realist theory applied to greek warfare
TRANSCRIPT
DESCENDING UPON US:
CONCEPTUAL APPLICATION OF REALIST THEORY TO GREEK HEGEMONIC STATES
Joshua Schow (PHC Box #336)GOV490 Directed Research
February 25, 2014Word Count: 11,818
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 1
Explaining the History of Greek Hegemons: Introduction
Wars and Rumors of Wars for the Spartans and Thebans
To study power is the study the root of all human interactions. Political power is but a
small, yet important, element of life. Since the social, political, and cultural implications of
political power are quite diverse, concentric analysis of particular events helps researchers
explain the disruptive and normative elements of power. The international realists school of
thought has developed remarkably coherent theories regarding the nature of power as it relates to
political systems. These theoretical constructs have potential use in investigating historical case
studies of political power struggles.
While considering the predominant socio-political characteristics of Sparta and Thebes
during the fourth century, this paper represents an attempt to apply analytical comparisons of
realist theory with historical realities. The significance of these two regional hegemons in
military history warrants consideration. The unique discipline of the Spartan military training
contributed to their virtual hegemony over Greece after the Peloponnesian War. While the
Thebans military dominance was short lived, their martial potency was well respected during
their ascendency. The military genius of Epaminondas, the determination of Theban Sacred
Band, and the political willpower of the Thebans all bolstered the war fighting potential of the
Thebans. Additionally, these two states all have similar cultural background and their military
leaders all drew from largely the same history and institutional practices. Greek city-states were
fiercely competitive, but they were also strongly committed to the same mythology, cultural
institutions, and way of life. Thus, it will be easier to establish substantive differentiation on a
granular analytical level.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 2
This paper will utilize a basic realist framework to examine Sparta and Thebes. This
framework is helpful for three primary reasons. First, realist theory emphasizes individual state
behavior in an anarchic international system. This theoretical construction, while seemingly
innocuous, is particularly useful for examining historical periods wherein no specific
international legal structure existed.1 Second, the realist analysis concentrates on the actions of
individual states as they interact with other states. The use of the term “state” here should be
rigidly construed to exclude modern notions of nations and instead embody a looser construction
of authority.2 Finally, the realist’s emphasize interest as defined by power. Thus, war is
conceptualized as a means of pursuing power.
Realist Theory Can Adequately Explain the Transition of Power
During the Greek Classical Period, the successive hegemonic power of the Spartans, and
subsequently the Theban can be understood as an evolution of socio-political power dynamics
triggered by the Spartan hegemony Post-Peloponnesus rather than socially disruptive imperial
changes of authority structures. This paper calls for specific analysis of each state as well as a
comparative synthesis of the respective trends theorists have typically observed regarding realist
theories. Through this analysis, this paper will evaluate the explanatory sufficiency of realist
concepts in the context of the two hegemonic powers in Greece during the fourth century.
There are two primary research questions that will help apply this thesis. First, what are
the basic conceptual models employed by realist theoretical constructs? Since international
theories are based on standard assumptions it is important to establish the accepted thinking
among realist circles. Given the large body of literature that has developed around international
1 While the internationalist school of international theory might argue the respective leagues of the time period constituted an international structure, these affiliations were too weak and abnormal to be considered a legitimate structure for standard international engagement. 2
To do otherwise would require an egregiously anachronistic reading of history.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 3
relations theory, it is important to provide clarity on how the terminology has developed. For the
purpose of this work, the conceptual models utilized in realism will serve as an operational
definition of the theoretical constructs. Second, how well do realist conceptual models explain
the salient historical elements of the Spartan and Theban hegemony? This second question seeks
to provide a logical comparison of the historical narratives of the three hegemonic states. Given
the historical period, there are quite a few similarities as well as substantial difference that make
comparing the two states a productive venture. The trends in the two hegemonic powers
demonstrate how the similar states provide a useful paradigm for using realist concepts.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 4
Concepts of Realist Theory
Constructing and Testing Formal Theories
There are several characteristics of formal academic “theories” that might seem counter-
intuitive to those who are not familiar with the standard terminology used in international
political theory. In fact, some theorists have, rather ironically confused the nature of theory with
the nature of exhaustive reality. In more common vernacular, so-called theories are used to refer
to unconfirmed notions, ideas, and abstract explanations. In formal scientific terminology,
theories are cohesive explanations of phenomena that have been confirmed through hypothesis
testing and rigorous observation. However, international political scientists understand theories
differently. Instead, a theory functions more a rational explanation of reality. As the well
respected international relations theorist, Kenneth Waltz explains, a theory is “a picture, mentally
formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity.”3 Theory is cognitively formulated through a
primitive observation of reality. Whereas a scientist is concerned with experimentation, the
political scientist is concern with explaining that reality. Such constructions require individuals
to envision “a pattern where none is visible to the naked eye.”4 Thus, theories in the international
theoretical context are primarily inductive exercises. Although theories predominantly follow the
inductive chain from particulars to universals, Waltz explains that theories cannot be solely
inductive because theoretical notions “can only be invented not discovered…[it] does not explain
3
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), 8.
4
Ibid.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 5
or predict anything.”5 As such, it can be said that theories are primarily inductive, but also have
an adductive component as well.
Since the primary purpose of any theory is to describe reality, the value of a theory comes
from its “explanatory and predictive power[s]”, theories themselves do not directly mirror
reality.6 The truth-value of a theory itself is not found in the comprehensiveness, but the
cohesiveness of the theory. Waltz explains this characteristic of theories as the difference
between laws and theories. Of laws, individuals ask if they are true; of theories, individuals ask
about their explanatory power. 7 Thus, “[t]heories explain laws.”8 Theories themselves
necessarily require reductions of reality to conceptual components. While concepts are supposed
to have a comparative correlation to reality, theoretical abstractions are not themselves reality.
Reality is far more complex than any theory could entirely explain. While the scientist
experiments, the theorist explains. All of this is not to suggest theories exist in vacuo completely
stripped of their context in reality. In fact, hypothesis testing is where observation and
interpretation intersects with theory. 9 However, binary evaluations of reality and systematic
explanations of reality are two different issues. The error that some students of international
relations theory make is to always subject theory to experimental validation. Two theorists can
have the same set of data and interpret it in two different ways. Experimental validation provides
little insight in how to resolve the disputing interpretations. Theoretical tests, alternatively,
5
Ibid., 5.6
Ibid., 69.7
Ibid., 6.8
Ibid.9
Ibid., 8.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 6
resolve the dispute by asking which interpretation has explanatory weight, is generalizable to
other situations, and can consistently predict the reoccurrence of the phenomenon. As such, the
question to ask of any theory is can it explain reality, not is it reality.
Formal theories are typically constructed by modeling reality. Models are the
representations of reality through simple formulations of theoretical notions. Any model has
necessary components that build on one another to create a useful narrative. In this manner,
models could refer to either the theory itself or a picture of reality drastically simplified to
atomistic facts.10 The modular expression of any theory contains only the most essential elements
needed to explain phenomenon.11 Theoretical constructions that attempt to explain reality will,
necessarily, not account for every factual piece of information and describe in complete detail
the reality of every situation. Thus, all models will isolate certain facts and ignore others. The
question of a theoretical exercise is never how comprehensively the theory incorporates every
facet of a particular phenomenon into a specific model, but how well the model actually explains
the phenomenon. Waltz explains that this is an important distinction because academics tend to
fixate on whether theoretical modeling is “realistic” or not. He says that “[t]he question, as ever
with theories, is not whether the isolation of a realm is realistic, but whether it is useful.”12 The
assumption with these ideas confuses the formulation of theories with the end result of the
theory. While the purpose of a theory is to explain reality, this does not necessitate that reality
constrain every component of the model. Reality is simply too expansive to force every factual
consideration into a model. That is why “[t]heoretical notions enable us to make sense of the
10
Ibid., 7.11
Ibid.12
Ibid.,8.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 7
data.” 13 To create a model that broadly incorporates every data point is redundant. Since the
purpose of theory is explaining the data, the model must be simple and elegant.
