recent footnotes to plato

Recent Footnotes to PlatoAuthor(s): Joseph OwensSource: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Jun., 1967), pp. 648-661Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20124389 .

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CRITICAL STUDIES

RECENT FOOTNOTES TO PLATO

JOSEPH OWENS, C.Ss.R.

JL ootnotes to Plato keep enriching Western philosophical dis

cussion, and the sign is a healthy one. Disagreement continues

rampant, as the issues become sharper in focus and wider in range. But in what other way can the spirit of Platonic thinking be passed from generation to generation? Was not Plato's thought

engendered in a dialectical matrix that requires for its propagation

lively and pointed dialogue between people who disagree radically about its meaning? That human excellence consists in knowledge seems all-pervading in the Platonic message. Yet what is knowl

edge for Plato? The question of the Theaetetus is still open. Is

knowledge passive reception or active engagement? Is it based on

features that transcend the individual conditions of sensibly per

ceptible things? If so, what is the status of the transcendental

aspects? These key themes keep coming to the fore in recent

publications in the field of Platonic scholarship. Hence a con

frontation of the divergent views can scarcely prove unrewarding.

I

I. M. Crombie, in Plato: The Midwife's Apprentice,1 assembles

the results of studies already published in two previous volumes.2

This latest book contains his "conclusions only without the argu ments on which, it is hoped, they rest" (p. vii). A stereotyped

"Platonism," the book insists, "renders static and dogmatic a body of philosophical work that was essentially dynamic, critical and

exploratory . . . freezing into a set posture something which really

consists of many postures" (pp. 25-26). In contrast, "Plato con

1 London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964.

2 An Examination of Plato's Doctrines. Vol. I: Plato on Man and

Society; Vol. II: Plato on Knowledge and Reality (London, 1962-1963).



RECENT FOOTNOTES TO PLATO 649

ceived of philosophy as an almost unending struggle to give satis

factory expression to what, in one sense, we know perfectly well all

along," and "to achieve an explicit understanding of that which we

understand implicitly all along" (pp. 75, 191-192). In this way the midwifery required by Plato's doctrine of anamnesis is ex

plained and justified in a development that goes "a little beyond what the texts allow," but of which Plato himself, the author

thinks, would not have disapproved (pp. vii-viii). Though the

"splendid vitality" of Plato's writings consists in their never satis

fied dialectical inquiry, "there is also something of value for us in

Plato's more positive conception of philosophy" (p. 191). Yet, in

comparison with the common view "that Plato's metaphysical doc

trine is the key to his whole philosophy," it is much nearer the

truth to maintain "that the key to Plato's philosophy is his concep tion of the nature of philosophical activity" (p. 33).

Having stated the primacy of the exploratory over the positive, Crombie gives a quiet and interesting discussion of the standard

Platonic themes, such as the Forms, physical and spiritual reality,

knowledge, the good life and the good society. In dealing with

the Platonic Forms, he makes use (pp. 48-59) of the Aristotelian

term "universal," the mediaeval "common nature," and the modern

"abstract entities," without calling the reader's attention to the

crucial and far-reaching differences between the meanings of these

terms in their own historical settings. Nor is sufficient inquiry

given to the reasons why "whoever talks about abstract entities

must therefore make them masquerade as things" (p. 51). The

question whether there actually is any masquerading or whether

the normal and honest features of human thought are being shown

in the process, is not probed. The result is a quite neutral con

clusion :

It seems to me that when Plato speaks of entities such as the P in itself

in the dialogues it is seldom the case that he is particularly interested

in the question what ontological status he would want to accord to the

entity that he is talking about. He is more concerned to insist that a

general term cannot be satisfactorily discussed in terms of its

instances, (p. 60)

The book, accordingly, remains non-committal in regard to

the positive status of the Platonic Ideas. Non-committal, likewise,



650 JOSEPH OWENS, C.Ss.R.

is the attitude toward the relation of Plato's notion of man to his

understanding of the corporeal world: "The truth probably is that

Plato never really reconciled his belief in the dignity of human

existence with his belief that nothing physical is of any ultimate

worth" (p. 86). This indicates "Plato's failure to make theo

retical sense of man's terrestrial existence" (p. 87). The authen

ticity of the Seventh Letter is accepted (p. 169), quite as in the

earlier volumes,3 together with a more or less common division

of the dialogues into early, middle, and late (p. 5). The whole of

the Laws is kept in the last period: "Plato must have been an old

man when he began it" (p. 181). To that extent the approach to

Plato is conventional. Insistence on the dynamic character of his

philosophy does not preclude notice of "Plato's mania for cultural

fixity" (p. 182). Nor does the pronounced emphasis on the

exploratory spirit of Plato keep the fundamental Platonic doctrines

from emerging clearly etched?a vivid testimony to their power of

persisting intact through the medium of new methods evolved by a good commentator. In no case need they be frozen in order to

