religious leaders and conflict transformation: northern ireland and beyond

Cambridge University Press978-1-107-16171-9 — Religious Leaders and Conflict TransformationNukhet A. Sandal FrontmatterMore Information

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religious leaders and conflict transformation

Religious dimensions of contemporary conflicts and the rise of faith-based move-ments worldwide require policy makers to identify the channels through whichreligious leaders can play a constructive role. While religious fundamentalismsare in the news every day, we do not hear about the potential and actual rolesof religious actors in creating a peaceful and just society. Countering this trend,Sandal draws attention to how religious actors helped prepare the ground for stabi-lizing political initiatives, ranging from abolition of apartheid (South Africa) to thesigning of the Lome Peace Agreement (Sierra Leone). Taking Northern Ireland asa basis and using declarations and speeches of more than 40 years, this book buildsa new perspective that recognizes religious actors’ agency, showing how religiousactors can have an impact on public opinion and policy making in today’s world.

Nukhet A. Sandal is the Director of War and Peace Studies and Assistant Profes-sor of Political Science at Ohio University. Her work on religion, foreign policy,and divided societies appeared in the European Journal of International Relations,International Politics, Review of International Studies, Alternatives, Political Stud-ies, West European Politics, Human Rights Quarterly, and Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science. She is coauthor of Religion in International Relations Theory:Interactions and Possibilities (2013).

www.cambridge.org/9781107161719

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Religious Leaders andConflict Transformation

northern ireland and beyond

NUKHET A. SANDAL

Ohio University


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Contents

Acknowledgments page viii

1 Religious Actors and Conflict Transformation:

Theory and Practice 1

Communities of Expertise and Religion 2

Religious Actors as Epistemic Communities in Conflict

Transformation 7

Investigating Religious Epistemic Communities: The Case of

Northern Ireland 17

Structure of the Book 20

2 Situating Religious Actors in Irish Political History 23

The Ulster Plantation and Challenges to Gaelic Christianity 23

The Irish Confederate Wars and the Williamite War 26

The United Irishmen Uprising and the Catholic

Emancipation Movement 30

Home Rule and the Establishment of the Irish State 33

Northern Ireland and the Beginning of the Troubles 35

Religious Actors, Conflict, and Governance 41

Contemporary Religious Actors in Northern Ireland: Churches

and Other Organizations 42

3 Churches in “Troubles”: Leaders, Institutions, and

Political Involvement 48

Religious or Not? Defining the Conflict 53

A Question of Means: Religious Perspectives on Terrorism and

Violence 60

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vi Contents

The Politics of Conflict: Internment, Sunningdale, and

Beyond 66

The Sunningdale Agreement: First Steps toward Peace 68

4 From Diagnosis to Treatment: Devising an Inclusive Public

Theology of Citizenship 72

The Anglo-Irish Agreement: A Step Forward? 74

Religious Actors in Action: Redefinition of Religious Identities 77

Conversion: Challenging Exclusive Theological Premises 78

Agenda Setting, Religious Actors, and Politics 83

Reinforcement and Expressing Grievances: Issues of

Representation and Religious Actors 88

Empowerment: Providing Communities with Political Tools 90

5 Public Theology of Inclusive Governance: Peace Deals and

Political Agreements 93

Initial Challenges: Political Deadlocks, Violence, and

Secularism 95

Toward the Agreement: Cease-fires and Brooke-Mayhew Talks 98

Roadblocks and Challenges: Canary Wharf Bombing and

Drumcree 105

The Belfast Agreement: Reclaiming the Peace 111

6 Religious Epistemic Communities in a Postconflict Setting 116

Churches Coming Along? Institutionalization of the

Epistemic Communities 117

Relinquishing Arms: Decommissioning and Public Order 123

The State of Violence and Sectarianism in Postagreement

Northern Ireland 127

Toward Institutionalizing Religious Peacebuilding? Peace

Offices in Northern Ireland 130

7 Beyond Northern Ireland: Religious Expertise and

Conflict Transformation 134

Why Epistemic Communities Framework? 135

South Africa: Changing the Public Theology of Apartheid 137

Colombia: Religious Epistemic Communities and Displaced

People 138

Sierra Leone: Religious Epistemic Communities and

Interreligious Reconciliation 142


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Contents vii

The Philippines: Interfaith Religious Epistemic Communities

in Conflict Mediation 145

Other Examples of Religious Epistemic Communities and

Further Directions in Application 147

Religious Epistemic Communities in Conflict Resolution:

Lessons and Policy Implications 150

Notes 155

Bibliography 182

Index 195


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Acknowledgments

Many people deserve special thanks for their contributions to this project.

This book would not have been possible without the generous intellectual

support of my mentor, Patrick James. He has been a constant source of inspi-

ration throughout my career. I cannot thank enough Laurie Brand, Thomas

Goodnight, Jonathan Fox, and Daniel Philpott for their valuable advice and

guidance on earlier drafts of this book and multiple other research projects.

I am indebted to Brian Walker and Richard English for their advice and

guidance “in the field.” My friends and colleagues Neophytos Loizides, Sean

Brennan, and Evangelos Liaras have been incredibly supportive and played

key roles especially in the initial phases of this research project – I am truly

grateful for their presence.

Shaun McDaid was generous enough to share his insights of Northern Irish

history with me whenever I asked for it; I feel very lucky to have had his

support.

The Center for International Studies at the University of Southern Cali-

fornia and the Watson Institute of International Studies at Brown University

provided me with the time and support needed to conclude this project.

Michael Kennedy deserves a special mention for his tireless mentoring and

the insightful discussions on epistemic politics when I was working on this

book at the Watson Institute.

I have been very lucky to have an amazing family who have been very

patient with me, well, since I was born. My mother, Cana, whom I skype ten

times a day, interestingly continues to accept my calls. My father, Ali Aslan,

supported this project through providing the thousands of cups of Turkish

coffees I needed – he continues to serve as my “crisis desk” and gives me

strength. My brother Hakan has transitioned from being my peanut to my

intellectual role model in the past 30 years – I am very proud of him, and I

hope he will like this book. My sister Aylin Ece Cicek is basically the most

viii


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Acknowledgments ix

amazing thing that has happened to me; thank you for believing in me more

than I have believed in myself.

A special thanks to my husband, Michael, who is the best life partner one

can ask for – I truly do not know how to express my love and gratitude for you.

Last, but not least, I would like to acknowledge my grandparents Fatma and

Ismail Hakkı Senyuva, to whom I dedicate this book. Although they are not

physically with us anymore, they are the reason I strive to be a good scholar.


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1

Religious Actors and Conflict Transformation

Theory and Practice

The role of religious actors in conflict transformation, as an area of academic

inquiry, is relatively new to the study of politics. Given the absence of religion

and religious actors – broadly defined to include faith leaders and faith-based

civil society organizations – in the mainstream politics of the Cold War years,

it remains a challenge to find appropriate frameworks to accommodate these

phenomena in the twenty-first-century peace-building and conflict resolution

practices.1 Today, it is critical to devise perspectives and tools that help us

understand religious actors better. Religious political parties have become

vocal in diverse settings ranging from India to Turkey. Ethnoreligious conflicts

with international ramifications, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, continued to

intensify while sectarian strifes in Syria and Iraq attracted attention worldwide.

The rise of violent actors, such as the Islamic State, whose leaders question

the legitimacy of secular arrangements and borders, concern policy makers

and communities not just in the Middle East but around the world. Conflicts

in places like Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Bosnia, India, and Pakistan

have religious dimensions. Therefore, finding lasting solutions to some of the

political challenges we currently face requires policy makers and academics

to understand the peaceful and violent theologies as well as to devise methods

identifying the constructive role religious actors can play in transforming

conflicts into stable political settings. The aim of this book is to explore the

dynamics of such constructive involvement with a focus on Northern Ireland

and to develop a novel framework that takes religious leaders seriously in

conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

One common view in both policy and academic circles is that religious

actors either incite violence or remain silent in the face of it. Compared to

the number of scholarly accounts of religion and violence, the number of

investigations of religion and peacebuilding still remains inadequate. Brekke,

in his review of religion and the peace process in Sri Lanka, points to this gap.

1

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2 Religious Actors and Conflict Transformation: Theory and Practice

He states that despite evidence showing religious actors “have often raised their

voices urging the parties to find a peaceful settlement to the war,” research

concerning this role remains surprisingly insufficient.2 In this book, I adapt

one of the influential frameworks of agency to the study of faith leaders today

to address this gap in the studies of conflict transformation and peacebuilding.

There is no systematic theory of expertise to study religious leaders in conflict

settings. I offer an analytical perspective by adapting and enriching an existing

framework, that of epistemic communities, to account for the impact religious

actors have on the politics of peace and conflict. Religion constitutes a type of

knowledge and an area of expertise. Religious actors, peaceful or violent, act as

knowledge producers. Therefore, we cannot treat religious actors as ordinary

members of civil society. They constitute a distinct category. Using such an

expertise-based approach in peacebuilding opens new avenues in the study

and practice of religion and conflict transformation.

communities of expertise and religion

Religious actors, in the context of this study, are experts and practitioners of a

religious tradition who have background in studying the principles of the reli-

gion and engage in the application of these principles to public life. A religious

actor can be a religious leader or any organization that overtly operates under

religious principles. Religious leaders, by forming and advancing a specializedtype of knowledge that shapes public understanding of religion, which I call

public theology, constitute a community of expertise.3 This expert community

has an influence on multiple policy fields. Before situating religious leaders as

members of epistemic communities in conflict transformation, a brief look at

the philosophical origins of the concept of episteme and epistemic communitiesis necessary.

Episteme means “knowledge” or “science” in Greek. It stands for theoretical

knowledge, in the form of agreed-on rules, standards, and procedures. Practi-

cal knowledge, on the other hand, is conveyed by the word techne, which is

used for Platonic models of knowledge.4 A coherent body of special knowledge

qualifies as episteme. That body of knowledge does not need to be in the realm

of physical sciences as we understand it today. To illustrate, episteme might

define the knowledge framework that the scientist or the theologian works

within, whereas techne would be more appropriately employed for crafts and

applied science. Religious leaders and theologians create and influence epis-teme by employing textual analysis to make sense of religious sources and

conveying the interpretation to the public. One area of such investigation, tex-

tual analysis and interpretation (also called hermeneutics), has its own specific



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methodology on which scholars agree and is designated as “a body of knowl-

edge that deals with understanding what is said in a text.”5 It is a distinct area of

expertise.

Foucault can be regarded as the intellectual father of politics of knowledge,

and, not surprisingly, religion has its place in his frameworks. In a Foucauldian

sense, religion has as much epistemic value – if not more – as science. I argue

that Foucault’s “Postmodern” episode would constitute a fourth episteme, after

the three epistemes defined in Foucault’s The Order of Things:6 the “Renais-

sance,” the “Classical,” and the “Modern.” Foucault’s epistemes belong to

periods that are marked by specific discourses and worldviews. These epis-temes do not follow a linear progression, but they may have similarities and

differences. The “Renaissance” period was marked by the interpretation of

“signs” and the discovery of resemblances; that particular episteme had a very

thin line between science, as we understand it today, and divination. The

“Classical” episteme focused on identity, difference, and measurement; there

was an increased value of man-made taxonomies and analyses with advance-

ments in technology. In the “Modern” age, there was an implicit rejection of

nature and divine as “the cause.” Nothing but “Man” is responsible for knowl-

edge. The “Modern” episteme, in terms of its premises and its confidence in

scientific theories and application, coincides with the strongly secular and

materialist political views of the twentieth century. The liberal internation-

alist approach to peacekeeping, with its focus on bringing liberal democracy

and market economy to every divided society, is a reflection of this Modern

episteme. The next step in peacebuilding is culture-sensitive strategic peace-

building that takes religion seriously.

As Foucault notes in various instances, the questions and discourses in each

episteme might resemble or borrow from another episteme, but the categories

still maintain an internal coherence. With the end of the Cold War and the

continuing decline in state capacities and secular ideologies to respond to

society’s material and psychological needs, there is arguably a decrease in

the unquestioned belief in science and secular forms of governance.7 This

shift has led to the recognition of actors who could actually devise “answers”

to people’s needs. Recent examples include the rise of religious actors during

and after the Arab Uprisings and the increasing role of religion in the relatively

more secular American and European political scenes. Within the American

context, Toft, Philpott, and Shah argue that the prevalence of religion forces

the candidates for national office “to speak the language of religion.”8 The

Postmodern episteme that we are currently influenced by, therefore, is the one

that acknowledges scientific advances but focuses on human spirituality and

how people can relate to the outside world without experiencing alienation.



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Expert communities of that particular episteme inevitably include faith leaders

and other religious actors.

How does religion take its epistemological place next to science in this

new era? Obviously, textual interpretation, no matter how rigorously it is

conducted, cannot be numerically precise. However, the existence of policy

debates regarding the interpretation of sacred texts renders the “absoluteness”

of religious precepts open to question. Religion, in terms of practice and inter-

pretation, evolves over time. There are multiple ways and methods through

which one can give meaning to the religious traditions. Scott Appleby, a pro-

fessor of history and expert on religious violence and peacebuilding, argues

these dynamics make the sacred “ambivalent”; there is no final say when it

comes to interpreting traditions.9 Similar to the scientific sphere, religious

expertise is the product of certain systematic procedures. Religious attitudes

change over time, as religious leaders reinterpret symbols, myths, and narra-

tives in the face of contemporary challenges. Religious actors bring together

multiple influences and sources to give meaning to world events, and they

usually strive for a consensus to ensure consistency and clarity. De Silva, for

example, notes that Buddhist political activism in Sri Lanka was defined by

Burmese monks educated in India and sympathetic to Marxist ideals.10

Treating religious interpretation and analysis as a special form of expertise

in public policy and diplomacy might raise questions. However, it is congruent

with the development of the epistemic communities theory in international

studies. The importance accorded to a specific area defines the classification

of knowledge, as well as its permeation into practice. Emanuel Adler, a key

scholar in the study of epistemic communities, asserts that depending on

the historical context, “theories and policy proposals that previously did not

make much sense to politicians may suddenly acquire a political meaning,

thus becoming viable.”11 This is true for resurgence of religion in the public

sphere. With religion’s reentry into the political realm and the questioning

of the secularization-modernization arguments,12 contemporary policy makers

assign more credence to faith-related issues.

In the field of political science, an epistemic community is defined as “a net-

work of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular

domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that

domain or issue area.”13 Peter Haas, a political scientist who has extensively

written on communities of knowledge, states that “epistemic communities

need not be made up of natural scientists; they can consist of social scien-

tists or individuals from any discipline or profession who have a sufficiently

strong claim to a body of knowledge that is valued by society.”14 However,

scholarly investigations that employ the epistemic communities framework



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have focused mostly on the influence of scientific elites on political decision

making. Examples include Mediterranean pollution control,15 the protection

of stratospheric ozone,16 nuclear arms control,17 climate change,18 and AIDS

control regimes.19 The only exception is the relatively recent treatment of

diplomatic corps as epistemic communities by Davis-Cross.20

This technocratic bias in the literature leads many to think that knowledge

communities can exist only in the realm of science and that other forms of

expertise, including religion, do not qualify as “knowledge.” However, those

scholars who have initially theorized knowledge communities in global politics

have clearly stated that an epistemic communities framework is a “vehicle for

the development of insightful theoretical premises about the creation of col-

lective interpretation and choice” and “methodologically pluralistic.”21 Given

the character and the formation process of public theologies and the voluntary

nature of religious affiliations and practice, faith-related debates and processes

call for such a theoretical vehicle.

The success of epistemic communities is historically contingent.22 Post–

Cold War systemic structures, identity debates, and political events, as well

as their resonance in domestic contexts, have rendered implementation of

religious policy proposals politically more viable than they were perceived in

the past. In other words, as the focus has shifted from material capabilities

to identity-related issues in politics, religious actors and their influence have

become more visible in politics. This influence is not confined to conflict

settings. Political debates on issues such as development and human rights

included strong religious voices. To illustrate, James D. Wolfensohn (former

president of the World Bank Group) and Lord George Carey (Archbishop of

Canterbury between 1991 and 2002) established World Faiths Development

Dialogue to foster understanding between faith-based organizations and the

World Bank, thus tapping into the expertise of religious actors in local set-

tings. We continue to witness the establishment of such interfaith institutes,

initiatives, and issue-based religious organizations every day.

Religious actors satisfy the criteria for the communities of knowledge and

expertise. According to Haas, a network of professionals should share a min-

imum of four conditions to qualify as an epistemic community: a shared set

of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared norms of

validity, and a common policy enterprise in the form of common practices

associated with a set of problems to which professional competence is directed.

Religious actors, albeit different in a number of ways from scientific commu-

nities, share those traits. In terms of their normative and causal beliefs, as well

as norms of validity, there is a remarkable level of agreement, which is not

surprising given that religious actors make reference to the same texts, usually



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by employing widely accepted methods of interpretation. Respect for life, a

belief in a transcendent being, and the need for a just economic system are

among the values that most – if not all – religious actors hold as an inte-

gral part of their “beliefs” and for which they advocate actively on national

and international levels. Evidently, stated belief and practice may differ to

a significant extent. However, this does not change the fact that theological

discussions usually revolve around some common principles. Articles of faith

are not created randomly; a practice or proclamation of faith is systematically

traced to text and tradition. Only religious leaders and experts in theology

can effectively undertake this step. People turn to their religious leaders when

they want to know more about what insights their religious tradition provides

on specific issues such as group membership, health practices, and public

service. Religious actors sometimes lead activist networks, which perpetuate

the interpretation and theological insights into a policy or concern.

One can argue that religious actors merely qualify as activists or communi-

ties of discourse and that religious knowledge cannot be treated like scientific

knowledge, the type of knowledge that has been at the center of the epistemic

communities approach so far. What counts as episteme (knowledge) at a spe-

cific time would be defined by consensus and the extent to which a body of

knowledge would be regarded as authoritative. In this vein, the preaching of

religious leaders and the communities that form around these teachings con-

stitute “islands of epistemic communities.” The audience for these teachings

takes this type of knowledge seriously, and its members regulate their public

and private lives accordingly. For a significant number of people, religious

knowledge has more relevance than scientific knowledge – actually, religious

knowledge, at times, has the power to define the borders of science, as we have

seen with the debates surrounding stem cell research in the US. This book

does not claim in any way, however, that religious knowledge is or should

be superior to its scientific counterpart. Yet ignoring religious actors’ influ-

ence in the politics of technology, conflict, and the economy is costly, and

no investigation of peacebuilding, conflict transformation, or human rights

can be complete without reference to the impact of religious interpretation.

Religious knowledge can lead to violence or bring peace; it can have pub-

lic manifestations in any direction. In either case, policy makers should take

religion seriously.

The main argument of this book is that religious interpretation translates

into a form of expertise, and religious actors are knowledge producers in con-

flict resolution, peacebuilding, and human rights, among other issue areas.

What makes the stance of a religious actor different from that of a layperson

is the employment of exegesis and hermeneutics, sometimes acquired through



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Religious Actors as Epistemic Communities in Conflict Transformation 7

intensive training. Exegesis is defined as the critical interpretations of an

authoritative text, such as the Holy Scriptures, and as stated before, hermeneu-

tics refers to the science of formulating guidelines, laws, and methods for inter-

preting a text’s meaning.23 This training and interest in exegesis and in the

study of hermeneutics lend faith leaders relative credibility when it comes to

religious approaches toward private and public spheres. While it is true that

one might find “conflicting” textual evidence that advocates different posi-

tions, in many cases it has been possible to have a technical discussion of the

context and the message in sacred texts. The existence of conferences, con-

ventions, and peer-reviewed journals in the field of theology consolidates the

argument that there exists a structured expert community that promotes the

advancement of knowledge in textual analysis, interpretation, and application,

all of which are subject to critique and refutation.24 Epistemic communities

are seeking and “marketing” not the “truth” but systematic new perspectives

that have the capacity to influence the politics of the moment. In other words,

the factors we should be interested in are the “values and visions that can

catch the imagination of decision-makers who then, on the basis of their

new understanding, may redefine strategic and economic interests so as to

enhance human interests across national borders.”25 In the fields of peace-

building and conflict transformation, these values and visions are the religious

perspectives that capture the subtleties of human security, trauma healing, and

reconciliation.

The epistemic perspective toward conflict transformation and peacebuild-

ing is interdisciplinary. It combines theology, sociology, philosophy, and polit-

ical science, among others. In this book, I use the so-called Troubles period of

Northern Ireland as a theory-building case, but the framework is applicable to

any ethnically divided society or any setting that requires countering a violent

discourse or practice. Production and dissemination of religious knowledge,

when investigated rigorously, can help both scholars and practitioners explain

the mechanisms of violence and peace. The framework also helps clarify the

duties of the practitioners in multidimensional strategic peacebuilding.

religious actors as epistemic communities in

conflict transformation

Twentieth-century peace-building efforts were dominated by liberal interna-

tionalism, which offered market economy and liberal democracy as a panacea

for divisions and problems of unstable societies. This approach failed in

many settings and destabilized societies even further. In Rwanda, Angola,

Bosnia, Mozambique, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, liberal internationalist



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peace-building missions “had the ‘perverse effect’ of undermining the very

peace they were meant to buttress.”26 Practitioners have gradually come to

the conclusion that peacebuilding needs to be sensitive to the particular

needs of the divided societies and that there is no magic solution that works

in every conflict setting. The conflict transformation process requires the

inclusion of multiple local and transnational actors in the process, which

means bringing together diverse knowledge networks and relevant areas of

expertise. Religion is one such critical area that peacebuilders ignored in

the past but that has become increasingly recognized as relevant to peace

processes.

Many contemporary conflicts and civil wars have a religious dimension.27

This does not mean that the parties are fighting over religion or that the

conflicts are religious in nature. There are diverse arguments when it comes

to the effect of religion on conflicts and their resolution. Toft argues that

religious civil wars are four times harder on noncombatants when compared

to their nonreligious counterparts.28 On the other hand, Svensson notes that

religious difference does not make a conflict more intractable, unless parties

are fighting for an overtly religious cause.29 However, the religion dimension

is too important to ignore altogether in conflict transformation and efforts for

a sustainable peace, even in nonreligious conflict settings. In most societies,

religion is a part of political identity and national narratives, and policy mak-

ers cannot underestimate its importance even when dealing with seemingly

secular issues and tensions.

All religions have both inclusive and exclusive interpretations and prac-

tices, which I call public theologies; no faith tradition is intrinsically violent

or peaceful. I define exclusive public theologies as perspectives and interpreta-

tions that discourage cooperation with the members of other denominations

or religions and aggressively defend a particular religious view without being

open to compromise or discussion. Inclusive public theologies, on the other

hand, focus on possibilities of cooperation and agreement, recognizing that

different faith groups can come together for a common purpose and that differ-

ences can be resolved or tolerated. Each of these theologies has its supporters

and ways to influence politics. The settings where exclusive public theologies

dominate are usually conflict prone. To bring stability to divided societies,

religious communities that support inclusive public theologies must find ways

to influence politicians and other parties to the conflict. These religious com-

munities work to advance their public theology in ways that are similar to the

ways scientific epistemic communities affect power politics. Accordingly, even

in conflict settings such as Colombia, Uganda, and El Salvador, where religion

was not the main issue of contention, religious actors played a constructive



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role in conflict transformation through their knowledge of local customs and

expertise in theological approaches to conflict.30

Especially since the end of the Cold War, religious leaders who are inter-

ested in representing their traditions in an inclusive manner have become

more visible. In August 2000, more than 1000 representatives of transnational

and indigenous religious traditions gathered at the United Nations for a Mil-

lennium Summit of World Religious and Spiritual Leaders, which indicated

the level of international recognition of faith leaders as influential actors in

global politics. What is surprising is not just how recent this focus on religious

actors has been but how long it has taken to recognize that they influence

politics both directly and indirectly. Former US Secretary of State Madeleine

Albright criticized the George W. Bush administration for its lack of recog-

nition of religious actors’ influence in an international context: “One of the

many ironies of U.S. policy is that the Bush administration, for all its faith-

based initiatives, is far more comfortable working with secular leaders than

with those Iraqis for whom religion is central. This is true even when the

religious leaders are moderate in orientation and generally accepting the U.S.

goals.”31 One reason for such discomfort is that policy makers have not suf-

ficiently recognized religious expertise in mainstream politics, including the

dynamics of peacebuilding and conflict transformation.

Today’s challenges show that even in places where a separation of church

and state exists, such a legal divide is not necessarily equal to a diminished

role of religion in the lives of individuals. Even if people do not experience

and practice religion in their everyday existence, knowing that “the church”

is there for them still matters, as do statements made by religious leaders.32

This understanding of “vicarious religion,” as observed by sociologist Grace

Davie, can explain how religions might appear to be absent in the political

and public scene yet might exert tremendous influence and meaning at the

individual level. Davie draws attention to the Nordic populations, who are

members of the Lutheran Church and pay “appreciable amount of tax” to

their churches yet remain to be among the least practicing populations in the

world on every comparable scale.33 Vicarious religion is not the only frame-

work that underscores the complexity of religion. Demerath developed the

concept of “cultural religion,” which is “identification with a religious her-

itage without religious participation or a sense of personal involvement per se,”

and among his examples are the Polish Catholics, Northern Irish Catholics,

and Northern Irish Protestants.34 Gans formulated “symbolic religiosity” that

he defines as the “consumption of religious symbols, apart from regular par-

ticipation in a religious culture and in religious affiliations – other than for

purely secular purposes.”35 These concepts indicate that even if people do



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not actively practice religion in their everyday lives, religious tradition, with

its symbols and myths, still plays an important role worthy of investigation,

and religious leaders and their public role remain highly relevant. In the con-

text of Northern Ireland, for example, Bruce states, “What matters is not any

individual’s religiosity, but the individual’s incorporation in an ethnic group

defined by a particular religion.”36 In short, even if the public does not appear

to be “religious” in statistical tabulations or surveys, it is still likely to heed

religious leaders and their public discourse.37 This is especially noteworthy in

conflict transformation and peace-building processes within seemingly secular

societies.

Religious actors play multiple roles in conflict transformation, peacebuild-

ing, and human rights, which we can subsume under the term “religious

peacebuilding.” Professor of the practice of Catholic peacebuilding Gerard

Powers defines religious peacebuilding as “the beliefs, norms, and rituals that

pertain to peacebuilding, as well as a range of actors, from religious insti-

tutions, faith-based private voluntary organizations that are not formally part

of a religious institution, and individuals and groups for whom religion is a

significant motivation for their peacebuilding.”38 According to Powers, inter-

religious peacebuilding has one or more of the following purposes: deepening

relationships, improving understanding, finding common ground on beliefs

and actions, promoting common action, and encouraging complementary

action.39 Everyone can participate in religious peacebuilding, but an epis-

temic community that can relate text and tradition to daily life and peace

efforts usually leads this network. Sociologist John Brewer and his colleagues

typify religious peacemaking as active and passive, the former living out com-

mitments as a social practice, the latter an idealistic commitment but lacking

in application. They also distinguish between social (related to societal heal-

ing) and political (related to negotiated deals) peace processes.40 Professor of

political science and peace studies Daniel Philpott argues that the central

meaning of reconciliation is the restoration of right relationship, and “it is

largely religious leaders and communities who have sponsored it, though not

exclusively.”41 In short, scholars in multiple fields have recently pointed to the

importance of religious expertise and religious leaders in conflict transforma-

tion and peacebuilding.42

To be recognized as an epistemic community, a group should be seen as

“experts” who are uniquely qualified to inform the public and policy debates.