Formal models are created through a simplification of facts of reality. Proper
simplification yields conceptually useful model for explaining the reality of a phenomenon.
Waltz explains that simplification typically occurs in four ways: (1) isolation; (2) abstraction; (3)
aggregation; and (4) idealization.14 Isolation of events means theorists will assume all things are
equal in a theoretical model and focus on a narrow set of actions and interactions. Isolation is a
necessary precondition to theoretical construction because, as previously explained,
incorporating all of reality into a model is impossible.15 Abstraction is more of the intentional
selection of facts for the purpose of constructing a theory. This does not mean facts are selected
arbitrarily or by force of preference. Instead, the selection of facts is based on contextual
relevance and meta-narrative significance. Similarly, aggregation involves grouping similar
elements together for the purpose of categorizing them based on criteria. Aggregation is
primarily comparison-based simplification. Idealization operates under the assumption that under
the bounded model perfection is attainable or in some way reachable. Hegemony, for instance, is
never actually attained because a state never completely dominates all political capital. However,
theorists regularly refer to hegemonic states as if they had achieved domination of political
capital. The end of simplification, and thus the end of constructing a theory, is to “seek the
essential factors where innumerable factors are present.”16 Once a theorist develops a sound
13
Ibid.,10.14
Ibid.15
Ibid.,8.16
Ibid., 10.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 8
understand of the central tendencies in a specific phenomenon, they have a working model for
the theory.
The purpose behind exploring how theories are formed is two-fold. First, it helps clarify
how realist theory developed as an academic discipline. Given the epistemological questions that
typically arise about theoretical foundations, this exploration provides a key groundwork for
exploring the axiomatic assumptions imbedded in the theory. Second, it helps avoid
misunderstandings about the essence of theory. Realist theorists, as with any theoretical school,
deal with the fundamental constraints of any academic discipline. There is a tendency to take
theory, especially realist theory, to be a Weltanschauung for international events. This is a far too
expansive reading of theory. Theorists never claim that their theory explains all of reality, nor do
they even claim it is irrefutable. Instead, they typically take a subdued position that their
scholarship offers the best explanations for the phenomena students of international relations
observe in the world. Their theory best explains the data.
While understanding the formulation and the purpose of theories is important, there is
also a need to test the validity of theories against specific phenomenon. Here, theory most
closely intersects with the empirical. Waltz also provides a useful seven-step framework to
properly test theories: (1) Explain the theory; (2) infer hypotheses from the theory; (3) test the
hypotheses with experiments and observations; (4) utilize definitions according to how the
theory defines the terms; (5) eliminate or control the variables that theory does not consider; (6)
test the theory from multiple angles; and (7) if the theory fails a test, consider whether the theory
“flunks completely, needs repair and restatement, or requires a narrowing of the scope of its
explanatory claims.”17 Perhaps the most common error of experimental tests from countervailing
17
Ibid., 13.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 9
theories is that the tests fail to operationalize the theoretical concepts correctly, or they
completely misread the theoretical concepts entirely. Another common error of theoretical
criticism is improperly re-evaluating the theory once it fails a theoretical test. Occasionally a
theory can easily absorbed an empirical failure with little consequence. A theorist might assume
that a specific empirical fact that seems to contradict a particular facet of a theory weakens the
overall usefulness of the theory, but instead the apparent contradict is of no consequence. For the
realist, if a particular state does not behave rationally in response to political signals, this does
not necessarily weaken the theories explanatory power because intervening variables or systems
noise could easily explain the aberration without crippling the realist theories. The necessary
requirements for theoretical failure require far greater failures than apparent contradictions.
The basic hypotheses of realist theory are defined by the fundamental concepts present in
realist scholarship. These concepts rationally constrain theoretical – as well as historical –
explanations of international phenomenon to certain parameters. The question to ask about each
concept is not whether there are particular cases that might disprove the rule, but whether these
concepts function as rationally coherent understandings of general behaviors of individuals,
states, and international bodies.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 10
Concept One: The Anarchic International System
Realists argue that the structure of international interactions between states is inherently
anarchic. A domestic polity has a final locus of power - be it in a democratically elected
legislature, a collective federal system, or a unitary dictator. The end result of a domestic system
is the same; decisions are made on the highest level of authority. The power in the system is well
defined.18 However, the international scene is the exact opposite so it is “governed and
circumscribed by the struggle for power.” 19 Any alliances, institutions, and legal authorities are
artificially constructed. No matter how powerful any political institution becomes, it still cannot
operate as a sovereign over other nations. Hence theorists use the term “hegemon” to describe a
particularly powerful state. The rise of international institutions in modern times have been a
result of internationalist theories attempting to provide a legal framework to building an ordered
international system. Although these institutions have become increasingly sophisticated, they
still have not altered the fundamental realities of the international system in that individual states
operate as units. These units are “functionally similar” and seek to maintain their own
autonomy.20 In a way, alliances functioned as a quasi-legal structure for the Greek states in the
fourth century, however, the primary power center where decision were made rested with the
individual states. Alliances were a process for advancing hegemonic interests, rather than an
attempt to reduce hegemonic influence into a sovereign legal structure.21
18
Even in unstable nations, a vertical hierarchy of authority still exists in a muted form. Anarchy exists when there is no legitimate sovereign. Thus, a nation is said be in anarchy only when legitimacy of existing hierarchies of authority decay..
19
Martin Wright, Power Politics, (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2004), 102.
20
Waltz, “Theory,” 104.21
Ibid., 114.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 11
Kenneth Waltz describes the international system as one of “self-help” wherein “units
worry about their survival, and the worry conditions their behavior.”22 This means the anarchic
international order is defined by competition, not cooperation among states. Each state has its
own interests and seeks to advance those own interests independent of other states (who in turn
have their own set of interests). The respective difference of states means that states must rely on
their own devices in order to preserve themselves. 23 As such, the interests of ones own state
defines how an individual state interacts with others. While they might work to serve a “greater
good,” states will make decisions based on the primacy of their own self-interests.
This is not to say a state that operates in isolation is the strongest unit in an international
system. Rather, the strongest hegemon is one that successfully projects its own political control
over other states while appealing to “some design of international unity and solidarity.”24
Hegemon’s become dominant powers when they “can measure strength against all its rivals
combined.”25 Most states seek to centralize power in order to maintain their influence in an
international system. As power is centralized, incentives to control the international system
increase because states wish to preserve their control of their own interests. 26 International
harmony arises when states are able to advance their interests without conflicting with the
interests of other states. Harmony thereby is an international equilibrium that services the
22Ibid., 105. 23
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 159.24
Wright, 36.25
Wright, 34.26
Waltz, “Theory,” 112.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 12
greatest number of interests for respective states. 27 Powerful states are those which can
assimilate the interests of other states into their own spheres of authority in order to maximize
their self-interests.
While states invariably prefer stable, peaceful international interactions, interests are
bound to clash and this makes conflict inevitable. Consequently, harmony is not the normal state
of affairs in the international system. Instead, states – being the final arbiters of their own causes
– will opt to use force if they determine it will serve their goals better. 28 This also means other
states must be prepared to counter force of other states with their own force. Typically, states
exercise force by coercing other states to comply with their demands. While typical state
interactions seem to require direct threats from one actor, coercion need not be overt to compel
other states to act. All that is needed for coercion to occur is when one actor acquiesces on one of
their stated interest to the advantage of another actor. 29 The necessary conflict of interest in the
international realm mean that war is the inevitable last resort for defending national interests.
