A Reanalysis of Lenneberg's "Biological Foundations of Language" by a Behaviorist and aNativistAuthor(s): Stephen I. Sulzbacher and D. Kimbrough OllerSource: Behaviorism, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall, 1974), pp. 146-161Published by: Cambridge Center for Behavioral StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27758818 .Accessed: 21/10/2011 09:42Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspJSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend accessto Behaviorism.http://www.jstor.orgAReanalysisof Lenneberg's Biological Foundations of Language bya Behaviorist anda Nativist Stephen I.SulzbacherandD. Kimbrough Oiler1 Universityof Washington Thiscollaborative retrospectiveanalysis of Lenneberg's(1967)significant mono graphrepresents aneffort at communicationbetween markedlydifferingperspectives concerningpsychological science.Because Lenneberg's bookaddressesitself directly to the controversy between empiricism and nativism,any theoreticalreviewofthe bookis likely to take sides (cf. Hockett,1970, or Bernand Bern,1968). This paper willin some measure present both viewpoints in afashionsimilarto Salzinger(1973). Theissues involvedwillbe exploredlargely in the light ofresearchdonesincethe publication of Lenneberg's bookandtherefore this paper shouldbeconsideredmoreasa discussionof issuesthan asa reviewofthe book.Giventhe authors' acknowledged differences, itwas decidedto presentseparate commentson Lenneberg's bookand separatereplies to the commentaries.A singlejoint reviewwould probably haveobscuredthe differing opinions whichwehave hoped to clarify. Becauseofthe breadthof Lenneberg's work, it hasbeen necessary, in general, toconfinecommentstotheauthors' ownareasof expertise andto emphasize in the discussionthe general theoreticalorientationofthe monograph. TheNativist'sAnalysis TheBook'sNativisticTheme On page 298ofhis book, Lenneberg says, "Manisno differentfromother animals. ' ' Thissentence provides a fineillustration of how misleading astatementcanbe when presented outofcontext.In fact, Lenneberg'sprimary thesisin Biological Stephen I.Sulzbacher (thebehaviorist) is AssistantProfessorofPediatricsandD. Kimbrough Oiler (thenativist) isaSeniorResearchAssociateinthe Dept. of Speech andtheCommitteeon Language Learning atthe University of Washington. Address correspondence to eitherauthorat: Child Development andMentalRetardation Center,WJ-10, Univ.of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195.This study was supported in partby theNationalInstituteofChildHealthandHuman Development(NIH-NICHHD 71-2446 COA #3) and Maternal and Child Health Service Project #913. 146 Stephen I. Sulzbacher-D. Kimbrough Oller Foundations of Language isthatmanis different ? thatmanin unique in the animal kingdomby virtueof his innatelygivenability tolearnandusenatural language. The quoted statement wasintendedtomeanthatmanis like other animalsin that both display species-specific behaviors. Hopefully, the discussionthat followswillbe sufficiently general andaccuratesothatwecannotbeaccusedof citing him out of context morethan once. Themost significantgeneral contributionofthe bookseemsto bethe gathering together ofa variety ofvaluable findings and convincingargumentsindicating the existenceof specific innatefactors whichmakehuman languagelearningpossible. The presentationbrings to bear (1) the workof aphasiologists and neurologists whohave shownthat there are relatively localizedcentersin the humanbrain (bothcortically and subcortically) whichseemto be necessary for normal language function;2(2) results from physiologysuggesting that there are special neural adaptions inmanfor controlof suchfactorsas respirationduringspeech;(3) resultsof aphasiology,psycholinguistics and speechpathology whichmake acasefor a"critical" period of development after whichthe normal learning of language becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible; (4) resultsfrom geneticists whoseexaminationsof family historiesandthe development ofidenticalandfraternaltwins suggeststrongly thatthereisaninheritedbasisfor language disorders;(5)arguments andresultsfrom linguistics and psycholinguistics indicating that languagedevelopment is a complicatedphenomenon, the existenceof whichcould hardly be explainedpurely in terms of environmental contingencies; and (6) workof physiologists,neurologists and psychologistssuggesting that rhythm3 isa central organizingprinciple for behaviorin general and language in particular, andthat rhythms inmanare controlled by underlying innate physiological mechanisms.Allof theseresultsserveto support the nativistconvictionthat languagelearning cannotbe explainedpurely intermsoftraditionalbehavioristicconstructslikeclassicaland instrumental conditioning.Lenneberg showsthat in additionto suchtraditional notions, wemust includein our modelof languagelearning aninnatehuman propensity for masteringlinguistic structures.Thebreadthof Lenneberg's treatment andthe care with whichhe presents variousdifficult arguments makehisdiscussionofinnatenessin language the most comprehensive and convincingcurrently available, even though the bookis nowmorethanseven years old. Particularlyprovocative is Lenneberg's discussionof rhythm in humanbehavior.He persuasivelyargues (citingLashley, 1951, andnumerous others) that serial ordering of linguistic unitscannotbe adequately accountedforin terms ofanassociative chaining model, butthat onemustinvokea hierarchicalmodelwhich suggests centralnervous system controlofserial ordering. His argumentsuggests a modelof linguistic structure where rhythm plays a primary role, the sort of model presented more recently by Martin (1972) who argues that rhythm provides a bridge between perception and production, as wellas providing theframeworkwithinwhich segmentalphonologyoperates. The 2 Lenneberg is actually oneofthe moremoderateofrecentlocalizationists (cf. Whitaker,1971). 