Citizens defer to the authority of experts not only in circumstances involv-

ing technical dimensions, but also in “all sorts of common decisions.”43

Thus, religious leaders appear on the political scene as “heralds,” “advo-

cates,” “observers,” “educators,” and “institution builders,” in addition to being



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citizens, public leaders, and activists.44 With such power and authority, they

can also legitimize or delegitimize political arrangements. One such example

is the role of Catholic priests in the civil disobedience campaign in the Philip-

pines. Religious actors under the leadership of Cardinal Jaime Sin along with

the Catholic radio station Veritas played a crucial role in mobilizing the masses

against the fraudulent victory of Ferdinand Marcos over Corazon Aquino in

the 1980s.45 Similarly, Buddhist monks played a leading role in the Saffron Rev-

olution in Burma, fighting against government repression.46 Another example

is the transformative role of the Catholic Church in Poland and its influence

in providing an alternative to Communism. The Catholic Church, which

had been suppressed under Communist rule, became a mediator between the

Communist government and Poland’s nongovernmental trade union that the

government tried to abolish.47

Faith leaders have the potential to employ “a well-established and pervasive

influence in the community, a reputation as an apolitical force for change

based on a respected set of values, unique leverage for reconciling conflicting

parties, including an ability to rehumanize relationships, and the capability

to mobilize community, national, and international support for peace pro-

cess.”48 Religious institutions have acted as “protective fortresses for threatened

people” in many conflict settings.49 Many faith leaders and faith-based non-

governmental organizations have provided training in conflict resolution and

play mediating roles.50 To illustrate, the Community of Sant’Egidio, played

a major role in hosting and mediating the negotiations that led to the end

of civil war in Mozambique.51 Similarly, civil society actors like Corrymeela

Community brought Protestants and Catholics together in Northern Ireland,

creating safe space and discussion forums for possible solutions to the conflict.

Clearly, not all religious leaders support peace processes or can reconcile

conflicting parties. Accordingly, this book does not claim that the epistemic

communities framework always works inclusively and peacefully but instead

argues that there are resources and traits only religious actors can employ in

changing the politics of divided societies. Religious interpretation, expertise,

and knowledge can influence conflict transformation in multiple ways, which

is why we should introduce a novel approach that can account for both positive

and negative influences of religious actors.

How do religious actors contribute to conflict transformation? Professional

training, prestige, and reputation for expertise in an area such as religion pro-

vide faith leaders with access to the political system, and legitimize or authorize

politicians’ activities. Beyond the elite level, religious congregations are hubs

for the forming of political views that cannot be simplified as the aggrega-

tion of the congregation’s membership.52 In terms of conflict transformation,



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Professor of International Peacebuilding John Paul Lederach states that such

midlevel and grassroots groupings and, consequently, leadership that can be

provided by clerics, are much more effective than elite-level transformation

attempts.53 Churches and other places of worship can provide individuals with

“civic skills,” enabling them to mobilize and actively participate in political

life.54 This kind of leadership by religious actors distinguishes them from

scientific epistemic communities that usually have little direct access to the

public. Unlike traditional scientific epistemic communities, the clergy possess

resources that can have an immediate impact on society. However, research

also shows that religious leaders feel constrained by theological factors when

it comes to playing an active role in the public sphere.55

The capability and, in a way, obligation of faith leaders to translate compli-

cated textual interpretations into everyday language and daily practice adds to

the effectiveness of their message when it comes to influencing high-level pol-

icy makers. The message and expectations that are created locally are conveyed

to policy makers via public announcements or through individual meetings.

The political elite, at a point in which such expectations would work best

for their political prospects, choose to follow the strategies recommended by

local experts (in our case, faith leaders) and promote the “knowledge” at their

disposal to their adversaries and other actors in international settings. One

such example is the role of Father Alec Reid in influencing prominent Irish

politician Gerry Adams’ views throughout the Troubles period.56

Religious leaders, like other epistemic communities, have their shared nor-

mative and principled beliefs. Among many of these beliefs is a conviction

regarding the fundamental unity of the human family; a sense of the sacredness

of the individual person and his conscience; a sense of the value of the human

community; a recognition that human power is not self-sufficient and absolute

and a sense of obligation to stand on the side of the poor and the oppressed

against the rich and the oppressors.57 The strongest disagreements among reli-

gious leaders do not stem from the rejection of any of these principles, but

from the “exceptions” such as the admissibility of harming another as a form

of self-defense, which could (or not) be made under certain circumstances.

Despite the fact that many religious traditions share a number of core

principles, specific rituals and practices involved in individual traditions may

significantly differ. This is not in itself an obstacle to achieving common

ends. These traditions, embodied in groups or states, may form purposive

associations, defined as a relationship among those who cooperate for the

purpose of securing certain shared beliefs, values, and interests, who adapt

certain practices as a means to that end, and who regard such practices as

worthy of respect only to the extent that they are useful instruments of the



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common purpose.58 An observant Protestant, for example, might have more

in common with an observant Catholic, than a Protestant who is not seen

as living up to the tenets of their tradition. Although this phenomenon is

not investigated in depth here, there are “religious communities” that define

their identities primarily against “nonbelievers,” as opposed to believers in

other traditions. Such a reinterpretation of “the other” may not always be

the best way to create a stable political environment, but it shows that the

borders of self and the others are fluid and open to interpretation by religious

actors.

How do we apply the epistemic communities theory to religious peace-

building? Adler introduces five variables within the context of the traditional

epistemic communities research agenda that are useful for explaining the

relationship between religious interpretation and politics: Units of Variation,

Innovation, Selection, Diffusion, and Units of Effective Modification. Schol-

ars have used these five elements of knowledge politics to investigate the

degree of influence scientists may exert over politicians. For the purposes of

our analysis, I adapt this framework to investigate the mechanisms by which

religious leaders and communities engage with political issues, especially those

of divided societies. To explain the impact of religious discourses, public the-

ologies, and the religious actors on the politics of divided societies, I expand

these dimensions as follows:

� Units of Variation: “Units of variation” stands for new conceptualizations,

interpretations, meanings, the units of change that are influenced by

the epistemic communities in question. Units of variation in religious

peacebuilding are exclusive public theologies (religious perspectives that

regard one tradition superior to others) and inclusive public theologies(religious perspectives that do not regard one religious tradition superior

to others).

Public theology is the reflection and implications of a religion in the activities

that take place in the common space, including political and social life. It is not

necessarily what is stated in the relevant scriptures; it includes human inter-

pretation of what is relevant and to what extent particular religious premises

are experienced in the public arena. Every religion contains observable and

influential currents of issue-based public thinking that are contingent on time

and space. It is usually the interactions and clashes of these currents that

interest policy makers on the ground, not the conflict of religions or civiliza-

tions. A number of works have investigated the dynamics of public theologies,

especially within the context of the US.59



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Unlike civil religion, which denotes the employment of myths and symbols

to support the practices of a country or group, public theology, as a term, is

normatively neutral.60 McElroy states that public theology has the compo-

nent of “acknowledging God’s participation in the life of the nation, while

at the same time using religious truth to critique the policies and direction

of the nation.”61 Even in contexts wherein the separation of church and state

is affirmed in key foundational documents, public theologies still exist; indi-

viduals who practice their religion reflect their perspective and translate their

beliefs to public actions in one way or the other.

A politically engaged understanding of Christianity is theologically commu-

nal (as opposed to agentic or individual-focused) and horizontal (concerned

with ethical matters, rather than individual salvation or “vertical”).62 There

are exceptions to this rule. In the context of Northern Ireland, evangelical

Protestants under the Free Presbyterian Church and the Democratic Union-

ist Party played an overtly political role, as opposed to mainstream churches.

They represented an exclusive public theology for many years; they claimed

superiority over other denominations, and demonstrated an inflexible atti-

tude toward communication with “the other.” Similarly, other fundamental-

ist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the Army of God in

the US, extremist Jewish organizations such as Kach in Israel, and political

groupings like the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh represent

exclusive public theologies. Inclusive public theology, on the other hand, is

the web of religious perspectives that claim no superiority over other visions,

and those who support such a theology remain open to communication. Both

interfaith initiatives and ecumenical cooperation become possible, because

actors subscribe to an inclusive public theology that respects the others’ right

to their own rituals and beliefs. As this book demonstrates, the approach of

a religious actor toward different issues and other religions may transform

over time. We should treat public theologies as “variables” that are prone to

change, rather than constants that can be easily judged or categorized by policy

makers.

� Innovation: Innovation denotes the processes by which the units of varia-

tion are packaged and the process by which they are transformed. To be

accepted by society, theological innovation must be introduced gradually,

usually in the form of framing issues in a way that creates positive rather

than negative identities. Innovation is critical to any knowledge process.

I integrate political scientist Ted Jelen’s four categories of clerical activi-

ties – conversion, agenda setting, reinforcement, and empowerment – to



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this stage of epistemic politics as components of a theological-political

innovation in conflict transformation.63 In other words, theological inno-

vation may come in the form of conversion (theologically justifying the

embrace of the other), agenda setting (suggestions of alternative political

arrangements that do not need to be public), reinforcement (represent-

ing the perspective of one’s congregation without creating an “other”),

and empowerment (giving the laity political tools to further their peaceful

interests). In the peacebuilding process, each of these four components

is crucial, and they are visible in settings where religious actors have an

impact.� Selection: This stage refers to the political processes that determine the

policies religious actors develop or suggest, and subsequently are adopted

by the policy makers. Selection processes in religious peacebuilding occur

only when politicians see them as feasible in realizing the agenda of

religious actors who support an inclusive public theology. In other words,

political leaders cannot reach a compromise if a country’s religious leaders

do not create a discursive space and legitimize peace moves. In cases

ranging from South Africa to Sierra Leone, stabilizing agreements have

been possible only after the theological basis has been established. In

order to build this theological basis, religious leaders need to consistently

formulate conciliatory interpretations of religion. This theological basis

may not be sufficient for a peace agreement, but as this book argues, it is

a necessary condition.� Diffusion: Diffusion denotes the spread of ideas to other communities or

relevant groups. In the context of the traditional epistemic communities

framework, diffusion means the replication of peacebuilding practices

and norms in different divided societies. Religious ideas can diffuse across

ethnic groups, churches, and even traditions. In the religious sphere,

actors compete with each other, as they continuously develop and lead

public theologies. However, religious leaders also need to maintain their

credibility along with preserving their tradition’s established mythology

and history, which restricts the extent of novelty that can be meaning-

fully introduced. It is therefore critical to investigate which elements of

religious tradition and identity remain constant and which components

religious leaders can modify to form a more consistent, coherent, and

useful public theology.

As an example, one cannot analyze the Presbyterian discussions of revising

the Westminster Confession of Faith of 1646 that regarded the Pope as “the



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Antichrist, the man of Sin, and the son of damnation”64 without examining the

Second Vatican Council that affirmed an individual can be saved regardless

of religious status. In this case, Catholics first changed the definition of “the

other” and then moved toward a more inclusive philosophy of salvation. In a

way, the Second Vatican Council recognized that the Catholic component

of individual identity was not the one that determined the individual’s status.

The Council recognized other religious traditions as legitimate, if not fully

equal. Such a perspective increased the quality and the frequency of interfaith

communication globally. Catholicism was perceived less of a threat by other

traditions. This does not mean that all other religious traditions changed their

boundaries as a response to the change in Catholic public theology. However,

the Catholic opening has led to introspection in many other traditions such

as that of Presbyterianism.

To illustrate the transnational diffusion, one can point to many instances

of international workshops and connections among the religious actors that

change the way they interpret religious knowledge. David Stevens, former

General Secretary of the Irish Council of Churches and former leader of

the prominent religious peace organization, Corrymeela Community, states

that these connections and diffusion of knowledge matter in peacebuild-

ing. Stevens remembers how Roel Kaptein, who had retired from a senior

position in the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa, changed the

way he understood the biblical message by bringing in ideas on rivalry,

scapegoating, conflict, violence, and the birth of culture as well as intro-

ducing him to the work of philosophers like Rene Girard.65 Diffusion can

be intimate and personal like Stevens’ experience or structural and institu-

tional. Especially in conflict transformation and peacebuilding, one can trace

the diffusion of one experience to another case by looking at the number

of conferences, conflict transformation workshops, meetings, and personal

experiences.

� Units of Effective Modification: These “units” indicate the change in the

patterned behavior of two or more parties as a result of the innovation,

selection, and diffusion processes. Under this category, policy makers

investigate how the public theologies actually transformed politics and

whether this variation was strong enough to form a normative base for

future interaction. Public theologies are modified over time. For success-

ful conflict transformation and peacebuilding to take place, theologies

and policies that represent the other as the enemy must be modified by or

through the influence of religious actors, and the possibility of peaceful

coexistence should be situated within a theological framework.



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Investigating Religious Epistemic Communities 17

investigating religious epistemic communities: the case of

northern ireland

Before investigating the influence of religious actors in Northern Ireland and

other conflict settings, clarification of key terms that are used throughout the

book is necessary. I define “religious actor” as experts or practitioners of a

religious tradition, who have background in studying the principles in the

religion and engage in the application of these principles to public life. In the

context of this book, religious actor means a religious leader, or any organiza-

tion that overtly and systematically operating under religious principles, that

takes an active role in the public debates. “Churches,” unless otherwise stated,

mean the Roman Catholic, Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, and Methodist

Churches, which are unofficially described as “the four main Churches” in

the Northern Irish politics literature.66 Religious leader (used interchangeably

with “faith leader”) is an individual who was trained to be clergy and who

played a leading role in his church (including bishops, moderators, influential

priests, and pastors). I use the term “religious leaders” to denote the leaders

and public representatives of the four main churches in Northern Ireland.

Another term, “conflict transformation,” in Lederach’s words, is “a way of

looking and seeing, and it provides a set of lenses through which we make sense

of social conflict.”67 Within this framework, conflict transformation perspec-

tive approaches peace as a constantly evolving concept rather than as a static

outcome. Conflict transformation is a part of peace-building activities, which

comprise negotiations, reconciliation, consolidation of postconflict stability,

and human rights. In order to build peace, we need to transform the conflict.

Throughout the book, although I recognize that there is a subtle difference

between the two, I do not strongly distinguish between these two terms, as

peace is constantly built through efforts of ambitious individuals, and conflict

is constantly transformed thanks to new interpretations and practices. I use

whichever term is the most appropriate for a specific action, though I concede

that, within the context of this book, which focuses on the transformation

of conflict to a set of stable and peaceful relationships, there is no clear-cut

difference between a conflict-transforming activity and a peace-building one.

Between Chapters 2 and 6, the book investigates how religious actors con-

tributed to a change in public theology in Northern Ireland between the 1960s

and 2000s and how this change contributed to conflict transformation. For

both scholars and practitioners of conflict transformation and peacebuilding,

the Troubles is a widely used representative case of the ethnoreligious conflict,

mostly because it has a relatively clear-cut beginning and end. To understand

the public role, discourse, and actions of the religious actors throughout this



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period and its immediate aftermath, I use four Northern Irish newspapers

published between the years 1968–2009, the Belfast Telegraph, the News Let-ter, the Irish News, and the Irish Times. These four newspapers have been

among the most-read papers in Northern Ireland during the Troubles period.

The Irish News is perceived as Irish nationalist and the Irish Times is Ireland’s

major newspaper that is also widely read in Northern Ireland. The News Letteris strongly Unionist and the Belfast Telegraph is mostly regarded as moderate

Unionist.68 Scholars have extensively used newspaper data in studying social

movements and identity.69 In this specific context, newspaper data is espe-

cially critical because we are interested in the public statements and actions

of the religious leaders throughout the conflict. Since there are no system-

atic records or databases of such speeches, reactions, and actions, newspapers

become indispensable. Although interviews provide insights into reasoning of

certain behaviors and actions, it is impossible for any individual to remember

all speeches and events. That is why newspaper data, consolidated with inter-

views, provide a reliable resource to trace the changes in discourse and behav-

ior. In addition to a review of newspapers for the declarations, speeches, and

actions of religious actors, I have conducted more than 50 interviews between

2008 and 2010 with religious actors and civil society members who have played

important roles in the conflict transformation, including prominent figures

like the former Methodist moderator Harold Good, Gerry Reynolds of the

Clonard Monastery and the former Presbyterian Moderator John Dunlop. I

triangulated the interview and newspaper data with pamphlets and other pri-

mary documents (brochures of churches and organizations) that are either

personally collected or were part of the Linen Hall Library collection.

The conflict in Northern Ireland is both local and international, due to

the involvement of the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Between 1966 and

2006, the conflict cost 3720 lives, 2087 of which were civilians.70 Among the

main local parties to the conflict were Republican (predominantly Catholic)

and Loyalist (predominantly Protestant) paramilitary organizations. To put it

crudely, the predominant Republican paramilitary organization, the Provi-

sional Irish Republican Army which inherited most of the traditional Irish

Republican Army structure and agenda in 1969, was working toward the estab-

lishment of a single independent Republic of Ireland. The Loyalist paramil-

itary organizations, such as the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster

Volunteer Force held that Northern Ireland should remain a constitutive unit

of the UK, and they were willing to use force to counter Irish Nationalist

political ambitions.

At this point it is necessary to clarify that, whereas Republican is used to

describe the militant ideology that tried to achieve complete independence



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Investigating Religious Epistemic Communities 19

from Britain, the term Nationalist/Nationalism is employed to denote using

constitutional means to achieve political, national, and cultural rights. Simi-

larly, Loyalist is not always interchangeable with Unionist; the latter implies the

attachment to the union of Britain and Northern Ireland as well as supporting

the cultural tradition of such unionhood. As a term, however, the latter does

not include in itself the forceful meaning the former term carries. Nation-

alists are usually Catholics and Unionists are overwhelmingly Protestant in

the Northern Irish context. There are shades of these political views and the

corresponding religious affiliation, but there are “clear trends for Protestants

preferring the union with Britain and Catholics preferring Irish unity.”71 In

short, political affiliation and religious identity are very much intertwined to

the extent that the lack of religious affiliation came to mean a lack of political

identity.72

Despite the correspondence between religious identity and political atti-

tude in Northern Ireland, there is no clear agreement as to what extent the

conflict was religious or political. Hickey and Bruce argue that the conflict is

more about religion, whereas McGarry and O’Leary disagree with that notion,

claiming instead that religion was only an ethnic marker and the conflict

was ethno-national.73 MacDonald claims the conflict was essentially colonial,

while Smith and Chambers trace the main causes to economic inequality.74

Ruane and Todd conclude that the conflict has the elements of all aforemen-

tioned aspects; economic and religious factors mutually reinforce each other

and have important implications in national identity.75 In short, there is no

consensus as to the conflict’s key cause.

Due to the contested nature of not only the Northern Irish conflict but

many others, the project confines its claims to the category of divided societies

and does not use the qualification of “religious conflict.” In the Northern

Irish case, although scholars cannot agree on the main cause of the conflict,

they all acknowledge that religion was an important element of the Northern

Irish identity and a dimension of the Troubles period. This is not surprising

given that Northern Ireland has traditionally been a highly religious society

in terms of both beliefs and practices.76 Societal divisions coincided with

religious differences, which have been perpetuated by the respective insti-

tution of each tradition. Churches played a key role in shaping the power

structures of the two historical blocs in Ireland.77 It is contested to what

extent the churches are actively responsible for the perpetuation of the divi-

sions, but at the very least, leaders of the four churches, who have often con-

demned the violence publicly, were blamed for staying inactive for a long time.

Countering this argument, Appleby states that in Northern Ireland, church

leaders “challenged the complacency and prejudice of their respective faith



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communities” and parachurch and ecumenical movements brought Protes-

tants and Catholics together in economic and social projects.78 Claiming that

Appleby’s positive portrayal overlooks the leaders’ conservatism, Brewer et al.

situate the religious actors in Northern Ireland within the civil society frame-

work and they assess “the usefulness of the idea of spiritual capital in settings

where religion is itself wrapped up in the conflict.”79 Similar to Brewer et al.,

Fitzduff argues that the churches in Northern Ireland failed to provide transfor-

mational leadership during the conflict.80 Although it agrees that the churches

fell short of “providing transformational leadership,” this book shares Appleby’s

positive perspective by pointing to the existence of a religious epistemic com-

munity in Northern Ireland that consistently provided inclusive alternatives

and understandings of responsible citizenship. The mere existence of such a

religious community of leaders and organizations that constructively engage

the public debates contributes significantly to stabilizing arrangements. This

book traces such underemphasized constructive engagements starting with

the beginning of the Troubles period.

structure of the book

In an edited volume on strategic peacebuilding, Philpott states that the build-

ing of peace is “far wider, deeper, and more encompassing” than the traditional

liberal approaches to peacebuilding recognizes.81 The literature on conflict

resolution and peacebuilding has focused primarily on activist networks, with

scholars neglecting the role of religious knowledge networks for the most part.

In that same book, Appleby and Lederach state that “the skills needed for

strategic peacebuilding are increasingly honed and named as such, by a range

of professionals in one or more of a variety of disciplines and areas of exper-

tise,”82 and Powers draws attention to the agency of religious actors in peaceful

social and political transformations. This book is an attempt to bring together

these points of view through a framework that recognizes the role of religious

expertise and systematic knowledge in strategic peacebuilding.

The overall argument of the book is that there have been prominent reli-

gious leaders and religious civil society members in Northern Ireland that

helped transform exclusive public theologies into inclusive ones, which ulti-

mately contributed to the peace process. These religious actors acted as an

epistemic community in promoting inclusive public theologies of governance

and belonging. There is a focus on news pieces to trace the messages reli-

gious actors were conveying to public between the 1960s until the resolution

of the conflict. Personal communications, primary documents, memoirs, and

secondary sources complement the picture.



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Structure of the Book 21

The book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 is dedicated to a brief

pre-Troubles account of religion and politics in Northern Ireland. In order to

help the readers understand the role of religion in the Northern Irish political

sphere, historical context and a brief description of the four main Churches are

provided. The following chapters focus on four decades of the Troubles and

investigate innovative steps religious leaders took. The fact that each decade

witnessed an important political arrangement (the Sunningdale Agreement,

the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and the Belfast Agreement, consecutively) makes

the cross-temporal analysis more meaningful and serves as a basis for com-

paring the behavior of clergy and politicians. Chapter 3 explores religious

communities’ standing in the late 1960s and 1970s, around the 1973 Sunning-

dale Agreement, and the “innovations” introduced. The 1970s are significant

for the purposes of this study, since this was the time period when religious

leaders started to acknowledge the conflict’s theological and religious dimen-

sions. Furthermore, these leaders began to see the role they could actively play

more clearly during these initial years. The transformation of existing perspec-

tives started around relatively uncontroversial issues such as a condemnation

of violence. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the 1980s were the years during which

religious leaders grew emboldened, engaging in ecumenical discourse and

activities. In the end, however, another political arrangement, the Anglo-Irish

Agreement, failed as well. During those years, the basis for religious leaders

facilitating a future peace process was established. Chapter 5 focuses on the

peace process and how, by this time, religious leaders’ direct efforts influenced

policy makers. I also examine why the “selection” process, the adoption of the

policies religious actors had been advocating for years, finally took place in

1998, and not before. Chapter 6 discusses both the postconflict epistemic status

of religious actors in Northern Ireland. The concluding chapter, Chapter 7,

looks at how we can observe similar dynamics of religious conflict transfor-

mation in different cases such as Sierra Leone, Colombia, South Africa, and

the Philippines; policy makers and scholars can apply the epistemic com-

munities approach to any context in which religious actors devise alternative

interpretations of the public sphere and disseminate it to influence political

attitudes.

Due to space restrictions, these chapters focus mostly on the leadership of

four main churches in Northern Ireland, but this does not mean that there

were no other prominent religious actors who were influential during the

Troubles period. One such actor is the late Ian Paisley. Although there are

frequent references to Ian Paisley, his Free Presbyterian Church, and Demo-

cratic Unionist Party, the four episode chapters do not discuss in detail the

creation and transformation of their theology or their epistemic status. This



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omission stems from the assumption that religious epistemic communities are

not directly involved in politics; otherwise, the knowledge they create will be

based on political interests rather than religious expertise with policy implica-

tions. This assumption is inherent in the epistemic communities framework,

and my argument does not challenge the main assumptions of this theoretical

perspective. Given the increasingly active involvement of religious actors in

politics, however, future research will need to engage politics of knowledge in

new and further ways.



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2

Situating Religious Actors in Irish Political History

While there are diverse views regarding the nature of the Northern Irish con-

flict, religion’s centrality in the divisions between communities is still notable.

This explains why religious leaders held an important key to establishing trust

and creating favorable conditions for a sustainable peace during and after the

Troubles. One must understand the background to this convergence of poli-

tics and religion, not only to account for the mechanisms of religious activism

surrounding the conflict, but also to capture the mentality and references of

the politicians in the twentieth-century Northern Irish public sphere. In a 1985

debate in Westminster on the Anglo-Irish Agreement, for example, Ian Paisley

stated that “anyone who has read history should understand that this did not

start in 1920, but goes far back to the days of the plantation settlement and back

into the dim and distant past.”1 Such allusions are commonplace in Northern

Irish politics. These legends and myths are especially relevant in the context

of the Troubles, as they have been ingrained in the minds of people, most of

whom had not benefited from a consistent and intensive history curriculum

in schools until lately in Northern Ireland.2 This is not unique to our case.

Teaching of history is almost always a political act and such commonplace

biases in history education consolidate divisions even further in conflict set-

tings.3 Hence, a background is necessary in history and symbolisms in any

story of conflict transformation.

the ulster plantation and challenges to gaelic christianity

The main point of contention between Catholics and Protestants in Ireland

stemmed from the question of who landed “first” on Ireland and hence, who

has a legitimate claim to land and power. Both Protestants and Catholics

have treated the territory as sacred. In this vein, while one can discuss the

23



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24 Situating Religious Actors in Irish Political History

importance of religious myths and identities in Irish history, a consistent reli-

gious epistemic discourse in political matters is hard to trace, simply because

local religious communities lacked the means of twenty-first-century com-

munication. Whereas the governing elite used religion for political purposes,

local communities practiced their own traditions, not having the wherewithal

to express their needs and expectations to political leaders, and the established

church mostly being in the service of these rulers.

