eligious leaders occupy pivotal and public roles in shaping Mauritania’s economic and political development. In a country where religious and national identity are closely aligned, faith actors are well placed to wield

their influence and engage with sensitive social and cultural issues such as child marriage and family plan-ning, yet their various contributions are often poorly understood. This brief offers an overview of education, gender, and health in Mauritania and highlights relevant faith-linked development efforts.

Slow economic growth, stark social inequalities, and the increasingly pronounced impact of climate change have contributed to poor performance across numerous development indicators. Access to quality education, women’s social and economic equality, maternal health, and family planning are major issues. Mauritania’s geographical location places it at the center of security concerns in the region.

Since Mauritania gained independence from France in 1960, authoritarian leaders have dominated positions of power in the country. Moktar Ould Daddah, the coun-try’s first president, established a one-party state and

Religion and Development in

wielded power for nearly 20 years before he was deposed in a military coup in 1978.1 After close to three decades of military rule, democratic elections were held in 2007, but the president thus elected was ousted by the military the following year. Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz then became president. His 10 years in office were marked by increased economic growth and political stability even as he faced criticism for cracking down on political opposition. Mo-hamed Ould Ghazouani, a close ally of Ould Abdel Aziz, was elected president in 2019; his inauguration was the first ever democratic transfer of power in Mauritania.

Mauritania is divided into 12 regions and the capital district of Nouakchott. The Sahara Desert covers the northern two-thirds of the country, which are sparsely populated and difficult to control politically. Today, slightly over half the population lives in urban areas along the coast and the southern border with Senegal and Mali. Decades of intermittent, severe droughts and unsustainable agricultural practices have led to the southern expansion of the Sahara, putting the country’s already small agricultural sector under additional strain. Vast reserves of ore, copper, gypsum, and other precious metals drive Mauritania’s large mining industry.2

APRIL 2020

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RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT IN MAURITANIA

Mauritania’s Religious Landscape espite its designation as an “Islamic Republic,” Mauritania is not a theocratic state; rather, gov-ernance structures combine an Islamic legal

framework with a democratic system.3 The Constitu-tion names Islam the official religion of the state, and all Mauritanian nationals are considered Muslim.4 Less than 1 percent of the population is Christian, almost all of whom are non-citizens. There is also a small Baha’i community numbering in the hundreds.5

Islam in MauritaniaArab merchants first brought Islam to Mauritania in the tenth century, after which the religion spread to the local Berber and Black African populations. Today, the majority of Mauritania’s Muslims are Sunni and follow the Maliki school of jurisprudence. As in other parts of West Africa, many Muslims are members of Sufi orders, or confréries; the largest of which are the Qadiriyya and

Tijaniyya.6 Mauritania is known for its longstanding tradition of Islamic scholarship, making it an attractive political partner to the Gulf states, especially Saudi Ara-bia.7 Unofficial estimates indicate that around 1 percent of Mauritanians are Shia Muslims.8

Since the 1970s, Islamist-linked groups have gained a foothold in Mauritania, particularly among young bidan men in urban areas. Mauritanian students returning from Cairo and Tunis, inspired by Egypt’s Muslim Broth-erhood, were among the first to establish such groups. The Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, have also played a significant role in spreading Islamism through student exchanges; by the early 2000s, the Saudi government had awarded hundreds of scholarships to Mauritanians to at-tend the Islamic University of Medina, which trains stu-dents in Salafist theology. In addition, Saudi Arabia has financed the construction of dozens of Islamic schools and mosques in Mauritania, most notably Nouakchott’s

D

 BOX 1: Race, Social Caste, and Slavery in Mauritania

a. “Mauritania.” Minority Rights Group International, 2018. Available at: https://minorityrights.org/country/mauritania/; Thurston, Alex.

“Mauritania’s Islamists.” (2012). 7.

b. Wehrey, Frederic. “Control and Contain: Mauritania’s Clerics and the Strategy Against Violent Extremism.” (2019). 2. ; “Caste-based

Slavery in Mauritania.” International Dalit Solidarity Network. Accessed February 20, 2020. Available at: https://idsn.org/key-issues/caste-based-slavery/caste-based-slavery-in-mauritania/

c. “The unspeakable truth about slavery in Mauritania.” The Guardian, June 8, 2018. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/08/the-unspeakable-truth-about-slavery-in-mauritania

d. “Caste-based Slavery in Mauritania.” International Dalit Solidarity Network. Accessed February 20, 2020. Available at: https://idsn.org/key-issues/caste-based-slavery/caste-based-slavery-in-mauritania/

e. Wehrey, Frederic. “Control and Contain: Mauritania’s Clerics and the Strategy Against Violent Extremism.” (2019). 2.

f. “Freedom in the World 2019: Mauritania.” Freedom House, 2019. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/mauritania

Mauritanian society is deeply hier-

archical, with racial identity shaping

a person’s social, economic, and

political status. The vast majority of

Mauritanians fall into one of three

social groups: bidan, or white moors,

the descendants of Arab conquerors

and indigenous Berber people; Black

Africans, also known as Afro-Maurita-

nians, which include members of the

Fulani/Peul, Toucouleur, Wolof, and

Soninke ethnic groups; and haratin, or

black moors, descended from Black

Africans enslaved by bidan.a Although

the Mauritanian government does not

track racial demographics, unofficial

estimates say that bidan and Black

Africans each account for around 30

percent of the population, while haratin

comprise 40 percent.

Racial hierarchies are closely tied to

Mauritania’s history of slavery. Today,

some estimate that nearly one in five

Mauritanians is enslaved. Almost all are

haratin, born into slavery and forced to

work for their bidan masters. Despite

legal action taken by the Mauritanian

government, including the abolition of

slavery in 1981 and its criminalization in

2007, patterns of slavery remain largely

unregulated due to weak enforcement

mechanisms and reluctance among

government officials to acknowledge

the problem.b Activist groups working

to free enslaved people and raise aware-

ness of the issue have faced government

scrutiny and imprisonment.c

Haratin who escape slavery retain

the stigma of their lower social caste,

making them the targets of racial prej-

udice and ostracism.d Black Africans

are also frequent targets of discrimina-

tion, especially during times of political

instability; in 1987, Black officers were

purged from the military, and Blacks

have been targeted in state crackdowns

since then.e As most Black Africans do

not speak Arabic, they face significant

disadvantages in an education system

that prioritizes Arabic instruction, es-

pecially at the tertiary level.f

World Faiths Development Dialogue | www.wfdd.us 3

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MAURITANIA

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 FIGURE 1: Map of Mauritania with Administrative Regions and Major CitiesSource: https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm, https://www.mapsland.com (adapted)

  BOX 2: Islamist Ideologies and Approaches in Mauritania

a. Thurston, Alex. “Mauritania’s Islamists.” (2012). 4.

b. Thurston, Alex. “Mauritania’s Islamists.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012. 1, 3, 4–5.