3" Rhythm" asusedherereferstothe placement and accenting ofbehavioralunitsintime. Linguistic rhythm, then, encompasses factorslike intonation, syllable stress, and syllable duration.It shouldbenoted thatthesearenot mutually exclusive factors, butratherare overlapping characteristicsofthe speechsignal. 147 A ReanalysisofLenneberg'sBiological Foundationsof Language central importance of rhythm hasnotbeenas yetincorporated intothe prevailing linguistic theoreticalframeworksof generativesyntax and phonology (as evidencedin Chomsky, 1965; Chomsky and Halle,1968; Harms,1968). The arguments of Len neberg and Martinmakeacasefor considerablerevisionoftheseframeworks. Criticisms by the Nativistof Lenneberg's Book Although the bookis appealing in terms ofits scientific directions, there areseveral points where Lenneberg's treatment isweakas regards details.For instance, onthe basis ofhisreviewof histological studiesofthe human brain, heconcludes:"Thereis no cytoarchitecturalpecularity ofthe corticalareasinvolvedin language"(p.61). How ever, whathas actually beenfoundin histological studiesis that there aresome apparent gross similaritiesbetweenthe cytoarchitecture of corticalareasinvolvedin language and othercorticalareas.Thefact that ' 'peculiarities' ' of areasinvolvedin language havenot yet beenfounddoesnot provethey donotexist.Thelackofademonstrationof differences maysimply beanindicationofthe relativelygross natureofthe research comparing the histology ofthesecorticalareas. Atanother point,Lennebergprovides an unfortunateconclusionto a brief discussion ofskeletalfeaturesoffossil man bysaying: We may deducefromthis evidence ... that vocalizationsoffossil mendidnot bear any closeacousticresemblanceto the speech soundsof any modern tongue ... (p.261). Thisis notin fact a deduction, but a conjecture. In fact, weknowthat the human speech apparatus is capable of undergoingquitegross structural changes without eliminating the possibility of quite normal soundingspeech.Lenneberg himselfreferstothis fact. Adult patients withoral pathology [for example,amputation ofthe tip ofthe tongue(Brodnitz,1960),harelip or cleft palate] manage neverthelessto produce soundsthat arefair approximations tothoseofnormal speech ... (p.51). Morerecentresearchhasshownthat evenin casesof relatively radical glossectomy (Seilo, LaRiviere, and Dimmick,1972) andin acaseoftotal motorie incapability of controlling movementsofthe lips andfacialmuscles (Fisher and Logemann,1972) subjects can producequite normal soundingspeech. Lenne berg referredto literature of this sortin substantiationofhisbeliefthat neurological controlfactorsareof greater importance than anatomical onesin the production of speech sounds.If neurological factors are primary (and onthat point Lenne berg is very persuasive), thenthereis no obvious reason why fossil mencouldnot have producedquite modern speech soundson the basisof neurological mechanismsaboutwhichthe skeletalfeature analyses cited by Lenne berg cantell us very little. In another spot,Lenneberg arguesreasonably that the acquisition of rule-ordering4 cannotbeaccountedfor solely in terms offactorslike attentionorrelativesalienceof 44'Ordering" ofrulesisatechnical necessity inordertoaccountforcertain linguistic datainan economicalmanner.Often byformulating twoorderedrules (i.e., onerule alwaysapplyingbefore the other to anylinguisticstring), wecanaccountfor linguistic datathat wouldnecessitatethreeor moreunordered rules. 148 Stephen I. Sulzbacher-D. Kimbrough Oller phonetic elements.Butheincludesin his discussionthe unfortunateclaimthat "all [my emphasis] rulesof generativegrammar havean orderof application"(p. 304). It is not completely clearwhat Lenneberg intendedwiththis passage,given the relatively non-technicalnatureofhis discussion, butthestatementneedsto berecastinthe perspective of the controversy which currently existsin generativelinguisticsconcerning the natureof ordering of linguistic(especiallyphonological) rules (for recenttreatment of acrucial problem of ordering, see Anderson,1970). Chafe (1968) makesit clearthat (contrary to Lenneberg'sapparentclaim) itis normally thecasethatinasetof phonological rulessomewill requireordering constraintsandsomewillnot.Further more, there are clearly various types of ordering(Kiparsky, 1968; Stampe, 1972) with quite different properties. Thelast chapter of Lenneberg's book ("Toward a BiologicalTheory of Language Development") introducesa couple ofseriousconfusions.Thefirst oneconcernsan apparentmisunderstandingbyLenneberg ofthe distinctionsof generativelinguistics between competence and performance, andbetween underlying andsurfacestructure. LennebergequatesChomsky's"competence" withhis ownnotionof "latentstructure" orthe 4 'propensity for language"(p.384) whichhelater definesasthe innatelyspecified mechanismof language. This equation is faulty sincea native speaker's"competence" in Chomskian terminology includesa body of knowledge whichis not innatelyspecified. For instance, an