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, frequent native Irish revolu-

tions against English economic domination led to drastic measures taken by

the Crown. When we look at the sixteenth-century writings, we see that the

English elite viewed the native Irish as savages needing control. English poet

Edmund Spenser, for example, called Ireland “a diseased portion of the state”

that needs to be “cured and reformed” in his vitriolic treatise.4 Sir John Davies,

Attorney-General for Ireland under James I, similarly expressed the need to

conquer Ireland in the following words:

For the husbandman must first break the land before it be made capableof good seed; and when it is thoroughly broken and manured, if he do notforthwith cast good seed into it, it will grow wild again and bear nothing butweeds. So a barbarous country must be first broken by a war before it will becapable of good government; and when it is fully subdued and conquered, ifit be not well planted and governed after the conquest, it will soon return tothe former barbarism.5

Within this framework, the main challenge to local Gaelic identity came dur-

ing the Nine Years War (1594–1603) in Ireland, during which religion played

an important role. The main cause of this conflict was the clash between the

Gaelic Irish chieftain Hugh O Neill and Elizabethan England, which aspired

to rule the whole island. O Neill managed to rally other Irish landowners who

were dissatisfied with English government. Catholics who opposed the con-

comitant postreformation spread of Protestantism in Ireland also joined the

cause, and hence, the religious dimension became more pronounced. Parties

fought throughout Ireland, but the northern province of Ulster became the

main battlefront. Ultimately, the Irish lost the war to the English. Although

O Neill and his allies received relatively favorable terms at the end of the

war, they were never fully trusted by the English authorities, and this distrust

was mutual. Discouraged by their defeat, O Neill, O Donnell, and the other

Gaelic lords from Ulster abandoned Ireland in 1607, leaving the island with-

out its aristocracy. This event came to be known as “the Flight of the Earls.”

The resulting power gap facilitated England’s colonization plans, which also



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The Ulster Plantation and Challenges to Gaelic Christianity 25

changed the religious demography of the island for years to come. English pol-

icy makers of the period were convinced that such rebellions would continue

to occur frequently as long as there was a Catholic population on the island.

This concern led to the colonization of Ulster by Protestant settlers who would

be loyal to the English Crown, an instance of “nation-building” which would

lead to conflicting claims to the territory in the future.

The essential history of the Northern Irish conflict dates to the 1608 Plan-

tation of Ulster.6 Plantation here refers to the systematic colonization of a

major northern province of Ireland, Ulster, by settlers coming from England

and Scotland. Plantation was executed with the help of James I, as an English

initiative to subdue Ulster. Counties of Donegal, Coleraine, Tyrone, Fer-

managh, Cavan, and Armagh were targeted in the plantation project. Until

then, two influential Irish Catholic families, the O Neills and the O Don-

nells, had owned most of the land. With the plantation initiative, these lands

were confiscated from the Irish and were used to settle the colonists.7 With

the departure of the Irish aristocracy’s established leaders in 1607, hopes of

an independent Gaelic Ireland had dimmed. The new “British tenants,” or

colonists, came from Scotland and England. These settlers were required to

be English-speaking and Protestant.8 The Scottish colonists were mostly Pres-

byterian.9 The Irish Catholic population saw these colonization waves as a

“crime against the Irish people,” and Catholic Ireland “still mourns the loss

of its Gaelic aristocracy and landed class.”10

The Protestant planters regarded themselves as superior to the native pop-

ulation, and they believed themselves to be agents of civilization in addition

to being true Christians.11 However, these planters were also deeply divided

among themselves. James I of England also happened to be James VI of Scot-

land, which made him the head of the highly dissimilar churches of Scotland

and England. During the initial stages of this plantation period, these divi-

sions mattered little. In later stages, however, English desires to form a unified

Protestant faith in Ireland threatened the Scottish Presbyterian identity. When

the English statesman Thomas Wentworth was appointed Lord Deputy in

Ireland in 1633, he wanted to carry out measures to establish Anglican unity

in the North of Ireland. In order to create such a unified Christian identity,

the English imposed the so-called “Black Oath” on all Scots in Ulster in 1639.

With the taking of this oath, the Presbyterian Scots were required to denounce

the Scottish National Covenant and leave their Presbyterian identity behind.

Those who refused to take the Black Oath were severely punished. Many Scots

left Ireland at the time and returned to their native land, resulting in a deeper

split between Presbyterian and Anglican communities.



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the irish confederate wars and the williamite war

During the period of settlement, the Irish Catholic population was not dis-

placed but put under the new landowners as tenants, leading to a high level of

resentment among them.12 This is why the tensions of the twentieth century

can be partly seen as the continuation of a class conflict that has its roots in the

seventeenth century. At the same time, this local Irish population had escaped

the influence of the Protestant Reformation, which had flourished among the

English middle classes. These novel religious traditions and perspectives of

the Protestant colonizers seemed alien to the local Irish communities. This

class- and identity-based anxiety led to two major confrontations: The Irish

Confederate Wars (1641–1653) and the Williamite War (1689–1691), both of

which resulted in Protestant victories.

The Irish Confederate War began with the rebellion of the Irish of Ulster in

October 1641. The rebellion was led by Phelim O’Neill, an Irish nobleman who

was frustrated with the persistent exclusion of Catholics from public office in

addition to the confiscation of Catholic lands by the Protestant settlers. O’Neill

and other leaders of the rebellion were parts of a socially notable class, so it

would be wrong to assume that rebellion reflected the interests only of the land-

less tenants. Perceval-Maxwell argues that Irish landowners were “ready and

able to compete in the new economic environment and what angered them

was the political restraint placed on their competitiveness.”13 With the rise of

these economic and social frustrations, tension between Catholics and Protes-

tants increased. The disagreement was more political than theological. Clarke

notes that coupled with the difficulties associated with access to religious

texts and financial concerns, there was no systematical theological-political

discourse that could “influence ordinary opinions” in seventeenth-century

Ireland.14

The rebellion initially started as small scale skirmishes between the Catholic

tenants and their Protestant landowners, which later spread to other counties

in Ireland. The aims of the rebellion were declared in Dungannon on October

24, 1641, and the Irish Catholics represented the rebellion as purely defensive.

During the outbreak, Catholic laborers and tenants attacked Scottish and

English Protestant settlers, resulting in the massacre of thousands of Protes-

tants. In the words of John Dunlop, a former Presbyterian Church moderator

who played an influential role in conflict resolution during the Troubles

period, “The rebellion of 1641 has gone down in the mythology of the Protes-

tant community in a similar, though less sustained and intense way, to that

of the story of Cromwell’s activities in 1649 in the memory of the Catholic

Irish.”15 Elliott notes that what singles out 1641 in identity formation is that it



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was promoted “to communicate Protestant solidarity at a time when Protes-

tants were anything but united.”16 In other words, the incident helped to create

an “imagined community”17 of united Protestants with common interests and

goals.

In 1642, the Association of The Confederate Catholics of Ireland was estab-

lished in an effort to organize the Irish Catholics. Their seal of office carried the

words Pro Deo, Rege et Patria, Hibernia Unanimis (For God, King and Father-

land, Ireland United), and religion remained an element of social capital

that brought people from different backgrounds together.18 The Confederates

pledged their loyalty to the English monarch Charles I, who they saw as the

only hope for the Catholics in Ireland. Charles I was in a constant struggle

for power with the English Parliament due to his claim that he was divinely

ordained. The Confederates formed an alliance with the factions in England,

who were loyal to Charles I, to decide how to fight “for the exaltation of their

religion, the defense of the King and the Royal House, the protection of their

own properties, liberties, and lives against the attention of the enemy” who

intended to “extinguish the Irish nation and its liberties.”19 The Confederates

ruled Ireland as a de facto state until 1649, fighting against the English and

Scottish armies. When one examines the discourse of the era, however, reli-

gion is always intertwined with one form of nationalism or another. Warriors,

kings, landowners, tenants, and laborers talked of defending the faith, without

going into theological technicalities or details. The merger of religion and

nation made it difficult for an independent religious epistemic discourse to

form, and the existing religious discourses were, for the most part, defensive,

exclusive, and intolerant.

In an attempt to put a definitive end to this period of constant war and

rebellion, the English Parliament sent Oliver Cromwell, a notorious English

commander, to Ireland. Cromwell was openly hostile to the Catholic Church,

which he saw as an institution that replaced the primacy of the Bible with papal

authority, and he blamed the Catholics for the persecution of Protestants in

Europe.20 Cromwell’s forces quickly defeated the Irish Confederates and occu-

pied the land. He then passed a series of laws against Roman Catholics. The

remaining Irish landowners lost their lands to Protestants. Cromwell’s cam-

paign and particularly his violent measures against Roman Catholics became

the subject of heated debates for centuries to come. At the siege of Drogheda

alone, after the town’s capture in September 1649, Cromwell’s troops massa-

cred nearly 3500 people, comprising around 2700 soldiers and all the men in

the town carrying arms, civilians, prisoners, and Roman Catholic priests.21

A prominent historian of Northern Ireland, Richard English asserts that

such extremity of the Cromwellian approach stems from the fact that “at the



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end of the sixteenth century, around half of Europe had been in Protestant

control; 100 years later, only around a fifth remained in Protestant hands.”22

Protestantism seemed in “international retreat, and Catholics and Protes-

tants alike in Ireland could see themselves as part of an international war

against each other.”23 Irish historical writer and columnist, Tim Pat Coogan

claims that “the massacres by Catholics of Protestants, which occurred in

the religious wars of the 1640s, were magnified for propagandist purposes to

justify Cromwell’s subsequent genocide.”24 A historian who focuses on geno-

cides, Mark Levene regards the Cromwellian settlement as an act of ethnic

cleansing.25

The second milestone, after the Irish Confederate Wars, that consolidated

Protestant dominance in Ireland was the Williamite War of 1689–1691. King

James II (1633–1701), a Roman Catholic himself, attempted to introduce free-

dom of religion for Catholics and other unpopular laws without consulting

the Parliament. He appointed an Irish Catholic, Richard Talbot, as Lord

Deputy of Ireland and admitted Catholics into both public office and the

army. As expected, King James became quite popular in most parts of Ire-

land, but he was opposed by the minority, mostly Protestant “Williamites,”

concentrated in the north of the country. At that point, even the Presbyterians

of Ireland accepted James II as their legitimate king, because they saw him

as the only hope for religious freedom they longed for. The threat of King

James II’s Roman Catholic heritage to the English political culture, however,

became overwhelming when his wife gave birth to a son, opening the way

to a Roman Catholic dynasty. This birth led the Protestant political elite to

persuade William of Orange, Stadtholder (lord) of the Dutch Republic and

the husband of James’ daughter, Mary, to invade England and assume the

throne. William invaded England in 1688, and James II fled, showing little

resistance. England’s Protestant identity was consolidated, but this change of

rule also meant further alienation for Irish Catholics. The landowning elite

of the Church of Ireland believed that the Presbyterians could be counted on

against an overwhelming regional Catholic threat that would jeopardize the

remaining Protestant economic prosperity and religious freedom. This brought

an “alliance” with the Presbyterians on the basis of two principles, namely, “the

Reformation in the most generic terms, particularly in its political-religious

aspect of opposition to Catholicism, and anti-native politics.”26

With the rise of Protestantism among the political circles in Europe, a

Catholic Ireland constituted a significant threat to England’s stability. The

execution of the popular Catholic Archbishop of Armagh, Oliver Plunkett (he

was later canonized as a Catholic saint by Pope Paul VI in 1975) for treason was

an expression of such fear. Upon William’s arrival, Richard Talbot, the lord



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deputy in charge of Ireland, ensured that a Catholic army loyal to King James

II held all the strategic outposts in Ireland. Talbot faced resistance in Ulster,

Ireland’s northern province, to which a high concentration of English and

Scottish people had migrated during the plantation period. In the meantime,

James II had not given up the fight. After he was deposed, and he fled to

France. King Louis XIV of France, also at war with William of Orange,

provided him with troops and financial assistance. On March 12, 1689, James

II landed on Ireland’s shores, accompanied by 6000 French soldiers. He went

first to Dublin, where he enjoyed a significant amount of support and, with

an army of Catholics proceeded northward, joining the Siege of Derry on

April 18. During this siege that lasted for 105 days, about 30 000 Protestants

resisted James II; thousands of people died as a result.27 This siege was another

trauma for Ireland’s Protestants, and the twentieth-century Unionist discourse

in Northern Ireland included multiple references to heroes of the siege and

the brutality of James II.

James II also agreed to the establishment of an Irish Parliament composed

of Catholic gentry. In order to muster support for his campaigns in Ireland,

he agreed to his Parliament’s demand for an act that took away the right to

legislate for Ireland from the British Parliament. He signed a decree, albeit

reluctantly, restoring to Irish Catholics the lands confiscated from their families

after the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland. This policy would be implemented

by confiscating the lands of the Protestants who opposed him and supported

William.

One of William’s primary goals was to put an end to the Catholic resistance

that still dominated Ireland, and the return of James II frustrated his plans.

James II and William of Orange confronted each other at the Battle of the

Boyne in 1690. Although the battle did not end in a clear victory for either side,

the fact that James II returned to his exile in France and deserted his supporters

rendered it a de facto victory for the Protestants. William imposed a severe

settlement on the remaining Catholics, which in turn led them to continue

fighting without an established leader. The last episode of the war, the Siege

of Limerick, ended in Irish surrender in 1691. The initial peace agreement,

the Treaty of Limerick signed on October 3, 1691, offered favorable terms

to those Catholics willing to stay in Ireland and pledge an oath of loyalty

to William, reflecting a desire to settle “the Irish issue” without spending

any additional resources. The initial settlement was tolerant of Catholicism

and provided Catholics willing to pledge with full legal rights. This change

in attitude demonstrates that it was not religion, but political loyalty about

which English political rulers cared most. However, the treaty was unpopular

in the Irish Assembly, which had been dominated by Protestants since the



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introduction of plantation settlements. The Irish Parliament refused to ratify

the articles of the treaty and from 1695 on, passed laws that discriminated

harshly against Catholics.28 Such conflicts of interest were also evidence of

how the views of the Protestant settlers and the English policy-making elite had

diverged.

The Williamite War had important consequences in identity politics. Once

it became clear that James II would be unable to regain his throne, Protestant –

especially Anglican – dominance in Ireland was consolidated. Catholics and

the predominantly Presbyterian Ulster-Scots were excluded from land own-

ership and state positions, thus causing enmity for a time between them and

Anglicans. To this day, Unionists celebrate the Williamite War, especially

the Battle of the Boyne, in Northern Ireland. The remembrance plays a key

role in Ulster Protestant tradition and is commemorated annually in July with

the leadership of the Orange Order, the Protestant fraternal organization that

was established in 1796. Similarly, another important siege of the war in Derry

is commemorated every year by the Apprentice Boys of Derry, a Protestant fra-

ternal organization established during the siege by James II. The siege, along

with the slogan “No Surrender,” is still a significant part of Ulster Protestant

culture, with the “siege mentality” of Ulster Protestants often traced back to

these early events.29 Overall, traditional Protestant commemorations, bonfires,

and parades close to the Catholic neighborhoods, were politically contentious

during the Troubles. Even after the Good Friday Agreement that brought

an end to the Troubles period, the July parades that cherish these historical

victories continue to be a source of occasional conflict between the Catholics

and the Protestants.

the united irishmen uprising and the catholic

emancipation movement

Economic conditions in Ireland started to change in the eighteenth cen-

tury. From the 1750s onwards, population increased rapidly, possibly as a

result of potato’s introduction as the main staple and the shift from pasture

to tillage.30 Among other possible reasons is the general improvement in

medicine throughout Europe at that time.31 Many Catholics grew prosperous

as subletters of land owned by an absentee landowning class. Also during that

period, Catholics began to show an acceptance of the status quo, and they

did not view the possibility of French interference – under the pretense of

protecting Catholic interests – favorably. Bishops pledged their loyalty to the

Crown in public addresses and “asked the faithful to pray for a British vic-

tory” in the Seven Years War (1756–1763) fought between Britain and France.



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The United Irishmen Uprising and the Catholic Emancipation Movement 31

Soon enough, the Irish Parliament partially changed its discriminatory posi-

tion against Catholics and with the passage of the 1778 Relief Act, Catholics

were allowed to purchase land.

However, these relative improvements in daily conditions did not change

the fact that the settlers were still the rulers. Native Irish Catholics and even

Presbyterians were still second-class subjects at the mercy of the Crown. Inde-

pendence from Britain became the political activists’ aim. At the end of the

eighteenth century, Wolfe Tone, a Protestant, led an uprising in support of

Irish independence from Britain. This uprising brought Catholics and the

Presbyterians under the nonsectarian United Irishmen banner. In the end,

Presbyterians and the Catholics had suffered from a similar treatment under

the English domination, which “made them distrustful of political authority

and [was] instrumental in the eventual alliance.”32 The leaders of the move-

ment were mainly Protestants. However, as Elliott notes, even Tone thought

Catholics were ‘the Irish properly so-called’ and he did not include the Protes-

tants in some of his statements.33

The United Irishmen worked to reform the Irish Parliament, to extend

suffrage to all without discrimination and to give Ireland greater autonomy

from Britain. Although the United Irishmen was nonsectarian and was trying

to bring Catholics and Protestants together around the cause of a united Ire-

land, an intense sectarian conflict had already started between the settlers and

the native population in some counties, including Armagh. Catholics

and Protestants formed their own “vigilante” groups – Catholic “Defenders”

and Protestant “Peep-o’-Day Boys.” The existence of these rural groupings

demonstrated that even if an alliance of convenience could be made at the

higher levels, it would be difficult to sell it to the local people who had very

little sustained contact with each other, if any. Accordingly, the absence of

cross-denominational channels led to the failure of joint initiatives of Catholics

and Presbyterians under the banner of Irish nationalism.

The United Irish movement was also countered by the Orange Order,

which “regarded itself as defending civil and religious liberties of Protestants

and sought to uphold the rule and ascendancy of a Protestant monarch in the

United Kingdom.”34 The Orange Order was founded after a violent confronta-

tion between Defenders and Peep-o’-Day Boys in 1795, which resulted in a

victory for the latter. The first Orange lodge was established in County Tyrone

after this confrontation, which is called the Battle of the Diamond. The first

grand master of the Order was James Sloan of Loughgall, in whose inn the

Peep-o’-Day Boys’ victory was celebrated.35 Like the Peep-o’-Day Boys, one of

the newly established Order’s goals was to hinder the Irish Catholic groups’

efforts and to uphold the “Protestant Ascendancy.” The Orange Order is a



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sectarian institution because of its exclusion of Roman Catholics as mem-

bers.36 Its very first marches celebrated the Battle of the Boyne.37 Origi-

nally, the Order was associated primarily with members of the Church of

Ireland but Presbyterians became increasingly involved in the nineteenth

century.

The uprisings by the United Irishmen were quelled quickly because the

leadership had difficulty keeping the movement united and securing outside

help against Britain. With the Acts of Union in 1800, the Irish Parliament was

integrated into the British Parliament. The downfall of the United Irishmen

was partly because the movement “overestimated their ability to transcend

the inherited politics of religion in Ireland.”38 Although the United Irishmen

were composed of both Protestants and Catholics – and this cooperation was

frequently used as a reference by the ecumenical initiatives during the Trou-

bles – the failure of the movement was largely regarded as another Catholic

defeat.

The Acts of Union were challenged in 1823 by Daniel O’Connell, an Irish

political leader who established the Catholic Association with the aim of

achieving “Catholic emancipation.” In 1828, O’Connell participated in the

elections in County Clare in Ireland, and he was elected. He could not take

his seat in the House of Commons, however, because he argued that the Oath

of Supremacy required from the members went against his Catholic identity.

Despite this constraint, O’Connell kept entering the elections. O’Connell’s

and the Catholic Association’s efforts resulted in the introduction of major

changes through the Roman Catholic Relief Act of 1829, removing some of

the substantial restrictions on Roman Catholics in the UK. O’Connell then

turned to trying to repeal the Acts of Union.

A prominent nineteenth-century historian, William H. Lecky, stated that

the struggle for Catholic emancipation led by O’Connell “had demonstrated

clearly the coercive power which might be exercised over Parliament by orga-

nized agitation.”39 English notes that while O’Connell’s movement democra-

tized Irish nationalism by bringing people from different backgrounds together,

“his politics also Catholicized it to such a degree that Catholicism became

a crucially defining characteristic of Irish nationalism under the Union.”40

However, members of clergy were not active community leaders. To the con-

trary, “when Irish Catholics committed themselves to a leader, the bishops

and priests tagged along,” and the clergy assumed little agency.41 O’Connell

regarded the Catholic Church as the national church. He opposed the estab-

lishment of what he called the godless universities of Belfast, Cork, and Gal-

way, because he opposed mixed (nonsectarian) education.42 During the same

period, the bishops recommended to their clergy that they steer clear of politics



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Home Rule and the Establishment of the Irish State 33

and attend to their spiritual duties.43 Elliott states that contrary to the Protes-

tant perceptions of it, “the Irish Catholic Church was very nervous about

any political involvement and regularly condemned priests who became so

involved.”44

In the meantime, many Ulster Protestants came to believe that their inter-

ests lay with Britain. The economies of Britain and Ireland were substantially

integrated with 85 percent of Irish exports going to Britain, and 75 percent

of Irish imports were coming from Britain.45 In the eyes of many Protestants,

the economic downturn of the nineteenth century was due to Catholic eman-

cipation.46 Also, the Protestants continued to develop a strong religious and

cultural allegiance with Britain. Bew notes that in the aftermath of failed ini-

tiatives in joining forces with the Catholics, “the Irish republican phase of the

Presbyterian community’s history was effectively over by 1800.”47 Therefore,

forming a union was a desirable prospect for Ulster Protestant population.

Another milestone in the Irish history was the Irish famine that occurred

between 1845 and 1852, and resulted in the deaths of more than a million

Irish and the emigration of another million.48 This famine was caused by

“potato blight,” which hit entire Europe in the nineteenth century. Potatoes

were among the main staples of the Irish diet, and the famine proved to

be especially disastrous for the rural communities in Ireland.49 This famine

was not entirely a surprise, however. Between 1801 and 1845, there were 114

commissions and 61 special committees inquiring into the state of Ireland,

and “without exception their findings prophesied disaster; Ireland was on

the verge of starvation, her population rapidly increasing, three-quarters of

her laborers unemployed, housing conditions appalling, and the standard of

living unbelievably low.”50 In short, the famine was partly attributed to the poor

English governance of the Irish territories. In the aftermath of the tragedy, “the

bond between hard-hit people and their consoling church grew closer, and

divisions between Catholicism and the main Protestant churches in Ireland

deepened.”51 The Irish diaspora that formed after the famine later played an

important role in rallying support for the Catholic Nationalist cause against

English domination.

home rule and the establishment of the irish state

The period after the famine saw the rise of a new movement to establish

Irish governance. In an effort to establish home rule, the Irish Parliamentary

Party (also called the Home Rule Party) was led in the 1880s by Charles

Stewart Parnell, an Irish Protestant. Parnell was a critical political figure who

constituted one of the exceptions to the link between Irish nationalism and



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Catholicism. He was remarkably successful in his defense of the need for

home rule within the empire and in the mid 1880s, British politicians actually

started to consider such a possibility. Within Ireland, there was a sharp division

between Nationalists and Unionists over the question of home rule. Irish

Nationalists argued that all those living on the island were part of the Irish

nation and would not accept that there was a distinct Unionist community

with a different heritage.52 In response, Unionists resisted both self-government

and independence for Ireland, fearing for their future in an overwhelmingly

Catholic country dominated by the Roman Catholic Church. Although they

saw themselves as a distinct Ulster community, they wanted to be part of

Britain.

As a result of these talks and campaigns, Ulster Protestants increasingly

felt threatened by Irish Catholic nationalism. In 1912, Unionists signed the

Ulster Covenant, a pledge that indicated full-fledged resistance to Irish self-

governance. Military capabilities soon matched the political will. Ulster-based

Unionists formed the paramilitary Ulster Volunteers. In return, Nationalists

established the Irish Volunteers to oppose the Ulster Volunteers and ensure

the introduction of the Home Rule Bill, which would establish Irish self-

governance.

With increasing levels of instability throughout Europe in the months lead-

ing up to World War I, British policy makers tried to pacify Irish Nationalists

by granting partial home rule. The Government of Ireland Act 1914, more gen-

erally known as the Home Rule Act, granted Ireland regional self-governance

within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Although the act

received Royal Assent in September 1914, its implementation was postponed

until after World War I, due to the fear that the threat of violence posed by

the Ulster Volunteers and the Irish Volunteers could lead to civil war.

The early 1900s also witnessed the establishment of new political organi-

zations. One of these organizations that played a crucial part in the Irish

political movements was Sinn Fein, which was established in 1905. Its policy,

delineated by Arthur Griffith, was “to establish in Ireland’s capital a national

legislature endowed with the moral authority of the Irish nation.”53 Although

Sinn Fein would play a central role in the twentieth-century Irish politics, it

did not enjoy much support and suffered from financial challenges during

the initial years of its establishment. At its 1910 party conference, for example,

attendance was poor, and there was difficulty in finding members willing to

take seats on the executive.54

Many Nationalists tried to tie support for the war but disillusioned factions

wanted to exploit the state of distraction during World War I. Irish Republi-

cans came together in the Easter Rising of 1916 seeking to end the British rule



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in Ireland and to establish the Irish Republic.55 The Easter Rising, however,

“did not claim the united support of the majority of the nationalist family”;

700 rebels took up arms, which was less than 1 percent of the number of the

Irish who served in the British army during war.56 Although the rising was

suppressed, a majority of Nationalists later came to support the Republicans

as a result of the British response. Fifteen insurgents were shot by firing squad.

Bew notes that snapshots of the shootings (like the sight of a prominent Irish

Republican Eamonn Ceannt, who had once played pipe before the Pope in

the Vatican, “clutching his blood-spattered crucifix” under a hail of bullets)

created a symbolism, which “compelled the Irish people to identify the insur-

gents as representative Irishmen with whom they shared much.”57 On April

19, 1917, a meeting held by Count Plunkett, a prominent Irish Nationalist,

resulted in the establishment of a political independence movement led by

Sinn Fein. This movement was formalized on October 25, 1917, with Sinn

Fein quickly becoming an important actor in constitutional politics. Sinn

Fein did not denounce paramilitary activities. Although the clergy and public

opinion were never fully reconciled to the violence, Britain remained a target

of criticism among the Nationalists.58

The General Elections to the British Parliament on December 14, 1918,

resulted in a victory for Sinn Fein, whose members of Parliament gathered

in Dublin on January 21, 1919, to form Dail Eireann (Gaelic for “Assembly of

Ireland”). The results of the general election changed the Nationalist move-

ment’s leadership. Sinn Fein became an official representative of the Irish

people and pushed for independence with more confidence. Yet, even with

the establishment of a legitimate representative of the Irish people, Britain

refused to grant independence to Ireland on any level. This refusal led the

Republicans to fight their War of Independence (1919–1921) to drive the British

out of Ireland.59

northern ireland and the beginning of the troubles

The Irish War for Independence led to the establishment of the Irish Free

State, and, eventually, the Republic of Ireland. However, in six counties,

which later became “Northern Ireland,” Sinn Fein failed to get support in

the 1918 election, as the Unionists constituted the majority in the region.

As a result of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, Ireland was divided into

two separate jurisdictions: Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland. Sinn Fein

initially refused to accept the Government of Ireland Act and the establishment

of Southern Ireland. Eventually the majority in Dail Eireann backed the

Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, which introduced the Irish Free State for 26 counties



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of Ireland. This treaty also proposed to place the northern Parliament under

Dublin but allowed the Northern Ireland Parliament to vote on this issue.

The Northern Ireland Parliament exercised its right to opt out of the newly

established Irish Free State in 1922.

