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Party Organization in a Multi-level System: Party Organizational Changein Spain and the UKElodie Fabrea

a Centre for Political Research, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

To cite this Article Fabre, Elodie(2008) 'Party Organization in a Multi-level System: Party Organizational Change in Spainand the UK', Regional & Federal Studies, 18: 4, 309 — 329To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13597560802223896URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597560802223896

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REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES GRADUATE

PRIZEWINNER 2008

Party Organization in a Multi-levelSystem: Party Organizational Changein Spain and the UK

ELODIE FABRE

Centre for Political Research, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

ABSTRACT This article investigates the link between regionalization of the structure ofgovernment, regional elections and regionalism on the one hand, and the organization ofstate-wide political parties in Spain and the UK on the other. It particularly looks at twoaspects of the relations between the central and regional levels of party organization:integration of the regional branches in central decision making and autonomy of the regionalbranches. It argues that the party factors are the most crucial elements explaining partychange and that party leaders mediate between environmental changes and party organization.The parties’ history and beliefs and the strength of the central leadership condition theirability or willingness to facilitate the emergence of meso-level elites. The institutional andelectoral factors are facilitating factors that constitute additional motives for or againstinternal party decentralization.

KEY WORDS: Political parties, party organization, multi-level systems, regionalization

Introduction

Devolution in the UK and the strengthening of the competences of the Spanish auton-

omous communities have sparked fresh interest in the multi-level nature of party

competition and party organization. State-wide parties—political parties that contest

state-wide and regional elections throughout a whole country—are subject to a particu-

lar pressure between party unity, cohesion and centralization on the one hand, and

diversity and internal decentralization on the other. The integration of the regional

branches of state-wide parties in the central party decision-making processes and the

Correspondence Address: Elodie Fabre, Centre for Political Research, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Park-

straat 45 – bus 3602, B-3000, Leuven, Belgium. Tel.: +32 (0) 1632 3246; Fax: +32 (0) 1632 3088; Email:

[email protected]

ISSN 1359-7566 print/1743-9434 onlineDOI: 10.1080/13597560802223896 # 2008 Taylor & Francis

Regional and Federal Studies

Vol. 18, No. 4, 309–329, August 2008

Downloaded By: [KU Leuven Biomedical Library] At: 09:47 13 September 2010

level of autonomy that the regional branches enjoy in terms of self-organization and

campaigning for regional elections are crucial aspects of the relationship between

the central and regional levels of party organization. They affect the level of influence

of the regional branches in central decision making and their autonomy to adapt the

party’s message at the regional level.

Based in part on empirical evidence collected via in-depth elite interviews in Spain

and the UK in 2005 and 2006, this article shows that the decision of the central level to

redistribute power in favour of the regional party branches depends predominantly on

intra-party factors. Incumbency plays a crucial role as a power resource for the central

and regional leaderships, and the nationalization of the stakes of regional elections—

which means that voters and parties alike tend to view regional elections in a larger

national perspective rather than only as regional contests—constitutes a powerful

incentive to maintain centralized control. The first section of this paper briefly presents

the factors that are expected to affect the relationships between central and regional

levels of party organization. The second section describes the multi-level framework

of government and party competition in Spain and the UK, and a third section com-

pares the way the Spanish and British state-wide parties (the Partido Popular and the

socialist PSOE, and the Labour party, the Conservative party and the Liberal Demo-

crats) are organized. Finally, the last section evaluates the contribution of institutional,

electoral and party factors towards explaining multi-level party organization.

State-wide Parties and Multi-level Politics

The literature on comparative federalism generally expects that political parties in

multi-level political systems and, in particular, in federal states, will adapt to the organ-

ization and distribution of power and competences across levels of government and

eventually ‘mimic’ the organization of the state (Riker, 1975; Filippov et al., 2004).

Whereas political parties do indeed tend to adapt to the structure of government by

creating organizational units at each level where public office-holders are elected,

the issue of whether the regional branches of state-wide political parties also enjoy

levels of power similar to those exercised by regional governments is less clear.

Quite detailed hypotheses have been developed to predict the effects of the type

and scope of federal and regionalized arrangements on the level of autonomy of the

regional branches of state-wide parties and on the integration of these regional

branches in central decision-making processes (Renzsch, 2001; Swenden, 2006). For

instance, dual federalism is expected to encourage the separation between central

and regional levels of organization and to facilitate the autonomy of regional party

branches (Scharpf, 1995: 32). In contrast, the interconnection of government levels

characteristic of joint-decision (co-operative) federal systems is expected to lead to

some level of integration of the regional branches in central decision making and

some central-level intervention in or oversight over regional party affairs (Chandler

and Chandler, 1987: 98). A positive correlation between the level of self-government

of a region and the level of autonomy of a regional party branch is also expected (Fabre

et al., 2005: 45). Finally, institutional asymmetry is likely to be reflected in the organ-

ization of the state-wide parties, and all the regional branches may therefore not have

the same level of autonomy or the same level of influence at the centre.

310 E. Fabre


As state-wide parties have to compete in elections at different levels, elections and

party systems certainly influence the way they organize. After all, political parties are

first and foremost organizations that file candidates in elections (Katz, 2006), and elec-

toral considerations are likely to have a crucial effect on their strategies. Caramani

(2005: 315) observed that “linguistic, territorial and ethnic cleavages that specifically

refer[ed] to the distinctiveness of the cultural and ethnic regions” had remained strong

and facilitated the resistance to the nationalization of politics. As a result, political

debates and voting patterns diverge from those of state-wide politics and regional

party systems include non-state-wide parties that aim primarily at defending the inter-

ests of their region rather than the ‘national’ community understood as the country as a

whole (Keating and McGarry, 2001).