remain positive in content. Nor are they advanced in the present book without reasons. However, as in the two previous volumes, the adversaries who maintain the fixed "Platonism" are un

identified and are opposed only as a group.

II

The way in which Plato's philosophy is propagated is also

scrutinized in Jacob Klein's A Commentary on Plato's Meno.4 The

author contends that "a (Platonic) dialogue has not taken place if

we, the listeners or readers, did not actively participate in it; lack

ing such participation, all that is before us is indeed nothing but a

book" (p. 6). Yet for us a Platonic dialogue is necessarily "a

written text." A careful inquiry shows, however, that a properly written text can initiate a process of learning and understanding, and that this is in fact done by the "dramatic or mimetic quality" of the Platonic dialogues (p. 17). By "due attention to the play

3 An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, I, pp. 10-14; II, pp. 122-128. 4

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965.




fully mimetic aspect of the dialogue, the faculty of eikasia may be

doubly aroused in us, and this can lead to our serious dianoetic

participation in the unfolding drama" (p. 19). The conclusion

follows: "

It is possible, then, and indeed necessary, whatever the

difficulties, to 'participate' in a Platonic dialogue which we face as

a written text" (p. 20). This estimate of a dialogue's function allows it to contain

'doctrinal' assertions" and "to discuss and state more or less

explicitly, the ultimate foundations on which those statements rest

and the far-reaching consequences which flow from them. But never is this done 'with complete clarity'

" (p. 9). Clarifying,

criticizing, accepting, correcting, or rejecting what one thus reads is truly engaging in philosophy. In this way Klein harmonizes the

dialectical character of the medium used by Plato with the presence of abundant positive thought. The dialogues do "contain a

Platonic 'doctrine' "

(p. 9), even though this is not a "philo

sophical system."

Moreover, the explanation of the dialogues in the above way allows another manner "of understanding how that which is not known can nevertheless be taken as somehow known" (p. 26). As with Crombie, it may be explained by recollection: "that which is not known to us is present, though hidden, 'within' us and can be brought out through the correlative processes of 'reminding' and 'recollecting.'

" But another way is opened. Insight shows

the incomplete character of our knowledge, and "the very anticipa tion of a never completely erasable residue of ignorance points to

knowledge as

something all-embracing and, therefore, whole,"

a wholeness that is required to make our actions good. Accordingly Socratic ignorance, in which human wisdom consists, is suggested as "the very germ from which both elements of a Platonic dialogue, its mimetic playfulness and its dianoetic seriousness, spring forth" (p. 27).

Within this overall framework a running commentary on the Meno is given. It does not confine itself to the strict limits of the one dialogue, but draws copiously on the Phaedo, Phaedrus, Phile

bus, Symposium, Republic, Theaetetus, and Timaeus, in a long digression (pp. 108-172) on memory and recollection, and in a

shorter one (pp. 191-199) on solids. In its first part, under the




title of amathia, Klein finds that "Meno in the dialogue is a clever man totally incapable of learning," providing "an example, a

paradigm, for the assertion that ignorance (amathia), the opposite of knowledge (epist?m?) is depravity (kakia), the opposite of

excellence (arete)" (pp. 199-200). Accordingly "Socrates and

Meno counter-image each other. "

By means of this contraposition our own efforts are able to bring out the message of the dialogue, namely that "human excellence is knowledge" (pp. 200-201). In

its second and much shorter part under the heading of doxa,

Anytus becomes from this new viewpoint the counterpoise to Meno :

"Anytus' anger is rooted in his firm reliance on the prevailing

opinion (doxa) concerning the respectability (the kalogathia) or

the unworthiness of the people ... He is the counterpart of Meno.

But in this role he represents above all the polis of Athens

itself" (p. 239). The above quotations speak pretty well for themselves.

