Redefining the PossibleRedefining the Possible

Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 2008-2011Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 2008-2011

IntroductionIntroduction•Southern Afghanistan is one of the most dangerous places in the world today, and it has remained stubbornly impervious to most efforts to improve it. One aid & development program after another has failed there.

•A certain NGO with several large contracts in Afghanistan is on record as claiming that their work can have a real benefit, provided that good security is already in place; only after the military has taken an area can the civilians come in and do work.

•This presentation seeks to make the opposite argument; that we can operate effectively in southern Afghanistan independently of the security picture. In the slides that follow, it will be shown that:

1. It is possible to complete a major construction project, even in the middle of a Taliban logistics corridor

2. It is possible to operate safely and effectively far outside the protective military bubble3. It is possible to build local cooperation so strong that whole communities are stripped from

Taliban control.

•The aid programs described here suffered zero attacks and were completed successfully. This did not happen by accident; these programs followed principles that are ignored by most other aid programs in the country, but which spell the difference between success and failure. Their record redefines what is possible.

#1: Bridging the Arghandab#1: Bridging the Arghandab•The Arghandab River is a major Taliban logistics corridor, especially during the summer fighting season.

•It is also an obstacle, hampering efforts by farmers on one side to reach markets on the other; a bridge was needed.

Pay Respect, Not BribesPay Respect, Not Bribes

•A local construction contractor was selected through an open bid process. No bribes of any kind were involved; bribes promote undesirable expectations.

•Good community outreach and visible, steady progress by the contractor won popular support for the project. This discouraged Taliban interference.

•The bridge was to be 160 meters long; 1/10 of a mile.

Serious ConstructionSerious Construction•Soil bearing tests, concrete tests, and steel bar strength tests were all performed at professional testing laboratories elsewhere in the country, and the results of these tests documented and analyzed.

•Early in the project the drill crews drilled deeper into the bedrock than was technically necessary. This bedrock had turned out to be shallower than expected, and the drillers used that opportunity to prove what they could do. When properly motivated (no bribery), it is not uncommon for Afghans to surpass expectations in this way.

Project SuccessProject Success•The bridge was completed on time, on budget, and without being attacked.

•The bridge is in good condition and remains in use to this day; these pictures were taken about two years after project completion.

•Heavy construction is possible in southern Afghanistan, and without an overwhelming security presence; do not believe those who claim otherwise.

#2: Rebuilding Faqir Well#2: Rebuilding Faqir Well

•Faqir Well is almost 100 miles from Kandahar, in the middle of the Registan Desert.

•Approximately 45 miles north of Pakistan border.

•Traditionally controlled by Baluchi people, but abandoned due to lack of water.

The WellThe Well•The original well is believed to be over 300 years old. It was dug by hand by Faqir, a sheepherder, over a nine-year period.

•Used freely over the centuries by countless nomads and pastoralists; the Faqir family became legendary for their generosity.

•The well finally collapsed due to drought 10 years ago.

•Without the well, nomads moved on and smugglers moved in.

The ThreatThe Threat•Bandits, smugglers, and Taliban now call the Registan home.

•Traditionally, Baluchi family men policed the Registan, keeping it safe for their women and children.

•Without a local water source, Baluchi families cannot live at Faqir. Now it is invested by those with sinister intentions.

•How to keep such people out? The well must be rebuilt.

ConstructionConstruction

•Heavy equipment was available, but could not reach this particular location due to soft sand. The well was re-dug by hand, removing all collapsed material.

•The well shaft was lined with brick from the bottom up, masons at times working from deep inside the shaft.

•The construction phase lasted six months and employed 34 laborers. Local enthusiasm for the project was such that an additional 12 volunteers worked without pay.

The ResultsThe Results•The well depth was increased to some 123 meters, ensuring an ample water supply.

•A double-tank system was installed for receiving the water, and concrete troughs for watering animals.