Realists thereby see war, not as a disruption of the international order, but as a natural
component of the international system. Power politics make war a socio-political necessity. 30
This is why the father of modern political science, Niccolo Machiavelli, said the only designs
and sole study of a prince should be the study of the art of war and the disciplines of war
27
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives, (New Haven: Yale University Press,1992), 102.28
Waltz, “The State and War,” 161.29
Mesquita and Lalman, 102.30
Wright, 104.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 13
making.31 Because of the natural state of competition, an international actors primary concern is
about gaining and maintained power within the international system.
Concept Two: Interests Defined as Power
Hans Morgenthau, one of the leading international relations theories in the 20th century,
argues the central tenant of realism is that states are concerned with “interest defined in terms of
power.”32 Morgenthau finds this principle a foundational assumption that grounds international
politics in a rational order because it considers the reality of human nature while grounding
discussions of international politics in its own “autonomous sphere” much like economists,
ethicists, legal theorists, and religious scholars have done for their subjects of study. 33 He
explains that any psychoanalytical attempts to determine the particular motives of particular
statement are futile and deceptive. Not only is it nearly impossible to determine precise
motivations of certain statesmen, it is also equally impossible to substitute the motivations of one
single actor for the motives of a nation.34 Defining international relations in terms of interests
also avoids another common fallacy of attempting to predict foreign policy from the
philosophical proclivities of individual statesmen. Political realism instead relies on strictly
rational considerations of political interests. Realism also draws “a sharp distinction between the
desirable and the possible” in that a realist will always consider what political ideals and moral
principles are used to rationalize international actions, but will never assume these principles are
31
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. William L. Marriott, (London, UK: Harper Press, 2011), 65.
32
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th edition, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson, and W. David Clinton, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006), 5.
33
Ibid.34
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 14
what controls political happenings in the international realm. 35 Since reality is “replete with
contingencies and systemic irrationalities,” Morgenthau acknowledges that there are inherent
limitations to realist theory.36 Even with these limitations, political realism provides a cohesive
explanation of international relations in rational terms.37
Since power is such a central concept of realist theory, it is important to understand how
realists define the dynamics of political power. In its most basic formulation, power in the
international context is simply “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over
man.”38 The important distinction here is that politically the conceptual significance of power is
not a static notion indiscriminately applied. In fact, power is a shifting concept in realism
“determined by the political and cultural environment.” 39 The subjective nature of power is best
understood under conceptual prism of political power.40 Although manifestations of political
power are quite diverse, the foundational element of all political power is the “psychological
relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.”41 This become
complicated once theorists add concepts such as nations acting rationally as would an individual.
The situation becomes all the more confusing when one considers the competing dynamics of
35
Ibid., 6.36
Ibid., 9.37
Ibid., 9-10.38
Ibid., 10-1.39
Ibid., 11.40
The use of the term “actor” encompasses a breadth of theoretical applications. It could refer to a single individual, a state, or even a large international body. For the realist, the state is the most important concept. Thus, when they utilize the term, it almost invariably refers to a state actor.
41
Ibid., 31.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 15
multiple states all trying to navigate similar politically complex environments. Here it is
important to recall that Waltz specifically cautioned against overcomplicating theoretical
constructs. While the dynamics of psychological relations between nations are indeed further
removed from the simplicity of two individual actors, there is enough similarity between
individual human interactions and international behaviors to afford comparison.
Typically, the source of political power is driven by three different psychological forces:
(1) expectation of reward, (2) fear of reproach and punishment, and (3) respect.42 This is true of
individuals and nations. How actors choose to exploit these forces is contingent on a plethora of
factors. Depending on which force actors rely on, the actor may rely on “orders, threats, the
authority or charisma of a man of an office, or a combination of any of these” to accomplish their
ends. 43 Often, nations will undertake certain policies for reasons entirely unrelated to uses of
political power, but these actions do not concern the socio-political dynamics of international
relations. For the realist, it is completely acceptable for them to admit that nations adopt
international policies that have no perspective toward political power.44 This could be something
like an economic policy undertaken for the sake of financial concerns within a nation. Of these
actions, Morgenthau explains that they should be evaluated according to their proper subject
matter. However, when actions do influence national power the value of said actions ought to be
judged according to how they contribute to the political power of the nation. The success of
international endeavors rises and falls in how useful the policy serves national interests. Without
this context, most international policies would seem completely irrational.
42
Ibid.43
Ibid.44
Ibid., 34.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 16
Morgenthau explains that national power is defined by a set of seven elements:
Geography, Natural Resources, Industrial Capacity, Military Preparedness, Population, National
Character, and National Morale. It is important to note that these elements vary in regard to their
stability and consistency. Morgenthau classifies the elements in two categories: “those that are
relatively stable and those that are subject to constant change.”45 In reality, the elements – aside
from perhaps geography – exist on a variable continuum. Other scholars have constructed similar
lists.46 Geography is relatively self-explanatory element of national power. Natural resources
include both agricultural capacity to produce food and raw materials such as metal and oil.47
Having resources, however, is not enough to advance national power. A nation needs to be to
exploit them for useful purposes. This is where industrial capacity comes into play.48 Even with a
robust industrial capacity, nations still need a military presence. According to Morgenthau,
“[m]ilitary preparedness requires a military establishment capable of supporting the foreign
policies pursued.”49 He explains that military preparedness includes technological capabilities
and leadership aptitude as well as the quantity and quality of armed forces.50 As to the more
variable elements, population is an important factor that governs all the others. Population is not
merely a fact of numbers, but also distribution and trends in growth.51 National character, though
45
Ibid., 122.46
Wright, 26.47
Morgenthau, 124-31.48
Ibid.,131-3.49
Ibid.,133.50
Ibid., 133-7.51
Ibid., 137-140.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 17
often difficult to define, is an essential element of national power. There is no disputing that a
nation with more militaristic sentiments will be far more agile, and adept at waging war than a
nation with pacifist preferences. Imperial Russia has a much different national character than
Republican Germany. National morale is tangentially related to national character. Morgenthau
identifies morale as “the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign
policies of its government in peace or war.”52 This is by far the most transitory element of
national power. It is subject to the subtlest shifts and whims of the public. However, it is still an
undeniable element of national power.
Concept Three: Vital Interests and Prestige
While all interests of the state are to secure power, the interests that are essential to the
preservation the state – what the realist call “vital interests” – play a central role in determining
state behavior. In any system governed by power politics, that which is deemed necessary for
preserving the independent control of power commands absolute respect.53 Decision-making in
the international context must serve the vital interests of the state regardless of ideological
commitments of the state. While states cast their rhetoric in high-minded ideals, the real political
decisions are made according to what advances the political power of the state. When it comes to
a conflict of ideas and interests of the state, the interests of the state will always win. Vital
interests are existentially necessary components of state power; thus they are the prime
commitments of any state.
Honor and prestige are concepts that continue to guide political thought today. Most
theorists would refer to state honor and prestige as international influence. In the English
52
Ibid., 147.53
Wright, 95.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 18
tradition, honor was used in the context of allegiance whereas in the Germanic tradition, it
referred to level concepts. 54 In the realist context, honor is used almost exclusively used to mean
the latter. Closely related to honor is prestige. International prestige is “the influence derived
from power.” 55 According to Morgenthau, prestige has only two ultimate objectives: (1) prestige
for its own sake or (2) to support current state efforts and political ends.56 While prestige is an
important instrument of international influence, actors rarely act based solely to advance their
own prestige. Collecting prestige should serve an end. The most effective policies are ones that
end up promoting “not the reputation for power but the substance of power.” 57 Although most
states do not adopt courses of action for the sake of prestige for reputation alone, they do
voluntarily restrict their behavior to preserve their prestige. When states see the advantage of
foregoing use of force to preserve international reputation, they frequently choose to adopt the
least coercive means possible. Simply because power exists within a state does not mean the
state will necessarily act. 58 This is why the international system is one of intrigue and subtlety. It
is by choosing when and how to exercise authority that states are able to advance their own
political influence.
