EMPIRICISM

PHIL3072, ANU, 2015Jason Grossman

http://empiricism.xeny.net

lecture 9: 22 September

Logical Atomism andthe beginnings of pluralist empiricism

Contents

Recap

Bertrand Russell: reductionism in physics

Common sense is self-refuting

Acquaintance versus description

Logical atomism

Differences between Idealism and Phenomenalism

Recap: Russell’s reductionism: from maths to physics

“There are many possible ways of turning some things hitherto regardedas ‘real’ into mere laws concerning the other things. Obviously theremust be a limit to this process, or else all the things in the world willmerely be each other’s washing”— Bertrand Russell, “The Analysis of Matter”, 1927, p. 325

Note the PLURALISM: this is new.

Recap: The impact of Einstein on Russell

Recall dates: Einstein’s “Special” Relativity was 1905 and his GeneralRelativity was 1915.

According to Einstein, “each event had to each other a relation called‘interval,’ which could be analysed in various ways into a time elementand a space element. The choice between these various ways wasarbitrary, and no one of them was theoretically preferable to any other.. . .

What has been thought of as a particle will have to be thought of as aseries of events. . . .

Thus "matter" is not part of the ultimate material of the world, butmerely a convenient way of collecting events into bundles. . . .Quantum theory reinforces this conclusion”— Bertrand Russell, “History of Western Philosophy”, p. 832

This is a rejection of the ontologies of both substances and objects.

See how what was speculative in Hume and Berkeley has now beenendorsed as science by Einstein (who read Hume and Berkeley).

Recap: Sometimes I just hate terminology

Russell sometimes referred to his version of empiricism asphenomenalism, and sometimes as logical atomism, especially1911-1924.

The details kept changing. I’m going to focus on Russell’s description ofphenomenalism in “Our Knowledge of the External World” from 1914,and his description of logical atomism in “Logical Atomism” from 1924;but see “The Relation of Sense-data to Physics” (1917) for his views onmaterialism.

Carnap’s detailed version of phenomenalism, in “Der Logische AufbauDer Welt”, 1928, was not atomistic.

Russell distinguished between:

1. sense-data, which are our sensations

= Locke’s phenomena = Hume’s impressions

2. sensibilia, which are potential sense-data

Recap: Sense and sensibilia

Russell often (not always) treated sensibilia as material (in Berkeley’ssense):

“What the mind adds to sensibilia, in fact, is merely awareness:everything else is physical or physiological.”

— Bertrand Russell, “The Relation of Sense-data to Physics”, in “Mysticism and Logic”, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917; reprinted in

Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1951, pp. 108-131. p. 110

Some historians see this as the beginning of Russell’s neutralmonism.

The one thing that is absolutely consistent in Russell’streatment of materialism is his ambivalence!

Later empiricists generally rejected material sensibilia, although not(usually) material objects.

Recap: Logicist reductionism

logicism: the reduction of mathematics to logic

. . . + definitions

. . . + maybe other general principles.

Does not necessarily deny the objective reality of mathematical objects(and, in Frege, strongly affirms it).

Logicism is pluralist: it can also be worked out in various differentways.

Recap: Phenomenalist reductionism

phenomenalism: the reduction of all knowledge to sensibilia + logic

. . . + definitions

. . . + maybe other general principles such as the principle oflogical analysis itself!

Does not necessarily deny the objective reality of physical objects

but does say that objects are parasitic on sensibilia.

Phenomenalism is pluralist: it can be worked out in various differentways.

Russell’s phenomenalism

Step 1. The distinction between hard and soft data.

Hard data: “those which resist the solvent influence of criticalreflection”.— Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy, London: George Allen & Unwin,

1914, pp. 75–76

This is a matter of degree.

“What does not go beyond our own personal sensible acquaintancemust be for us the most certain”.— Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 74

Russell’s phenomenalism

Step 2. Testimony comes from relatively soft data about otherminds.

This means that almost all our knowledge is soft.

“The belief that [tables and chairs] persist is, in all men [sic] except afew philosophers, logically primitive, but it is not psychologicallyprimitive . . . we feel that some kind of argument must be produced . . .

We do not feel this as regards the immediate objects of sense”— Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 77

A belief being “not psychologically primitive” means that it needsjustification

. . . & it can’t be justified by common sense because common sense isself-refuting!

