Relativism

For the physics theory, see Theory of relativity. Forrelativism in Buddhism, see Two truths doctrine.

Relativism is the concept that points of view have noabsolute truth or validity, having only relative, subjec-tive value according to differences in perception andconsideration.[1] As moral relativism, the term is oftenused in the context of moral principles, where principlesand ethics are regarded as applicable in only limited con-text. There are many forms of relativism which vary intheir degree of controversy.[2] The term often refers totruth relativism, which is the doctrine that there are noabsolute truths, i.e., that truth is always relative to someparticular frame of reference, such as a language or a cul-ture (cultural relativism).

1 Forms of relativism

1.1 Anthropological versus philosophicalrelativism

Anthropological relativism refers to a methodologicalstance, in which the researcher suspends (or brackets) hisor her own cultural biases while attempting to understandbeliefs and behaviors in their local contexts. This has be-come known as methodological relativism, and concernsitself specifically with avoiding ethnocentrism or the ap-plication of one’s own cultural standards to the assess-ment of other cultures.[3] This is also the basis of the so-called "emic" and "etic" distinction, in which:

• An emic or insider account of behavior is a descrip-tion of a society in terms that are meaningful to theparticipant or actor’s own culture; an emic accountis therefore culture-specific, and typically refers towhat is considered "common sense" within the cul-ture under observation.

• An etic or outsider account is a description of a so-ciety by an observer, in terms that can be appliedto other cultures; that is, an etic account is cultur-ally neutral, and typically refers to the conceptualframework of the social scientist. (This is compli-cated when it is scientific research itself that is understudy, or when there is theoretical or terminologicaldisagreement within the social sciences.)

Philosophical relativism, in contrast, asserts that the truth

of a proposition depends on the metaphysical, or theo-retical frame, or the instrumental method, or the contextin which the proposition is expressed, or on the person,groups, or culture who interpret the proposition.[4]

Methodological relativism and philosophical relativismcan exist independently from one another, but most an-thropologists base their methodological relativism on thatof the philosophical variety.[5]

1.2 Descriptive versus normative rela-tivism

The concept of relativism also has importance both forphilosophers and for anthropologists in another way. Ingeneral, anthropologists engage in descriptive relativism,whereas philosophers engage in normative relativism, al-though there is some overlap (for example, descriptiverelativism can pertain to concepts, normative relativismto truth).Descriptive relativism assumes that certain culturalgroups have different modes of thought, standards of rea-soning, and so forth, and it is the anthropologist’s task todescribe, but not to evaluate the validity of these princi-ples and practices of a cultural group. It is possible foran anthropologist in his or her fieldwork to be a descrip-tive relativist about some things that typically concern thephilosopher (e.g., ethical principles) but not about others(e.g., logical principles). However, the descriptive rela-tivist’s empirical claims about epistemic principles, moralideals and the like are often countered by anthropologicalarguments that such things are universal, and much of therecent literature on these matters is explicitly concernedwith the extent of, and evidence for, cultural or moralor linguistic or human universals (see Brown, 1991 for agood discussion).The fact that the various species of descriptive relativismare empirical claims, may tempt the philosopher to con-clude that they are of little philosophical interest, butthere are several reasons why this isn't so. First, somephilosophers, notably Kant, argue that certain sorts ofcognitive differences between human beings (or even allrational beings) are impossible, so such differences couldnever be found to obtain in fact, an argument that places apriori limits on what empirical inquiry could discover andon what versions of descriptive relativism could be true.Second, claims about actual differences between groupsplay a central role in some arguments for normative rela-tivism (for example, arguments for normative ethical rel-

1

2 4 THEATRE AND RELATIVISM

ativism often begin with claims that different groups infact have different moral codes or ideals). Finally, theanthropologist’s descriptive account of relativism helps toseparate the fixed aspects of human nature from those thatcan vary, and so a descriptive claim that some importantaspect of experience or thought does (or does not) varyacross groups of human beings tells us something impor-tant about human nature and the human condition.Normative relativism concerns normative or evaluativeclaims that modes of thought, standards of reasoning, orthe like are only right or wrong relative to a framework.‘Normative’ is meant in a general sense, applying to awide range of views; in the case of beliefs, for exam-ple, normative correctness equals truth. This does notmean, of course, that framework-relative correctness ortruth is always clear, the first challenge being to explainwhat it amounts to in any given case (e.g., with respect toconcepts, truth, epistemic norms). Normative relativism(say, in regard to normative ethical relativism) thereforeimplies that things (say, ethical claims) are not simplytrue in themselves, but only have truth values relative tobroader frameworks (say, moral codes). (Many norma-tive ethical relativist arguments run from premises aboutethics to conclusions that assert the relativity of truth val-ues, bypassing general claims about the nature of truth,but it is often more illuminating to consider the type ofrelativism under question directly.)[6]

2 Postmodernism and relativism

The term “relativism” often comes up in debates overpostmodernism, poststructuralism and phenomenology.Critics of these perspectives often identify advocates withthe label “relativism”. For example, the Sapir–Whorf hy-pothesis is often considered a relativist view because itposits that linguistic categories and structures shape theway people view the world. Stanley Fish has defendedpostmodernism and relativism.[7]

