......... .... ... ...... ...... .... ............. ... .............. ....... .............. . 4 1
Que!-.t for Rerorn1~ ..... .. .......... .. ......... .. ..................... ... ............ ........... ......................... 4 1
The InDucnce or Upton ...... ...... .. .. ....... .. .. ..... ........ .... ........ ............... ........................ 4 1
The National Guard A. ~ociarion .......................... ................................................. . .42
The D·ick Ac t ......... ........... ............. ..... .... ..... .... .... .. ....... ...... ...... ... ........ ... ..... .. .. .... ... . 44
The Mil itia Act or 1908 ........................................................ ...................... ........... .46
Coastal Batteries ................ .... .... ..... ........... .. ......... ... ... ... .. .. .. ... ...... ..... .... ... .. .... ... .. ... 46
The A.nny Reserve .................................................................................... .. ............ 47
The Cont inental Plun .......... .. ...... ........................... ... ... .... .... .... .. .. ............ ... ... ... ... ... . 47
The Modern National Guard .. .. ................................ .. ............................................. .. .48
Training as they Fight ....... .. ....................... .... ...... ... ......... ... ......... .. ............. .. ......... .48
The Defense Act of 1916 ... .. ............ ........... ............................................................ 49
The lnnuence of Pcl1Jner ............... .. ............................................. ............... .. ........... 49
Reorganizing c.u1d Remissioning .. ... ....... ............ , ............... ............. .. ...... ..... ....... .... 50
Cold War .................. ... ............ ...... , ... ............................................. ............................ 52
Strategic Re, erve ....... .. .. .. ... ... .. , .. .. .. .... ... ... .... ....... .. ........... .............. .. ....... .. .. ... .. ... .. . 52
The Al l-Volun teer Force .................................................................. ....................... 52
l"he Abran1s Doctrine ................. ... ..... ..... .. .............. ........... ... ........ .. .................... .... 53
The Perpich Lawsuit ......... ......................................................... ............................. 53
Post-Cold w~,r .... .... .. .. ............ .. ........ ... ....... .. .......... ..... ...... .. ............ , .................. .... .. .. 54
Tiered Rcadinec; . ................. ... ... , ... .......... ............ ..................................... ............... 54
CHAPTER 3: Recommendations for the National GtJ<u·d .. ..... .. ................. .. .... ... ............. 56
·rhe Adaptive Force ....... .... ............................................................................................. 56
M u lti-purpo:-.e Force Structure .. ...... ...... ..... ...... ... .. ... .. ......... ... ............................ .. ... ... 56
Growing Missions for the Guard ......................................................... ., ................. 56
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau .................. .. ..................... .. ........................ 57
NOAA 20 12 ............ .. , ... .. ... .... .................... ... ......... .. ......... .. .. .. ..... .. ........ ... ... ........... 57
DOTMLPF ................................................. ........... ............ ........... .......... ............... .. 58
Homeland Defense and Homeland Security .. ....... .... ... ..... .. ...... .... ... ....... .... ........... . 61
The ationaJ Guard-Re ·erve Equipment Account .. .................... .. ......................... 62
Developing Domestic Guard Uni ts ... .. ..... .. .... ...... .... ..... .. .. ... ... ... ...... ...... ... ... ....... .... 65
vi
Joint Doctrine Development System ...................................................................... 66 Functional AJ·eas for Guardsmen ...... ... .. ...... .... .................. ... ........... ............ .... ....... 66
Building Partner Capacity .... ............ .. .. ... ......... .......... ...... ............................ ......... ..... 67 State Partnership ProgTam ........................... .. .......................................................... 67 Operational Memor Liaison Teams ............ .... ...... .................................................. 69
CONCLUS JON .................................................................................................................. 70 BJBLIOGRAPHY ... .. .... .. .. .. ... ......... ......... .. ... ........ ....... ..... ... ... .... ........................ ......... ...... 71
vii
INTRODUCTION
On November 10, 20 II. the Senate Armed Servi ces Committee conducted a
bearing o n the National Guard Empowerment Ac t o f 201 2. The main focu. of discu ' sio n
wa., whether or not the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) ~hould be included
as a member o f the Joint Chief~ of Staff (JCS ). This Wa! the first time the entire Jo im
Chiefs bad ever testi fied together be fore the committee. Additionally, the CNGB and the
General CounseJ for the Department o f Defense (DOD) were called to testify. With the
exceptio n of the CNGB, all of the uniformed member& from the panel opposed the
legis latio n.' Considering the lop:-.ided opposi tion by the JCS, the unique ne. s of the mas
appearance and the additional resistance of Secretary o f Defense Leon Panena.2 who did
no t attend, it would have seemed U1at the amendment was doomed to cettain failure;
however, it passed with oveiwhclming bi -partisan support.
The member o f the JCS each listed their criticisms o f the Act in letter to the
committee. Most cited the important contribution the National Guard make::. to national
defense and that Lhe CNGB has ··service-like'' functions; but, tho e functio ns do not rise
to the leve l o f a ervice chief. Most were critical of e levating a reserve compo ne nt force
to have a voice ~eparate from it primary service. A few promoted Lhe fact that there was
no direct civilian overs ight. The U.S. Marine Corps faced the ·arne crilici m when
legis lation was introduced to elevate the Commandant to the JCS. When asked by
1 U.S. Congn:!.s. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Hearing to Receil·e Testimony on \Vhether the Chief of the National Guard Bureau Sltnuld be a Member of rhe JCS: Nearing before the Cnmmiuee on Armed Sen ,ices. I 12th Con g .. l st sess., Novcmher I 0. 20 I I (statement of Senator Carl Levin). hllp://armcd ... en icc\ . ..,cnatc.gm lc "" i tnc ... .., li -..t.cfm?id=5255. ! U ... Congrcs!.. Scnuh.:. Commillee on Armed Services. Leuer ro f11e /-Jonort1hfe Carl Lnin. Chairman. 11 21h Con g .. I M SCl>!> . , Decem her 7' 20 II ( Lcltt: r fro m Leon Panella • • ecrctary or Ddcnsc).
Senator Scou Brown from Ma. sachuscll to explain the difference between the National
Guard and the Marine Corps. the Commandant of the Mcu·ine Corps, General James F.
A mo . . stated:
... we cu·e a service. We have been one for 236 year. . When the
Marine Corps got its scat at the rab1e in 1978, we had been fighting
our Nation's battles as a service for over 200 year!:l. That is
different. The Guard is not a servicc.1
What he failed to ·tate wa that the mjlitia was erving Lhc states befo re they were even
united. Ln fac t, the National Guard, known as the militia until the late 1800' .. pre-dares
the Marine Corp by nearly 140 years.-l The mili tia was the fi rst American military
-;ervicc. ll now has an annual budget of $28 billion, lightly less than the Corps $29
hillion budgct.5 ll also has the ·arne "Common Military Department Functions"
descrihed in Departmenr of Defense Directi ve (DODD) 5100.0 I which include recruiting,
organizing, supplying, equ ipping, training, servicing, mobilizing. demobilizing.
administrating. maintaining, construction and repairs of strucrures.6 Moreover, it has the
additional role of !>erving as the State Governors emergency re. ponse force. Not onl y
docs the National Guard fight our nation·~ wars-it nlso responds to our dome~tic
1 U.S. Congn:ss. Senate. Commillt:c on Armed Services. Hearing to Receive Tesrimully on Whether the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau Should be o Member of the JCS: HearinJ: bef ure the Committee on
Armed Sen •ices. I 12th Cong .• I st ~css .. Novcrnhcr I 0, 20 II (testimony of General James F. Amo~.
Commandam of the Mari ne Corps). hup:l/armcd-~crviccs.:-.cnate.gov/c Wi t nc.,..,list.c.:fm'?id=5:!55 .
1 Michael D. Dnublcr, Civilian in Peace. Soldier in Wur-The Army National Guard, t63(1-2000
(L;mrcnce. Kan•;as: Uni vers ity Pres~ of Kan ... a~. 200:1). 229.
1 U.S. Congrc~~. Scnate. Committee 1111 Armed Servicl!s. Hearing to Receiw! Testimuny on \Vhether the
Chief of rhe Na riunal Guard Bureau Slwuld he a Mt>mher of rite JCS: Ilea ring he fore rhe Cmnmillee 0 11
Armed Sen •ice.\. I 11 th Cong .. lo;t SC!'-~.. O\emhcr tO. 2011 (tcstimnny of Craig R. McK1nle}. Chief of the
National Guard Bureau). hup:/hlrml!tl-~>crvlccs.senwe.uov/e \\i t nL·:-.~1 ist.dm'!iu=5255 .
11 U.S. D~.:partmen t or Defense. DoD Directh•e 5100.0 I : Frul('ticms oft he Depnr1n1ent c~{' Defense and lt.s
Mojor Ct1111ponet1tS. December 2 1. 20 10 (Wn hington. DC: Department of Dcfcn<>c. 2 t December 20 I 0).
26.
2
emergencies. Given it unique dual ro le and complimentary statu , the National Guard
rnu t be defined a a ervice equi valent force and is worthy of expanded Department-
level au thori tie~.
Tn hi s testimony. General McKinley dismissed concern about the National Guard
~eeking 10 become a . eparate . ervice. He pointed out that by tatute; the National Guard
is a re~crvc component o f the U.S. Army and Air Force. The Army and Ai r Force have
<;ervicc Secretaries with primary responsibility of e tabli ·hing po licy for the National
Guard employment in a T itle I 0 ·talus. Those Secretaric. provide c ivili an oversight,
pre cribc training requiremen t · , procure equipment and validate budget request .7
USNR, 65,006 8%
8%
USCGR, 7,982 1%
Reserve Component End Strength Although the National Guard make. up only two o f the seven DOD re erve components,
the Army and Air National Guard have almo. t 470,000 soldier and ainnen. Thi. i
nearl y fifty-five percent of the 850,000 in the entire reserve component. The Natio na l
7 U.S. Congre s. Senate. Comrruuec on Armed Scrvtcc . 1/earing ro Receive TeHinumy on Wherher rile
Chief of The Narionaf Guard Bureau Should be a Member of rite JCS: Hearing before the Commiuee on Armed Services. I 12th Cong .• I sl scss .. November I 0, 20 II (testimony of Cratg R. McKinley. Chief or the National Guard Bureau). hup://armcd ... crHcco;.!'>cn:ue.!!o\/c witnc'''''u:fm'!id=5255 .
Guard also maintains almo. l all of the re crve combat capabilities for the Army and Air
Force. Becaui>e of this and its ·heer ~ ize. the National Guard is e ential for the Army
and Ai r Force strategic capabilities.8
The National Guard has another role that clearl y sets it apart from all the other
c.;ervices-its uppmt to civiJ authoritie . Primaril y, it i1> this unique functi on that
compelled Congre~s to disregard U1e JCS advice and elevate the CNGB to full
membership. The CNGB i exdusivcly qualified lo provide advice on militc.u·y support
for domestic operation . The CNGB docs not command these forces in the arne fashion
that other service chief~ do not command their service fo rce~ once a. signed to a
Combatant Commander. That said. he is nevertheless re~pon~ible for balancing the
response to dome~tic emergcncie and the readines~ of National Guard forces for
contingency operations. Specifically, the Chai rman of the Joim Chief~ of Staff
Instruction (CJCS J) 3 125.01 B requires the CNGB to:
Ensure all states have the foJJowing NG capabilities or acces~ to
the. c NG capabiJities on a regionaJ ba is:
(a) Command and Control: Joint Force HQ-State: and JTF-State.
(b) Weapons of Ma De truction Civil support teams.
(c) Maintenance. (d) Aviation. (e) Engineer (technical search and rescue).
(f) Medica l. to include ANG Expeditionary MedicaJ Support.
(g) Communications. (h) Tran portation. (i) Security. U) Logistical. '~
s Jamc-. E. Cartwright and Dcnnt:. M. McCarthy. Comprehe11.1il·e Re1•ieu• of the Future Role n.f the Resen·e
CcmtiiOIIellt. Volume I, Executh·e Su111mary and Main Reporr (Wnshingron. DC: Orticc of the As~i)ttant
Secretary of Dc fl'n~c ror R C!>I.!fVC Affairs. Apnl 5. 20 II). 20.
'1 U.S. Joint Chid:; or Staff. Defense Support of Ciril Atahorities ( DSCA) for Dome.1tic Conseque11ce
Management (CM ) Operarions ;, Re 1ponse to a Cht•mical, BiolngiC'ul. Rmliologiml. Nuclear. or 1/igh
Yie/d £tplosil·e (CBRN£) lncidem. CJCSI 3125.0 I 8 . (Wa.,hington, DC: Joint Chief!> of Stall. August 19.
2009). B- 14.
While aJI these capabilitie are neces ary fo r consequence management in response to a
Chemical , Biological, Radiologica l, Nuclear or High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) incident,
it demon trates that the CNGB currently ha, • ervicc-llke functions and necess itates the
capability to develop forces through the Joint Capabilities Integration Development
System (JCIDS ), which is clearly a service function.
The CNGB needs the authorities to develop units for roles and functions either
unique to the Guard or for which it is well suited. Roles are defined in Joint PubUcation
I a. ··the broad and enduring purpo es for which the Services and USSOCOM were
e-.tabli~bcd in Jaw."' Function are .. the appropriare assigned duties. re ponsibilities,
mission~. or tasks of an individual, office, or organization." 10 Thi paper examines the
historic role and functi ons of the National Guard and makes recommendations for
developing Doctrine, Organization. Training. Materi al. l eadership, Personnel, and
FaciU Lies (DOTMLPF) ~olution s to bridge capability gaps. Fir. r, it will examine the
historic role of the militia and how much of the discu. sion about reserve component
utilization ic nothing new. Often, leadcr ·hip within the DOD finds the Guard too di fficult
to understand or too complicated to be useful. The goal of this paper is to inform that
leader hip of how the Guard hus been used in the past and ' hould be modeled for Lhe
future. Then, it wi ll look at the rise of the National Guard and the factor · and force · that
have transformed the militia. It conclude with recommendations fo r future
improvement to improve and enhance the capabilities of the National Guard and how
that is beneficial to the Nation.
10 I 0 U.S. Join I Chief\ or wiT. DOD Doctrine fnr the Armed Fvn·e.1 of tlw United States. Join I Puhlicalion I. May 2. 2007 Incorporating Change I March 20. 2009 (Wash1ngwn. DC: J<,i nl Chiefs or Staff, March 20, 2009). 11-3.