Common sense is self-refuting

“common sense leaves us completely in the dark as to the true intrinsicnature of physical objects”— The Problems of Philosophy, p. 53

“We all start from ‘naive realism’, i.e., the doctrine that things are whatthey seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and thatsnow is cold.

But physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness ofstones, and the coldness of snow, are not the greenness, hardness, andcoldness that we know in our own experience, but something verydifferent. . . .

Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naiverealism is false.”— Betrand Russell, An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth, New York: Norton, 1940, p. 15

So . . .

Step 3. The hardest data about physical objects are aspects, whichare sets of sensations.

Step 4. Replacement of objects by sets of aspects.

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Acquaintance anddescription

Knowledge by acquaintance

Definition: “We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything ofwhich we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process ofinference or any knowledge of truths.”— “Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description”, in Betrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Butterworth,

1912, p. 73

What I know by acquaintance: Russell

patterns in my visual field

some simple relations — e.g., before

universals, i.e. abstract ideas (“whiteness, diversity, brotherhood, andso on [and] all verbs”)

memories

introspection

the self . . . maybe— “Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description”, in Betrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Butterworth,

1912, p. 81

What I know by acquaintance: Carnap (and Ayer)

Gestalts “comprising a sort of snap shot of a given time of everythingperceived”— http://www.newappsblog.com/2014/01/was-the-aufbau-meant-by-carnap-to-be-a-refutation-of-hegels-phenomenology-of-spirit.html, viewed

2015-09-22

i.e. not atomism . . .

note that perceptions can overlap.

Carnap’s view is much more accurate psychologically

but we’ll concentrate on Russell’s view (even though he waswrong) because doing this properly is so complicated.

Gestalt psychology

— "Grey square optical illusion" by Original by Edward H. Adelson, this file by Gustavb - File created by Adrian Pingstone, based on the

original created by Edward H. Adelson

Knowledge by description

Definition: “We shall say that an object is ‘known by description’ whenwe know that it is ‘the so-and-so,’ ”

This is one reason why Russell cares so much about analysingthe word “the”.

Paradigm cases of knowledge by description

physical objects

other people’s minds

(other) inferences from theories — e.g., mathematical objects

most things, in fact

What I know by acquaintance

patterns in my visual field

some simple relations — e.g., before

universals, i.e. abstract ideas (“whiteness, diversity, brotherhood, andso on [and] all verbs”)

memories

introspection

the self . . . maybe— “Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description”, in Betrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Butterworth,

1912, pp. 81–82

A basic example

“the sense-data which make up the appearance of my table are thingswith which I have acquaintance, things immediately known to me just asthey are.

My knowledge of the table as a physical object, on the contrary, is notdirect knowledge. . . .

My knowledge of the table is of the kind which we shall call ‘knowledgeby description’. The table is ‘the physical object which causessuch-and-such sense-data’.”

But: “In order to know anything at all about the table, we must knowtruths connecting it with things with which we have acquaintance”— “Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description”, in Betrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Butterworth,

1912, p. 74

This is serious mum

“Every proposition which we can understand must be composed whollyof constituents with which we are acquainted.”

E.g., ‘Julius Caesar was assassinated’ becomes ‘the man whose namewas Julius Caesar was assassinated’. In this sentence:

“Julius Caesar is a noise or shape” — this means it’s marks ona piece of paper or sounds in air.

The rest of the sentence consists of concepts which we’reacquainted with.

We then have to say more about the noise or shape JuliusCaesar.

— “Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description”, in Betrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Butterworth,

1912, pp. 91–92

We have to get to acquaintance

Since we’re not acquainted with Julius Caesar, we have to translate thenoise or shape into things we’re acquanted with.

Russell illustrates this for Bismarck.

He gets “ ‘the first Chancellor of the German Empire.’

Here all the words are abstract except ‘German.’ ”

And we can be acquainted with abstractions (“universals”),remember.

“To some [this word] will recall . . . the look of Germany on the map”,which they’re acquainted with.

Hooray!— “Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description”, in Betrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Butterworth,

1912, p. 86

And finally . . . why should we believe all this?

“it is scarcely conceivable that we can make a judgment . . . withoutknowing what it is that we are judging . . . about.