Combined with territorial diversity, the presence of autonomist parties puts more

pressure on the internal cohesion of state-wide parties, as they emphasize different

issues and politicize the relationships between the central and regional levels

(Deschouwer, 2003; Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006: 136). The existence of regionally

concentrated sets of interests and distinctive regional characteristics may prompt

regional party elites to ask for some level of autonomy. They may argue for instance

that they can be seen as more legitimate than the central party organization and that

they can better understand the local and regional situation because of their first-hand

knowledge of regional specificities (Harmel and Janda, 1982: 63). They may also con-

sider that they need to be able to adapt the party message to the regional political, econ-

omic and social context in order to address this electoral threat. One can also expect the

regional branches to be more autonomous in the most autonomist regions than in

regions closer to state-wide voting patterns and cultural identity, and therefore some

degree of asymmetry in the organization of the state-wide parties is likely to occur.

The level of interconnection between state-wide and regional elections is also an

important factor, and it depends on such factors as the electoral cycle, the effect of

state-wide considerations on regional elections and the impact of regional elections

on central government (Deschouwer, 2003: 223). This link between the levels of

party competition is most likely to occur when the institutional design facilitates

co-operation between central and regional governments or when regional representa-

tives participate in central decision making (Deschouwer, 2003). When the outcome

of a regional election depends on the national context, or when regional elections influ-

ence national politics, state-wide parties are more likely to try to keep a certain level of

control over their regional branches. In return, regional party branches may be allowed

to participate in the decision-making processes of the central party to make sure that

regional interests are still represented within the party. In contrast, when state-wide

and regional elections are disconnected, this disconnection is likely to be reflected

in the organization of the parties, and the regional branches are more likely to enjoy

large degrees of decision-making autonomy but lack representation at the central

level. Overall, as more characteristics of the electoral framework conspire to increase

the divergence between the state-wide and regional arenas, state-wide parties are more

likely to decentralize power to their regional party branches.

However, party leadership is often wary of change and eager to preserve its power,

unless it expects its electoral performances to deteriorate if the status quo is main-

tained. Parties have a natural tendency toward organizational inertia (Panebianco,

Party Organization in a Multi-level System 311


1988). The weight of ideological traditions, its history, its organizational tradition, its

rules and its standard operating procedures tend to limit the pace of change and the

party’s ability to respond rapidly to environmental change (Hopkin and Paolucci,

1999: 309; Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006). This means that political parties are unlikely

to respond to all the changes in their environment but also that the responses to

environmental changes vary depending on each party’s experience, set of entrenched

interests, practices and beliefs.

The respective incumbency status of the central and regional party elites can also

affect the balance of power between the levels, as holding executive office can provide

party leaders with resources that they can then use in intra-party relations (Fabre and

Mendez-Lago, forthcoming). When a state-wide party governs the whole country, it

will try to maintain a certain degree of centralized control over the party’s policies,

as the costs of regional divergences and intra-party divisions are likely to be higher

for governing parties than for opposition parties. The regional branches of state-

wide opposition parties may find it easier to gain some autonomy, particularly when

they hold regional office (Fabre, 2008: 50–51). Regional party leaders who hold

office may also find it easier to have access to the state-wide party leadership and influ-

ence the party as a whole than those regional leaders who are in the opposition. As a

result, relations between the central and regional levels of party organization can

change, depending on the electoral fortunes of either.

Regionalization and Regional Party Politics in Spain and the UK

Estado de las Autonomıas and Regional Party Systems in Spain

The State of the Autonomies (Estado de las Autonomıas, that is, the regionalization

arrangements throughout Spain) has undergone such changes between the country’s

transition to democracy and 2006 that the Spanish autonomous communities came

to enjoy relatively similar levels of self-government.1 The three historic nationalities

(Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia), Navarre and Andalusia had initially

obtained higher levels of autonomy than the remaining 12 autonomous communities.

Over time, these differences decreased, as the 12 autonomous communities gained new

competences (Morata, 2001: 143–144; Moreno, 2001: 64–65). The main points of

institutional divergence now relate to the financial autonomy of the Basque provinces,

policing and issues of regional identity and language (Agranoff, 1999: 101–103).

Shared and concurrent competences are quite numerous because the division of com-

petence between levels is not always clear-cut and because the central government

remains able to enact framework legislation over a large range of policy matters

(Aja, 2003: 127–129; Swenden, 2006: 55–56).

Regional governments are feebly integrated in central decision making: intergo-

vernmental relations are quite weakly developed and the Senate is not a real

chamber of regional representation (Swenden, 2006: 195). Sectoral conferences,

which convene high-ranking officials and representatives of the central and regional

governments on issues of shared competence, can only achieve non-binding con-

clusions (Aja, 2003: 162; Grau Creus, 2000: 61). Mixed commissions can facilitate

relations and develop policy in case of shared competence (Agranoff, 1999: 109),

312 E. Fabre


but the bulk of intergovernmental relations occur through bilateral relations. The

institutional framework provides a mixed picture: one can expect regional party

branches to enjoy a certain level of autonomy to reflect the important competences

of the autonomous communities, but the co-operative aspects of the State of the

Autonomies is likely to encourage central control or oversight. The asymmetry of

the system may, however, facilitate the autonomy of the regional branches in the

historic nationalities. If the institutional arrangements are to be reflected in the organ-

ization of the parties, then it is likely that the regional branches will be rather poorly

integrated in the parties’ central decision-making organs.

In terms of regional identity, strength of autonomist parties and importance of

regional elections, the situation varies very much across the regions (Table 1). In

the three historic nationalities, the level of regional identification is high, but the

strength of the autonomist parties varies quite considerably between, on the one

hand, Catalonia and the Basque Country, where the share of the vote for autonomist

parties exceeds 40%, and Galicia, on the other, where the state-wide parties garner

three-quarters of the votes. Three other regions combine reasonably high levels of

regionalist feelings and support for regionalist parties: the Balearic Islands and the

Canary Islands, both with a strong insular identity, and Navarre, which enjoys a

‘foral’ system close to that of the Basque country. Cantabria and Aragon are both

regions with low to moderate levels of regional identity and a relatively strong region-

alist party. The expectation here is that the regional branches of those regions where

regionalist feelings and autonomist parties are strongest will be more autonomous,

as the state-wide parties empower them to respond to the electoral challenge posed

by autonomist parties.