CJ !APTER 1: The Role of the Militia
The Colonial Militia
The Origin1-. of the American Mi litia
} amestowfl Settlement
The legacy of the American Citizen-Soldier begins with the carlie t senlement of
Engti ~h colo nie~ in the New World. In 1607. the arri val of English . ettler~ at the mouth
or U1e Che:-.apeake Bay was met shorlly thereafter with open ho ti lity from Native
Americans. After locating up the James Rjver on a marshy peninsula tbat afforded
protection from the Indians and concealment from the Spanish, tile ~ellJer. founded
Jame town colony on the 161h of May.1 Ten days later, over 200 braves from the
Powhatan tribe attacked the settlement with the intent of either ki lling all the inhabitant.
or causing them to t1ee. The surprised ~ettJers rei ied on make-shift defenses that were
hastily e~t ablished and cannon fire from their th ree nearby naval vessels to repel the
auack. /\!though onl y two colonist. were killed. the attack left an indelible image of
warfare in the new worlu.2
The senlers relied on the military training and weaponry they had received in
England. They would implement a militia sy ·tern similar to that u~cd in Europe:
however, it would be adaptive, nexiblc and ~cll"-reliant.3 The militia was the sole
protector again. r the existential threats posed by Native Americans, the Spani~h and later
1 Dougla~ F.. Leach. Arms for Empirl': A Military Hiunry of the British Culonie:. in North America. /607-
17n3 (New York: Macmillan. IY?l), 1-2.
~ Michad D. Douhkr. Cit·ilian in Pettee. Soldier in \Var- The Army National Guard. 1616-2000
(Lawrence. Kan:.a).: Univcr.!>ily Pres~ or Kan-.a .... 200~). 10-l I .
. I Ibid. 7-I.J .
6
the Fre nch. The necess ity of local defense forced the seulers to task each able-bodied
male to ervc both for self-pre e rvation and lhe protection of the eltle ment.4
In September of 1608, Captain John Smith became the eulement leader anc.J
began ho ldiJlg compubory drill s to improve the capabilities of the militia.5 Soon
afterward, he initiated an offens ive up the peninsu la to raid Powhatan vi .ll age~, forage for
food and seek other pos ible selllemenl ites. During thi !> campaign, Smith quickly
learned to adapt tactics and rid his soldier~ of the heavy <umor and he lmets. Although
Smith wou ld be wounded in a mi nor skim1ish, hi. su rveys and writing encourage the
further ex pansion of more ·ettlements on the Jame River. These would be the first
writing~ that would be used for doctrine ahout warfare in early America.1'
The growth of the colonies meant a growth in the militia. Each eulement wou ld
follow Jamestown· model of compulsory service and regular drill for training. The
colonist and Powhatans continued to conduct raids and ambushes against each other unti I
an unea. y peace w~ brokered in 1614. With the truce e tablished , the settlers quick ly
abandoned the militia practices to focus on lucrative tobacco production. ·tarli ng new
settlements and extending land tracts.7
As the co lony expanded , so did the gap between the settler and the Powhatan .
On M arch 22. 1622. the Powhatan, lau nched a massive, coordinated and ·urprise auack
against the . e tllcments that re ulted in over three hundred colonist kil led. This was
nearly twenty- fi ve percent of the j us t over 1.200 senlers. After reco ering from the
I [bid.
5 William L. Shc<l, The Vir~inia Militia in the Sel'enrenth Cewury (B:uon Rouge. LA: Loui'>iana State Univcr-;uy Pre-;. 1983). pp. 12- 16.
~ Douhh:r, 12- 1-1 . 7 lhiJ. t-1 .
7
;;hock, the militia led a series or devastating reprisal agajnst the offending tribe. Once
again , the militia protected the settlements from annihilation and expanded territory into
Powhatan land.. From this time forward. the colony would maintain a mili tia in even the
mo~t remote ertlement!'l. Tbe Virginia A ~embly developed a re~ponsive command
<> trucntre with four mi litary district. that could reinforce each other. Because of it ·
!'luccess. rhe Virginia mjl itia ystem would be copied throughout the coloni e~ with each
region hav ing a distinct model.h
The New England Militia
ln New England, the Puritans were very conscientious about their militia <>crvice.
Though :-.ervice was compul. ory and in some in ranees re4uired citizen to own and
mainrain their own firearms. mo. t served out of a sen. e of duty. On December 13, 1636,
Ll1~.: M assachusetts General Court ordered lhe estab li shment of the first militia regiments.
Tl1is decision heralded the birth of the National Guard. Officers were chosen by popular
election-. and non-commissioned officers were ~elected by the electetl ofllcersY
A the colonies grew. the tension wirh orne Indian tri be became more elevated.
in 1637 and aga in in 1675, the colonisl<; were at war with Indian tribes. In both cases, the
mi litia wu'i [he sole military response l'or the colonies. The coloni<> t had allied themselves
in both W<HS with friendly Indi;.m~: but. Briti h "Regulars" were not used. King Philip's
War brought witlcsprcad devastation to New England colonies. "King Philip" was the
name bestowed by Lhe coloni!'t upon Metacom.tbe chief of the Wampanoag lndians. It
wou ld take the militias from multiple co lonic~ and their [ndian alliances to defeat ''King
j, Douhh:r. 1-1 .
9 fhid. Jo.
8
Philip" and hi. allie . The aftermath would leave over one thou and coloni t · kiJJed and
over ninety towns attacked: many of which were completely de. troyed. In the Virginia
mil ilia y tern, seulements joined forces to ~ecure the colony. Significantly, King
Philip 's War wa the first time colonie · united their militia . IU
Colonie would be reluctant to place their mi litia · under external leadership.
Even when serving under the British, the militia maintained its unit integrity to the be t
ex tent possible. This recurring caveat is ;;t ill prevalent today. The New England
confederation was an attempt to maintain a military aUiunce during the mid- 1600s. It
wa an integral a pect to defeating Meracom dming King Pbjlip' s War. Colonie. united
their militia in the interim under a ingular command umil the danger was averted. Then,
the militia returned to it normal tmcture. AJLhough ucce ful during the cri i , the
confederation was soon dis ·olved. 11
Compulsory Service
Though the first militia was formed out of self-pre ervation. it would not be long
before ervice becume compul ory. Most able-bodied men from 18-45 were enrolled for
duty except those excluded for race, cond ition of servitude or poverty. When threats
became ominous. rhese exclus ions were often Lifted to provide volunteers. 12 The Virginia
militia system formed companies e:U1d regiments around town or settlement leaders. By
1630, the colony fielded over 2,000 soldiers in the militia . When plamations became
10 Leach. 59-66.
II Jhiu. 64-66. 12 Jerry Cooper. Tire Ri.1e of the National Guard: The Em lraion of rile American Miliria I R65-1920 (Lincoln . NE: Uni vcrs il y of Nebra.~ka Press. 1997). r .2.
9
more prevalent. militias were formed around the plantation owner or manager. Plamation
militias were also used to control slave populations and track down n tnaway-;. 1'
In New England, the setllement~ had extremely well organized militia . Although
service was compul. ory, most felt it was their duty to serve. Some villages required their
militia member~ to provide their own muskets and hot. 14 As Lhe colonie. grew and
prospered, militia service conflicted with employers and busine. s leader~ at times.
Colonial assemblies clearly understood the ramifications of exrended mililia
mobilization. The threat requiring rhe mobilizat ion had to warrant such a use of
manpower and distraction from oLher essential tasks occe, sary to make the colony
pro per. They frequently exercised their mobilizations and drilled on a regularly
scheduled basis. While they had relatively few suppli e~, they emphasized mark manship
a:-. uppu cd to massing fires. Because of the frequency or drill and the nature of the
mis~ion , most members were younger and le~s prominent in the community. There
~ervice became a means of elevation within colonial society. 15
Thi was in stark coolra~t to the British. They filled their regular army ranks by
conscription. They often emptied their jail s of criminals with mi~dcmeanor level
offenses and placed them in army. They were neither respected nor trusted by the
co l oni ~l. When the British imposed heavy taxes to pay for the pre~cncc of the army in
the colonie:-. and quartered their soldiers in colonist homes. they hegan a chain of events
P . hea. 12- 16.
1 ~ Doubk1 . 1-1-22.
15 Cooper. 2-4.
10
that would lead to the Revolutionary War. Ultimately, these event would impact how
the founders would view the military and the militia. 16
The Evolution of the American Militia
The Minutemen System
Following the Pequot war, New Hampshire, Rhode LosJand and Connecticut would
e tabli ~h formal militia <.;ystem .17 Many colonie. required their militia to have one third
of its members ready to march within thi1ty minutes notice. The term "minutemen"
comes from the. e militia!'., which often proved e~~cnlial to protecting against Indian
attacks. SertJemem opted to have either an "enrolled militia .. or a .. minutemen"
compcu1y. The local governing body organized the mililias as necessary depending on
threats and availability of military age male .18 For example, settlements with smaJI
population. like Lexington relied on the enrolled militia for local ccurity and would
mobilize for regional threats a needed. Concord had a much larger population so it
formed minutemen companie from its enrolled militia. The minutemen companies
allowed for a rapidly deployable fo rce within the colonies. 19
When the need for a more permanent military presence occurred. some colonie
estab lished ·'Ranger Companies'' that served on an in-eguJar ba-;is and would be paid,
unlike regular militia member·. The Ranger were highly skilled at conducting extended
palrolling and allowed for the colonie to have a greater awarene s of Lhe Indian threat
16 R. S . Stephenson, "Penn.,ylvania Provincial Soldier~ in the Seven Years' War." Pemuyll'lmia 1/istory 62. no. 2 ( 1995): 205. 17 Doubler, 17. 18 Galv1n. John R .. The Minme Men: The Firsl Fil:lll. Myths and Reolitie~ of the American Re,•olmion (Washington. DC: Bra~sey'~. 1996). 10 -11.
I'J Doubler, 32-35.
II
and early warning of imminent attack. Thc!-.e companies would he used ex tcn ively
during the French and Indian War by the Briti ·b. The famous " Roger's Rangers" gained
their notoriety from this sy. tern. His "Standing Order ·" are still taught today in U.S.
Army Ranger School. The e were the three basic militia systems that the colonies would
use ror security until rhe Revolutionary War.:w Even though the readiness and functions
of each of these systems were diliercnt , they were ull part of the colonial militia.
Typicall y, tbc militias were organized around company level units with a Captain
as its commander. They usually provided thei r own equipment and weapon!-.. ln ome
~ettlemcnt~. citizens were required to own their own mu ket. U' they could not afford
one, a musket was generally provided as a ailablc. The minimum number of men in a
company was fift y. As the militia ·y\tem developed. companie~ formed into battalions;
and , battalion formed into regiment ·. Each company elected its own officers and in rurn
tho'ie omccrs elected the senior officer of the ballalion.21
The Role of the Militia in Revolution
The Battles of Lexington and Concord
Although there were many cont ributory factors thut caused the Revolutionary
War, the incident that began it was the Battles of Lexington and Concord. As tensions
between the British ;md the colonist grew. Briti h General Gage became concerned over
the militia and the amount of arms and ammunition stored in the variou enclaves
throughout the region. He ordered a raid on the powder hou~e just wc~t of Boston seizing
ju "l over 250 haJf barrels of gunpowder. All or the gunpowder and mo~t arms were
111 Oouhlcr. I g-:.!6.
21 rhid. 1 n-26.
12
manufac tured out ide o f the colonie . Gage believed that by seiz ing the arms and
gunpowder fro m the militias he could prevent an escalatio n of hostilities. He wa · gravely
mi ·taken. The raid . e rved a a cataly tlhat angered colonist and welled the rank of the
militi a and suppo ners o f revolution. The ini tial action had caught the coloni 1 by
surprise; however, the militia would quickly adopt a series of "powder alarm ·: · Thi!)
warning network was drilled frequentl y to respo nd again t the " Regular ·" if needed .2:!
The second British attempt to seize arms from the colonist at F01t William and
Mary in New Hamp hire found Lhatthe militia had re moved its over 100 barre ls of
powder and 16 cannon . . Additionally, militia forces raided British supply depots in
Connecticut and Rhode island capturing mo re cannons and powder. Gage believed he
would surprise the coloni st when he sent fo rces to Salem on Sunday, February 22. 1775
to seize powder and arm~. In stead. the Briti. h were urprised to find militia units
streaming to encircle their patrol and lining the way back to the coast. Lt was clear that
the co lo nist not only did not fear rhe vaunted ''Regulars;" they were deliberately trying to
provoke them. When word reached London about the fa ilure o f the raids and the co loni t
acti on, Gage was ordered to take decisive acti on and s trike at the heart of the rebellio n.23
When General Gage targeted Concord fo r a raid , he knew that surpri e would be
cs.-enti al to [he missio n but hard to achieve. He band-selected o fficer and units for the
attack. Almo l 900 ~oldiers made up from twenty-one companie. o f light infantry and
gre nadier" were placed under the leader hip o r Gage' s mo. [ capable commander. LL
Colo ne l Franc is Smith. It was the largest ~trike force used thu far and would travel the
fa rthesr inland . The risk was worth the prize in General Gage ' l\ mind. The mis. ion wa
21 Daviu Hackel! Fischer. Pa11i RePere·~ Ride (Bnsrun. MA: Oxford Univcrsily Pre~s. 1995). ~7-44 . 21
lb•u.
13
to rush to Lexingron to arrest the rebel leaders John Hancock and Samuel Adams. Then,
they were to de troy Ma .. achuseu. ' large t cache of war ·upplic at Concord. Although
their intelligence wa excellent. they failed to achieve surprise. Pau l Revere and Wi ll iam
Dawe!'> were dispatched to warn Hancock and Adams while other riders alerted nearby
towns to rally their mil iti as. By tbe time the British had fini hed their boat movement
under the cover of darkness and began their movement toward Lexington. Adams and
Hancock were gone and multiple militia units were moving toward Concord. While the
Briti h mo ed <;peedil y toward their fir. t target. it wru, clear to them they had lost the
element of surpri e. All along the route they heard church bells, gun hot. fired as signal.
and the movement or riders through the wood-;. Smith wise ly sent a message back to
General Gage to in fo rm him of the ·ituation and request that reinforcement. be readied. 21
Lexington had opted not to form a minutemen company. They relied in ~> teacl on
enrolled mil itia as did many smaller vi ll ages. They chose Captain John Parker, a highly
capable and respected veteran of numerous campaign during the French and lndian War,
to raise and lead their militia. Most of the men in the un it were blood relati ves or Pm·ker.
He had mobi li zed hi:;; men around two o'clock in the morning. With the British sti ll far in
the distance, they impatiently waited in the local tavern . Sborrl y after dawn, a rider came
through the village waming of the advancing Briti. h column. The militia reformed on
the comm~ns racing the oncoming troops. When the first Briti h officer saw the militia,
he directed the first companies of troops to form hattie lines and ordered the rebel. to lay
down their arms. Parker. seeing that he was hopele ly overmatched. ordered his men to
disperse. Before the unit had time to react. a shot was fired. rt is unclear if iL was by the
1~ F1~chcr. 56.
l..J
militia or by the Briti h. The result wa the British fired a volley into the militia
formation fo llowed by rapid individual firing. WhiJe some militia uied to return fire,
most . imply l'led. Parker's men uffered even killed and nine wounded.25
After a brief recovery, the Briti h continued toward Concord. The minutemen
and enrolled militia had each massed a regiment north of Concord. The supplie · the
British sought were long gone by the time they arrived. As they prepared to search the
town, Smith sent patrols to secure the two bridges between hi force, and the militia.
