Regime Change Anxieties: American Hegemony andthe Regime Change Security Dilemma

Benjamin DenisonCenter for Strategic Studies

The Fletcher School of Law and DiplomacyTufts University

bcdeniso@gmail.com

Prepared for the 2019 New Wave Realism ConferenceColumbus, Ohio

August 22, 2019

Abstract

What role do regime security dilemma dynamics play in understanding challenges toAmerican hegemony? In this paper, I argue that one under examined piece of moderngreat power relations is the regime security dilemma and the regime change anxietiesit produces. Using the case of American-Russian relations since the end of the ColdWar, I contend that the post-Cold War foreign policy of the United States focusedon democratic enlargement has produced anxieties in potential peer rivals that drivetheir foreign policy decision-making and defense posture towards the United States.Anxiety over security of the regime due to increased capabilities that can help fomentregime change and increasingly unclear intentions over American willingness to pursueregime change has produced a regime security dilemma that pushes targeted regimesto resist broad swaths of American foreign policy to ensure their own regime security.These anxieties have manifested themselves in various foreign policy venues, includingnuclear politics, NGOs and civil society programs, human rights missions, internationalinstitutions, and military alliances. Thus, I contend that the regime change anxietyproduce by the United States’ post-Cold War foreign policy has directly contributed tothe rise of competitive behavior by peer challengers to resist the American-led liberalorder.

Introduction

In his first week as Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul faced resistance to his diplomaticmission almost immediately. After organizing a visit for Deputy Secretary of State BillBurns, which included meeting with civil society groups at the Moscow embassy, state-controlled television began labelling the meetings as proof that the new Ambassador was a“specialist in color revolutions” that President Obama had sent “to Moscow to orchestratea revolution against the Russian regime.”1 McFaul’s arrival in Russia came on the heels ofprotests against the Putin regime that President Putin viewed as orchestrated by Obamaadministration officials.2 At the time and throughout his later writing, Ambassador McFaulwas incredulous that anyone would think that America, or him specifically, would be tryingto orchestrate regime change in Russia.3 Alternatively, the Putin regime in Russia seemedincredulous that the United States would send McFaul as Ambassador and continue withprograms that worked with opposition and civil society leaders.4 This short encapsulation ofRussian-American relations presents an analytic puzzle about how to think about Russianchallenges to American foreign policy and vice-versa. Was Ambassador McFaul correct toidentify that Putin was manufacturing narratives about American regime change intent fordomestic audiences? Or was President Putin correct that McFaul and others had beenfomenting regime change in Russia that required defense? I contend that neither of theseperspectives are correct and instead this story is an encapsulation of what I call the regimesecurity dilemma, where American intentions and capabilities against certain regimes havecreated genuine fears in some peer states about willingness to attempt to remove regimes, andpushing these regimes to work on regime security that makes them appear more threateningto America, deteriorating relationships and inspiring revisionist behavior.

As the United States has recognized that it is increasingly facing a world of revisionistpowers and resurgent great power competition, scholars have presented different argumentsas to why peer challengers are increasingly acting to challenge American hegemony and itsliberal order.5 One under examined aspect of the return of competition and resistance to

1. Michael McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia (Boston:Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), 251.

2. McFaul noted that President Putin had created a theory of American intentions were to foment colorrevolution, as had also occurred in Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia. ibid., 244.

3. Michael McFaul, “Putin needed an American enemy. He picked me.,” The Washington Post, May 11,2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/05/11/feature/putin-needed-an-american-enemy-he-picked-me/?utm_term=.083f3daa84a7.

4. David Remnick, “Vladimir Putin’s New Anti-Americanism,” The New Yorker, August 2, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/11/watching-eclipse.

5. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House,December 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; John J Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,”

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American hegemony is the emergence of regime change anxieties through regime securitydilemma dynamics. While traditional theories of balancing can help explain part of thestory of rising competition against American hegemony, I contend that the post-Cold Warforeign policy of the United States that has included the pursuit of forceful regime changehas produced anxieties in potential peer rivals that drive their foreign policy decision-makingand defense posture against the United States.

In particular, I argue that the regime security dilemma inspired by American foreignpolicy post-Cold War has made the American-led international order appear particularlythreatening to various regimes and peer competitors, even when traditional forms of securitythreats are not as abundant. While traditional theories of international politics focus onthe threat of invasion, conquering territory, or other military action, for certain states andregimes a threat to the leadership of a country is often as, it not more, threatening. A lackof recognition of these regime security dilemma dynamics then makes Russian responses toAmerican hegemony appear more threatening, driving further spirals.

To be clear, this paper is not an excuse for Russian revisionism aggression nor arguesthat the United States should not pursue democracy promotion as a foreign policy. Rather ithighlights an underrated aspect of international politics, namely that regime change behaviorinspires regime change anxiety and the regime change security dilemma. This, then, hampersdemocracy promotion efforts and encourages balancing behavior that would not be otherwiseexpected. In the rest of this paper, I first lay out the regime security dilemma and discusshow regime change anxieties can produce deteriorating relationships. Second, I turn tothe case of American and Russian relations since the Cold War to examine how the regimesecurity dilemma operates in this case and provides a valuable means to fill the gaps betweenexisting theories of Russian revisionism and poor US-Russia relations. Finally, I brieflyexamine whether there are ways out of the regime security dilemma for the US and Russiaand determine a foreign policy based on non-interventionism and restraint might be theonly means available. Overall, this paper attempts to take a step in explaining how fears ofregime change, even when overstated, can contribute to downward spirals in internationalrelationships.

International Security 43, no. 4 (2019): 7–50; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, Quest forStatus: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019); Hal Brands,“Democracy vs Authoritarianism: How Ideology Shapes Great-Power Conflict,” Survival 60, no. 5 (2018):61–114.

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Regime Change Anxieties and the Regime Security Dilemma

Anxiety has been shown to be a crucial factor in explaining a variety of political attitudes,beliefs, and actions.6 Specifically, anxiety is an emotion that occurs after appraising “asituation as being unpleasant, highly threatening, and uncertain,” and the actor cannotcontrol the threat.7 In international relations, anxiety is an implicit factor is many theoriesand stems from conditions in the international system. Indeed, concerns about unpleasantthreats, unknown intentions of others, and the uncertainty they impose are a common featureon many theories of international relations due the anarchic nature of the internationalsystem.8 This is seen most clearly in the idea of the security dilemma, where uncertainty andanxiety over lack of security can produce sub-optimal outcomes and competition.9 Anxietyand fear produce security dilemmas because states cannot guarantee their own security andare uncertain about the intentions of other to use their capabilities for harm.10 Under thesecurity dilemma, anxiety over the intentions and capabilities of other states leads to armingdecisions to increase the sense of security, which in turn raises the anxiety of other actors whosee the arming as a threat and something they cannot be sure will not threaten them, so canlead to arm spirals and other negative effects.11 With security only being assured throughself-help measures, states feel anxious about their security when the relative strength of otherstates grows and their intentions are more uncertain, harming a state’s ability to feel secureand not have to arm and build capabilities to maintain the security themselves.12

There are two ways through which the anxiety that results from security dilemma dy-namics can be reduced: reducing the gap in capabilities or removing the uncertainty overintentions. Building capabilities (or finding a way to reduce the capabilities of the other

6. For instance, see: Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological security in world politics: State identity and the se-curity dilemma,” European journal of international relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 341–370; Leonie Huddy etal., “Threat, anxiety, and support of antiterrorism policies,” American journal of political science 49, no. 3(2005): 593–608; Mark Galeotti, The Age of Anxiety: Security and Politics in Soviet and Post-Soviet Rus-sia (London: Routledge, 2014); Christopher J Fettweis, “Threat and anxiety in US foreign policy,” Survival52, no. 2 (2010): 59–82; Shana Kushner Gadarian and Bethany Albertson, “Anxiety, immigration, and thesearch for information,” Political Psychology 35, no. 2 (2014): 133–164; Bethany Albertson and Shana Kush-ner Gadarian, Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening World (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2015).

7. Albertson and Gadarian, Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening World , 8.8. Tang contends that fear caused by uncertainty over intentions is a crucial piece in most theories of

international relations. Shiping Tang, “Fear in international politics: two positions,” International StudiesReview 10, no. 3 (2008): 451–471.

9. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma,” World politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214.10. Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World

Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).11. Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171–201.12. Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato, “Balancing in Neorealism,” International Security 40, no. 2

(October 2015): 51–86.

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state) is the first way through which many states in the security dilemma approach mitigat-ing anxiety. However, if undertaking arms buildups to remove the difference in capabilities,then this could appear threatening to the other state and make them more anxious, startinga spiral. The second way security dilemma anxieties are reduced requires removing uncer-tainty about the current and future intentions of the rival state. Finding ways to createclear intentions means less concerns about uncertainty, but disagreements about what typesof actions can signal intentions is varied, and states often focus more on capabilities andhistory for understanding intentions than the words of the other states. It is also hard tosignal benign intentions if they do not know that the capabilities in other states are nottargeting them or their interests. Hence, anxieties over security dilemma dynamics can bedifficult to remove.