Concept Four: Unitary Decision Making of the State
54
Ibid.,96-7.55
Ibid., 97.56
Morgenthau, 90-1.57
Ibid., 91.58
Wright, 99.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 19
Since international interactions are a composite of an innumerable number of actions and
decisions converging for particular points in time, realists reduce political decision making to the
singularity of the state. In this manner, realist theorists conceptualize states as unitary acting
units in the international scene. 59 Because foreign policy considerations require one single
response, states require unity in order to provide a single voice.60 Singular rational actors select
acceptable goals and strategies to pursue vital interests within the international sphere. This is
particularly critical when it comes to crisis situations such as war. Although unity is not absolute
within a domestic polity, states that “attempt[] to achieve a nearly unanimous backing for foreign
policy are most likely to be successful.” 61 Such an assumption has become particularly useful in
modern contexts because of the centripetal force of national power. However, the unitary actor
assumption is not dependent on the existence of a nation-state. 62
Of all the realist concepts, the unitary actor assumption has probably been the most
harshly criticized on an empirical level. The dispute comes from defining exactly how much
discretion is assumed in setting state agendas. Scholars Mesquite and Lalman point out that the
unitary actor model requires that a single decision-maker set goals and strategies. Domestically
constrained models add the nuance that “goals are determined by the domestic political process
in each state.” 63 Thus, the single rational actor can only select strategy. They point to empirical
evidence gained from the past two centuries of international conflict, concluding that the
59
Waltz, “The State and War,” 175-6.60
Ibid.,179.61
Ibid.,178-9.62
Ibid.,178.63
Mesquita and Lalman, 27.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 20
evidence “provides no support for the general outlines of the realpolitik perspective” of a single
unitary actor in international relations. 64 Furthermore, they criticize realist theory because “when
domestic factors play a crucial role in shaping foreign policy demands, the opportunity for
uncertainty to ameliorate relations between states is a boon not available in a world controlled by
realist imperatives.”65 From a theoretical perspective, the concept of unitary rational actor can
technically accommodate the domestic political perspective without undermining the
assumption. Most realist theorists merely avoid parsing domestic and international interests
ultimately suggesting that the individual state acts within its own interests – be it domestic or
international. However, Mesquita and Lalman’s perspective does highlight the limits of the
unitary actor assumption.
Concept Five: Morality in Realist Political Thought
Realists understand the role of morality in political actions as a secondary matter to the
socio-political realities of international interests. While the existence of universal moral
principles is not necessarily questioned, the realists suggest that filtering decisions through a
moral framework distorts the political realities of decision-making. Whereas power politics asks
of politics “what is,” morality considers “what ought to be.” Realists suggest that these are two
separate considerations. While they would not decouple morality from political decision making,
the realist would adamantly discourage politicians from constructing power struggles in terms of
moral absolutes.
There are several aspects to this conception of morality. Context must be given to any
moral claims. Morgenthau argues that realism requires that universal moral principles cannot be
64
Ibid., 266.65
Ibid., 269.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 21
arbitrarily applied to state actions unless they put into proper context of time and location. 66
Likewise, realists also have a very clinical view of historical events. As explain by Edward Carr,
“condemnation of the past on ethical grounds has no meaning.”67 It is the belief that the facts of
history cannot be judged as morally right or wrong that place realists in direct opposition
utopianisms. The realist objects to political utopia not only because it is political naïve but also
because it is an exercise in international egoism. The utopianist argues that they are concerned
with the greater good, however they define the greater good by what their state believes is the
greater good. 68 Another manifestation of the moralizing phenomenon is when states cast conflict
in moral language while creating a political advantageous frame. Geoffrey Blainey explains that
war is replete with opportunism from before the war begins, during the war, and especially after
the war concludes. 69 Real motives are “concealed beneath rhetoric and the façade of morality” 70
The net effect of this behavior actually obscures effective political decisions.
The realist understands the duplicity of casting every political action in moral language.
The problem is not that morals are being used, but that such behavior is misguided at best and
manipulatively disingenuous at worst. Even the utopianist cannot cast a world that is not defined
by the interests of his own nation. The fact is most states behave opportunistically, regardless of
their moral thinking. In the context of war, it is useless to blame on side for causing the war and
the other for being a victim of the war because such neither side is entirely innocent. “All we can
66
Morgenthau, 12.67
Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1949), 66-7.
68
Ibid., 75-6.69
Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 173-4.70
Ibid., 162.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 22
say is that one nation initiated or started or opened the war, but that is description, not
explanation of the beginning of a war.”71Thus the pitfall realist wish to avoid is not morality, but
the naïve syncretism of claiming the national interest of ones own nation are abstract principles
with absolute moral goods. 72 Here the fault of human psychology is evident. Waltz notes men
are “born and reared in insecurity” yet seek to create security by inventing theories that attempt
to provide universal systems.73 When absolutized, the political system itself becomes a moral
framework. Realists reject this idea, opting for a more nuanced understanding of international
power dynamics.
Internationalists and moralists alike criticize the concept of limiting moralization in
international politics on the ground that it validates immoral political decision-making.74 Indeed,
realism does have a tendency to amoral political opportunism. The best instance of this is
Machiavelli’s admonition to rulers to cast aside false humility and accomplish his own agenda
because the ends justify the means.75 However, criticizing all political realists as amoral
Machiavellians is misguided. The realists are not denying the moral significance of individual
political actions, but they are resistant to crass oversimplification of decisions to simple binary
decisions between good and evil. 76 Furthermore, the realist seeks to explain how the
international system functions, not how it ought to function. Thus, moral considerations will
71
Ibid., 173-4.72
Carr, 88.73
Waltz, “The State and War,” 21.74
Carr, 87-8.75
Machiavelli, 80.76
Morgenthau, 12.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 23
always be secondarily considered. The realist argues that morality may play a role in the
decisions of individuals in their personal interactions, but when it comes to international units,
moral concerns have no bearing. That which advances the power of the state is what governs the
international system.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 24
How to Apply Realist Theory to Greek City-States in the Fourth Century
Clearly, the conceptual significance of the “state” was much different in ancient Greece
than it is in modern context. Thus, there is an element of anachronism to apply modern
theoretical constructs to ancient socio-political history. While most realists would claim
Thucydides as the original scholar of realist thinking77, his political realism was far less
formalized than the modern notions of power, influence, anarchic order, and vital state interests.
However, applying realist theory to ancient Greece actually has several productive ends.
First, while it would be a disservice to both history and realist theory to carte blanche port
realist theory to the fourth century without particular sensitivity to historical differences, using
the explanatory models of realism to explain the events of the fourth century can provide useful
insight into several puzzling questions such as how the political leaders of the Greek powers
controlled power dynamics, why hegemonic influence was so volatile among Greek powers, and
why socio-political power shifted from Sparta to Thebes to Macedon. Scholars such as Martin
Wright argues that power politics emerged out of sixteenth century with the dissolution of
Christendom as states began operating as sovereigns with the only legitimate authority to
exercise political power. 78 The centralization of power within the state effectively made all social
organization political in nature. Consequently, loyalties to the state have dramatically increased
so that no other association commands as much fealty as does the modern state. 79 Thus, power
politics are a necessary element of modernity. While power politics became readily apparent
during the development of the modern state, elements of power politics were critical components
77
Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally), 1964, 139.78
Wright, 2579
Ibid.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 25
of the ancient political conflicts between Sparta, Thebes, and Macedon. States were concerned
with their respective spheres of influence and how loyal their citizens were to their authority. As
such, modern realist theory is a useful theoretical tool for investigating the history of ancient
Greece.