During the . earch, the British found some wooden gun carriages and decided to burn
them. at:cidently setting the town meeting hou ·eon fire. The militia watching from hill
acros~ the swollen ri ver thought the British were about to rat e the town. They moved
forward to attack the British guarding the nonh bridge. While the skirmish was small ,
thi.s was the legendary ·'shot heard ·round the world."26
The fir t battle of the Revolutionary war is often po11rayed as masses of farmer~
or villagers grabbing their mu~kcts and rushing tlu·ough the woods haphazardly to j oin a
baule in progress. While this may have happened, obviously units were already engaged.
The majority of the patriot that responded to Paul Revere ' alarm formed into units.
They had caprains and coloneL many of whom had rehearsed a response to , ucb a British
action. In numerous io~ tances during the British retreat to Boston. militia un.ils were
emplaced at exact location. to inflict large numbers of casualties while exposing militia
units to minimal risk . The militia suffered 50 killed, 39 wounded and 5 mi (j~ ing. By
contrasL. the British had 65 killed, 180 wounded and 27 missing. Were it not for the
reinforcements that Smith had reque~ted earlier, the Brili h would have suffered far
15 Doubkr, p. ~ 1 -13. 2t. Ibid.
15
greater ca~ualties. Brigadier General Hugh Percy wus able to prevent a total loss of
Srnjth · <; force when he arrived with his 1.000 oldier force to rescue the beleaguered
raider'->. Percy him ·elf would remark, "Whoever looks upon them (the militia) as an
irregular mob, will find himself much mistaken.''27 While the coloni ·t lacked a foc.:u ·ed
unity of command. they certainly achieved an exceptional level of unity of effoJt.
The New E ngland Army
Within days of the BaiLie · of Lexington and Concord. militias bad gathered to
UITOund the Briti h in Bo~ton . When it became apparent that the British were not
pre sing for a rematch, the Mas~achusetts Provincial Congress ·ent reques~ to
neighboring colonie~ for reinforcements. Thi wa the beginning of the ew England
1\rmy. Th i. army would find its first test in June of 1775 when the British auempted to
capture the dominating heights on the Charlestown Peninsula. While the Briti~h would
take Breeds Hi ll , they paid an excessively heavy cost. Of the 2,000 man British force,
half were wounded or killed. The lesson~ from the batLJc exposed several weaknesses of
the militia army. Pour logistics, inadequate taff. and poor di<icipline nearl y proved fatal
to the nedgling army. It wa~ clear rhat it would take more than just a spontaneously
joined anangcmcnt of militia units to defeat lhc world' · greatest land power.
The Continental Army
The Birth of the Army
During the co lonial era. the colonies relied primarily on the militia for its defense
rrom I ndian~ or other European powers. From the earlie"t se lllers, the militia was
adapted to meet emerging requirements with varying degrees of succe. ~- Jt evolved from
27 Doubler, :H -15 .
16
a mandated force for self-preservation to one of community service. Although the
colonies occa ionally unified militias for action , rarely did they ever place their force.
under the control of another colony. Even when required to ~upply fo rce under a British
banner, the colonies maintained their own command structure and resented any perceived
m1 use or slight to the militia. This is till prevalent today. A the revolution began, it
would become apparent that a '·continental" force would be needed to tight the British.
This woul.d provide a uni fying fo rce that could be regionall y enhanced by local militia
uni~ but commanded by officers selected by the Continental Congres .28
Congre. s voted to organize ten companies of riflemen from Penn yl vania.
Virginia and Maryland on June 14. 1775, three days before the Baule of Bunker Hil l.
Th.is would be the beginning of the Continental Army and i celebrated a. the birthday of
the Uni ted States Army. Congres. quickly approved the election of George Washington
to lead the new Army. They further approved twelve General officer to erve beneath
him from varying colonies and proportional to the troops that colony ~upplied. ln one
stroke, Congress establi~hed civilian control of the military. broadened the base of
. upport for the revolution and laid the foundation for an expandable rniJitary? 9
The new Continental i\rmy was comprised initiall y of militia unit and the
majority of the officer and initial enli tee\ were directly from the mili tia. In fact, the
leadership of rhc Continental Army would almost entirely be comprised of officers who
had gained thei r experience in the colonial militia with the obviou exception of rhe
foreign advisor~. Tn time, the colonie wou ld organize, equip and end to the army
regimcnrs known collecti vely as rhe "continental line.'' The colony that sent the
:s Doubler, 46-49.
29 Doubler. 33-39.
17
Regiment could appoint the leadership in the unit to the rank of coloneL These
"continentals" would become the backbone of the new army. While the regiment::, were a
huge boo. t to Wa. hingtoo, they came with a problem that was already beginning to
exa perate the new commander- hort cnlistments.;\0
Enlistment. were on a one year of service basis. The shortnes!) of enli tment
would plague the Regu lar Army until 1777 when the "\ervice term went to three years or
the end or the war. The inability of Congress to properl y pay, equ.ip and supply the army
wou ld likewise hamper re-en li stment efforts. Additionally, many of the leader that made
up the "continental .. came fro m the militia. This caused a ca cading effect of stripping
the leadership from multiple militia unjt !). Militia units primadJy '>Upported the war effort
by conducting raids on British outposts. haras ing ga rrisons or pickets, conducting
ambushe-.. and informing the Continental Army of enemy movements. While the militia
did not travel e ten::.ively. it did provide a persistent problem for the British.
The Constitutional Militia
Dual Military SyMem
Federalist ver.m s Anti-Federalist
With Congressional ratification of the Treaty of Paris in September of 1783, the
question of what to do with the Continental Army and Lhe militia began to be de li berated.
Under the Article~ of Confederation, the army rcmajncd a~ the unifying force from the
war with reduced troop number::.. The army largely over aw the withdrawal of British
troop~ and consolidated at forts near largely populated cities, along the Canadian border
and the l'ronticr. As the debate about forming a new constitution began, one of the major
111 Ibid.
dispute was tbe .issue of a standing arm y versus the militia . ystem which co lonies had
prior to the war. Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilto n. favored a strong central
government that wou ld become the key to developing a great natio n-state o f the
combined states. They claimed tbat re lying on the mi li tia as the primary natio nal defense
'·wa to lean on a broken reed:· The Republicanl:>, known first as anti-Federajjsts, wanted
a stronger central government than the Articles of Confederation provided; however. they
ll wanted the states to be the centra l actor of government. The debate grew more
acrimonious over the i ~. ue o f national defense, and continues to t.hi~ day.
The dual military . yste m the Continental Congre. had developed would not
i>atisfy the Federalis ts. They believed a large s tanding army was needed complete wilh
fortificatio ns, arsenals, industrial support and learning in titutioos specifica ll y for
military training. Thi would allow for further we. tward expans io n, guard the northern
and southern borders, provide a model for the remaining militias and be prepared to
defend the nation while ot.her fo rces we re raised as necessary. Conversely, The
Republicans feared a large standing army. They viewed the militia as largely effective
during the war and thought that was enough to provide internal defe nse. They be lieved
that having a large ocean as a barrier and a weU armed and equipped citizenry would
provide lhe necessary time to raise an army if one were needed. Republicans feared that
a large standing army wou ld be prone to in vo lvement in unneces~ary wars and could be
u. ed again. t the people to enfo rce tyranny. They also worried that a large army would
·11 Richard H. Knh n. Eagle and Sn·ord: Tile Federalist and the Creation of tile Military Eswhlishllll!ll f in America. 1783-1802 ( ew York: The Prcc Pres!>. 1975). 86-tH~ .
l l)
detract from suppon of militia which they fe lt was the bedrock of any national defense.
A~ the debated waged un etlled, a few key events would become catalysts for action.:u
At the end of the war, ·cveral officers joined together at Newburgh. New York
began ro plan a march on Congress in Philadelphia. While the officer had legitimate
grievances, their action~ parked a ci vil-military crisis that frightened member of
Congre%. The intervention of George Washington quelled the officer' s fury; but, the
trust bad been broken. A few months later, many or these officers would form the
Society or Cincinnati to promote their ideas and beliefs. Thi was to be a non-profit
organization for officers of the Revolutionary Army that had <;erved Lhree year or more.
Memher. hip in the group wa to be hereditary. When congressional leader. heard this
news, it <..eemed subver. i ve and ari tocratic to them. Another incident in June of 1783
provided un example of the Republ i.eans anxiety. Members of the Pennsylvania
Continentals marched on the State House where Congress and the ~tate legi!-.laturc were
in e sion. Both events would pressure Congre s and lend ruel to the fiery debate.
Washington 's Sentiments
Congress appointed a special comm.ittee to find a compronu c solution. The
committee chair. Alexander Hami lton. quickJy sought the advice of Washington.
Washington rc~ponded with his ··sentiments on a Peace Estahlishmcnt·' in May or 1783
which had four major military piUar . First. he believed that a mall Regular Army wa<;
es~enria l to gani~on frontier po~t. protect trade routes, defend the borders \Vith Briti~h
Canada und Spa ni~h Florida, and provide ecurity rrom a surprise auack. Second. he
proposed 'Weeping reforms to the mi li tia sy~tcm . Third, he ·uggested a se rie:- of arsenals
-~~ Kohn. 157-70.
20
spread throughout the country comrolled by the central government and Lhe ~tates.
Finally, he made the argument for esrabli ·rung mi litary academic~ for the purpose of
studying military cience, pecializing in engineering and artillery. 13
Washington's proposals for the militia were a major overhaul. He recommended
a ''National Militia .. ab le tore pond with better equipment and training than that of tate
militias. Hi- proposal wa. to enroll every able-bodied male from the age of 18-50 in the
militia. Each state would e tablish a "Corps" of special militia with the mo. t moti vated
and phy..,ical ly fit men like the minutemen sy tem. They would be paid for mu ter day •.
trained and equipped to be abJe to fa ll in line next to Regular Army un it when needed to
repel sudden attacks. Congress would manclme militia regulations that would tandardize
these unit and provide for the same manner of di cipline a. impo ed upon the Regulars.
Finall y, he recommended that each late appoint an "Adjutant General"' to over ee the
admini.tration of the militia under the direction of the Governor.34
Wa hington saw the shortcoming · of each . tares militia during hi tenure a
Commander in Chief. He clearly understood the es. entiaJ role that the citizen- oldier
played and wanted to harncs that potential into a national defense policy. He viewed the
Regular Army and the militia a.., complimentary and not competitive. While not all hi
proposaL would make it into the Constitution. it i clear that many of them would find
their way into practice evenn1ally.
" Doubler, 63-65 . 1~ Ibid. 63.
21
Constitutional Compromise
The compromise that would divide the power of Lhe government would
aho divide military powers as well. Congres would have the power to "rai ~e and
support Armies.'' and the President would act as Commander in Chier. The militia would
be different. They wou ld not have to be raised but called forth . The Pres ident would
have no au thority over the militia unless Congress authorized the mobilization.
To provide for calling forth the Militia tO execute the Law. of the
Union. ~uppreso;; lnsurrectiolb and repel Invasion ; To provide for
organizing, mnling, and discipling, the Militia. and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the Uni ted
States. reserving to the State re~pectively, the Appointment of
Officer!-.. and the Authority of Lrain_ing the M i I it ia according to rhe
di!->cipline pre. cribed by Congre. s:35
The intem of this pa~sage clearl y renect · the debate to limit the power of the executive.
The implication i ~ that the ·tatcs would maintain thei r mi litias with their rare appointed
officers responsible for their training. Congress would prescribe how they would be
organized and disciplined. Additionall y, Congre would also have the responsibility to
arm the militi a. The Constitution also restricted the States from engaging in war with
foreign powers and restrained them from '·keeping Troops, or Ships or war in time or
Peace,'· without consent of Congress.-~11
k:. the Con, tirution began to be rati fied, the State. mged thaL a '>e rie of
enume-rated rights be specified that applied to the individual and the State. Tbe. e would
become the Bill or rights. Of these ten amendments. two would deal c;pecifically with
military matter~. The Third Amendment addres-cd the quartering of ~oldier~o,, which was
·~ u.S . Con!)litution.arl. l.'cc. !tcl.l5- 16.
''' Kohn. 74-7lJ.
22
sti ll a fresh injury to population from the French and Lndian war until and throughout the
Revolution. The other wa.'l the Second Amendment which read. :
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the ecurity of a free State, the right of the people to keep and beur Arm, shall not be infrioged.:n
The o.;tate tbat upponed the Bill of Rights clearly wanted to pre. erve their ab ility to raise
mi .liti.a forces within their territory, not ju t the individuaJ right to bear arm . . The
posses~ion of firearrru, by the civilian population had been essential in the survival of the
Colonie. and the winning of the Revolutionary War. The pre cnce of an armed and
capable citizenry was not only a strong deterrent to potential adversarie :it was a strong
prevention or possible governmental abu!>e on the citizenry. Many of the men who
scrambled to prevent the British from eizing the colonies arms du ring the Powder
Alarms were the ~arne men pressing for the e Amendment:s.38
Mi litia Reform.
The Knox Plan
Wa~hingron' !> admini tration pre~~urcd Congress for action to pass sweeping
reforms for the militia. Wa hington 's "Sentimem " were u ed as a ba is for a propo. al
by the fir. t Secretary of War, Henry Knox. Knox wa. a former Mas. achusetL militia
member and was Washington's Chief of Arti llery during the Revolutionary War. The
main objecti ve of his plan wa to provide better training by dividing the militia into age
group~. Males between the ages of 18-20 would undergo 30 day of Lrainjng each year in
"camps of di . cipline." These camps would insuuct basic soldier ski ll and citizenship.
u U.S. Constituti lln, amd. 2.
'S Douhkr. 6 1-69.
23
American youth were required to palticipate in these camps to qualify to vote. hold office
or exercise other legal right . The ··main corp ·· wa, formed by male aged from 2 1-45.
Tbi provided the manpower pool to create armjcs if needed for a prolonged conflict and
their training would he as necessary or dictated by the State. The ··reserve corps··
consisted of men older than 45 and they mustered twice a year and only ser eel in
homeland defense in the event of an actual invas ion. The plan allocated a minimum of
, -WO.OOO annually for training, equipping and uniforms. Their organization and
!'l tanda rd~ were to he compatible with federal fo rces. Finally, the provision required
. enior militia o fficer~ to repolt the status of the militia to federal authorities. w
A skeptical public and Congress shocked by the expense rejected the proposal.