There is also a variety of regional party systems: party systems that systemati-

cally diverge from the state-wide party system (such as the Basque Country), auton-

omous communities where voting patterns are similar in state-wide and regional

elections (Galicia, for instance, but also the autonomous communities without

autonomist parties, such as Murcia, Madrid, Castile-la Mancha, Extremadura), and

autonomous communities where voters vote differently in state-wide and regional

elections (Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, the Canaries) (Pallares, 1994; Pallares and

Keating, 2006). Overall, Catalonia, the Basque Country and the Canary Islands are

the regions where voting patterns tend to diverge the most from state-wide voting

patterns. As a result, the regional branches of PP and PSOE should be more auton-

omous in these regions (Catalonia, the Basque country, Navarre) than in other

regions.

There is a tendency for parties governing at the state level to fall back in auton-

omous elections. Contrary to the expectations of the second-order thesis (Reif and

Schmitt 1980), state-level opposition parties do not always benefit from the poor

results of the governing party, and the share of the vote of non-state-wide parties

tends to increase in regional elections (Pallares and Keating, 2006: 107). However,

the 2003 regional elections saw the governing PP lose power in only one region

(Cantabria) and win in another (the Balearic Islands). In the next regional elections,

the governing PSOE maintained its positions and won two regions: Galicia, where it

governs in coalition with the autonomist BNG, and in the Balearic Islands. The 2007

election continued the tendency for the same party to dominate at both levels.



Table 1. The party systems of the Spanish regions (1999, 2003 and 2007 regional elections)

% of votes Governing coalitions

Feeling ofregional identity

PP þ PSOE Regionalist parties

(2005) 1999 2003 2007 1999 2003 2007 1999–2003 2003–2007 Change in 2007

Castile and Leon 2.5 85.9 87.2 88.7 5.2 5.1 3.9 PP PP noCastile la M. 3.3 95.2 95.8 95.5 — — — PSOE PSOE noMadrid Com. 4.0 89.4 89.0a 88.4 — — — PP PP noMurcia 4.9 90.0 92.1 91.5 — — — PP PP noCantabria 9.6 77.5 74.0 67.2 17.0 19.7 29.5 PP–PRC PRC–PSOE noValencian Com. 9.3 83.0 84.4 88.3 9.4 7.8 1.0 PP PP noExtremadura 10.3 89.5 91.6 92.8 — — — PSOE PSOE PSOE–CELa Rioja 11.2 88.5 88.4 90.8 5.9 6.9 6.1 PP PP noAragon 13.2 70.5 70.2 73.9 24.8 25.4 20.7 PSOE–PAR min. PSOE–PAR noAsturias 15.8 79.5 81.5 85.6 9.9 4.8 2.3 PSOE PSOE–IU PSOE min.Andalusiab 16.0 83.4 83.3 n.a. 7.5 6.3 n.a. PSOE–PA PSOE n.a.Balearic Islands 23.8 71.7 70.5 80.2 19.4 15.7 16.1 PSOE–PSM–IU min. PP PSOE–BM–UM min.Galiciac 24.7 72.6 74.7 79.4 25.1 23.0 18.9 PP PP PSOE min.


Canary Islands 36.5 52.0 56.8 59.4 37.5 33.3 35.8 CC–PP CC–PP noNavarre 36.8 63.2d 64.2d 65.6d 28.6 15.4 28.4 UPN min. UPN–CDN UPN–CDN min.Cataloniae 37.7 47.8 43.4 38.3 46.8 47.8 46.5 CiU min. PSC–ERC–ICV noBasque Countryf 45.8 37.7 41.0 40.1 55.6 52.8 53.4 PNV–EA min. PNV–EA–IU min. noAverage 20.1 74.9 76.5 77.3 17.2 15.5 14.7Spain 1999–2007g n.a. 76.4 78.7 n.a. 11.1 11.9 n.a. PP min–PP PP–PSOE min. n.a.

aNov. 2003 election.bElections in Andalusia in 2000 and 2004.cElections in Galicia in 1997, 2001 and 2005.dIncludes the UPN (Union del Pueblo Navarro), which is associated with the PP.eElections in Catalonia in 1999, 2003 and 2006.fElections in the Basque country in 1998, 2001 and 2005.gSpanish parliamentary elections took place in 2000 and 2004.

Abbreviations: n.a., not applicable; CE, Coalicion Extremena; PA, Partido Andalucista; PRC, Partido Regionalista de Cantabria; BNG, Bloque Nacionalista Gallego; BM, Bloc per

Mallorca; UM, Unio Mallorquina; CDN, Convergencia de Democratas de Navarra; CC, Coalicion Canaria; PSC, Partit dels Socialistas de Catalunya; ERC, Esquerra Republicana

de Catalunya; ICV, Iniciativa per Catalunya-Els Verds; PNV, Partido Nacionalista Vasco; EA, Eusko Alkartasuna.

Sources: CIS Estudio 2610 Barometro Autonomico (2005), http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/-Archivos/Marginales/2600_2619/2610/Es2610_mapa.html; Ministerio del Interior

http://www.elecciones.mir.es/MIR/jsp/resultados/index.htm; Argos Archivo Historico Electoral http://www.pre.gva.es/argos/archivo/index.html; Josep Ma Reniu’s website

on coalitions in Spain http://www.ub.edu/grepa/Datosydocs.htm (websites all accessed on 10 Dec. 2007).


This contradicts the second-order thesis but suggests a degree of nationalization of

electoral stakes. The exception is the Basque country, which remains dominated

by the PNV. The nationalization of electoral results suggests a certain level of cen-

tralization of party organizations. The central levels of the PP and the PSOE have an

interest in limiting the autonomy of the regional branches in order to maintain their

internal cohesion and make sure that the poor results or policies of one regional

branch do not affect the rest of the party. The Basque country may be an exception

to this tendency.

Overall, the electoral data suggest that the Spanish parties should give some level

of autonomy to their regional branches in order to accommodate the parties’ electoral

platforms to the variety of regional contexts. The regional branches in the regions

where autonomist parties are the strongest (the Basque country, Catalonia, the

Canary Islands, Galicia and Navarre) should have higher levels of autonomy than in

those regions without an autonomist challenger (Madrid, Murcia, the Castiles, etc.).