The partition of Ireland created two polities with very different denomi-

national balances. The south was predominantly Catholic with only a small

Protestant minority. The 1926 census showed that the population of the new

Irish Free State was 92.6 percent Catholic and 7.4 percent Protestant. In

sharp contrast, the majority of the North’s population was clearly Protes-

tant but there was a substantial Catholic minority. In 1926, Protestants were

66.5 percent of the population of Northern Ireland while Catholics were

33.5 percent.60 Northern Ireland was left under the rule of the British gov-

ernment, but with a separate Parliament and devolved government. In other

words, this separate Parliament was responsible for local issues, whereas the

national decisions were to be taken under “the United Kingdom,” not by

Northern Ireland as a separate entity.

The Irish nationalists saw the partition of Ireland as temporary, and did not

feel the need to make provisions that would allow a voluntary reunification.

Southern leaders tried to weave Gaelic culture into the daily life of the new

Irish state. The Irish language was made compulsory in all schools and an

Irish language qualification became essential for civil service jobs and many

of the professions. Eamon de Valera, one of the authors of the constitution,

President of the Executive Council and then Taoiseach (the equivalent of the

Prime Minister) for most of the time between 1932 and 1959, held the view that

since the Irish Republic was almost 90 percent Catholic, its moral and social

outlook would reflect Catholic beliefs.61 The Irish constitution of 1937 had a

key reference to the “special position” of the Catholic Church and the Church

was allowed to hold enormous influence in areas of health, education, and

social welfare. Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 constitution contained a territorial

claim over the six counties of Northern Ireland, which alarmed northern

Unionists and which were revised eventually in 1999, as a result of a referendum

arising from the Good Friday Agreement. In the meantime, the Protestant

majority discriminated against the Catholic minority in the North. British

politicians passed the responsibility of the Irish question to the Northern Irish

Parliament based in Stormont, which “ignored abuses of Catholics’ civil rights

and minimized its involvement in Irish politics.”62

Ulster Unionists made security a priority because they were afraid that

sustained Irish Republican Army attacks would take Northern Ireland away

from them.63 In response to these attacks, the Northern Irish government

passed the Special Powers Act in 1922, which gave extraordinary powers to the



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government and police to carry out any action deemed necessary to preserve

law and order.64 Although most of the secessionist violence had ceased by

1927, the British government left the Special Powers Act in force until 1973.

According to the Special Powers Act, “if any person does any act of such nature

as to be prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order

in Northern Ireland and not specifically provided for in the regulations, he

shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against the regulations.”65 The

introduction of this act alienated even moderate Catholics. Joseph Devlin,

an Irish journalist and a prominent Nationalist politician, stated that Britain

was arming “pogromists to murder Catholics.”66 As the Catholic identity of

the Irish state consolidated over time, the insecurities of the Ulster Protestants

increased, leading to a security dilemma set to explode by the mid twentieth

century.

At the time, the British attitude toward the Irish question was ambivalent.

Winston Churchill had opposed an independent Irish state, expressing his wish

that the Irish would be united under the Crown.67 The British Labour Party

was more sympathetic to the Irish cause yet did not view partition favorably.

However, after witnessing the waves of independence and self-determination,

Irish Nationalists and even some British policy makers came to believe that

“an independent, politically reunited Ireland was inevitable” even if not desir-

able.68 Those who favored a united Ireland did not constitute a majority,

especially given Northern Irish Protestants’ strong desire to remain out of the

Irish state.

The Parliament of Northern Ireland chose formally to opt out of the Irish

Free State under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Shortly after, a bound-

ary commission was established to determine the border between the Irish

Free State and Northern Ireland. Although leaders in Dublin expected a sub-

stantial reduction in the territory of Northern Ireland with Nationalist border

areas moving to the Free State, the commission decided against such a parti-

tion. Neighborhoods remained segregated. Marriages in Northern Ireland took

place within the same religious group and usually between people from the

same area, leading to family-based structures that were exclusionary.69 Even

the names of cities and neighborhoods continued to be used to denote reli-

gious and national affiliation. For example, those aligned with most Protestant

Unionists called Londonderry by its official name, while those of Nationalist

sentiment referred to it as Derry.70

In the meantime, many Northern Catholics continued to support the idea

of a united Ireland. In terms of political manifestations, the Nationalist Party

expressed this belief, while Sinn Fein representatives sometimes contested

elections and refused to take their seats at either the Westminster or Stormont.



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The minority Catholic community in Northern Ireland could never fully

integrate with the Protestant community, and it formed a “parallel universe

to the majority one.”71 At the economic level, the Protestant majority kept

the Catholics in an inferior position in Northern Ireland. In white-collar jobs,

Catholics would be far more likely to work in clerical rather than managerial

positions, very similar to their distribution in the public sector in general.72 The

most disconcerting aspect of this inequality was that Northern Irish politicians

openly supported this discrimination. Sir Basil Brooke, who served as Northern

Ireland’s Prime Minister for 20 years, “warned” the Protestants about their

Catholic neighbors with the strongest possible terms:

I recommend those people who are Loyalists not to employ Roman Catholics,99 percent of whom are disloyal; I want you to remember one point in regardto the employment of people who are disloyal. You are disenfranchisingyourselves in that way. You people who are employers have the ball at yourfeet. If you don’t act properly now, before we know where we are we shallfind ourselves in the minority instead of the majority.73

At a political level, proportional representation was abolished for local elections

in 1922 and for Stormont elections in 1929. The abolition of proportional rep-

resentation in 1929 limited electoral opportunities for small nonconfessional

parties. The Unionist Party, on the other hand, enjoyed a sizable majority

and formed the government for 50 years mostly because the question of the

union with Britain continued to dominate politics in Northern Ireland. The

Catholic community, constituting only a third of the population, did not have

a sufficient level of political representation that could make a change within

the existing structures.

In the judicial system, 15 out of 28 appointees to the Northern Ireland high

court between 1921 and 1972 were either current or former members of the

Unionist political party, which strengthened the link between political and

judicial control.74 Law enforcement also reflected Protestant dominance. The

Ulster Special Constabulary drew mostly from the early Ulster Volunteers.

Catholics regarded the “B specials,” a reserve police force for “emergencies,”

as a militant and sectarian army. The units of the B Specials often used

Orange Order lodges for training exercises and practice drills.75 The Catholic

community viewed these forces as symbols of oppression and violence due to

their use of heavy-handed force.

Despite social and political inequalities, Northern Ireland avoided civil war

for most of the period from 1924 until the late 1960s. There were exceptions to

this trend of relative stability. In 1935, the worst episode of violence occurred

since partition took place in Belfast. After an Orange Order parade decided



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to return to the city center through a Catholic area instead of its usual route,

the resulting confrontation left nine people dead. More than 2000 Catholics

were forced to leave their homes across Northern Ireland.76 Other exceptions

to this trend were episodic Irish Republican Army activities. In the face of

oppression and the rising levels of paramilitary movements, religious leaders

understood that keeping their pastoral activities out of politics would be dif-

ficult. Despite the Roman Catholic hierarchy’s formal condemnation of the

Republican paramilitary activities, for example, some Irish Republican Army

units were given absolution by individual clerics before going out on opera-

tions.77 Intensifying its activities, the organization published a declaration on

December 12, 1956, announcing the start of the Campaign:

Spearheaded by Ireland’s freedom fighters, our people have carried the fightto the enemy . . . Out of this national liberation struggle a new Ireland willemerge, upright and free. In that new Ireland, we shall build a country fitfor all our people to live in. That then is our aim: an independent, united,democratic Irish Republic. For this we shall fight until the invader is drivenfrom our soil and victory is ours.78

By the mid 1960s, economic and political frustrations of the Catholic pop-

ulation had taken on a more systematic expression. One of the institutions

that became a hub for the Catholics was the Northern Ireland Civil Rights

Association, but there were a number of other outlets that advocated review-

ing Northern Ireland’s legal structure to provide more equality for Catholics

without any reference to the partition issue.79 At that point, the civil rights

movement did not regard “religion” as the main dividing point – according to

the activists, the fight was more class-based than religious. Some Nationalists

even saw religious identification as an obstacle to the overall goals of the move-

ment. Voicing this Marxist understanding, Bernadette Devlin, a prominent

civil rights activist at the time, drew attention to the hypocrisy of “Catholic

slum landlords marching virtuously beside the tenants they exploited [and]

Catholic employers marching in protest against the Protestants they excluded

from their factories.”80

One of the central political and religious figures throughout the Troubles

period was Ian Paisley, who advanced a fundamentalist ideology through

his church and political party. In 1951, he founded the Free Presbyterian

Church, and in 1971, he co-founded the Democratic Unionist Party, which

had the most aggressive agenda when it came to issues of Irish Nationalism and

the Catholic population in Northern Ireland. Paisley’s hostile views toward

the Catholics grew increasingly prominent since the 1950s. Paisley merged

a Loyalist discourse with an evangelical theology hostile to any alternative



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perspective that includes the Catholics in political arrangements, and he

started to carry out his activism under the Ulster Protestant Action, which later

became the Protestant Unionist Party in 1966. Ulster Protestant Action started

to actively engage the local Protestants against the Irish Catholics. Its local

branches were established, including one by Paisley in Belfast’s Ravenhill

area under his direct control. It shifted its focus from political loyalism to what

Paisley called “Bible Protestantism,” an understanding that solely focuses on

scripture and devoid of any element of what he called “Romanism.” As Paisley

became more active in Ulster Protestant Action, he was convicted of public

offenses, one of which was his hate speech in a June 1959 rally during a

major riot that occurred on Shankill Road.81 In 1969, he organized an illegal

counterdemonstration against a Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association

march in Armagh with Ronald Bunting, a British army officer and Unionist

politician. He was released during a general amnesty for people convicted of

political offenses.82

The year 1966 was the fiftieth anniversary of the 1916 Easter Rising. The

Nationalists celebrated the fiftieth anniversary in Northern Ireland and there

were large Republican parades that took place in Belfast. In Dublin, some Irish

Republican Army members planted bombs in Nelson’s Pillar, a statue that was

erected in 1808 in honor of the British Royal Navy officer, Horatio Nelson.

The bombs virtually destroyed the pillar, which the Republicans saw as a ves-

tige of British rule. Loyalists expressed their fear that these commemorations

would lead to a violent Republican resurgence, especially given a growing

campaign for equality reforms in Northern Ireland led by the Campaign for

Social Justice. On May 7, a group of Loyalists bombed a Catholic-owned

pub on Shankill Road. On the same day, four Loyalists shot a Catholic civil-

ian, followed by other similar incidents. Two weeks later, a group calling

itself the Ulster Volunteer Force issued a statement, declaring war on the

Irish Republican Army.83 On June 28, the Northern Ireland government, con-

cerned about the spiral of violence, declared the Ulster Volunteer Force illegal

but the group continued to engage in paramilitary activities throughout the

Troubles.

Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister, Terence O’Neill, tried to enlist Catholic

support for the Unionist Party during his tenure in office between 1963 and

1969. O’Neill carried out political and economic reforms that would ease

the tension between Catholic and Protestant communities. The Irish Coun-

cil of Churches called upon its members “to consider ways in which they

could contribute to the cause of social reconciliation, and instructed its exec-

utive to consider how to set up a full study of the role the Churches could

and should play.”84 Paisley and the Loyalist paramilitary organizations grew



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Religious Actors, Conflict, and Governance 41

disillusioned with concessions that were extended to Catholics, such as

increased public housing, job opportunities and the prime minister’s desire

to ameliorate relations and cooperate with the Republic of Ireland in eco-

nomic initiatives. Paisley stated that O’Neill was selling the Protestants down

the river with his reform campaigns.85 To make matters more complicated,

the Nationalist community was not happy with the reforms either. Catholic

organizations such as the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association found the

reforms insufficient, and members tried to express their impatience through

marches and demonstrations. Paisley, once again, did not shy away from hold-

ing Catholics responsible for the violence. In 1968, the police responded

to Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association marches with disproportion-

ate force. These clashes marked the beginning of a period of intense sec-

tarian violence, known as the Troubles, which opened a new episode of Irish

history.

religious actors, conflict, and governance

Until the plantation period, Ireland was relatively homogeneous in terms of

religion. Challenges started to arise with the Presbyterian and Anglican pres-

ence. The Irish Confederate Wars and the Williamite War followed the planta-

tion projects. These wars had an important religious dimension, because they

were part of the larger political Catholic-Protestant rift throughout Europe, a

competition driven more by emperors and kings than by clergy. Eighteenth-

century Ireland saw the emergence of Nationalist movements. The United

Irishmen, a nonsectarian Irish movement, was one such forerunner. The

Catholic Defenders and the Protestant Peep-o’-Day Boys established their own

doctrines, which they passionately and, at times, violently espoused. Through-

out the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these movements dominated the

political scene, and religion found itself subordinated to the political aims of

these movements’ leaders. The famine and the clashes among these move-

ments brought people and their clergy closer, but there was no systematic,

distinct religious discourse that clashed with the dominant political narratives

of the time.

With the establishment of the Irish Free State in the early twentieth century

and the drawing of the border creating Northern Ireland, politics assumed an

increasingly sectarian tone. Catholic nationalism continued to influence the

Northern Irish sphere. Loyalism, which drew attention to the Northern Irish’s

Protestant roots, countered the Irish Republican ideals. Until 1968, Protestant

majority dominated Northern Irish politics. Still, members of the clergy, both

Protestant and Catholic, continued to perform their pastoral duties and ignore



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the political events. With the start of the Troubles, this relatively neutral stance

changed, and some prominent members of Northern Ireland’s clergy shifted

their position toward offering emphatic political opinions.

contemporary religious actors in northern ireland:

churches and other organizations

According to a UK census conducted in 2001, around 40 percent of Northern

Ireland is Roman Catholic and 46 percent belong to Protestant churches.

Other religious traditions constitute less than 1 percent of the Northern Irish

population; these include Muslims, Jews, Hindus, and Baha’is. Although

members of these traditions became active in the aftermath of the Troubles,

their number still remains too low to have a significant impact in peacebuild-

ing. Therefore, in this book, I concentrate on the Christian tradition and

churches whose adherents, by virtue of their ethnoreligious identity, became

heavily involved in the conflict.

In Northern Ireland, although we can think of the Catholic Church as a

unitary actor, the Protestant tradition is fragmented with close to a hundred

denominations. The Presbyterian Church, the Methodist Church, and the

Church of Ireland represent the traditions that have the highest number of

adherents. According to the 2001 Census, 21 percent of the Northern Irish

population was Presbyterian, 15 percent was affiliated with the Church of

Ireland, and 4 percent was Methodist.86

The religious actors constituting an epistemic community of an inclusive

public theology were affiliated usually with the churches or faith-based orga-

nizations. However, this project does not claim that churches are the main

actors constituting an epistemic community. Religious leaders and activists

are the focus of interest more than churches as institutions. These religious

actors, sometimes with the help of their institutional base and sometimes risk-

ing exclusion from their churches, attempted to create a form of religious

understanding that allowed the laypeople to live peacefully in a Christian

society. These actors include church fellowships and interchurch initiatives

(such as the Fitzroy-Clonard Fellowship under Christopher McCarthy, Gerry

Reynolds and Ken Newell), individual church leaders taking initiatives both

as representatives of their churches and independently (such as Harold Good

and John Dunlop), and religious organizations that were established to pro-

vide assistance and safe space to the parties that are affected by the conflict

(such as the Corrymeela Community) or to address peacebuilding from a

religious standpoint (such as Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland).

Since most of the religious actors have some connection to one of the four



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Contemporary Religious Actors in Northern Ireland 43

established churches in Northern Ireland, a brief look at these churches is

useful.

� The Catholic Church in Ireland: The Catholic Church in Northern Ire-

land is part of the Catholic Church in Ireland, which is under the spiritual

leadership of Rome. The Irish Catholic Church has around 28 dioceses,

including the ones in Northern Ireland, and it is led by 4 archbishops

and 23 bishops.87

Although the Catholic Church was supportive of the Acts of Union in the

nineteenth century and was relatively loyal to the Crown, it has aligned itself

with Irish nationalism in the latter part of the nineteenth- and twentieth-

century Irish public sphere.88 In Northern Ireland, the Catholic Church has

been especially prevalent in the social sphere, even more so than the Protes-

tant churches, as “in the absence of the state to which many Catholics owe

their unconditional allegiance, the Church has become the main institutional

organizer.”89 It has contributed significantly to the establishment of a “society

within a society”90 through its social functions; it has provided schools, church

societies, and even a hospital, the Mater Infirmorium.91

The Catholic clergy is less directly involved in party politics compared with

their Protestant counterparts, some of whom chose to become politicians later

in life – sometimes leaving their religious post, sometimes not – such as Ian

Paisley (founding member and former Moderator of the Free Presbyterian

Church of Ulster), Robert Bradford (ordained Methodist minister and later,

Ulster Unionist Member of Parliament), and Martin Smyth (ordained minister

of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and later, Ulster Unionist Party Member

of Parliament). Another difference is that the Catholic clergy has been, for

the most part, reluctant to offer advice on how to vote.92 Despite this aloof

stance when it comes to party politics, it is widely regarded that the Catholic

Church sympathizes with the Social Democratic and Labour Party, although

this relationship is never made public, especially due to the party’s “secular”

nature.93 Sinn Fein, due to its association with the Irish Republican Army in

the minds of many, did not enjoy a similar approval from the Catholic Church,

since the latter was more supportive of mainstream politics that lacks such

controversial associations. Having said that, the clergy officiated Republican

paramilitaries’ funerals in a traditional manner, and some clergy members kept

in contact with paramilitaries, the latter of whom sought spiritual guidance,

if not political support. Although one cannot generalize from the few extant

examples, some clergy regarded paramilitary activities as legitimate in a world

of structural violence.94



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� The Irish Presbyterian Church: The Irish Presbyterian Church operates

across the island of Ireland and is the largest Protestant denomination

in Northern Ireland. The Church describes its tradition as “‘Reformed’

with a strong emphasis on the Sovereignty of God, the Kingship of Christ

and the authority of the Bible.”95 The consolidation of Irish Presbyteri-

anism dates back to Scottish migrations to Ulster in the early seventeenth

century. The Irish Presbyterian Church is a founding member of the

World Alliance of Reformed Churches and has more than 240 000 mem-

bers belonging to 545 congregations across 19 Presbyteries throughout

Ireland, north and south.96 Unlike the Catholic and Church of Ireland

hierarchical systems, authority in Presbyterianism is at local level. The

General Assembly is the supreme governing council of the Presbyterian

Church in Ireland, and the head of the General Assembly is the Moder-

ator, who is elected annually. The General Assembly – with 1200 elders

and ministers – meets once a year usually in Belfast, under the chair-

manship of the Moderator. The Moderator is “without executive power

and with limited influence,” and for controversial matters, there will be

more than 700 elders and ministers present.97 With the exception of one

private session, all other meetings are carried on in public.

The Free Presbyterian Church, established in 1951 by Ian Paisley, is different

from the Irish Presbyterian Church. Moderators of the latter have distanced

themselves from Ian Paisley’s theological and political views. Former Moder-

ator of the Irish Presbyterian Church, John Dunlop once wrote that Paisley

“invested a considerable energy attacking the Presbyterian Church in Ireland,

happily with a limited amount of success” and he “periodically honours the

General Assembly by turning up outside to protest.”98

� The Church of Ireland: Operating across the island of Ireland, Church

of Ireland is the largest religious body therein after the Roman Catholic

Church. In Northern Ireland, it is the third largest after the Roman

Catholic and Presbyterian churches. The Church of Ireland is a Protes-

tant church that regards itself as both Catholic, in that its beliefs and

practices stem from the practices of the early church, and as Reformed,

in that it does not accept the universal jurisdiction of the Pope. This is

why the adjective “Roman” is used to denote the Catholics who accept

the jurisdiction of Pope, and “Catholic” without any modifiers can be

employed to denote both the Church of Ireland and Roman Catholic

Church adherents. Elliott notes that “despite its perceived privileged sta-

tus, the Church of Ireland was much more historically Protestant than its



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English counterpart” and its members had no problem using the Protes-

tant identity in addition to the Catholic one.99

The Church of Ireland is part of the worldwide Anglican Communion, which

has 70 million members in 164 countries, tracing its roots to the early days

of Christianity.100 Every ten years, the Anglican bishops meet in conference

under the presidency of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Church of Ireland

notes that “any resolutions made by the conference, while in their own right

carrying considerable weight, become operable in the different Churches

only when they have been officially accepted by them. The struggle to main-

tain independence and interdependence in communion, challenges these

churches to face the attendant issues of identity and authority.”101 Like other

Anglican churches, the Church of Ireland is a member of the World Coun-

cil of Churches and the Irish Council of Churches. The Church of Ireland

is led by the Archbishop of Armagh (Primate of All Ireland) and the Arch-

bishop of Dublin (Primate of Ireland). The General Synod is the supreme

legislative authority of the Church of Ireland and it consists of two Houses:

the House of Bishops and the House of Representatives, the latter compris-

ing the other clergy and the laity. Although the Church has distanced itself

from the Protestant fraternal organizations, it has had historical links with

the Orange Order, which used the Church buildings for its events in the

past.102

� The Methodist Church in Ireland: The Methodist Church in Ireland

is a Wesleyan Methodist Church that covers Republic of Ireland and

Northern Ireland. It is the fourth largest Christian denomination in both

jurisdictions and on the island as a whole. The Methodist Church in

Ireland works on a democratic structure. Lay and ordained people, both

men and women are involved in decision making at all levels. There

are no bishops or ordained hierarchy; its authority rests in the annual

conference and the trustees. It has 212 churches or ‘societies’ with a total

community membership of around 53 000.103 According to its website, “a

group of classes in a locality form a society or congregation, administered

by a Church Council. A large society or a group of societies form a

circuit, which may have one or more ministers, and is in the care of

a Superintendent minister and administered by a Circuit Executive.”

The supreme court of the church is called “the Conference,” which is

the final authority in the Church in all matters of doctrine, worship,

discipline, and order. The Methodist Church is a member of the World

Council of Churches, the Conference of European Churches, Churches

Together in Britain and Ireland, and the Irish Council of Churches.



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In 2002, the Methodist Church in Ireland also signed a covenant for

greater cooperation and potential ultimate unity with the Church of

Ireland.104

In addition to these established churches, a number of faith-based organiza-

tions played significant roles in conflict transformation and peacebuilding,

both through grassroots activities and their bringing together religious leaders.

A prominent example is the Corrymeela Community, established in 1965 to

bring together the Catholic and Protestant communities. Such faith-based

organizations provided a platform for religious leaders and community mem-

bers at a time when churches were unwilling to assume an active role in the

public sphere. Community leaders expressed their vision in religious terms,

writing extensively on the importance of sacred texts and traditions in recon-

ciliation.

In an interview with the author, the late David Stevens, leader of the Cor-

rymeela Community between 2004 and 2010, agreed that unless policy makers

see religion as a form of knowledge or expertise, it will always be difficult to

tap into the religious sources in peacebuilding. Stevens observed that, vio-

lent circles take religion more seriously than those working for peace. In

other words, although treatment of religious as a form of knowledge can be

a double-edged sword, we are already facing violent actors, ranging from Al

Qaeda to Christian White Supremacist movements that use religion as a ral-

lying point. Peacebuilders need to tap into religious sources on a systematic

basis, and politico-theological inquiries should take their well-deserved place

in the studies of peacebuilding. Stevens himself contributed to the literature

with his numerous works on religious texts and action. In the introduction

of his book, The Place Called Reconciliation: Texts to Explore, for example,

he calls special attention to the letter to Ephesians and asserts that “only a

rediscovery of the Servant Lordship of Christ and the depth of His healing

love” can unite the factions in Northern Ireland.105

Another organization, Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland (later

succeeded by Contemporary Christianity) played a crucial role in conflict

transformation with its “Thinking Biblically Building Peace” principle. Its

director David Porter (who, in 2013, was appointed as Director for Reconcil-

iation by the Archbishop of Canterbury) emphasized the difference in their

strategy from Corrymeela’s. Instead of focusing on a Christian brotherhood that

would unite Protestants and Catholics, Evangelical Contribution on Northern

Ireland leaders stressed that even if the other side is considered an enemy, it is

a religious duty to love them. Porter also agrees that faith-based resources have



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been influential during the Troubles period and for every person who joined

the paramilitaries, there were many others who did not.106 The examples of

these faith-based organizations and initiatives can be multiplied in the context

of Northern Ireland and engagement with the conflict parties. In the following

chapters, I discuss the role of these religious actors in during different episodes

of the conflict.



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3

Churches in “Troubles”

Leaders, Institutions, and Political Involvement

One of the discussions that surround religious actors’ contributions to conflict

transformation is how they started to assume an active role in the politics of the

Troubles to begin with. How did they become relevant, and how did they use

their expertise toward stability and peace? How did they share this expertise

with the laity as well as politicians? Although one can always argue that reli-

gious leaders can influence political trajectories simply by concentrating on

their pastoral duties, there usually is a more direct tie between religious knowl-

edge and high politics. Just as the initial studies of epistemic communities in

international relations focused on the linkages between scientists and the poli-

tics of disarmament, it is possible to find a link between religious actors and the

politics of conflict. Civil rights marches and demonstrations, the internment

of the paramilitary suspects, the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly

(referred to as “Stormont” from this point on), the rise of both Loyalist and

Republican paramilitary violence and the Sunningdale Agreement – the first

political attempt to bring an end to the cycle of violence – are among the

political issues that attracted attention during the initial years of the conflict.

Any attempt to trace the conflict resolution and peace-building efforts of the

clergy and faith-based civil society actors, therefore, should take into account

the atmosphere surrounding these political milestones.

The official beginning of the Troubles dates back to the October 1968 civil

rights march that was led by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association,

an organization campaigning for civil rights on behalf of the Catholic popula-

tion who was discriminated against by the Protestant-dominated government.

Shortly after the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association announced the

march, the Apprentice Boys of Derry – a fraternal Protestant organization –

stated their intention to organize a march of their own on the very same day.

Fearing the collision these two marches would create, William Craig, the

Northern Ireland Minister for Home Affairs, banned the civil rights march.

48



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Churches in “Troubles”: Leaders, Institutions, and Political Involvement 49

Despite these warnings and the political pressure, the civil rights march took

place on October 5, 1968. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (the Northern Ire-

land police) responded violently to the demonstrators. Many Catholics were

injured in the events and two days of heavy rioting ensued as a reaction to

Royal Ulster Constabulary’s heavy-handed tactics.1

A similar march took place on in January 1969. This time, a Loyalist crowd

attacked the civil rights marchers at Burntollet Bridge, and the police forces

failed to prevent the violence. These encounters, coupled with the absence of

any intervention by the law enforcement, arguably increased the attractiveness

of Republican paramilitary organizations as a shield against Loyalist violence.

The marches continued with an increasing number of injured protesters and

casualties. The British Army Regiment shot 26 civil rights protesters during

another march on January 30, 1972. This event, called “Bloody Sunday” or

“Bogside Massacre,” was especially significant because this time it was the

British army, not the Northern Irish paramilitaries, that killed the protesters.