We must attach some meaning to the words we use, if we are to speaksignificantly and not utter mere noise; and the meaning we attach to ourwords must be something with which we are acquainted.”

“The chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables usto pass beyond the limits of our private experience.”— “Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description”, in Betrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Butterworth,

1912, pp. 91–92; also available at http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus5.html

This is a refinement of a similar doctrine in Hume.

.

Russell’s logical atomism

Logical atomism is the theory that everything can be seen as a system ofrelations between entities from some privileged class (“particulars”), andthat all or many factual statements can be analysed by means ofdefinitions and logic into statements of atomic facts.

Russell’s logical atomism was based on his own Phenomenalism, Frege’slogic, Leibniz’s atomism, and possibly also Meinong’s earlier logicalatomism.

Russell’s theory brought out the possibility of moving from the logicalstructure of mathematics

to the logical structure of all language

to the logical structure of the world.

This became Wittgenstein’s program in his TractatusLogico-Philosophicus (1921).

The relationship with Idealism

“The philosophy which I advocate is generally regarded as a species ofrealism, and accused of inconsistency because of the elements in itwhich seem contrary to that doctrine.

For my part, I do not regard the issue between realists and theiropponents as a fundamental one”— Bertrand Russell, “Logical Atomism”, La Salle: Open Court, 1924/1985, p. 157

I doubt that this was really true of Russell.

But it was true of Carnap, as we’ll see later.

And it’s a popular view now (Simon Blackburn).

Russell’s logical atomism

Atomic entities can be subjective (first-person), but facts are objective.

Facts are expressed by propositions, which are sentences.

But propositions are not proper names for facts, because thereare false propositions but no false facts.

Why not?

Because facts are objective.

What are the atoms?

“White” is a simple symbol, and whiteness is a simple property, becauseit can be the object of acquaintance.

This applies to phenomenal whiteness, not a set ofwavelengths.

“I do not want you to think about the piece of chalk I am holding, but ofwhat you see when you look at the chalk. If one says, ‘This is white’ itwill do for about as simple a fact as you can get hold of.”— Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, La Salle: Open Court, 1918/1985, p. 59

“The only kind of word that is theoretically capable of standing for aparticular is a proper name, and the whole matter of proper names israther curious. . . .

you cannot ever talk about a particular particular [sic] except by meansof a proper name. . . .”

Talking about atoms 1

“How are you to express in words an atomic proposition? An atomicproposition is one which does mention actual particulars, not merelydescribe them but actually name them . . .

Yet it does seem a little odd if, having made a dot on the blackboard, Icall it ‘John’.”— Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, La Salle: Open Court, 1918/1985, p. 61

Talking about atoms 2

“The names that we commonly use, like ‘Socrates’, are reallyabbreviations for descriptions; not only that, but what they describe arenot particulars but complicated systems of classes or series. . . .

The only words one does use as names in the logical sense are wordslike ‘this’ or ‘that’. . . .

If you agree that ‘This is white’, meaning the ‘this’ that you see, you areusing ‘this’ as a proper name.” :–)

“But if you try to apprehend the proposition that I am expressing when Isay ‘This is white’, you cannot do it.” :–(— Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, La Salle: Open Court, 1918/1985, p. 62

Note the similarities to Idealism.

Logic in logical atomism

Atomic propositions can be combined into molecular propositions usinglogical words such as “and” & “if . . . then”, which are truth functional

i.e., they can be completely understood using truth tables.

Important: Molecular propositions correspond to molecular facts, butthey do not indicate any additional complexity in the world.

I.e., the world can be completely described by atomic facts.

More logic in logical atomism

Atomic propositions can also be combined in molecular propositionsabout beliefs and desires:

“I believe I am a hat”, “I wish I was an alpaca”, etc.

These are NOT relations between a person and a fact.

Why not?

Because facts are objective, but beliefs can be wrong.

Worst case scenario: beliefs can be about nonexistent objects.There cannot be any facts about nonexistent objects. (?)

This was a major motivating argument for Russell.

They can be analysed into atomic propositions, but these analyses arenot truth functional — they are more like maps.— Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, La Salle: Open Court, 1918/1985, p. 90

There’s an infinite number of other possible forms of propositions andfacts.