•A subterranean storeroom beside the well houses buckets, cables, and other items. This room has no lock; it may be freely used by any who can reach the site.

•The well was completed on time, on budget, and without incident.

Faqir Well TodayFaqir Well Today

•Concrete troughs extend from the main tank for the purpose of watering livestock. With its current design, Faqir Well can provide water for about 9,000 animals.

•Three Bauchi communities have already established themselves in the area, maintaining a permanent presence and guaranteeing local peace and stability.

•This project created goodwill between our side and certain senior Baluchi leaders; goodwill that could be capitalized upon in future collaborations.

#3 Aid-for-Labor#3 Aid-for-Labor

•This program targeted 11 rural villages in Dand District, Kandahar Province: 4 friendly, 5 unknown, 2 hostile. They would all be on our side by the time it was over.

Building Political CapitalBuilding Political Capital•We allowed certain village elders to identify projects needed by their villages. In most cases, they sought irrigation control structures.

•Elders provided the project management within their villages, we provided funding and assisted with quality control.

Everyone Gives Something, Everyone Gets SomethingEveryone Gives Something, Everyone Gets Something•Labor on these projects was provided by villages residents, rather than outside contractors.

•Participation was voluntary, and workers were paid, through their elders, in sheep. The more work they performed the more sheep they would earn.

•This mechanism enabled us to inject wealth into the communities without introducing market distortions or fostering jealousy among recipients.

•Elders had to manage projects carefully and pay honestly, lest they lose political capital.

•Village economies boomed, and we were welcomed into the first 9 villages.

Monara and Kuchnay KarezakMonara and Kuchnay Karezak

•The two hostile villages were aligned with the Quetta Taliban, who forbade them to work with us.

•We negotiated secretly with the leading families of these villages. If they would nominate official elders and get the written approval of the Dand District Governor, we would bring our program into their communities. We quietly kept the Dand battlespace commander appraised of these negotiations.

•The family patriarch was in Quetta. He consistently refused the villages’ requests to work with us, but he had no aid of his own to offer in its place.

What Victory Looks LikeWhat Victory Looks Like

•March, 2011: Fed up with Quetta, the family broke and the villages quit the Taliban and formally sided with the government of Afghanistan. They met with the District Governor who approved of their village governance structure and gave us written approval to begin work in their villages.

•Work proceeded almost immediately, and Monar and Kuchnay Karezak have remained aligned with the Afghan government to this day.

Success We Can Build OnSuccess We Can Build On•Thanks to the Aid-for-Labor strategy, we succeeded in completing 100% of all projects in all 11 communities. This included 377 irrigation control structures, 2062 meters of flood protection walls, and 7500 meters of concrete-lined drainage canals. This was all accomplished without a shot fired or a life lost.

•As a side effect to the improved economic conditions, numerous new jobs and businesses appeared as well.

•The elders claim that this program improved the lives of every last person in their communities, one way or another. Elders from surrounding communities sent us over a dozen written requests inviting our program to their villages. All of them would like to work with us further.

Conclusion: It Can Be DoneConclusion: It Can Be Done

•The three projects presented here demonstrate that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we can achieve anything in southern Afghanistan that needs achieving. The people can be turned away from the Taliban; construction projects can be completed professionally and competently; and we can operate very far from the population centers.

•Furthermore, it is possible to do all this without paying bribes or suffering violence. Aid programs that result in killed personnel month after month or that pay masked forms of extortion to local power brokers clearly misunderstand the culture and have guaranteed their own failure.

•Private enterprise seeking to operate in southern Afghanistan should take note of this. The dismal ROI on foreign aid to Afghanistan to date is misleading; outsized success in Afghanistan is possible, even in the south. With the proper approach, it is possible to build and pacify the country, resulting in prosperity for all involved. It can be done.

•The information presented in these slides is current as of August 18, 2012. To learn more, contact Scott at Alamanach@hotmail.com.