However, the elements of co-operative federalism in the design of the State of the

Autonomies and the nationalization of electoral stakes might limit the extent of their

autonomy.

Devolution and Party Systems in Scotland and Wales

Devolution is much more recent in the UK and less hindsight is available than in Spain.

In institutional terms, the devolution agreement of 1999 created a very asymmetrical

system. Devolution was imposed from above, albeit under the pressure of autonomist

parties that had seen their influence grow and their electoral results increase since the

1970s. Devolution has taken an integrative form in Wales, where a National Assembly

with powers of secondary legislation was set up,2 and a dual form in Scotland, where

the Scottish Parliament can enact primary legislation and has a limited tax-varying

power. Both governments are financed primarily by a central block grant calculated

with the ‘Barnett formula’, which adjusts public expenditures in Scotland and Wales

to changes in spending in England (Bogdanor, 2003: 243; Swenden, 2006: 137).

The Scottish and Welsh authorities can spend this grant as they wish, as it is not

attached to a particular programme or spending area. In spite of these differences,

Wales is not more integrated in central decision making than Scotland. In fact, inter-

governmental relations are quite limited and take the form of inter-executive meetings

and bilateral relations between ministers (Swenden, 2006: 202–203). If party organiz-

ation matches the organization of the state, this asymmetry should be reflected in the

organization of the three state-wide parties: the Scottish branch should be more auton-

omous than the Welsh one, and both regional branches should have a very limited input

in central decision making.

Nationalism and feelings of regional identity have always been higher in Scotland

than in Wales. Table 2 shows that a larger share of Scottish respondents has a predo-

minantly regional identification. Likewise, the Scottish National Party has always

attracted larger shares of the electorate than Plaid Cymru in state-wide elections

(Newell, 1998: 108; Van Morgan, 2006: 259–260, 267). Both parties have won

only small numbers of seats in state-wide parliamentary elections because of the plur-

ality electoral system and the small size of their electoral bases compared to the

316 E. Fabre


Table 2. Regional elections, governments and identity in Scotland and Wales

Conservative Labour Liberal Dem. SNP/PC Other Regionalidentity

(%)a Governing partiesVotes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

Scotland 1999 15.4 18 33.6 56 12.4 17 27.3 35 11.3 3 66.5 Lab–LD(0 þ 18) (53 þ 3) (12 þ 5) (7 þ 28) (1 þ 2)

2003 15.6 18 29.4 50 11.8 17 20.9 27 22.3 17 64.7 Lab-LD(3 þ 15) (46 þ 4) (13 þ 4) (9 þ 18) (2 þ 15)

2007 13.9 17 29.2 46 11.3 16 31.0 47 14.6 3 61.0b SNP min.(4 þ 13) (37 þ 9) (11 þ 5) (21 þ 26) (1 þ 2)

Wales 1999 16.5 9 35.4 28 12.5 6 30.5 17 5.1 0 37.4 Lab min. (1999–2000)(1 þ 8) (27 þ 1) (3 þ 3) (9 þ 8) Lab-LD (2000–2003)

2003 19.2 11 36.6 30 12.7 6 19.7 12 8.4 1 46.8 Lab(1 þ 10) (30 þ 0) (3 þ 3) (5 þ 7) (1 þ 0)

2007 21.4 12 29.6 26 11.7 6 21.0 15 16.3 1 34.9b Lab min. (2006–2007/2007)(5 þ 7) (24 þ 2) (3 þ 3) (7 þ 8) (1 þ 0) Lab-PC (2007/2007–)

aSum of share of replies “More [REG] than British” and “[REG] not British” to the question: “Which of the following statements best describes how you see yourself?”.bData for the year 2005.

Note: The share of the vote refers to the regional ballot. The figures in parentheses are respectively for the number of constituency MSPs/AMs and regional (top-up) MSPs/AMs.

Sources: House of Commons Library Research Paper 03/59 (2003); National Centre for Social Research et al. (2001); Scottish Centre for Social Research (2005); Jones et al.

(2000, 2004); British General Election Study (2005) http://www.besis.org (accessed 10 Dec. 2007).


English electorate. In contrast, regional elections, which are held under an electoral

system (compensatory mixed system) that increases their chances of winning seats,

have represented clear opportunities for the SNP and PC to become key political

players in their respective regions. In the 2003 and 2007 elections the SNP attracted

a larger share of the vote in Scotland than Plaid Cymru in Wales. These facts

should strengthen the asymmetry between the Scottish and Welsh branches of the

state-wide parties and work to the advantage of the Scottish branch.

Scottish and Welsh elections are neither completely second-order nor first-order

(Trystan et al., 2003: 648; Fabre, 2008: 92–97). Table 2 documents the domination

and yet the slow decline of Labour in both regions. The party has not only governed

at the central level but also in both regions until the 2007 elections. It is therefore

difficult to attribute this decline solely to the party’s governing position at the

centre. The autonomist parties SNP and Plaid Cymru both achieved the second

highest share of the vote in their respective regions in the 1999 and 2003 elections.

In 2007, the SNP was the first party in Scotland and formed a minority government,

occasionally supported by two Green MSPs. Plaid Cymru only came in third behind

Labour and the Conservatives but joined a coalition with the Labour party. Overall,

the party systems have become increasingly different from the state-wide party

system, and governments have become increasingly different from the state-wide

government. This may lead to a greater autonomy of the regional branches of the

state-wide parties to accommodate the parties’ strategies to the different regional

contexts.

Whereas Scottish and Welsh elections occur on the same day, there is no evidence

that the horizontal simultaneity has led to a nationalization of the stakes of these elec-

tions. Campaigns were run mostly on regional issues, with occasional visits from UK

party leaders, and a very low level of interest from the UK media (Jones and Trystan,

2000: 5; Thomas et al., 2003: 4; McAllister, 2004: 7). As a result, in spite of the low

turnout, Scottish and Welsh elections tend to be quite important by themselves and

have little influence on national politics. This should strengthen the autonomy of the

regional branches of the state-wide parties, as these elections have only a limited

impact on the party as a whole.