Busines. leaders objected to los ing its manpower for up to four weeks a year. the public
feared the .. camps .. would corrupt young men and militarize policy. Also. tares objected
to unir organizations being dictated by the federal government. Southern states needed
more cavalry units to cover its more sparsely populated territory and conduct sla e
pat rob while the northern states had no , uch requirement. Republicans feared the
intrusion into state rights wanted to protect the integrity or the carefully crafted clauses
controlling the miliria.40
The Militia ;t el of 1792
Congress responded to Washington's initiati ve by enacting the Militia Act or
I 792 required all free, able-bodied males between the ages of 18-45 to ~erve in the
enrolled militia. They were to provide their own weapons and equipment. Federal and
I<J Knh n. tD-135 .
40 Dnuhlcr. 66-o9.
24
State-elected o fficials, postmen. sailors ttnd other skilled craftsmen were exempted from
. ervice. While the legislation attempted some tandardi zatio n o f units, it uJso stipulated
' ' if convenient' ' which meant the State need not compl y. Congress provided no funding
or penaltie for no n-compliance. Viewed as a victory fo r Republican as protecting State
control over its militi a fo rce, the act . imply was poorl y wrillen and fa iled to meet the
o bjectives that Washington and Knox were o ut to achieve.41
QuickJy fo llowing the Militia Act o f 1792, lhe ' 'Calling Forth Act" was passed to
clarify lhc power o f Congre s to mobili ze the militia. T his act delegated . ome of
Congress· power to call fo rlh lhc militia to lbe Pre idem. He wo uld be autho ri zed to
mobilize as many militiamen from as man y States as neces ary whenever the U.S. was
invaded or tlu·eat o finva. ion wa imminent. ln . imilar fashion, he could use the militia to
put down insuJTectio ns: but, onl y afte r the Governo r o r Legis lature from the affected
State requested federal assistance. The u e of the militia for law enfo rcement wa o nly
after an associate or di strict judge determined that local civilian authoritie were unable
or unwilling to maintain order. Another significant a.;;pect o f the legi ·latio n i · that it
prov ided fo r penalties for non-compliance. While militiamen called up under thi
authority were to be paid the same as Regulars: they were ab o subject ro the same kinds
of punitive mea~ure . Many of these provi io n. are currcnt.Jy still in place:t:!
The ((Essential Pillar"
Jeffer on ought to repea l what he felt wru; an over-expan i e centra l government
This. coupled with the fact he was the rormer Governor of Virginia. made him a ·trong
~I Jhid.
~1 Knhn. 127- 133.
25
supponer or the militia. Early in hL adrnini~tration. he identified two tenets of his
military policy- .L ) civilian supremacy over military authority; and 2) a well disc ipJjned
militia. He believed the Guard would be the stronge t deterrent to war and effective
enough to defend again ' t any enemy until a sufficient army could be raised, if needed. to
relieve them. -1'
While he tri~d to maintain a l"irrn hold on his Republican ideab, stark rcaJi ties
began to challenge many of his as en ions. The administration and member or Congres!-.
were concerned about per~o, i stent conflicts with the British on the Canadian border and
high seas. along with disputes and skirmi. hes with Indians. Jefferson wou ld support
developing a ~trong Navy and a small Regular Army. The Navy would be des igned to
dcl"eat enemy fleets and prevent enemy flotill as from approaching the coa tline.
Additionally, u substantial tleet of small gunboats and masonry forts were built to protect
key harbors. l f these two deterrent~ did not prevent an enemy from reaching the shores,
the Navy and fortification. would allow enough time for the militia ro mobiLize and
rcinrorce the Regular Army. Jefferson wanted m reduce the Army, but ;,LI~o ensure the
Regulars that remained espou:-,cd Republican values. He took advantage of the reduction
in troop numbers to eliminate any officers he felt were feclercilisr.44
Due to Jefferson's avid as ettion that the militia wa!\ ··an essential pillar" of
national defense, the War Depunment wa~ prompted ro appraise the readiness of militia
units. What they di ~covered wa~ that the States failed to comply with War Department
annual reporting requirements. When an a. sessme.nt was finally achieved, the War
H John K. Mahon. The American Miliria: Decade of Deci.1ion. 1789-1800 (Gai nesville, FL: University of
Flo rida Pre:--.. 1960). 2:!-46.
~~ Mahon. 2R-46.
Department found that 525.000 were enrolled in the militia. Thi wa. con idered enough
manpower to build up the anny iJ needed: however, they till were di organized and
deemed incompatible with Regular Army unit fo rmations. Although some State · had
started purchasing weapons, most uni ts were ill-equipped. Jefferson would push for
militia reform ; but, hi 1-> own party would eiLher deny his request or water-down any
authorities that were perceived to change the State •' control of their militia . He final ly
got Congress to allocate $200,000 annuall y to pun.:hase muskets for the mi litia. Although
Pre. ident Jefferson would reline the national defense policy to prioritize the militia ,
arguably hi-.. greatest conLribution to reform wa providing the militia with 13,000
mu ·ket a year.45
The War of 1812
The nati.onal defense policy would not have long to wait before it would be te · ted.
The continuou Briti. h support of Indian attack in the North we t Territory on settler
and impre. ment~ of American mru"iner into the British Navy angered Americans.
When diplomatic and economic pres ures failed to produce any re ul t., Congre · ~
declru·ed war on Great Britain on June 18, 1812.46
The mi litia's involvement would expo ·e several weaknes e~ to the defense
strategy. First. several of the Northern Governors disagreed with the Declaration of War.
Their economies relied heavi ly on trade with England. They maintained that Britain had
not invaded and there was no compelling reason to cal l forth the militia fo r an
in urrection or enforce federal law . By refusing to mobilize their mil itias, some of the
1 ~ Doubler. 80-82.
·lb Oouhler, 82.
27
Nation·s besL. they derailed much of the Nation' capability to carry out an o ffen~i vc
against the British in Canada. In two instances, New York militia failed tore. pond in
sufficient number to defend their own cities from Briti h raids into Buffalo and
Plattsburgh. In at least '\ix occu~ions, Ohio and New York militias refu'\ed to auack into
Canada. In other instances, unwillingne. s to cooperate and perry jealou. ies prevented
effec ti ve integration of Regulars and militi.a. To this day, the debate over ··as~ured
,. h . 47 access · to t e reserve component conttnue~.
Since Regulars were responsible for official reports back to WashingtOn, the
mi litia wai> often blamed for every defeat no matter what the cause. BG Peter Porter or
the New York mili tia accused Regular officers of taking complete credit fo r every victory
and blaming the militia for every defeat. lronk ally, both the Regulars and the mi litia
units had poor leadership at the initiation or lhe WcU'. Each had similar methocb for
promoting or assigning officers for fu milial ties and politics, than witl1 merit or abili ties.
In mo ·t cases where militia units were ineffective, poor leadership was the primary cause.
When the militia had compelent leadership. they performed exceptionall y. They found
their leaders in William Henry llmTison who led an expedirion to crush the Briti:-.h and
Indian allies in Ontario and Andrew Jackson who delivered a sLaggering defeat to the
Briti. h at the Battle of New Orlean~ . Although that ballle was fought two weeks afler the
Treaty of Ghent was signed, it left an indelible image or a lopsided victory to the end of
the war."'~
While the contributions of the tniJitia were significant, the legacy of the war was
Lbe failure of militia units to be mobilized due to the politics of unsupporti ve Governors
17 Mahon . ..J t}-5o.
IS Doubler. g2-H().
and the unwiUingness of some militia leaders to cross international border. to fight.
The ·c issues lingered beyond the war and demon trated the flaw. of the Militia Act of
1792 and the CaJling Fonh Act. Mili tia unit uffered o the r humiliations during U1e war
as well. The los11 at Bladensburg, Mary land .led directl y to the British capruring
Washington, D.C. Militia uruts were mocked for running away by Regulars calling the
hattie the B ladensburg Race . Many would use the lesson learned from the war to offer
various proposals to reform the mi li tia and modify the national defense policy; however,
the results would be fruitless.49
In the wake of the war, o nce again Congre. would set about to s lash the force to
reduce costs. Although they wanted LO go furtbe r, President Monroe was able to keep
10,000 a his Regu lar Army end strength. He appointed John C. Calhoun ao;; the
Secretary of War who set about reorganizing Ule war department into functional bureaus
and div isions such as quartermas ter , medical , ordinance and inspector general. The
bureaus were designed to be more efficient and deliver cost aving; but. onl y created
fi . sures between field commanders and the newly redesigned general ·tafT Thi theme
wou ld begin repeating itself througho ut American mililary his to ry. After termination o f a
conflict. Lhe military would be slashed for '·co t- avings" and ''efficiencies.''50
Calhoun 's Expandable Army Plan
Calhoun be lieved that the model for the Army's future was more like Hancock'
victory m Chippewa th<.tn Jackson's at New Orleans. He fe lt that rhe mi liti a was too
unreliable for the reasons discovered during tbe War or 1812. He also realized that
~·> I bid.
~~ Mahon, 55-5!:1.
29
leadership wa~ the key to succc. s for both the Regulars and the militia. He developed a
plan to make the Army expandable by mainraining a cadre of leader hip for each
regiment. The units would stay in place along with compw1y and tall leadership. Only
the enliqed member would be reduced. This would allow for continued development or
leadership and the maintenance of their competencies ror a crisi and al low for the rapid
expan!-.ion if neces~ary for wartime emergencies. Hi. proposal would have a peacetime
Army of 6.3 16 that could be expanded to 11.558 in the event of war. This would
eradicate the '"confusion and di . order'" that accompanied reliance on the militia. ~ 1
Congre~s rejected his plan outright. They were not trusting nor in favor of ·'rop-
heavy"' cadre unit~. They disagreed with his evaluation of the militia and wamed to
maintain its preeminence in defen e policy. While Calhoun's plan failed to be enacted, it
wa imponam hccause it was the first time a national defense plan wab put forth without
the militia as a primary participant. More imponantly. Regulars hegan to view
themselves as the focus for futu re war planning and not include or cooperate with rniJiUa
leader .52
>I fh1tf .
\! Doubkr. 86-~7 .
3U
CHAPTER 2: The Rise of the National Guard
The Volunteer Militia
The Demise of the Enrolled Militia
Manifest Destiny
A. America continued to grow in Lhe l91h cenrury. rhe enrolled militia began to
decline. Jack on's one-sided defeat of the British seemed to cement the belief that
European powers were not go ing to be able to threaten invas ion, Lhe Indian threat had
dimini c:;hed significan tly and westward expan ion provided new opponunitie for all
classes of peoples. lmmigraLion and. high birlh rates provided for an ever-growing
number of enrollees for the militia; but. the State;; could neither support them nor equip
them if nece~ ary. States expanded exemptions from ervi~.:e (or a myriad of reason .
Business and industry leaders argued for exemptions to service because they were too
imponantto be distracted. They also thought mu ters or camps were costing them too
much money when Lhey had to lose workers for those days. Muster. devolved into liLLie
or no training va lue and eventually were degradated to little more than ocial occurrences
of drinking and card playing. Many of these arne prejudiced views continue today.
Society" · view of the militia wa that it was a wa ·te of time, money and worse-it was
corruptive. Whi le elites could buy LJ1eir way out of service or do "special service'' in lieu
of enli!>tment . the poor would face fine for not ·hawing for muster. Fai lure to pay the
fine. cou ld actually lead to incarceration which was all too common.1
1 William H. Ril..cr. Soldier> of rhe Swres (New York: Arno Press. 1979) 22-35.
31
Throughout Lbe remaining l'irst half of the 191h century. reform iniLialives were
studied. proposed and rejected. lr seemed destined rhat the militia that had fired the fusr
. hot in the American Revolution bad fired irs last. As more and more either failed to
enrol l in the militia or failed to show for mu ters. the ntilitja began to disintegrate.
Because of the perceived and real unfairne ·~for how !'>ervice was exempted. fines
imposed and incarceration for those unable to pay the fines, public support for the militia
fell to an all-time low. Slowly and steadily, heginning with Delaware in 183J and ending
with New Hampshire in 1851. all the States repealed compu lsory . ervice in the militia.
The era of the enroUed mijjtia was over.:!
Volunteer Companies
To replace the enrolled militia, the SLatC!I expanded a system already emplaced.
Since the charteri ng or the fir!:.t militia regiments i.n Massachusetts. vo lunteer companies
bud been u~ed to fill units that !)erved in both ceremonial and combat roles. Each State
had provision for these type~ of units. While they were a fracti on of the overall number
in the miliua. they rarely had a problem filling their ranks wilh quality men. Volunteer
companic~ ~trove to sepnrate them clvc!> from the enrolled militia by setting higher
~tandards and keeping their membership selective. Membership for these companies was
of societal importuncc a~ well as a method or service. Mo~t of the members were of
!>imilar hnckgrounds, tradecraft and most commonJy-ethnicity. Many immigrant~
scited the opportunity to join the vo lumeer companies as a way of !->hewing loyalty and
! Riker, 22-40.
32
patriotism to thei r newly adopted homeland. The ability to join a group of s imilar
ethnjcity made that ervicc even more advantageous, and esprit de co1ps flourished. ~
Volunteer companie. had trict entry requirement . To join, a nominee would
have to be ~ponsored by an ex i ting member. Member. hip was granted usuaJJy by
election or the company i11 accordance with it · chmtered by-laws. Members had to buy
lheir own uniforms and the wearing of the uniform was according to the companie · by
Jaws as well. The e companies· di tinct uniforms ranged from the practical gray
uniforms of the Mechanic PhaJunx of LowelL Massachusetts to the Pioneer Rifles or
Roche ter, New York with their taJI beaver hats, green waJiowtajJ coats with large cuff
and while pants. The e companie were present at any important civic parade of
celebrati on of the day. While uniforms demonstrated their ·epaJation from the Regular
Army, the ·e ceremonie displayed their real connections with the community. Often
the ·e uni t. functio ned in philanthropic capacity to assi. t orphanage or de. titute famil ies
in the area. If a member d ied unexpectantly, member of the company would en ure that
the surv iving widow and children were provisioned. Their reputations and prc. ti ge laid
the foundmion for po litical gains in futu re years.4
While these units were o rnate, Lhey were also functiona l. On numerou
occasion~. the e unjLS were caJJed out to a i t in law enfo rcement actions. In the outb,
they conducted lave patrol and put down lave riots. The ew York City A, tor Place
Riol of 1849 was pul down by the 71h New York Reg iment made up exclu ively of
1 Doubler. 90-9-t.
~ Ibid, 9~-95 .
volumeer companie:-.. Volunteer companies would provide the backbone for the building
of the new militia.5
As America began to ex pand westward following the Loui iana Purcha~e. the
concept or ·'M anifest Des tiny'' propagated the belief that Lhe U.S. should be a continental
power from the Atlnntic to the Pacifi c. This coupled w ith Lhe admjuance of Texas into
the Union, created tensions with M exico. For the first time. the U.S. would he fight ing a
war completely on foreign soil. While Regulars and the militia had fought a l ong~icle of
each other in every previous war. Pre~ident Polk was he itant about u. ing the mil itia.(!