Plato's philosophy is presented through vivid and highly polarized

dialogue, a medium that inspires us to work out for ourselves its

positive meaning. No pertinent interest is shown in chronology. Rather, one is warned against the pitfall of becoming "obsessed by the view that the chronology of the Platonic dialogues implies a

'development' in Plato's own thinking and that an insight into this

development contributes in a significant way to the understanding of the dialogues themselves" (p. 9). While recognizing the in

dispensable role of philological and historical criteria, Klein

makes rather sparing use of them: "All these biographical and

historical considerations, however, lead away from the problem which writing poses, lead away, that is, from a genuine and uni

versal problem" (p. 22). It is the permanent relevance of Plato's

positive thought, worked out anew through sensitive response to

the dialogue form, that sparks the commentary. This explains the import of the opening words of the book: "In the past . . .

writing commentaries was a way of expounding the truth. It still

may be that." Unfortunately, the book has no index.




III

Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, edited by R. E. Allen,5 is an

impressive collection of articles that were published in the nineteen

thirties and the nineteen-fifties, plus Allen's own 1960 article on

"Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues." The

book culls the best in periodical literature on Platonic metaphysics

during the last three decades. Twenty in number, the articles are

individually well-known, and the contents of most have been quite

widely discussed. Individual introduction is accordingly un

necessary. In fact, "these articles speak for themselves, . . .

they

are their own best introduction" (p. ix). As may be expected from the use of the term "metaphysical" in

the title, the doctrine of the Ideas with its various ramifications

looms large throughout the collection. More precisely, the editor

focuses upon "a general issue which runs through many of the

articles, . . . whether Plato abandoned or sharply modified the

Theory of Forms in later life" (p. ix). Any affirmative answer to

that question "must deal with the Timaeus and the Seventh Epistle, and in dealing, it must deal radically" (p. xi), rejecting the authen

ticity of the letter at least in the section about the Ideas, and

making the account of the Ideas in the Timaeus either purely

mythical or else of the middle period. Moreover, genuinely philo

sophical problems have to be faced in this regard: "Issues in the

scholarship of philosophy have always tended, though by no means

wholly, to be governed by issues in philosophy itself, and nowhere

has this been more true than with Plato" (p. xii). One's judg ment, the editor points out, will naturally be influenced by one's

estimate of the philosophical truth and importance of the doctrine

of Ideas. If true and philosophically worthwhile, why would it

ever be abandoned by Plato? If untrue or trivial, why should not

Plato be expected to rid himself of it ?

In spite of the editor's studious impartiality in the "Introduc

tion," the combined impact of the articles themselves can hardly

help but stress the positive importance of the doctrine of Ideas both

5 New York: Humanities Press; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.




in Plato and as an approach to the problem of knowledge in

Western philosophy as a whole. The issues that evoked this

Platonic doctrine are both real and persistent. The articles in the

collection, in laying bare so many ramifications of these issues, make manifest the continued timeliness of the content in Plato's

thinking. From this viewpoint the volume fills a distinct need

at the moment, and is a deeply appreciated gift for those who are

interested in the perpetuation of sound metaphysical thought. The volume has an index of all the Platonic passages cited in

the articles, perhaps the only kind of index practical for it. Fifteen

different writers are bound to use terms in different ways; conse

quently a topical index would be difficult and could easily become

misleading.

IV

The challenge to deal, and deal radically, with the Timaeus

and the Seventh Letter is met against an exceptionally com

prehensive background by Gilbert Ryle in Plato's Progress.6 Ryle's

starting point is the problem, unrecognized by history, of a "crisis

in Plato's life." The crisis is indicated by Plato's abandoning both the elenctic dialogue and the teaching of dialectic at a certain

period of his career, as well as by the peculiarly limited character

of Aristotle's philosophical dependence on Plato's writings and

teachings. A priori, philosophy for Ryle "is exploration," and

"only a Terra Incognita is interesting" (p. 9). Accordingly "if

Plato was anything of a philosopher, then he cannot have been

merely a lifelong Platonist" (pp. 9-10). Moreover, as the first

part of the Parmenides shows, Plato "cares more for a conclusive

rebuttal than he cares for even his own, once darling doc

trine" (p. 19). This is "the real Plato, a Plato who has been over

looked by his antagonists no worse than by his devotees." But

how did this Plato grow and develop and change? The situation

requires a "drastic revision" of the chronology of his writings, of

the account of his visits to Sicily, and of the authenticity of the

Letters together with fresh appreciation of notable differences in

type among the dialogues handed down in the Platonic corpus.