As a result, one should expect the British state-wide parties to be quite decentra-

lized. The asymmetric nature of the devolution process, however, means that one

expects the Scottish party branch of the three state-wide parties to be more autonomous

but less integrated in central decision making than the Welsh branch.

Multi-level Party Organization in Spain and the UK3

This section compares the organization of the British Liberal Democrats, Labour and

Conservative parties and the Spanish PSOE and Partido Popular. The relationship

between central and regional levels of organization consists of two dimensions: the

integration of regional interests in central decision making (central party organs, selec-

tion of leaders and candidates for state-wide elections, elaboration of the manifesto for

state-wide elections, and procedure to amend the party constitution) and the degree of

autonomy of the regional branches from central party interventions. These two aspects

of party organization are considered in turn.

318 E. Fabre


Integration of the Regional Branches in the Central Party

The Liberal Democrats are the party with the highest level of involvement of

the regional branches in the central party. This is due to the fact that the Scottish

and Welsh Liberal Democrats select the party’s candidates for state-wide elections,

can veto any change to the party constitution that would affect their competences,

and send representatives to the all the organs of the central (called Federal) party

(executive, policy-making commission, etc.). In sharp contrast, the Labour party

barely includes its regional branches in central decision making: they are not rep-

resented in the National Executive Committee, do not participate in the selection of

the party leader and of candidates for Westminster elections, and they do not have a

say over the reform of the party constitution. The organization of the Conservative

party is asymmetrical. The Scottish and Welsh Conservatives both have a low input

in the central party, with a limited representation in the party executive and no role

in the selection of the leader or in amending the constitution. The Scottish Conserva-

tives can, however, select the party’s candidates for state-wide general elections, while

the candidates for Welsh constituencies are selected by the central party.

The regions can be represented in state-wide party conferences via their constitu-

encies. Interviews have shown that the presence of Scottish and Welsh conference del-

egates has diminished over time because there is a growing perception that state-wide

conferences discuss mainly English issues and that there is less at stake for the Scottish

and Welsh party branches. In addition, party conferences—in particular in the Labour

and Conservative parties—have a limited role in the determination of party policy.

Labour and the Liberal Democrats also count a number of Scots and a more limited

number of Welsh people in top party positions, starting with their leaders. These

high ranking party officials, however, own their position to the state-wide party and

their election to the Westminster parliament. Therefore, they are more likely to rep-

resent the state-wide party and defend its interests over those of the regional branches.

Gordon Brown is a case in point: as a high ranking Scottish member of the UK govern-

ment and now prime minister, he has kept close tabs on the evolution of the situation in

Scotland and has tried to maintain his influence over the Scottish Labour party in order

to ensure that the positions of the Scottish party did not stray too far from those of the

central party.

The regional branches of the PSOE are represented in the central party, but their

input is rather limited. The introduction of individual secret ballot in the party congress

has reduced the ability of regional leaders to influence the votes of the delegates and

hence the choice of the party leader. The most crucial point of influence of the regional

party branches in the central party is the party executive. Powerful regional party

leaders have, at times, been able to affect the whole party through their participation

in the Federal Executive Commission (Mendez Lago, 2006). Their level of influence

has varied considerably over time. A form of zero-sum game is played between the

state-wide and regional leaderships: the central leadership dominated the party appar-

atus during most of the Gonzalez leadership, but in the 1990s, when the state-wide lea-

dership was weak and divided, the power of regional leaders at the centre increased

considerably. The most important regional ‘barons’ were presidents of an autonomous

community, like Chavez in Andalusia and Rodrıguez Ibarra in Extremadura. Finally,



the strengthening of the central leadership with Rodrıguez Zapatero since 2000 has led

to a retreat of the regional leaders from the centre stage of the party, even though some

regional barons remain influential in the party (Mendez Lago, 2005). Meanwhile,

regional party leaders have gained an official role in the definition of the party’s

policy on the State of the Autonomies via the Territorial Council. The creation of

this council has been a somewhat mixed blessing for the regional branches: it rep-

resents an improvement in their role at the centre, as they have gained a genuine

role in the formulation of state-wide policy, but it has also served as an excuse for

the central leadership to limit the presence of regional leaders in the FEC.

The PSC–PSOE is a special case: as a separate party federated to the PSOE, it

chooses its own leader and candidates for state-wide elections, develops its own pro-

gramme for Spanish parliamentary elections and adopts its own constitutional rules. At

the same time, the PSC is involved in the central decision-making organs and processes

of the PSOE, with representatives in the PSOE congress and in its executive organs.

The level of autonomy of the PSC and its ability to develop policies autonomously

should not, however, be overestimated, as the influence of the PSOE remains import-

ant, and both parties co-ordinate their policies at the state-wide level through a

common parliamentary group.

The central organs of the Partido Popular have remained firmly in charge of can-

didate selection and policy making. The regional branches of the PP are also integrated

in the central party executive, but their role is rather limited, and regional leaders

included in the central executive have not had the same role as the regional barons

in the PSOE. The presidentialized nature of the Partido Popular means that the party

president is powerful enough to set his own agenda and is relatively immune from

external pressures. As a result, the presence of regional leaders in the National Execu-

tive Committee (Comite Ejecutivo Nacional) has served to integrate the peripheries in

the state-wide party and ensure that their leaders shared the same interests and message

as the central party.

Overall, all the parties involve their regional branches in central decision making to

a limited extent only, which conforms to expectations. In most cases, the central party

has retained full responsibility over state-wide election processes (candidate selection

and policy making) and the regional branches are integrated only weakly in central

decision-making organs. The Labour and Conservative parties tend to integrate their

regional branches in central decision making slightly less than their Spanish counter-

parts. This also conforms to expectations according to the type of regionalization of

each country. This lack of regional representation at the centre can also be explained

by a willingness of central leaderships to remain unconstrained by meso-level elites. In

order to remain insulated for the pressures of regional leaders, most state-wide parties

have chosen to limit their integration in central party organs. This is reflected in the

small numbers of arenas where regional leaders can affect the state-wide

parties. This is particularly true of the Labour and Conservative parties in the UK,

which have not really adapted their central organs to the new devolved organization

of the state, but also of the Partido Popular, which was created as a very centralized

and presidentialized party (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2005). The PSOE shows that

the central party generally tries to limit the influence of regional leaders at the

central level.