Second, applying realist concepts to fourth century Greek states affords an opportunity to
test the explanatory sufficiency of multiple realist assumptions. The strength of any theory is not
in the true of a single premise, but in the overall cohesiveness of the theory. Realist theory, as
with any theory, increases in credibility when it successfully passes a multiplicity of tests.80
Using the events of the fourth century, it is possible to test the rigor of realist theoretical concepts
such as interest defined as power, anarchic state structure, and unitary actor decisions. The
purpose of using realist concepts is to test whether “expected behaviors and outcomes are
repeatedly found where the conditions contemplated by the theory obtain.”81 The following
analysis demonstrates that realist theory provides a relatively strong explanation of the events of
the fourth century – more so than one might initially assume. As with any theory, there are also
several theoretical weaknesses that do not account for historical realities. However, these
weaknesses do not undermine the theoretical soundness of realist theory even when it is applied
to fourth century Greek states.
80
Waltz, 124.81
Ibid., 123.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 26
Late Spartan Period
The Military Ethic of the Greek States
Much has been made of the Spartan ethos in popular literature. The war fighting
techniques of the Spartan have come to represent the quintessential essence of the martial spirit.
In some fashion, the glorification of Sparta is really an overgeneralized praise of Greek military
ideals. War was an extremely important writ for almost all Greek states. Tradition going as back
as the Homeric legends championed the raw match of strength between warriors.82 Fair and open
battle were said to be the ideal for the Greeks. Warfare itself took on a rather mythical quality.
The warrior ideal is an oft-discussed element of academic scholarship on Greek war fighting.
The persistent theme among all Greek states is that the warrior is celebrated for his masculine
strength, disciplined, courageous, and noble. 83 In the ancient times, warriors displayed these
characteristics through heroic conquest and daring feats. 84 Gradually however, the heroism of the
Archaic order gave way to the adoption of the phalanx. While champions and individual skill in
combat were not the focus of classical Greek combat, the phalanx was a symbolic representation
of the collective strength of the city-state. The phalanx was a political extension of individual
combat because every solider acted part of a single unit. 85 By the fourth century, the phalanx was
the primary means of combat for all Greek city-states. As the political structures of Greece
became more communitarian, the Greeks developed the idea that defense of one’s community
82
J.E. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity, (Hew Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 41.
83
Hans Van Wees, Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities, (London: Duckworth, 2004), 39.84
Ibid., 81-2.85
Lendon, 65.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 27
was a moral duty. 86 Traditionally, the duties attached to war rested with the political elite, with
the non-elite simply fighting because of command or the authority of state. Now however, every
citizen had a duty to the polis. In this way, the Greeks advanced their intensely competitive spirit
while promoting loyalty to their city. 87
While the dynamics of military obligations transformed during the Classical Period, the
central principles of excellent soldiery were solidified. Andreia – roughly meaning manliness –
was always an important Soldiers of the phalanx stood in tightly packed formation with shields
overlapping holding their spears in either an overhand or underhand position. 88, 89 The depth of
formations for other Greek city-states varied, but typically, the Spartans would line up twelve
men deep. 90 Lines would typically advance toward each other at a metered pace, and then close
the final several hundred yards at a run.91 Front rank soldiers would physically push opponents
with their shields.92 In phalanx style fighting, discipline and cooperation are key. Hoplite combat
thereby required soldiers who could not only suppress their fear, but also temper their aggression
so as not to break formation and destroy the cohesion of the phalanx. 93 The proper hoplite was
one of high honor. Shame played a major role in war. From a practical perspective, the soldier
86
Wees, 81-2.87
Lendon, 65.88
Lendon, 41.89
Wees, 189.90
Ibid., 185.91
Xenophon, Hellenica 4.3.17.92
Ibid., 6.4.12-14.93
Wees, 192-3.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 28
that retreated jeopardized the entire unit because it meant the phalanx would break down.
Courage to stand and fight was a military necessity. Phalanx warfare was the ultimate
competition because once the phalanx was engaged, retreat meant total loss.94 Thus, the solider
of the classical era was acutely adverse to shame while striving for honor.
94
Lendon, 53.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 29
The Uniqueness of the Spartan Ethic
While there is a considerable commonality of war fighting sentiments among Greeks, the
Spartan did have a unique advantage. While other city-states would general training of hoplite
soldiers might occur in time of emergencies, most Greek states left the military matters to only
the most elite. Peace was the desired state of life, so war was only considered when it was thrust
upon the citizen. 95 Not so with Sparta. Beginning at age 7, young boys left home in groups to
train for military service.96 Training consisted of intentionally harsh, survivalist environments.
The Young boys would sleep in barracks together, but trusted no one. They were whipped so that
they would learn respect. They were starved to make them resilient. They were taught to endure
silently that they might understand self-control. 97 At age 18, the boys would were eligible for
military service and would be brought before a unit of 15-20 men called a syssitia. If he was
accepted into the group, he would become one of the soldiers of the Spartan army. War was not a
primitive necessity for Sparta, it was secret craft to be practiced and learned well. The techne of
war was their way of life. It was the brutal training and focus on martial discipline that was said
to “make Spartans brave.”98
Realist concepts have much to explain about the Spartan approach to war. The realist
would say that the idyllic vision of the warrior upheld by Greeks was an idealization of the war
fighting tactics of the Greeks after the battle of Marathon. While there might be some truth to
95
Ibid., 108.96
Sarah B. Pomeroy, Stanley M Burstein, Walter Donlan, Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, Ancient Greece: a Political, Social, and Cultural History, (New York : Oxford University Press, 1999), 139.
97
Lendon, 112.98
Ibid.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 30
that claim, it appears that the Greeks, be they Spartan, Athenian, Corinthian, or Theban did have
a very mythical understanding of war. Their religious myths even compelled them to see war in a
more ritualistic fashion. This conception of war still held sway over the minds of prominent
Spartans such as Lysander were obsessed with the classical myths and building themselves up to
glory. Others such as Agesilaus had grand aspirations to become the net Agamemnon.99 The
obsession with personal glory directly competes with the notion of interests defined as power.
Defining interests in terms of power concerns the overall well being of the state, not the
individual. When individual leaders aggrandize themselves, they typically weaken to overall
interests of the state. Such is the case with Lysander who, by his own will achieved such success
that he excited the jealousy of his fellow Spartans.100 The realists typically assume that if glory is
being sought, it is being sought for the state in the form of prestige. However, this is clearly not
always the case.
Alternatively, the Spartan conduct of military affairs strongly reinforces the realist
conception of the role of morality in international systems. The Spartans – as a collective – were
acutely aware of power dynamics and thereby constantly seeking to work them in their favor. A
fact Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian Wars quickly points out.101 In fact the
perpetration of the Spartan mirage in classical historians was in part because the
Lacedaemonians carefully encouraged their fellow Greeks to see Sparta as an egalitarian state
with boundless courage.102 They also displayed a remarkable propensity to dispose of idealized
99
Noreen M. Humble, “Xenophon's view of Sparta: A study of the ‘Anabasis,’ ‘Hellenica’ and ‘Respublica Lacedaemoniorum,’” Open Access Dissertations and Theses, 1997, 186.
100
Bury, 516.101
Thucydides 1.88.102
Pomeroy et. al., 132.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 31
notions once they became impractical. For example, the orators made much of Sparta’s citizen
militia. The Spartans took great pride in their army of citizen. However, the Spartans were not
above using helots or otherwise non-citizens for their hoplite divisions. In fact, as Hans Wees
notes, “the Spartans structurally relied on large numbers of hoplites who did not enjoy full
citizen-rights, in flagrant disregard of the ideals of the citizen militia.”103 It is here that the realist
will say it demonstrates the artificiality of applying idealized notions to power politics. When
ideals conflict with vital interests, vital interest will win. The realist would not say that Sparta’s
reliance on non-citizens was hypocritical, they would only note merely that necessity trumps
ideology. While the Spartans might wish wars were fought with only citizens, prevailing social
and political factors militated against that assumption. 104 Overall, military mindset of the
Spartans provides an adequate confirmation of realist ideas.