Islamists in Mauritania share a com-

mon commitment to elevating the

role of Islam in political and public

life, such as by establishing a legal

system based solely on sharia law

and promoting foreign policy that

favors other Muslim-majority states

over Western nations.a Islamists

vary in their approach to achieving

these ends, however. Some support

democracy, seek influence through

elected office, and renounce violent

methods to gain political power, while

others, known as jihadis, advocate the

use of violence and the overthrow of

democratic structures. Salafism,

an Islamist movement linked to the

Saudi Wahhabi movement, strives to

model contemporary society off the

first Muslim community of Medina.

Some Mauritanian Salafists partic-

ipate in mainstream politics, while

others support violent measures

against the government.b (For more

detail on Islamist groups and religious

militancy, see the box, “Jihadism in

Mauritania.”)

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RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT IN MAURITANIA

largest mosque, commonly referred to as the “Saudi Mosque.”9

Mauritania’s Islamist movement continued to grow throughout the 1990s and 2000s, fueled by rising socioeconomic inequality, declining democratic institutions, and a series of policy decisions that alienated mainstream Muslims.10 Many Mau-ritanians felt that the government’s recognition of Israel in 1999 was a capitulation to Western pressure. Similarly, the decision to cooper-ate with U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in the aftermath of the at-tacks of September 11, 2001 ignited intense criticism among citizens who saw it as yet another conces-sion to the West. In both instances, Islamist groups drew on popular discontent to appeal to members of the religious mainstream. In addi-tion, political liberalization in the 1990s enabled Islamists to expand their formal political presence, es-tablishing the country’s first official Islamist political party, the National Rally for Reform and Development (widely known as Tewassoul).11

Christianity in MauritaniaMauritania has one of the smallest Christian populations in West Af-rica. Christian missionaries strug-gled to evangelize local populations long before the post-independence government declared Islam the state religion. Today, there are a mere 10,000 Christians in the country, the majority of whom are from neighboring countries or Europe. Around half are Catholic, while the rest belong to Protestant and inde-pendent churches.12 Christians live predominantly in urban areas, especially Nouakchott. While the national

government permits registered churches to conduct services, Christians may not proselytize. Furthermore, Mauritanian nationals are barred from attending Chris-tian gatherings.13

Religion, Government, and Society he Mauritanian government has a complicated and often shifting relationship with religious institutions. Following independence, political

leaders declared an Islamic Republic in order to unite

the country’s disparate regional, racial, and ethnic tribal groups under a shared religious identity.14 The Constitu-tion of 1991 cites Islam as the sole source of Mauritanian law; in practice, however, the legal system draws on both

 TABLE 1: Mauritania’s Development Indicators

Indicator Current Status (Year)

Population 4.4 million (2018)a

Total area 1,030,700 sq. kmb

Urban population (percent of total) 53.7% (2018)c

Population growth rate 2.78% (2018)d

Capital city population (Nouakchott) 1.2 million (2018)e

Population aged 0–14 years 1.8 million (2018)f

GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 1,190 (2018)g

GDP growth rate 3.6% (2018)h

UNDP Human Development Index Rank 159 of 188 (2017)i

Corruption Perceptions Index Rank 144 of 187 (2018)j

Personal remittances, received (current US$) $77 million (2017)k

a. “Population, total.” World Bank, 2018. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=MR

b. Stewart, Charles et al. “Mauritania.” In Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 1st ed. Encyclopedia

Britannica, 2019. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Mauritaniac. “Urban population (% of total population).” World Bank, 2018. Available at: https://data.

worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=MRd. “Population growth (annual %).” World Bank, 2018. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/

indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=MRe. “Population in largest city.” World Bank, 2018. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/

indicator/EN.URB.LCTY?locations=MRf. “Population ages 0–14, total.” World Bank, 2018. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/

indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO?locations=MRg. “GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$).” World Bank, 2018. Available at: https://data.

worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=MRh. “GDP growth (annual %).” World Bank, 2018. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/

indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=MRi. “Human Development Report 2019.” United Nations Development Programme, 2019. Available

at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-updatej. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2018.” Transparency International. Accessed February 6, 2020.

Available at: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018k. “Personal remittances, received (current US$).” World Bank, 2017. Available at: https://data.

worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=MR

T

World Faiths Development Dialogue | www.wfdd.us 5

French civil law and sharia, with the courts applying sha-ria mainly in cases of family law.15 Mauritania has been a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) since its founding in 1969.16

Religious matters are overseen by a number of gov-ernment ministries, foremost of which is the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (Ministère de la Culture et de l’Orientation Islamique). The Islamic High Committee (Haut Comité Islamique), established in 1992, acts as a direct link between the president and religious leaders, while the High Council for Fatwa and Administrative Appeals (Haut Conseil de la Fatwa et des Recours Gracieux) advises policymakers on producing legislation in line with Islamic teaching. Faith-inspired organizations

(FIOs) and other NGOs must register with the Ministry of the Interior.

The government actively promotes Islamic values through education and media. Public and private sec-ondary schools are required to teach at least four hours of religious education per week, and state-owned and operated media channels broadcast television and ra-dio specials on Islamic teachings. The state regulates religious education through the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Traditional Education (MAIEO, Ministère des Affaires Islamiques et de l’Enseignement Originel), which also enacts fatwas, organizes pilgrimages to Mecca, and monitors mosques for extremist activities and sermons.17

 BOX 3: Jihadism and Security in Mauritania

a. “Niger.” L’Observatoire de la Liberté Religieuse. Accessed February 4, 2020. Available at: https://www.liberte-religieuse.org/niger/b. Porter, Geoff. “The Renewed Jihadi Terror Threat to Mauritania.” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 7 (2018): 16, 19.; Wehrey, Frederic. “Control and Contain:

Mauritania’s Clerics and the Strategy Against Violent Extremism.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2019.

c. Porter, Geoff. “The Renewed Jihadi Terror Threat to Mauritania.” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 7 (2018): 17–18.; “Debunking Mauritania’s

Islamist militancy mythology.” The New Humanitarian, August 23, 2016. Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2016/08/23/debunking-mauritania-s-islamist-militancy-mythology

d. Rao, Sumedh. “Conflict analysis of Mauritania.” GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services, 2014. 4, 8. Available at: https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/GSDRC_ConflAnal_Mauritania.pdf

e. U.S. Department of State. “Mauritania 2018 International Religious Freedom Report.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2019.

f. Porter, Geoff. “The Renewed Jihadi Terror Threat to Mauritania.” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 7 (2018): 17.; Wehrey, Frederic. “Control and Contain:

Mauritania’s Clerics and the Strategy Against Violent Extremism.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2019.

Since the 1990s, several militant Is-

lamist groups have gained a foothold

in Niger. Chief among these is Boko

Haram, based in northern Nigeria.a

Mauritania was the target of numer-

ous jihadi attacks by Al-Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the early

2000s. In June 2005, members of

AQIM’s predecessor, the Salafist

Group for Preaching and Combat

(GSPC), attacked the Lemgheity mil-

itary barracks in northeastern Mauri-

tania, killing 17 soldiers. Subsequent

years saw several more prominent

attacks, including the murder of four

French tourists and three Mauritanian

soldiers in two separate incidences in

December 2007.