With memories of the militiamen refusing to cross the border into Canada and
Governor~ denying the federal government the l!!->C of their militi a~ . he devised an
altcrnmi ve plan to raise forces for the war. He implemented a levy on the States to
provide V olunteer Regiments. Similar to the Continental Line units of the Revolutionary
War. these units would be raised by the States, elect their own leaders and the States
would appoint senior officers up Lo the rank of colonel. Just like the Continental Line
units. the maj ority or Lbe leadership would be formed from exi . ting militia leaders. In
many ca:-.e~, junior militia leaders were gi ven their nex t rank and told they coulc.l keep it i f
they recruited the requisite quota to support their new position. While thi s was a
common occurrence, the effect was similar to that of the Revolutionary W ar. The rniljtia
lost some of its best leaders to the Regulars or the new V olunteer Regiments. M osl of the
Volunteer Regiments were .in reality militia unit~ with an enlarged recruitment. When the
war ended. the Volunteer Regiments were disbanded and mo, t citi zen-soldiers happily
' IJouhler. 96.
1' Jim D. Hill. The Millllft? Man in Peace anc/IVar: A lli.1tory of the Narivna/ Guard (Harrishurg. PA:
Stat.:kpolc Rnok!i, 196-1 ). 15-24.
went back to their civi li an li fe. This would become the new model for the Regular Army
and future defen!>e planning. The Army would u e a system of rapid enrollmenL of
vo lunteers ver u the militia as a primary means of add ing formation. for war in the
future planning.7
Civi l War and Reconstruction
The Emergence of the Regular Army
As the U.S. careened toward civil war, the militia continued to play a vital role in
military matter!>. The altack at Harper's Ferry by abolitionist Jolln Brown had created a
sense of inevitability about war. It cemed only a maller of time until the conflict over
~ lavery and State· · right became violent. With the election of President Uncoln and the
·ubsequent sece~~ion of Southern States. the South would immediately employ thei r
volunteer militia companies to seize federal assets within their borders. Whh no current
standing army, the Confederate States of America would have to rely on their militia
until an army could be rai ed. A with the Revolutionary War. the new government
turned to its mil itia to provide the initial force and leadeL hip and a new Congress would
be formed to build a Confederate Army. 8
Ironicall y, tJ1e Confedera tes would have to employ a "national" conscription law
to field force. nece~sary to with, tand the Union Army. The conscripts accounted for
approx_imately 20 percent of the ~oldiers that ~erved in the South. The Confederate Army
was largely a grouping of vruious Stare volunteer regiments. formed basically from an
expansion of the volunteer militia companies. These organizations were bolstered by the
7 Douhler. 96-YY.
~ James M. McPhcr!->on. Ordeal by Fire: The Cil·if War and Recon.1tmcrion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, I 9H2 ). 135-SR.
multitudes of girted leader · and oldiers that refu!-ed to serve in the Regular Army a-; it
prepared to invade the South. Most notably of these was Robert E. Lee. He resigned hi.
commiss ion and returned to hi l> home state to develop the Army of onhern Virginia.
Though the South had many capable leader~ in its militia, mo ·t of its senior commander~
would come from officers leaving the Regular~ ro retu rn and defend their homeland.
Militia and vo lunteer regimems were seamless ly integrated and militia officers and their
Regular counterpart~ worked welllOgcther with few problems. The South utili zed a form
of Henry Knox's plan by conscripting all males from 18-35 for three-year term~ followed
by manda1ory rcnewment if necessary. Older aged males were utilized for internal and
coa~tal defense under the militia. They were also largely re~pon l'.> ible for rounding up
runaway -;laves. deserters and enforcing Jaw.9
The northern militia units had sinlilar uti lization. They too were rcspons.ihle for
coastal defense, internal securit y. guarding pri . oners and about any other task that could
be given them to free up Regulars for the war effort. The No1th also utilized the
vo lunteer regiments as they had during the Mexican War. While the NorLh had a fa r
great~r population and did employ drafts to meet State quotas. onl y six percent of the
army was conscripts. The conscription law~ were large ly ba!)ed on militia laws of the
past. Just like in the past, exemptions and ~ubstitutions could be made. Many
.. volunteers'' were paid substitutes. Militias were often used to deliver the initial training
to recruits. The Union used militia units as whole or part of other rormations. At the
outbreak of hostilities, the first units sent to "guard'' the "narional" Capital were militia
units. Many or these unit~ were being referred rom; "National Guard" units. ln 186 1,
'J M<.: Phers(ln. 137-160.
Connecticut became lhe first to officially recognize their militia a. National Guard. The
following yem·, the Empire Stale officiaiJy des ignated its militia forces as ''The National
Guard of the State of New York.' ' Pennsylvania ru1d Ohio would follow suit. Many of
their uniforms had NG prominently displayed. 10
With the ma~si ve number of units rai. ed to support the war, it is impo ible to tell
where the militia began and ended: however, there were notable excepLions. The
''Fighting 691h,. was an entire.ly militia regiment from New York City and was a part of
the famed Lri ·h Brigade. Even Roben E. Lee referred to Lhem a the Fighting 69Lh and
respected their valor immensel.y. Unlike the South, the Union Army suffered from peuy
politics and ri valries between senior officer . Many officer received prominent position
due to influential and political connection ·, while other. received special con ideration
because they were alumni of We!>l Point. While the Army of the Potomac , uffered from
revolving leader hip, the alJocation of forces and officer positions became cliqui hand
were perceived to be aloof toward citizen-soldiers. One of the most capable commanders
in the Union Army was John A. ''Black Jack" Logan. On three occa ions. he wa
bypassed for promotion by Regulars only to replace them soon afterward. When he
finally ascended to command of the Army of Tennessee after McPher on wa killed.
Sherman refu sed to make the promotion permanent opring for another West Point
graduate, Oliver 0 . Howard. The deci..,ion did not sit well with Logan and after the war
he became a major critic of the Regular Army and how it eJected and promoted its cnior
leaders. 11
10 Doubler. 99- I 03. 11 Jonathan A. Logt~n. The Vol1111teer Sohiier of A11•erica (Chicagot~nd New York: R.S . Peale and Company. 18R7). 31 -38.
37
R econ .... truction
Because of the nature and inten ·ity of the Civil War. the consumption of
manpower was staggering. After the South' . defeat and given the overwhelming number
of fatalities and casualties. soldier were eager to pur the war and mili tary crvice behind
them. Volunteer Regiments began to disband and disappear. Militia units demobilized
and Stares eager to u·irn budgets gladly reduced the militia from any tax payer support.
Most felt that the Rcgu.lars could handle the reconstruction of the South. Adjutant
Generals in the North found themselves re ·ponsible for veteran affai rs and that duty took
more time and aucntion than recruiting and training the miJitia. 12
ln the South. militia units were disbanded in accordance with lhe surrender terms.
Once the States were rcadmined, they were free to reestablish their mi litias which they
did with great eagerness. The southern militias were used to enforce '·Black Codes" to
mainrain the stamling societal norms. As a result, Congress passed lcgi lation negating
rhc code. and took away U1e States right to form a militia. As tbe advem of while
terrorist groups like lhe Ku Klux Klan began to plague reconstruction and civil rights
ellorls. Congress reauthorized State militias as long as they swore loyalty to the Union.
Al l black militia units sprang up thmughoutthc South. 13 The Regular Army had already
e~tablished four all black units commanded hy white officer . The primary difference
with the militia uni~ is that the ·oldier were free to elect their own officers. Many of the
firs t African-American to rise to senior ranks did so in the Suuth th rough rhe militia. In
I R70, MG Robert B. Elliott of South Carolina became the first black Adjutant General of
a Stale. The Regular Army would not have an African-American General until October
1' Dnuhk:r. 106-10.
11 McPhcr~nn . .S45-55.
of 1940, BG Benjamin 0 . Davis. In contrast, Elliott would achieve his rank seven years
before Davis was bom. 14
By some accounts. roughly one-third of the State had a ·emblance of an
organized militia. The volunteer companies that wove many communi tie togetl1er
before the war were now painfu l reminders of lo. t loved-ones. Military age men had
their fill of r1Uiitary service and large numher nligrated we_t or outh. The volunteer
militia had only 90,865 member~ nationwide anclten out of 37 States reported no militia
organization at all by 1875. While orne of the vo lunteer companie.-. carri ed on out of a
!)ense of community and tradition, the m<tiority of the uni r. formed in the early 1800's
were fading memories. 1 ~
The Great Railroad Strike of 1877
The resurgence of the mjliLia would not come from a growing Lhreal of war o r
political outcry but from an unlikely source-labor disputes. In 1877. due to many
European bank failings. many American investors lost massive amounts of monies.
These were the fund rui ed by ~ tockho lder. that purchased the promi e of owning
rai lroads. While the investors were shocked to find the some of the railroad companies
had lost their in vestment. by storing the funds in insolvent banks. the workers who were
not being paid afler month. of labor began revolting. Riots took place in over two-th iJd
of the State . Many were bloody and included mass ive property damage. Loot ing was
wide~preud and robberies occurred, covered by the ensuing confusion. 16 Governors
began to call up their mi litia. with varying degree~ of effect. In . ome case~. Lhe militia
11 Douhlcr. II I. 15 Cooper. 21-31.
IC• McPI11.:r!-on, 586-RR.
:w
~yrnpathized with the strikers. ln other . they were not able to stem the tjdc of violence
and Regular had to be u cd to break up violent strikes. In some area~. the mililia wa
extremely crrective and pacified angry mobs with "grapeshot and cani~ter." The strikes
turned the attention of policy-makers hack toward the militia. 17
Strikebreakers
The militia found a new mission a~ that of .. trikebreakers.'' Labor org<mjzations
regarded the Guard us an evi l tool of the ·'robber baron ." They resented the heavy-
handed tactics and prohibited their members joining tbe militia. Slowly, militia units
began to return. Politicians and busincs~ leaders were eager to support a resurgent militia
and Guard leaders glad ly promoted their units as strikebreakers. Guard units were often
financed by indu~tri e~ that were all too happy to provide storage space for weapons <md
floor '\pace for necessary muster!-.. Business groups were eager to purchase cannons and
horse~ for their local fighter~. This way, the money pent was !.laying local and
providing security where it was needed in~tead of upporiing the Regular Army. JR
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878
Another result of the Great Railroad Strike and Civil War Recon tnJction was the
passage of the Po~~e Comitatus Act of 1878. The new law prohibited lhe conunon
practice of U.S. Mm ·halb or judges ordering Army units to enforce laws. The Army
could only a-,. ist civil authoritie · when ordered to do so by Lhc President. Governors
would retain Lhe u~e of their respective Nati011al Guard units to serve nR they deemed
17 Mahon. 5~-5-1. 18 Hi l l. ~2U-2H.
-10
nece !:lary during a ~ tate emergency. This law still serves as landmark legislation for the
use of Regular Army and National Guard forces within the U.S. to this day. 19
The Legislative Battle
Que t for Reforms
The Influence of Upton
MG Emory Upton was a Union General during Lhe Civil War: however, he wa.
more notably remembered for his outspoken reform-minded writings after the war.
Wbjle he wrote prolifically about Cavalry. Infantry and Artil lery tactics, he also had other
suggestion about national defen. e. He propo ed developing a pro fes ·ionali7ed general
staff based on tile German model and believed in expanding the Regular Army. More
importantly. Upton believed the mil irja was a waste of re ources. lie recommended the
militia he utilized as a resource pool for personnel that the Regular Army could pull from
as needed. Any militia unit that was not used to fill Rcgulcu· Army ranks would be kept
for locnl mi slon. such law enforcement or guard duty. He hlgb1ighted historical failings
of militia unit~ in banle such a Bladensburg and BuU Run. He neglected to mention
such victories a Bunker Hil l, Cowpens, aratoga. New Orleans and Bennington. Whi 'le
he lectured prominently for Regular Army issues. llis writings would not become widely
read until after hi · dealh and only after the Spanish-American War. :!O
Wben Upton' · writings were brought to the attention of Secretary of War Elihu
Root, he had them printed and widely distributed for professional reading . While Root
was far more intere ted in teaching the Regular Army what Upton was writing about
''' Doubler. 112- 13. 20 Emory Upton. The Milirary Policy oj the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. War 11cparlment. 1907). IV-XV.
41
developing force . trucrure, organizing troops. the profe . . ionaJ general taff and his
teachings ahoul tactic from around the world. Upton· disdai n of the Citizen-Soldier and
the partisan poli tics of various states that influenced promotion. was unduly assimi lated
into the Regular Army officer corps . Officers that proclaimed this view and acted aloof
toward tate militia officers were actual ly ca lled ·'Uptonians.''21
One of Upton 's views was that it was essential fo r the Army to have a we ll trained
anc.l organized reserve. The rc ·erves should be activated periodicaJiy to train with the
profes~ional army to maintain tandards and develop capability. The militia unit roles
during the Spanish-American war made them very popular with the American people.
The forces that sei.led the Philippines and Pueno Rico were predominantly mil itia uni ts.
As with previous w;:u· . many stale~ had establi hed Volunteer Regiments made up from
the militia and sent off to fight a Regular Army Regiments. The difference with this war
was thut when they reltlrned, they did not di sband cntire.ly as they bad in previous
practice. A large number or these Regiments simply went from being an army unit to a
stale National Guard Regiment. They maintuincd a high number of veteran officer!'> and
pressed for greater ro le~. This coupled with Secretary of War Root' s campaign to expand
the Army provided Guard reformers the opportunity to press for favorable legislation. 21
The National Guard Association
As further reform iniriatives were being developed by Congress. it was clear rhat
the National Guard was incapable or effectively represent.ing it. e lf. While almost every
State had a National Guard or Militia Association, there was not one at the national level.
~~ Douhlcr. I J9- l -t I .
n Hill , I X0-1 R6.
Ln 1878, at the initiation of ex-Confederate, MG Dabney Maury. a meeting was convened
for the purpose of organizing mil itia leaders and fonTting a national organization that
could di cu sand develop po itions on policy affecting the militia. Jt would also become
a forum for developing initiatives that these leader would support for propo. ed
legislation.23 One year later, the National Guard Association (NGA) held its fir t annual
convention. Among its major items to discuss wus an increase to the annual
appropriation for the purchases of weapon . The original appropriation wa/) $200,000 a
yea r [or musket~ during the Jefferson Adnuni. tration. That aid, after 70 years and three
major war~. the appropriation wa. till $200,000 annually. Most convention member.
believed the reform of the National Guard wa-. ncces ·ary and specific recommendation
. d . ' I [ . d d "'4 remame s1m1 ar to many rom prev10us eca es.-
Members that u·aveled to Washington to lobby Congress for the new weapons
appropriation were sorely di appoi nted. The majority of Congre ·ional members were
either apathetic, anti-mil itary or state-right advocates that did not want any federal
entanglements in state affairs. Additionally, Regular Army repre entative. actively
campaigned against the initiative. As is still the case, the Regulars wanted to replace
their older weapon. with modern inventory. They lobbied for new arms purchases for
Lbcm and wi llingly offered tO tran fer their aged weapon. to the militia. Thi ~ would
begin a new precedent of supplying the National Guard with outdated and u~ed
equipment. Eventually, the NGA was able to generate enough upport ro double the
2·1 Denhick. Martha. The National Guard in Po/itin (Camhridge. MA: Han anJ Unhcrsily Press. t965).