Post-Peloponnesian Power Dynamics and the Hegemonic State
At the conclusion of the Peloponnesian Wars, Sparta was the undisputed victor in Greece
having just soundly beaten the Athenian-led Delian League. While the Athenians had previously
controlled a majority of Greek states, Sparta quickly became the regional hegemon. However,
the Spartan victory did not come exclusively from Spartan power alone. Indeed, the Persians
helped them considerably during the Peloponnesian war, much to the ire of other Greeks. 105 The
assistance of Persia did not come without political concessions. In 411 BC, when Sparta was
attempting to win Persian financial aid, the Lacedaemonians agreed to recognize the sovereignty
of Persia over the Greek cities along the Aegean coast, which the Athenians had liberated almost
103
Wees, 84.104
Ibid., 85.105
J.B. Bury. A History of Greece To the Death of Alexander, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan & Co.), 1963, 516.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 32
seventy five years prior.106 With the financial backing of the Persian empire, it was much easier
for Sparta to defeat the Athenians and in 404 BC the Spartans and Athenians negotiated terms of
peace that were particularly advantageous to the Spartans.107 Immediately following the peace,
the Spartan leader and former admiral Lysander moved to solidify Spartan authority by installing
oligarchs in the Aegean states, levying taxes, and garrisoned troops in city-states around Greece.
108 Unlike most of his Spartan comrades, Lysander had designs for expanding Spartan imperial
control to the Aegean and northern Greece. 109 Both Spartan kings, however, preferred to restrict
the Spartan hegemony to the Peloponnesus and restrict Athens from obtaining more power.110
However of the time being, they saw the need to establish some control so they allowed
Lysander to establish his decarchies.
Lysander’s policies meant that Sparta had to act as a more aggressive hegemon in the
Aegean region. Although the Lacedaemonians had agreed to turn over the cities to Persia, when
the Persian general Tissaphernes began moving into the area and taking over land, the Spartans
resisted. Instead of stepping aside, the Spartans dispatched Thibron with an army to defend Ionia
and the other city-states along the coast.111 The Spartans had decided to project their hegemony
in order to preserve their own political prestige. Though it might not have been a particularly
popular decision, the Spartans knew they had to maintain their military image. While the
106 Charles D. Hamilton, “Sparta,” in Lawrence A. Tritle, The Greek World in the Fourth Century: From the Fall of the Athenian Empire to the Successors of Alexander, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 42.
107
Ibid., 45-6.108
Ibid., 46-7.109
Bury, 515.110
Hamilton, 47.111
Hamilton, 50
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 33
Spartans definitely promoted their own power, they struggled diplomatically. Both Thebes and
Corinth had been growing weary of Spartan aggression and Lysander’s policies continued to
alienate other Greek states.112 By 395 BC, the Athenians, Corinthians, and Thebans were openly
hostile to Sparta.
But Lysander’s ambitions to project the influence of Sparta beyond the Peloponnesus
could not last. Lysander was quickly dispatched to Boeotia to deal with the new aggression from
the Thebans. While in Boeotia, Lysander planned to overtake the town of Haliartus with King
Pausanias. When Lysander’s forces arrived at the town, Pausanias’ forces were nowhere to be
found, but Lysander chose to assault the walls of the town anyway. However, unbeknownst to
Lysander, a sizeable Theban force was camped nearby. When his soldiers began assaulting the
wall, the Thebans moved in and trapped the Spartan forces. In the ensuing battle, Lysander was
slain and his forces were scattered. 113 For almost a decade the Spartans struggled against united
enemies in what was known as the Corinthian War. At first, the conflict seemed to favor the
Spartans with their superior skills and battlefield discipline. In 394 BC, the superior training of
the Spartans at the battle of Nemea meant that the Spartans were able to turn what would have
otherwise been a tactical stalemate into a decisive victory. During the battle, when the two
phalanx lines of the armies met, the right wings of both armies broke through the opposing line.
While the anti-Spartan Confederates continued to pursue the fleeing wing, the Spartan wheeled
around and began picking off the Confederate soldiers once they began returning from their
pursuit.114 However, that same year, the Spartans suffered a crushing naval defeat at the hands of
112
Pomeroy et. al., 333.113
Bury, 541.114
Bury, 543.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 34
the Persian fleet now allied with the anti-Spartan Confederacy at Cnidus.115 Forced to face the
reality that the Corinthian War had reached a standstill, the Spartans and Athenians agreed to a
peace mediated by the Persians. The idea of barbarians mediating a peace between Greeks was as
humiliating as it was indicative of the ferocity of hostilities between the respective powers. For
most Greeks, the King’s Peace was a humiliation of Greek ideals. 116
From the realist perspective the Spartan hegemony and the outbreak of the Corinthian
war highlight the anarchic nature of the international order. The self-help nature of international
systems prioritizes competitive interactions among states. Sparta’s dependence on Persia quickly
moved beyond mere utility into long-term dependence. Much of Sparta’s hegemony was
overshadowed by Persian mechanizations for and against Greek states.117 The political interests
of the Greek city-states also validate the soundness of conceptualizing political interests in terms
of power. War is said to be the continuation of political relations by other means.118 In this
manner, Sparta’s conflict with other nations was an attempt to maintain their hegemonic power.
The political and military actions of the respective Lacedaemonian leaders were all clearly
designed to preserve the vital interests of their state amidst formidable opposition.
The Declining Power of the Spartan Hegemony
At the conclusion of the King’s Peace, the Spartan king Agesilaus became the preeminent
political force in Spartan politics in 387 BC. Thoroughly aware of the rising power of Thebes,
Agesilaus moved quickly to dissolve the Boeotian league and impose Spartan influence in
115
Pomeroy et. al. , 335.116
Bury, 554.117
Ibid., 516.118
Wright, 104.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 35
Mantinea. 119 Despite the set backs of the Corinthian war, he managed to consolidate Spartan
control of the Peloponnesus quite well. However, Agesilaus’ success was short lived. Until
around 382 BC, the Spartans had been relying on the pro-Spartan factions in Thebes to keep
more radical policies at bay. Leontiades was particularly sympathetic to the Spartans. But the
Thebans were increasingly hostile toward the pro-Spartan factions in their midst. During the
summer of 382 BC, the Spartan general Phoebidas seized control of the Theban acropolis, began
prosecuting political prisoners, and installed pro-Spartan officials into power. 120 This was the
final impetus for revolution. In 379, seven Thebans exiles entered the city by the cover of night
and assassinated Leontiades and the other reigning boeotarchs. 121 Upon hearing of the successful
assassination, two Athenian regimes supported the Theban liberators in expelling the Spartan
garrison from the city.122
It was then the Spartans knew the political tides had turned. In an attempt to reverse the
course of events, the Spartan king Cleombrotus marched his army to Thespiae in an attempt to
muster forces to retake Thebes. However, with the Athenians cooperating with the Thebans,
Cleombrotus realized there was little he could do. 123 Sensing the political weakness of Sparta,
the Athenians created the Second Athenian Confederacy and war began anew against Sparta.
Athens won a major naval victory at Naxos in 376 BC. 124 In the spring of 375 BC, the a small
119
Hamilton, 53.120
Mark Munn, “Thebes and Central Greece,” in Lawrence A. Tritle, The Greek World in the Fourth Century: From the Fall of the Athenian Empire to the Successors of Alexander, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 76.
121
Ibid., 77.122
Pomeroy et. al., 337.123
Ibid., 78.124
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 36
band of 300 Thebans managed to defeat a much larger Spartan force in the Battle of Tegyrae. 125
By this time, the Spartans, Athenians and Thebans were ready to discuss terms of peace. That
same year, they agreed to terms of Common Peace, but was very short lived.126 Conditions for
Sparta continued to decay as they faced their own troubles with other states and they had little
appetite for what they saw as a meaningless war so they reopened negotiations for peace in 371
BC.127 Both the Spartans and Athenians wished to check the rising power of Thebes as much as
possible. However, Thebes was intent on promoting itself as the hegemon of Boeotia. When the
Theban general Epaminondas insisted that Thebes represent all of Boeotia Agesilaus adamantly
refused and struck Thebes name from the treaty entirely.128 The failure of negotiations set the
international scene for the fateful battle of Leuctra.