Traditionally, discussions of security dilemma anxieties have focused on anxiety over se-curity emerging from interstate threats to invade a territory, annex the territory, or harmthe territorial security of the state. To illustrate, in rationalist bargaining models of war,concerns over credible commitments and ability to know intentions are presented as threatsrelated to territory and bargains over territorial division.13 These dynamics typically arefocused on capabilities of states to invade territory, project military force abroad, and harmthe territorial security concerns of other states. In trying to think about how states canovercome anxiety, different theories have sought to explore how different types of armingprocesses or signals might reduce anxiety and help signal benign intentions, but mostly fo-cus on territorial security.14 In discussions of the nuclear revolution, nuclear weapons aretheorized to remove anxiety of territorial invasion because they are the ultimate defensiveweapon that removes the need for buffer states and robust arms competition.15 Others arguethat territorial integrity norms have helped reduce the uncertainty over territory that is achief flashpoint of international conflict, and thus reduce anxiety over the possibility of revi-sionist intent of other powers.16 On the other hand, theories such as offensive realism arguethat security dilemmas and anxiety can only be reduced once obtaining regional hegemony

13. For instance, issue indivisibility is often portrayed as indivisible pieces of territory. Stacie E. Goddard,“Uncommon ground: Indivisible territory and the politics of legitimacy,” International Organization 60, no.1 (2006): 35–68; James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no.03 (1995): 379–414.14. For instance, in offense-defense theory, some argue that if defensive weapons are purchased then the

purchasing state does not appear as threatening because the weapons cannot be used to invade the territoryof others. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited”; Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causesof War,” International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 5–43.15. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).16. Douglas M. Gibler, The Territorial Peace: Borders, State Development, and International Conflict

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: Interna-tional Boundaries and the Use of Force,” International Organization 55, no. 02 (2001): 215–250.

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in the territory and the elimination of potential rival great powers that could threaten keyterritorial locations.17 The point here is that in discussions of how to mitigate the capabilitiesand uncertainty that drive security dilemma anxieties and to obtain certain security are alllargely premised on anxieties over territorial security issues.

Crucially however, anxiety about threats to security go beyond territory. Challenges towho rules a states or threats to the regime from an external power can be equally if notmore salient threats. Indeed, throughout history, challenges to who rules over a territoryhas been a common source of international conflict. As Betts explains, “Wars have manycauses, and each war is unique and complicated, but the root issue is always the same: Whorules when the fighting stops?”18 Wars of succession were common throughout Europe andwars over the type of religious regime that would govern a territory became the normalways wars were seen. While leadership and territory did go hand in hand in much of thistime period, the concerns over who ruled rather than which territory was included in thatadministrative boundary was often more important.19 In this way, concerns over insecurityof a regime ruling a territory is not a new phenomenon but has been a key concern forvarious regimes. Even during the Cold War, certain leaders viewed the internal regimecharacteristics of foreign territories as inherently threatening more so than the territorial orconventional security concerns, making them prime targets for regime change action ratherthan traditional concerns over territorial security.20 Whether in various Wars of Successionin Europe, or the proxy wars fought by the United States and the Soviet Union during theCold War, often conflict and anxiety over threats to the state emerge from threats relatedto changing the government of a territory. And yet even with these cases, regime securitythreats are not typically discussed as features of security dilemmas, whether as covert orovert armed actions, and are often omitted from thinking about security dilemma anxietieswhich retains a focus on territorial conventional discussions.

This is odd, ironically, because in the canonical formulation of the security dilemma byJervis, he makes the point that regime security is just as important for security dilemmaanxieties. As he states, “When there are believed to be tight linkages between domestic

17. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: WW Norton & Company,2001).18. Richard K. Betts, “The delusion of impartial intervention,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (1994): 21.19. Owen has highlighted over 200 cases of this phenomena since 1550, others have highlighted even greater

number of cases since 1815. John M Owen IV, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks,States, and Regime Change, 1510-2010: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510-2010(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to BeFree?: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization,” International Security 37,no. 4 (2013): 90–131.20. Elizabeth N. Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 2011).

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and foreign policy or between the domestic politics of two states, the quest for security maydrive states to interfere pre-emptively in the domestic politics of others in order to providean ideological buffer zone.”21 Even in an era traditionally thought of as a high point ofWestphalian sovereignty focused on territory, Metternich discussed how great powers seekto decide who rules in foreign territories to ensure their own security. As he claimed “Anyfalse or pernicious step taken by any state in its internal affairs may disturb the reposeof another state, and this consequent disturbance of another state’s repose constitutes aninterference in that state’s internal affairs. Therefore, every state–or rather, every sovereignof a great power-has the duty, in the name of the sacred right of independence of every state,to supervise the governments of smaller states and to prevent them from taking false andpernicious steps in their internal affairs.”22 When threats are seen as emanating from whorules, then regime security dilemma dynamics are clearly at play. Combined, conflict overwho rules in a territory and threats emanating from states over who is in charge of variousterritories provides a key security issue that states have been concerned about.

I contend then that anxieties over regime security can create a regime security dilemma,where anxiety over the security of the regime, emerging from capabilities that could targetit from another state and the uncertain intentions about great powers who may want toharm the regime creates incentives for a state to build up their own capabilities to ensuretheir regime is secure. This, in turn, can make the regime appear threatening. In particular,the regime security dilemma can exist in two directions. First, a state can fear that cer-tain regimes are inherently threatening to their interests. Alternatively, the regime securitydilemma could emerge because capabilities that could harm their regime and are inherentlythreatening. These regime security dilemma dynamics become particularly insidious whenboth things are occurring simultaneously, with one state viewing a certain regime as a threatto their interests and the other regime viewing the first state’s capabilities as a threat totheir own regime. This creates a spiral when a great power views a regime as a threat,and the actions taken to protect their interests or remove that threat create greater anxietyamong the other regime, pushing them to take more aggressive actions to try and protectthe regime, which then makes the regime then appear more threatening.

In traditional security dilemma dynamics, the focus is often on military arming decisionsand signaling with arms.23 However, regime security dilemma dynamics are unique from

21. Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma,” 168.22. Paul W. Schroeder, Metternich’s Diplomacy at Its Zenith, 1820-1823 (Austin: University of Texas

Press, 1962), 126.23. For instance, in traditional security dilemma dynamics, there are often arming decisions that play other

this way. Initially, a state buys and develops new missile defense technology that would protect them fromincoming missiles and boost security of the state, but that also makes the opponent more wary of their abilityto deter future aggression so they need to build new military capabilities to maintain their own security.

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these traditional security dilemma dynamics is a few different ways. First, the types of ca-pabilities that can threaten regime security are much more varied than traditional militarycapabilities and also can be more difficult to defend against to be able to deter. These ca-pabilities include in some cases covert actions, quasi-NGOs, coup plotting, political partylinkages, civil society programs, international institutions, sanctions, non-proliferation agree-ments, and other types of foreign policy tools that can be used to apply pressure towardsregime change. The tools available to threaten or impact regime security can be also cheaper,more diffuse, and less controllable from the highest echelons of power. Further, not all capa-bilities that can harm the regime are inherently nefarious, but rather only appear threateningto certain regimes and often are considered normal foreign policy tools.

Beyond these capabilities, the ability to signal benign intentions is also different. Inorder to signal benign intent, there would have to be a way to show that these broad foreignpolicy capabilities would not harm the targeted regime. However, due to the diffuse andmultifaceted nature of these capabilities and tools, it is much more difficult to show thegreat power would not use them since the costs are so low and they cannot be as controlled.It could be the case that it might be more easily believed when said that not interested inharming the regime and becomes easier to trust that will not view other regimes as a threat.However, it’s unclear exactly how trustful or credible these promises are and what makescertain promises to not harm a regime more credible than others. Regardless however, whena regime believes there are hostile intentions against it, and especially when armed force hasbeen used against certain regimes in the past, then regime security dilemmas will emerge.This creates anxieties over the intentions of the state and leads to viewing all types of foreignpolicy as designed for regime change and assuming the worst intentions.24

While regime security dilemmas can produce negative outcomes, but there are three fac-tors make regime security dilemmas more likely to emerge. First, regime security dilemmasare particularly salient for authoritarian regimes, where the linkage between who rules andthe security of the state are more intimately entwined.25 Authoritarian regimes are often

Hence even when the missile defense technology is not designed to be used as a way to allow for offensivestrikes, it threatens the security of others because it is unknown if the state will actually do this.24. Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 587–

623.25. In democratic regimes, who rules is less seen as a matter of state security, but it could still be the case

that threats to democratic regime could emerge. Particularly during the Cold War, both communist anddemocratic states, namely the Soviet Union and the United States, both attempted to intervene in variousdemocratic elections and regimes through various means, but the regime security threats were never as acuteas when it was authoritarian regime being targeted. See Dov H. Levin, “When the Great Power Gets a Vote:The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results,” International Studies Quarterly 60,no. 2 (2016): 189–202; Lindsey A. O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 2018).

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more concerned about regime security than democratic regimes at the domestic level, withauthoritarian leaders often seeking to remove potential internal threats to their regime. Thisoften includes coup-proofing measures, co-optation of elites, and other actions aimed at pro-moting regime security.26 Given authoritarian regimes are willing to sacrifice traditionalterritorial security concerns for regime security, this implies that regime security dilemmasshould affect them more. Further, authoritarian regimes are also more concerned about per-sonal security after they might lose power given they are more likely to face threats of death,imprisonment, or exile compared to democratic leaders.27 Thus, regime security dilemmascould become particular acute for authoritarian states because the individual leaders in theregime might also fear for personal security.