While AQIM continued to attack

neighboring countries in the 2010s,

Mauritania was spared similarly violent

incidents for reasons that remain un-

clear. A document recovered at Osama

bin Laden’s compound during the 2011

raid by U.S. military suggested that Al-

Qaeda had agreed to cease attacks in

exchange for financial support from

the Mauritanian government and the

release of AQIM militants; however,

any such arrangement has been

strongly denied by the Mauritanian

government and individuals close to

Al-Qaeda. In a May 2018 communique,

AQIM named Western companies in

Mauritania as permissible targets for

jihadi attacks, signaling the likely end

to a period of relative tranquility in

Mauritania.b

While there has yet to be a resur-

gence of jihadi violence on Mauritanian

soil, the country remains fertile ground

for Al-Qaeda’s recruitment and training

operations, producing more high-pro-

file jihadi operatives per capita than

any other country in the Sahel. Low

levels of media censorship enable

jihadi groups to broadcast messages

and propaganda material with relative

ease, drawing recruits from among

disaffected Mauritanian youth.c Most

of these recruits are bidan, although

some experts fear that escalating ra-

cial tensions and economic disparities

in the country may push more haratin

toward jihadism.d

The Mauritanian government has

developed a multipronged approach to

respond to the threat posed by AQIM. In

2018, the MAEIO collaborated with Is-

lamic civil society organizations to lead

a series of workshops against religious

radicalization and terrorism in all 15 re-

gions of the country.e The Ministry has

also worked with religious leaders to

deradicalize imprisoned AQIM fighters

and help them reintegrate into Maurita-

nian society.f

Mauritania is a member of the G5

Sahel, along with Burkina Faso, Chad,

Mali, and Niger. Since 2014, G5 Sahel

has coordinated joint efforts develop-

ment and security matters in the Sahel.

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RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT IN MAURITANIA

A Pew-Templeton review underscores the high level of government restrictions on religion in Mauritania.18 These include harsh penalties for speech deemed critical of Islam. In 2014, the Mauritanian blogger Cheikh Ould Mkhaïtir was sentenced to death for posting statements on social media that disparaged the Prophet Muham-mad and denounced slavery and social caste. Mkhaïtir’s sentence was subsequently commuted to two years’ im-prisonment, but Mauritania’s National Assembly passed a law in 2018 that mandated the death penalty for “blas-phemous” and “sacrilegious” acts.19 A 2017 law imposed a penalty of one to five years imprisonment for criticizing the dominant Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence.20

Government regulations shape many aspects of reli-gious expression in Mauritania, particularly among reli-gious minorities. All non-Muslim religious gatherings must receive approval by the Ministry of the Interior, including those held in private homes, and Mauritanian citizens may not attend these services. Although the possession

of non-Islamic religious materials is not illegal, there is a ban on printing and distributing such materials. The government has also taken steps to regulate and restrict Mauritania’s small Shia Muslim minority, closing a prom-inent Shia religious center in Nouakchott in May 2018.21

Since the 1990s, Mauritanian authorities have taken numerous measures to curb the Islamist influence in Mauritania, from passing laws aimed at curbing extrem-ist speech to authorizing the arrests of prominent Isla-mist clerics. In May 2003, authorities arrested around a dozen Islamist leaders and preachers in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou on the suspicion of radicalizing and recruit-ing Muslim youth for international jihadi organizations.22 A July 2003 law tightened regulations on the content of sermons, and in June 2015, the government announced a salary cut for more than 100 imams who promoted Salafism and Wahhabism.23 State authorities have also closed down religious training centers and schools with ties to Tewassoul and the Muslim Brotherhood.24

Educationhronic underfunding, high dropout rates, and poor academic results place Mauritania’s schools near the bottom

of global education rankings. In 2017, Mau-ritania ranked 128th of 137 countries on the “health and primary education” category of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competi-tiveness Index. Within this category, it ranked last for quality of the education system and extent of staff training.25

While enrollment rates have steadily risen across all levels of education, a significant share of Mauritanian children still do not attend school. In 2018, primary gross enroll-ment was near 100 percent, but net enroll-ment was 80 percent, meaning that a fifth of primary-age children were out of school.26 (The disparity between primary gross and net enrollment is due in large part to the fact that many secondary-age children are still in primary school.) A full third of students drop out before completing school, and only 35 percent go on to secondary school.27 Information about the number of children attending pre-primary schools is scarce, but one 2015 estimate put the number at a mere 30,000.28

Enrollment and retention of students does not nec-essarily translate to academic success. In 2016, only 29 percent of lower secondary students and 15 percent of upper secondary students passed their culminating

exams. Inadequate teacher training is a major factor behind this trend. A 2017 study found that the average grade 4 teacher lacked the knowledge to be considered qualified to teach French, Math, and Pedagogy. Large class sizes are another likely cause of low student per-formance; with close to 50 students in a single classroom, teachers struggle to monitor and support each individ-ual students’ progress.29

Poor management of the education system poses a significant obstacle for many children wishing to attend school. Children in rural areas must walk many miles to

C

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%Secondary

Primary

20172012200720002199719921987198219771972

SecondaryPrimary

 FIGURE 2: Gross School Enrollment Rates, 1972–2018Source: https://data.worldbank.org

World Faiths Development Dialogue | www.wfdd.us 7

reach the nearest school; more than a fifth of children who dropped out of primary school cited distance from the nearest facility as the main reason behind the deci-sion. Yet in the 2016/2017 school year, one in ten primary schools lay empty because of a lack of government fund-ing and teaching staff. A majority of operational schools are considered “incomplete,” with only 35 percent of pri-mary schools offering all six grade levels. Furthermore, chronic underfunding frequently leaves schools without proper teaching equipment and materials; a 2018 World Bank survey found that only 12 percent of Mauritanian students had textbooks. Additionally, only 1 in 20 public primary schools had clean and accessible latrines, which deters many adolescent girls from attending.30

Previous reform efforts have been mostly counter-productive in improving the reach and quality of public education in Mauritania.31 A structural overhaul of the education system introduced in 1999 mandated bilingual (French and Arabic) education in all public schools but proved ineffective because the majority of teachers were not trained to teach in French. In 2011, the government launched a new education sector development plan for 2011–2020; the plan aims to achieve universal primary education by 2020, increase access to preprimary and secondary school, promote enrollment and retention of out-of-school children, improve school curricula to align with the needs of the labor market, and strengthen technical and vocational training. In 2014, 14 percent of the government budget went towards education, almost half of which went toward primary education.32

Private schools have emerged to offer an alternative to public education for some Mauritanian families. Private school enrollment went up by 61 percent between 2010 and 2014, compared to a 5 percent decrease in public school enrollment. In the 2016/2017 school year, private schools accounted for a fifth of all schools in the country (not including religious schools).33 Private schools re-main a largely urban phenomenon, with more than 80 percent of private primary school enrollment at schools in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou.34

Islamic schools, known as mahadras, provide an alter-native to formal public or private institutions for many Mauritanians. These schools cater to students of all ages, from children as young as 6 to those in their twenties.35 Although curricula vary by school—from focusing ex-clusively on Qur’anic recitation to including courses on Islamic history, law, and literature—the majority of mahadras eschew formal education in subjects such as science and mathematics. While the MAEIO officially oversees mahadras, these schools are not required to report to the ministry, and they do not receive govern-ment funding.