Englishspeaker'scompetence includesthe knowledge ofalearned English lexiconas wellasnumerous linguistic rules whichare specific to English and thus couldnotbe thought to be fully determined by innatefactors. Furthermore, Lennebergapparently usesthe terms "latentstructure"and "underly ing structure" interchangeably. This usage introducesafurther confusionsincethe generativelinguist's notionof underlying structure doesnot necessarily includeall (or even most) ofthe innate factors of language which Lennebergimplies in his usage. There is now accruing considerableevidencethatthereexistuniversals (and henceinnate factors) ofsuch non-underlying(i.e., not pertaining to the output ofthe phrase structure component ofa grammar)operations as syntactic transformations (see, for instance, Bach,1965); there is also muchrecent evidencethat there existuniversalsof phonologi cal processes(seeMiller,1972; Stampe,1969). Afinal confusion appearing in Lenneberg's last chapter is embodiedin his untenable assertion concerning the "tolerance"of language to changes introduced byspeakers: Thefreedomsthatindividuals may take donot appear to be regulatedbyany constantand everpresent forces. Consequently,languagesmay move through history in any oneof a great mart y possibledirections, andcertainfeatures may disappear or reappearagain and again without anyapparent order (p.389). The systematicity of linguisticchange hasbeen accepted asa methodological and theoretical given in linguistics atleastsincethelast quarter ofthe nineteenth century whenthe writings ofthe Junggrammatiker(neogrammarians) formalizedthe notionof "soundlaws" (Osthoff and Brugmann,1878). Robins (1967) in his Short Historyof Linguisticspoints outthat the neogrammarians' ideasabouthistorical linguistics have been incorporated in largepart into contemporarythought.Recently,Stampe(1969) pointed outthat manysystematic historicalsound changes have parallels in systematic 149 A ReanalysisofLenneberg s Biological Foundationsof Language childhoodsoundsubstitutionsandin synchroniephonologicalprocesses ofadult gram mars. Stampe argues that the sameconstantinnateforcesshouldbeinvokedto account for historicalsound changes aswellaschildhoodsubstitutionsand synchronie adult processes. Lenneberg's claimabout languages'changingaccording to no"constantandever present forces"seemsto be based partly upon his observationthat ' 4 a painstaking search for univeralsin historical changes(Cowgill, 1963; Hoenigswald, 1963) revealed very little that the authorswere willing to regard asevidencefor suchuniverals" (p. 387). Cowgill and Hoenigswald, however, were looking not just for systematicity of historical changes, but for systematicity of highlyspecific sorts based upon their personal interests andresearch paradigms. Bothauthors wereawareofthe interpretive limitationsoftheir paradigms.Cowgill refersto his investigation often Indo-Europeanlanguages asa "preliminaryexploration" of possible consistentdrift in Indo-European with respect to various highly specific morphological indices developedby Greenberg(1960). Hoenigswald,pointing outthelimitationsofhis own frameworkin the statement, weare onlybeginning to constructa frameworkof minimalformal concepts ... (p. 24) goes onto say: It is possible that new approaches like transformational grammar which promise to unify synchronietypology in a hitherto unsuspected sense may also bring new principles of importance to an understanding ofthe universalsof change ... (p. 39). In spite ofthe acknowledged limitationsoftheir paradigms, both Cowgill and Hoenigs waldrefer to certain regularities5 of historical change revealed by their work.Theterm "universal"isinvoked sparinglyby theauthorsbecauseoftheircareful scholarly approach andbecauseofthe specific natureoftheir investigations. Conclusions Giventhe specific technicaland terminologicalproblems which appear in Lenneberg's book, it is important for the readerto take histreatment asan encyclopedic overview, andnot asthe final wordin twenty fieldsof study. On questions of specifics, the bookis not alwaysstrong. Onthe other hand, at a more general theoretical level, I believethe workis persuasive.Lenneberg hasamassedmuchinformationto support the claimthat there areinnatefactorsin languagedevelopment. It shouldbenotedthatin criticizing the book, I havenot onceattachedthe basicnativisticthemeofthe work. 5Cowgill referstothe languages hestudiedas showing aclear developmental trend. Atthe earliest period whichourreconstructions can reach, the numberof morphemesper wordwas rising in the Indo-European dialects.Withineachdialectit reacheda maximumandthenturned downward, in whichdirectionit hasbeen moving eversince (p. 102). Butwithcharacteristiccaution Cowgillgoes onto point outthat Further data, ofcourse,could reasily revealthatthisscheme ... istoo simple ... (p. 102). Hoenigswald referstothefactthat Recent comparative workfromallover suggests that sound change 'is'indeed regulareverywhere onearth ... (p.29). 