320 E. Fabre


Autonomy of the Regional Party Branches

The Partido Popular is the party with the highest level of central involvement in

regional party affairs. The party’s emphasis on party cohesion is reflected in the low

level of autonomy of the regional party branches (Astudillo and Garcıa-Guereta,

2006: 409–410). The central party tends to intervene in all aspects of party organiz-

ation and the regional branches have only a limited room for manoeuvre when it

comes to choosing their leader, their candidates for regional elections and drafting

the manifestos for regional elections. In addition, the central party has a veto power

over the decisions taken by the regional branches.

Among all the regional branches of the PP, the Galician PP had a slightly greater

level of political autonomy during the period of Fraga’s leadership of the PPdeG. In the

post-Fraga period, the Galician branch has become a normal party branch again. This

change has been facilitated by a combination of regional party change, the presence of

a Galician party leader in Madrid and the PPdeG’s loss of the Xunta de Galicia to an

alliance between the socialists and the autonomist party BNG in 2005. In Catalonia and

the Basque country, the central party tends to intervene in order to make sure that the

potential for divergence in these regions does not interfere with the party’s message in

the rest of the country. In Catalonia, the central party has played a crucial role in the

choice of party leaders in order to accommodate the strategy of the PPC to the needs of

the state-wide party (Yanque, 2003; Marın, 2006). During the debate on the Catalan

Statute of Autonomy, the central party has taken the lead of the campaign against

the statute adopted by the Catalan Parliament, often adopting a position that was

likely to affect the electoral chances of the Catalan party branch negatively. Recently,

interventions from the central level pushed the Catalan party leader Josep Pique to

resign from his position, as he felt disavowed when the central leadership appointed

a parallel steering committee to prepare the 2008 general elections (Barbeta, 2007).

The other regional branches, even those that have been in power for a long period

of time, have a limited autonomy and follow the central party line.

In the period that spanned the democratic transition and the PSOE’s loss of its

majority in the Spanish parliament, the federal party, under the dual leadership of

Felipe Gonzalez and Alfonso Guerra, controlled the peripheries and managed to influ-

ence the various regional federations in order to maintain the cohesion of the party

(Mendez Lago, 2005: 179). After 1993, with the increasing tensions between the reno-

vadores and guerristas factions at the central level, the leadership turned its attention

away from the regional federations and focused instead on factional divisions. The

regional branches used this sudden change as an opportunity to increase their auton-

omy. Holding power for an extended period of time in an autonomous community pro-

vided some regional federations and their leaders with a strong power base and a strong

level of democratic legitimacy, and regional heavyweights used the temporary weak-

ness of the central leadership to increase their decisional autonomy at the regional

level. It is in non-historic nationalities that the PSOE has created strongholds, with

the continuous government of Andalusia, Extremadura and Castile-la Mancha.

After the election of Rodrıguez Zapatero as secretary-general in 2000, the auton-

omy of the regional branches remained rather high. Mostly, the federal party tends

to limit its interventions in regional affairs to trying to prevent internal divisions and



ensuring that regional congresses are run smoothly. More recently, the federal party

had tried to prevent regional branches from diverging from the strategy of the

central party. This was apparent in the FEC veto of the Navarre PSN–PSOE’s coalition

agreement with the Basque autonomists of Nafarroa Bai. Instead, the FEC forced the

PSN to support the election of a minority regional government led by the UPN, which

is linked to the PP.

While officially a separate party, the PSC remains organically linked to the PSOE,

which leads to some necessary level of co-ordination. The Spanish party has focused its

interventions in Catalonia on leadership selection and party policy, two crucial

elements for the convergence between the parties. The PSC has nevertheless increased

its level of autonomy in the 1990s, like the ordinary regional branches of the PSOE and

also thanks to Pasqual Maragall’s leadership. The PSOE central leadership’s disagree-

ment with Maragall was, however, one of the factors that contributed to destabilizing

his leadership and led to his replacement by Jose Montilla, first secretary of the PSC

and until then minister in the Spanish government, in the 2006 election.4

In the UK, the three state-wide parties have relatively similar formal forms of

organization in Scotland and Wales, but the actual levels of autonomy of the regional

branches can be quite different. The Labour party is the party that has been the most

involved in regional party affairs. The central party has limited constitutional

powers to intervene at the regional level, but the secretaries of state for Scotland

and Wales (or shadow secretaries, when the Labour party returns to the opposition

benches) are quite involved in the life of the regional party branches. They serve as

a liaison between the central and regional levels, but also as vectors of the influence

of the central party in Scotland and Wales.

The central Labour party (the parliamentary leadership, via the National Executive

Committee) has paid particular attention to the selection of party leaders and candi-

dates for the first regional elections of 1999. By making sure that a majority of

candidates to regional elections were from the same faction as the central leadership,

the central party tried to make sure that its Scottish and Welsh branches would refrain

from diverging from state-wide party policies. The central party particularly intervened

in the selection of the party leader in Wales, where it initially managed to prevent the

election of Rhodri Morgan as regional party leader (Shaw, 2001: 43). The Labour

group in the National Assembly, however, rebelled later and replaced the leader

favoured by the central leadership with Rhodri Morgan (Fabre, 2008: 111). In

Scotland, the issue of leadership was less problematic, but the central party tried to

control the selection of candidates by influencing the composition of the panel inter-

viewing prospective candidates. These cases of blatant intervention from the centre

were publicized quite widely and caused some level of uproar within the party and

bad publicity outside of the party (Bradbury, forthcoming). The central party seems

to have been less involved in 2003, but it is true that candidate selection was not as

crucial as in 1999, when the party had to produce an initial pool of candidates to fill

all the positions.