The complexity of shifting power dynamics is rather striking. In the span of thirty years,
three leagues129 were either formed or dissolved, two major wars were fought with a third major
conflict developing, and Sparta went from a dominant hegemon to a state in crisis. The political
sea change was dramatic.130 What is clear is that Spartan did not have an adequate capability to
sustain their hegemony for an extended period of time. While there are many potential
Ibid., 79.125
Ibid.126
Pomeroy et. al., 339.127
John Buckler, The Theban hegemony, 371-362 BC, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 47.
128
Ibid., 54.129
The Peloponnesian League, Delian League, and Boeotian League.130
In the Peloponnesian War the Spartans fought with the Corinth and Thebes with the backing of Persia against the Athenians. In the Corinthian Wars, Sparta found itself opposing all of these states. In the coming conflict, Thebes found itself opposing both Sparta and Athens.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 37
explanations of the failure of Sparta, realists would attribute many of the failings to the
internecine conflict between leaders within Sparta. Noreen Humble explains that the “common
desire for personal glory” was present among the Spartan leaders at the expense of “what is best
for the state.” 131 This competitive spirit is an embodiment of the ethos of Greek city-states which
was more aggressively expressed in Sparta.
As mentioned previously, the competitive spirit of Sparta creates a theoretical tension
against the realist concept of unitary state actors, but this very tension is the element of state
power, which explains the imminent collapse of the Spartan hegemony. Thus, realist theory has
some difficulty integrating this fact into its theoretical model. This is not to say that the
competitive spirit of Sparta entirely negates the unitary actor assumption. It only means the
unitary actor model has its limitations. However, as a collective whole realist provides a
remarkably adequate explanation for how Sparta chose to conduct its politics as well as
demonstrating the necessity of the self-help in an anarchic international order. Of the five
theoretical concepts, four strongly support the Sparta hegemonic narrative.
131
Noreen M. Humble, “Xenophon's view of Sparta: A study of the ‘Anabasis,’ ‘Hellenica’ and ‘Respublica Lacedaemoniorum,’” Open Access Dissertations and Theses, 1997, 186.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 38
The Rise of Theban Hegemony
The Battle of Leuctra and Its Political Significance
Most scholars agree that the Battle of Leuctra was the critical event that signaled the end
of the Spartan hegemony and the ascendancy of the Thebans. When Agesilaus went into
negotiations with Athens and Thebes, he also sent Cleombrotus with an army to the fields of
Phocis to ensure a favorable outcome. 132 Once the peace treaty was signed without Thebes being
a party to the treaty, Cleombrotus sent massagers to Sparta asking for advice on whether he
should move on Thebes. At the urging of Agesilaus, Cleombrotus began to march on through
Phocis to the Corinthian Gulf, taking out several Boeotian garrisons along the way. 133 The goal
was to march on Thebes in order to compel them to dissolve the Boeotian Confederacy. 134 The
Theban leaders were divided on what to do. While they all agreed they could not capitulate, the
leaders feared that they would lose any pitched battle with Sparta. Epaminondas argued that if
they did not face Cleombrotus in pitched battle, they would lose the support of their allies. 135
Eventually, Epaminondas won out so he and their allies marched to Leuctra. When the Spartans
drew up their lines in standard formation with the Spartans at the place of honor (infantry
numbered somewhere between 9,000-10,000) and placed his cavalry in front of the line (800-
1,000 strong). 136 Epaminondas adopted a slightly different tactic. He placed the Thebans on the
left flank of his line so that they would directly face the Spartans and instead of lining up the
132
Ibid., 48-9.133
Munn, 83.134
Buckler, 54.135
Ibid., 62.136
Ibid., 63
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 39
Thebans in the standard twelve shields deep formation, he put them fifty shields deep.137 At the
front of Epaminondas line stood the 300 soldiers of the Theban Sacred Band. After the Theban
cavalry drove off the Spartan cavalry, Cleombrotus attempted to outflank the Theban line. But
Epaminondas ordered his line to advance in an oblique rotation so that they would meet the
Spartans head on. When the lines met on the battlefield the Thebans and Spartans were the first
wing to clash. The fighting was frenetic and intense, but eventually the Spartan line broke and
scattered and the rest of the army fell back to their camp. Of the 700 estimated Spartans present
at the battle, 400 were killed along with their king Cleombrotus.138
The immediate consequence of Leuctra was that Sparta’s reputation was entirely ruined.
The image of the powerful Spartan warrior had been completely shattered. Sparta never
politically recovered their loss at Leuctra. The Thebans capitalized on this humiliation of Sparta
by consolidating their power in central Greece, first taking a stronghold of Thespian exiles, next
eliminating Orchomenus, and then assimilating the Phocians into the Boeotian League.139 Their
closest rival, Jason of Pherae in Thessaly, was the only central Greek threat to the Theban
ascendancy. Conveniently for the Thebans, Jason was soon assassinated.140 Meanwhile, in the
Peloponnesus, the state of affairs was rapidly declining for Sparta. Sedition was proliferating
throughout the area with the most prominent insurrection of Mantinea, Tegea, and city-states in
Arcadia formed their own league to oppose Lacedaemonian control of the area.141 As state new to
137
Pomeroy et. al., 340.138
Munn, 84.139
Ibid., 86.140
Buckler, 67.141
Pomeroy et. al., 340.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 40
hegemonic power, the Thebans initially concentrated most of their efforts on internal security as
opposed to expanding their influence to other states. Consequently, the distraction of external
dissent in the Peloponnesus provided adequate peace from Spartan encroachment into Boeotia.
Because the battle of Leuctra singled such a gravitational shift in political power, there is
wide latitude for testing realist concepts against these events. The application of the anarchic
international order provides an elegant test for the conditions leading to the battle itself. The
political power struggle between Sparta and Thebes gives us a good instance of how competing
states attempt to leverage their own power in an anarchic system. The violence inherent in the
transfer of hegemonic status is to be expected in anarchic international systems. 142 Peace is still a
legitimate option for any state. As with the Kings Peace negotiated by Persian, the Theban
agreement to peace in 374 BC was another instance of the process of negotiation was subsumed
in the interests of the state. The same was true of Spartan interests in peace. However, the peace
accords broke down rapidly because the Thebans continued to displace significant vital interests
of the Spartan state. Since the controlling interests of Thebes were to continue expanding its own
power, conflict of interests was inevitable. This means the second concept – interests defined as
power – is also equally verified.
While the initial disagreement of Theban leaders about the proper course of action after
the breakdown in negotiations in 371 BC might seem to compromise the unitary actor
assumption, concept is not at all jeopardized. Here the unitary actor assumption is not
compromised because the assumption does not require an absence of disagreement – such
assumption would be absurd – but that a state acts with one decision. The reason the Spartan
behavior calls the unitary actor assumption into question is because the competing interests
142
Mesquita and Lalman, 186.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 41
frequently produced a multiplicity of responses. Here that problem is nonexistent because
Epaminondas actually acted in the end without any contradictory output.
