regulating work and employment: in search of a more comprehensive paradigm

Regulating work and employment: in search of a more comprehensive

paradigm

Ida RegaliaUniversity of Milan

Decline of TUs and collective action and crisis of traditional paradigm of IR/ER

For some time now an important strand of study has been emphasising the limitations of the traditional paradigm of IR/ER, according to which• work and employment in the advanced economies are

regulated on interactions among 3 groups of IR actors (labour, capital, and the state)

• rely largely upon three exchange mechanisms: individual exchange, collective bargaining, political exchange

• although with the predominance of collective, trade-union-controlled logics of action, based on worker representation

Decline of TUs and collective action and crisis of traditional paradigm of IR/ER – 2

To be noted that the industrial relations field had historically consolidated as an arena of national dimensions.

Within this space, two canonical levels of relations among actors• a central or national level • and/or a decentralized level (the company). to which corresponded a twofold logic of action

– the centralized bargaining for the settlement of distributive conflict (at the centre)

– the bargaining/control of specific working conditions in firms (within workplaces)

Decline of TUs and collective action and crisis of traditional paradigm of IR/ER -3

• during the glorious 30 the extraordinary success of this system of interaction rooted in a collective, union-based logic of action, and worker representation, more or less substantially supported by intervention of the state, appeared long uncontested

• The subsequent widespread “decline” of TUs and collective bargaining put under stress also the field and theory of IR and ER

need for a revitalization of collective action and readjustment of theory.

Weaknesses of the traditional paradigm

Less attention paid to other shortcomings and weaknesses, that characterised the model even during the “Glorious 30”

At micro and meso levels not all groups of workers were adequately represented and

protected: women, white collars, ethnic/migrant workers, part-timers.

Not all kind of firms were covered by mechanisms through which employment rights were generally implemented: SF, co-operatives

Not all sectors were properly covered by systems of regulation established through collective bargaining

Weaknesses of the traditional paradigm

While at macro level,

• the national dimension of the IR field de facto prevented the possibility of devising ways to regulate work and employment in MNCs outside each national state – or even the imagination of such possibility.

Crisis of the modelSince the mid-1970s, in consequence of

• macroeconomic and political changes (oil shocks, economic crises, growing exposure to international competition, financialisation of the economy, decreasing capacity of governments to intervene autonomously in the economic and social spheres, etc)

• the firms’ production strategies ( search for alternatives to Fordist production models),

• changing dynamics of labour markets (with regard to both supply and demand)

the structural conditions which had allowed the virtuous development of the model gradually disappeared

Crisis of the modelThe already existing gaps and limitations of the regulatory model emerged together with new ones:• the dualism in the labour market between workers well

protected and the others. • the difficulties for the unions to reach and organize

younger, or highly skilled, IT & knowledge workers; • the limited possibility in protecting even strong workers

against the consequences of economic crises or relocation processes in the new global context

reduced ability of the system to maintain its promises in its traditional strongholds crisis of the system

What can be done?Does this crisis signal the end of the possibility of a positive, sustainable, socially fair, regulation of work and employment in the post-fordist globalized economy, and inevitable decline of collective action and TUs? Is there something that can be done?• Perhaps the more popular solution is the one

discussed by the literature on the revitalization of Tus and collective action.

What can be done?

• But this approach is limited in that it aims at reproducing – under different forms – an order substantially similar to the previous one.

• What is at stake goes beyond the efforts and subjective capacities of the unions, at least as we have been knowing them.

• What is needed is instead a paradigm change, broad enough as to take account of both old and new shortcomings of the traditional order.

A complex research programme

More fruitful and promising would be to start again from careful inquiry on developments that are taking place exactly at the weaker points of the previous system or on still unexplored fields. A complex research programme• But hints can already be found drawing on results of

empirical research on topics such as:– regulation of new forms of employment/nonstandard work– regulation of work and employment in small firms– trade union initiatives at the territorial level and the social

domain– trade union initiatives at international level (IFAs, etc)

Preliminary hints and suggestions Issues and practices are different. But common features can be stressed:

• Not necessarily they take place at sectoral and/or workplace level. the traditional limits of IR playfields tend to become porous or frayed. New territorial spaces, with open, fluid boundaries, tend to emerge;

• Not necessarily they are based on TUs initiative. Other actors – traditional and/or new, especially civil society organization – may come in and even take the lead.

• Unconventional forms of action and protest –enhanced by the new communication technologies – tends to supplement the traditional repertoire

• Communication, networking and virtual participation may become more important than real face-to-face participation

Lacking many of mechanisms through which employment rights are generally operationalized, ER in SF are difficult to be assessed . • Earlier debates trapped between the two opposite poles of:

“small is beautiful” Because of the quality and characteristics of personal, face-to-face,

relationships within them, small firms seen as the reign of harmonious employment relations (Bolton 1971 and Ingham 1970)

“the bleak house” Because of the disproportionate and unbalanced amounts of power

enjoyed by employers, small firms seen as the reign of managerial autocracy (the sweatshop) (Rainnie 1989)

An example: The regulation of work and employment in small firms


But the topic can be approached from 2 viewpoints: a. Whether labour in SF is protected, its terms and

conditions sufficiently and satisfactorily regulatedb. Whether labour in SF is represented by

representative organizations• The 2 perspectives can be interrelated. But they do

not overlap. Neither are they mutually exclusive

• The first regards the quality of employment relations in SF, and more particularly, the possibility for workers to enjoy socially acceptable levels of employment security and welfare. – Very often these are employment relations without (explicit) employee

representation.