The Scottish and Welsh Labour parties have been left rather free to develop their

own electoral platforms, but they have shown limited levels of divergence from the

state-wide party in their policies and campaign profiles (Pogorelis et al., 2005). In

the 2007 election, the Labour–Liberal Democrats coalition was threatened by the

322 E. Fabre


rise of the Scottish National Party in the polls. This resulted in a higher level of

involvement of the state-wide leadership of the Labour party in the campaign. State-

wide leaders Blair and Brown campaigned in Scotland with Scottish party leaders to

reject the SNP’s separatist agenda and emphasize the advantages of remaining in the

Union and of quasi-congruent government in Scotland and in London.

In contrast, the other two parties have left their regional branches freer to run their

own affairs. The Liberal Democrats have, for instance, completely adapted to devolu-

tion, in practice allowing the Scottish and Welsh Liberal Democrats to exercise powers

that were only theoretical until then. The party adopted a federal organization at

the moment of the merger of the SDP with the Liberal party in 1988, even though

the British state was still centralized. The Scottish and Welsh regional branches

can select their leaders and their candidates for regional elections freely, and they

can also elaborate their manifestos for regional elections. Overall, the Scottish and

Welsh party branches have not really diverged from the party line of the federal

party. They have adapted the party line to the different regional contexts and to the

necessities and consequences of being part of coalition governments with Labour,

which means that the regional party policies can be ‘different but not dissimilar’ to

those of the state-wide party.

The Conservative party was initially opposed to devolution. Yet, it rapidly adapted

its organization to the new structure of party competition. The central party has given

its regional branches in Scotland and Wales a large degree of autonomy to select their

leaders and candidates and to develop their own election manifestos. The Scottish

party, which was an independent Scottish Conservative party until 1965, has more

autonomy than the Welsh party, which is organizationally weaker. The Scottish

party has a longer experience of regional autonomy. In fact, it used to be a completely

independent party until 1965. After the Scottish Unionist party integrated with the UK

Conservative party, it retained some level of autonomy and selected its own candidates

for Westminster elections. The party did not have a Wales-wide organization before

devolution, and the new Welsh Conservatives have less resources and less practice

of making decisions for themselves than the Scottish Conservatives. In spite of their

organizational autonomy, the Scottish and Welsh branches of both parties have

remained relatively close to the party line set out by the state-wide party.

The relationships between the Scottish and British Conservatives are not always

easy. In the run-up to the last Scottish election, the relationships between the

Shadow Scottish Secretary David Mundell (the party’s only Scottish MP) and the Scot-

tish party seriously deteriorated after he criticized the party’s MSPs (Barnes, 2007).

A month later, rumours of a separation between the Scottish and UK parties were

sparked after it appeared that the UK party considered this option in order to play

the anti-Scottish card against Gordon Brown. Similarly, the Scottish Conservatives

could benefit from distancing themselves from the Thatcherite, tax-cuts image that

the Conservatives still have north of the border (Peev and MacMahon, 2007). These

rumours were soon dispelled by the Scottish leader Annabel Goldie, amid increasing

concerns from the central party that the Scottish Conservatives were unable to increase

their election results from the 2003 election (MacDonnell, 2007).

Overall, there is a variety of situations in both countries. The PP is certainly the

most centralized party of all. The PSOE is also quite centralized, but the central



party has, however, lost some of its leverage over regional federations and regional

leaders. The evolution of the PSOE reflects the growing importance of the autonomous

communities and the alternation between government and opposition at the central

level. In the UK, Labour is the party that has faced the most difficulties with regard

to the organizational consequences of devolution, but this can probably be explained

in part by its status as a governing party in London. The costs of intra-party divergence

were likely to be higher for the governing party than for the opposition parties, which

have found it easier to adapt to devolution. The Conservative party is, however, now

starting to suffer from tensions between the UK and Scottish levels, as the image of the

UK party can be a liability for the Scots, and the UK party tends to become the repre-

sentative of English nationalism.

Institutions, Elections or Parties: Which Factors Matter the Most?

Empirical data supporting the detailed hypotheses on the effects of institutional design

on party organization are scarce. The cases of Spain and the UK both show important

levels of variation within countries, demonstrating that institutional factors such as the

structure of the state alone cannot explain multi-level party organization. The distinc-

tion between the dual devolution in Scotland and the more integrative design of Welsh

self-government is visible only in the Conservative party, but this asymmetry owes

more to the party’s history than to institutional arrangements.

Likewise, institutional design and the institutional asymmetry between historic

nationalities and non-historic autonomous communities in Spain do not explain

much of the differences between regional branches within the PP and the PSOE.

The strength of minority nationalism and a distinct historical experience can explain

the creation of a separate Socialist party in Catalonia (Gillespie, 1989; Roller and

van Houten, 2003: 10). Original forms of organization and organizational ethos also

explain the strength of the central leadership of the Partido Popular. Created as a pre-

sidentialist party, the PP remains very centralized and the party leader enjoys a strong

level of autonomy in the running of the party, whether in organizational terms or over

policy matters.

The levels of regional identification and of support for regionalist parties do not

seem to cause greater levels of autonomy for the regional party branches in regions

with high levels of regional autonomy or strong autonomist parties. For instance, the

Basque branches of both Spanish parties have not achieved higher levels of autonomy

than the other party branches. This can probably be explained by the high salience of

Basque nationalism and terrorism in national politics, which has contributed to main-

taining a high level of interest and involvement of the central party in the region. This

is true for the PP, for which terrorism and security are key campaign themes, but also

for the PSOE, which does not want to be seen as being soft on terrorism. However, the

regional branches of the state-wide parties have not been given more leeway in other

autonomous communities with strong levels of support for regionalist parties.

The higher level of centralization of the Spanish parties reflects better the expec-

tations on the basis of the characteristics of the multi-level electoral context, in

which state-wide and regional elections have not become completely separate political

arenas. The Scottish and Welsh elections are less tied to the national context and to the

324 E. Fabre


results of the state-wide elections than the Spanish regional elections. The Spanish

state-wide parties tend to be symmetrically organized, even in those autonomous com-

munities with identity and electoral specificities. The limited connection between elec-

toral levels certainly facilitated the form of organization adopted by the Conservatives

and the Liberal Democrats, which may want to give more autonomy to their regional

branches in order to increase their electorability at the regional level without fearing a

negative impact during state-wide elections.