6 Cambridge: University Press, 1966.




Under lively scrutiny, the eristic or "dialectical dialogues" (such as the Charmides, Meno, Euthydemus) appear as documents that "should be read as case-books of recent Moots, dramatized

partly to help students remember and digest the argument

sequences" (p. 18). Middle-sized dialogues like the Symposium, Philebus, anc Sophist, of around 52-54 Stephanus pages, are found to be compositions meant for recitation in competitive contests at

the various Greek Games, with Plato using the stage name

"Socrates" when he was there to recite them in person and names

like "Athenian Stranger" when for various reasons he could not

himself be present. The longer dialogues, the Republic and the

Laws, are subsequent collections and elaborations of the first two

types of composition?e.g., the first book of our Republic is

elenctic; the next three books (II-V) were originally meant as a

contribution to a Palace Festival in Syracuse (pp. 243-244). The

Republic YI-VII may draw heavily on Plato's lecture or lecture

series "On the Good," and the Laws VIII-XII on Plato's legislative program for Sicily. The "unwritten" doctrines would mean those

of which copies had not been released at the time the reference was

made to them (p. 256), not that they had never been set down in

writing. The Parmenides "as a whole would be impossible to

represent on the stage" (p. 287). It is a combination of an un

finished fragment and an independent writing. The Timaeus

"Plato wrote just for the Academy, and he wrote it not to entertain

but to instruct" (p. 13). Plato did not intend to publish its con

tents to the world at large. The Seventh Letter (written by the

composer of Letters III, VIII, and XIII?p. 80), appears as a strictly

contemporary document by some one exactly informed, who forged the letters "as propaganda weapons against Dionysius" (p. 69).

Ryle suggests that Helicon of Cyzicus may be their author. In

accordance with its propaganda purposes, the Seventh Letter

deliberately creates deception about Plato's motives for visiting

Sicily. Plato's second and third visits were for the sole purpose of

presenting dialogues at court festivals (pp. 83-86).

These criteria are used to distinguish the original composition of the different dialogues from additions made at other times, and to establish a chronology. Thus Plato's dialogue writing begins after the 380's, with "no stringent reason for thinking that any




Piatonic dialogue had been presented to an Athenian audience more

than about a decade before Aristotle joined the Academy" (p. 219). The eristic dialogues were written during the next four years or

so. The Crito and the Apology begin the non-eristic dialogues, and

belong to the years 372-369, though probably not before the

founding of the Academy, which is dated as 370. The Phaedo,

Symposium, and Critias follow. Ryle holds that the Timaeus was

composed and delivered before Dionysius in Syracuse in 367-366.

There Plato learned his natural philosophy from Archytas and

others, and through this new knowledge came to center his

interest on the physical world instead of on something beyond it.

The contents of the Timaeus "quickly became a basic study for

students in the Academy" (p. 12), as evidenced by Aristotle's use

of its teachings from his early writing period. The Republic grew from "the late 370's or very early 360's" to the end of the 360's,

though its written text remained unknown to Aristotle. The

Philebus is dated 366-361, and the Laws 361-356. The other

middle-sized dialogues follow, with the Parmenides last, brought

together "only for the tutorial benefit of juvenile philosophers inside the Academy" (p. 287). Its first part may date from the

middle 350's, or preferably from the late 360's, while the second

part is located perhaps near the middle 350's.

What portrait of Plato may be sketched by using these critical

techniques? The early writings, which begin after the 380's,

when Plato (b. 429/427) was not far from his fortieth year, show

him as "the teacher and practitioner of the Socratic Method,"

conducting "eristic Moots for the young men," and catering to

"discussion-hungry lads" (pp. 194-195). In this epoch "no such

discipline as what we think of as philosophy was yet discernible

from serious eristic match-play" (p. 210). The crisis followed,

and "in his Apology Plato was, so to speak, dramatizing the

offensiveness of some of his own recent compositions" (p. 179).