 BOX 4: Civil Registration as an Obstacle to Public Education

a. “Mauritania: Administrative Obstacles Keep Kids from

School.” Human Rights Watch, March 29, 2018. Available

at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/29/mauritania-administrative-obstacles-keep-kids-school

Civil registration measures introduced in 2011 have denied

thousands of Mauritanian children access to public edu-

cation. The biometric registration process requires that

citizens and non-citizens register with the government

in order to obtain social services, including the ability to

enroll in public schools; to register their child, parents

must produce a birth certificate, copies of their national

identity cards, and a copy of their marriage certificate.

Many families are unable to register because they are

missing documents, live far from the nearest registration

center, or lack the time to file an application. According to

UNICEF estimates, a third of children under age 5 were

not registered, including 60 percent of children from the

poorest households. While some families have managed

to enroll unregistered children by appealing directly to

school administrators, these children cannot take man-

datory national exams in order to graduate. Faced with

few options, many parents of unregistered children opt to

send their children to Islamic schools instead.a

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RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT IN MAURITANIA

In 2010, there were over 9,000 mahadras in Maurita-nia, with 170,000 enrolled students, 30 percent of whom were female. Close to half of these students attend a for-mal school (whether public or private) in addition to a mahadra.36 Those who exclusively attend mahadras typ-ically do so because they cannot afford formal schooling. Since mahadras do not follow the national curriculum, their diplomas are not recognized by state authorities,

and many graduates struggle to find work in a competi-tive job market.37 A pilot project launched by the MAEIO to improve educational outcomes at mahadras intro-duced science and math curricula at 23 mahadras and trained 200 teachers in the relevant curricula. At its close, the project was widely considered a success, sug-gesting the possibility for future collaborations between mahadras and public institutions.38

Gender Equality omen face numerous obstacles to full legal and economic rights in Mauritania. In 2018, the country ranked 136th of 149 countries in

the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index, which measures women’s access to education, health services, economic opportunities, and political repre-sentation.39 A mere 43 percent of Mauritanian women are literate, compared to 64 percent of men, and the average Mauritanian woman is in school for just 2.7 years.40 Child marriage, gender-based violence (GBV), and female genital mutilation (FGC) are topics of par-ticular concern, as is gender bias in Mauritanian laws. While gender-based discrimination affects all classes and ethnic groups, haratin and Black African women are disproportionately affected.41

While Mauritania is a signatory on numerous interna-tional treaties for gender equality, local laws treat men and women differently in matters of divorce, child cus-tody, marriage, and inheritance.42 Under the 2001 Per-sonal Status Code, it is easier for men to obtain a divorce than for women, and divorced women risk losing their property and custody of their children. Furthermore, women are unable to transfer their nationality to their children except in special circumstances.

Mauritanian women make up just over a quarter of the national labor force, where they earn less than men and have fewer opportunities to advance their financial interests. In 2018, the gross national income per capita for women was $2,018 (2011 PPP $), compared to $5,462 among men. Gender-based restrictions on inheriting and owning land pose another obstacle to accumulating wealth. A 2015 World Bank study found that women held less than eight percent of Mauritania’s 27,000 title deeds.43 Furthermore, only 16 percent of women had an account with a bank or mobile money service provider.44

Child marriage is a persistent barrier to women’s legal, economic, and educational empowerment. Over a third of Mauritanian girls are married by age 18, and eighteen percent by age 15, with the average age of first

marriage just over 17 years. While a 2001 law sets the minimum legal age of marriage at 18, it allows legal guardians to marry off younger girls under particular circumstances. Child marriage is more common in ru-ral areas (55 percent) and among girls from the poorest households, who are twice as likely to be child brides than girls from the wealthiest households. Education is likewise linked to a girls’ chances of marrying early: 43 percent of Mauritanian girls with no educational at-tainment were married as children, compared to only 22 percent of those who had completed secondary edu-cation or higher.45 For girls who are still in school, early marriage frequently leads them to drop out, which per-petuates low educational outcomes among child brides.46

Gender-based violence (GBV) is a major concern in Mauritania. While official statistics on GBV are not pub-licly available, local NGOs report that the issue is wide-spread and underreported. The Association of Women Heads of Family (Association des Femmes Chefs de Fa-mille), Mauritania’s premier women’s rights NGO, inter-vened in 428 cases of rape, 128 cases of child marriage, and more than 1,600 instances of domestic conflict in

W

 BOX 5: Force-Feeding among Mauritanian Girls

a. “Beauty’s big problem.” The New Humanitarian, February 21,

2011. Available at: http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/91956/mauritania-beautys-big-problem

In a society in which a heavy figure is associated with

beauty, wealth, and wellbeing, many young girls are force-

fed high-caloric diets in order to improve their marriage

prospects. This practice, known as leblouh (gavage in

French), is frequently overseen by girls’ mothers and

other female relatives. While force-feeding is declining

in urban areas, some women are turning to dangerous

alternative methods of weight gain, including growth hor-

mones meant for livestock.a The use of such drugs has led

to serious injury and death in some cases.

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2017. The Mauritanian Association for the Health of the Mother and the Child (Association Mauritanienne pour la Santé de la Mère et de L’Enfant) assisted 260 survivors of sexual assault and 40 survivors of domestic violence in the same year.47 These numbers likely only reflect a small portion of GBV cases, as many women do not report their experiences for fear of retaliation, social stigma, and the legal repercussions of speaking out.

Discussion of GBV, including sexual violence, is con-sidered taboo across Mauritania’s social and ethnic groups, an attitude reflected in the legal framework governing the issue. Consent is not clearly defined un-der Mauritanian law, and all extramarital sex, whether consensual or non-consensual sex, is considered zina (adultery). This legal principle has led to the prosecu-tion, conviction, and imprisonment of hundreds of rape survivors and has deterred many women from giving voice to their experiences. Moreover, sexual violence is narrowly defined as rape, giving women little legal leverage to raise complaints related to other offenses, such as sexual harassment.48 While domestic violence was criminalized under a 2001 law, many survivors do not report their experiences for fear that it may lead to the arrest and imprisonment of their husbands.49

For those women who do report GBV, ineffective re-porting mechanisms, social taboos around sex, and laws that legally disadvantage women can prevent them from bringing their perpetrators to justice. Women wishing to pursue legal action must first report their case to the police in order to receive a referral for medical examina-tion. The reporting process does not ensure the privacy of the individual making the complaint. Furthermore, there is no standard police protocol for sexual violence cases, which leaves much to the discretion of individual police departments. Numerous rape survivors have re-ported being dismissed by police officers and told that they were responsible for being raped. Moreover, health professionals sometimes refuse to conduct medical ex-aminations out of fear of retaliation by perpetrators.50

The government has taken steps in the past five years to curb the number of incidents of GBV and as-sist survivors. The country’s first ever sexual violence unit opened in a public hospital 2017; it offers medical consultations, emergency interventions, and free STI screenings and counseling services for women.51 A bill drafted in 2016 would strengthen punishments for rape, establish courts to deal specifically with GBV cases, and permit NGOs to bring GBV cases to the courts. Yet the bill, which is supported by numerous women’s rights groups, has twice been rejected by parliament on the grounds of being anti-Islamic. It has not been put forth for another vote at the time of writing.52

 BOX 6: Trafficking of Women and Girls in Mauritania

a. U.S. Department of State. “Trafficking in Persons Report.”