150 Stephen I. Sulzbacher-D. Kimbrough Oller In one importantregardLenneberg's bookis a lengthy promissory note. Whileit is very convincing aboutthe ideathat there existinnate languagecapacities, itdoeslittle to specify the natureofthese capacities. Ofcoursethis is not surprising, sinceoverseven yearslater, it is stilltrue that very little hasbeendoneto specifically characterizethe child'sinnate linguistic endowment.Futurestudiesinthe biological foundationsof language seemboundto attempt suchcharacterization.6 TheBehaviorist'sAnalysis Thereis no inherent conflictbetweenstudentsof biological as opposed to environ mentalinfluenceson languagedevelopment. Indeed, thetwo kindsofstudiesshould complement eachother.Yet Lennebergpresents hisdiscussionof biological factorsin language asif to excludethe possibility that the study of environmentalvariables might be significant. For instance, in the concluding statementof his book, he speaks ofthe question about"howmuchor whatit [the environment] contributesto the development of language" andclaims parenthetically that "theanswersarealmosttoo obviousto deservemuchattention" (p.394). Thisunsubstantiatedand alienating claimis not, I believe, a crucialissuein the long-term evaluationof Lenneberg's booksincethe fact of thematteris that Lennebergsimply doesnot give a carefultreatmentto the question of the effect of environmentalfactorsin languagelearning. In fact, very little researchhas beendonefrom the perspective of modern psycholinguistics onthe effect of environmen talfactorsin languagelearning(notableexceptions are Cazden,1965, and Dale, in press). Suchatreatment willdoubtlesshavetobe givenby someonewhohasa fundamentalinterestin environmental factors, andLenne bergapparently doesnot have suchaninterest. Language is particularlyinteresting to both behavioristsand nativistsbecauseit is the scientifically observable, behavioral phenomenon whichmost closelyapproximates the unobservable process inmanwhichwecall "thinking." Another interesting feature of language is that the process ofits acquisition is an apparently irreversible phenomenon, sinceonce acquired, it cannotbe easily erasedandthen re-taught. Thesetwo characteris tics of language makeits study at once fascinating and frustrating. These properties have led some nativists, notablyChomsky (1959) and Lenneberg (1967, p. 266), toconclude that language behavioris differentfromallotherbehavior. Others, notably Skinner (1957) have suggested that language behavioris nodifferentfrom any other behavior, except thatits environmentaleffectsare usually mediated sociallythrough another organism. Lenneberg's theoretical position is basedonanextensivereviewof workdone by othersandhisownresearchin variousareas including:(1)languagedevelopment in normal children, deafchildrenand adults, aphasie adults, mongoloid childrenanda motorically-handicapped child; and (2)cognition and language asseenin studiesof color 6 At present the specific formulationofa theory of innatelygiven human languagelearningcapacities is in verypreliminarystages with primary attention being directedtowardthe areaof phonology(Stampe,1972; Edwards,1971; Oilerand Warren,1973). In syntax, reviewsof pertinent discussionsare provided in Bowerman (1973). Furtherreferencescanbefoundin Hockett (1970). 151 A ReanalysisofLenneberg s Biological Foundationsof Language perception and naming. Hisbeliefthat language is primarily determined bygenetic rather than environmentalfactorsdraws heavysupport from hisstudiesof congenitally deafchildren who, at an earlyage,producespeech-likebabblingcomparable to that of their hearingpeers. Further support for hiscontentionthattherearecritical periods during which language "unfolds" (and that language willnot developnormally unlessit occurs during these critical periods) is taken from studiesof aphasies whichcorrelatethe age at whichinsultto the centralnervous system occurredwiththe degree of subsequent language and motorfunction recovery. Lenne berg alsocorrelatesmeasuresof anatomi cal development with generalphysicalgrowth and development, andhe suggests that the degree ofcorrelationbetweenthesevariablesand languagedevelopmentsupport the contentionthat allofthesevariablesarecontrolled by thesamebasicfactor: genetic determination. Nearly allofthe data presentedby Lenneberg in support of his position arederived from descriptive studies on relativelylargesamples withstatistical analysisby meansof correlations. Although itmustbeadmittedthat many of his arguments basedonthese correlativestudiesdo intuitively make sense, his useofsuchevidenceto suggest that the phenomena describedare genetically causedis untenable (as Lenneberg himself admits, p.248), since unfortunately statisticalcorrelations may not beusedto imply causality of any sort (for a discussionofthis matter, see Sax,1968).By careful analysis of dataon environmentalfactorsin languagelearning, it is possible to arriveat moreclearcut inferenceswith respect to causalitythrough direct experimentalmanipulation. Once again, then, weseea clearneedfor cooperation ratherthan conflict among behaviorists and developmentalists. In Lenneberg's discussionofthe biological(genetic) foundationsof language, he statesthat: Thebasic capacity [for acommunications system]developsontogenetically in the courseof physical maturation;however, certainenvironmentalconditions mustalsobe present to makeit possible for language to unfold.Maturation bringscognitiveprocesses to astatethat wecall language readiness (p. 375). WhatLenne berg leavesunansweredis how, andtowhat extent, it is possible to alterthe rate orthe directionofthe maturational process. Amolecular biologist would suggest that geneticmanipulations couldbe employed;similarly, the behavioristwould suggest that someofthe steps naturehas programmed intothe maturational schedule, either chemical, genetic, or environmental, are not absolutelynecessary andthat someofthese steps may, in fact, bedetrimental.Thebehavioristwouldcontendthatwe might beable to improveupon nature's program(Baer,1966). Furtherclarificationof Lenneberg'sposition is foundelsewhere: We are,therefore, suggesting, asa workinghypothesis thatthe general non specific statesof maturationofthe brainconstitute prerequisites and limiting factorsfor languagedevelopment.They arenotits specific cause (p. 169, emphasis added). Lenneberggoes onto say inthe concludingparagraph ofhisbook: Thusnofeaturesthat arecharacteristicof only certainnatural languages, either particulars of syntax or phonology, or semantics, are assumedhereto beinnate. 