21-22. 2 1 Cooper. 105- tO.
appropriation to 5400.000. While the relationship between the Regular Army and the
militia had often been contentious: now. it would become political.l.'i
A the westem expan ion completed and the need for Army units to suppres
l ndian attacks diminished, the Regular Am1y sought a new miss ion. Many of its
vi ionary leaders prophetica lly foresaw involvement in future European conl'l icts. They
o;;ought to fa. hion the Army simi lar to those of European powers with professional
general ' tarrs and a dedicated. large, organiLed and trained reserve. The National Guard
was likewise eager to distance it ·clf from the reputation as suikcbreakers. They looked
to so lidify their po:-. ition formally as the reserve for the Regular Army. State ought to
purcha"e the same uniform as the Regular A rmy and Guard leaders used thi to bolster
the perception of '>ervice a~ a reserve corps.:!<•
Guard leader" focu ed on forming regiments in lieu of the eparate companic of
the volunteer militia era. M ost '\tates reorganized from the enrolled militia districts to a
divisional system. Pennsyl vania led rhe way organizing the first combat division in
peace time. It wou ld become the 28th Infantry Division, the oldest division in the Army.
At the request of the NGA, Regular Army officers were ~>ought to advise States in rhe
manner of training and organiz ing Guard unit~ . Other reforms such as spending and
reorganiz.ing the National Guard were continually debated and pre ed to legis larors.:!7
The Dick Act
The MiJjtia Act of 1903, also known as the Dick Act was landmark legislation of
it~ duy. The hill wa~ sponsored by Senator Charles Dick from Ohio. a member of the
1~ Cooper. R7-95.
:n lbid
17 Doubler. I 17-2 1.
Ohio National Guard cU1d veteran of the Spanish-American War. He carefully crafted the
act and cultivated the relationships to build a consensus hiJJ that would pa~:>s wirh scarcely
any oppo ition. The act repealed the antiquated Militia Act of 1792 and convened the
volunteer militia into the National Guard. It solidified the Guard · role a there erve for
the Regular Army. Guard units would receive increa ·eel funding and equipment in return
for conforming to federal standards for structuring and training. The bill recognized two
forces: the organized militia (National Guard), and the Reserve Militia which was the
mas of males 18-45 who would othe1wise be available for military service. The act
required Guard. men to attend 24 drill period~ a year and a five day summer camp. For
the fi rst time, Guardsmen would be paid for attending . ummer camp. though not for dri ll
altendance. The lcgi~lati on also mandated Guard unirs ro conduct maneuvers with the
Army and receive inspectors and training assi!,tance from lhe Regulars. Mobilizations
were capped at nine months with the mistaken belief that in this era wars would not last
longer than a few months. Additionally, Guard members that did not pru1icipare in
reporting ror federal call -up~ were ubject to pos ible court martial.2~
The Dick Act had a dramatic effect on funding for the National Guurd. Federal
pending on the militia and National Guard for the entire J 9th Century wa!:. $22 million.
In 1900. GA lobbied and gained an annual increao;;e from $400,000 to I million. The
Dick Act al o allotted a one-lime clisbur ement of $2 million for the Guard. In 1906. Lhc
NGA was able to double the annual funds to$ 2 million and two years later. they lobbied
to double it again. By 1908, the National Guard had a tenfold increase in annual fund in
211 llill. 180-88.
45
a many year~ . By 19 10. the National Guard had recei ved more federal funding in the
. '9 fir~ t ten year~ of the 1900~. Lhan aU of the 1800s.-
The MWtia Acl of 1908
f-ollowing the Dick Act. the War Department was ·tiJlcd fi lled with officers
!->kcptical of the National Guard as a credible re~crve force. To Uptonjan officers, the
National Guard with it s dual allegiance could not be relied upon for federal missions.
They que ·ti oncd. ''what if a Govemor refu ses to send hjs mi litia,'' as had been the case
during the War of 18 12. To quell their concerns. Senator Dick wrote a new legisJation.
The Militia Act of 1908 gave the Pre. ident fuU authority to call out the Guard for national
emcrgencie .... Unlike the 1\ct of 1903. it removed geographical boundarie and length of
~e rv ice for their employment. 11 aJso created the Divi ion of Military AlTair!> (DMA).
whid1 '"'m ild eventually become the Natio nal Guard Bureau (NGB).30
Coastal Batteries
While the U.S. continued to ex pand its teJTi to rial gra ps, the nece ity for coastal
defen e grew beyond the capabilities of the Army to manage. National Guard unit~ were
stood up Lo directly -;uppon rhe~e Regular Army mi . ion . As a result, numerous units
began training for artillery mis-.ion. and man coastal defense batteri es in varying
l ocation~. Much like the Ranger companic~ of the colonial era. the!)e were primarily
vo lunteer!:> used for a limited duration and scope until either replaced or the requirement
''' Douhlcr. t4 1-·.J:\.
30 Mahon. 142.
46
was di. sipated. The e types of mi~s ions were considered beneticial for the Guard and
Lhe nation. The territory was protected and the readine of lhe Guard was improved.31
The Army Reserve
Tn 1908, the Army founded the Medical Rcl>erve Corps (MRC) for the purpose of
augmenting the Army during time of war. The MRC wa not subject to comrol by the
governors like the National Guard. The MRC more than tripled the number of medical
doctors that the Army could rely on in time of war in just two years. From this model,
Lhe Army in. tituted lbe Officer Reserve Corps (ORC). the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC)
and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). The purpose of the ORC and the ERC
was to provide the Army with a group of officers and NCOs to expand the Army as
neces. ary for war. Since 1he Rc~erve was not subject to governor'!> control, they were
ea y to acccsl> for the Army and deployable out ide of the U.S. without .legislati ve
constraint. ROTC was established to provide training for college wdents to prepare
them for service a~ an officer. The primary role of the e Corps wa.o; to upply per onnel
to rhe Army and not oeces ·arily to individual units. r!
The Continental Plan
With the continued build up of European armies, the War Department continued
its skept icism of the National Guard as a viable reserve force. Both Germany and France
had annie · that exceeded 1.5 million with their reserves. The American Army had only
200,000 soldiers and the majority wa National Guardsmen. When it sought to bolster its
number of doctors, the development or the MRC was extremely succcs ful. Army
11 Douhlcr. 150. 11 Cooper. 56-5R.
47
leaders thought that the same re ult would occur if they ·ought to build a reserve army.
They envisioned a corps of trained and ready rc crvists that could be used to build
volunteer units as in previou. mobiliLation . . 13
There were also lingering doubts a~ to the legality of using the National Guard a:.
an expeditionary force. Secretary of Wru· Henry Stimson sent an internal finding tO U.S.
Allorney General George Wickersham claiming the Militia Act of 1908 violated the
ConstiLUtion because it authorized the use or the Guard beyond the border_. Wicker ham
agreed with Stimson and declared that the Guard's service overseas was uocon. rirutional.
After replacing Secretary Stimson. Secretary of War Lindley Garrison developed the
Continental Army Plan. Much or the plan followed sound logical design to develop m1
American Army of 12 1,000 Regulars and 379,000 Reservist. The Militia Acts of 1903
and 190~ were to be repealed. Within weeks of unveiling it, he resigned in protesl when
President Wilson publical ly denounced the plan.l 1
The Modern NationaJ Guard
Training as they Fight
In the years prior to World War l. militia reforms greatly improved readiness.
The Dick Act mandated summer training camps attended by borh Regular Army and
National Guard. These camp proved in ·trumental in raising the ahilities of the Guard
and the understanding or the Regulars. The shared experience aided Guard leader-;
understanding of modern l og i~ tica l prohlems and gained a greater experience for tactics. 15
While the leader or the National Guard and the Regular Army were in Washingwn
JJ IIIII. 205-7.
l J Douhll:r. 15-l-56.
l\ c .. ooper. I OlJ- 1 I I.
banling over legislatio n, the Leaders in the field were developing mutuaJ understanding
and tru. t that would prove benefic ial on upcoming battlefields. The Army opened it
staff schoo l and War College to tbe Natio nal Guard , though the re ults were not alway
good. 36 The most profitable learning wa do ne at local po ts where Guard leaders f01med
relationships and worked close ly with various commands. At the end of W orld War f, it
was discovered that there were eight d ivis ions that the Germans regarded as the best the
lighting forces al lies had-six o f the e ight were from the National Guard.37
The Def ense Act of 1916
A a result of the backlash over the Continental Army Plan , Congressman James
Hay set out to pas. comprehensive legislation to address the compos ition of the Arm y.
Hay felt that Garri . on· ~ plan subverted the framers intent of a dual-military . tructu re and
gave too much mjlilary power to the federa l government. He advocated for a Regular
Aony s tre ngth of 175,000 and wrutime srrength of 276,000. The National Guard would
comprise the Army' principle re erve force with maxi mum end strength of 435,800 (800
men per Congre5!>ionaJ Di trict). lt aJ o formalized the ORC, ERC and ROTC to provide
a pool of u·ained leader. for lhe cxpan ·ion of the Army in wanime.38
Th e Influence of Palmer
rr Upton was con idered a foe o f tbe National Guard, then it had no better friend
than John McAuley Palmer. Palmer was the grandson o f MG John McAuley Palmer who
rose throu gh the ranks a. a ciliLe n-soldier to command a Union corp. in the Western
lb Douhler. 146-49 17 Ibid. I ~3-84 .
)~> Douhll.!r, I 5o-59.
49
Theater of the Civil War. MG Palmer wa~ very critical of the '·professional .. officer of
the Regular Army and feared that they would fo rm an cliti. r caste of officers. The
younger Palmer was balanced by his upbringing and benefited by the Root reform.'.. He
had many experiences wi th tbc National Guard during !-.ummcr maneuvers. fir~t in 1909
and then many other training exercises. In the following years. he gained a favorable
impress ion of the leader~ of the Guard and especially of it commander~.39
He proposed building on the traditions of the Citizen-Soldier and developing
va ri ous unib wilhin stares that could be utilized by the governors and ready to ~uppo11 a
war efrort if called upon. While Upton Wi.ls dismissive of Guard leaders and sought to
replace them with a ··<.:ompetent reserve officer,·· Palmer sought method!-. to improve
Guard leadership and training. Palmer understood the inherent strength~ of a community
based force of soldier that were more than comrades-in-arms-they were ncighbors.-1°
Reorganizing and Remissioning
Prior to World War I. the National Guard wa.;; predominantly composed or
infantry units. The. c were the simple. t for state~ to organize, easiest to adapt and the
cheape~tto fund. After the war, a surplus of equipment was available leading to an
increase in multi-role units. By tbe time World War II began. the National Guard wa ·
organized almo ·t identically to Regular Army. A the Army progressed with
standardized organi;arion~. the National Guard followed •;uit.-1 1
39 Jonath:.~n M. Hou~e. John McArtley Palmer am/ rhe Re.\'f'r l'e Compunencs. Chaprer 2: Guard and
Reten·e in rhe Tow/ Force (Wao;hingtnn. DC: ND Pres,. 1985). 29-39.
~~~ H OU'\C 2l)-19.
11 Dnuhler, 152- 1 :u.
5()
The National Security Act of 1947 reorgan ized the ational Defense tructure. A
newly created position of Secretary of Defense wa. e tabh bed along with three other
departments--the Deparunent of the Arm y. the Department of the Navy and the new
Department of the Air Force. With the estab lishment of the Air Force, the Air National
Guard wa formed as wel1.42 Both the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard
would form part of the NO B under the di rection of the CNGB. The CNGB was to
function as a conduit for the stC:lle. and the Department of Defense, as it does so to thi
day."'J
While lhe Cold War fla~hed in Korea and Vietnam, the National Guard was bu~y
upporting both the war effort abroad and civil autholitie. at home. The National Guard
was often in the forefront of integration of chools. When the Ku KJux Klan (KKK)
threatened violence in Clinton. Tennessee outside an elementary school. the governor
responded with a Guard tank company. The impre. ive show of fo rce overwhelmed the
KKK and quickly quelled the di~pute. In 1957, the Governor of Arkans~ famously
cal led out the Guard to prevent integration. On September 2, 1957, the Arkansas
National Guard was mobi lized to Central High School in Li tt.le Rock where Governor
Faubus blocked the door preventing black students from attending. Twenty-two days
later, President Ei~enhower federalized the Arkansa.'> Nat ional Guard effecti vcly taking
the force out of the Governor's conu·oJ. The same troops that blocked the doors on the
24111 cleared the way on the 251h.-1-1
I! Gro . Charlcl> J .. Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard 1945-1 961) (Washington. DC: U.S. Air Force, Office of Air Force Hi~tnry, 1985), 1-3 .
.n Douhlcr. 227-29.
II (hid., 245-4~.
51
Cold War
Strategic Reserve
During the Cold War, the National Guard began to train on newer technologic • .
The development of nuclear mi~~iles made lhe role of the ··strategic reserve"' even more
crucial. They were the follow-on forces that would be mobilized to defend or free
We~tern Europe following a Soviet inva ion. It was even conceivable that the National
Guard woLIIt.l be the homelant.l dcfen e force should nuclear war occur and the majority or
the acrive component was aurited. Through the decades of the Cold War. the National
Guard went through cycles of restructuring and reorganiLing. Unfonunately, it did not
alway~ have a positive effect. Often unit · would recei ve some modern equipment, but
not ncce~~•u·ily the training for it. In some instance , their ·upport personnel to mainrain
it were not trained or equipped. While these were of ten times growing pains, the Guard
learned valuable les-;ons and wa~ able to overcome many of these ob tacles.4 '
Tlte All- Volunteer Force
Tn the af£ermath of the Vietnam War, the already unpopu lar draft was legis lated
out of ex i ~tem:c. The National Guard had long since abandoned its recruiting program
relying on the draft to fil l the ranks. The populace suffered from war weariness and
military ~crvi ce was out or favor. A s Lhe number of Gu~u·d recruits dwindled. the
National Guard began to reestab l i hit~ recru it ing force. Because the Adjutant Generals
of each Stale arc re-;ponsiblc for the personnel strength in their uni ts, the NationaJ Guard
i~ the only reserve component with a specific recruiting force ... 6
l'i Douhlcr. 2:!7-.1 1.
~h !hid. 27"}.-75.
52
The Abrams Doctrine
A major ctiticism many General · had for the conduct of the Vietnam War was the
failu re to mobilize the Reserve Component. The decision wa made by political leader
not to involve them because act ive forces were con ·idered sufficient to conduct a low-
intensity connict. Some alleged thar Pentagon leader · u~ed the war to bui ld troop
-.trengtb and grow program . Army Chjef of Staff General Creighton Abrams believed
that by not utilizing lhe Reserves. the Army became isolated from public support. He
initiaLed a policy to integrate the components in such a fashion that the Armed Forces
could never again be dep loyed for war without substantial mobilization of the re ervcs.