2019. 277.

Slavery and human trafficking affect thousands of Mau-

ritanian women and girls, most of whom are haratin.

Many are forced into domestic servitude from a young

age, where they are vulnerable to sexual violence. There

have also been incidents of women and girls signing up for

nursing and teaching positions in the Gulf States only to

be forced into domestic and sexual slavery upon arrival.a

 BOX 7: Female Genital Cutting (FGC) in Mauritania

a. “Prevalence Data on Different Forms of Violence Against

Women.” Global Database on Violence Against Women.

Accessed February 6, 2020. Available at: https://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/en/countries/africa/mauritania?formofviolence=fac5fe48636e4d388 2bbd2ebbf29bd60

b. “They Told Me to Keep Quiet”: Obstacles to Justice and

Remedy for Sexual Assault Survivors in Mauritania. Human

Rights Watch, 2018. 17. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/mauritania0918_web.pdf

c. “Mauritania.” Girls Not Brides. Accessed February 6,

2020. Available at: https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/mauritania/

d. “Mauritania.” Orchid Project. Accessed February 6, 2020.

Available at: https://www.orchidproject.org/about-fgc/where-does-fgc-happen/mauritania/

e. “‘They Told Me to Keep Quiet’: Obstacles to Justice and

Remedy for Sexual Assault Survivors in Mauritania.” Human

Rights Watch, 2018. 17.

FGC is common in Mauritania, where two-thirds of women

and girls aged 15–49 have undergone some form of cut-

ting.a Rural women are more likely to experience FGC than

their urban counterparts (79 versus 55 percent of women

aged 15–49, respectively).b FGC is closely linked to child

marriage, as girls who have undergone the procedure

are considered ready for marriage, regardless of age or

physical immaturity.c

In recent years, the Mauritanian government has taken

steps to address FGC. A national strategy for combatting

FGC was released in 2015, and the issue was included

in the country’s Strategy on Accelerated Growth and

Prosperity (2016–2030). FGC was officially criminalized

in a 2017 reproductive health law.d Around the same time,

Islamic scholars released a fatwa against the practice,

claiming that it lacked basis in religious teaching.e

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RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT IN MAURITANIA

Mauritanian religious leaders’ engagement on the is-sues of child marriage, GBV, and FGC reflect their ability to address socially sensitive issues in ways that respect Mauritanian culture. Over 200 Mauritanian religious and community leaders have highlighted Islamic teachings that oppose child marriage in their communities as part of the Sahel Women’s Empowerment and Demographic

Dividend (SWEDD), a project supported by the World Bank and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Imams have led training sessions on women’s empowerment for over 370,000 Mauritanians in rural areas and participated in radio broadcasts that promote women’s social empower-ment. Islamic scholars have also participated in UNFPA-led educational sessions on child marriage, GBV, and FGC.53

Healthife expectancy in Mauritania rose by 20 years between 1960 and 2018, yet the current average lifespan of 64.5 years still falls far below global

averages.54 Infectious diseases account for over a third of deaths, and birth-related complications account for another 13 percent.55 The health sector lacks the funding, infrastructure, and human resources to address the everyday needs of Mauritanians, and there has been a notable lack of government-led public health campaigns focused on disease prevention and healthy living.56

Infectious diseases pose a significant health threat. In 2018, there were around 2,400 new and relapsed cases of tuberculosis, a fifth of which were fatal.57 HIV/AIDS infections are on the decline, dropping from less than

1,000 new infections in 2005 to less than 200 in 2018. An estimated 5,600 people were living with HIV in 2018, more than half of whom were on antiretroviral therapy. There are an estimated 8,200 orphans (aged 0–17) due to HIV/AIDS in Mauritania.58 Two-thirds of the Mauritanian population lives in high malaria transmission areas in the south of the country. In 2017, there were over 20,000 confirmed cases of malaria and 67 deaths, but the WHO estimates that the real number is much higher, at more than 238,000 cases and 1,500 deaths.59

Poor water, sanitation, and hygiene systems contrib-ute to the spread of diarrheal diseases and neglected tropical diseases (NTDs). In 2019, under half of Mauri-tanians lived with basic hygiene and sanitation services,

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while nearly a third still lived in areas where open defecation is commonplace. Uniting to Combat Neglected Tropical Diseases re-ported infections of 850,000 people in 2017 (600,000 cases of bilharzia and 340,000 cases of blinding trachoma), of which under a third received the necessary treatment.60

Mauritania’s health care system is ill-equipped to address these and other health challenges. The country’s hospitals and health centers are heavily concentrated in urban areas, and more than two thirds of the pop-ulation lives more than an hour away from a functioning health facility. Furthermore, there is a lack of qualified medical person-nel across the country, with approximately one nurse or midwife for 1,500 people and one physician for every 8,300. Outdated and dysfunctional equipment poses an additional obstacle to effective medical treatment, as do frequent shortages in medical supplies. A 2016 survey of Mauritanian health facilities found that the average facility only stocked 4 out of 13 essential medicines at any given time, and no facility stocked all 13. The survey also found that slightly less than half of facilities had basic medical equipment.61 Furthermore, the health care system lacks a centralized system for maintaining patient records and coordinating care among primary, secondary, and tertiary facilities.62

In order to address these challenges, the government launched the National Health Development Plan (PNDS) for 2012–2020, which focuses on improving access to care, training community health workers, and re-forming pharmaceutical care and the hospital system. However, progress toward achieving the PNDS goals has been mixed, largely due to insufficient funding. Only 6 percent of the national budget goes toward the health sector, far below the 15 percent benchmark set by the Abuja Declaration. The vast majority of health funding goes toward running hospitals, with only around 21 percent of funds allocated to primary care and a mere 4 percent to preven-tative efforts such as immunization and family planning.63 State funding is insufficient in cov-ering the health care costs of citizens: of the average USD $56 spent per person on health finances in 2016, only $20 came from gov-ernment sources. The average Mauritanian

20

40

60

80

100

120Under-5

Infant

Neonatal

201520102005200019951990

InfantUnder-5

Neonatal

400

600

800

1000SSA

Mauritania

201520122009200620032000

Sub-Saharan AfricaMauritania

0

5

10

15

20All Women

Married Women

2018201720162015201420132012

All WomenMarried Women

  FIGURE 4: Neonatal, Infant, and Under-5 Mortality Rates (per 1,000 live births) in Mauritania, 1990–2018

Source: https://data.worldbank.org

  FIGURE 3: Maternal Mortality Rates (per 100,000 live births) in Mauritania and Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000–2017

Source: https://data.worldbank.org

  FIGURE 5: Modern Contraceptive Prevalence Rates (mCPR) among Mauritanian Women, 2012–2018

Source: https://www.familyplanning2020.org/mauritania

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RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT IN MAURITANIA

paid $28 for health care expenses.64

Despite strides in ma-ternal and child health outcomes in the past decade, there remains significant room for im-provement. While mater-nal mortality has steadily dropped in sub-Saharan Africa since the 2000s, the rate has remained relatively stable in Mau-ritania. In 2018, 766 out of 100,000 live births resulted in the death of the mother, the seventh highest maternal mortal-ity rate in the world.65 One factor behind this trend is the lack of qualified personnel to assist with birth-related complications; in 2015, nearly a third of women did not give birth in the presence of a skilled birth attendant. Common causes of maternal death in-clude hemorrhaging, hypertension, and sepsis, which are all preventable if given proper medical attention.