152 Stephen I. Sulzbacher-D. Kimbrough Oller However, there are many reasonsto believethatthe processesby whichthe realized, outerstructure ofa natural language comes about, are deeply rooted, species-specific, innate properties of man's biological nature (p. 394). Thus, Lennebergappears to agree that language is modifiablewithincertain genetic constraints.Thenativist-behaviorist argument is then onthe natureofthese constraints. MacCorquodale(1970) in his commentary on Chomsky's(1959) reviewofSkinner's (1957) VerbalBehaviorhas very elegantly statedasimilar position: Thereisnolethal incompatibility orevenmild inconsistency betweenthe principles of genetic evolutionandthe principle ofreinforcement.Reinforce menthas manynecessarypoints ofcontactwith genetics.Reinforceability is itself a genetically-determined characteristic; organisms are simply bornrein forceable. They haveevolvedthat way. Thefact that organisms behaveat allis dueto genetic determination.Stimulus generalization and response induction are genetically determinedcharacteristics.The onlyincompatibility between genetic determinationand learningby reinforcementis that if somebehavioris whollygenetically determined, as unconditionedreflexes are, then no learning is neededto accountforits occurrences.Suchbehaviors hardly'disprove' rein forcement theory, ofcourse, (p.93) The "processes"spoken of by Lenneberg in the above passage andthe genetically determinedcharacteristicsof "reinforceability"spoken of by MacCorquodale canbe seento be conceptually similarfactors.The positions ofthe two authors are not, atthis level, incompatible in the least, in spite of Lenneberg'sprotestations that reinforcement plays no important rolein languagelearning. One way to viewthe differencebetweenso-calledinnate behaviorand"learned" behaviorisin the amountoftime required for anindividualto acquire or modify that behavior.Thebehaviors typicallythought to beinnatearethose whichoftencanbe elicitedafter only one trial (i.e., conditioned reflexes, suchasthe eyeblink) and which are difficultto eliminatefromthe individual's repertoire. Learnedbehavioris typically characterizedas requiring somewhatmoretimeanda greater numberoftrialsfor acquisition to occur. More important, however, is the fact that procedures can easily be specified whichwill effectively eliminatelearnedbehaviorsfrom the individual's reper toire. Bolles (1970) has persuasivelyargued this point with regard to avoidance learning. Therather obvious implication for those who might insistthat all language is learnedis that manyaspects of language are unfortunately mostdifficulttoeliminatefroma person'srepertoire.Although there are considerabletechnicalas wellasethicaldifficul tiesin designingexperiments to suppress various aspects of language in children, I believesuchstudies withhumanswould complement the studiesof languageacquisition by chimpanzees(Gardner and Gardner,1969; Premackand Premack,1972) andlead us to a clearer understanding of language behaviors.I agree withBolles (1972) that facile referenceto auniversallawofreinforcementis no longer an adequateexplanation of these phenomena. In his discussionof physiological correlatesof language behavior, Lenneberg states that a fundamentalthemeofhisbookisthat: Thefoundationsof language are ultimately to befoundin the physical natureof 153 A ReanalysisofLenneberg s Biological Foundationsof Language man ? anatomy and physiology ? andthat language is best regarded asa particularadaptation ofa very universal physiologicalprocess toa species specificethological function:communication among membersof our species(p. 106). Inadditionto stressing theroleofthe physiology and anatomy ofthe humanvocal apparatus in shaping human language, healsostates: Everyone knowsthat it takes a humanbrainto acquire a natural language suchas English, andthisis true of languageproduction as wellas comprehension(p. 53). Overlooking the factthat "Everyone knows .. ."is simply a way of concealing a lack of data, this statementclarifiesoneof Lenneberg'sapparent inconsistenciesin theory. Although it might betrue that vocally-expressedlanguage(speech) couldbe specific to humans, this is certainly notthe casefor languagedevelopment and productionthrough another expressive mode. However, onseveraloccasions throughout the book, Len neberg substitutestheword "speech" for "language" andthis is often misleading to the reader.For example,Lenneberg states: It wouldbecircularor meaningless to statethat only manhasacortical speech area, becausecortical languagemaps are basedonobservationof behavior.We cannotobserve language interferencein an animalthat doesnot speak. Suchan animal, by definition, lacks speech areas (p. 62, emphasisadded). Elsewherehe makesasimilar logicalslip: ... the practical failureof our attempts to train closely related species to utter intelligible words, to