Prevented now from conducting live Moots, Plato applies his

talents to dialogues that are not records of actually held debates,

but original creations that aroused and developed his own philo

sophical abilities: "He became a philosopher because he could no

longer participate in questioner-answerer Moots, or any longer be




their dramatic chronicler" (p. 209). The crisis "made him in the

end a self-moving philosopher." Plato's philosophical activity, accordingly, begins when he

was quite close to the age of sixty. At its commencement he held

the doctrine of the Ideas, but "his captivation by the Theory of

Forms was of relatively short duration, lasting, perhaps, for about

the half-dozen years from, say, 370 to 364" (p. 102). Afterwards

he turned to the special sciences: "His first essay had been his

Theory of Forms. Then dialectic had been an inquiry into

some special entities. Now it is a search for some special truths" (p. 134). The sojourn in Italy had given him the

"physical, physiological and pathological doctrines" found in

the Timaeus. These allowed the visible cosmos to compete "with the Transcendent World in both interestingness and in

vestigability" (pp. 12-13). Finally, "the sole prop provided for

the Theory of Forms by Plato's Timaeus is tranquilly removed by Plato's Theaetetus" (p. 15). When Aristotle "arrived in the

Academy in 367, the Theory of Forms was in its heyday" (p. 211). But "now the young Aristotles are brought up on the physics and

the physiology that Plato has recently imported in his Timaeus

from Sicily to the Academy" (p. 14). Dialectic, of course, had

been banned from the start, on account of the crisis in Plato's life

that "made him forbid the teaching of dialectic to young men in the

Academy, and even, perhaps, caused him to found the Academy itself with a curriculum which gave no teaching role to its

Head" (p. 20).

Then, at the end of this decade the Academy turns to rhetoric in order to compete with the school of Isocrates, quite some time after "the sixty-year-old Plato's 'Farewell for Ever' to his darling

twenty-year-olders" (p. 209). Its program becomes geared to the

requirements of "the rhetoric-hungry young men for whom at last the Academy is going to provide rhetoric-teaching of a philo

sophically fortified kind." Finally, "the suggested Isocratean

polishing" in the comparatively hiatus-shy dialogues, the assem

bling of the Parmenides, and the testimony given by Dionysius of

Halicarnassus, allow the "pathetic hypothesis, which is hardly more than a faute de mieux," (p. 299) that Plato spent his last

years, after invention had died in him, polishing and repolishing




yet unpublished works. Accordingly "Aristotle, so far from hav

ing been brought up on all of the writings, was himself producing

logical, scientific and philosophical ideas before he had access to

most of Plato's later dialogues" (p. 20).

Many readers, naturally enough, will disagree both with Ryle's

conception of philosophy in general and with his overall estimate of

Plato as more interested in achieving a "conclusive rebuttal" than

in developing positive doctrine. On innumerable points of inter

pretation, likewise, critics will be at odds with the way Ryle under

stands the documents and the particular passages under scrutiny. For instance, can there be general agreement that the Politicus is a

"weary dialogue" (p. 285; cf. p. 139) without "interesting philo

sophical issues," that in the Timaeus the Theory of Forms, though treated honorifically, is not put "to any positive work" (p. 14), that

the first part of the Parmenides, with its impressive conclusion

about the absolute necessity of the Ideas for any kind of discourse, is meant as their rebuttal, or that "the fact that the Timaeus Locrus

is written in amateurish Doric strongly suggests that Aristotle com

posed the work for delivery to a Sicilian audience" (p. 96).

But it is not on points like these that Plato's Progress is to be

judged. The real issue is whether this new method of interpreting the Platonic writings is viable. Ryle has presented the method in

clear and vigorous reasoning, with detailed erudition and a

remarkably sensitive feel for situations in classical antiquity. He

has not based it on narrow deductions from a limited "key text," or

on the indiscriminate application of set philological criteria.

Rather, it is couched in a global scrutiny of the actual conditions

in the epoch and places concerned. Does it offer promise of a

breakthrough to deeper understanding of Plato, a breakthrough that perhaps may be achieved only by future writers who will

follow the approach opened in this book?

Undoubtedly Ryle has centered attention on a real problem,

long known but inadequately focused. What kind of access did

Aristotle have to Plato ? What were the means by which he

acquired his knowledge of Plato's teachings? Was he really in a

position to report Plato correctly? Much too facile has been the

notion of an undergraduate making pass course mistakes, such as

confusing "Socrates" with "the Athenian Stranger" in the Laws.