These perspectives do not strictly count as relativist inthe philosophical sense, because they express agnosticismon the nature of reality and make epistemological ratherthan ontological claims. Nevertheless, the term is usefulto differentiate them from realists who believe that thepurpose of philosophy, science, or literary critique is tolocate externally true meanings. Important philosophersand theorists such as Michel Foucault, Max Stirner, polit-ical movements such as post-anarchism or post-Marxismcan also be considered as relativist in this sense - thougha better term might be social constructivist.The spread and popularity of this kind of “soft” rela-tivism varies between academic disciplines. It has widesupport in anthropology and has a majority following incultural studies. It also has advocates in political theoryand political science, sociology, and continental philos-ophy (as distinct from Anglo-American analytical phi-

losophy). It has inspired empirical studies of the socialconstruction of meaning such as those associated with la-belling theory, which defenders can point to as evidenceof the validity of their theories (albeit risking accusationsof performative contradiction in the process). Advocatesof this kind of relativism often also claim that recent de-velopments in the natural sciences, such as Heisenberg’suncertainty principle, quantum mechanics, chaos theoryand complexity theory show that science is now becom-ing relativistic. However, many scientists who use thesemethods continue to identify as realist or post-positivist,and some sharply criticize the association.[8][9]

3 Related and contrasting posi-tions

Relationism is the theory that there are only relationsbetween individual entities, and no intrinsic properties.Despite the similarity in name, it is held by some tobe a position distinct from relativism—for instance, be-cause “statements about relational properties [...] assertan absolute truth about things in the world”.[10] On theother hand, others wish to equate relativism, relationismand even relativity, which is a precise theory of relation-ships between physical objects:[11] Nevertheless, “Thisconfluence of relativity theory with relativism became astrong contributing factor in the increasing prominenceof relativism”.[12]

Whereas previous investigations of science only soughtsociological or psychological explanations of failed sci-entific theories or pathological science, the 'strong pro-gramme' is more relativistic, assessing scientific truth andfalsehood equally in a historic and cultural context.Relativism is not skepticism. Skepticism superficially re-sembles relativism, because they both doubt absolute no-tions of truth. However, whereas skeptics go on to doubtall notions of truth, relativists replace absolute truth witha positive theory ofmany equally valid relative truths. Forthe relativist, there is no more to truth than the right con-text, or the right personal or cultural belief, so there is alot of truth in the world.[13]

4 Theatre and relativism

Theatrical research and performance studies also uti-lize methodological relativism. Formally referred to asmethod acting: the idea that an individual or group ofindividuals conducts research on a particular fictional ornon-fictional situation. In an effort to repurpose these sit-uations for dramatic effect, many approaches have beenderived to bring the “etic” as close as possible (even com-bined) with the “emic” and one can arguably state that theresearch done by Stanislavski, Meisner and physical the-atre (among many other practitioners) all emerge from

5.3 Benedict XVI 3

this same science. Through repeated training with dif-ferent strategies, an actor commonly seeks to embody theemic under intense scrutiny utilizing numerous tools suchas a script, dramaturgy and their own personal capabili-ties to bring a character or situation to life through thesuspension of disbelief.

5 Catholic Church and relativism

The Catholic Church, especially under John Paul II andPope Benedict XVI, has identified relativism as one of themost significant problems for faith and morals today.[14]

According to the Church and to some theologians, rela-tivism, as a denial of absolute truth, leads to moral licenseand a denial of the possibility of sin and of God. Whethermoral or epistemological, relativism constitutes a denialof the capacity of the human mind and reason to arriveat truth. Truth, according to Catholic theologians andphilosophers (following Aristotle) consists of adequatiorei et intellectus, the correspondence of the mind and re-ality. Another way of putting it states that the mind hasthe same form as reality. This means when the form ofthe computer in front of someone (the type, color, shape,capacity, etc.) is also the form that is in their mind, thenwhat they know is true because their mind corresponds toobjective reality.The denial of an absolute reference, of an axis mundi,denies God, who equates to Absolute Truth, accordingto these Christian theologians. They link relativism tosecularism, an obstruction of religion in human life.

5.1 Leo XIII

Pope Leo XIII (1810–1903) was the first known Popeto use the word relativism in the encyclical Humanumgenus (1884). Leo XIII condemned Freemasonry andclaimed that its philosophical and political system waslargely based on relativism.[15]

5.2 John Paul II

John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor

As is immediately evident, the crisis of truth isnot unconnected with this development. Oncethe idea of a universal truth about the good,knowable by human reason, is lost, inevitablythe notion of conscience also changes. Con-science is no longer considered in its primor-dial reality as an act of a person’s intelligence,the function of which is to apply the univer-sal knowledge of the good in a specific situa-tion and thus to express a judgment about the

right conduct to be chosen here and now. In-stead, there is a tendency to grant to the in-dividual conscience the prerogative of inde-pendently determining the criteria of good andevil and then acting accordingly. Such an out-look is quite congenial to an individualist ethic,wherein each individual is faced with his owntruth, different from the truth of others. Takento its extreme consequences, this individualismleads to a denial of the very idea of human na-ture.