Bloody Sunday carried the conflict to an international level. A crowd of at least

20 000 people protesting the British soldiers’ brutality destroyed the British

embassy in Dublin. This period also saw a rise in violent activity by paramili-

taries who were no longer just concerned about self-defense or civil rights but

sought to promote their national agendas, for or against a united Ireland. To

give a rough idea as to the intensity of the conflict, from 1969 to the end of

1972 there were 724 deaths. Security forces were responsible for 146 deaths,

Loyalists for 145, Republicans for 407, and others for 23.2

The British intervention in these incidents complicated the picture for both

the Unionists and the Nationalists looking for political solutions to the ten-

sions. The dissolution of the Unionist dominated Northern Ireland Assembly

and the establishment of direct rule by the British in 1972 implied that the

Unionists were no longer trusted in issues of political governance nor could

they deal with instability in their home territory by themselves. Despite their

traditional attachment to the UK, this intervention frustrated the Unionists

because it suggested “the Ulster men were incapable of ruling themselves and

needed London to teach them how to govern.”3 The Unionists had developed

their form of nationalism with self-governance at its center. Even before the

border between the North and the South existed, Unionists were wary of the

“home rule,” but of a different kind. At that time, “home rule” meant an Irish

nationalism based on the Catholic narrative. However, after the separation

of Northern and Southern Ireland in 1921, the meaning of “home rule” in

Northern Ireland had changed: the Protestants, who regarded themselves as

a community loyal to Britain, would rule Ulster. Britain’s direct rule move,

therefore, was a blow to the Unionist political ideals.



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50 Churches in “Troubles”: Leaders, Institutions, and Political Involvement

In the 1960s, there was also a split within the Irish Republican Army that

would have implications for the violence during the Troubles period. Cathal

Goulding became the group’s leader in 1962 and sought to recreate their

image, hoping to transform it from militarism to an intellectual Marxist move-

ment. This desire ultimately led to a split in the Republican movement in

1969, resulting in two distinct organizations. On one hand, there were the

“Officials” Goulding commanded. They intended to transform the move-

ment into a revolutionary party integrated into parliamentary politics, in addi-

tion to decreasing the emphasis on street violence. On the other hand, the

Provisionals (also called “Provos”), continued to refuse any involvement in

parliamentary politics. The Provisionals wanted to use armed force to defend

the Catholic community in Belfast from Loyalist attacks. Although the official

Irish Republican Army also supported the Catholic defenders and smaller

factions in Belfast, its strategy and aims became considerably different from

those sought by the Provos. Ultimately, the latter wanted to rebuild the group’s

military capacity to launch a full-fledged armed campaign to obtain a united

Ireland without giving any compromise to the Unionists. The official Irish

Republican Army maintained its armed activities until 1972, characterizing

them as “defensive.”

Although the Troubles date back to the 1960s, a public clerical recognition

of religion’s role in conflict did not come until 1976. In 1970, leaders of the four

main churches in Northern Ireland (Presbyterian, Methodist, the Church of

Ireland, and Roman Catholic) issued a joint statement claiming that religion

was not a cause or component of the conflict, rather than recognizing the role

of the churches in creating an increasingly divided society. A possible reason for

this detachment was hesitation over becoming involved in a political contro-

versy, not to mention the responsibility such an involvement would have placed

on the churches. However, even at that time, the representatives of the four

main churches were already meeting on an ad hoc basis. Eric Gallagher, the

former President of the Irish Methodist Church, met with Jack Weir, Clerk of

the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and Archbishop James McCann, Church

of Ireland Primate, and they decided to write confidentially to the British

Prime Minister Harold Wilson to warn him about the increasing polarization

and “an explosion of real violence if confrontation is continued.”4 The events

had come to such a stage that “ecclesiastical scene was transformed . . . joint

statements, meetings, and television appearances became common place” and

the church leaders foresaw that the situation would require much more than

occasional meetings.5

Church leaders were initially unwilling to engage in interdenominational

and ecumenical activities that could potentially help remedy the divisions in



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Churches in “Troubles”: Leaders, Institutions, and Political Involvement 51

the community. Many religious actors, for reasons of credibility and reputation

and in the absence of active institutional support from higher authorities in

the main churches, did not want to lose their followers in a religiously com-

petitive environment. In other words, religious leaders were initially hesitant

to formulate an inclusive public theology that could potentially compromise

the coherence of their respective traditions. Norman Taggart, President of

the Irish Council of Churches at the time, stated that the Church leaders

avoided publicity in communication regarding societal matters because “it

was felt that this was the most effective and appropriate way of proceeding

in the circumstances, on account of the suspicion in which ecumenism was

held.”6

Sustained practices of segregated education and the encouragement of

endogamy further reinforced the absence of contact between members of the

Roman Catholic and Protestant communities. Church leaders’ reluctance to

involve themselves in party politics also reflects a traditional posture, dominant

throughout the history, as outlined in the previous chapter. Although clergy

had been vocal in local politics, for centuries they had preferred to follow

the political leaders who defined governing arrangements. Kings and political

leaders had defined the place of religion in politics, instead of religious leaders.

As events unfolded, active parties to the conflict, ranging from paramili-

taries to political parties, attacked this neutral stance of the clergy, claiming

that religious leaders needed to play a part in realizing the political ambi-

tions of their parishioners, whether in maintaining the union with the UK

or establishing a union with the Republic of Ireland. Consequently, the four

main churches became an unwilling party to the conflict, even before they

themselves recognized it. The active involvement of Ian Paisley, the leader

of the Free Presbyterian Church, in politics by establishing the Democratic

Unionist Party in 1971, complicated the picture by further blurring the line

between religion and politics. With Noel Doherty, a prominent Christian fun-

damentalist and Loyalist, Paisley had co-founded the Protestant Telegraph in

1966, which quickly became known for its strong anti-Catholic stance. He also

published a number of books and pamphlets on religion and politics to pro-

mote his exclusive theology, denouncing the Catholic Church and the Pope.

He formulated an exclusive evangelical Protestant theology in regards to the

broader questions of the conflict in Northern Ireland; for him and his follow-

ers, there was one true form of Christianity and the other forms, including

Catholicism, were in error.7

By virtue of their interpretation of the scripture, one might claim that Pais-

ley supporters led a counter epistemic community to the one that formulates

inclusive public theologies. They favored an exclusive portrayal of Protestant



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identity. There was not only one theology or one religious epistemic com-

munity around the conflict in Northern Ireland. In other words, it was not

only the peacebuilders who produced knowledge. By virtue of his interpre-

tation and his direct political outlet, Ian Paisley significantly influenced the

Northern Irish politics. However, the recognition and the mechanisms of this

knowledge production are not as clear as those of the faith leaders of the four

main churches and other religious actors who contributed to peacebuilding.

The fact that Paisley had his own political party raises doubts about his groups’

qualification as an independent epistemic community. Regardless of their

epistemic status, Free Presbyterians constituted an important challenge for

the pro-reconciliation epistemic community of religious actors in Northern

Ireland.8

With the churches struggling to remain aloof, the Democratic Unionist

Party carrying the Protestant fundamentalist banner9, and the political parties’

rejection of the possible religious causes of the conflict, religion’s contribu-

tion to a positive conflict transformation initially seemed almost impossible.

Finally, in 1976, with the violence levels increasing, the Irish Council of

Churches and the Roman Catholic Church Joint Group on Social Questions

published “Violence in Ireland,” a report criticizing the churches for their

implicit role in the increasing bitterness. The initial signs of an inclusive theol-

ogy of belonging in Northern Ireland came as a response not only to increasing

levels of violence but also to Paisley’s exclusive theology, which had started to

appeal to the masses in the absence of a theological alternative. In other words,

one form of knowledge production and interpretation led to the activation of

another. Leaders of the four main churches came to understand that unless

they made theological expertise and knowledge accessible to the people, Pais-

ley’s narrow interpretation would inevitably dominate in the public sphere.

Thus began the overall innovation stage detailed in Chapter 1. The main-

stream religious leaders entered the political sphere by virtue of declarations

on political matters, frequent meetings, and self-reflection, concerning both

their approach to the conflict and the theological constraints facing intercom-

munal relationships. This innovation was a considerable change from what

Liechty and Clegg regard as fatal religious beliefs underlying sectarianism

throughout the Irish history: No salvation outside of the church; error has

no right (the transgressors can be punished without hesitation) and unlimited

belief in divine providence (disasters and adversity are God-sent).10 Since such

transformation was relatively novel to the Northern Irish theological landscape,

its initial manifestations were not systematic, consistent, and visible.

Despite their initial hesitation regarding involvement in a complicated and

violent political struggle, religious actors – especially the leaders of the four



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main churches – attempted to create both a faith-based public sphere and a

theological discourse parallel to the mainstream political discourse surround-

ing political arrangements. During these first years of the Troubles, religious

leaders generally refrained from making political statements or qualifying the

conflict as “religious.” Their occasional joint statements focused more on

social issues such as unemployment, drug addiction, alcoholism, housing

conditions and poverty.11 The initial years of the conflict saw almost no direct

political involvement on the side of the leaders of the four main churches.

Theological innovation, however, came in the form of agenda setting, conver-

sion, reinforcement, and empowerment, to adopt Jelen’s terminology. From

early on, religious leaders assumed active roles in the conflict and conciliation

discourse through offering political suggestions (agenda setting) and attempt-

ing to change exclusive discourses in their own denominations (conversion),

as well as voicing the their own communities’ concerns (reinforcement)and providing the laity with tools they could use in their own public life

(empowerment).

religious or not? defining the conflict

Leaders of the four churches initially rejected the possibility of religion being

one of the causes contributing to the outbreak of violence. They saw the

conflict as “political” and “social,” and “is no more based on religion than

the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs or the conflict between India

and Pakistan.”12 Church leaders tried to keep political and religious spheres

separate to the extent possible. The Belfast Presbyterian Synod even passed a

motion stating that the press should be more sensitive when using the labels

Catholic and Protestant – the frequent referral to religious traditions as primary

identities in the conflict would exacerbate an already sensitive situation.13 Pat

J., a Presbyterian minister who remembers this Presbyterian Church motion

in the 1970s stated that “even if the conflict had not had religious causes,

they [journalists and politicians] managed to make it ‘religious’ in a matter of

seconds. When a violent act was committed, the perpetrators and the victims

were Protestants and Catholics, not Unionists or Nationalists, not Billy or

Joe.”14 Another minister noted, “Some religious leaders avoided taking an

active stance especially for the fear that such an involvement would imply that

the conflict was religious, which it was not.”15

In the ensuing years, religious leaders continued to caution the media

to be sensitive about reporting the incidents and political developments. In

1973, for example, just before the issuance of a white paper concerning the

fate of Stormont, nine church leaders (including Cardinal Conway, Roman



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Catholic Archbishop of Armagh; the Most Rev. Dr. Simms, Church of Ireland

Archbishop of Armagh; the Rt. Rev. Dr. Lynas, Moderator of the General

Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland; and Dr. E. R. Lindsay,

President of the Methodist Church in Ireland) issued a joint statement,

encouraging the media to join moderate political circles. “Following the

publication of the white paper on the future of Northern Ireland, the media

will have, probably as never before, an opportunity for responsible reporting

that can wield a powerful influence for good within the whole community in

Northern Ireland,” church leaders wrote. “We seek your cooperation in the

avoidance of sensationalism and in the making of balanced and constructive

comments.”16

At the same time, leaders of the four churches were condemning violence

and advising restraint regularly, and a number of clergy protested the unfair

treatment of churches by the politicians and the media, especially given that

religious leaders had done their best to constrain violent attitudes and reactions.

The conflict was not essentially religious, the religious leaders stated, and those

who blamed the churches should look more carefully into the root causes of

war. The issues that divided the Northern Irish were essentially political and

social.17 The clergy also drew attention to the fact that a large section of

the community remained calm in spite of frustration, fear, riots, bombings,

shooting, and killings; credit for this communal restraint could well be given

to church leaders.18

Religious leaders did not approve of the direct involvement by the clergy

in politics and the discourse employed by “political clerics,” most notably

the tone of Ian Paisley. According to these religious leaders, even if there

were political prescriptions that were to be made or if any of the theological

knowledge was relevant to political issues, clergy needed to share this from

their pulpits – akin to scientists influencing politics from their laboratories

during the Cold War – instead of actively stepping into politics. Leaders of

the four churches, therefore, continued avoiding taking any specific political

stand, reminding the public that the political sphere was distinct from that

of the church. The churches issued public statements to that effect: “There

are aspects of political practice upon which the church is not competent to

direct its members. Within the Methodist Church in Ireland, there is a great

variety of political thought and commitment,” one such statement noted, “the

church’s brief lies rather in the sphere of matters of conscience and moral

standards.”19 Accordingly, almost all mainstream Protestant leaders criticized

Paisley’s “political clergy” identity. The President of the Methodist Church,

Eric Gallagher, stated that “the time has come for the Protestant churches

to spell out the biblical reasons why Paisley does not speak for them” and he



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called Paisley a “political” rather than a “biblical” Protestant.20 A Church of

Ireland Bishop, Richard Hanson, cautioned that “there are those in public life

who style themselves ministers of religion and wear clerical collars, but who

bring nothing of the message of religion to politics. They merely stand for a

section of the Protestant community and only serve the identification with

politics.”21

Paisley expounded an exclusive evangelical identity, and he condemned

ecumenism in the harshest way possible. He accused the World Council of

Churches of funding terrorist organizations and declared the Pope to be the

“Antichrist.”22 The leaders of the four churches spent considerable time and

energy throughout the Troubles countering Paisley’s allegations and theolog-

ical interpretations. Viewed from another perspective though, if Paisley had

not employed such an exclusive and violent religious discourse in politics, the

formation of a moderate epistemic community around the conflict might have

been delayed for another decade, if not indefinitely. The exclusive and violent

public theologies in conflict settings call for the formation of an inclusive and

peaceful epistemic community as a counter. Free Presbyterians constituted a

clear “other” to which mainstream religious actors felt the need to respond. In

the words of the Bishop of Down and Connor, Cahal Daly,

in most cases, both locally and at a national level, there are better relationsthan ever before between the main churches and their leaders. Clergy meet,people meet, they pray together, areas of difference and dissension are dis-cussed frankly and openly. However, in his speeches and so-called sermons,Mr. Paisley attacks the Catholic Church and anyone who would dare to asso-ciate with it. He has completely misrepresented the whole idea of ecumenismas a sellout to Rome, which of course, it isn’t.23

Although the churches’ prevailing attitude was to point to political factors

and reject religion as a direct force in the violence cycle, a number of church

leaders made critical references to the role churches played in deepening

the political divides in the community and the way the church had become

irrelevant for some people. In other words, whereas religion was not regarded

as a cause of conflict per se, there was public recrimination of churches

as institutions. Most of the arguments focused on church passivity that led

to a decrease in the attractiveness of the churches, along with a decrease

in churches’ capacity to determine solutions to contemporary problems.

Religious leaders of the main churches criticized themselves for letting this

happen; this passivity had led to a conflict unable to be controlled or contained

even by moderate church leaders. They invited the fellow Christians to

question and challenge the images of a “domineering, triumphal Roman



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Catholic Church” and a “bullying, politically oriented Protestantism.”24 At

the same time, some religious leaders argued that the churches could not

avoid getting involved in the conflict and that wanting to do so would harm

the fabric of Christian society. Following are examples of statements made by

clergy regarding the potential role of the churches in the conflict:

The churches in Ireland have tended to be Unionists, Socialists, or Republi-cans first and Christians second. Their priorities have been wrong and theyare now undergoing judgment. Things have been taught and said that werecontrary to the mind and will of God. God’s message to Unionists and Repub-licans alike was “your ways are not my ways.” The basic lesson now for allparties in Northern Ireland is simply that they could not solve the NorthernIreland problem on their own terms.25

The difficulty for us is to recognize how the church is to fulfill its responsibil-ities here. There are two attitudes which I believe cannot be countenanced.The first is absorption in party politics. The Christian cannot be a party politi-cian without reference to Christian principles. But equally unacceptable isabsolute abstention. If it is to serve the interests of its Lord and His work, thechurch cannot refuse to speak on the burning issues of the day.26

We in the churches know that this is not a religious conflict but the churcheshave a responsibility, because the divisions in the community have beenfostered and helped by intolerant religious attitude.27

The nature of the church’s involvement in our divided society has beenwell described as overidentification with our own communities. Such anoveridentification was understandable, even if not justifiable, in the ear-lier circumstances of our church. But the time has come and in terms ofeffectiveness, it may be passing, for us to withdraw from that position of overi-dentification and to recognise and act on the principal that our first concernand commitment must be for the dignity and rights of all the people of thisland.28

In the early years of the Troubles, religious leaders were vocal in putting forth

initiatives, ranging from personal/spiritual ones to those suggesting public

action. However, social issues continued to be at the forefront of the agenda

in the coming years. They saw poor housing and unemployment rather

than religious differences as the cause of the violence. In order to get to

the core of the Troubles, Northern Ireland needed “down-to-earth, practical

level” initiatives “irrespective of religious or political outlooks” that would

cover “the level of unemployment, industrial development, export drives,

tourist development, and other matters.”29 Unemployment was a “national

emergency” in the words of the Catholic bishop, philosopher, and theologian



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Cahal Daly; therefore, religious leaders encouraged economic cooperation

between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.30

Religious actors emphasized personal spiritual activities, such as family

prayers, avoiding provocative behavior, observing charity, and forgiveness as

part of a possible peace plan.31 Church leaders highlighted the relevance

and importance of Christianity, and encouraged the layperson to question

the myths that “divide” and perpetuate “sectarian tribalism”; the unity and the

welfare of the people was of supreme importance, and the killings were against

Christian teachings, regardless of the conditions:32

Real Christian toleration needs to be rediscovered in Ireland today. Tolerationin practice means seeking dialogue, meeting fellow countrymen, learningfrom each other. There is a wide gulf separating Catholics and Protestants.Gentle and firm testimony is what Protestants owe to Catholics and whatCatholics owe to Protestants.33

The world now knows that our land, officially professing Christianity, andhaving more church buildings per square mile than any other, is now asbarbaric as any that rejects the Christian faith. The answer was to be foundin the experience of the impoverished and numerically weak church of theNew Testament which changed the world of its day, because its memberslived out the reality of the gospel so impressively that non-Christians testified:“See how they love one another.” Unless they are prepared to unite now ina new allegiance not to dogma but to Christ and His way of humility andlove, the future for Christianity in this land will be bleak indeed. The priorityof the churches therefore must be to persuade all their committed membersto come together at the grassroots level of congregational life to study God’sword, to seek the power of the Holy Spirit and then to go out, as the firstChristians did to outthink and outlive political and religious extremists whothrive on hate and destruction.34

The regular meetings of and cooperation among the leadership of the

four churches was the most important indicator of the religious epistemic

community’s consolidation as one that was capable of influencing the politics

of conflict. Such regular interchurch meetings and brainstorming in political

matters had never before existed at such a scale in the history of Northern

Ireland. These meetings, both on a local church fellowship level and via

larger scale platforms, such as councils of churches, aimed to find Christian

solutions to the violence in Northern Ireland. These religious leaders, who

came together in public – in addition to their meetings behind the scenes –

stated their shared norms of validity and their recognition of each other’s

legitimacy. At least in terms of conflict transformation, they focused on their



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commonalities while setting aside doctrinal differences for most of the time.35

As an epistemic community working toward changing an exclusive public

theology of group membership to an inclusive Christian understanding of

citizenship, religious leaders convened meetings and training groups. They

focused on Christian leadership as well as textual evidence that supported

peaceful political participation.36 The community the religious leaders

formed was not only discursive. They engaged in exegesis, hermeneutics, and

doctrinal discussions on a theological platform. A majority of the religious

leaders consulted for this study, including influential religious actors of the

conflict transformation process, such as Harold Good, Gerry Reynolds, Walter

Lewis, and John Dunlop, agreed that although the core may not change, there

is always a place in religion for interpretation, objective as well as subjective

investigation and analysis. A Church of Ireland minister, for example, who used

the term “knowledge production” without knowing the epistemic communi-

ties theory, drew attention to ways religious leaders interpret the tradition today

will be employed as study material for the next generation of religious leaders:

There is knowledge production in theology; not all members of the clergyengage in it with the same level of professionalism, yet it is there. Not every-thing is absolute in Christianity; we read, we look at the history, look at thetext, and see how we can do the most justice to what is there.37

Religious leaders strived to extend their perspective by continuing doctrinal

discussions to see whether it was possible to come to a common understanding

in matters of faith and public life, and if it was, which public spheres were

conducive to a nonsectarian membership.38 These leaders, sometimes

individually but also under the auspices of the churches, organized united

prayers and went to one another’s aid when there were attacks on church

buildings.39 Even these gestures, without any other evidence, showed that

there was no set theological basis for denigration of “the other,” contrary to

what Paisley had been preaching. Instead of emphasizing the “rightness” of

one group, leaders encouraged compromise and even sacrifice:

All sides must do a little giving in to the other if peace is to be restored. Theidea of sacrifice is as old as religion itself and the symbol of the Cross hasalways stood for giving – for giving up, for giving out, and maybe in our time,it should be seen in its application of giving in.40

As theological discussions progressed, religious leaders took steps to apply

their expertise in the form of agreed-upon interpretations by representatives

of the main religious authorities. Religious leaders worked on possible

interpretations of the scriptures, the divine revelation, the sacraments, and



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the creeds, as well as historical statements of belief to learn which kind of

insights their tradition provided in the context of the public issues of the day.

In one instance, religious leaders drafted pamphlets – signed by 14 priests and

ministers – with specific suggestions backed by scripture, such as getting to

know neighbors from the other tradition (Protestant or Catholic), working

on social issues, and being alert for possible agitation.41 Church leaders also

authored a joint statement noting that even if Protestants and Catholics

saw each other as outside of their respective interest group, they should still

embrace the “other” and appreciate the complementary differences between

them. “The apostle Paul teaches Christians each to ‘look not only to his own

interests but also to the interests of others.’ Whatever our political differences,

we must remember that those with whom we differ are our fellow men

and women, with God-given rights to life and hope, justice and peace for

themselves and for their children,” the statement noted, “We must conduct

our campaigns and choose our representatives with this too in mind.”42

Within the context of these theological discussions, a clear epistemological

innovation was the portrayal of Catholicism and Protestant tradition as

complements, rather than competitors. “The Catholic element is essential

to emphasize continuity of the faith through the visible historical community

of the church through centuries and to counteract any tendencies among

Protestantism to subtract from the substance of the faith,” Church of Ireland

priest and theologian Dean Griffin wrote, “the Protestantism is essential to

emphasize the necessity of returning to the original sources, especially the

New Testament and to keep a critical and reasonable eye open for tendencies

among Catholicism to add to the substance of the faith.”43 Similarly,

Archbishop of Armagh, William Conway, urged empathy between the people

of two traditions, stating that “all this [violence has occurred] because a

handful of men without any mandate from the people have decided that this

is the way to achieve a united Ireland. We appeal to Catholics to realize the

genuine fears and deep frustrations of the Protestant community at the present

time. Understanding each other’s fears and feelings can smooth a path to

peace.”44

In addition to forming a coherent Christian voice against violence, church

leaders found the chance to meet with politicians on different occasions and

convey their view to relevant political actors.45 Such channels, which enabled

faith leaders to express their interpretation and possible solutions not just to

paramilitaries but also to policy makers, rendered their position unparalleled in

the conflict-ridden society of the time. The President of the Methodist Church

in Ireland, Hedley Plunkett, criticized political inflexibility and expressed the

need for a more accommodating policy that transcended narrow sectarian



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interests.46 Catholic Bishop Cahal Daly similarly emphasized the need for

new political arrangements in public settings:

Peace is not just a state of mind, not just a philosophy. We must changestructures, institutions, as well as minds, and that is the work of politics.Reconciliation is not just an emotion, not just person-to-person relationships.It is communities and their traditions, their values, their loyalties whichhave to be reconciled and such reconciliation can only be brought about bypolitical changes which create institutions with which both communities canidentify, because they each participate in their construction and direction.47

Church leaders encouraged a new perspective on politics that took into

account the interests of the Northern Irish society as a whole. This new perspec-

tive required the establishment of new political institutions as well. Although

religious leaders tried to stay out of party politics, they formed arrangements

that could serve as advisory committees in the issue areas of social develop-

ment. These committees constituted a first step toward the institutionalization

of the clergy’s epistemic contributions. In 1977, for example, Irish Catholic

bishops set up a special committee to monitor policy developments and legisla-

tion within the European Economic Community.48 Leaders of both Catholic

and Protestant churches urged an examination of the political structures. The

Church of Ireland Bishop of Derry, Robin Eames, for example, noted,

While we must acknowledge that no political settlement will ever succeedwhich does not have the support and confidence of the majority, we must alsorecognize that as Christians, we must continue to seek, and urge others toseek, a solution in which the rights of all people are safeguarded. This processwill involve much more than dialogue at a political level. It will involve anexamination of our laws, our institution, and above all else, our hearts.49

This questioning and examination led to an emphasis on the value of a new

Christian understanding during the Troubles, and its implications in daily life.

Religious leaders made specific suggestions all along the way, and they had

access to the people as no other actor did. The clergy justified their arguments

and prescriptions in religious terms, even when it meant challenging dominant

interpretations.

a question of means: religious perspectives on terrorism

and violence

Religious leaders criticized the groups that used exclusive and violent dis-

course. After every potentially explosive statement by a public leader, one



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A Question of Means: Religious Perspectives on Terrorism and Violence 61

or multiple religious leaders issued a statement, putting distance between

churches and popular calls to resorting to “all means possible” to counter the

other. Although this cannot be generalized to cover all clergy in Northern

Ireland, the mere existence of these public statements showed that religious

leaders of the four main churches were trying to create a public image. The

average layperson who took a quick look at the daily newspaper headlines

before leaving home was likely to read about a religious leader condemning

violence or aggressive public discourse. This was also a significant depar-

ture from the relationships between the clergy and sectarian fraternities that

were detailed in the previous chapter. Especially between the seventeenth

and nineteenth centuries, during which many Catholic and Protestant groups

advocated all means possible to achieve their cause, the churches had not

come forward and openly denounced the violence committed by their parish-

ioners. Religious actors of the twentieth-century Northern Ireland started to

change this outlook.

Illustrative of this stance, Church of Ireland Bishop of Connor, Arthur

Butler, objected to the use of words used by William Craig at a large Unionist

rally. In response to Craig’s statement that “we must build up the dossiers on

the men and women who are a menace to this country, because one day, if

the politicians fail, it will be our duty to liquidate the enemy,” Butler stated,

“phrases like ‘the elimination’ and ‘liquidation of the enemies’ can never be in

the vocabulary of the Christian who takes the New Testament as his guide.”50

Intimidation, in the name of nationalism or any other ideology, was against

Christian conscience and was framed as “a sign of the dissolution of civilization

and the emergence of barbarism” that churches should speak out against.51

In this vein, religious leaders worked toward creating a Christian vocabulary;

words and actions of hatred and revenge would find no place in religion. Most

importantly, violence was one of the most unacceptable acts in the Christian

tradition, no matter how “legitimate” the cause:

This violence is a breach of the 5th and 7th commandments of God, and indirect opposition to the teachings of Christ – There is no lawful authority inHeaven or on earth to teach you any other doctrine or to vindicate before theAlmighty the conduct of those who perpetrate or encourage this violence.52

Jesus’ love is also practical. Ours must be too in terms of how we behavetowards one another as individuals. What does “love your neighbor” meanwhen he is jobless or homeless; when feelings are running high and thepressure is put on him to get out; when in a Catholic area, he sticks byhis principles and refuses to leave the Royal Ulster Constabulary or oneof the auxiliary forces designed to maintain law and order; or when in a



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mixed area, your next-door neighbor is interned, leaving his family without abreadwinner? What does “love your neighbor” mean in these circumstances?These are hard questions, but are there any others worth asking? Our lovemust be practical, too, in how we order our common life. The cut andthrust of political debate and activity is conducted in a language and stylefar removed from the New Testament concept of love, but love must remainthe motivation and ideal of the man of Christian principle in public life.53

The leaders of the four churches, in a joint statement, also condemned the

secular conceptualization of nationalism expressed in violent terms, whether

by Loyalists or Republicans.54 In all four decades analyzed for this book, clergy

treated secularism as a major challenge and sometimes, even as an enemy.