Second, regime security dilemmas are particularly salient when threats to state territoryare less common. The anxiety that remains most acute is insecurity over the regime. Ifannexation, territorial change, and large cross-border attacks become less likely to occur,then the largest security concerns remaining are aimed at the regime rather than the territory.The remaining sense of threat that can emerge is one to the leadership of the state, and thatthreat then filters how they view threats. When these traditional external threats are seenas less important or less likely to occur, then the worry about regime security becomes evenmore paramount. Put differently, when traditional territorial security dilemma dynamics arereduced, regime security dilemma dynamics can then become even more acute or the mainlocus of continued competition.

There are reasons to think the decline of territorial threats might be real. Since 1945, avariety of different changes have made territorial security concerns less threatening as previ-ous eras, though potential regime change remains as a core threat to certain states. Nuclearweapons have reduced the need for territorial conquest of buffer zones as they are no longerrequired to protect capitals from invading militaries.28 As the ultimate defensive weapon,then threats to territorial integrity are less likely to emerge. In addition, the settling ofborders and removal of territory as a source of insecurity has made the prospect of conven-

26. In fact, it is often the case that they weaken the military against external threats because they areso concerned about internal threats. Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness inAuthoritarian Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).27. In fact, it has been shown that authoritarian leaders are much more likely to face death, imprisonment,

or exile when removed from office. Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Randolph M Siverson, and Gary Woller,“War and the fate of regimes: A comparative analysis,” The American Political Science Review, 1992, 638–646; Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans, “International conflict and the tenure of leaders: Is war still expost inefficient?,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 3 (2004): 604–619. In addition, as goldenparachutes have become less likely in the world due to increased jurisdiction of international courts, exile isseen less as a viable option and makes maintaining hold on the regime a crucial factor.28. Benjamin Denison, “No, Russia doesn’t require buffer states for its security,” The National Interest,

December 3, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/no- russia- doesnt- require- buffer-states-its-own-security-14494.

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tional great power war unlikely and has lessened traditional security dilemmas about militaryexpenditures and offensive or defensive capabilities.29 Finally, changes in international in-stitutions and alliances, such as NATO, and other comprehensive security agreements hashad the effect of reducing security concerns by removing the traditional security lines be-tween states and placing them under the same alliance or institutional umbrella.30 Whilethere are obviously still concerns over maritime claims and other flashpoints, territorial se-curity dilemma concerns seem muted due to these technological, normative, and structuralchanges in the international system. And yet even with these changes in flashpoints thattypically create interstate competition and provoke challenges to the international order,regime security dilemma dynamics shows how competition can re-emerge.31

Finally, hegemony or unipolarity can make regime security dilemma dynamics moresalient. In a multipolar system, regimes that are facing regimes threats from a great powercould find a patron or other power to help defend them. However, in an era of unipolarity,the threat to regime security cannot be buttressed against by another power and insteadrequires other solutions for defending the regime’s security. Typically, when unipolar powersor hegemons emerge, other states in the system recognize that their security is at the whimsof the intentions of the unipolar power. However, when territorial threats are reduced, thenthe typical territorial threats from hegemons are not concerning, but then other tools ofpower that could threaten the domestic regimes of other states still exist. Hegemons mightnot target territorial expansion, but they could target regimes that do not follow the goalsof the hegemon for the international order. Gunitsky has illustrated that hegemons oftendo look to exert their power through changing regimes or influencing domestic regimes afterchanges in the international system.32 Thus when a great power obtains hegemony, it be-comes difficult for regimes that they dislike having any certainty that their regime will notbe targeted for regime change in the future and the regime security dilemma emerges

As Monteiro points out though, there is nothing determinative about unipolar hegemons

29. As Fazal explores, the relative decline in the number of state deaths in the international system showsthat the threat of annexation, while not removed, has been drastically reduced since 1945 and removed thistypical source of security anxiety from many states minds. Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics andGeography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton University Press, 2011). See also Gibler,The Territorial Peace: Borders, State Development, and International Conflict .30. Patrick J McDonald, “Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic

Causes of Peace,” International Organization 69, no. 3 (2015): 557–588.31. To be clear, territorial security dilemmas can still exist in the nuclear age and with territorial integrity

norms, especially when it was the inter-German border in the Cold War. However, nuclear weapons andother factors reduce these tensions and then make regime security dilemmas even more acute.32. He illustrates, in periods of hegemonic transition, that is where the most changes to domestic regimes

occur as other states emulate the new hegemon’s domestic regime, and prodded through inducements orcoercion to a new hegemon’s preferred regime, or are forcibly changed. Seva Gunitsky, Aftershocks: GreatPowers and Domestic Reforms in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

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that will make them seek to impose new regimes by force, but there is also no constraintstopping them if they choose to do so.33 While the hegemon might not intend to targetchanging a regime. The regime security dilemma can still emerge if peer competitors cannot know that the hegemon does not have intentions to target the regime. Particularly onceit is clear that the hegemon has some interest in exerting its influence and imposing regimessomewhere, it becomes more difficult to signal that they are not interested in targeting theregime of a peer competitor. Because of the unknowable intentions of the hegemon, oncea reputation for regime change emerges, anxiety over regime change intentions makes othertools of foreign policy appear as security threats to the regime, regardless if they are or not.34

Finally, when there is hegemony it becomes more difficult for states to see the regimechange capabilities of the unipole as inherently threatening. Sechser argues that often hege-mons can ironically produce more resistance to their coercive requests and threats fromweaker powers because the weaker state cannot be certain they will not ask for somethingmore in the future.35 In other words, the sheer power differential means that weaker statescannot be certain of the hegemon’s intentions and assumes that all forms of revision shouldbe resisted. In a similar but different vein, the power differential the hegemon has over otherstates makes their ability to convince others that their tools of foreign policy are not beingused to undermine the regime security of others. And even if they are not being used tofoist regime change now, it is difficult under hegemony to trust future intentions becausethey could be used that way in the future. Thus, hegemony enhances the regime securitydilemma because it is fundamentally difficult to credibly commit to not use tools of foreignpolicy to attempt to influence regimes. At the same time the actions taken to resist theinfluence of the hegemon, then can become seen as a threat to the interests of the unipolarpower, encouraging more coercive threats and spiral to emerge.

Any action taken by a hegemon to influence domestic politics of another country thenbecomes a signal that could target or threaten the regime security of a peer competitorsand makes them update their beliefs about intentions and the threat that is posed to theirregime. Thus, democracy promotion programs, civil society support, humanitarian aid,political party building, or other foreign policy factors can be seen as threatening even whenthere is no hostile threat intended. When these mechanisms are seen before or after theviolent overthrow of a regime, other regimes then will try to find ways to protect the regime

33. Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” International Security 36, no.3 (2012): 9–40.34. Sebastian Rosato, “The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers,” International Security 39, no. 3 (2015):

48–88.35. Todd S Sechser, “Goliath’s curse: Coercive threats and asymmetric power,” International Organization

64, no. 4 (2010): 627–660.

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by resisting these programs. Once a hegemon demonstrates a possible interest in carryingout regime change, their intentions are unclear as to whether they will use these foreignpolicy tools only for peaceful means or to possibly overthrow regimes. And with no meansto credibly commit to not using these foreign policy tools in service of mission to overthrowthe regime, the hegemon faces broader balancing and targeted efforts than we would normallyexpect.

Overall, I argue that the regime security dilemmas creates a regime change anxietiesthat push states into security competition because it is difficult to not credibly commit tooverthrowing regimes when the hegemon has capacity to do so and particularly when it is anauthoritarian regime that is under threat. Competition, rather than cooperation, emergesas regimes cannot be certain that the hegemon will not try to overthrow the regime andthus there is larger competition that theoretically expected. Thus, even with the powerdifferentials indicating the unipolar era should continue, regime change anxieties produceother outcomes that lock in competition and harm American hegemony.

The Regime Security Dilemma and Russian Anxiety of

American Regime Change

To examine the regime security dilemma in depth, I move to the case of American and Rus-sian relations following the Cold War. Through this case, I examine how American regimechange behavior has impacted regime security anxieties in Russia, and how anxieties havemanifested in Russian foreign policy approaches towards the US. I first explore commontheories that seek to explain rising Russian revisionism and aggression against Americanhegemony, in particular the 2014 Ukraine crisis and Crimea annexation. Second, I reviewAmerican grand strategy since the end of the Cold War and attempt to highlight the con-verging patterns that have signal regime change intentions and also increased regime changecapabilities. Next, I try to integrate the regime security dilemma dynamics into these expla-nations of increased Russian revisionism and highlight how the post-Cold War trajectory ofAmerican intentions and capabilities produced regime change anxieties in Moscow. Finally,I look to how the actions taken in response to this regime change dilemma has made theUnited States distrust the regime more and furthered the ongoing dilemma in various issueareas affecting both American and Russian foreign and defense policies.