He believed thi. would not only galvanize public uppott - it became a forcing function
to pre. sure poli tical leaders. -.~7
The Perpich Lawsuit
rn 1983. the Army National Guard began to participate in training and
humanitarian exercises in Central America. Primarily focused in Panama, tbe Guard
deployed engineer uni t · ~si ting other acti ve componenr units and Panamaruan force~ to
bui ld roads in the interior of U1e nation. The scope of these operations began to expand
including chool building. , medkaJ faci lities and other infra tru<.:lllre. Additionally, the
National Guard began to conduct medical assi. tancc in Ecuador and Honduras. The
purpose of these exercise~ was to upport U.S. Southern Command's theater plans to
prevent the prcad of communist regimes in Cenmtl America.48
47 Lcwi Sorlcy, Tlumderbolr: General Creighton Abrams ond rflel\ rmy of lli.1 Time.1 cWushingtm1 . DC: First Brassey Edi taon, 199!<) page 360-~()R. 111 Doubler. 295-97.
53
While considered successful operations. po l itica l opponents of the Reagan
Administration saw this use of the mjlitary as a veiled threat to our . outhern neighbors.
They sought to prevent the u~c of the National Guard for exercise outside the U.S. or a ·
pan of a campaign again~! the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Congressman Sonny
Montgomery auached an amendment to the 1986 National Defense Authorintion Act
I hat stipulated National Guard lroops cou ld be deployed for training without the conc;;en t
of the Governor. It speci!lcaUy stipulated that the Gumd could not be withheld "hecause
of any objection to location. purpo e. type or schedule of such active duty." The
Governor of Y1 inne ota along with six other governor~ ued in Federal Court over the
Con titutionality of the Montgomery Amendment. The case was decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1990. It upheld the amendmenr as written; however, it ruled that the
governors cou ld with-hold Guard force!'> for training, if needed for a local emergency.49
Post-Cold War
Tiered Readiness
Following the collap ·e of the Berlin waU, both the Army and Air Force reduced
force structure considerably. The Guard followed <;uit. l n an effort to save money for
remaining forces on active duty, a policy of "tiered read iness'' was institulcd. This meant
that unit. were resourced ba!:>ed on how and when they would be utilized in time of war.
A Tier I unit wa~ fully re ourced becau e ir wa~ an "active duty unit" with a greater
likelihood of receiving a deployment order for combat. Tier 2 units would be re~ourced
at u lesser level because i1 was expected that they would bavc time 10 equip <lnd train
during their mohilization. They maintained a higher degree of readiness than tier 3 ro
~·, Doubler 295-99.
54
speed them [hrough the mobili zation process. Tier 3 units had only the basics that
allowed them to do the minimum amount of training. 5°
While thi. may make en e from a re. ourcing perspecti ve in peace-time, it was a
di astrouc; failure when the Army needed to cyc lically mobilile unit. . Dudng De!>en
Shield and again al'ler the events of September I I. 2001. both the abi lity and the amounL
of units for the war-plan required significaiH adjustment. In many case~, tier 3 units were
called up more frequently than tier 2 and in some cases tier I . The morale and readiness
of these units suffered. The model' as built on the underlying assumption that the
mobilization proccs would be fully re ourced and would be for an all out total war. [t
was never designed to handle incremental issuance of equipment and modernization a
well as multiple. cycli~.;al deployrnents.51
50 Stephen M. Dunc:an, Ciri~l!ll Warriors: America's National Guard a11d l?eserve Force.\ wul 1lle P()litics of National Secttrily (Novato. CA: Prc~idio Pres . 1997). 225-40.
\I Notional Guard Bureau. A r-ormula ror Operational Capadty White Paper (Arlington, VA: ARNG Din.:c.: toratc, 20 I I ) 1 -~.
55
CHAPTER 3: Recommendations for the National Guard
The Adaptive Force
Mulli-purpo!-tc Force StrucLUre
Growing MissiOil!)' for lite Guard
Hisluri,call y. Lbe National Guard has proven itself to be adaptive to differing
-;tructurcs. mi~sion~ and mobilization processes. Tbis flex ibility w.ill be paramount for it~
fmurc role "erving both ~late and nationaJ interests. As evidenced by the FY 13 DOD
budge t proposal , the DOD can expect an era of dwindling resources, 1 That will most
certainly mean significant transitions with in the department and the National Guard.
Likewise. ~tate governments face budget . honfalls which may reduce fir t re..,ponder- and
other emergency re~pon-;e capabililic'>. According ly, the pol itical leaders arc seeking
efficient mean · to a<;hicve strategic end . In the ational Security Strategy. lhe Pre~ident
look'> to holster partner capacity while maintaining a force capable of winning in major
combat operations.:! ll i thi s critical balance thatlhe DOD must achieve to gain rhe
efficiencies desired by our leadership cmd effecti vcnes~ to deter future conflict or win if
deterrence fail s.
The National Guard ha, a criti cal role in fu lfilling thls trategy. Secretary of'
Defense Gates stated:
Us ing the National Guard and Re erve will lower overall
personnel and operating costs. better ensure the right mix and
availabi lit y of equipment, provide more efficient and effecti ve
I Dt:l't:n~c Buhgcl Prinrit ie~ and Choices (Washington. DC: Office or lht: Secretary or Defense. 20 12).
1 Barrm:" H. Obama. the Nmional Securiry Srraregy (Wru.hington. DC: Whih.: Hou~c. 20 I 0).
56
u e of defense assets, and contribute to the u tainability of both the AC and RC.3
The Guard provides 35-40 percent of the operational force whi ,le consuming less than
even percent of the defense budget. At any given Lime, an average 63.000 Guard~men
are mobilized for FederaJ mis ions whiJe another 5,800 e:u·e activate for domestic . upporl.
The C GB ha stated thi i s sustainable provided that much prepar~ttory time i aJJocated
as rea"ionably poss ible. It i not Lhe reluctance of the oldier to serve as much a it i lhe
indecision or the DOD to formulate and execute a decision. The National Guard
continues to expand its capabi lities and develop personnel for a variety of divergent
ta$ks.4 While there arc several aspects and efficiency measure · that cou ld be di cussed,
thi~ chapter wiU focus on two--the role of the Chief of the NationaJ Guard Bureau
(CNGB) as a member of the Joint Chief of Staff and the National Guard in Building
Partner Capacity.
The Chief of the Ncnional Guard Bureau
NDAA 2012
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 elevated the CNGB to a . itting
member or the Joinr Chief or Staff. While the provision was under debate, the Senate
Armed Service Committee held hearings with the Chairman, Vice-Chairman of the Joint
Chjef~. the General Counsel for DOD. each of the ervice chie f~ and the C GB. Under
te ·timony. all uniformed members of the panel. with the exception of the CNGB,
3 Roht:rl M. Gmcs, Quadrennial Defense Revie11• Report. Fehmary I, 2010 (WashingiOn. DC: Office uf th~.: St:cn:la) of Dcfcn e. 20 I 0). 1 Craig R. McKinley. 20 12 National Guard Po l'lure Stwement: Adding V(l/ue to America (Wa hingtnn. DC: Nmional Ciuan.l Bureau. 20 12).
57
expressed opposition to the legi. lation centering around one major criticism- the
National Guard is not a service. While the National Guard i. comprised of two services
and is the largest reserve force, (Army and Air Guard), the National Guard doe have
service- like function~. The service chiefs spoke in terms of is uing regulation , ~eparate
uniform ·. managing budgets and title 10 authorities.5 What wa. mis ing i11 their
di scussion of crv.ice wa~ function. for example, the Air Force i. the primary . ervice for
warrare in the air domain. Likewise, rhe Navy is a specific servit:c for naval warfare.
The Nationnl Guard has the primary mission to support civi l-authoritic .
DOTMLPF
Each ~crvice uses an appropriate method to DOTMLPF based on a ·pccific
function or service they render for the nation. Likewise, the National Guard ha a
specific fu nction- -.upporllo civi l authoritie . Unlike the service~. Lhe National Guard
has a very limited capabi lity to create DOTMLPF olutions for their service. ln mo. t
ca<;es. units that arc w; igned to conduct a civil support mission arc tactical units which
have to task organi7c based on the crisi . Even wilb a doctrinally structured unit for any
civil support. there i a substamiallikclihood thattbe organintion would .;;ti ll have to
modify to meet the requirements at hand. The CNGB needs the capabi lity to gather the
requirements of the :-.evera1 ·rates, assign force structure to balance acli ve component
requirements with state needs, develop unique fo rce structure~ where necessary. expand
5 Congress. Scnmc. Committee on Armed S~.:rv iccs. SASC 1-/carin~ 011 Wherher the Chief nfrhe Nat irma/
Guard Bureau Should he a Member of the JCS. I 12'h Cong .. I 1 scss.. O\ cmhl!r I 0. 20 II . hllp://annl!d
<,Cl'\ i..:c' ·'t' tla!C.!!OV/C Wl lllC:,~II',[.C.:('I11'!id=5:!55 .
5X
material solution · when military equipment is not avai lable and control the budget
processes nece::.sary ro accomplish these tasking . . 6
The National Guard Bureau is identified as a member of the Joint Doctrine
Development Community; however, they are a non-voting member. While the role of the
National Guard Bureau l1a · grown in it& capabilities over the past decade. it has not
developed doctrine writers or the proce . that would be required tO do so. Ir the NationaJ
Guard is to continue to grow in it s ervice-like duties, this shor1faJI will have to change.
Jt is likely that with the elevation of the CNGB to the JCS. the National Guard will
become a voting member and therefore more responsibility with regard to doctrine
development. NOB will certainly have to restructure per onnel to meet lhis task. Since
the NOB doctrine responsibilities will only deal with "Title 32. United States Code, or
Late active duty legal statu ,··NOB can accomplish thi. by developing a systematic,
internal approach which trains elected per onnel to write doctrine through the arne
training that the Army and Air Force conduct. Then, these writers can be committed with
various experts that can provide subject experti ·eon Title 32 and stale active duty. They
would provide the NGB with the genes.i::. for expanding doctrinal soiULions ror it civil . . 7 . uppor1 mr 1ons.
The Secretary of Defense directed the implementation or Weapon. of M~
Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) that are resident in the National Guard.
These teams are compdsed ofboth Air and Army Guardsmen and have the unique
function of re pending to domestic CBRNE incident site to conduct initial asses. mcnts
1' McKinley. 2-6
1 Chairman of t he Joint Chief of Staff lnsLrUction (CJCS I) 3 170.0 I G. Joint Capahilitie~ lnregration and Development System (W.u.hingwn. DC: Office of the Ch11irman of the Joint Chief~ nr Staff. March I, 2009).
59
that would either enable or ~afcguarcl emergency responder . Due to its distinctly unique
requirements, mo t of the equipment needed i non-military. Each team ha:- a
communications suite mounted on a large civilian purchased vehit:le that primary role is
to bridge communications along multiple networks ensuring rapid communication
capability in almost any scenario. The ·e teams are an example of why the CNGB needs
to increased authorities to develop the National Guard.
Interestingly, Lhe WMD-CSTs were not initially considered military formation
nor were they identi fied on any organizational document. The ystems that bolh the
Army and Air Force use to manage personnel and equipment did nor apply. Additionally,
it is difficult to develop u life-cycle management for these ski ll set . Some of the
positions require cnorrnou. amounts of training. Once the . oldier or airman has
completed the required training and completed the follow on assignment. he or she is not
necessari ly competiti ve for promotion in their primary military occupational ~pecialt y
(MOS) or branch. Equipment necessary for these teams is expensive and require.
~pcc.:iali zcd maintenance that the team~ cannot perform. Moreover, it also requi re!> life-
cycle management hecause it wi ll soon become obsolete material requiring replacement.
When the~e teams were C!->tablished, no ex i~ting training program~ were available. Their
vehicles wh.ich had sophisticated communications equipment required special facilities
for c:; torage in accordance with ccurity protocol . These facilities were not even in
drarting '>luges when the teams were stood up and equipment purchased. Clearly, the
prohlem they were developed to address did not receive a full DOTMLPF solution.
8 Ch::urman llf the Joint Chief· of taff ln-.truction (CJCSI ) 1125.0 I B. Defen!>c Sup poll of C1"tl Authorities
CDSCJ\) for Dnmc,lic Consequence Management (CM) Operation~ in Response to a Chemical, Bio logic~tl.
Radiological. 1udcar. or High-Yield Explo.,ivc CCB R.N E) Incident. (Washington. DC: Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chief<; ufS tarr. Augu:-.1 19. 2009) 13- 14.
CiO
AUlhorizing the CNGB to generate force tructure · for the specific civil-support
functions would help facilitate developing a more integrated response capability within
the National Guard.9
Homeland Defense and Homeland Security
Homeland Defense present:. some unique challenges for the National Guard iJncl
the DOD as a whole. E. cntially. the National Guard h<.is always been ta-;ked with
supporting local governance due to its proximity and control. When the Posse Comi tatus
Act was passed, it wa~ to allow civil authorities to exercise c ivil controls. The National
Guard wa one of the instruments for them to utilize as necessary. Current guidance from
the DOD relics heavily on the National Guard for a myriad of response functions that
include: CBR~E, Counter-Drug. natural and man-made disa<;ter<;. c ivil di ·turbance and
humanitarian relief. While the CNGB is responsible for ass isting, assessing, advising,
and training, he primaril y has to prevent civil re pon ·e from bjndcring readine s of unit
for the Army or Air Force as needed. Since civil suppo11 functions are almost uniquely
maintained within the National Guard, it ~eems reru onable that the CNGB be empowered
for how best to prepare for threats against the homcla11d. This would require at least a
portion of the National Guard to be focu ed continually on thi s mis ion versus any Army
or Air Force <;ervice-spccific miss ion. Similar to hi toricaJ debate~ about developing
force s truc ture , _ome states may need a c:ipab ility or a threat may necessitate a new
requirement. In the WMD-CST example, these units onl y deploy to the Mates and
territories. Other similar forces are under cons ideration for development. 10
~ McKinley. 2-R. 1n Dcparunentof Defense Directive (DoDD) ~ 160.0 I . /lome/am/ Oefeuse J\cti1•itie.\ Condttcted by the Nmiona/ Guard. J\ugusl 25. 2008.
6 1
The National Guard-Reserve Equipment Account
The National Guard and Re crve Equipment Account (NGREA) ha!', been the
ingle bigge~t financial improvement for the National Guard and Reserve~ with respect to
equipment procurement. While it onl y funds existing equipmcm programs for
modcrni :t.ation. it is responsible for revital izing Lhe aging equipment of the Gumd and
Re~e rves. The Army and Air r orce have often submitted budgets wirh funding requests
specificall y l·or Guard and Reserve equipment update~ that were approved hy Congrcs
and ye t never actually implemented. In some in ·tanccs. fund~ were di verted for other
program '\ or the equipment wa purchased and di tri buted to acti ve component forces and
older equipment was issued to the reserve c.:o mponent ·' in lieu of" what was purchased.