In Evangelium Vitae (The Gospel of Life), he says:

Freedom negates and destroys itself, and be-comes a factor leading to the destruction ofothers, when it no longer recognizes and re-spects its essential link with the truth. Whenfreedom, out of a desire to emancipate itselffrom all forms of tradition and authority, shutsout even the most obvious evidence of an ob-jective and universal truth, which is the foun-dation of personal and social life, then the per-son ends up by no longer taking as the soleand indisputable point of reference for his ownchoices the truth about good and evil, but onlyhis subjective and changeable opinion or, in-deed, his selfish interest and whim.

5.3 Benedict XVI

In April 2005, in his homily[16] during Mass prior to theconclave which would elect him as Pope, then CardinalJoseph Ratzinger talked about the world “moving towardsa dictatorship of relativism":

Howmany winds of doctrine we have known inrecent decades, howmany ideological currents,how many ways of thinking. The small boatof thought of many Christians has often beentossed about by these waves – thrown from oneextreme to the other: from Marxism to liber-alism, even to libertinism; from collectivism toradical individualism; from atheism to a vaguereligious mysticism; from agnosticism to syn-cretism, and so forth. Every day new sects arecreated and what Saint Paul says about humantrickery comes true, with cunning which triesto draw those into error (cf Ephesians 4, 14).Having a clear Faith, based on the Creed ofthe Church, is often labeled today as a fun-damentalism. Whereas, relativism, which isletting oneself be tossed and “swept along byevery wind of teaching”, looks like the onlyattitude acceptable to today’s standards. Weare moving towards a dictatorship of relativismwhich does not recognize anything as certain

4 7 ADVOCATES

and which has as its highest goal one’s own egoand one’s own desires. However, we have a dif-ferent goal: the Son of God, true man. Heis the measure of true humanism. Being an“Adult” means having a faith which does notfollow the waves of today’s fashions or the lat-est novelties. A faith which is deeply rooted infriendship with Christ is adult and mature. It isthis friendship which opens us up to all that isgood and gives us the knowledge to judge truefrom false, and deceit from truth.

On June 6, 2005, Pope Benedict XVI told educators:

Today, a particularly insidious obstacle to thetask of education is the massive presence inour society and culture of that relativismwhich,recognizing nothing as definitive, leaves as theultimate criterion only the self with its desires.And under the semblance of freedom it be-comes a prison for each one, for it separatespeople from one another, locking each personinto his or her own 'ego'.[17]

Then during the World Youth Day in August 2005,he also traced to relativism the problems produced bythe communist and sexual revolutions, and provided acounter-counter argument.[18]

In the last century we experienced revolutionswith a common programme–expecting nothingmore from God, they assumed total responsi-bility for the cause of the world in order tochange it. And this, as we saw, meant that a hu-man and partial point of view was always takenas an absolute guiding principle. Absolutizingwhat is not absolute but relative is called total-itarianism. It does not liberate man, but takesaway his dignity and enslaves him. It is not ide-ologies that save the world, but only a return tothe living God, our Creator, the Guarantor ofour freedom, the Guarantor of what is reallygood and true.

6 Criticisms

A common argument[19][20][21][22] against relativism sug-gests that it inherently contradicts, refutes, or stultifies it-self: the statement “all is relative” classes either as a rela-tive statement or as an absolute one. If it is relative, thenthis statement does not rule out absolutes. If the state-ment is absolute, on the other hand, then it provides an ex-ample of an absolute statement, proving that not all truthsare relative. However, this argument against relativismonly applies to relativism that positions truth as relative–i.e. epistemological/truth-value relativism. More specif-

ically, it is only extreme forms of epistemological rela-tivism that can come in for this criticism as there aremanyepistemological relativists who posit that some aspects ofwhat is regarded as factually “true” are not universal, yetstill accept that other universal truths exist (e.g. gas lawsor moral laws).Another argument against relativism posits a NaturalLaw. Simply put, the physical universe works underbasic principles: the “Laws of Nature”. Some con-tend that a natural Moral Law may also exist, for ex-ample as argued by Richard Dawkins in The God Delu-sion (2006)[23] and addressed by C. S. Lewis in "MereChristianity" (1952).[24] Dawkins said “I think we facean equal but much more sinister challenge from the left,in the shape of cultural relativism - the view that scien-tific truth is only one kind of truth and it is not to beespecially privileged”.[25] Philosopher Hilary Putnam,[26]among others,[27] states that some forms of relativismmake it impossible to believe one is in error. If thereis no truth beyond an individual’s belief that something istrue, then an individual cannot hold their own beliefs tobe false or mistaken. A related criticism is that relativiz-ing truth to individuals destroys the distinction betweentruth and belief.