To be clear, I am not arguing that American foreign policy behavior directly causes orexcuses Russian aggression, that the United States should not attempt to promote democ-racy, the rule of law and human rights, or that it is worth omitting these values to achieve

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better foreign policy outcomes. Rather, I simply seek to highlight that regime securitydilemma dynamics can explain straining relations and should be factored into foreign policydecision-making. Understanding how the variety of different signals and capabilities thatthe US possesses as a hegemon might produce anxieties is crucial for better analysis andpolicymaking.

Traditional Accounts of Post-Cold War Russian Revisionism

Following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia emerged inthe American unipolar also transitioning from great power status and to a new regime, whichincluded American support moving to a more democratic political structure and new cap-italist economy. This transition featured severe reductions in military power, internationalpower, and status on the global stage. While this transition to away from great power statusplayed out, Russian assertiveness was also reduced. As the Partnership for Peace programand other forums for increased US and Russian cooperation emerged, fruitful partnershipseemed like a possibility for a time in Russia, even with political and economic instabilitycontinued to hamper Russia.36

However in 1999 the Russian military began a robust modernization program to attemptto rebuild some of its capacity it had lost in the decade after realizing how inadequate itwas.37 This largely did not threaten US interests at the time but eventual growing Russianmilitary capabilities manifested in the 2008 Georgia War where they utilized force in aborder crisis over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.38 This assertiveness and successful militaryoperation by Russia was followed however by the Obama administration attempting to ’reset’relations and move back towards a path of peaceful cooperation.39 However, while there somepositive takeaways from the ‘Reset’, it ended with Putin returning to power after the Libyamission grew to include overthrowing the Qaddafi regime and tensions reasserted themselvesto grow.40 Finally, with Russia annexing Crimea and intervening in eastern Ukraine, and

36. James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: US Policy toward Russia after the ColdWar (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).37. Alexei G. Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo

and Chechnya, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 2. George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, 2000;Stephen J. Blank, “The New Turn in Russian Defense Policy: Russia’s Defense Doctrine and National SecurityConcept,” in The Russian Military into the 21st Century, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (New York: Routledge,2013), 53–74.38. For an accounting of this crisis, as well as later discussions of Russian actions in Ukraine, see: Gerard

Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West, and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus (Oxford: Oxford Uni-versity Press, 2017).39. McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia, 76-238.40. Mikhail Zygar, “The Russian Reset That Never Was,” Foreign Policy, December 9, 2016, https :

//foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/09/the-russian-reset-that-never-was-putin-obama-medvedev-libya-mikhail-zygar-all-the-kremlin-men/.

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the full re-emergence of Russian assertiveness, the breakdown of prospects of Americanand Russian partnership was finalized.41 This led to increasing cases of American strategydocuments identifying Russia as a challenger to American interests, fully ending the idea ofthe Russian Reset, and eventually led to a refocusing on great powers and hegemony in theTrump administration’s national security strategy focused on great power competition.42

Since the Russian annexation of Crimea, there has been a robust debate over why Russiarevisionism and aggression against American hegemony has re-emerged.43 One strand arguesthat Russian aggression is a natural outgrowth of NATO expansion towards their sphereson interest.44 This argument has a few different strands, but they focus broadly on eitherthe US expanding NATO to former Warsaw Pact countries starting in 1999, turning backon promises allegedly given to the Russians at the time of the end of the Cold War. Assome put it, Russian resistance and assertiveness against “further enlargement of NATO tothe east...is hardly surprising: no state would welcome the extension of a historically hostilemilitary alliance up to its borders.”45 Others argue that while these promises were not given,US signaling interest in expanding NATO beyond central and Eastern Europe to Georgiaand Ukraine right on Russia’s border was the major catalyst for aggression.46

Others have disagreed with these assessments and have argued that Russian revisionismis instead a reaction to a loss of status and is seeking to return to the great power status theSoviet Union once had.47 This argument holds that following the Cold War and the collapseof the Soviet Union, Russia faced two decades of lower status and humiliation at the hands

41. On Ukraine, see: Andrew Wilson, Ukraine crisis: What it means for the West (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 2014).42. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America; National Defense Strategy Commis-

sion, Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessments and Recommendations of the National DefenseStrategy Commission, November 2018, https://www.usip.org/index.php/publications/2018/11/providing-common-defense.43. For a review of the competing perspectives of Russian aggression in light of Ukraine, see: Elias Götz,

“Russia, the West, and the Ukraine crisis: Three Contending Perspectives,” Contemporary politics 22, no.3 (2016): 249–266; Elias Götz, “Putin, the State, and War: The Causes of Russia’s Near Abroad AssertionRevisited,” International Studies Review 19, no. 2 (2017): 228–253.44. John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the west’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014):

77–89; Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the US Offer toLimit NATO Expansion,” International Security 40, no. 4 (2016): 7–44; Elias Götz, “It’s Geopolitics, Stupid:Explaining Russia’s Ukraine Policy,” Global Affairs 1, no. 1 (2015): 3–10; Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine:Crisis in the Borderlands (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).45. Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, “Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not

Psychology,” Foreign Affairs 90 (2011): 128.46. Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, 4-5.47. Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “StatusSeekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,” International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 63–95;Anne L Clunan, “Historical aspirations and the domestic politics of Russia’s pursuit of international status,”Communist and post-communist studies 47, nos. 3-4 (2014): 281–290.

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of the West and the United States that they were not accustomed to as a former great power.However once economic stability returned following the 1990s and the military gained morecapacity, that the unifying vision of Russia under Putin was to return the status to oneof great power with a major role in world affairs.48 Even as early as 1999, commentatorswere realizing that Russia was "preoccupied with a great power status" that they no longerhad and were seeking to rebuild.49 As such, increased aggression was determined by theincreased capacity of the Russian military and the desire to appear like a great power onceagain. Others argue that there is an insatiable desire for Russian empire that drives forcontrol over its near abroad.50

A final school of thought argues Russian revisionism is a response to domestic factors.There are two main arguments related to this school of thought. One argument holds thatincreased Russian nationalism can help insulate the regime during economic troubles as theyhave faced and can help produce policy wins to allow for further control. Particularly inresponse to the 2011 protests in Russia that the regime saw as influenced by Americanhands, growing nationalism was needed to drive increased support for the regime and thuslead to aggression to manufacture that nationalist support.51 The premise is that the primaryconcern of the Russian regime and Putin in particular is how to maintain domestic power,and all aggressive foreign policy actions in the region stemmed from that desire.52 In thissense, the military mission in Ukraine was a "pressure release valve and a way to compensatefor its weaknesses in other areas (including the economy)"53 Another branch of this argumentfocuses on how various aggressive actions taken by Russia are designed to help enrich theoligarchs Putin and the regime depend on and surround themselves with.54 These arguments

48. Kimberly Marten, “Reconsidering NATO Expansion: A Counterfactual Analysis of Russia and the Westin the 1990s,” European Journal of International Security 3, no. 2 (2018): 135–161.49. Lawrence Freedman, “The New Great Power Politics,” in Russia and the West: The 21st Century

Security Environment, ed. Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, and Robert Legvold (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,1999), 34.50. Alexander J. Motyl, “Putin’s Zugzwang: The Russia-Ukraine Standoff,” World Affairs 177, no. 2 (2014):

58–66; Alexander J. Motyl, “The Surrealism of Realism: Misreading the War in Ukraine,” World Affairs,2015, 75–84.51. Kimberly Marten, “Putin’s Choices: Explaining Russian Foreign Policy and Intervention in Ukraine,”

The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 2 (2015): 189–204; David J Kramer, “The Ukraine Invasion: One YearLater,” World Affairs 177, no. 6 (2015): 9–17; Anne Applebaum, “Putin’s Grand Strategy,” South CentralReview 35, no. 1 (2018): 22–34.52. Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, “Who Lost Russia (This Time)? Vladimir Putin,” The Washington

Quarterly 38, no. 2 (2015): 167–187; Michael McFaul, “Moscow’s Choice,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 6 (2014):167–71.53. Lilia Shevtsova, “The Kremlin is Winning,” The American Interest, February 12, 2015, http://www.

the-american-interest.com/2015/02/12/the-kremlin-is-winning/.54. Karen Dawisha, “Is Russia’s Foreign Policy That of a Corporatist-Kleptocratic Regime?,” Post-Soviet

Affairs 27, no. 4 (2011): 331–365; Celeste A. Wallander, “Russian transimperialism and its implications,”Washington Quarterly 30, no. 2 (2007): 107–122.

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largely hold that aggressive actions in the near abroad are signals that the oligarchs aredepending more from the Putin regime rather than signaling greater geopolitical intent.55

Each of these theories has distinct benefits and drawbacks, but, interestingly, implicitin many of their discussions is the role regime change anxieties play in Russian insecurityand aggression. Fear of regime change, for instance, helps explain why control over domesticlevels of power becomes so essential because a fractious domestic society becomes an easiertarget of regime change. Additionally, NATO expansion and discussions of NATO expansionwith Georgia and Ukraine become particularly threatening not because of any threat oftanks rolling across those borders, but rather they could serve as easier outposts to startinfluencing regime change behavior. Finally, as the quote from Metternich above indicates,regime change can often be seen as the behavior of great powers onto smaller powers, andthe Soviet Union was intimately involved in regime change activities as part of its time as agreat power. Thus, status concerns over the return to great power status have something todo with regime change as well, and do not want to be seen as a smaller power that is the onegetting imposed on. Each of these theories contains some aspect of fear of external regimechange or undue regime influence and how that can affect perceptions of regime security. Iargue, rather, an underappreciated aspect helping explain increased Russian revisionism isthe regime security dilemma, and it can help explain the deterioration of America-Russianrelations as well as help link together the other theories of Russian aggression. It can alsohighlight the ways in which American actions, without much consideration of how the signalwould be received, produce anxieties inside Russia and elsewhere that make regime changeappear as a key threat. Thus the deterioration of relations is a spiral that endures due toregime security dilemma dynamics that are extremely difficult to find offramps from.