The problem was not that people were getting involved in a religious conflict,

but rather that there was no actual religion involved. A common fear, starting

from the initial years of the Troubles, was the trend toward secularization, and

religion’s losing its relevance:

The religion answering modern man’s need would be both idealistic andrealistic; it would both set before man an ideal of love and goodness andhuman fulfillment and would, at the same time, recognize and explain thereality of man’s lovelessness and sinfulness, his alienation and unhappiness,as well as of the pain and evil which marked the human condition. As aCatholic bishop, I rejoice when Protestant churches are filled and grieveif they are empty. The Catholic Church will not gain what the Protestantchurches lose; unbelief will. The Protestant churches will not gain what theCatholic Church loses; de-Christianization will.55

The Catholic Church also distanced itself immediately from the secular

nationalism of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Catholic leaders reg-

ularly pointed out legitimate grievances of the Catholic minority, yet they

did not regard these grievances as a legitimate cause of violence for the most

part.56 The Provisional Irish Republican Army, in the meantime, regarded

Catholic Church leaders as collaborators of the British army.57 Bishop Cahal

Daly, stated that the faceless leaders of the self-styled “Republican movement”

did not have any relationship with the fathers of the Irish Nationalism, con-

demning Republican and Loyalist violence, which did not answer the current

needs of the community. “The thinking of many activists in both extreme

Republican and Unionist camps is frozen at the pre-rational stage in the deep

freeze of 50 years ago,” Daly wrote, “unless Republicanism moves away from

its obsession with an anachronistic militarism and physical force, the Ireland

they speak of liberating could become a grave of democracy.”58 This dissoci-

ation was later criticized by mostly secular civil society organizations, which



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claimed that by putting a distance between themselves and politics, religious

leaders tried to avoid taking responsibility. The Nationalists complained that

religious leaders were only condemning the “men of violence” and not the

British agencies, which were seen as the cause of the injustice prevailing in

Northern Ireland.59 However, this type of criticism of one’s own institutions

was widespread; paramilitaries never saw the efforts of the church as sufficient.

Brewer et al. note that ironically, Republican paramilitaries believed that the

Protestant churches stood with their community whereas Loyalists envied the

Catholic Church’s closeness to its community.60

Within the Catholic world, there were exceptions to this trend of strongly

condemning the Republican paramilitaries. Roman Catholic priests like Joe

McVeigh, Denis Faul, and Des Wilson, thought that the violence expressed

the frustration the Catholics felt as a result of decades of oppression, and it

was important to qualify the self-defense aspect. Although these views pre-

sented a discursive challenge to the mainstream interpretation, they were not

systematic enough to form an alternative epistemic community. Des Wilson

criticized mainstream church leaders for pursuing peace without any will-

ingness to change. “‘Violence is out’ is a misrepresentation of the view held

by Christians that there comes a point at which violence becomes the only

way to right wrongs,” Wilson warned, “what should concern us in the present

circumstances is whether we have reached that point or not.”61 In order to

distance himself from the institution, Wilson left his position and applied for

“retired priest” status in 1972. He later became involved in many projects,

including People’s Theology Group, for which he worked with his colleagues

Joe McVeigh and Denis Faul.

Regardless of these discursive challenges coming from their own ranks,

many – if not all – religious leaders condemned the violence within their

own traditions. Both Catholic priests and Protestant religious leaders wanted

to contact the violent factions both on the Loyalist and the Republican side.62

They also mediated the talks between paramilitary groups and political actors.

Gerry Adams states in his memoirs that the initiation of a dialogue between the

Republicans and the representatives of the Loyalist paramilitary groups in the

1970s took place through the efforts of Fr. Reid and Fr. Wilson, but he also notes

that the absence of a real dialogue with the Protestant churches was a source

of frustration at the time.63 The same was true with the Catholic Church as

well – Adams writes that Fr. Reid was supported by individual religious leaders,

yet “the hierarchy did not sign on” in peacemaking.64 Brewer et al. also report

that paramilitaries, in their communications, made a distinction between the

constructive efforts of the individual religious leaders and the aloofness of the

churches as institutions.65 These statements confirm that although individual



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religious leaders played critical conciliatory roles from the beginning of the

conflict, it took the churches some time to work with the political actors toward

a stable society.

The main challenge for the religious actors was to justify communication

with political and paramilitary representatives in theological terms. Yet, as

members of an emerging epistemic community, a number of religious leaders

succeeded in doing that. For example, nine Protestant ministers issued the

following joint statement in 1972, advocating direct talks with Ulster Defence

Association members: “As Christians, our first allegiance must be to Christ.

Bearing this in mind, we take our stand on the New Testament teaching,

especially as we find it in 1 Peter 2, v 13–17. Peter wrote to Christians who

were undergoing a fiery ordeal of persecution at the hands of the State,”

the statement read, “He went on that it was the will of God that by their

good conduct they would win the State over to understand their position.

This is stressed in the New Testament because to do otherwise is to open

the door to anarchy.”66 The fact that the ministers came together to relate a

specific religious narrative to policy issues of the time, once again, indicates

the existence of a knowledge community working toward a common purpose.

Religious actors did not confine themselves to statements. Although com-

municating with paramilitaries has never been church policy, a number of

individual clergy carried out ambitious initiatives. For example, as early as 1971,

Eric Gallagher, former President of the Methodist Church in Ireland, met with

the leadership of the Provisional Sinn Fein and Provisional Irish Republican

Army: Sean Mac Stıofain (Chief of Staff of the Provisionals), Ruairı O Bradaigh

(President of Provisional Sinn Fein) and Joe Cahill (Belfast Commander of

Provisional Irish Republican Army).67 In the meeting, Gallagher stated that

the campaign of violence was against his understanding of the New Testa-

ment. In return, he was asked to convey Provisional Irish Republican Army’s

message to the British policy makers.68

During the Feakle talks of December 1974, Protestant church represen-

tatives, Provisional Irish Republican Army representatives and Provisional

Sinn Fein leaders came together. Among the religious actors involved were

Ralph Baxter and William Arlow (Irish Council of Churches secretaries), Jack

Weir (Clerk of the Presbyterian Assembly), Harry Morton (Secretary of the

British Council of Churches), Arthur Butler (Church of Ireland Bishop of

Connor), Eric Gallagher (former President of the Methodist Church in Ire-

land), Stanley Worrall (former headmaster of Belfast Methodist College) and

Arthur McArthur (Moderator of the United Reform Church in England). The

clergy “appealed on humanitarian grounds for an end to the Provo campaign,”

whereas the Provisionals conveyed their own justifications and arguments.69



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Although the Feakle talks prematurely broke up due to the intervention of the

police, it signaled the extent to which the religious actors were willing to go

for peace.

In my personal communications, I came across many accounts of individual

religious leaders engaging paramilitaries. A retired Church of Ireland minister

I talked to stated that the initial years of the conflict were the most challenging

years in terms of such involvement, because the church, as an institution,

was not ready to engage the paramilitaries, yet a number of clergy felt the

need to intervene in their neighborhoods. In 1978, for example, a Church of

Ireland minister, Rev. William Arlow, stated that he had been in touch with

the Provisional Sinn Fein, and he noted that “they are always ready and willing

to listen to points I wish to make to them and willing to give consideration to

these points.”70 Not all church members received Arlow’s actions favorably.

A Methodist minister, Henry Holloway, stated that Arlow’s actions were of

“great regret” to him personally.71 However, Arlow was not alone. Although

one cannot say that contact with paramilitaries was a norm among the leading

church members of the time, there were bold declarations in favor of including

everyone – even violent paramilitaries – in the political process. The Belfast

District Synod of the Methodist Church of Ireland, for example, advocated

meetings with paramilitaries and passed a resolution defining the details of

such meetings, as well as the need for these to be in line with the Christian

teachings:

No one would dare in a Christian church to defend taking the law into one’sown hands but it is only common sense when paramilitary organizations area fact of life and when their membership cuts across quite a number of ourcongregations, that in some way we have official contacts with them.72

Whereas religious leaders condemned paramilitary violence almost unequiv-

ocally, the main church leaders often saw the use of force by the Royal Ulster

Constabulary legitimate:

The use of violence between men, whether in open war or lesser conflicts, is agreat evil. Force should be exercised only by those having some authority andaccountability for how it is used. Those who of themselves turn to violenceare to be condemned.73

Violence is violence from whatever source it comes. But anyone who evenappears to equate the excesses of individual members of any of our SecurityForces with the determined and ruthless actions of sectarian assassins shouldsurely pause and consider the dangerous implications of what he is saying.74



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We cannot blame the military for all the destruction and loss of life. Undoubt-edly, they were responsible for some of it, but we ourselves must take part ofthe blame . . . When it comes to a matter of praise or blame, we apportionthe praise or blame fairly squarely where it is due. As for the soldiers, it mayinterest you to know that the vast majority of them are here against their will.Nothing would please them more than to be moved out of here to anywhereelse in the world.75

These statements by high-ranking religious leaders show that there was a public

discourse in formation that condemned violence and brought in the religious

insights to promote stability. This discourse was formulated through the actions

of individual religious leaders, who reached out even to the paramilitaries at a

time when the politicians rarely considered such actions. Religious actors, in

their statements and actions, went beyond merely condemning violence. One

of the reasons why these efforts did not seem enough from outside was the

“natural unwillingness of the church leaders directly to advise their members

how to vote.”76 However, they engaged various political initiatives and events,

such as internment, hunger strikes, and multiple political agreements such as

Sunningdale.

the politics of conflict: internment, sunningdale,

and beyond

Brian Faulkner, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, introduced

internment in Northern Ireland in August 1971. It involved the arrest and

internment without charge and trial of people accused of being affiliated with

paramilitary groups by the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

The most controversial aspect of internment was that, despite the violent

activities of both Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups, those interned

were predominantly Catholics. “What they did not include was a single

Loyalist,” Irish historian Tim Pat Coogan later protested, “although the Ulster

Volunteer Force had begun the killing and bombing, this organization was

left untouched, as were other violent Loyalist satellite organizations such as

Tara, the Shankill Defence Association, and the Ulster Protestant Volunteers.

It is known that Faulkner was urged by the British to include a few Protestants,

but he refused.”77 Upon the introduction of internment, Northern Ireland

Civil Rights Association initiated a campaign of civil disobedience. Social

Democratic and Labour Party, the party of choice for many Catholics at the

time, was criticized for its cooperation with the Northern Ireland government.

Internment led to an increased support and sympathy for Republican



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The Politics of Conflict: Internment, Sunningdale, and Beyond 67

paramilitary movements and resulted in a resurgence of Irish Republican

Army activities.78

The initial reaction of religious actors toward internment was mixed. Lead-

ers of the three main Protestant churches initially issued a joint statement

acknowledging the need for internment, a day after its introduction: “We rec-

ognize that because of the continuing violence and bloodshed for which there

can be no Christian justification, the government in its duty to all citizens

has no option but to introduce strong measures which must be distasteful

to many.”79 However, upon finding out about the widespread allegations of

abuse and torture employed under internment, church leaders quickly shifted

their position. This shift occurred after the Parker Report, released on March 2,

1972, found the interrogation methods illegal. The Parker Report was the prod-

uct of a committee of inquiry chaired by the Lord Chief Justice of England,

Lord Parker, charged with investigating legal and moral aspects of the use of

interrogation techniques. Religious leaders, initially taking the word of the

Stormont for the necessity of internment to establish order, were dismayed by

the findings of the report. The reactions started even before the document’s

release. The consequences and the daily implications of internment caused

the religious leaders to question ways to achieve the ends. Public statements

by various religious leaders of the time also reflect this line of thinking:

The Christian ethic is absolute. Whenever Christians fall for the temptation todecide ethical standards pragmatically, they are denying what is fundamentalto Christian teaching. It cannot be right to imprison men without using thedue processes of law which protect the rights of the individual. These rightsare based on the Christian view of man in society.80

The fundamental need today is to break the association of the IRA and theRoman Catholic community. This is an association of fear but one which isstrengthened and made almost inevitable by the policy of internment. It isdriving vicious and ruthless men into the arms of a bewildered community.Internment must be reexamined and the time is now. Somehow, sometime,somewhere, the communities must start talking or there will be nothing leftto talk about.81

In 1975, the British Council of Churches and the Irish Council of Churches

held a meeting attended by 32 delegates representing 11 churches and 5 inter-

church councils. The representatives discussed internment and its implica-

tions for public life as practiced by the Christian population. The delegates

concluded the meeting stating that “detention without trial must always be

abhorrent to those concerned for human rights” and emphasized their hope

that “the situation may soon enable it to release all who are detained without



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trial in Northern Ireland.”82 This was a bold statement against the Northern

Irish authorities and it was a turning point for the Protestant leaders who had

initially condoned this extraordinary measure.

While this debate was taking place, Northern Ireland policy makers strug-

gled with governance issues. In 1972, as a result of the increase in the Repub-

lican paramilitary activities and the resurgence of violence in Northern Ire-

land, the UK government, believing that Stormont was incapable of maintain-

ing order, suspended the Unionist-controlled home rule government. Direct

Rule – political governance of Northern Ireland from London – was intro-

duced as a short-term emergency measure. The suspension of Stormont came

as a shock, especially to Unionist circles that had held the political author-

ity for decades. Leaders of the main Protestant churches also protested the

suspension. The Presbyterian Church in particular was vocal on the issue,

arguing that any takeover without the will of people or without providing a

space for the elected representatives would be to the detriment of the com-

munity in the long term. The church declared that they “deplore the decision

of the UK government to prorogue the Northern Ireland Parliament and the

consequent denial to democratically elected representatives of the people of

a voice in the government of their country, and we further deplore that this

action now is above all else at the expense of a peaceful majority who have

sought to maintain their cause in an orderly and lawful way.”83 The Presby-

terian Church also warned the policy makers, noting that “lack of political

institutions through which legitimate interests and popular aspirations can be

expressed effectively in an orderly and peaceful way, whether by majorities or

minorities, is to increase the dangers of disorder and violence.”84

In the aftermath of the suspension, the churches focused more on the

prospect of power sharing, a style of governance that ensures both Catholics

and Protestants are represented in the Northern Irish Assembly. Thus, the

solution to Northern Ireland’s complex problems was for locally elected repre-

sentatives to apply Christian principles in a transparent manner, which would

be embodied, the religious leaders hoped, in the Sunningdale Agreement.85

the sunningdale agreement: first steps toward peace

The Sunningdale Agreement, which was signed in December 1973, was the

first official attempt at party-level reconciliation and power sharing. It was

an initiative of the British government and the Republic of Ireland. The

agreement followed the line of an earlier white paper, published by the

British government in March 1973, entitled “Northern Ireland Constitutional

Proposals.” The paper had proposed a devolved power-sharing assembly for



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Northern Ireland and an Irish presence in the form of a Council of Ireland. An

80-member assembly composed of Nationalists and Unionists was proposed

instead of the majoritarian system that had ensured Protestant dominance for

decades. In consolidating power sharing and multiple forms of cooperation

and communication among the actors, Sunningdale was such a pivotal

political step that it constituted a “template for peace” through its provisions

of power sharing.86 The Belfast Agreement of 1998 would later be defined

as “Sunningdale for slow learners.”87 Why did an arrangement that failed

in the 1970s succeed 20 years later? One possible response is that in those

ensuing 20 years, political actors and the public came to recognize the options

available to them and made a more informed decision, eliminating vague

and controversial terminology.

The negotiations for the Sunningdale Agreement included a number of key

actors. Edward Heath, then British Prime Minister, and Liam Cosgrave, then

Prime Minister of Ireland, and senior ministers attended the Sunningdale

Conference, along with the representatives of the Ulster Unionist Party, the

Social Democratic and Labour Party, and the Alliance Party of Northern

Ireland. The negotiations excluded the Democratic Unionist Party and the

Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party, both of which already opposed any

structure that would even slightly increase the influence of the Republic of

Ireland in the affairs of Northern Ireland.

The Sunningdale Agreement was the communique that followed the con-

ference. The agreement proposed three main political bodies:

1. an elected Northern Ireland Assembly

2. a power-sharing Executive

3. a “Council of Ireland” that “would be confined to representatives of

the two parts of Ireland, with appropriate safeguards for the British

Government’s financial and other interests”88

The stated executive functions of the Council of Ireland were mostly non-

political, such as tourism, electricity generation, roads and transport, public

health, and agricultural matters. A considerable segment of the Unionist pop-

ulation, however, opposed the agreement. Immediately after the agreement

was reached, Loyalist paramilitaries established the Ulster Army Council,

a coalition of paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Defence Association

and the Ulster Volunteer Force that also were in strong opposition to this

arrangement, especially the existence of a Council of Ireland that legitimized

a unified Nationalist identity on the island. The Ulster Workers’ Council, a

Loyalist labor organization, called a general strike for May 15, 1974. After two

weeks of barricades, shortages, and intimidation, Brian Faulkner resigned as



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Chief Executive, and the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed in May 1974 in

the face of increasing Unionist opposition and British unwillingness to use

force against the protesters.

The Sunningdale Agreement, by virtue of its exclusion of the critical Union-

ist circles and its introduction of a “Council of Ireland,” received scant support.

Initially, key religious actors supported the agreement, thinking that it was a

major step toward a mode of governance in which all parties would have a

voice.89 However, as the details of the agreement became clear, the leadership

of the churches withdrew their support, although they continued to praise

politicians’ courage to find a political solution to the ongoing violence. The

Protestant majority saw the Council of Ireland as an imposition, especially

after decades of Unionist control of the higher echelons of political decision

making in Northern Ireland. “It is my personal belief that in Northern Ireland

at present a high proportion of people in both the Roman Catholic and Protes-

tant communities want to see the idea of power-sharing succeed,” Bishop of

Connor, Arthur Butler stated, “but not nearly such a high proportion are happy

at the idea of a Council of Ireland, though many of those who are most vocifer-

ous against such a council did not appear to have read the terms upon which

it is based.”90 Jack Weir of the Presbyterian Church also warned that “any

attempt to ratify Sunningdale without regard to the democratically expressed

dissent against that agreement in the recent general election would be court-

ing disaster.”91 Despite such poor prospects of reaching an inclusive political

arrangement in the near future, the religious leaders continued to encourage

the politicians to devise alternatives and stick to the power-sharing principle.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland drafted a res-

olution commending the power-sharing work.92 Church leaders stated that

whatever the final arrangement would be, it should have the blessings of both

communities and there should be no constitutional change in the status of

Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of her people. One of these

leaders, the Church of Ireland Bishop of Derry and Raphoe, Robin Eames,

voiced the need for such consent:

A devolved method of administration, which is sensitive to and fully rec-ognizes the peculiar needs of Northern Ireland and her communities, isdesperately needed. Many thousands of people would echo the cry to ourpolitical representatives and to the British government – “Try again. Tryharder. Remember before God the awesome price of failure.”93

In short, Sunningdale failed, yet religious leaders’ proficiency in diplomatic

matters developed. It became clear that devising an arrangement that would

simultaneously satisfy two communities and their politicians was an extremely



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challenging endeavor, and progress was slow. The religious leaders, who had

hoped that the conflict soon would be over and that their role in negotiating

the ramifications of political divisions would end, came to realize the need to

study the political documents themselves, which would allow them to pursue

politically informed dialogues, in addition to being prepared with relevant

comments whenever new developments arose. This recognition helped to

establish a link between theological expertise and political arrangements.

The first decade of the Troubles constituted the most challenging period in

terms of defining the conflict and the roles different actors would play. Until

the mid 1970s, religious leaders exerted almost no political influence at the

party politics level. They preached on issues of daily concern and engaged

mostly in pastoral duties. The only common political declaration was that the

conflict was not essentially religious. Realizing that this declaration appeared

unconvincing to the masses, and given the emergence of religious actors such

as Ian Paisley, who employed an inflammatory faith-based discourse, church

leaders changed their attitude toward the politics of conflict and admitted

that churches had a role in perpetuating community divisions. These devel-

opments meant that the clergy’s role required changing to find remedies for

the ongoing violence in Northern Ireland. Emphasizing such a need was not

to assert that religious actors were not engaging in constructive interpretation

and relevant knowledge production processes before the beginning of the

Troubles. However, a politically relevant interpretation of a Christian under-

standing of citizenship and coexistence by the religious actors came about

later in the conflict.

Especially in the second half of the 1970s, the epistemic community of

religious leaders started to crystallize. Amid frequent meetings and declara-

tions, these leaders began to closely follow the political agenda and strove to

clarify the duties and responsibilities of Christians. Religious leaders investi-

gated and analyzed political documents; they no longer accepted the word of

politicians at face value, preferring to study the issues for themselves. These

issues ranged from violence on the streets to the Sunningdale Agreement,

and church leaders believed that conveying a religious perspective based on

contemporary knowledge of the tradition was a requirement for resolving the

conflicts. These leaders from the four main churches would provide this guid-

ance for future decades. The significance of this first decade of the conflict

is that religious leaders recognized the need for a new type of knowledge, a

theological justification for peace and order, that only they could provide, and

they demonstrated a willingness to work with each other in order to devise a

public theology of inclusive Christian citizenship.



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4

From Diagnosis to Treatment

Devising an Inclusive Public Theology of Citizenship

Sunningdale Agreement did not satisfy all the parties to the conflict yet it

provided a useful blueprint for the future consultations and agreements, espe-

cially the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and the Belfast Agreement of 1998.

By the late 1980s, there was a military stalemate between the Republican

paramilitaries and the security forces.1 This deadlock facilitated the search

for alternative paths to a mutually agreed solution. The renewed desire to

reach a stabilizing arrangement can be partly attributed to the exhaustion with

the violence. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed in part to defuse

external pressure from the US and Europe, and it revealed a fuller picture

of the Northern Irish public opinion regarding the UK and the Republic of

Ireland. Politicians on all sides learned important lessons that helped formu-

late the Belfast Agreement in the end. More importantly, religious leaders

of the four main churches – Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist, and

the Church of Ireland – played critical roles in foregrounding the embedded

views of their respective communities and communicating their grievances to

Northern Irish politicians.

I argue that most of the revisions to the agreement Northern Irish religious

leaders proposed or supported ultimately became part of the Belfast Agreement

and clergy’s central role could not have been undertaken by politicians or any

other segment of civil society. The conditions created at the end of the 1980s

brought Northern Irish religious discourse closer to an inclusive/horizontal

theology, which is a necessary condition for reaching enduring political

settlements in divided societies.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part gives a brief account of

the political agreement under investigation – namely, the Anglo-Irish Agree-

ment – what it represents and the main actors involved in the process. The

second part focuses on the conversion, agenda setting, reinforcement, and

empowerment activities of the religious actors.2 These activities illuminate the

72



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From Diagnosis to Treatment 73

“innovation” and “selection” aspects of the epistemic communities framework

explained in Chapter 1. Whereas the conversion and agenda-setting activities

of top religious leaders are sufficient to draw significant parallels with the

scientific epistemic communities of the Cold War period, their reinforce-ment and empowerment activities render their status unique, albeit not at odds

with the framework. More than a decade into the Troubles period, religious

leaders continued to display the characteristics of an epistemic community,

with shared norms of validity, shared sets of normative and principled beliefs,

and common policy enterprises, as these are reflected in their dealings with

outside actors.3 Employment of a common discourse made it possible for reli-

gious leaders to continue their activities, despite occasional resistance from

the politicians and paramilitaries. Politicians accused the religious leaders of

becoming involved in activities for which they were not qualified, running

counter to the accusations voiced in the 1970s – that religious leaders were not

involved enough in politics.4 In short, the involvement of religious actors in

conflict transformation – no matter how constructive it is – has been a point

of contention among policy makers.

Public theology is not independent of context, and the second decade of

the Troubles witnessed the rise of an alternative theological understanding of

citizenship that was not quite common in the initial years. Statements and

interpretations of the clergy constitute additional evidence that in all four

churches, the focus shifted from individual salvation to societal ethics and

from relatively exclusive identities to a relatively inclusive understanding of

community. The chapter shows how the clergy’s exegetical/hermeneutical

debates and interpretations continued to form a common knowledge base and

discussion platform as a religious epistemic community that influenced the

conflict resolution dynamics.

Northern Irish religious leaders became increasingly and constructively

vocal in political affairs during the 1980s, no longer limiting themselves to

the discourse of nonviolence employed in the preceding decade. Public dec-

larations made headlines in daily newspapers and reflected much more than

pastoral duties. Harold Good, former President of the Methodist Church,

who played a significant role in decommissioning Republican paramili-

tary weapons in 2005, states that the 1980s can be called the “years of

awakening”:

The clergy here stayed quiet for too long. There was a lack of leadership. Onlyin the quite recent past, I would say 20 years, church leaders became strongerand vocal that there must be a political solution that should be activelysought. After a period, violence became unacceptable. Catholic Church, for



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74 From Diagnosis to Treatment

example, took up a clearer stand against Irish Republican Army; banningthe display of guns or other relevant symbols in funerals. Second, politicalarrangements made it clear that we are in a democratic process.5

Similar to the Sunningdale Agreement of the 1970s, and the Belfast Agreement

of the 1990s, the Anglo-Irish Agreement is its decade’s most critical political

initiative. Therefore, we take it as a reference point in studying religious

leaders’ attitudes in the 1980s. Arguably, with its exclusion of Unionist parties,

it proved to be even less inclusive than the Sunningdale Agreement, which led

to its eventual failure. At the same time, policy makers of the UK and Ireland

came to understand that a sustainable peace is not possible through excluding

what they perceived to be potentially “problematic” political actors.

In the second decade of the Troubles, religion was still an important identity-

marker in Northern Ireland. Despite a survey claiming that Christianity was on

the wane in the 1980s, nine out of ten people still identified with a church.6 This

identification is the key to understanding religious leaders’ role in Northern

Irish society. As noted in the introduction, although religion can take the shape

of “cultural religion,” defined as “an identification with a religious heritage

without any religious participation or a sense of religious involvement per se,”7

even the symbolic importance of this identification demonstrate the need to

investigate high-ranking religious leaders’ guiding role, who made frequent

public appearances and whose writings and pictures were seen regularly in

the press. Davie’s concept of “vicarious religion”8 was and is still valid, at least

in Northern Ireland. People may not have regularly practiced their religion,

but they wanted to ensure that the church was still in place. They heed their

leaders, because heritage and basic values still matter in individuals’ lives.

A worldwide decrease in the practice of religion does not signal a decrease

in faith’s place in people’s lives. Public theologies, found on the boundary

between politics and religion, can play significant roles in determining a

society’s political preferences.

the anglo-irish agreement: a step forward?