usesentences meaningfully, orevento understand sen tencesoutofcontextmakessuchan assumption [that languageproduction is dependent on specificphysiological mechanisms] reasonable (p. 76). Itmustbe pointed out,however, that other places in the book Lenneberg usesthetwo terms appropriately. In anyevent, Premack (1971), PremackandPremack (1972) and Gardnerand Gardner (1969) havedemonstrated languageacquisition in chimpanzeesby employing non-vocal language. Thesestudieshavealso clearly demonstratedthe error of someof Lenneberg'sassumptionsregardingaspects of language whichhefelt couldnot belearned. Another majorpremiseLennebergdevelopsregards whathecalls reference, the relationship betweenwordsand things, andthe roleofour capacity for naming in the organization of cognition. His chapter on language and cognition is fascinating sincehe develops his arguments for stimulus generalization in a manner essentially similarto that taken by Sidman (1960), andthen proposes a theory of cognition.Lenneberg's main argumentgoes asfollows: Mostanimals organize the sensory world by a process of categorization, and fromthisbasicmodeof organization twofurther processes derive: differentiation or discrimination, and interrelating of categories orthe percep tion of andtolerancefor transformations. In manthese organizational activities are usually called conceptformation; butitisclearthatthereis noformal differencebetweenman's concept-formation andanimal's propensity forre sponding to categories ofstimuli.There is, however, asubstantivedifference. 154 Stephen I. Sulzbacher-D. Kimbrough Oller Thetotal possibilities for categorization are clearly notidentical across species (pp. 331-332). His argument is basically that, in the courseof normal development, the animal begins by making thesame response to almost any stimulusandthen through a process of categorizationbegins to responddifferentially asit discriminates among various categories ofstimuli.Lenne berggoes onto suggest that: It doesnot appear to be possible to teacha dog to dothe 4name-specific stimulus generalization' that every childdoes automatically. ... Thereis nocon vicing evidencethat any animalbelowmanhaseverlearnedto relate any given wordto the same range of stimulithat is covered by thatwordin common languageusage (p. 329). Hedwellsatsome length onthe semanticsof metaphors asevidencethat animalscould never comprehend this complex feature of language. Itwouldseemto bea simple tour de forcefor a behavioristto teach an animala large range of stimuli eachof which signals the same response and thereby teachthe animalto respond to "metaphoric"meanings at leastasoftenasthe average adult human; thus refuting Lenneberg's statement.How ever, soefarmore interesting experimentalquestions couldbederivedfromthis discus sion:such as, how many dog-like anduncleanbehaviorsmusta manexhibitbefore a childunfamiliarwiththe common metaphor wouldlabel himas a "dirtydog?" Thiskind of research, while certainlyentertaining, wouldalsobe usefulin defining whichstimulus cuesare necessary andsufficientfor a given normal (orexceptional) childto apply a given labelto a physicalobject. Lenneberg'sconcept of transformation is based on his theory oftwo-level cognitive functioning.Lennebergsuggests that organisms musttransform input fromthe environ mentto fit grammatically-structuredcategories which are, biologicallyspecialized transformations, applicable toacoustic patterns that havein manthefunctionofcommunication.This type oftransformational capacity is clearlybiologicallygiven, ... this emphasizes the importance of Chomsky'scompetence-performance distinctionandmakesthose language theoriesdoubtfulthat are primarily based upon a response-shapinghypothesis. A comparison of language in retardedchildrenwith languagedevelopment of normalchildrenindicatesthat thereis a natural language-learningstrategy that cannotbealtered bytraining programs(pp.325-326). Lenneberg is suggesting that this "deeply rooted" biologicallygivengrammar is the primary factor of cognition andthat a secondary factor oftransformationsis the environ mental overlay whichcanbemore easilyadaptedthroughtraining. This interesting position deservedmore space and development than itwas given in Lenneberg's book. In summary, onecan say that Lenneberg has extrapolated fromlimiteddatawhat may bean untenabletheoretical position. Butasa practical matter, hehas synthesized some impressive anduseful findings from various disciplines andhas thereby made a substantialcontributionto our understanding of language.Similarly, hehas developed an elegant methodof describinglanguageacquisition. Thisstate of affairsleadsoneto conclude, as Gray(1970)has, that: 155 A ReanalysisofLenneberg s Biological Foundationsof Language In fact, boththe linguist andthe behavioristhavecriticalinformationto bring to the problem.Linguists can provide the informationrelativeto selectivity. That is, informationaboutthe structure and development of language can provide a basisfor determining which language unitsarecriticalandalsofor determining in whatorder they shouldbeconditionedintothe behavior.Behavioristscan provide themethod by whichthe criticalunitscanbecome incorporated into the child'sbehavior pattern.Knowledge of learningprinciples and conditioning methodology can provide a basisfor languageacquisitionprocedures whichare efficientand objective. Thesituationcouldbeseenin terms ofthe curriculum from linguistics andthe deliverysystem from