American Regime Change Intentions and Post-Cold War Regime

Security Dilemma

American regime change behavior has created Russian anxieties and harmed American in-terests due to regime change being seemingly implicit in all foreign policy tools. The anxietyproduced by the post-Cold War focus on democracy promotion and American regime changebehavior has signaled threat to the regime security of Russia, with the power differential andhegemonic tools available to America making the threat to the regime more tangible. It hasalso pushed Russia to pursue tools to reduce the threat to their regime, but by doing so, hasmade itself appear more threatening to the US, creating a regime security dilemma.

55. For a review of the development of oligarchs and corruption in Russia, see: Karen Dawisha, Putin’sKleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon / Schuster, 2014); Brian D. Taylor, State Building inPutin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion After Communism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

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There is much evidence that the United States might be interested in regime change andpossess revisionist intent for the domestic politics of rival states, such as Russia. Since the endof the Cold War, the United States has focused on democratic enlargement as a key foreignpolicy goal. This focus stemmed from a grand strategy of primacy that focused on deterringother peer competitors from ever challenging American hegemony and seeking to extendthe American-controlled liberal international order in perpetuity.56 As a feature of thisgrand strategy of primacy, the United States pursued a logic of democratic expansion underthe logic that American security, prosperity, and national interests would be best servedwith a wider community of democratic regimes.57 Each of the foundational national securitystrategies of the first three presidents following the end of the Cold War highlights this trend.President Clinton premised his national security strategy of democratic enlargement andexpanding democratic communities to enhance American leadership and protect Americaninterests.58 The Bush administration continued this focus, albeit modified, and sought toexpand and transform the political regimes that were in the democratic community.59 TheObama administration furthered this trend, especially embracing the Arab spring, but inother ways also supporting the expansion of democracy as a core feature of its nationalsecurity strategy.60 The overarching logic linking this focus on democracy and security andprosperity was the belief that American interests were best achieved when it was surroundedby a community of democracies.61

The focus on promoting regime change was driven primarily by a desire to help promote

56. For a broader view on the enduring grand strategy of primacy, see Patrick Porter, “Why America’sGrand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,” InternationalSecurity 42, no. 4 (2018): 9–46; Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).57. Paul D Miller, “American Grand Strategy and the Democratic Peace,” Survival 54, no. 2 (2012): 49–76.58. As the Clinton National Security Strategy phrases it: "All of America’s strategic interests - from

promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory - areserved by enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations." William J. Clinton, A NationalSecurity Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington D.C.: The White House, 1994), 18-19, http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1994.pdf.59. As they state, "the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom

across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and freetrade to every corner of the world." George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica. (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2002), V, http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2002.pdf.60. Obama’s National Security Strategy phrases it as, "The United States supports the expansion of democ-

racy and human rights abroad because governments that respect these values are more just, peaceful, andlegitimate. We also do so because their success broad fosters an environment that supports America’s na-tional interests. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (WashingtonD.C.: The White House, 2010), 37, http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf.61. Relating to Saunders’ discussion of internal threat perceptions when carrying out military intervention,

similarly in the post-Cold War period there was a belief that threats could exist due to domestic regimetype and thus should be changed to promote stable and secure global community to preserve unipolarity.Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions.

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democracy across a variety of regions and formerly non-democratic societies, and mostlyused tools of hegemonic influence to help support and prod democratic transitions forward.As Gunitsky notes, the United States’ focus on democracy promotion did not use coercionor forceful regime change initially.62 Rather, the unipolar moment meant other forms ofhegemonic influence were sufficient to push regime change and promote democratization.These forms of influence included investments in quasi-NGOs, such as the NDI and IRI, fo-cusing on USAID programs, State department diplomatic initiatives, civil society programs,political party building efforts, development initiatives, supporting international institutionexpansion, conditionality programs, such as through NATO accession and IMF loans, andalso often focused on expanding human rights and the rule of law throughout various po-litical communities. Importantly for Russia, these efforts also included forms of material orideational support for the so-called color revolutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asiathat saw the breakdown of old authoritarian regimes following the end of communist ruleand transition to more electoral regimes following the demise of the Soviet Union.63 Ad-ditionally, similar support for the Arab Spring uprisings was attempted to help transitionregimes towards democracy.64 Each of these tools was useful in a variety of ways attemptingto help promote democratic expansion and utilized non-coercive means to support the driveto enact regime change throughout the non-democratic world and consolidate gains.

However, beyond these missions there were three main lines of American regime changeactions in the post-Cold War era that signal broader revisionist intent that promoted aregime security dilemma with Russia. First, American efforts immediately after the fall ofthe Soviet Union to help Russia transition to democracy and support Boris Yeltsin useda variety of the same tools listed above to help build political parties, foster civil societydevelopment, and in general attempt to find ways to make Russia join the community ofdemocracies.65 While perhaps out of noble intent, it was also designed to remove Russia as a

62. Gunitsky, Aftershocks: Great Powers and Domestic Reforms in the Twentieth Century , 201-204.63. For more on the color revolutions, see Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian

Leaders in Postcommunist Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Lucan Way, “TheReal Causes of the Color Revolutions,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008): 55–69; Michael McFaul,“Transitions from Postcommunism,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 5–19; Mark R. Beissinger,“Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/TulipRevolutions,” Perspectives on politics 5, no. 2 (2007): 259–276.64. For more on Arab spring, see Lisa Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab spring: parsing the differences

between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (2011): 2–7; Peter J. Schraeder, “Tunisia’sJasmine Revolution & the Arab Spring: Implications for International Intervention,” Orbis 56, no. 4 (2012):662–675; Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons fromthe Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (2012): 127–149; Erin A. Snider and David M. Faris, “TheArab Spring: US Democracy Promotion in Egypt,” Middle East Policy 18, no. 3 (2011): 49–62.65. For a broad review, see: Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose: US Policy toward Russia after

the Cold War .

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threat to American security as the assumption was democratic Russia would no longer harmAmerican interests.66 Regardless, it signaled American intent and interest in the domesticregime of Russia and willingness to use resources to try and foster a more favorable regimein Russia. While American involvement in Russian domestic politics evolved over time, withless direct focus on embracing certain politicians but more on help enhance civil society andclean elections, there still remains American interest in the domestic politics of Russia thathas endured.67

Second, as noted above, American support for ‘color revolutions’ through the variousforms of support and linkages also provided more evidence to Russian elites about Americanregime change intentions. As Levitsky and Way illustrate, linkages with the United Statesand Europe were crucial factors in help the Color Revolutions succeed, and support forthose missions through various US-backed offices and institutes produced more signals aboutAmerican willingness to support protesters and domestic opposition groups.68 The US rolein these color revolutions in particular has made Russia think the US has a continued intentto continue to engage in regime change in their near abroad, harming their own interests aswell as increasing pressure on the Russian regime.69 Combined with the above history andconcern over previous American role in Russian domestic politics, concerns over Americahaving intentions of using Russian elections as potential launching pads for color revolutionin Moscow were publicly discussed and feared as far back as the 2007-2008 election seasonand also following the 2011 election protests.70

Finally, and perhaps most crucially for the regime security dilemma emerging as it has,America’s use of armed force post-Cold War in regime change wars has signaled a particularhostile intent and means to overcome resistance to their softer efforts at regime influence.The US embrace of forcible regime change operations as a tool in its kit to promote the

66. For instance, see Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill, “America’s Stake in the Soviet Future,” ForeignAffairs 70, no. 3 (1990): 77–97; Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy,” Foreign Policy, no. 87 (1992): 25–46.67. Nicolas Bouchet, “The Difficult but Necessary Task of Supporting Democrats in Russia,” The German

Marshall Fund of the United States Policy Brief, no. 047 (2017), http://www.gmfus.org/publications/difficult-necessary-task-supporting-democrats-russia; Frederick W. Kagan, “Russia: The Kremlin’sMany Revisions,” in Rise of the Revisionists: Russia, China, and Iran, ed. Gary J. Schmitt (WashingtonD.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2018), 12–44.68. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).69. Jeanne L. Wilson, “The Legacy of the Color Revolutions for Russian Politics and Foreign Policy,”

Problems of Post-Communism 57, no. 2 (2010): 21–36; Anthony H. Cordesman, “Russia and the “ColorRevolution": A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West,” Center for Strategicand International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-and-%5C%E2%5C%80%5C%9Ccolor-revolution%5C%E2%5C%80%5C%9D.70. Peter J.S. Duncan, “Russia, the West and the 2007–2008 Electoral Cycle: Did the Kremlin Really Fear

a ‘Coloured Revolution’?,” Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 1 (2013): 1–25.