Ryle offers an approach that one can hardly resist comparing with

the method used by Jaeger in his Aristoteles (1923). Like Jaeger,

Ryle takes slight historical, cultural, or literary indications, pro

jects them in depth, and visualizes a concrete factual situation in

all its ramifications. This method impels one to speak as though an eye witness. It makes for vivid and attractive writing. But it

has its evident dangers. There are abundantly illustrated in the

four decades of Aristotelian controversy that followed in the wake

of Jaeger's thought-provoking book. Others applied Jaeger's methods, but visualized the situations in different ways. The

result was about as many development theories as writers. More

than that, the "findings" of the various writers cancelled each other

out, both in general and in detail. The development, inaugurated

by Jaeger as moving from "Platonism" to "Aristotelianism," was

finally reversed, surviving on the way a tangent that attributed

most of Aristotle's work to Theophrastus. Each writer, putting himself into the situation, tended to visualize after his own image and likeness. It is quite easy to substitute one's own personality for that of Plato, even though using the name of Plato, just as

Plato used the name of Socrates in Ryle's explanation of the

dialogues.

However, philosophical life like any other kind of human life

is full of surprises. When the philosophical life under considera

tion is that of Plato, with all the whimsical and ironic touches

apparent in the dialogues, how can one ever be certain that Plato

would respond the way one would expect? The danger becomes

all the more acute if one is willing to go as far as Crombie in speak

ing of "Plato's strong streak of practical silliness." 7

Even reject

ing unreservedly with Crombie the "implication that Plato was a

kind of intellectual adolescent" (p. 188), and presuming that both

Plato and one's self are reasonable men, can one be sure that Plato

would map out his conduct in the way that one thinks is indicated

by the circumstances? Rather, given what we know about Plato, is not the hope to relive his thinking in exact historical stages quite farfetched? Is it really possible to avoid the injection of personal views and tendencies into one's interpretation?

7 Plato: The Midwife's Apprentice, p. 165.




Does this mean that Ryle's book will usher in an era of

Platonic research paralleling the four decades of Aristotelian

scholarship following Jaeger's widely read work? If so, will the

forty years end in the findings of different scholars cancelling each

other out and adding up to a laborious zero? Or will the Aris

totelian experiment serve as a

prophylactic, somewhat as the excite

ment stirred up by Z?rcher 's work on Aristotle (1952) resulted in

an aftermath in which his subsequent application of the same

methods to Plato caused hardly a ripple? That is for Platonic

scholars to decide. An outsider can only note the situation, and

remark that just as, thanks to the research sparked by Jaeger, we

now understand the Aristotelian treatises much better than we

did four decades ago, so investigation of the Platonic corpus in the

framework marked out by Ryle should have corresponding effects

and for the good. As in the Aristotelian parallel, the theory may fall to pieces in the process, and the permanent results may be of

a different kind than those directly sought by the researchers.

Nevertheless an enlivened focusing of attention on Plato, just as on

Aristotle, can hardly remain barren of fruit.

V

Each of these four approaches to Plato, then, is able to play a

worthwhile role in leading readers to the text of Plato himself.

That is the really important thing. The Platonic texts remain, while the views of interpreters evolve. Yet each new sun beams

its own special light into hidden corners. Need one doubt that

through the widely differing reflections of the commentators there

runs the one increasing purpose of making Plato better understood, and that the thoughts of men about Plato are in fact widened with

the process of these suns ? Pointed debates about the literary char

acter of the dialogues, about the presence of positive content in

them, about the importance and truth of the doctrine of Ideas, about the nature and spirit of Platonic philosophizing, all help to

pass on in a vibrantly living medium the heritage of Plato's

thought to future generations. This is a practical issue. A survey made in 1965 of Canadian

philosophy professors asked for the philosophers on which




students majoring in philosophy should concentrate, as well as the

philosophers who were considered historically most important. On both counts Plato led all others. This indication, along with

similar ones, suggests that Plato is still regarded as the strongest formative influence for future Western philosophy. In the lively

disagreement of interpreters about the meaning of his dialogues the core of Platonic thinking may best be transmitted. In that

disagreement, as Allen suggests, "there is health and hope for the

future," since "Plato, more than a philosopher, is philosophy itself" (p. xii). If the latter observation is at all correct, an out

sider to Platonic scholarship, as long as he is seriously interested

in philosophy's general progress, can hardly be considered an

outsider to Platonic thought. He has a stake in the actual condi

tions of the Platonic world, and in its progress. He becomes

increasingly convinced of the radically open character of Plato's

thinking, as well as of the need for continued research and reflec

tion upon its content and the means by which it is transmitted.

Any confidence that we have yet learned to read the Platonic corpus with adequacy and finality is premature, and perhaps, because of

the very nature of Plato's thought, is destined to remain so.

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.



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