7 Advocates

7.1 Indian religions

Indian religions tend to view the perceivable universeand cosmos as relativistic. Mahavira (599-527 BC), the24th Tirthankara of Jainism, developed an early phi-losophy regarding relativism and subjectivism known asAnekantavada. Hindu religion has no theological diffi-culties in accepting degrees of truth in other religions.A Rig Vedic hymn states that “Truth is One, though thesages tell it variously.” (Ékam sat vipra bahudā vadanti)Madhyamaka Buddhism, which forms the basis formany Mahayana Buddhist schools and was founded byNagarjuna, discerns two levels of truth, absolute and rel-ative. The two truths doctrine states that there is Relativeor common-sense truth, which describes our daily expe-rience of a concrete world, and Ultimate truth, which de-scribes the ultimate reality as sunyata, empty of concreteand inherent characteristics. The conventional truth maybe interpreted as “obscurative truth” or “that which ob-scures the true nature” as a result. It is constituted by theappearances of mistaken awareness. Conventional truthwould be the appearance that includes a duality of appre-hender and apprehended, and objects perceived withinthat. Ultimate truths, are phenomena free from the dual-ity of apprehender and apprehended.[28]

In Sikhism the Gurus (spiritual teacher ) have propagatedthe message of “many paths” leading to the one God andultimate salvation for all souls who tread on the path of

7.5 Thomas Kuhn 5

righteousness. They have supported the view that propo-nents of all faiths can, by doing good and virtuous deedsand by remembering the Lord, certainly achieve salva-tion. The students of the Sikh faith are told to acceptall leading faiths as possible vehicle for attaining spir-itual enlightenment provided the faithful study, ponderand practice the teachings of their prophets and leaders.The holy book of the Sikhs called the Sri Guru GranthSahib says: “Do not say that the Vedas, the Bible and theKoran are false. Those who do not contemplate them arefalse.” Guru Granth Sahib page 1350.[29] and “The sec-onds, minutes, and hours, days, weeks and months, andthe various seasons originate from the one Sun; O nanak,in just the same way, the many forms originate from theCreator.” Guru Granth Sahib page 12,13.

7.2 Sophists

Sophists are considered the founding fathers of relativismin the Western World. Elements of relativism emergedamong the Sophists in the 5th century BC. Notably, itwas Protagoras who coined the phrase, “Man is the mea-sure of all things: of things which are, that they are, andof things which are not, that they are not.” The thinkingof the Sophists is mainly known through their opponents,Plato and Socrates. In a well known paraphrased dia-logue with Socrates, Protagoras said: “What is true foryou is true for you, and what is true for me is true forme.”[30][31][32]

7.3 Bernard Crick

Another important advocate of relativism, Bernard Crick,a British political scientist, wrote the book In Defenceof Politics (first published in 1962), suggesting the in-evitability of moral conflict between people. Crick statedthat only ethics could resolve such conflict, and when thatoccurred in public it resulted in politics. Accordingly,Crick saw the process of dispute resolution, harms reduc-tion, mediation or peacemaking as central to all of moralphilosophy. He became an important influence on thefeminists and later on the Greens.

7.4 Paul Feyerabend

The philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend wholeheart-edly embraced relativism at many points of his career.

Many of the more important papers Feyer-abend published during the mid-1980s werecollected together in Farewell to Reason (Lon-don: Verso, 1987). The major message of thisbook is that relativism is the solution to theproblems of conflicting beliefs and of conflict-ing ways of life.[33]

However, he also expressed growing dissatisfaction withit toward the end of his life, while by no means endorsingrealism either:

In an aphorism [Feyerabend] often repeated,“potentially every culture is all cultures”. Thisis intended to convey that world views are nothermetically closed, since their leading con-cepts have an “ambiguity” - better, an open-endedness - which enables people from othercultures to engage with them. [...] It fol-lows that relativism, understood as the doc-trine that truth is relative to closed systems,can get no purchase. [...] For Feyerabend,both hermetic relativism and its absolutist ri-val serve, in their different ways, to “devaluehuman existence”. The former encourages thatunsavoury brand of political correctness whichtakes the refusal to criticise “other cultures”to the extreme of condoning murderous dicta-torship and barbaric practices. The latter, es-pecially in its favoured contemporary form of“scientific realism”, with the excessive prestigeit affords to the abstractions of “the monster'science'", is in bed with a politics which like-wise disdains variety, richness and everyday in-dividuality - a politics which likewise “hides”its norms behind allegedly neutral facts, “bluntschoices and imposes laws”.[34]

7.5 Thomas Kuhn

Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, as expressed inThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions is often interpretedas relativistic. He claimed that as well as progress-ing steadily and incrementally ("normal science"), sci-ence undergoes periodic revolutions or "paradigm shifts",leaving scientists working in different paradigms withdifficulty in even communicating. Thus the truth of aclaim, or the existence of a posited entity is relative tothe paradigm employed. However, it isn't necessary forhim to embrace relativism because every paradigm pre-supposes the prior, building upon itself through historyand so on. This leads to there being a fundamental, incre-mental, and referential structure of development which isnot relative but again, fundamental.