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democratic community was particularly anxiety inducing. These missions came about to re-install democratic leaders, overthrow non-democratic leaders, and for a variety of differentmissions, but the use of armed force in Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, andelsewhere contributed to an idea that the US could use armed force when its non-militarizedforms of democracy promotion did not succeed.71 The view that American interventioncan follow after regimes crack down on protesters and rebels is particularly threatening andshows willingness to escalate challenges to the regime.

These three factors have created a potential view of American intentions as interestedin promoting regime change, including in Russia, and willing to escalate to military force ifthe regime change efforts are resisted. There is a clear pattern that emerges of the UnitedStates then that uses these hegemonic tools to promote regime change and can use forceif resisted. The continued spread of commentary about the need for democracy promotionand to spread democracy in Moscow has amplified this signal and help to promote a viewof American foreign policy behavior as focused on promotion and spreading their preferredregime type.72 These signals sent a view that America was interested in muddling in thedomestic regimes of potential adversaries or other powers and became difficult to say foreignpolicy tools were not designed for focus on targeting regimes seen as non-beneficial forAmerican security.

This created a problem where even if most cases of democracy promotion involved softtools of hegemonic influence, the non-militarized forms of regime change became associatedwith forcible regime change. The soft tools of hegemonic influence could be seen as potentiallythe first stage of armed regime change following these initial steps. While it is the case thatthe US would and does not use armed force to install democracy everywhere, the use ofarmed force provides a template showing a signal to Russia and others how the UnitedStates could move from softer forms of regime change behavior to military missions, creatinganxiety.73 And in fact, the US foreign policy elite have often called for harder application ofthese various tools of foreign policy for the explicit purpose of spreading democracy, whichto authoritarian regimes is the sound of forcible regime change coming.74

71. In particular, the US mission in Serbia, Iraq, and Libya provided a clear intent that American ambi-tions see removing regimes they view are problematic through force as both in their interests and possiblegiven their prime position in the international system. Samuel Charap, “Russia, Syria and the Doctrine ofIntervention,” Survival 55, no. 1 (2013): 36.72. As Fred Kagan articulates a common Washington view, “We must cajole Russia into developing a new

national identity not bound in the subjugation of a large empire and military might but rather as a peacefuldemocratic state.” Kagan, “Russia: The Kremlin’s Many Revisions,” 38.73. In fact, the number of cases where the US used military force to install democracy is quite small relative

to the military power it has.74. Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions : America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S.

Primacy (New York: Farrar, Straus / Giroux, 2018).

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The desire for regime change is not new. The United States was interested in promotingregime change in earlier periods, and has intervened in various conflicts and imposed newleaders in many different locations since 1898.75 However, in these previous periods, theUnited States was often countermanded by other great powers trying to impose their ownsystems and the power differentials between the peer competitors was such that threats to theregime of another was not seen as feasible.76 However, in an era of American hegemony, thethreat the US poses in terms of regime security is more acute and requires a more substantialdefense than previous periods. Hegemony allows for American ambitions for regime changeto go unchallenged by other great powers and creates more opportunities to act on regimechange intent. When there are no other great powers to work with to enhance your regimesecurity, this threat becomes much more acute and produces greater anxiety because themeasures needed to ameliorate the threat do not exist. This heightens anxieties about whatthe pattern of American hegemony looked like and the future of democratic expansion as athreat to other regimes.

To be clear, the focus of how America has helped spread democratic expansion that hasbrought many benefits with development, rule of law, and more are goals that should becelebrated. One major problem however is that the United States did not realize it wassignaling such revisionist. For the US, many of these signals sent to Russia about regimechange intent were not seen by the American policymakers themselves as anything regardingintentions towards the Russia regime.77 In fact, seldom does discussion about Americandemocracy promotion extend beyond the cases it has actively been promoted and does notto look at the signals democracy promotion might send others. When the United Statesdoes not realize that these actions combined with the forcible regime change missions sendsignals that make them appear revisionist, it can help prompt the regime security dilemmaand make it harder to find ways for the US to send countermanding signals to promote betterrelations.

75. Benjamin Denison, “Strategies of Domination: Uncertainty, Local Institutional Strength, and the Poli-tics of Foreign Rule” (Ph.D. dissertation., University of Notre Dame, 2018).76. For more on competition for influence in foreign elections, see: Levin, “When the Great Power Gets a

Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results.”77. For instance, how the US defense community talks about missile defense not being aimed at Russia is

emblematic. Jamie McIntyre, “Pentagon: U.S. missile shield in Romania aimed at Iran, not Russia,” TheWashington Examiner, 2016, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/pentagon-us-missile-shield-in-romania-aimed-at-iran-not-russia.

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Russian Reactions to American Regime Change Capabilities Under the RegimeSecurity Dilemma

The ways in which Russia has responded in this period towards American foreign policyprovides evidence of the regime security dilemma dynamics discussed above. Chief of theRussian General Staff, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, and other Russian military voices have con-sistently articulated their view of Russia’s security as focused on threats to regime security.In their writing and published Russian military doctrine, they have articulated a view ofAmerican post-Cold War military doctrine, or foreign policy posture, that has been aimedat growing American influence around the world and using a variety of military and politicalcapabilities to exert their influence over regimes and exerting influence as a piece of Ameri-can regime change action.78 As Gerasimov articulates the view of the Russian military, “theprimary threats to Russian sovereignty” are “stemming from U.S.-funded social and politicalmovements such as color revolutions, the Arab Spring, and the Maidan movement.”79 Evenin their interactions with other like-minded states, Russia has discussed that the principlethreat emanating from the United States is the threat posed by regime change policies.80

The threats seen by Gerasimov and others in Russia extend beyond a focus on Americanintentions and toward many foreign policy tools they view as means through which Americacould exert influence on the Russian regime. American intentions toward regime change donot matter much if they do not possess the capabilities to actual enact the regime changemission. The regime security dilemma, like other security dilemmas, becomes particularacute when the intentions and the capabilities both point to regime change. Interestinglythough, what counts as a capability in the discussion of regime security dilemmas is distinctfrom other forms of security dilemma that focus on traditional military units of power. In thiscase, the capabilities that could be brought to bear include not only military power, such asnuclear modernization and alliance commitments, but other forms of so-called ’soft power’,such as NGOs, international institutions, and ties with local actors that could be used asmeans through which to organized regime change or provoke a regime crisis that mandatesa militarized response. Of course the intelligence community could also theoretically serveas assets in these missions as well.81 However, beyond the CIA and other assets that could

78. Roger N. McDermott, “Does Russia have a Gerasimov doctrine?,” Parameters 46, no. 1 (2016): 97–105.79. Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (2016): 37.80. For instance, at the May 2014 Moscow Conference on International Security, the focus was on the

principal threat that popular protest backed by American foreign policy posed to Russia and its peers.Dmitry Gorenburg, “Countering Color Revolutions: Russia’s New Security Strategy and its Implications forU.S. Policy,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 342, September 2014, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm342%7B%5C_%7DGorenburg%7B%5C_%7DSept2014.pdf.81. As O’Rourke has shown, intelligence services have often been used in various ways to support regime

change abroad. However, these missions are often unsuccessful and counterproductive. O’Rourke, Covert

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be used for covert regime change operations, the post-Cold War capabilities inherent toAmerican hegemony and its interest in spreading democracy helped to make the regimesecurity dilemma with Russia acute. Understanding how these capabilities are seen byRussia in light of regime security provides a lens to view a variety of different disputesbetween various foreign policy issue areas and provide a holistic understanding of debatesover various issues.

Initially, the most unique aspect of the regime security dilemma is how it extends thesecurity dilemma concerns over capabilities to non-military instruments such as NGOs, civilsociety programs, democracy assistance and other tools of foreign policy that are not securitythreats or military tools but can serve as capabilities to help promote democracy or regimechange abroad. These capabilities are designed for use by well-intentioned civil servants,activists, and democracy builders abroad and have also promoted human rights and therule of law abroad as a feature of American post-Cold war foreign policy. They often dogreat work in enhancing accountability, helping build a robust civil society, and serve otherimportant roles abroad.82 However, these foreign policy tools have helped create a networkof democracy builders and provided linkages to promote pressure on regimes that was notpresent previously. As previously noted, in the Color Revolutions near Russia’s frontier, thesetools and networks were crucial in successfully changing the regime towards democracy andthus show how networks could be utilized to help spread knowledge about effective protestand strategies to promote regime collapse.83

As such, even though these programs have no military component, they can still threatenthe regime by highlighting its corruption by helping to mobilize those who are opposed tothe regime, by providing support for opposition parties, and creating international linkagesthat foster democracy. All of these aspects are beneficial for democracy but are also seen aspotential threats to the ruling regime. And while often these programs are not targeted atoverthrowing regimes but instead improving the lives of citizens, there is a chance that theseprograms can provide means for American influence over which preferred politicians are ableto be successful in elections or other forms of candidate selection in the future.84 Giventhe linkages between civil society group and American-backed or US government programs

Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War .82. Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington D.C.: Carnegie En-

dowment for International Peace, 1999).83. Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries; Steven Levitsky

and Lucan Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 20–34.84. Ironically though, Bush has argued that democracy NGOs actually have reigned in their challenges to

dictators so as to maintain their ability to operate in the various countries. Sarah Sunn Bush, The Tamingof Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2015).