Incumbency seems, however, to be a decisive factor in the balance of power between

the central and regional levels of party organization. The Labour party is a case in point:

it has governed the UK since 1997 and it has ruled Scotland and Wales either alone or in

coalition since 1999 (but was sent back to the opposition in Scotland in May 2007).

During this period, the central party has tried to maintain a high level of party cohesion

and ensure that the Scottish and Welsh parties followed the policies of the state-wide

party. This strategy was, however, not entirely successful. For instance, the Welsh

party leader Rhodri Morgan declared that there would be “clear red water” between

the Welsh party and the central party leadership, and the Scottish party also attempted

to model itself as an autonomous Scottish party and rejected some key policies of the

UK party, such as the creation of foundation hospitals, while remaining quite close to

the ‘New Labour’ agenda (Bradbury, 2006: 226–227). These timid attempts to show

some independence from the central party were maybe also prompted by the incumbent

status of the Scottish and Welsh Labour parties.

The PSOE also illustrates the importance of incumbency at the central level, as the

federal organs of the PSOE had a much tighter grip over their regional branches when

the party governed Spain than during the opposition period that started in 1996. The influ-

ence of regional barons at the central level diminished again after the election of

Rodrıguez Zapatero as secretary-general (Mendez Lago, 2005) and even more since

the party returned to office. Between 1989 and 1996, the PP endeavoured to become a

governing party and focused on maintaining party cohesion in order to achieve this

goal. The focus of power at the centre was seen as an essential element of the party’s strat-

egy, and the goals of the central party took precedence over those of the regional branches.

Once the party won office in Madrid in 1996, this centralizing tendency was strengthened.

The cases also show that when in opposition, state-wide parties tend to give more

autonomy to their regional branches. The exception here is the Partido Popular, which

has remained centralized throughout its history. Opposition parties sometimes tend to

place less emphasis on party cohesion and can actually benefit from adapting their mess-

ages to specific regional contexts. In addition, parties in opposition at the central level

may hold office in some regions. This has been the case of PP between 1989 and

1996, of the PSOE between 1996 and 2004 and of the Liberal Democrats between

1999 and 2007. Holding power provides regional leaders with some leverage within

the party and a level of authority that may make them less susceptible to yield to the

pressures of the centre. Occasionally, they may use these resources to increase their influ-

ence at the central level. This has particularly been the case with PSOE regional leaders

who became presidents of autonomous communities, such as Manuel Chavez in

Andalusia and Jose Bono in Castile-La Mancha. Incumbency and the personal prestige

of Manuel Fraga can also explain why the Galician party branch of the PP has managed

to adopt a slightly distinct profile and adopt more regionalist policies.



Finally, intra-party factors such as party history and ideology contribute towards

explaining some of the differences that are observed between the parties. The centra-

lization of the PP is a legacy of its formation and reflects its position on the State of the

Autonomies. The federal organization of the Liberal Democrats reflects the party’s

commitment to federalism and its swift adaptation was facilitated by its federal

form of organization since 1989. The tendency of the Labour party to try and

impose party cohesion can be traced back to the trauma of the long period of opposition

in the 1980s and 1990s and the leadership’s perception that the party’s success can be

guaranteed only if it remains united and avoids infighting. Lastly, the asymmetry

between the Scottish and Welsh Conservatives can be explained by their different

histories.

Conclusion

Overall, one finds a variety of organizational forms in Spain and in the UK, and the

parties have adapted to regionalization to the extent that they were comfortable with

the possibility of policy divergence. There is a general tendency towards a limited

inclusion of the regional branches in central decision making. The organizational

habits of the state-wide parties contribute toward explaining their multi-level structure

and the level of autonomy of their regional branches, as do the parties’ incumbency

situation at the central and regional levels. The institutional context is important

insofar as it creates significant levels of regional government but not in the sense

that a particular form of state organization can explain the relationship between

party levels and the distribution of competences within the parties. This article has

shown that the parties and their leaders remain crucial actors in processes of party

change and that parties do not simply react to environmental changes. Central party

leaders generally have managed to limit the changes at the centre and party leaders

at both levels have often tried to use the resources that were available to them to

increase their decisional autonomy vis-a-vis the other level. Attempts to increase the

autonomy of the regional branches of state-wide parties have often been limited by

the centralized ethos of some parties and the incumbent position of the central level.

Party change is, however, likely to continue and the relations between the central

and regional levels of party organization are likely to keep evolving, as a new wave of

statute reforms is giving some autonomous communities more responsibilities and as

devolution in Wales becomes stronger after the Government of Wales 2007. Whereas

patterns of party organization can be considered as pretty established in Spain, the

recent nature of devolution in the UK and the fact that the Labour party has been in

power at the central level since 1999 mean that it will be interesting to monitor the

evolution of the British state-wide parties when devolution has run for a longer

period of time and under other government configurations at the UK level and in the

regions.

Acknowledgement

This research was made possible by a doctoral grant from the Flemish Fund for

Research FWO and the participation in the research group ‘Federal parties and regional

326 E. Fabre


party competition’ funded by the FWO and the University of Leuven Research

Council. The author would like to thank Bart Maddens, Wilfried Swenden and

Liselotte Libbrecht for their numerous comments on earlier versions of this article.

Responsibility for interpretation remains solely with the author.

Notes

1This article refers to the pre-2006 period and does not take into account changes in the statutes of auton-

omy that have taken place in Andalusia, Catalonia and the Valencian Community in 2006 and 2007 and

that are proposed in a number of other autonomous communities.2The change in the Welsh devolution arrangement need not concern us here as its provisions were

implemented only after the 2007 election.3This section draws heavily on the author’s PhD dissertation. For a more detailed account of the vertical

organization of the Spanish and British parties, see Fabre (2008: chs 5, 7).4Other factors that contributed to Maragall’s downfall were his problems with the rest of the direction of

the PSC and his poor relations with one of the coalition partners of the PSC, Esquerra Republicana de

Catalunya. The author thanks Monica Mendez Lago for this information. Any error or misinterpretation

is, of course, the author’s.

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