From these remarks, one thing is howevercertain: Kuhn is not saying that incommen-surable theories cannot be compared - whatthey can’t be is compared in terms of a sys-tem of common measure. He very plainlysays that they can be compared, and he reiter-ates this repeatedly in later work, in a (mostlyin vain) effort to avert the crude and some-times catastrophic misinterpretations he suf-fered from mainstream philosophers and post-modern relativists alike.[35]

6 7 ADVOCATES

But Thomas Kuhn denied the accusation of being a rela-tivist later in his postscript.

scientific development is ... a unidirectionaland irreversible process. Latter scientific theo-ries are better than earlier ones for solving puz-zles ... That is not a relativist’s position, and itdisplays the sense in which I am a convincedbeliever in scientific progress.[36]

Some have argued that one can also read Kuhn’s workas essentially positivist in its ontology: the revolutions heposits are epistemological, lurching toward a presumably'better' understanding of an objective reality through thelens presented by the new paradigm. However, a numberof passages in Structures do indeed appear to be distinctlyrelativist, and to directly challenge the notion of an objec-tive reality and the ability of science to progress towardsan ever greater grasp of it, particularly through the pro-cess of paradigm change.

In the sciences there need not be progress ofanother sort. Wemay, to be more precise, haveto relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit,that changes of paradigm carry scientists andthose who learn from them closer and closer tothe truth.[37]

We are all deeply accustomed to seeing sci-ence as the one enterprise that draws constantlynearer to some goal set by nature in advance.But need there be any such goal? Can we notaccount for both science’s existence and its suc-cess in terms of evolution from the commu-nity’s state of knowledge at any given time?Does it really help to imagine that there is someone full, objective, true account of nature andthat the proper measure of scientific achieve-ment is the extent to which it brings us closerto that ultimate goal?[38]

7.6 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson define relativism intheir book Metaphors We Live By as the rejection ofboth subjectivism and metaphysical objectivism in or-der to focus on the relationship between them, i.e. themetaphor by which we relate our current experience toour previous experience. In particular, Lakoff and John-son characterize “objectivism” as a "straw man", and, toa lesser degree, criticize the views of Karl Popper, Kantand Aristotle.

7.7 Robert Nozick

In his book Invariances, Robert Nozick expresses a com-plex set of theories about the absolute and the relative. He

thinks the absolute/relative distinction should be recastin terms of an invariant/variant distinction, where thereare many things a proposition can be invariant with re-gard to or vary with. He thinks it is coherent for truth tobe relative, and speculates that it might vary with time.He thinks necessity is an unobtainable notion, but canbe approximated by robust invariance across a variety ofconditions—although we can never identify a propositionthat is invariant with regard to everything. Finally, he isnot particularly warm to one of the most famous formsof relativism, moral relativism, preferring an evolution-ary account.

7.8 Joseph Margolis

Joseph Margolis advocates a view he calls “robust rela-tivism” and defends it in his books: Historied Thought,Constructed World, Chapter 4 (California, 1995) and TheTruth about Relativism (Blackwells, 1991). He opens hisaccount by stating that our logics should depend on whatwe take to be the nature of the sphere to which we wish toapply our logics. Holding that there can be no distinctionswhich are not “privileged” between the alethic, the ontic,and the epistemic, he maintains that a many valued logicjust might be the most apt for aesthetics or history since,because in these practices, we are loath to hold to simplebinary logic; and he also holds that many-valued logic isrelativistic. (This is perhaps an unusual definition of “rel-ativistic”. Compare with his comments on “relationism”).“True” and “False” as mutually exclusive and exhaustivejudgements on Hamlet, for instance, really does seem ab-surd. Amany valued logic—"apt”, “reasonable”, “likely”,and so on—seems intuitively more applicable to Hamletinterpretation. Where apparent contradictions arise be-tween such interpretations, we might call the interpreta-tions “incongruent”, rather than dubbing either “false”,because using many-valued logic implies that a measuredvalue is a mixture of two extreme possibilities. Using thesubset of many-valued logic, fuzzy logic, it can be saidthat various interpretations can be represented by mem-bership in more than one possible truth sets simultane-ously. Fuzzy logic is therefore probably the best math-ematical structure for understanding “robust relativism”and has been interpreted by Bart Kosko as philosophi-cally being related to Zen Buddhism.It was Aristotle who held that relativism implied weshould, sticking with appearances only, end up contra-dicting ourselves somewhere if we could apply all at-tributes to all ousiai (beings). Aristotle, however, madenon-contradiction dependent upon his essentialism. Ifhis essentialism is false, then so too is his ground fordisallowing relativism. (Subsequent philosophers havefound other reasons for supporting the principle of non-contradiction).Beginning with Protagoras and invoking Charles SandersPeirce, Margolis shows that the historic struggle to dis-credit relativism is an attempt to impose an unexam-

7.10 Isaiah Berlin 7

ined belief in the world’s essentially rigid rule-like nature.Plato and Aristotle merely attacked “relationalism”—thedoctrine of true-for l or true for k, and the like, wherel and k are different speakers or different worlds, or thesomething similar (Most philosophers would call this po-sition “relativism”). For Margolis, “true” means true; thatis, the alethic use of “true” remains untouched. However,in real world contexts, and context is ubiquitous in the realworld, we must apply truth values. Here, in epistemicterms, we might retire “true” tout court as an evaluationand keep “false”. The rest of our value-judgements couldbe graded from “extremely plausible” down to “false”.Judgements which on a bivalent logic would be incom-patible or contradictory are further seen as “incongruent”,though one may well have more weight than the other. Inshort, relativistic logic is not, or need not be, the bug-bear it is often presented to be. It may simply be the besttype of logic to apply to certain very uncertain spheres ofreal experiences in the world (although some sort of logicneeds to be applied to make that judgement). Those whoswear by bivalent logic might simply be the ultimate keep-ers of the great fear of the flux.