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can be seen then as a form of influence that can be exerted to help start a form of colorrevolution, these can be seen as capabilities that have to be defended against to protect theregime.

In Russia, these democracy promotion organizations faced a backlash from the Russianregime As Carothers notes, Putin viewed “pro-democracy groups as a security imperative,asserting that the United States is trying to encircle Russia with pro-Western governmentsand subvert its political order."85 This manifested in 2006 when Russia passed laws imposingnew Russian controls on foreign NGOs and also in 2012 Putin passed a new law requiringNGOs to register as foreign agents, particularly aimed at American NGOs and institutionslike NDI and IRI that they saw as potentially meddling in domestic affairs and threateningto the regime.86 Attempting to break these linkages is one way in which to break capabilitiesthat might target Russian elites, but also provides ways in which the US sees the regimeas nefarious and continues to the cycle of worst assumptions about intentions. Importantly,even if the NGOs are in no way pursuing regime change goals, the fact that America hassignaled regime change intent in the past and the NGOs could be used for regime change iswhat prompts the fear and anxiety that drives the regime security dilemma.

Another venue and capability that is at times also seen as potential threatening byMoscow given American intentions is in the realm of humanitarian intervention. In particu-lar, the ability for the United States to go beyond the United Nations and not be constrainedby a Russian veto in the United Nations Security Council when attempting to justify armedintervention abroad for nominally humanitarian reasons has made Russia convinced thatAmerican interventionism can be turned against its own regime if they try to repress anydomestic opposition movement. As noted above, American armed action in Serbia duringthe Kosovo war, armed invasion in Iraq, and then finally with the armed intervention inLibya has painted a picture in Moscow that America using the veneer of humanitarian in-tervention, the responsibility to protect, or other international humanitarian justificationsto garner support for regime change operations that could just as easily be turned againstRussia one day.87

The Libya war in particular provides a crucial point where it seems Moscow finallyrealized that even their willingness to work with the idea of humanitarian intervention does

85. Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006):57.86. Carothers, “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion”; Roman Goncharenko, “NGOs in Russia:

Battered, but unbowed,” Deutsche Welle, November 11, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/ngos-in-russia-battered-but-unbowed/a-41459467.87. John Berryman, ““Fear and Loathing” in the Kremlin: Russia and the Challenge of Intervention,” in

Shifting Priorities in Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy, ed. Rémi Piet and Roger E. Kanet (New York:Routledge, 2016), 51–72.

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not provide a break on American regime change intentions when the capabilities exist. Afterallowing the no fly zone mission to be authorized by the UN Security Council in an effort toallow for protect civilians in Libya, the expansion of the mission to include the overthrow ofQaddafi confirmed in the eyes of Moscow that American interventionism for humanitarianreasons can easily expand to regime change and should be resisted. Moscow noted thatthe mission in Libya went beyond the UN mandate they voted for, and this sparked arealization that the US and its allies could willingly use the international institution forjustification and then go beyond the limits authorized.88 The regime change operations thatoverthrew Qaddafi impacted Putin especially as he is said to have watched “the video of thekilling over and over.”89 The Libya operation appears to be the final death knell in Russianperceptions of American humanitarian intervention and directly lead to Russian reactionsin Syria and elsewhere to prevent American intervention that could lead to regime changeand convince them to resist intervention everywhere. As stated in a European Parliamentreport, “subsequent events in Libya have persuaded decision-makers in...Moscow...to rejectany similar proposal" of humanitarian intervention in the future.90

However, because of this fear that humanitarian intervention can be turned into regimechange, Russia possesses anxiety stemming from belief that similar justifications can beturned against their own regime. As the regime security dilemma predicts, Russian hasmoved to resist an international order or American-led international institution that is usedas justification and forum for launching humanitarian intervention. As some explain, “Russiatherefore uses what power it has to shape the international system (particularly its permanentseat on the Security Council) to avoid creating a precedent that could eventually be usedagainst it."91 It is in the ruling Russian regime’s interest to make using UN power as ameans to justify an intervention or regime change mission anywhere to remove that as aviable capability that could harm Russia in the future. Russia has an incentive to findways to remove international linkages that provide both the means for initial protests andjustification for intervening on behalf of protesters.

Moving away from the non-traditional capabilities that can target regime change, nuclearcooperation and nuclear agreements can also be affected by the regime security dilemma. Inparticular, American missile defense technology and other nuclear modernization programsthat might threaten the Russian nuclear deterrent and could be seen as a prerequisite for

88. “Russia says NATO strikes on Libya exceed mandate,” April 15, 2011, http://www.france24.com/en/20110415-russia-says-nato-libya-strikes-exceed-un-mandate.89. Julia Ioffe, “What Putin Really Wants,” The Atlantic, January 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/

magazine/archive/2018/01/putins-game/546548/.90. Peter Ferdinand, The positions of Russia and China at the UN Security Council in the light of recent

crises, 2013, 4, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN.91. Charap, “Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention,” 37.

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potential regime change mission in Moscow. Under this logic, the Russian regime is threat-ened by American missile technology if it can prevent any nuclear strikes from reaching theUS homeland and would not be able to deter American intervention to support protestersagainst the current regime. In particular, American precision guided munitions as a firststrike capability in regime change missions has created anxieties over Russian military elites.American missile defense technology being developed and continued missile modernizationhas also caused “Russian leadership to fear U.S.-sponsored unrest (as Russian leaders believehappened in Ukraine), backed up with precision munitions supplied by the United Statesand its allies. The Russians think they have seen this movie before in Serbia, Libya, Iraq,and, if not for timely Russian intervention, Syria.”92 As some Russian participants at a TrackII nuclear dialogue put it when discussing missile defense technology, “Russian complaintsabout strategic military problems are a verbalization of subliminal fears of a color revolution.And Putin wants a guarantee that no color revolution happens in Russia.”93

The biggest threat here is the development of new technology that necessitates the Rus-sians developing new technology that might violate treaties, such as the INF, in order todeal with their anxieties over American capabilities to target their strategic deterrent that intheir mind are protecting against regime change.94 As some explain “Ballistic missile defenseand ‘prompt global strike systems’ ” exacerbate “the Russians’...fear of Western technologicalsuperiority and the possibility that Western technological surprise may render their defensesobsolete.”95 Further, the future of nuclear arms control between US and Russia is imperiledas long as missile defense assets are not included due to the Russian fears of their use in aregime change crisis.96 In general, this paints a dire picture where the regime change dilemmaextends to nuclear arms control talks and capabilities and creates hostile spirals between theUS and Russia.

Finally, the last American capability that could be perceived as a driver of regime changeis one that has received much focus related to Russian foreign policy, alliances and specificallythe NATO alliance. Growing military alliances on the border might provoke traditional fears

92. Austin Long, “Russian Nuclear Forces and Prospects for Arms Control,” in The RAND Corporation,Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation,and Trade (June June 21, 2018), 6, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT495/RAND%7B%5C_%7DCT495.pdf.93. Mikhail Tsypkin and Diana Wueger, Twenty-First Century Strategic Stability: A U.S.-Russia Track

II Dialogue, technical report (Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD ReportNumber: 2014 010, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict, 2014), 12, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a620199.pdf.94. Long, “Russian Nuclear Forces and Prospects for Arms Control,” 7.95. Thomas R McCabe, “The Russian Perception of the NATO Aerospace Threat: Could It Lead to Pre-

emption?,” Air & Space Power Journal 30, no. 3 (2016): 71.96. Long, “Russian Nuclear Forces and Prospects for Arms Control,” 7.

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of conquest, surrounding, and aggressive action, but particular aspects of American alliancecommitments with NATO, and their previous uses, have created larger fears about their usefor regime change. Rather than a territorial threat, the regime security dilemma shows NATOexpansion creates larger fears about the use of new alliance members on Russia’s bordersto foment regime change rather than invade the territory. These fears created by NATOexpansion in turn tie together the NGOs, intervention, and nuclear capabilities discussedabove to create a unified perception that NATO could use all of these capabilities to begina regime change mission in Moscow. As some explain, a “more recent perception by theKremlin betrays fear of the alliance as an offensive military organization employed to meetthe larger objective to dismantle Russia’s political regime."97

The expansion of American alliance commitments towards Russia’s borders can be seenas threatening due to the focus of democratization behind NATO expansion and the creationof transnational linkages between democracy activists, but also through the way NATO hasbeen used to support perceived regime change missions outside of the UN. Democracy ac-tivists and NGOs could be based on Russia’s border with NATO expansion and creates alarger community where domestic opposition movements could find support. As noted above,when transnational linkages get closer, then democratization becomes more likely and thereare more means to use to influence domestic political events across the border. As NATOexpands, it could provide greater forums for opposition leaders to meet with activists, train-ing to occur from American NGOs, and other democracy promotion programs that are seenas threatening. Even if these actions never actually occur, the fear that expansion presentsopportunities for those capabilities is sufficient to further the regime security dilemma. Inparticular, the NATO mission in Kosovo and NATO’s UN-authorized mission in Libya painta picture that once opposition movements begin rising up against the regime, NATO militarymissions can be used to support the opposition movements if the regime attempts to crack-down on rebellion. McCabe points out that Russian military elites fear of American airpowerand precision strike weapons emerge through their interpretation of American interventionbehavior starting with Kosovo, and view them as targeted at supporting regime change be-havior after protests have begun,98 With NATO on Russia’s border, there are more bases forAmerican airpower, but there are also more territories that would be willing to justify andlegitimate American military interventions.