• The second regards the possibility – even the desirability – of

employees’ representation by collective agents in such firms.

• By combining the two perspectives, the following ideal types of possible ER configurations will be figured out.


The regulation of labour in small firms

Labour protection, security

- +

Labour representation

-

IBleak House

IIPaternalistic “smallis beautiful”

+

Ritual representation III

Collectively mediated IR models

IV


What can we learn from the results of the investigation on the ways in which the use of labour is regulated in the Italian SFs?– The picture is variegated. It does not correspond

simply to either the “sweathouse” or the “small is beautiful model”.

– Games are not played within workplaces only:


• Not only/simply autocracy:– Although not compulsory, managements resort systematically to

sectoral collective agreements – Sometimes (1/3) they negotiate collective (informal/formal)

agreements within workplaces – They may directly come to term with employees, through

negotiations • on aspects related to the organisation of work and allocation of

opportunities and constraints (participative style of managerial decision-making)

• on wages


Games are not played within workplaces only:• Besides the benchmark function of sectoral collective

agreements (socially legitimated framework/ template coming from outside)

relationships with territorial institutions (that can provide different kind of resources to approach problems – representative organisations of both sides– governmental organisations– mutualistic/cooperative organisations

Comments Returning to our scheme:Me may easily show how data fit within the quadrants

I, III, IV:- the area of SF enjoying poor conditions (I quadrant) - the situation in which a not very effective presence of TUs is recorded (III quadrant)- the small group where a more effective presence of TUs is apparent (IV quadrant) = the case more similar to the traditional model of IR. What is however different is the possibility for the actors to benefit from external resources.

Comments

But the most interesting situation is the one of quadrant II.

participative style of decision-making individual wages negotiation bonuses direct contacts with management welfare benefits

not necessarily paternalistic= a case of (individually) negotiated order

Comments

Labour protection, security

- + Labour representation

-

IBleak House

IINot necessarily paternalistic “smallis beautiful”

+

Ritual (ineffective)representation

III

Collectively mediated IR models grounded of external resources

IV

Points for reflection

a) forms and levels of decision-making and negotiation within workplaces: - from managerial autocracy (without negotiations) to collective bargaining

passing through individual negotiation (Pizzorno’s distinction) from outside- the fundamental role also of collective bargaining from above/outside: the

normative framework of sectoral collective negotiations- the possibility of political exchange: intervention of institutions from outside possibility as well of institutionalised cooperation between the IR parties

outside workplaces (bilateral bodies) providing resources to and influencing patterns of relations within workplaces

Points for reflection need to consider the interplay between different normative

forms and levels in negotiation and regulation need to reflect on the alternative/complementarity of

individual exchange/collectively mediated regulation– not simply autocracy vs collective bargaining• Does labour in SF require representation to enjoy

protection and security?• How and under which conditions the intervention of a

representation agency can improve labour’s terms and conditions?

The cases of self-organisation of protest by employees (without representation) the importance of social dimension

Final remarks• It is not simply a problem of the effectiveness of TU

role (as we are used to imagine it)• You may imagine socially acceptable and positive

ways of setting the rules of work – without collective representation – at least as we know

it – That may take place in spaces different from workplaces– Involving a vast array of representative, and especially

not representative, actors, whose logic of interaction needs to be investigated

Final remarks

• In this perspective the way we have been accostumed to imagine a positive regulation of work (as it happened in the 30 glorious) is not simply a traditional vision, that needs to be updated.

• More generally, also with respect to the past it is only one possibility among others that require to be empirically investigated.

appendix

Other fields and topics might/should be considered

The role of social networks in IFAs – the strategic use of attacking MNCs reputation as a new form of action and protest

The possibilities of regulating the labour market to protect workers through forms of security outside the standard forms of contract

The possibilities for Tus to intervene beyond workplaces and industries (on the territory)

Patterns of Intervention, According to the Type of “Security” Sought

Security through membership within organized settings

Security through permanence on the labor market

Job security and skills development

low

I

Promotion of paths leading to a standard contract in a firm

II

Compensated promotion of opportunities for atypical work

high

III

Programs for the shared use of human resources by several firms

IV

Invention of protections and rights independent from stable memberships

Types of union initiatives and practices at the territorial level according to the logic and scope of action

logic of action

in behalf of workers with respect to: employers, firms local governments,

institutions both, others

unilateral initiative, direct protection

1 provision of labor market assistance and services to employees and workers

2 establishment of specialized offices to deal with bureaucratic issues and public policies

3 - organization of spaces for consultation/discussion - establishment of multi-function territorial structures

negotiation

4 collective bargaining at local, territorial level

5 ‘social’ negotiation, negotiation over welfare policies

6 social, territorial pacts

participation, cooperation

7 participation in bilateral employer-union bodies

8 participation in committees set up by local authorities, welfare institutions

9 involvement in tri/ multi-partite institutions

regulating work and employment: in search of a more comprehensive paradigm

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