This has been a major point of contention with the National Guard. Much or the National
Guard·s equipment is set aside as dual-use equipment. Thi,') means it i allocated against
dome. ti c emergency contingencie~ . By cominuing to ·'clump .. old cquipmem into the
Guard. it created an inc ·cu. able deficiency that impacted training. morale and readine~s .
Since Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budgets are set by Lhe amounl of mileage Lhe
vehicles are uc;;ed , Lhe National Guard was exJ1austi.ng it. limited budget trying to
mnintain equipmcnL beyond it. '\ervice life. 11
The Commi~s i on on the National Guard and Re erves asked the Libnuy or
Congrc~ . . Federal Research Di vi ion to in ve~tigale the impact of NGREA and lli>~Cs :-. if it
was , till nece')sary. Their conclusion was scathing. They cited that Lhe DOD fai led to
receive a d ear audit for the past Len years. While they did not find evidence of
11 L1 hrary of Con,grc~~. Federal Rl'senrch Di vi'>inn. Funding for Reserve Compmwnt Equipment: An
Ano{_1 .1i.~ of the Budx('/ Pmce~., ( Wn~hmgt0n. DC: Library or Congre;,:... 2007).
62
ystematic wrong doing. there was some evidence that the Army National Guard and
Anny Rc crve did not receive the appropriate amount of new equipment that was
budgeted. It further tated Lhatlhe sy tern is o muddled that a defini te finding could not
be ascertained. While the conclusion endorses continuing NGREA, it.i. their third
recommendation that is most noteworthy. JL reads,
... re erve componcm funding requests are contained in parent . ervicc budgeLs, making them difficult to track independently. A <:. a result, it is all but impossible to determine the impact of funding on actual equipment procurement. ln order to re olve the e is':.ue ·.it might make !>ense for each reserve component to be given independent budget authority . The associated overhead expense would seem to be justified by the improvement in u·ansparency, accountability, and ultimatel y .l . d. p rru 1tary rea 1ness. -
By giving the CNGB Independent Budget Authority (iliA) over equipment purcba e · for
the Guard, the National Guard would have significant capability to address futme
development of force and equipment for the future.
T he Nat ional Guard was founded on aulhoritics to provide local defense for the
col onic . . Tbi · unique function is sti ll applicable today. When a dome Uc emergency
occur. , the fir~ t responder~ in a military uni form will almost alway. be a ational
Guardsmen. It is becau<;e of this respon c role that the CNGB need to be able ro develop
doctrine for this uniquely Guard miss ion. The Army can conduct amphibious landings;
but. the Marine Corps ha~ that mi~~ion a. a core ta~k . Therefore, the Marine Corp L lhe
primary ourcc for amphibious as. aulr doctrine. They would be the JCIDS Program
Director for any material solution. Tbe <;Ume should apply to the domestic function and
1! !hid.
63
the Guard. By enabling this activity, it will allow for the CNGB to develop an array of
support option. that can be allocated tO dome tic operation!-..
Critics of the National Guard have auernpted to down play this as unnece. sary.
They u~e the same line that the CJCS u cd during the Senate hearing. ··11 is unclear to me
what problem we are trying to solve:·l:l The logic seems to be. if the National Gumd
doe · not have the ability to ident ify a capabmty gap, and then there is not a gap. Without
a strong voice in the JCIDS process. the National Guard cannot demonstrate the
prohlem-.. Much i said about ensuring that we have the right force for future conflict ·
where American ·oldicrs . sailor . marine and airmen wil l be in harm· way. The
National Guard wants to have the right re ponse for the future emcrgencie where
American citizens <He under ui tress or alrack. 14
Critics also contend that the National Guard does not have the requisi te ski ll or
~ tructurc for such a task. None of rhc service~ did until they were e cntually e tablished.
Additionally. the ational Guard already provides input for Army and Air Force doctrine.
While only a small part icipant. developing this capability will natural ly improve the
National Guard's abi lity to review doctrine and provide more meaningful feedback. By
developing its own doctrine, it would create the need to u·ain, retain and manage these
personnel in an efl'cctive manner thar produced the rcquisi[e -.kills. One of the be t ways
to do that would he for tho e selected personnel to take a _ hon tour wilh either Army
11 U.S. Congress. Sl!natc. Commiuce on Armed Sen icc\. SASC Hearin~ on Whether the Chief oj the
NotirJnal Guard Bureau Should be a Me111ber c~f rile JCS. 112'11 Con g .. I s1 sc. s., Nnvc::mhcr I 0, 20 I I
( tc~timon) l•f Martin E. Dcmp~cy. Chai rman o f 1he Joinl Chid\ of Staff). hup://armed-
1-<crv ices. senatc.gov/c_ witncs..,I•:-.Lc fm !id=5255 .
'·' CJCSI ~170.0 1G . B-2.
TRADOC ARCIC or the A ETC. This recommendation oot only improves the Guard; it
help the Guard help the Army, the Air Force and the Joint Doctrine Communi ty.
Developing Domestic Guard Units
The CNGB and the states need the authority to organize functional uni ts and
headquarters for uniquely Guard mis ions. This would enable the Guard to generate
fo rce structure with a variety of capabilities to re~pond in dome tic emergencie with
-.peed anu efficiency. It also enable both NGB and stale leadership to "fence off'. the ·e
un it. for trajning and development which would mitigate disrupting units in the
mobiliL.atioo proce s. Curren II y, most dome, tic upport mis. ions are tasked organiL.ed as
!he crisi!> develops. Whi le each stale refi ne. this proce s based on their local governance
and civilian capabi lities. the National Gunrd rc ponds wi th units that are organized for
combat operation . By aiJowing the National Guard to create thi type of force strucwre.
the CNGB and the state · would be empowered to develop at lea t a portion of their Guard
units for domestic speci fic missions. These forces could be utilized for humanitari an
rni s ·ion. that frequently occur and DOD ha~ to respond. By developing National Guard
forces. not only i!-. a more capable rc ponse available for homeland disaster event :a
more capable DOD response could be employed when necessary to our allie or potential
h . d I'\ partners t at arc 111 nee . ·
Critic. to these initiatives argue correctl y that thi is not a DOD .. core .. mission.
ll is DOD' mandate to right and win the nation·s wars. It is Lbe "what"s next" that DOD
has to contend. The ab ility for the National Guard to develop capab ilitie~ that augment
and enhance tran'i itioning from war to peace and civilian control would be greatly
~~ McKincly. 3-8.
beneficia l. Additionally, dome Lie emergencies can overwhelm civi li an response
capabilities. The continued evolution of Guard response forces only facilitates the life-
~avi.ng and consequence management activities that en. ue once either a man-made or
natural cata~trophe occur. 16
Joint Doctrine Development System
The National Guard Joint Staff participate. in the Joint Doctrine Development
Sy~lem in a limited manner. The voting membership i'l comprised or the CJCS, all the
Combatant Commands, the J-7 and the serv i ce~. Even the Coast Gu;ml, which is no
longer a member of the DOD, has membership and a vote. The National Guard i. a non-
voting member and can onl y . end repre ·enrati ve . . In many ways. thi exempli fie!) the
rca on why the CNGB wa elevated to the JCS. 17
Functional .4reas for Guardsmen
The CNGB could develop a series of Guard functional areas that could be utilized
to identify. validate and catalog these civi lian job skills. Additionally, he could use the!)e
-;kil ls or develop functional skill~ within units for domestic cri ses or Building Panner
Capacity (BPC) with the State Pcutner~hip Program (SPP) or other initiative~. Moreover,
the ability of TAG could use thi ~ as a mechanism for rebalancing thei r ~late-force
-;t ructure during transitions. For example. as rhe Air Guard i ~> currently looking at major
force structure t:Uli>. TAGs could use the dual system to absorb the shock from reuuctions
while maintaining capability and t:ran~f01ming to their future rorce structure. Tt would
abo allow the Guard to better track and then appropriately utiliLe civilian job ski lb.
I n Chairman of the Joint Chief:> or Staff lnslruclion (CJCSI) 51 20.0:2C. Join I Doctrine Deve lopment
Sy~lcm. ( Wa~hington . DC: Oflic\.' of the Chamnan of the Join1 Chief~ of Swff. January I J, 20 12)
1, CJCSI 3170.0 1Ci. B-4.
Building Partner Capacity
State Partnership Program
After lhc fall of the Ber.lin Wall in 1989, the National Guard began a littJe known
initiative called the State Partnership Program with former eastern-bloc nation~. The
program coupled the e nations with variou. State · who would end Guard men to ad vi e
in mi litary matter ·. Exerci ·es with National Guard units and exchanges of Officers for
. hort duration~ would prove the beginning of trust and respect. With linle inveslmcnt,
many of" the relationships with various State have yielded numerous benefit for the U.S.
Several nations would become panners and some even deploy troop in the GlobaJ War
on Terrorism. From these modest beginnings in Europe, the program has grown to
incJude six ty-three partner nation~. The succe s of the SPP illustrate. that the National
Guard is well suited to build miJitary-to-miUtary rapport with partner nation .18
The 20 10 QuadJenniaJ Defense Review (QDR) identified four objecti ve for
national . ecurity: "prevail in today' war. prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat
adversarie. and succeed in a wide range of contingencies and pre ervc and enhance the
All-Volunteer Force." Prevent and deter conflict is a important and difficult as any of
the four. Building Partner Capacity (BPC) eeks to prevent conrtict by increa. ing partner
nation's ability to conduct internal security. It at o has potential to ass i t regional
·tabili ty operations by develop.ing partner nations that wil l have acce . and capabilities
that may either not be present or avai lab le in U.S. force . U.S. aJJic currently lend
troop. and other support to assist ongoing operation . A tbc e allie. are proving
invaluable now, it underscores the need of developing of fuwre parLners. The QDR
IX Na1ionnl Guord Bu n.:au, Pre1•eming Fwure ConjliCI: 111e Army Nwional Cw:ml und Seuriry Cooperation White P(lper (ArlingJon. VA: AR G Directorate. 20 II ).
67
~tate:-, ··preventing and deterring future conflicts will likely nece · ~i late the continued usc
of some element!\ of the Re ·erve Component--especia ll y tho-e that posses~ high demand
<;kill o.;ets-in an operational capacity well into the future.'' 19
The National Guard has demonstrated a proven track record for security
ussi ' lance as pan of the SPP and is the groundwork for the Security Cooperation
Enterpri se (SCE) that is currently being developed . SCE has the mandate of developing n
fu ll array of security cooperation ass i. tance that is tailorable and scalable for va rying
mission set~. As the DOD forecasts more involvement in these types of .. other than war"
mission . the skills ctllTCn tly resident in the National Guard make a compelling argument
for it to be the ··force of fir~t choice·· for security cooperation.20
Policy maker. de~ire ~trategies that prevent regional connict or provide punner ·
to respond should one arise. Recenrly. the President outlined a new strategy that
rcfocuse military efforts on the Pac ifi c.-~ 1 Security a i tance and other military
program!) will likely play a large role in supporting this approach. While security
assistance i~ clearl y a function that DOD is assigned, it has not gamered the re~ources l'o
ful ly implement most Combatant Commander' s Theater Security Campaign Plans
(TSCP). The National Guard has been supplying the majority or the force. conducting
the exercises Lhat support these plans fo r a number of years. In fact, the Army Nut ional
Guard provided approximately 63% of the troops for fiscal year 2010 that conducted
regional exercises in ·upport of GCC TSCP.22 While the growth in reliance on :Hional
1'1 Gat~:-.. 23.
lll Natamal Guard Bureau. 1-4.
~· Obam~. 9.
11 National Cluan.l Bureau. 2- 10.
Gucu·d forces over the last decade has stemmed primarily from the lack of available active
component forces, the National Guard hm .. performed thi ta k well and with great
efficiency.
Operational Mentor Liaison Teams
The Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OML T) i ~ a NATO-TSAF led enterprise
intended for the profe sionalization of the Afghan 1ational Army. When Croatia was
asked to provide force1:1 using this model, like many other of the SPP nations, they asked
for the assistance from their State Pilliner. Multiple Stales have developed OM.LTs and
deployed them with their SPP counterpart to Afghanistan. Minnc. ota upplied an OMLT
to up port [he Croatian Army Battalion that deployed 20 I 0. The OSD hal) ta~ked Lhe
National Guard to develop two Military Engagement Teams (MET ) for the purposes of
conducting BPC in future yearsY
Institutional barriers present a per ·i ·tent challenge to achieving ecurity
cooperation success. Un it tructures are li nked to table or organization that support
combat functions and not mentoring or training capabilitie!>. Therefore, they are
recruited, filled. promoted and developed based on that primary model. A force that is
more capable of dealing with the many tasks of Civil-Military operations can be
developed by allowing the National Guard to de clop it~ own DOTMLPF elution .
'I Thomas Keeler. ··Minnc.: l:lota OMLT deploys wuh Croatiuns to Afghamstan," ' National Guard Magtdne. March I , 20 I 0. hup://www.u g.mil/m:w~nrc i11Ve~l20 I 0/0~1030-l l 0-0MI.T.aspx (acces ~!d October I 0. 2011 ).
(ll)
CONCLUS ION
Countle!->~ -;tudies and recommendation~ all point ro the same conclu ion: the
alional Guard will play un important role in defending America in fuwre years. While
the dbcu~sions vary on what role the Guard will bave :md how frequent it wi ll be
utilized, mo ·t of the discourse fails to address how rhe National Guard wi ll pmticipate in
the development of its future. lL i~ imperative that Guard leaders have a systematic
methodology to integrate its force structure into DOD mis~ion while preserving capacity
to meet the need::. of the Governors.
Hi~torical l y . the National Guard ha proven its adaptability and eagerness lo
pursue mi sions that other services try m avoid. Jt al. o has demonstrated that it can rill in
gaps until the a<.:tive component can " right-size·· itself or realign forces. By law and
de..,ign. it ha arc. ponsibility "to execute the law~ of the Union" a~ well a~ defend the
nation. While often u::.cd to assist local leader . bureaucratic friction often prevent the
National Guard from demonstrating it~ capability gaps or utilizing the fo rmal DOD
-;y-;tems currently in place to aquire necessary force stwcturc.
The elevation or the CNGB to membership on the JCS will likely benefit the
Guard' ability I() addre s the.:;e matters; however. it is the ancillary effect.:; that will be of
mo~t benefit. By integrating more of the NationaJ Gumd into the JCIDS and Global
Force Management. the eventual resu lt will li kely improve the seemly interaction
between the component!'>. Tf the National Guard is to have a greater role , it makes ~cnse
that it ha~ a greater voice to di. play it capabi li ties and requirement..
70
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