Newborns, infants, and young children are also vul-nerable to health complications. In 2018, 76 out of 1,000 children under the age of 5 died, nearly half of whom died during the neonatal phase (birth to one month). Pneumonia and diarrhea were among the top causes of death of children under 5.66 Food insecurity has also had a particularly heavy impact on young children: over 30 percent experience moderate acute malnutrition (MAM), and 20 percent suffer from chronic malnutrition.67 In 2015, 15 percent were wasted (low weight for height) and 28 percent were stunted (low height for age).68

In recent years, family planning has gained recognition as a major public health concern. With 40 percent of the population under the age of 15, a predicted population surge to 6 million by 2050, and consistently poor maternal health outcomes, the government and civil society officials are promoting family planning methods for the purpose of spacing births.69 A landmark 2017 law declared repro-ductive health a universal human right and a decree the following year authorized health practitioners to distrib-ute modern family planning methods.70 Since then, the Mauritanian government has included family planning as a priority in its National Health Development Plan. Mauri-tania is part of the Ouagadougou Partnership that aims to increase access to modern family planning.

Despite policy changes, many Mauritanian women still lack access to modern contraceptive methods (MCM), with close to a third of married women ex-pressing an unmet need for family planning. Nearly 10 percent of women use MCM (compared to 14 percent of married women).71 Poor women are disproportionately affected, with only 9 percent of women in the lowest wealth quintile saying their need for family planning is satisfied, compared to 46 in the wealthiest quintile.72 Low usage rates are driven by a variety of factors, including women’s lack of access to health facilities, shortages of MCM at facilities, widespread misinformation about the health risks of family planning, and certain religious voices that oppose all forms of contraception, even for the purpose of spacing births.

Muslim leaders are widely recognized as stakehold-ers in policy discussions around reproductive health and family planning in Mauritania; government officials and civil society representatives consider religious sup-port a necessary step toward the acceptance of mod-ern contraceptive methods by everyday Mauritanians. Several high-profile imams joined civil society leaders, medical experts, and government officials in drafting the 2017 reproductive health law.73 Local NGOs have also worked with religious leaders to spread awareness and dispel misconceptions around contraception; El Hanane, a Nouakchott-based NGO, works with religious and civil society leaders to provide Mauritanians with information about birth spacing in accordance with Islamic teaching.74

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Looking Aheadeligion touches upon almost every aspect of Mauritanian life, and Muslim leaders are in a strategic position to help shape policy dis-

cussions and individuals’ behavior around education, gender issues, and health. Religious groups run Islamic schools, help set policy agendas, and work with com-munity members to shape local attitudes around sen-sitive topics such as gender-based violence and family planning. However, these contributions sometimes go unacknowledged in official development discussions. This brief has highlighted development in Mauritania in the fields of education, gender, and health, focusing on applicable faith-linked contributions. The key findings included below are designed to initiate further discus-sion and research into these topics.

Government officials and mainstream Muslim leaders have a history of working together closely to oversee religious speech and counter extremist ideology in Mau-ritania, but the growing presence of Islamist groups is reshaping the nature of these relationships. Public opinion about who speaks for Mauritania’s Muslims has begun to shift as Islamists expand both their religious following and political base in the country. Growing concerns about religious extremism and violence in the region have further influenced the relationships among religious communities and with the government. Government restrictions on religious speech and crack-downs on Islamist mosques and schools have done little to diminish popular support for Islamists, especially as many mainstream Muslims become increasingly critical of foreign policy decisions deemed favorable to Western nations. Since legalizing the country’s first Islamist polit-ical party in 2007, the government has included Islamist political leaders in policy discussions about preventing jihadi violence and radicalization in the country.

Women face numerous obstacles to full legal, economic, and social equality in Mauritania, where gender-based violence, female genital cutting, and child marriage are widespread. Survivors of sexual assault have few options for legal recourse in a legal system where rape victims can be prosecuted for adultery. Taboos around sex further deter women and girls from speaking out

about sexual violence and harassment, and a legal loophole enables parents to marry off their daughters before age 18. The government has yet to pass legislation to discourage these practices and reform the existing laws governing them. While some Muslim leaders have spoken out against child marriage and gender-based violence, there have been no efforts to try to address these issues on a systemic level.

Maternal health and family planning are at the forefront of Mauritania’s public health agenda; government offi-cials, civil society representatives, and religious lead-ers are working together to address the multi-faceted nature of these issues. Mauritania has one of the worst maternal mortality rates in the world, with one in every 766 out of 100,000 live births resulting in the death of the mother. A lack of medical facilities and trained per-sonnel, as well as high child marriage rates and lack of family planning, contribute to these outcomes. Family planning is of particular concern, with a third of married women expressing an unmet need modern contracep-tive methods. The government has named access to contraception a policy priority and has partnered with religious leaders to shape public opinion on the matter. While their impact has been gradual, numerous imams have publicly endorsed family planning as a religiously permissible means of birth spacing.

In a country with some of the world’s worst public edu-cation scores, religious schools provide an alternative to conventional education, but they remain largely dis-connected from the broader education system. More than 9,000 religious schools, known as mahadras, are an alternative to students without access to a public or private school, as well as a supplement to students who attend these conventional schools. However, students at-tending mahadras do not graduate with state-recognized degrees, and they frequently lack the skills to compete in the job market. One recent government initiative introduced science and math curricula in two dozen mahadras and was met with initial success, pointing to a potential path for bridging the divide between re-ligious and public schools and improving Mauritania’s education rankings.