7.9 Richard Rorty

Philosopher Richard Rorty has a somewhat paradoxicalrole in the debate over relativism: he is criticized for hisrelativistic views by many commentators, but has alwaysdenied that relativism applies to much anybody, beingnothing more than a Platonic scarecrow. Rorty claims,rather, that he is a pragmatist, and that to construe prag-matism as relativism is to beg the question.

'"Relativism” is the traditional epithet appliedto pragmatism by realists’[39]

'"Relativism” is the view that every belief ona certain topic, or perhaps about any topic,is as good as every other. No one holds thisview. Except for the occasional cooperativefreshman, one cannot find anybody who saysthat two incompatible opinions on an importanttopic are equally good. The philosophers whoget called 'relativists’ are those who say that thegrounds for choosing between such opinionsare less algorithmic than had been thought.'[40]

'In short, my strategy for escaping the self-referential difficulties into which “the Rela-tivist” keeps getting himself is to move every-thing over from epistemology and metaphysicsinto cultural politics, from claims to knowl-edge and appeals to self-evidence to sugges-tions about what we should try.'[41]

Rorty takes a deflationary attitude to truth, believing thereis nothing of interest to be said about truth in general,

including the contention that it is generally subjective. Healso argues that the notion of warrant or justification cando most of the work traditionally assigned to the conceptof truth, and that justification is relative; justification isjustification to an audience, for Rorty.In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity he argues that thedebate between so-called relativists and so-called objec-tivists is beside the point because they don't have enoughpremises in common for either side to prove anything tothe other.

7.10 Isaiah Berlin

The late Sir Isaiah Berlin expressed a relativistic viewwhen he stated that, to “confuse our own constructionswith eternal laws or divine decrees is one of the most fataldelusions of men.”[42] And again when he said, “the con-cept of fact is itself problematic…all facts embody theo-ries...or socially conditioned, ideological attitudes.”[43]

8 See also• Anekantavada

• Anthropology

• Bahá'í Faith and the unity of religion

• Degree of truth

• Factual relativism

• False dilemma

• Fuzzy logic

• Graded absolutism

• Heraclitus

• John Hick

• Moral relativism

• Multi-valued logic

• Normative ethics

• Perspectivism

• Philosophical realism

• Pluralism (philosophy)

• Polylogism

• Principle of Bivalence

• Propositional logic

• Protagoras

• Relationism

8 9 REFERENCES

• Religiocentrism

• Science Wars

• Scientism

• Social constructionism

• Subjectivism

• Worldview

9 References[1] American Heritage Dictionary, “The doctrine that no

ideas or beliefs are universally true but that all are, in-stead, “relative” — that is, their validity depends on thecircumstances in which they are applied.”

[2] Maria Baghramian identifies 16 (Relativism,2004,Baghramian)

[3] Collins, Harry (1998-04-01). “What’s wrong with rela-tivism?". Physics World (Bristol, UK: IOP Publishing).Retrieved 2008-04-16. ...methodological relativism - im-partial assessment of how knowledge develops - is the keyidea for sociology of scientific knowledge...

[4] Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversityin the Enlightenment and Beyond by Dr. Daniel Carey

[5] Methodological and Philosophical Relativism byGananath Obeyesekere

[6] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

[7] Don't Blame Relativism as “serious thought”

[8] Sokal and the Science Wars

[9] Quantum quackery

[10] Baghramian, M. Relativism, 2004, p43

[11] Interview with Bruno LatourOn Relativism, Pragmatism,and Critical Theory

[12] Baghramian, M. Relativism, 2004, p85

[13] Wood. A, Relativism

[14] World Youth Day News August August 21, 2005

[15] Humanum genus

[16] Mass «Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice»: Homily of Card.Joseph Ratzinger

[17] Inaugural Address at the Ecclesial Diocesan Conventionof Rome

[18] 20th World Youth Day - Cologne - Marienfeld, YouthVigil

[19] Craig Rusbult. Reality 101

[20] Keith Dixon. Is Cultural Relativism Self-Refuting? (BritishJournal of Sociology, vol 28, No. 1)

[21] Cultural Relativism at All About Philosophy.

[22] The Friesian School on relativism.

[23] The God Delusion, Chapter 6

[24] Mere Christianity, Chapter 1

[25] Richard Dawkins quoted in Dawkins’ Christmas card list;Dawkins at the Hay Festival, The Guardian, 28 May 2007

[26] Baghramian, M. Relativism, 2004

[27] Including Julien Beillard, who presents his case on the im-possibility of moral relativism in the July 2013 issue ofPhilosophy Now magazine, accessible here

[28] Levinson, Jules (August 2006) Lotsawa Times Volume II

[29] Guru Granth Sahib page 1350

[30] Richard Austin Gudmundsen (2000). Scientific Inquiry:Applied to the Doctrine of Jesus Christ. Cedar Fort. p. 50.ISBN 978-1-55517-497-2. Retrieved 2011-01-24.