Theban Status as a Hegemonic Power
Within a year, Thebes had consolidated power in central Greece and was preparing to
project its influence into the Peloponnesus itself. Before invading the region however, the
Thebans secured the cooperation of Argos, the Arcadian League, and Elis. 143 With a ring of
hostile states threatening their power, the Spartans used the pre-text of settling civil unrest in
Tegea to launch a campaign against the Arcadian League. The Thebans responded in kind by
mobilizing their army in the Peloponnesus.144 The 6,000 Boeotian troops eventually came to
Laconia and Epaminondas deployed his strategy to conduct a four-pronged attack on Sparta. 145
Upon hearing of the impending invasion, the Spartans managed to muster an additional 4,000
men from allies. This was not enough men to mount a counter-attack on Epaminondas’ forces,
but it was enough to dissuade the army from attacking Sparta directly. While in Laconia,
Epameinondas’ men encountered significant resistance from the helots and perioikoi.146 The
destruction the Boeotian army wrought on the land appalled the inhabitants who saw them not a
liberators, but as a foreign plague. Eventually, the Spartans managed to convince the Athenians
to send a full levy of troop into Corinthia which eventually encouraged Epaminondas to leave the
Peloponnesus to push the Athenians out of their territory before they menaced Thebes. In the
summer of 369 BC, Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnesus again with the intent to isolate
143
Buckler, 73.144
Ibid., 74145
Ibid., 77.146
Ibid., 85.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 42
Sparta politically and diplomatically. By the end of Epaminondas’ second campaign, all of the
Peloponnesian states – save Corinth and Phlius – continued to participate in the war against
Thebes. 147
During his invasions of the Peloponnesus, the Thebans demonstrated an acute awareness
of their own expanding power as hegemon. Machiavelli would likely have praised their
fortuitous protection of their own interests in isolating their enemies and dismantling their key
elements of power. The Thebans directly deprived the Spartans of their natural resources,
industrial capacity – to the extent “industrial” capacity existed in classical Greece – and military
prepared while simultaneously demoralizing the Lacedaemonians. The threat of force became a
reality for the Thebans. Although Epaminondas never managed to conquer Sparta, he did not
need to. The destruction he visited on the surrounding territory crippled the Spartan military
system. 148 Theban prestige during their hegemony was high. As other city-states began to
recognize the coming shift of political power, they quickly sent envoys to Thebes in order to
secure the favor of Thebes. 149 It is likely that other city-states – especially those in the
Peloponnesus were motivated more by their distaste for Spartan than their appreciation of
Thebes. But from the realist perspective these motivations are secondary concerns. The
important element is that Thebes had secured its status as hegemon.
147
Ibid., 101.148
Ibid., 90.149
Ibid., 72.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 43
The Battle of Mantinea and the Decline of Thebes
However, after the invasions of the Peloponnesus Thebes began gradually retreating from
Peloponnesian politics. The retreat allowed several disputes to fester and allowed the Arcadians
to being reasserting themselves. 150 Eventually Arcadian gathered enough political power to begin
politically challenging Thebes status as hegemon. The peace treaty between Thebes and the
Arcadian League did not specify a legal hegemonia, but the Thebans instead functioned as a de
facto hegemon throughout their alliance. 151 However, Lycomedes of Mantinea now argued that
Thebes did not have a right to claim that solution. To avoid this political question Epaminondas
devised a simple solution: he would declare an invasion of Achaea and the Peloponnesian allies
would have to commit troops to the effort and the question of hegemony would be resolved. The
Achaean campaign would also serve to stabilize relations between Arcadia by resolving ongoing
disputes between other city-states. 152 When Epaminondas announced the invasion, all of their
allies promptly obeyed. As events progressed, Epaminondas found himself invading Arcadia
preparing for a battle against a united Mantinea, Sparta, and Athens. On the plains of Mantinea
Epaminondas drew up his army of 30,000 infantry and cavalry to faced 22,000 infantry and
cavalry from the coalition forces. 153 Epaminondas quickly arrayed his forces like he had at
Leuctra with the Thebans on the left wing. He then immediately ordered his line forward. This
immediate action caused some confusion among the Spartan ranks. The cavalry divisions of each
army began fighting, but the more sophisticated Boeotian cavalry easily prevailed, driving their
150
Ibid., 105.151
Ibid., 186.152
Ibid.153
Munn, 94.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 44
opponents back into their own battle lines.154 While the cavalry were engaged, Epaminondas’
wing struck the Spartan line. As at Leuctra the Thebans prevailed over the Spartan line, however,
as soon as the line began to break, Epaminondas, who had been fighting at the front of his wing
was struck and killed. 155 The Boeotians immediately ceased their pursuit. While the battle was a
tactical victory, the engagement proved to be fatal to the Thebans. Without the decisive
leadership of Epaminondas, the Theban hegemony quickly evaporated.
The realist perspective provides two useful insights about the end of the Theban
hegemony. First, while the political leadership of Epaminondas was a welcome advantage to
Thebes, the absence of any suitable successors crippled the political power of the Thebans. From
a theoretical points of view then, the Theban hegemony was rather thinly constructed because it
was not based on strong political power, but a singular personality. In fact, the competitive spirit
of the Greeks probably limited the effectiveness of any hegemony, be it Spartan, or Theban.
With no institutional state to perpetrate the power of the Thebes, there is no way to sustain
political hegemony. In this way, the classical Greeks deferred sharply from the nation-state
system in which political realism tends to thrive. Second, while the Theban hegemony definitely
confirms the necessity of prestige, it also highlights the limitation of the concept. The Theban
reliance on their own prestige to maintain their status could not be sustained on a finite supply of
power from a single individual.
154
Buckler, 218.155
Ibid., 218-9.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 45
Realist Concepts as Applied to the Fourth Century Greeks
The exercise of applying realist theory to the Spartan hegemony and Theban confirms the
validity of realist concepts of international politics. The Spartan behaviors related to the
treatment alliances and processes of negotiation confirm that they understood the nature of a self-
help anarchic international system. Similarly, the Thebans reliance on their own political capital
illustrates the importance of understanding that states organize accordance to power dynamics. In
this way, the anarchic system is an “organic” method of organizing political interactions.
Sparta’s reliance on Persian support further illustrates the necessities of self-help in such an
organic system.
Conceptually, interests defined, as power has been the strongest notion. The entire
political framework of both Sparta and Thebes essentially assume that the chief end of their
system is to maximize power and minimize threats to their own existence. Every political action
is organized according to this principle. The Spartans were particularly adept at asserting their
image and promoting positive images of their culture to advance their power. The Thebans
understood the nature of competition meant that they had to secure themselves and secure their
objectives as a matter of political necessity.
In the same vein, this study has also confirmed the conceptual soundness of states
pursuing their vital interests. The prestige of Sparta’s military might and martial spirit did much
to advance their position among their fellow Greeks. When it came interacting with other states,
particularly rivals, both Lysander and Agesilaus both had an understanding of which interests
they needed to serve in order to maintain the hegemony of the Spartan state. Likewise,
Epaminondas’ understanding of the interests of Thebes led him to solve political questions with
ease.
Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 46
Perhaps the weakest concept in realist theory is the unitary actor assumption. Given the
Spartans competition among leaders for personal glory, it is sometimes impossible to deduce a
singular actor with final authority. The concept is less problematic in the Theban context.
Nevertheless, the unitary actor assumption is still a useful model for understanding how political
decisions are made. While it might not always be clear where to vest unitary decision making
from a theoretical perspective, it is still essential to providing a useful explanatory model of
reality.
Finally, the minimized role of the morality in politics has been confirmed as well. Both
the Spartans and Thebans, while they might have invoked moral language or noble ideals, clearly
acted according to their own self-interests. They obeyed custom, protocol, and treaties when it
was in their best interests. However, when it inhibited the interests of the state they were quick to
abandon them. Sparta’s outright disregard for the treaties – even though the breach of a treaty
was a sacred offense – demonstrates their self-interests were relevant factors for their decisions.
Hegemonic power is quite unique in that it involves complex interaction of unperceivable
social behaviors and an innumerable amount of strategic moves. Realist theory is a useful tool
for reducing those infinite complexities to a systematic, coherent model of reality. If power is the
root of all human actions, then realist theory provides a useful paradigm for understand the
essential elements of human interactions.
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