behaviorism. TheNativist'sRebuttal Sulzbachermaintainsthe traditionalbehavioristicbeliefthat it is possible, inmean ingful psychologicalexperiments, to ignore biological factors. Lenneberg, onthe other hand, claimsthat biological andenvironmentalfactorsof learning cannotbe practically separated in research.In support of Lenneberg's belief, itcanbesaidthat externalstimuli induce organisms to respond in ways whichare inevitably limited by the biological capacities ofthe organisms. The "reinforceability" of organisms referredto by Mac Corquodale in the abovecited passage is one biological factor whichdiffers from species to species and whichmustinfluencethe resultsof anyexperimentemploying reinforce mentwithanimalsorhumans.Lenne berg'spositionsuggests thatit is necessary to formulate a theory of biologicallygivenlearningcapacities, and throughexperimental researchtoevaluatetheinfluenceofenvironmentalfactorsinthecontextofthis biological framework. Lenneberg also expresses the belief that, historically,psychologists in this country havebeen largely unawareofthe necessity in researchof dealingsimultaneously with biological andenvironmentalfactors. He argues that "behaviormust always beinvesti gated in terms of specificspecies," andfurther claimsthat "this proposition runs counter tothe beliefof many psychologists"(p. 3). Laterhe says: Behavioris far fromthe monolithic,clear-cut, self-evident phenomenonpost ulated by psychologists a generationago(p.126). Later yet, he points outthat in spite ofthe traditionalbeliefof behavioristic psychologists in the power ofclassicaland op?rantconditioning: there is no evidencethat intensive training procedures can producehigherstages of languagedevelopment(p.178). Furthermore, Lenneberg refersto a"relativeineffectivenessof programmedtraining upon the rate [emphasis added] of languageacquisition"(p.379). If Lenneberg is basicallyright onthese points, then certain traditionally-accepted notionsof behavioris tic psychology willhaveto berevisedin orderforthe frameworkoftraditionalbe havioristic psychology to be maximally effectivein contributing to the study of language learning. It willbe necessary forbehavioriststoaddresstheresearch problem of discovering the "triggering" environmentalfactors whichstimulatecertain maturational factors of languagelearning, rather than addressing the purelytechnologicalproblem (to 156 Stephen I. Sulzbacher-D. Kimbrough Oller whichSulzbacher refers) of discovering how muchthe programspecifiedby naturecan be changed. Neither Lenneberg northe present authorintendsto suggest that technological questions couldneverbeanswered.Butatthe present stateofour knowledge about language and languagelearning, it is mostreasonableto beginbyclarifying certain more-or-lessmetatheoretical questions(about the importance of biology in an adequate theory of learning) andto obtaina muchmoresubstantial understanding of biological factorsthanis presently available.Oncescientific knowledge ofthesefactorshasbeen codified, significanttechnologicalquestions canbe more appropriately handled. Surely mostbehavioristswill disagree withthe foregoingpassage asa characteriza tion of history andfuture directionsin the study of behavior.This interpretation is offered simply in the hope that itwillmakealittlemoreclearthe motivationsof Lenneberg's theoreticaland methodologicalapproach. Anotherissueof great differencebetweenthetwoorientations expressed inthis reviewcanbeillustratedin the contextof Sulzbacher'sclaimthat Lenneberg conceals a 'Mack of data" by using the phrase"everyone knows." Interestingexperiments are ones which might revealcharacteristicsof language or languagelearning of which wewould otherwisebeunaware. Uninteresting onesdealwithissueswhichare experientially obviousor otherwisetrivial. The questionLenneberg refers towithhis phrase"everyone knows" (viz., thatit takesa humanbraintolearnahuman language) is, I believe, experientially obviousanddoesnot deserve experimentaltesting. Thenativist'sdefini tion of"data"is sufficiently broadto includeinformation whichis not experimentally obtained.Someofthisinformationisbasedonnatural logic andsomeonnon experimentalexperience. Suchinformationamountsto aset of assumptions.Many of these assumptions shouldnot be subjected to test simply becausesuchtests wouldbe (in the nativist's opinion) a wasteoftime. Trivial experiments to demonstrateobvioustruths canbe designed andconductedad infinitum. Perhaps the particularobjection Sulzbacherhasto ' 'everyone knows" (' 'that it takes a humanbrainto learn a human language") ismost directly revealed by his commentthat the Premacksand Gardners"havedemonstrated languageacquisition in chimpanzees. .. ."Thisclaimorits equivalent hasbeenadvancedso many timesthat it deservesa reply. The "languages" ofthe chimps Sarahand Washoehavenot been clearly shownto possessmany standard properties of naturalhuman languages.Among thesearerecur siveness, self-embedding, structural ambiguity, andallofthe properties whichare properly accountedforin terms of permutation transformations (for definitionsofthese crucial properties, seesuch worksas Chomsky, 1957,1965; or Langacker,1968). This list of properties could go onandon.Furthermorethe list doesnot point outthe factthat the chimps'linguisticsystems are muchmorelimitedthan natural languages in quantita tive as wellas qualitativerespects.Lenneberg's basic position doesnot cruciallydepend upon the chimps'inability to acquireanyparticular