R

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Endnotes1. Stewart, Elizabeth. “History of Mauritania.” The Guardian,

August 6, 2008. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/06/mauritania.history

2. Stewart, Charles et al. “Mauritania.” In Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 1st ed. Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Mauritania; Boussery, Mohamed. “Fighting back the desert in Mauritania.” MDG Achievement Fund. Accessed February 20, 2020. Available at: http://mdgfund.org/story/fighting-back-desert-mauritania

3. Pazzanita, Anthony. Historical Dictionary of Mauritania. (2009). 278.

4. U.S. Department of State. “Mauritania 2018 International Religious Freedom Report.” (2019). 1.

5. “Religions 2020.” World Christian Database. Accessed on February 20, 2020. Available at: https://worldchristiandatabase.org/

6. Pazzanita, Anthony. Historical Dictionary of Mauritania. (2009). 277.

7. Farquhar, Michael and Alex Thurston. “How Mauritania exports religion to Saudi Arabia—and not just the other way around.” Brookings, December 13, 2018. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/13/how-mauritania-exports-religion-to-saudi-arabia-and-not-just-the-other-way-around/

8. U.S. Department of State. “Mauritania 2018 International Religious Freedom Report.” (2019). 2.

9. “L’Islamisme en Afrique du Nord IV: Contestation Islamiste en Mauritanie: Menace ou Bouc Émissaire?” International Crisis Group, 2005. 8, 15, 18–19.; Farquhar, Michael and Alex Thurston. “How Mauritania exports religion to Saudi Arabia—and not just the other way around.” Brookings, December 13, 2018. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/13/how-mauritania-exports-religion-to-saudi-arabia-and-not-just-the-other-way-around/

10. “L’Islamisme en Afrique du Nord IV: Contestation Islamiste en Mauritanie: Menace ou Bouc Émissaire?” International Crisis Group, 2005. 18–19.

11. Thurston, Alex. “Mauritania’s Islamists.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012. 1, 7–8.; Pazzanita, Anthony. Historical Dictionary of Mauritania. 3rd ed. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2008. 281.

12. Moreau, A. Scott (ed.). Evangelical Dictionary of World Missions. 1st ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2000. 606.

13. U.S. Department of State. “Mauritania 2018 International Religious Freedom Report.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2019.

14. “L’Islamisme en Afrique du Nord IV: Contestation Islamiste en Mauritanie: Menace ou Bouc Émissaire?” International Crisis Group, 2005. 8.; Pazzanita, Anthony. Historical Dictionary of Mauritania. 3rd ed. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2008. 278.

15. “Mauritania’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2012.” 3–4. Constituteproject.org, 2012. Available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritania_2012.pdf?lang=en; U.S. Department of State. “Mauritania 2018 International Religious Freedom Report.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2019.

16. “Member States.” Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Accessed February 20, 2020. Available at: https://www.oic-oci.org/states/?lan=en

17. “L’Islamisme en Afrique du Nord IV: Contestation Islamiste en Mauritanie: Menace ou Bouc Émissaire?” International Crisis Group, 2005. 9–10.; U.S. Department of State. “Mauritania 2018 International Religious Freedom Report.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2019.

18. “Mauritania.” Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project. Accessed February 20, 2020. Available at: http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries/mauritania#/?affiliations_religion_id=0&affiliations_year=2010&region_name=All%20Countries&restrictions_ year=2016

19. U.S. Department of State. “Mauritania 2018 International Religious Freedom Report.” (2019). 1.; “Mauritania Mandatory Death Penalty for Blasphemy.” Human Rights Watch, May 4, 2018. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/04/mauritania-mandatory-death-penalty-blasphemy

20. U.S. Department of State. “Mauritania 2018 International Religious Freedom Report.” (2019). 4.

21. U.S. Department of State. “Mauritania 2018 International Religious Freedom Report.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2019.; “Mauritania: Mandatory Death Penalty for Blasphemy.” Human Rights Watch, May 4, 2018. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/04/mauritania-mandatory-death-penalty-blasphemy

22. “L’Islamisme en Afrique du Nord IV: Contestation Islamiste en Mauritanie: Menace ou Bouc Émissaire?” International Crisis Group, 2005. 11.

23. “Mauritanie: le Ministère des affaires religieuses supprime le salaire de cent imams salafistes.” Dakaractu, June 9, 2015. Available at: https://www.dakaractu.com/Mauritanie-le-Ministere-des-affaires-religieuses-supprime-le-salaire-de-cent-imams-salafistes_a91266.html

24. “Mauritania closes ‘extremist’ Islamic school.” Qantara.de, September 26, 2018. Available at: https://en.qantara.de/content/mauritania-closes-extremist-islamic-school

25. “The Global Competitiveness Index: Mauritania.” World Economic Forum, 2017. Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2017-2018/03CountryProfiles/Standalone2-pagerprofiles/WEF_GCI_2017_2018_Profile_Mauritania.pdf

26. “School enrollment, primary (% gross).” World Bank, 2018. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRR?locations=MR; “School enrollment, primary (% net).” World Bank, 2018. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.NENR?locations=MR

27. “Mauritania Education Support Project: Project Information Document.” World Bank, 2018. 4.; “Mauritania: Administrative Obstacles Keep Kids from School.” Human Rights Watch, March 29, 2018. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/29/mauritania-administrative-obstacles-keep-kids-school

28. “Summative Evaluation of GPE’s Country-level Support to Education: Mauritania: Draft Report (V3).” Universalia, December 2018. 8.

29. “Mauritania Education Support Project: Project Information Document.” World Bank, 2018. 4–5. Available

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at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/209611537995952900/pdf/Concept-Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Mauritania-Education-Support-Project-P163143.pdf

30. “Summative Evaluation of GPE’s Country-level Support to Education: Mauritania: Draft Report (V3).” Universalia, December 2018. 8.; “Mauritania Education Support Project: Project Information Document.” World Bank, 2018. 4–5. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/209611537995952900/pdf/Concept-Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Mauritania-Education-Support-Project-P163143.pdf

31. “Mauritanie: Le système éducatif au bas de l’échelle Mondiale.” Le 360 Afrique, September 17, 2017. Available at: http://afrique.le360.ma/mauritanie/societe/2017/09/16/15082-mauritanie-le-systeme-educatif-au-bas-de-lechelle-mondiale-15082

32. The World Bank. “Mauritania Education Support Project: Project Information Document.” (2018). 3.

33. “Summative Evaluation of GPE’s Country-level Support to Education: Mauritania: Draft Report (V3).” Universalia, December 2018. 7–8.

34. “Mauritania Education Support Project: Project Information Document.” World Bank, 2018. 4. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/209611537995952900/pdf/Concept-Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Mauritania-Education-Support-Project-P163143.pdf

35. Wehrey, Frederic. “Control and Contain: Mauritania’s Clerics and the Strategy Against Violent Extremism.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2019. 2.

36. “Summative Evaluation of GPE’s Country-level Support to Education: Mauritania: Draft Report (V3).” Universalia, December 2018. 6–7.; “Mauritania Education Support Project: Project Information Document.” World Bank, 2018. 4. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/209611537995952900/pdf/Concept-Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Mauritania-Education-Support-Project-P163143.pdf

37. “L’enseignment coranique traditionnel dans les Maharas de Nouakchott: Etats des lieux et perspectives.” Educational Research Network for West and Central Africa, 2009. 12, 29, 31.

38. “Summative Evaluation of GPE’s Country-level Support to Education: Mauritania: Draft Report (V3).” Universalia, December 2018. 54.

39. “The Global Gender Gap Report: 2018.” World Economic Forum, 2018. 11.

40. “Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above.” World Bank, 2017. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS?locations=MR; “BTI 2018 Country Report: Mauritania.” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018. 16.

41. “Social Institutions & Gender Index: Mauritania.” OECD Development Centre. Accessed on February 7, 2020. Available at: https://www.genderindex.org/wp-content/uploads/files/datasheets/2019/MR.pdf

42. Human Rights Watch. “They Told Me to Keep Quiet”: Obstacles to Justice and Remedy for Sexual Assault Survivors in Mauritania. (2018). 14.