Margaret Thatcher, then Prime Minister of the UK, and Garret FitzGer-

ald, then Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, signed the Anglo-Irish

Agreement9 in County Down on November 15, 1985. The Anglo-Irish Inter-

governmental Conference,10 established as a result of the agreement, had a

membership of officials from both the Irish and British governments. This

body, albeit confined to a consultative role in political, legal, and security mat-

ters, aimed at “promoting peace and stability in Northern Ireland; helping to



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The Anglo-Irish Agreement: A Step Forward? 75

reconcile the two major traditions in Ireland; creating a new climate of friend-

ship and cooperation between the people of the two countries; and improving

cooperation in combating terrorism.” The conference also institutionalized

the relationship between the UK and the Republic of Ireland; regardless of its

overall performance, it provided the parties with a stable channel of commu-

nication, thus facilitating what would become the achievement of common

ground in the 1990s.11

By signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the two governments committed to:

1. affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only

come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern

Ireland

2. recognize that the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern

Ireland is for no change in the status of Northern Ireland

3. declare that, if in the future a majority of people of Northern Ireland

clearly wish for, and formally consent to the establishment of a united

Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respective Parliaments

legislation to give effect to that wish12

With this agreement, a united Ireland or a permanent political merger of

Northern Ireland with the UK was now out of the question unless there

was consensus in Northern Ireland about the political future. The consensus

clause was especially telling, given the ambiguity of Northern Ireland’s status

in the eyes of the UK and the Republic of Ireland, both of which regarded

Northern Ireland as a constitutional part of their country. The parties to the

agreement apparently wanted to avoid any discussion about the existing status –

an ongoing and intense debate in Northern Ireland – in order to be able to

devise a common declaration.

The agreement did not ratify Northern Ireland’s status in the UK as perma-

nent. In fact, Article Two granted the Republic of Ireland a vote in Northern

Ireland’s affairs. This was a “first” and, as such, was significant grounds for

opposition in Unionist circles. The agreement stated,

The United Kingdom Government accepts that the Irish Government willput forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Irelandwithin the field of activity of the conference in so far as those matters are notthe responsibility of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland. In theinterest of promoting peace and stability, determined efforts shall be madethrough the conference to resolve any differences. The conference will bemainly concerned with Northern Ireland; but some of the matters underconsideration will involve cooperative action in both parts of the island ofIreland, and possibly also in Great Britain. Some of the proposals considered



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in respect of Northern Ireland may also be found to have application by theIrish Government. There is no derogation from the sovereignty of either theIrish Government or the United Kingdom Government, and each retainsresponsibility for the decisions and administration of government within itsown jurisdiction.13

Neither Unionist parties nor their politicians were consulted for fear that

they would not agree to an arrangement that had an Irish dimension. The

agreement was seen as an attempt at “coercive power-sharing.”14 Indeed, the

main Unionist parties in Northern Ireland, Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist

Party and Jim Molyneaux’s Ulster Unionist Party, strongly protested against

the agreement through strikes, mass rallies, and resignations from the British

House of Commons. Molyneaux characterized the agreement as an exam-

ple of “hypocrisy, deceit, and treachery,” and Paisley compared Thatcher to

Jezebel, the biblical epitome of an evil, manipulative woman.15 Both Unionist

parties, in their own ways, were strongly opposed to any meeting that took

the agreement as a basis, and unlike the Protestant faith leaders, these polit-

ical leaders expressed that they would not be satisfied with just a “revision.”

Democratic Unionist Party leader Ian Paisley made it clear that Unionists

would not be satisfied with merely cancelling the agreement, and stressed that

additional measures were needed. “We will have to renegotiate our position

so that we will never again be put in this situation,”16 he wrote. Unionist

politicians demanded full support from the Unionists in Northern Ireland and

worked fiercely for the agreement’s complete annulment. Unionist opposition

was expressed at City Hall on November 23, 1985, on March 3, 1986, and on

January 23, 1986, by elections. With the apparent failure of these demonstra-

tions and electoral protests to attain the cancellation, Unionists turned to civil

disobedience in the form of strikes.

Nor did the agreement enjoy strong support among the Nationalists of

Northern Ireland, especially Sinn Fein members, since it failed to deliver

immediate British withdrawal from Northern Ireland or the establishment of a

united Ireland in the foreseeable future. Only the moderate Social Democratic

and Labour Party and the Alliance Party supported the agreement. However,

the alienation of Sinn Fein and cooperation with Social Democratic and

Labour Party were among the aims of Thatcher, who feared a Sinn Fein resur-

gence that would make any accommodation with the North impossible and

worsen the security situation. From her perspective, in order for Republican

paramilitary movement to be defeated, first the Nationalist community needed

to reject it. It had to be deprived of international support, and a carefully man-

aged relationship between Britain and the Republic of Ireland was necessary.17



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Religious Actors in Action: Redefinition of Religious Identities 77

According to Thatcher and other politicians involved in the making of this

arrangement, the Anglo-Irish Agreement constituted a good opportunity to

take control of the situation.

In sum, we find only marginal political support for the Anglo-Irish Agree-

ment in the Northern Irish context. The main disagreement centered on power

vested in outside actors, instead of power sharing among those who had the

highest stakes. Despite a poll suggesting that four in five Protestants opposed

the pact,18 another poll conducted in the agreement’s aftermath, showed that

68.4 percent of people in Northern Ireland agreed with the principle of power

sharing between the political parties; 61 percent of Protestants and 78.6 percent

of Catholics backed the arrangement.19 However, a couple of years after the

agreement was signed, even Catholics noted that it offered nothing to improve

their situation.20 This overall disappointment most probably resulted from an

intense Unionist campaign against the agreement and the governing bodies’

failure to “deliver” success, with their focus on the formalities of an accord

that did not have daily life implications. Dublin’s presence in formal Northern

Irish politics had more symbolic than practical importance for Nationalist –

mainly Social Democratic and Labour Party – politicians who consented to

and supported the agreement.

religious actors in action: redefinition of

religious identities

In the context of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, discourse of the religious leaders

of the four churches strongly emphasized including all parties to a political

arrangement. These leaders continued to unconditionally renounce violence.

Renunciation of violence – the dominant discourse of the previous decade –

had gained prominence especially after religious leaders recognized the major

role played by religious tradition during the Troubles. Following the social

theology of equality and nonviolence widely expressed in the 1970s, faith

leaders increasingly recognized and reminded Northern Irish politicians that

any political agreement lacking the blessing of all parties involved would be

short-lived. Even if not easy to achieve, sustained communication with all

sides was necessary for a viable peace agreement.

Leaders of the four churches differed in terms of the extent of their support

for, or opposition to, the agreement, but they managed to conduct common

public and private discussions on the merits and disadvantages of the proposed

political arrangement, producing constructive feedback that influenced the

politics of reconciliation. The episode also constitutes another instance of

religious leaders acting as epistemic communities: they met regularly to



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discuss and evaluate the situation, they communicated using theological

references, they published common declarations, and they influenced the

actions of political leaders.21 They made joint and individual political

recommendations in occasional church papers, talks, and public statements.

Religious actors even improved on the innovative ideas of the previous

decade, such as engaging with paramilitaries. This engagement could at

times be regarded as a challenge to the status quo institutions such as the

churches themselves, so these meetings usually happened at the discretion of

individual religious leaders, rather than under the auspices of the churches.

In the 1980s, politicians such as Molyneaux, Adams, Thatcher, and Pais-

ley did not “select” the moderate discourse employed by the mainstream

religious leaders. Religious leaders’ activities, however, along with their inclu-

sive discourse laid the foundation for more ambitious attempts that followed

in the 1990s, which would lead to an eventual cease-fire and peace agree-

ment. Among the usual exceptions to the epistemic communities’ framework

were Ian Paisley and other members of the Democratic Unionist Party, who

possessed both religious and political titles at the same time. As explained

in previous chapters, electoral concerns of these Protestant clergy members

marked their exclusion from the epistemic community in the theoretical and

practical sense.

conversion: challenging exclusive theological premises

As defined in Chapter 1, conversion refers to the attempt to change a congre-

gation’s prevalent position and to introduce new perspectives based on shared

religious convictions.22 Making changes in the established discourse usually

comes at a high cost to the religious actors, especially when it is about political

matters, including conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Along with the

need for extraordinary steps comes the question of how far a minister can go

without jeopardizing his reputation with the congregation. Accordingly, this

concern dictated Northern Irish religious actors’ response to sensitive chal-

lenges. Hunger strikes and intense paramilitary violence that showed no signs

of abating defined the political context of the second decade of the Troubles

period, and the religious leaders walked a fine line between representation of

their own community’s concerns and showing empathy for the other commu-

nity’s problems.

The 1980–1981 hunger strikes continued the tensions that accompanied

internment procedures introduced in 1971. Political prisoners, mostly Nation-

alists, were treated as ordinary criminals. Margaret Thatcher, upon demands

that Republican political prisoners be granted a special status, stated that “we



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are not prepared to consider special category status for certain groups of people

serving sentences for crime. Crime is crime, it is not political.”23 This denial

of “political prisoner” status resulted in mass protests, which in turn culmi-

nated in hunger strikes in 1980 and 1981. In the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike, ten

Republican prisoners starved themselves to death. The first hunger striker to

die was Bobby Sands, a Provisional Irish Republican Army member. During

his strike, he was elected as a member of the UK Parliament. Sands remains

an important figure for Republicans, with many songs and murals in Northern

Ireland dedicated to his memory.

In his biography, Robin Eames states that hunger strikes represented a

turning point in the Troubles, and the Protestants did not understand the sig-

nificance of it.24 Because of the tension created by the hunger strikes and the

mounting international attention to the Nationalist cause, the atmosphere did

not seem conducive to challenging the embedded views of the Northern Irish

society. The general frustration with the ongoing conflict, however, allowed

church leaders to take a step toward reaching out to the community. One

explanation that emerged in my conversations with religious leaders and civil

society actors was that a majority of people had reached a threshold in the

1980s, after which they grew more attentive to measures that had the potential

to end the conflict. Borrowing an idea from the field of economics, schol-

ars have compared religious denominations to businesses, in that they attend

to the demands of their “customers” in response to working in a competi-

tive economic environment.25 Embodying this comparison, religious leaders

strove to achieve a balance between spending some time reconciling political

problems and negotiating their traditional pastoral duties. In a personal com-

munication, John Dunlop, the former Moderator of the Presbyterian Church

who was active in the conflict transformation, touched upon this dilemma

with the following words:

The churches were clear that it was not our job to do the politics. On thepastoral level, they were dealing with the bereavements and the outrage ofthe families. If it stops there, the priest might be confined to solidarity. Thequestion is, is the church capable of moving outside of its comfort zone? It isdifficult, it is not only intellectual, you are dealing with emotions and fears.26

This comfort zone was the product of centuries. “For generations,” Worrall

and Gallagher say, “Protestants were taught that Roman Catholic theology

and devotion are unscriptural” and “Roman Catholics have been taught that

Protestants were contumacious heretics destined for hell.”27 The Troubles led

to a new introspection among Northern Ireland’s church leadership, mostly

in the form of questioning exclusive assumptions that salvation is reserved



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only for the members of one tradition.28 For example, Protestant churches felt

a need to revisit their centuries-old doctrines after the Second Vatican Ecu-

menical Council (1962) affirmed that an individual could be saved, regardless

of his or her religious status. Given that “theological Protestantism and anti-

Catholicism can lay claim to a longer unbroken historical pedigree in Ulster

than any other still-existent ideological rival,”29 it was challenging for the

Protestant faith leaders to eradicate hostilities without compromising their

own religious identity. Nevertheless, the Church of Ireland 1986 General

Synod encouraged increased community and personal relationships among

members of all Christian traditions. In a similar vein, the 1987 Methodist

Conference concluded with invitations to joint prayers and study, and unity

in Christ. The boldest attempt at doctrinal revision came from the Presbyte-

rian Church in the 1988 General Assembly. The assembly challenged a core

document of the tradition, the Westminster Confession of Faith (1646), which

regarded the Pope as “the Antichrist, the man of Sin, and the son of damna-

tion.” Delegates argued that this interpretation was not manifestly evident in

scripture. John Dunlop, in a later speech, recognized the importance of the

Second Ecumenical Vatican Council on the epistemic understandings of the

time:

Since God cannot be privatised to only one of our two communities, or tothe European Community of which our two countries are members, thechallenge is to listen and speak across the frontiers and not to becomethe private chaplains of only one community. This has become easier sincethe end of Vatican II when the people in the churches are frequently now infrank discussion with one another.30

The theological discussions noted earlier, held on a highly technical level,

satisfied an important prerequisite of transition to a peaceful and inclusive

theology. Even the mere existence of these debates proved that denominational

lines did not definitively create exclusive identities that narrowly described

the parameters of belonging to Northern Ireland. Faith leaders frequently

appeared together in public, further consolidating the notion of breaking

down walls between traditions. They cooperated to create a climate within

which political decisions would be possible for the benefit of all the Northern

Irish people. They even helped materially with the restoration of each other’s

religious buildings damaged by paramilitary activities in a gesture of unity

demonstrating that there was no theological justification for violence.31

There were numerous clerical attempts to define a Christian identity, sup-

porting positive declarations rather than negative ones that created an explicit

“other” from which one’s identity needed to be protected. Ian Paisley, with



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his clerical credentials, continued to constitute a challenge to the epistemic

communities of inclusive theology, offering theological but mostly violent

counterarguments. Emphasizing the importance of the way in which identity

is defined, John Dunlop notes,

There are two elements of identity: Positive and Negative. Normally, positiveshould be dominant but in Northern Ireland, negative parts gained influence.Paisley, for example, heightened the negative elements. It really matterswhich sides you focus on. For example, you can say I am a Protestant, whichmeans you are not a Muslim, you are not a Catholic, you are not a Jew. Whenyou start with “I am a Protestant” instead of “I am not a Catholic,” that makesa difference.32

Within the framework of this identity debate, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, by

its inclusion of the Republic of Ireland in the affairs of Northern Ireland,

increased existing Unionist insecurity. Unionists had governed Northern Ire-

land for decades, they had defeated the power-sharing arrangement of Sun-

ningdale Agreement, and they saw no reason why the “Nationalist minority”

and its “benefactor,” the Republic of Ireland, should be given equal status in

domestic affairs. The secondary “conversion” activities (the first ones being

the theological steps toward the acceptance of the other) taken up by Protes-

tant religious leaders both in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland,

therefore, renewed the emphasis on human rights and the need for all com-

munities to recognize that the “other” should be included in the final political

arrangement. While examples of this focus can be found in the early Trou-

bles period, systematic integration of the concept into the political system

did not occur until the 1980s. Religious leaders attempted to persuade Protes-

tant congregations that Catholics must be included in decision making and

that the extreme choices made by Catholics stemmed from frustration with

their social and economic conditions. Church of Ireland Bishop of Down and

Dromore Gordon McMullan drew attention to the need to empathize with

those less privileged, who might be drawn into extreme measures because of

their economic condition. “While I resolutely condemn and oppose paramili-

tary violence, from whatever source, I also recognize the significance of social,

economic, and political frustration,” he noted in a public statement, “it is

important that everything possible be done to ensure that work opportunities

are provided in areas of high unemployment, particularly in the west of Belfast

and west of the Bann.”33

The theological focus shifted from “rights” to “obligations,” redefining the

religious and personal duties of the everyday Unionist. Allegiance to the UK

could no longer be accepted as the sole political base of the Northern Irish



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Protestant identity. This was partly because of the unexpected “betrayal” by

the UK, which cooperated with the Irish Republic at the expense of Unionists.

High-ranking church officials who emphasized the binding aspect of the belief

in Jesus and the gospel reminded the Protestant laity of its duties toward fellow

Northern Irish Christians. Protestant faith leaders also integrated justice-based

arguments with the order-based discourse of the prevalent Protestant vocab-

ulary. “Christians reject violence as a means of resolving disputes, because it

does not in fact resolve them. Clearly any responsible state has a duty to give

maximum protection to its citizens, but it too is wise to do so with minimum

force and minimum interference with human rights,” Brian Hannon, Bishop

of Clogher, stated, “peace ultimately depends on creating a democracy recog-

nized as just by all its law-abiding citizens, which is the task of politicians.”34

Protestant religious actors encouraged Unionists to redefine their political

visions in a more inclusive manner. “The claim that the Unionist/Protestant

will should permanently determine every public decision in Northern Ire-

land is as indefensible as the claim that the Catholic/Nationalist should do

so, because its people constitute a majority on the island as a whole,” the

headmaster of the Methodist College, Stanley Worrall wrote, “that will has

prevailed in the Republic for 60 years by virtues of a 95 percent majority.

Northern Ireland needs a separate existence, but as a pluralist, not a Protestant

state.”35 Such public statements were not common among the policy mak-

ers of the time; it is hard – if at all possible – to point to a politician who

was daring enough to recognize the rights of the other community in such

a sensitive period. In that sense, religious actors, in their individual rights,

were among the first to voice the need to empathize with the other and create

an inclusive system of governance. Godfrey Brown, a former Moderator of

the Presbyterian Church, defined the obligations of the laity in the following

way:

We have a Christian duty to find new ways of relating to the Catholic Churchand its people with openness and honesty, with grace and indeed with love.Hatred and tribalism have torn Irish society apart and has brought worldwideshame to the name Christian. For too long the name “Protestant” has beensynonymous with “anti-Catholic.” We have an obligation and a duty as achurch to create a new image. The process does not involve betraying thegospel or rejecting the Reformation. It is because we are a church whosedoctrine is clear and held with deep conviction that we are at liberty to beourselves and to build relationships with others, conscious that God is at workin ways beyond our knowing and is calling us to be faithful to the past, yetalways open to Him.36



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While the Protestant churches were probing the possibility of a Christian iden-

tity and encouraging the laity to reconsider long-held religious assumptions,

similar discourses were taking place on the Catholic side. Key clergy members

strengthened the theological terms of condemnation of the Provisional Irish

Republican Army actions, declaring it “sinful” for Catholics to support any

such violent organization. Anti-paramilitary discourse by the Catholic Church

was nothing new, but it intensified as the Provisional Irish Republican Army

continued with its violent actions. In 1981, Cardinal O Fiaich preached in

Armagh, reminding that the paramilitaries claimed many murders. “Let me

there state in simple language, with all the authority at my command, that

participation in the evil deeds of this or any other paramilitary organization,

which indulges in murder, wounding, violence is a mortal sin which will one

day have to be accounted for before God in judgment,” the Cardinal warned,

“to willingly cooperate in any way with such organizations is sinful and, if the

cooperation is sinful, the sin is mortal.”37

In an attempt to “convert” uncompromising members of congregations and

set the agenda, religious leaders periodically came together and reminded

constituents that their options were limited, and a united Christian identity

was the only answer. Even if this agreement was not the solution, compro-

mise would be the necessary choice for any lasting accord. The Interchurch

Group, composed of prominent religious leaders of Northern Ireland, voiced

this sentiment clearly in its statements: “Protestants must either share power

with Nationalists or face violence and repartition; Roman Catholics should

start a process of reconciliation rather than sitting back and making series of

demands.”38 The statement, a criticism of both communities, made it clear

that an uncompromising stance was unjustifiable in religious terms or even on

a pragmatic level. Facts on the ground did not allow the victory of only one side.

agenda setting, religious actors, and politics

During the discussions surrounding the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, the main

focus moved toward all parties’ active participation in the process and imple-

mentation of a mutually acceptable structure of government. Therefore, it is

no exaggeration to state that the 1980s marked the beginning of the political

theology of inclusion, just as the 1970s had reinvigorated a social theology

of nonviolence. The clergy, in general, opposed strong forms of protest but

encouraged the expression of specific grievances and disagreements in rele-

vant political arenas, so that future accommodation or revision would be more

inclusive of Northern Irish society’s diverse political segments.



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Religious leaders of the four churches discouraged Unionist strikes and mass

resignations in protest of the agreement. Furthermore, they criticized politi-

cians’ short-term interests that compromised long-term stability. The chair of

the Belfast District of the Methodist Church, Norman Taggart, called for a

detailed review of political documents, even if they explicitly excluded cer-

tain segments of society. Taggart urged that “the proposals be still more fully

examined before final positions are taken up,” and he continued, “I hope that

political leaders so wrongfully excluded from the process of negotiation will

not now exclude themselves from exercising their influence where it matters

most – in Parliament, local government, and in discussion with ministers.”39

The Standing Committee of the General Synod of the Church of Ireland

made a similar statement, recognizing the splits in the church and encour-

aging the continuation of dialogue at a party level. The statement was not

as specific as those made by the Presbyterian and the Methodist Churches,

yet it did encourage representatives to work toward a peaceful resolution.

“The Standing Committee of the General Synod of the Church of Ireland,

conscious of the fact that the members of the church have widely differing

views on the Anglo-Irish Agreement,” the statement read, “but that above and

beyond such difference lies a universal desire for peace and reconciliation,

urges all constituted political parties to work together through their elected

representatives towards that end.”40

The Presbyterian Church took its place beside the Methodist Church and

Church of Ireland in criticizing the agreement yet insisting on a political

and nonviolent way of advancing Unionists’ interests. It also reminded its

members of the limit on criticizing authorities and on creating alternative

modes of governance. The governance committee noted that “while it is

accepted the Anglo-Irish Agreement had not brought peace and reconciliation

to the community, there are ‘legitimate means’ of expressing peaceful protest

and dissent within the law,” and the board of the Presbyterian Church called

upon members of Parliament and local councils to “fulfil their responsibilities

by taking their seats and seeking to further their policies by using as fully

as possible the democratic process available to them.”41 Attempts to define

a Protestant identity and to overcome the shock of being excluded from the

agreement through violent means also were denounced by the Presbyterian

Church. “Arms are meant to kill; justification for arms stockpiling by Protestant

voices is an insult to the name of Christian, and much deeply grieves our Lord

Jesus,” the religious leaders wrote, “in any civilized society, there can only be

one lawful authority, one source of law and order, and the Christian citizen

is not free to judge it a failure and to substitute some armed authority of his

own.”42



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Similarly, representing the Catholic view, the Bishop of Down and Connor,

Cahal Daly, encouraged both parties to work together while condemning the

Republican paramilitary violence and framing the organization as a common

enemy to both Nationalists and Unionists. Daly stated that Northern Ireland

must have political institutions that reflect its dual British-Irish nature, and he

blamed policy makers who care more about their political interests than those

of society:

Politicians who continue to refuse dialogue, or who demand preconditionsfor dialogue which they know to be impossible, are failing their country in thisdecisive moment in history and bringing politics increasingly into disrepute.Irish Republican Army campaign is the destruction of civil rights, not onlyfor Unionists, but also for Nationalists. It is one of the greatest tragedies of thepast 20 years that peaceful campaign was met by sectarian violence. This inturn gave opportunity and pretext to what was soon to become the ProvisionalIrish Republican Army to steal the mantle of civil rights for their campaignof murder and destruction.43

In this framework, the clergy also stood against identification and classification

of laymembers by politicians, fearing that surveys and records that document

personal details and preferences could result in attacks on individuals as well as

permanent damage to the fabric of society. In response to Unionist politicians’

door-to-door petition-signing campaigns, religious leaders stated: “While the

right to peaceful protest must be upheld, it is essential that there be total respect

for the rights and privacy of others and that no pressure or appearance of pres-

sure be put upon people who disagree with us politically,” one statement said,

parties should find “alternative methods” and must “give a clear undertaking

that no records will be kept of those who do not sign.”44 The religious actors

who advocated the need to keep identities secret for security reasons infuriated

Unionist leaders with these concerted statements. Jim Molyneaux, the Ulster

Unionist Party leader, noted that Bishop Cahal Daly had “become the latest

recruit to the despicable conspiracy to sabotage our legitimate petition for a

secret ballot box test of the Anglo-Irish Agreement,” whereas the Presbyte-

rian leaders were accused of “doing the Social Democratic and Labour Party

and Alliance party’s dirty work and parroting the propaganda of the Repub-

licans” by the Belfast Lord Mayor Sammy Wilson of Democratic Unionist

Party.45

Another important agenda-setting role religious communities played was

their interaction with different political actors. The three Protestant churches

(occasionally joined by the Catholic Church) managed to meet regularly to

forge a united response in their communications with outside actors such as



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Thatcher and FitzGerald. This action attests to the existence of a basic con-

sensus among religious leaders concerning their mutual goodwill, as well as

a tacit acknowledgment of the drawbacks of excluding Unionists from polit-

ical arrangements.46 This is especially interesting, given the varying degrees

of support and opposition found in the churches themselves. Whereas the

Methodist Church cautiously welcomed the agreement, the Presbyterian

Church was divided.47 These intrachurch debates at times reached the point

of threatening to sunder the decision-making mechanisms. To illustrate, 24

Presbyterian ministers challenged the governing committee of the church fol-

lowing its dismissal of the accord.48 However, these disagreements did not

mean that the religious actors could not continue working toward a more

desirable political framework. Religious leaders conducted these debates in a

way that would not disturb the consistency of declarations made to the pub-

lic or political leaders. Even if some members backed the agreement, such

support was still qualified. Church leaders, recognizing these internal splits,

focused on the points that needed to be amended beyond any contention.

The existence of debates and rifts, coupled with the desire to find expressions

reflecting theological consensus, illustrates these religious actors’ epistemic

status.

In addition to supporting active political processes, protecting their con-

stituents’ privacy, and informing political actors of their congregations’ views,

church leaders devised specific proposals of inclusion. Presbyterian Modera-

tor John Thompson suggested the following as steps to peace: The rejection

by Northern Irish communities of the killers in their midst, constructive pro-

posals for a devolved government from present Unionists, and support for

the Royal Ulster Constabulary from all sections of community.49 Church of

Ireland Primate, Archbishop Robin Eames argued peace would be possible

only with an alternative agreement. “A new Anglo-Irish Agreement, to which

all constitutional parties in Northern Ireland would contribute, could be the

key to ending the present political impasse in the North,” the Archbishop

wrote, “it is up to the governments in London and Dublin to take the initiative

on this, but such an initiative would fail unless Unionist leaders were prepared

to engage in consultations aimed at framing a new agreement. Since the first

agreement was seen as an obstacle by Unionists, new structures would have to

be found.”50

Another idea expressed by Eames two years later echoes the functionalist

theory of international relations, which argues that cooperation in limited

areas toward a shared interest will lead to political integration.51 Notably,

Eames suggested that the parties start cooperating on less controversial

issues:



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There are two levels in the political process in Northern Ireland. There is theinvolvement of elected members of parliament at Westminster, and there isthe whole complex picture of local government at home. Recent indicationsof local councils being prepared to work together are heartening. But themajor issue of possible agreement in the government of the province remainsto be solved. There are fields where cooperation is surely possible: agriculture,health, tourism, regional development. To build on these foundations couldbring a new awareness of what is possible. Combined party efforts to help theship-building industry indicated what could be achieved.52

Despite occasional calls for cooperation on politically less-charged issues,

there were also ambitious attempts to bring parties together. One of the most

prominent agenda-setting actions was Fr. Alec Reid’s facilitation of the estab-

lishment of a united Nationalist front that would renounce violence and work

for negotiation. Reid, who created the Clonard church ministry that would

provide politicians with a safe space in the years to come, managed to bring

together the leaders of Sinn Fein and Social Democratic and Labour Party,

Gerry Adams and John Hume, respectively. Reid was the contact person with

the Irish Government from 1987 until the Belfast Agreement in 1998. During

this period, he conducted a number of behind-the-scenes meetings with politi-

cians to ensure unity in the pro-peace Nationalist front. These meetings were

not made public, and Gerry Adams writes in his memoirs that engineering

meetings under the shadow of the Anglo-Irish Agreement had not been easy.53

Fr. Gerry Reynolds, who was with Fr. Reid in his reconciliation journey, notes

that the initiatives were carried out with “peace” in mind, without creating

an “other.” “We tried bringing together the representatives of Nationalism,

which were always divided. Hume, Adams, Dublin government – getting

them together on a common democratic process – meetings have been held

in great privacy, without anybody knowing,” Reynolds remembers, “we were

in sympathy with Unionists as well, we didn’t do it to dominate them. We

just had to do everything to stop people getting killed, identify the causes,

provide a better way, an alternative; to create communication between people

from each sides, to keep the hope alive.”54 Gerry Adams writes that Reynolds’

ecumenical outreach made it possible for him to meet a range of people from

Unionist backgrounds and have thought-provoking discussions.55 However,

the invisibility brought by the secrecy of these meetings led many to believe

that religious leaders were not doing enough to bring an end to the conflict.56

Although one can still say that churches usually maintain the status quo and

refrain from getting involved in sensitive political matters, we know now that

many religious actors moved out of their comfort zones and took significant

risks which many politicians avoided taking.