The regime change anxiety inspired by NATO expansion has produced some uniqueeffects in Russia. In response to American alliance expansion around Russia, there has been

97. Andrei P. Tsygankov, “The Sources of Russia’s Fear of NATO,” Communist and Post-CommunistStudies 51, no. 2 (2018): 102.98. McCabe, “The Russian Perception of the NATO Aerospace Threat: Could It Lead to Preemption?,”

66-69.

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increasing attempts to use economic, energy, and other ties to positioning various NATOstates or potential NATO member states as more pro-Russia to subvert the means throughwhich they can be used to promote regime change in Russia itself.99 In particular, Russianchallenges to American alliance partners in NATO, and efforts to subvert the political regimesthere provide a similar type strategy in removing potential domestic threats to the regimein the authoritarian system, namely trying to divide the potential opposition and keepingcertain potential members close to the regime. In authoritarian regimes, concerns overinternal threats to security lead to leaders attempting to divide the power bases of potentialrivals and prevent a consolidated challenge to their rule.100 Knowing there needs to be acritical mass of insiders to support a coup or overthrow means that the regime can try todivide and co-opt crucial nodes. Looking at how Russia has targeted NATO and Americanalliance partners shows similar type dynamics where they attempt to influence these partnersto prevent any consolidated action from possibly taking place.101

The unfortunate upshot here is that in all of these efforts to perhaps remove threats tothe regime, Russia ends up becoming even more threatening to the US and the regime is seenas one that needs to be changed, perpetuating the spiral. To respond to these perceptions, inrecent years, commentators have noted that Russia has increasingly been using new types ofso-called ‘hybrid war’ in an effort to advance their interests.102 This has included a variety ofpolitical and military tools to compete for influence and provide for security for the regime.This extends from interventions in Ukraine, interference in elections in the US and Europe,and cultivating closer ties with neighbor states and likeminded regimes. To protect againstpotential intentions for regime change, Russia has identified using what they perceive assimilar tools that the US has used to project their influence. Unfortunately, these actionsthen make the Russian regime appear even more threatening to the United States and canperpetuate the regime security dilemma further.

To be clear, this is not to say that NATO expansion, status concerns, and domestic politicsare not important for explaining Russian aggression or recent Russian revisionism. Ratherfailure to understand how US regime change policies around the world impact calculations byMoscow and how that contributes to the regime security dilemma is crucial. The traditional

99. For a review, see: Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds., NATO’s Response to HybridThreats (Rome: NATO War College, 2015).100. James T. Quinlivan, “Coup-proofing: Its practice and consequences in the Middle East,” InternationalSecurity 24, no. 2 (1999): 131–165.101. Rob Berschinski, “Viktor Orban and the Threat Within NATO,” The Atlantic, April 7, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/nato-hungary-authoritarianism/557459/.102. Christopher S. Chivvis, “Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” and What Can be Done About It,” inThe RAND Corporation, Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee (March 22, 2017), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND%7B%5C_%7DCT468.pdf.

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explanations involving NATO expansion, domestic concerns, and Russian status do notconflict with this explanation of the regime security dilemma as crucial for thinking aboutrising Russian challenges to US-led order. Rather it shows how all of these theories unitewhen Russia is seeking to find ways to ensure security due to the anxiety against US possibleregime change in Moscow. Concerns about domestic politics, status, and NATO expansionand security interact not because of threat of NATO action across the Western Steppes,but rather NATO as launching pad to support potential domestic opposition challenging theRussian regime.

Implications for American Grand Strategy

As the previous sections have shown, regardless of the actual intentions of the United Statesand Russia, being engaged in a regime security dilemma hampers cooperation and breedsresentment and anxiety that needs to be mitigated to produce better relations. Given theseregime security dilemma dynamics, what can be done with American grand strategy to pre-vent increased regime change anxieties but also still attempt to achieve American interests?In other words, are there any offramps to be found to reduce the regime security dilemmabut maintain and interest in democracy promotion? Two options exist. First there can be anattempt to either reduce capabilities or only obtain non-offensive capabilities, but these areeven harder to determine in the case of non-military capabilities that threaten the regime.Second, and more likely, there can be an attempt to show benign intentions and will nottarget regime change. First, reducing regime change capabilities is difficult to limit due tothe non-military means that theoretically could affect regime security or are perceived to beused to affect regime security but are still useful for a variety of other foreign policy goals.There could be actions taken to reduce certain capabilities that explicitly targeted at regimechange, but it will be hard to convince others that these foreign policy tools could not beused for nefarious purposes if so desired. It is not clear how to make costly signals showingthat American NGOs and democracy promotion efforts will not be targeted at Russia. Todo so would require America stopping to promote democracy abroad which goes againstAmerican values and public opinion.103

The second option is to try to signal intentions against regime change as a means toreduce the regime security dilemma. This is the more likely option to succeed and includesending calls for regime change abroad. This, unfortunately, could include not attempting tochange odious regimes in other locations but instead working with other foreign policy tools

103. Dawn Brancati, “The Determinants of US Public Opinion Towards Democracy Promotion,” PoliticalBehavior 36, no. 4 (2014): 705–730.

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to try to prevent the regimes from impacting the American security. Reducing concerns overinternational interests and security to external features of states rather than focusing oninternal characteristics would go a long way to help signal benign regime intentions. Insteadof seeking to make statements against regimes that are producing problems, focusing on howto deal with externalities produced by odious regimes should be the focus. While some ofthis was attempted with the Russian reset, it ultimately failed when these interventions andfocus on domestic characteristics could not be resisted.104

However, if the US continues to see certain regimes as inherent threats or see linkagesbetween certain regimes as indications that they are a threat, this will become more difficultto do. With political commentators in America continuing to talk about certain regimesas threats, and with a decades long reputation of wanting to engage in regime change,it is supremely unclear how the United States could walk back its reputation for regimechange. It could be the case that certain regimes do pose a threat to the United States andthese intentions cannot be mitigated or signaled. In such cases however, the United Statesshould recognize the long-term effects their various foreign policies play in the assessmentsof US intentions towards regime change by others and how seemingly disconnected policychoices can be re-interpreted by an adversary who is facing uncertainty over US intentions.Understanding that most US actions will be viewed in this lens is crucial and recognizingthat how the US interacts with Venezuela, Iran, Syria, and others today is a part of thatlens. Each time the United States threatens regime change, uses sanctions or other toolsin effort to pressure regime, and tries to remove regimes they disagree with, it will beused as confirmation by other peer competitors that they need to prepare their defensiverequirements for defending their regime. It signals that the United States has a variety ofcapabilities they can use to target regimes they disagree with and also shows they have thewillingness to do so.

In general, resisting the urge to engage in armed intervention probably the best meansthrough which to defuse the regime change anxieties. Approaching this in the context ofa grand strategy of restraint would probably serve American interests best by not focusingexisting European alliance commitments but reaffirming those commitments as defensive andnot willing to go ‘out-of-area’ to inspire regime change and use military force to those ends.This will not remove all capabilities that could carry out regime change, but it would signalthat American democracy promotion efforts will not take the shape of a Kosovo or Libya-style bombing campaign. This can be the first step to walking back the regime securitydilemma. It could be the case that America’s interest in democracy and anxieties that

104. Ruth Deyermond, “Assessing the Reset: Successes and Failures in the Obama Administration’s RussiaPolicy, 2009–2012,” European Security 22, no. 4 (2013): 500–523.

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inspires in Russia cannot be reconciled. However, in a restrained foreign policy posture, atthe very least relations will not deteriorate further and there can be steps taken to not leadto American interests being harmed.

Conclusion

The regime change anxieties produced through the regime security dilemma are an under-studied phenomenon in international politics and can crucially help explain the deteriorationof American-Russian relations in the post-Cold War era. While many have focused on purelyRussian domestic or purely American foreign policy factors driving the deterioration of rela-tions and the rise of Russian revisionism, this is not sufficient I contend. Rather, the linkingof how American foreign policy and concerns of Russian domestic politics interact throughfears of American power exerted through regime change is the crucial missing link.

It is not important, as Ambassador McFaul says, that he was “not” in Moscow 11to fo-ment a revolution.”105 Rather, if Russia cannot know intentions of the United States andAmerica has capabilities to help fund and promote regime protests, then you look at behaviorand America public strategy documents, it becomes hard to think and assume that Russiadoes not have to defend against the potential threat. Couple this fear with the hard militaryassets, such as prospective missile defense and military alliances and bases, and anxiety isoverdetermined. The regime security dilemma highlights a fear that America is seeminglypursuing revisionist behavior and is locked into competition over who is in charge in Moscow.The fundamental problem that Russia does not see the armed militarized missions as fun-damentally different from supporting democratization programs under the regime securitydilemma.

105. Julia Ioffe, “The Undiplomat,” Foreign Policy, May 30, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/30/the-undiplomat/.

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