[31] Sahakian, William S.; Mabel Lewis Sahakian (1993).Ideas of the great philosophers. Barnes & Noble Publish-ing. p. 28. ISBN 978-1-56619-271-2. What is true foryou is true for you.

[32] Sahakian, W. S.; M. L. Sahakian (1965). Realms of phi-losophy. Schenkman Pub. Co. p. 40. Retrieved 2011-01-24.

[33] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Paul Feyerabend

[34] Cooper, David E., “Voodoo and the monster of science,”Times Higher Education, 17 March 2000

[35] Sharrock. W., Read R. Kuhn: Philosopher of ScientificRevolutions

[36] Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 206.

[37] Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 170.</

[38] Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 171.</

[39] Rorty, R. Consequences of Pragmatism

[40] Richard Rorty, Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism

[41] Rorty, R. Hilary Putnam and the Relativist Menace

[42] Sir Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current: Essays in the Historyof Ideas, London: Pimlico, 1997, p.303

[43] Sir Isaiah Berlin, 'Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth Cen-tury Thought,' in The Crooked Timber of Humanity,Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1999, p.89

9

10 Bibliography

• Maria Baghramian, Relativism, London: Routledge,2004, ISBN 0-415-16150-9

• Gad Barzilai, Communities and Law: Politics andCultures of Legal Identities, Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press, 2003, ISBN 0-472-11315-1

• Andrew Lionel Blais, On the Plurality of ActualWorlds, University of Massachusetts Press, 1997,ISBN 1-55849-072-8

• Ernest Gellner, Relativism and the Social Sciences,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985,ISBN 0-521-33798-4

• Rom Harré and Michael Krausz, Varieties of Rel-ativism, Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Blackwell,1996, ISBN 0-631-18409-0

• Knight, Robert H. The Age of Consent: the Rise ofRelativism and the Corruption of Popular Culture.Dallas, Tex.: Spence Publishing Co., 1998. xxiv,253, [1] p. ISBN 1-890626-05-8

• Michael Krausz, ed., Relativism: A ContemporaryAnthology, New York: Columbia University Press,2010, ISBN 978-0-231-14410-0

• Martin Hollis, Steven Lukes, Rationality and Rela-tivism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, ISBN 0-631-12773-9

• Joseph Margolis, Michael Krausz, R. M. Burian,Eds., Rationality, Relativism, and the Human Sci-ences, Dordrecht: Boston, M. Nijhoff, 1986, ISBN90-247-3271-9

• Jack W. Meiland, Michael Krausz, Eds. Relativism,Cognitive and Moral, Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1982, ISBN 0-268-01611-9

• HeWillAdd FromTheBroadMeadow AHelperOf-Man, “In Defense of Relativity.”, CreateSpaceIndependent Publishing Platform, 2013, ISBN1482608359

11 External links

• Westacott, E. Relativism, 2005, Internet Encyclope-dia of Philosophy

• Westacott, E. Cognitive Relativism, 2006, InternetEncyclopedia of Philosophy

• Professor Ronald Jones on relativism

• What 'Being Relative' Means, a passage from PierreLecomte du Nouy's “Human Destiny” (1947)

• BBC Radio 4 series “In Our Time”, on Relativism- the battle against transcendent knowledge, 19 Jan-uary 2006