featureof language, butratherit depends onthe inability of non-humananimalsto acquire the totality of natural language (including allthe complicatedsyntactico-semantic structuresaswellas phonological aspects of language frombotha comprehension anda productionstandpoint). The 157 A ReanalysisofLenneberg s Biological Foundationsof Language Gardnersandthe Premacksthemselvesareawarethat they are onlyteaching certain select features ofnatural languages totheir chimps.7 In fairness, it shouldbe acknowledged that the Premacks'and Gardners' fascinating workhasdemonstratedthe ability of chimps to employ oneofthe featuresofnatural languages which Lenneberg'sposition would suggest non-humanscouldnot acquire. Lenneberg claimsthat productivity (the ability to combinecommunicativeunitsin novel ways for novel communications) is "totallylacking in the examples of animalcommuni cation" (p.233), Sarah'sand Washoe's languages doincludethis productivity feature, albeitin a very limitedfashion. Arguments aboutanimalcommunicationalmost always turn outto be frustrating. Fodor ( 1967) hasclaimedit to beirrelevantthat a chimp oncealmostlearnedto say'cup. ' I agree. It seemstomethat it is time to leavethe controversiesover whetheror not other species canlearn language and get on withthe characterizationofthe biologicallearning capacities ofvarious species,especially man. "Everyone knows"manis different. Let's seeifwecancharacterizethese differencesin a useful way.Lenneberg's bookis a majorstep in that direction. TheBehaviorist'sRebuttal Why should any behavioristin his right mind (sic) read Biological Foundations of Language? After all, in all of Lenneberg's bookthere are only three pages out of 465on whichthere ismentionof environmentalinfluences uponlanguagedevelopment(pp. 12, 135and 136). Onthe other hand, Lenneberg andother mentalistsdevoteconsiderable effort to discussionsof "deep" structures generatedby underlyinggrammars which they assertinclude many innate anduniversal properties whichare unique to human beings. The underlyinggrammarsgenerate all language anddictatethemannerinwhich specific languages arelearned.In linguistics, theterm "generate" is synonomous with"ac countsfor" (Dale,1972). Thewords deep and generate are precisely definedtechnical terms to the linguist but appear to havebeen misunderstood by others, notably those of a behavioraloutlook.It tookacareful reading of Lenneberg's book, Dale's book, anda discussionwith Oiler, for this behaviorist, at least, to understandmore adequately what theseterms meant.The uninitiated, suchasthe present writer, might wellassumethat "deep structure" implies a fictitious, unobservableconstructlikethe"id"orthe "unconscious," andthat generativegrammars referto equally absurdmechanisms locatedin the chromosomesfrom which languagesprings atthe appropriate timein the developmentalhistory ofan organism. However, toabehavioristit might notbe unacceptable to viewthe underlyinggrammars as empirical sets oflimits withinwhich verbal responses canbedefinedto occur.The generative grammar becomes acceptable to a behavioristasaset ofrules whichdescribeand categorizelanguageresponses in the 7Brown ( 1970)presents evidencethatWashoedoesnoteven possess a grammar ofthesort possessedby childrenwhoare producing utterancesofa comparablemorphemiclength. Brown (1973) discusses differencesbetweenthe languagepossessedby WashoeandSarahandnaturalhuman languages. 158 Stephen I. Sulzbacher-D. Kimbrough Oller samesensethat atomic theory describesthe behaviorofatoms. However, itmustbe madeclearthatthese generative rules, just aswiththerulesofatomic physics, are descriptive andnotcausal. Insome sense, an analogy canbedrawnbetweenthe deep-structure, surface structuredistinctionmade bylinguists andthe distinctionbetween response rateand responsetopography made by behaviorists.Thebehavioristhas typically considered responsetopography(thatis, whetherarat presses the barwithhis snout, forepaw, hindpaw, tail or whatever) as relativelyuninteresting in revealinganything aboutthe lawsof behavior. However, behavioristshavelooked beyond the topography atthe rate oflever pressing to discovermoreuniversallawsaboutanimalbehavior.Ina similar fashion, linguists haveconstructedlawsabout language behaviorwhichhavewider applicability when they look beyond thesurfacestructureandlookat grammatical components not immediately evidentin spoken sentences.To date, the usefulnessof these deep structure grammars hasnot been widely established among social scientists, butthen it tookseveraldecadesbeforeschedulesof reinforcementwere widelyaccepted as major determinantsofhumanbehavior. Regarding the distinctionbetweenenvironmentaland biological factors, the be havioristfindsthis distinctionto be unnecessary. Thebehaviorist does,however, require experimental verificationofthe degree towhich any variablerelevantto humanbehavior canbe changed. Theexistenceof species-specific behaviorsis certainly not denied (cf. Skinner,1969,pp.199-203), butit is important that weobtaindataonthe degree of specificity anddefinethe conditionsunderwhichsuchbehaviorscanbe modified. Experimentschallengingconcepts that4 'everybody knows' ' havebeenat the heart of every major scientificadvance.Tocite but on example, the Wright brothers literally flew intothe faceofrationalist's arguments that their experiments weretrivialsinceitwas thought that 4'everybody knewthat mancouldnot fly." 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