43. “Social Institutions & Gender Index: Mauritania.” OECD Development Centre. Accessed on February 7, 2020. Available at: https://www.genderindex.org/wp-content/uploads/

files/datasheets/2019/MR.pdf ; “BTI 2018 Country Report: Mauritania.” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018. 14, 22.

44. “Mauritania: Human Development Indicators.” United Nations Development Programme. Accessed February 7, 2020. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MRT

45. “Mauritania.” Girls Not Brides. Accessed February 6, 2020. Available at: https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/mauritania/; “Sahel Women’s Empowerment and Demographic Dividend (SWEDD).” UNFPA, 2016. 14. Available at: https://wcaro.unfpa.org/en/publications/sahel-women%E2%80% 99s-empowerment-and-demographic-dividend-project-swedd

46. Malé, Chata and Quentin Wodon. “Basic Profile of Child Marriage in Mauritania.” World Ban, 2016. 2.

47. “‘They Told Me to Keep Quiet’: Obstacles to Justice and Remedy for Sexual Assault Survivors in Mauritania.” Human Rights Watch, 2018. 16, 20.

48. “They Told Me to Keep Quiet.” Human Rights Watch, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/05/they-told-me-keep-quiet/obstacles-justice-and-remedy-sexual-assault-survivors; “‘They Told Me to Keep Quiet’: Obstacles to Justice and Remedy for Sexual Assault Survivors in Mauritania.” Human Rights Watch, 2018. 41.

49. Zeidane, Nebghouha Mint. “‘It must be love’: wife-beating a source of pride for some in Mauritania.” Reuters, February 25, 2017. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mauritania-women/it-must-be-love-wife-beating-a-source-of-pride-for-some-in-mauritania-idUSKBN1640B9

50. “‘They Told Me to Keep Quiet’: Obstacles to Justice and Remedy for Sexual Assault Survivors in Mauritania.” Human Rights Watch, 2018.; “They Told Me to Keep Quiet.” Human Rights Watch, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/05/they-told-me-keep-quiet/obstacles-justice-and-remedy-sexual-assault-survivors

51. Human Rights Watch. “They Told Me to Keep Quiet”: Obstacles to Justice and Remedy for Sexual Assault Survivors in Mauritania. (2018). 37.

52. “In conservative Mauritania, confronting sexual violence laws.” France 24, March 7, 2019. Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/20190307-conservative-mauritania-confronting-sexual-violence-laws

53. “In Mauritania, imams take to radio waves to say child marriage is against Islam.” UNFPA, December 9, 2019. Available at: https://www.unfpa.org/news/mauritania-imams-take-radio-waves-say-child-marriage-against-islam

54. “Life expectancy at birth, total (years).” World Bank, 2017. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=MR

55. “Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 12.6 Million to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.” World Bank, 2017. 17.

56. “The Mauritanian Health Care System Overview and Recommendations.” Global Centre for Renewal and Guidance, 2012.

57. “Mauritania: Tuberculosis profile.” World Health Organization, 2018. Available at: https://extranet.who.int/sree/Reports? op=Replet&name=%2FWHO_HQ_Reports%2FG2%2FPROD% 2FEXT%2FTBCountryProfile&ISO2=MR&LAN=EN& outtype=html

16 World Faiths Development Dialogue | www.wfdd.us

RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT IN MAURITANIA

58. “Mauritania.” UNAIDS. Accessed February 20, 2020. Available at: https://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/mauritania; “Mauritania Country Profile.” USAID. Accessed February 7, 2020. Available at: https://idea.usaid.gov/cd/mauritania

59. “Malaria Country Profile: Mauritania.” World Health Organization, 2018. Available at: https://www.who.int/malaria/publications/country-profiles/profile_mrt_en.pdf?ua=1

60. “Mauritania: Neglected tropical disease treatment report 2017.” Uniting to Combat Neglected Tropical Diseases, 2017. 3, 5.

61. “Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 12.6 Million to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.” World Bank, 2017. 12, 15.

62. “The Mauritanian Health Care System Overview and Recommendations.” Global Centre for Renewal and Guidance, 2012.

63. “Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 12.6 Million to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.” World Bank, 2017. 13, 16.

64. “Mauritania.” Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. Accessed February 4, 2020. Available at: http://www.healthdata.org/mauritania

65. “Mauritania Country Profile.” USAID. Accessed February 7, 2020. Available at: https://idea.usaid.gov/cd/mauritania

66. “Countdown Country Dashboards: Mauritania.” Countdown to 2030. Accessed February 7, 2020. Available at: http://profiles.countdown2030.org/#/ds/MRT

67. “WFP Mauritania: Country Brief.” World Food Programme, 2019. Available at: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000110488/download/

68. “Countdown Country Dashboards: Mauritania.” Countdown to 2030. Accessed February 7, 2020. Available at: http://profiles.

countdown2030.org/#/ds/MRT; “Mauritania Country Profile.” USAID. Accessed February 7, 2020. Available at: https://idea.usaid.gov/cd/mauritania

69. “Population ages 0–14 (% of total population).” World Bank, 2018. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=MR ; Ministry of Health. “Action Plan for Birth Spacing for 2014–2018.” 9.

70. “Mauritanian Reproductive Health Law Moves to Implementation.” Health Policy Plus, March 9, 2018. Available at: http://www.healthpolicyplus.com/MauritaniaLaw.cfm ; “Mauritania’s Council of Ministers Approves New Reproductive Health Bill.” Advance Family Planning, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.advancefamilyplanning.org/mauritanias-council-ministers-approves-new-reproductive-health-bill

71. Ministry of Health. “Action Plan for Birth Spacing for 2014–2018.” 15.; “Mauritania: Commitment Maker Since 2013.” Family Planning 2020. Accessed February 6, 2020. Available at: https://www.familyplanning2020.org/mauritania

72. “Countdown Country Dashboards: Mauritania.” Countdown to 2030. Accessed February 7, 2020. Available at: http://profiles.countdown2030.org/#/ds/MRT

73. “Mauritania’s Council of Ministers Approves New Reproductive Health Bill.” Advance Family Planning, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.advancefamilyplanning.org/mauritanias-council-ministers-approves-new-reproductive-health-bill

74. “USAID West Supports local NGOs, Stop SIDA and El Hanane.” U.S. Embassy in Mauritania, September 29, 2017. Available at: https://mr.usembassy.gov/usaid-west-africa-supports- local-ngos-stop-sida-el-hanane/

The World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) is a not-for-profit organization working at the intersection of religion and global

development. Housed within the Berkley Center in Washington, D.C., WFDD documents the work of faith inspired organizations

and explores the importance of religious ideas and actors in development contexts. WFDD supports dialogue among religious and

development communities and promotes innovative partnerships, at national and international levels, with the goal of contributing

to positive and inclusive development outcomes.

This brief, authored by Luisa Banchoff, is a continuation of WFDD’s country mapping work. Additional information and publications can

be found at https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/projects/mapping-of-faith-inspired-organizations-by-world-region-and-country.

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