• Against Relativism, by Christopher Noriss

• Relativism entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy

• The Friesian School on Relativism

• The Catholic Encyclopedia

• Harvey Siegel reviews Paul Boghossian's Fear ofKnowledge

10 12 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

12 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

12.1 Text• Relativism Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativism?oldid=653941947 Contributors: Slrubenstein, Larry Sanger, Little guru, KF,Stevertigo, Tubby, Michael Hardy, Pit~enwiki, Jahsonic, Dcljr, SebastianHelm, Ellywa, Evercat, KayEss, Renamed user 4, Lit-sci, CharlesMatthews, Paul Stansifer, Dysprosia, Pedant17, Wetman, Banno, Chealer, Fredrik, Tomchiukc, Clngre, Texture, Ruakh, Seano1, Andries,Cobra libre, Nikodemos, Wolfkeeper, Bfinn, Wikiwikifast, Gracefool, JRR Trollkien, Andycjp, Phe, Lumidek, ArcticFrog, Trilobite, Eep²,Lucidish, Rich Farmbrough, R6144, Mal~enwiki, Neko-chan, El C, Carlon, PhilHibbs, Joo, Viriditas, .:Ajvol:., La goutte de pluie, Nk,ADM, Alansohn, Hektor, Borisblue, Wiki-uk, Bigcheesebebbs, SHIMONSHA, Snowolf, Suruena, Maestral, Bookandcoffee, Ceyockey,Mullet, Lkinkade, Velho, Firsfron, Woohookitty, Benhocking, Kzollman, Crackerbelly, Ruud Koot, Bkwillwm, Xipheus865, Huhsunqu,Thebogusman, Karbinski, Dysepsion, Magister Mathematicae, V95micfa, Rjwilmsi, Koavf, KYPark, Crazyvas, Seraphimblade, The wub,GregAsche, ShadowyCaballero, Cjpuffin, Tpkunesh, FlaBot, Marax, Common Man, Spencerk, YurikBot, Wavelength, Deeptrivia, Russ-Bot, Hede2000, Anders.Warga, ENeville, BlackAndy, Slarson, Haoie, Mlouns, Tullie, Maunus, Tomisti, Kronocide, C h fleming, JoanneB,Curpsbot-unicodify, NeilN, Infinity0, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Jagged 85, ProveIt, Colonel Tom, Gaff, Hmains, Mike Werther~enwiki,Bluebot, MalafayaBot, SineQ, Dawd, Jfsamper, Darth Panda, Gracenotes, Scwlong, Jimi 45, Go for it, Raoul-Duke, Zentuk~enwiki, Red-Hillian, Stevenmitchell, Jmlk17, Cybercobra, Nakon, Saejinn, Just plain Bill, Clicketyclack, Byelf2007, CinnamonApril, Lapaz, JohnI,JoseREMY, Mr. Lefty, Gargletheape, Kripkenstein, The-Pope, Keahapana, Daedalus71, K, Hikui87~enwiki, George100, CmdrObot,Basawala, ShelfSkewed, Neelix, Gregbard, Michfan2123, Future Perfect at Sunrise, Jonathan Tweet, Peterdjones, Dougweller, In De-fense of the Artist, Letranova, Thijs!bot, Peter morrell, JustAGal, Pv27uk, The Hybrid, Nick Number, Emeraldcityserendipity, Opelio,Nine9s, Indian Chronicles, Lantios, Gcm, Dsp13, Matthew Fennell, Savant13, .anacondabot, VoABot II, JNW, Qzed, Talon Artaine,JaGa, Greenwoodtree, Mschel, Inabyssian, Grazia11, Adavidb, Merillupin, Cpiral, It Is Me Here, BrokenSphere, Tarotcards, Plasticup,NewEnglandYankee, Heyitspeter, Joshua Issac, Natl1, CWii, Fences and windows, Davehi1, Rei-bot, Lordvolton, The Tetrast, Broadbot,Disneyfreak90, Crònica~enwiki, Maurici, Duetonamepolicy, Vladsinger, Matt.voroney, MCTales, Sapphic, Cnilep, Peter Muckley, In-sanity Incarnate, Enkyo2, SieBot, Malcolmxl5, Paradoctor, Iamthedeus, Vexorg, Ψμον, O-shield999, Sonnenshein, Robertcurrey, Tsiser,OKBot, Berjangles, Superbeecat, Complex Buttons, Emptymountains, Dallas1942, ClueBot, Dragoninstal, Der Golem, Mild Bill Hiccup,Shaded0, Ktr101, Bhamfree, NuclearWarfare, Frongle, Pithycus, Leon1948, DumZiBoT, Heironymous Rowe, Mitsube, Stickee, Presen-tism, Addbot, Anwk, DOI bot, Mootros, Eboepple, Download, The world deserves the truth, LAAFan, Singer18, Lightbot, Jan eissfeldt,Jkt-tinz, Legobot, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Sageo, Mballen, AnomieBOT, Andrewrp, Galoubet, Untitled 2008, Apjohns54, Cureden, Capri-corn42, Jeffrey Mall, J04n, Omnipaedista, Dawei20, Poseidon1266, Epicuro~enwiki, Steve Quinn, Icepick007, Citation bot 1, Dazed-bythebell, Bejinhan, Kylin.Ma, FormerIP, Weekeepeer, Pollinosisss, Jordgette, Reaper Eternal, JLincoln, Ashot Gabrielyan, Princekarate,Esoglou, WikitanvirBot, RenamedUser01302013, Slightsmile, ZéroBot, Ratpow, Bas-Celik, DASHBotAV, Socialservice, ClueBot NG,Vacation9, Braincricket, Widr, Lightskr, Helpful Pixie Bot, BG19bot, PhnomPencil, Ichthus77, Blue Mist 1, Colin.gorrie, Barkmeowmoo,Polmandc, Aisteco, TripodPG, Pug6666, GoShow, Khazar2, Achauhan85, Nathanielfirst, Kasel555, Vincerofa, Cherubinirules, Kruegster,Tostic, Philofiler, Anonposeidon, JaconaFrere, DecessaDae, Monkbot, Asdf1234jkl;1234, Susanhelen and Anonymous: 255

12.2 Images• File:Edit-clear.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f2/Edit-clear.svg License: Public domain Contributors: TheTango! Desktop Project. Original artist:The people from the Tango! project. And according to the meta-data in the file, specifically: “Andreas Nilsson, and Jakub Steiner (althoughminimally).”

• File:Folder_Hexagonal_Icon.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/48/Folder_Hexagonal_Icon.svg License: Cc-by-sa-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

• File:People_icon.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/People_icon.svg License: CC0 Contributors: Open-Clipart Original artist: OpenClipart

• File:Portal-puzzle.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/fd/Portal-puzzle.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ?Original artist: ?

• File:Wikiquote-logo.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Wikiquote-logo.svg License: Public domainContributors: ? Original artist: ?

12.3 Content license• Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0