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reinforcement and expressing grievances: issues of

representation and religious actors

Perhaps the most commonly observed behavior of the clergy is reinforcement,

which refers to the process of representing and shaping the congregation’s

political preferences.57 Reinforcement also took place when religious lead-

ers expressed the beliefs of their congregations publicly and conveyed their

sentiments to political actors. Reinforcement is a form of legitimizing the per-

spective of the congregation’s membership, and at a time when church leaders

took bold steps to mend rifts in their communities, reinforcement helped them

remain politically relevant.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement’s major drawback was the ambiguity of its terms

and its inaccessibility to the average citizen. Religious leaders, faced with

complicated questions regarding the nature of the agreement, first took issue

with the elite-level decision making and demanded accessibility:

The document itself is very complicated and various people have taken var-ious different interpretations of its contents. This ambiguity and uncertaintyhave only made the situation worse. It is clear that the talks would continuewithout open debate and this in itself will lead to the alienation of the majoritycommunity.58

Politicians obviously have to do the political decision-making, but it is terriblyimportant that their decisions have built into them an understanding of howordinary people think about things. We want to try to help communicate thethoughts of those people in a rational, reasonable way.59

Religious leaders pointed to the fact that Unionists were not consulted prior

to the arrangement, and their desires were kept out of the picture. The clergy,

especially Protestant religious leaders, reflected this disappointment in their

public declarations, albeit somewhat cautiously and never implying that vio-

lent protests might help the situation. Presbyterian leaders reflected this senti-

ment in a public message to Margaret Thatcher:

Presbyterians are apprehensive of the degree of vagueness that exists as to therole of the representatives of the Republic of Ireland. They are afraid thatalmost every aspect of domestic policy – for example, security, education,social services – will be under the scrutiny of an outside power, not alwayssympathetic to the ethos of the majority of the Ulster people. It is recognisedthat the sincere aim of those drafting the agreement was to reconcile theminority groupings to the structures of government. However, it is transparentthat in so doing there has not been the attempt to reconcile the minority tothe majority and vice versa.60



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Reinforcement and Expressing Grievances 89

Church of Ireland Archbishop Donald Caird, also appealed to Northern Irish

politicians to come together and work out an acceptable agreement to correct

the mistakes made in the beginning:

The review of the Anglo-Irish Agreement next month might allow its “mostobvious defect” to be remedied. This was the “lack of involvement of theUnionist interest in the composition of the agreement and the apparentfailure to consult with the Unionists when it was being drawn up.”61

As for Catholics, clergy reflected the demands and the tasks of Catholics regu-

larly, albeit not as frequently or as specifically as Protestant leaders. Although

the Republican wing did not favor it, the Anglo-Irish Agreement marked a sig-

nificant step for most Catholics, and religious leaders refrained from criticizing

this first arrangement that made a possible connection with the Republic of Ire-

land. The long-expected inclusion of the Republic of Ireland into the political

process had finally been achieved, but it had come at the expense of Unionists,

and the process had not developed in the desired fashion. This widespread

disillusion in Northern Ireland led the Catholic clergy to devise balanced

evaluations of the situation, focusing on expectations and obligations. One

example of the expressions of “wish and duty” was the following statement

from Fr. Denis Faul: “Catholics have two tasks: To end the violence of the

Provos and to achieve reconciliation with the Protestants. Catholics have two

demands: Release of prisoners; security of life and home, equality of treatment

in respect of employment.”62

Protestant and Catholic leaders each condemned paramilitaries, exercis-

ing a high level of caution. Religious leaders framed the issue as a clash of

“means” in which a violent path could not be accommodated within a Chris-

tian framework. Funeral statements included condemnations of violence and

discouragements of revenge; they almost never took direct aim at “Catholics”

or “Protestants,” but instead at members of paramilitary organizations. In

other words, the violent means were condemned, but the ends were kept out

of public religious discourse, and religious adjectives were used to identify the

victim’s identity, not the perpetrator’s. Most of the time, political legitimacy of

the “other” perspective (Nationalism or Unionism) was implicitly recognized.

This enabled the public theology of inclusion to go further than it traditionally

had in the past and to extend its scope to embrace political ideologies as well

as those individuals subscribing to them. Examples of such statements could

be found in newspapers:

Instead of bringing honor or respect to your political objectives, you causethem to be branded with the mark of corruption. For generations to come, the



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initials IRA will be associated with robbery, extortion, violence, destruction,and killings. In the short term, you can kill human bodies, but in the long termyou destroy yourselves morally and spiritually, and you bring into dishonorthe cause you claim to serve.63

These statements were important in the sense that they consolidated the identi-

ties, without demeaning the “other” tradition. This framing by religious leaders

contributed to the formation of an understanding that could tolerate – if not

warmly welcome – a peaceful discussion of alternatives and a new arrangement

that would include all parties.

empowerment: providing communities with political tools

The empowerment process refers to the clergy’s enabling role in terms of

giving the local communities a voice along with the skills to participate politi-

cally. Seemingly apolitical duties, such as conducting joint prayers or serving

on a church committee, can have political implications,64 and the 1980s were

no exception, given the number of joint prayer services and ecumenical activ-

ities. Empowerment included embracing those who “live in the inner city,

the unemployed, the marginalized, not least prisoners who will be released

after almost a lifetime in prison.”65 Religious leaders carried out such activ-

ities more effectively than the politicians. Religious actors assumed a more

active leading role incorporating communities into the political process. They

moved from an individualistic theology focused on individual salvation toward

a communal one focused on ethical matters and political problems. Ecumeni-

cal activities with solid institutional bases, like Corrymeela Community and

the Clonard Monastery, kept helping Protestants and Catholics work toward

a common cause. The number of faith-based civil society organizations sig-

nificantly increased and these religious actors quickly became parts of the

epistemic community the mainstream religious leaders started to form in the

1970s. Among these organizations, the Corrymeela Community is especially

significant, because it was not part of any official church hierarchy, yet it had

provided laypeople with a forum to exchange views on politics and societal

problems since the late 1960s. It was established by a Presbyterian minister, Ray

Davey, to bring Christians together and give them the space and opportunity

to devise strategies to cope with the tension of conflict.

Another forum, Cornerstone Community, was established in 1982 “to

continue an interchurch search for justice and peace and a common wit-

ness to the reconciliation of Christ’s disciples.”66 Cornerstone partnered

with the Clonard Monastery, and their representatives have conducted



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Empowerment: Providing Communities with Political Tools 91

behind-the-scene meetings with Catholic and Protestant political figures

toward dialogue and reconciliation. In addition to forums that promote inter-

religious dialogue and political initiatives, there were Christian organizations

that focused on social welfare issues to empower citizens. One such example

is 174 Trust. Anchored in the Presbyterian tradition, the trust worked to find

solutions to North Belfast’s problems, one of the conflict-ridden areas, and

even managed to reach out beyond it. The director, Rev. William Shaw, not

only has played a crucial role in bringing Catholic and Protestants together in

sports and social activities but also has written about the reconciliation process

and Christianity, building upon experts’ arguments concerning peacebuild-

ing. In one of his papers, Shaw states that the churches of Northern Ireland

are guilty, too, for “the absence of proper biblical exegesis and application

allowed our own form of apartheid to take root.”67

Common prayers and social activities have attracted thousands of people

in Northern Ireland. In December 1986, for example, despite harsh weather

conditions, leaders of the four churches led 8000 people in a walk for peace

and unity.68 Peaceful protests of this type have provided the laity with the

tools and encouragement needed to demonstrate their desire for “inclusive”

arrangements. There were also individual brainstorming meetings and work-

shops, which brought interested citizens under a faith and politics framework

to discuss the issues at hand. One such group, officially called “The Faith

and Politics Group,” began in 1983 after an ecumenical conference calling

for the establishment of a Christian Centre for Political Development. In the

end, participants decided that a center was too far-fetched given the conditions

of the time and they decided to set up an unofficial think tank. The group

members state that they were “influenced by a lot of different people from

inside and outside Northern Ireland” and they learned a lot “from the work

of the political scientist Frank Wright and the Croatian theologian Miroslav

Volf.”69 The group shares its discussions and reviews of healing, grievances,

forgiveness, and reconciliation through pamphlets and brochures.

While the number of faith-based groups and organizations increased sub-

stantially, the church leaders drew the attention of those at the grassroots level

to divisions, and in the 1980s, there was a concomitant increase in the number

of calls to ecumenical activities:

Apartheid is not just a South African phenomenon, as religious apartheid hadexisted in Ireland for generations with the different churches going their ownseparate ways with interchurch activity at a minimum level. This is as trueof relationships between the Protestant churches as between the Catholicand Protestant churches. Interchurch and interdenominational programs for



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mutual understanding are urgently needed so that members of the differentchurches could be accurately informed about the beliefs and practices ofother denominations.70

Church leaders should try to develop intercongregational contacts betweenparishes and congregations throughout our churches, so as to involve moreand more of the so-called “ordinary” churchgoers in ecumenical activity.Ecumenism must be an important element in the theological and pastoraleducation and training of all candidates for the ministry. Catholic seminariansand Protestant candidates for the ordained ministry should have opportunitiesfor joint contact and discussion and where possible, shared sessions andseminars.71

Echoing Cahal Daly, Gerry Reynolds of Clonard Monastery who, along with

Alec Reid, contributed to the peace process by providing the space for politi-

cians to work with each other away from the public eye, notes that the grassroots

awakening did not coincide with faith leaders’ own political awakening:

Violence begets violence; it became a spiral. If we were true to our faith,every funeral should have been an ecumenical occasion. At the practicallevel, churches were divided. At a political level, there were united voicesbut [at the] grassroots levels, they were still divided. The other side is verysimilar to you; when you discover common humanity, you are moved to givejustice. The church leaders mostly tried to do that.72

In summary, the 1980s witnessed the consolidation of a more inclusive and

accommodating public theology. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, the major

political step of the decade, provided another opportunity for clergy to come

together and convey their parishioners’ views to politicians as well as to encour-

age grassroots involvement through empowerment. Examining that decade in

isolation, one cannot assert that clerical theories and recommendations deci-

sively influenced political decision making. The years were marked more by a

gradual awakening to the idea of a responsible Christian citizenship shared by

all in Northern Ireland – regardless of heritage or creed. A theological under-

standing emerged that included all relevant parties involved in the historical

conflict, and the legitimacy bestowed by this understanding established the

basis for successful accommodations that would ultimately come to fruition

within the next decade.



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5

Public Theology of Inclusive Governance

Peace Deals and Political Agreements

The Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement), signed

on April 10, 1998, brought an end to direct rule from London and is regarded

as the de facto end point of the Troubles. Both the Republic of Ireland and

the UK recognized that any arrangement excluding any of the relevant parties

in Northern Ireland was destined to fail, as experienced in the earlier Anglo-

Irish Agreement. Belfast Agreement provided a way to reconcile conflicting

Unionist and Nationalist aspirations and to guarantee people’s rights to be

British, Irish, or both. It rejected violence. It provided local power sharing in

government. At the local level, policy makers paid more attention to alleviating

the growing rift between Nationalists and Unionists, focusing on social and

economic policies. With the British support, new resolutions were introduced

to ensure equality in education and employment.1

The talks that led to Belfast Agreement began much more inclusively

than had the earlier ones; the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement had illustrated

that excluding any major groups from negotiations would create a deadlock.

Clergy members had learned that they needed to be more proactive in push-

ing for inclusiveness and in acting as the bridge between secular political

arrangements and the Christian laity. Religious leaders continued their work

on bringing the parties together and encouraging “sacrifice” if it meant an end

to the conflict. Although they were cautious in their statements, their occa-

sional involvement in political affairs came at the expense of their own place

in their community and politicians continued to contest the idealistic views

of the religious leaders. Gerry Adams, for example, writes in his memoirs that

he had been in touch with religious leaders including Fr. Reid and Cardinal

Daly throughout the conflict, and he had difficulty understanding what these

religious leaders meant by their call to “peaceful struggle.”2 For a long time,

the alternatives posed by the religious actors were not options for political

leaders, some of whom regarded violent protests and postures as the most

93



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94 Public Theology of Inclusive Governance

effective way to make their point. In their book, Brewer et al. report Fr. Reid’s

statement that “people would believe that the churches had no selfish interest

in it and they were not following some kind of agenda; they were following

the principles of the Christian faith, the principles of peace.”3 Later in his

memoirs, when talking about the Good Friday Agreement, Adams concedes

that “we were determined to do our best to take the gun out of politics, but

this needed a collective effort. It was back to the template which had emerged

from the discussion all those years ago with the Sagart [the Irish word for priest,

used by Adams to denote Fr. Alec Reid] and later with John Hume.”4 John

Major, former Prime Minister of the UK, states that during the peace process

“for distinctive and dispassionate viewpoint,” he “turned in complete privacyto the church leaders.”5 Similarly, Albert Reynolds, former Prime Minister of

Ireland, says in his memoirs that Archbishop Robin Eames “had a clear under-

standing of the Northern Protestant position, and gradually he helped me to a

better understanding too, not in a party-political sense, but in comprehending

their aspirations.”6 The public theologies of peace developed by the religious

leaders and the templates they offered became increasingly visible to policy

makers, including Adams, Reynolds, and Major, who continue to point to the

influential role of these actors in conflict transformation.

The challenges of the 1990s were not entirely novel. Although there was an

air of optimism, the violence continued, and initial political talks did not bring

forth concrete arrangements. Religious actors also were concerned about the

secularization trend and worried that churches were gradually losing their

relevance. In a way, these challenges slowed down the epistemic progress, yet

the challenge of secularism in particular brought churches together in a joint

attempt to remain relevant. Religious leaders played a role in paramilitary

groups’ disarmament and the removal of obstacles toward realizing a political

arrangement. I focus on the effects of the Provisional Irish Republican

Army bombings and the Drumcree deadlock on the political process in this

chapter, in addition to the Belfast Agreement. Belfast Agreement heralded the

potential realization of stability and inclusive Christian citizenship in the eyes

of religious leaders. Given that even the most persistent actors, such as Paisley

and Adams, involved themselves later on in the process, the Belfast Agreement

represents the selection of a particular epistemic/discursive approach toward

the issue of coexistence and citizenship. This selection was partly the result

of the innovations religious leaders worked on throughout the Troubles.

Toward the signing of the agreement, policy makers had started to take the

suggestions of the religious leaders more seriously. The “peaceful struggle”

expounded by the religious leaders became part of the mainstream political

discourse, unlike the first two decades of the conflict when the political



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Initial Challenges: Political Deadlocks, Violence, and Secularism 95

leaders did not regard conciliatory insights of the religious actors as viable

options.

initial challenges: political deadlocks, violence,

and secularism

The 1990s began much more auspiciously compared to other decades of

the Troubles. Church leaders continued to condemn violence and, at times,

engaged in ambitious attempts to meet with paramilitaries. When one looks

at the newspapers and political/religious documents of the decade, it is clear

that the actions of certain high-profile religious leaders went against the grain

to such an extent that they were strongly criticized by their own communities.

This disapproval served to drive the communications efforts underground, as

it were, with a number of more ambitious communications with politicians

and paramilitaries actually taking place in closed-door meetings.

One factor that contributed to the consolidation of ecumenical activities and

a more rigorous faith-based agenda of conflict resolution was the concern about

the increasingly secular approach to public issues. The secular arrangements

created competition by posing alternative perspectives to the disillusioned

members of society and they endangered religious leaders’ prestige. Therefore,

in a number of instances, religious leaders stated that their greatest concern

was secularization, rather than challenges posed by the “other”:

There is a sizeable group of Christians in the Protestant tradition who believethat the Roman Catholic Church is not a Christian church but a deceptionconceived by the devil himself. What we have here is basically a theologyof hatred and a series of godly excuses for regarding fellow human beingswith contempt. There is no justification for such an outlook. The opinions ofanti-Catholic extremists do not reflect the beliefs of the vast majority of ourProtestant fellow-Christians in Northern Ireland. We must be united in ourcommon witness for the truth against the real enemy: the forces of nihilism,hedonism, secularism, and godlessness.7

Although the Northern Irish population retained its reputation as one of the

most “religious” communities in Europe, the level of practice had fallen during

the late 1980s and early 1990s.8 During this period, religious leaders advocated

the superior epistemic status of religious precepts, and they were concerned

about losing their voices in the society. This is understandable, since religious

principles and insights are not regarded as being as authoritative as scientific

knowledge in the Western world. This is one feature that differentiates reli-

gious epistemic communities from scientific ones. The threat of losing status



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in the community was one of the reasons why religious leaders felt the need

to consolidate their role in advising political parties and guiding laypeople.

However, this growing rift between secular and religious elements led religious

actors to increase their efforts in reaching a unified voice that could compete

with the secular alternative. In this spirit, religious leaders referred multiple

times to bridge-building among faith traditions to overcome the conflict. Pres-

byterian Minister, and the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland

in 1992–1993, John Dunlop touched upon the clash of secular and religious

spheres and expressed the need to reach out:

The leaders of the largest four churches meet and travel regularly in orderto demonstrate there is diversity in Ireland and that such diversity must berecognized and respected, and should find expression in cooperation andnot in conflict. Since we are made in the image of the Trinitarian God,we must seek to reflect our true nature which takes unity and communityseriously. This means that the peace of the people who live on the islandof Ireland must never be marked by the domination of the few by the manyor the exploitation of the weak by the strong . . . Ireland needs both realismand vision. We need to encourage forms of mutual cooperation which aremarked by mutual respect, grounded in attitudes shaped by the worship ofGod who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.9

With the concerns about secularization and the decrease in the level of reli-

gious practice, religious leaders drew attention to the symbolism of holidays,

celebrations, and practices that they claimed to be of central importance for

all Christians who were ready to revise their lives from a religious perspective.

Methodist President, Norman Taggart, for example, noted St. Patrick belonged

to Nationalists, Unionists, Protestants, and Catholics with a message of vision,

prayer, purpose, and hope, yet he warned that however one identified himself/

herself, there was a need to recognize the Christian identity first: “We today

need relevant visions arising from our own circumstances. Political Protes-

tant and political Catholics, secular Catholics and secular Protestants need to

be truly converted to Christ.”10 A number of religious leaders also explored

other Christian experiences in conflict transformation, such as the mending of

divisions in South Africa.11 There was a conscious concentration on the prior

peacemaking experiences as part of the diffusion of knowledge within the

relevant spheres of public activity. Religious approaches and battles between

inclusive and exclusive theologies are not just temporarily experienced and

forgotten. As with every other type of knowledge, they become references that

may shed light on similar future scenarios. We will explore cases of diffusion

and similar experiences in other conflict settings in Chapter 7.



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Initial Challenges: Political Deadlocks, Violence, and Secularism 97

As expressed in Chapter 2, churches’ expectations were different a century

ago, and church leaders could get away with appropriating the words of politi-

cal leaders. However, in twentieth-century Northern Ireland, people expected

the clergy to continue their pastoral duties and yet at the same time, inform

their publics about existing political choices and prevent large-scale intercom-

munal conflicts from happening. Religious leaders tried to respond to these

needs. The Bishop of Derry and Raphoe, James Mehaffey, for example, urged

church leaders to take a more active role in stamping out sectarianism:

Church leaders needed to adapt to changing situations and the challenges ofthe future in order to survive. In the new Millennium, the churches will bechallenged about their responsibility in helping to bring about mutual under-standing and in promoting mutual respect for different traditions. People willdemand to know and to be informed. Advances in the information technol-ogy field will need to be matched by far greater openness and by effectivechannels of information within the churches and outward to society.12

Ecumenical relationships developing in Northern Ireland caught the atten-

tion of the extremist factions on both sides, which continued to regard the

“opening” of mainstream churches as a betrayal. A number of church build-

ings became the target of arsonists. As a response to these attacks, religious

leaders maintained their unity, and offered material assistance to churches

that were attacked, regardless of denomination.13 Interestingly, material assis-

tance was not confined to these emergencies. Fitzroy Presbyterian and City

Church both provided renovation funds for St. Malachy’s Catholic Church,

and leaders claimed that such solidarity was not a new phenomenon but had

existed for centuries. In a joint statement, the three churches declared,

In the 1790s, Belfast Protestants gave generously to the building of St. Mary’sCatholic Church. The parish priest warmly welcomed many Protestants tothe opening service. By 1798, numbers of Protestants and Catholics shared acommon vision, humanity was shared, and there was a common search forjust relations in Ireland, which embraced freedom, fairness, and equality foreveryone.14

This was a reference to the United Irishmen movement, which brought

Catholics and Protestants together toward the end of the eighteenth cen-

tury. As mentioned in Chapter 2, despite its failure to secure independence

from England, this movement had brought a nonsectarian Irish identity to the

forefront. This nonsectarian Irish identity had essential elements that church

leaders wanted to achieve in the 1990s, but this time to keep it sustainable.



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Arguably, the intensified interfaith cooperation of the 1990s also resulted

from what religious leaders saw as continuing threat of secularism and the

decreasing levels of church attendance, as mentioned earlier. In addition

to discursive battles with secular ideas, mainstream religious leaders had

to counter exclusive public theologies that related the conflict directly to

a particular religion. For the most part, Ian Paisley and his Free Presbyte-

rian Church represented this theology by continuing to blame the Catholic

Church for all conflicts and problems throughout Irish history. Dennis Cooke,

a Methodist minister, stated that Paisley remained convinced that Catholic

Doctrine was a root cause of the violence in Northern Ireland, clear in his

statements such as, “You teach people from infancy error, that error one day

will surface, and there will be diabolical fruit from that rotten root which was

planted in their hearts.”15 Paisley did not command majority support, and

the support he gathered was more due to disillusionment with the existing

political parties than to active support of his theology. However, he created

a specific interpretation based on what he called the “errors” of the Catholic

Doctrine and its negative influence on politics and conflict transformation.

The existence of such extreme discourse facilitated cooperation among more

moderate religious leaders, who could not afford to leave the stage to the Free

Presbyterians.

toward the agreement: cease-fires and brooke-mayhew talks

In the early 1990s, developments in the public sphere contributed to the move

toward a more egalitarian society, in which Catholics would enjoy the same

rights as their Protestant counterparts. However, street violence continued

unabated. Increasing Loyalist paramilitary activity in Nationalist areas sur-

prised even the Republican movement, which continued to carry out its own

operations.16 Between 1990 and 1998, 500 people died as a result of political

violence.17 Church leaders repeatedly condemned paramilitary activity, stead-

fastly refusing to recognize extreme positions as representative of any tradition.

Edward Daly, Bishop of Derry, stated that included in this category were not

only the Republican paramilitaries, but also Sinn Fein, which was a political

party thought to have links with the paramilitary movement:

IRA and Sinn Fein exercise an evil and sinister influence over young people.From the civil rights movement onwards, the IRA and Sinn Fein have onlysucceeded in destroying and corrupting and distorting and sullying everymovement and every issue with which they have identified themselves. Theyhave even destroyed and sullied the noble ideal of Irish Republicanism.18



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However, this rejection of the representativeness of the paramilitary groups

did not result in a political bypassing of these actors by the religious leaders.

Although political party leaders kept avoiding any contact with paramilitaries,

many religious leaders continued to advocate for their inclusion in the process

and the need to understand the motives behind their actions, even as they

refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of their interpretation of Republican-

ism/Loyalism. Finlay Holmes, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church wrote

many people were “so conditioned to reject the IRA that they compared it

talking to the devil,” continuing,

But obviously if one thought that they could be persuaded to follow a differentpath, one would be prepared to argue one’s case with them . . . The messageI am trying to put through to them is that apart from the error of breaking thelaw of God and being inhuman, their campaign is hardening people’s heartsand is not likely to succeed.19

The statement of Holmes was condemned as “abject folly” by leading Protes-

tant politicians. However, the Presbyterian clergy was not yet done with their

ambitious attempts to reach out to the rival side. Former Moderators Jack

Weir and Godfrey Brown, after talking with the Ulster Defence Association,

also met with Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams at a time when other political

parties ostracized them. Although Weir and Brown stated that their meetings

were a “personal initiative,” they reported back to the Presbyterian Church,

advocating the need for the cessation of violence on both parts:

Whatever political programs may be offered to remedy our situation, thefirst prerequisite is a cessation of the continuing violence. That was alsothe aim of their meeting with leaders of the Ulster Defence Association inFebruary . . . We readily accept that a mere end to present violence will notitself secure a just and lasting peace but urge that a ceasefire now wouldenable the government and political representatives involved to give theirundivided attention to the search for an agreement on which peace might bebuilt.20

In a similar vein, an influential Dundonald minister, Roy Magee, secured

a 20-day cease-fire from Loyalist militaries.21 That paramilitaries heeded

religious leaders more than political leaders rendered the religious epistemeand discourse more relevant in the context of the conflict. One can also

argue that it was the integrity of religious leaders that led paramilitaries to

communicate with the clergy. The inclusive nature of this moderate Christian

discourse that emphasized both justice and order, along with the consistency



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of such a discourse among the members of clergy across denominations could

be regarded as a theological innovation of major public significance.

The attempts to reach out went beyond meetings with paramilitaries. Some

church leaders continued to broach theologically innovative approaches. The

Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, John Dunlop, pursued a reconciliatory

stance toward Catholics, angering the extreme Protestant parties who accused

him of “pro-Romanism and ecumenism.” Dunlop replied,

In the last 25 years, since Vatican II, we have faced a new situation, whichour parents did not face. We are being offered, unexpectedly, the hand offriendship by the leadership and many of the people in the Roman CatholicChurch in Ireland. Let us by all means maintain as a Reformed church, butlet us cross that ancient frontier of animosity as warmhearted Presbyterians.22

Dunlop’s statements are the continuation of the development of a public

theology of inclusive governance. The news that the Unionist Party of Northern

Ireland and the Northern Catholic Bishops would have a meeting was regarded

as an important step, which exemplified the cross-communal power of religious

leaders. Denis Faul stated that religious leaders had much to impart to political

leaders in this type of meeting:

The bishops will be concerned with the absolute need to build peace uponconfidence, trust, understanding, and hope: to see the good in other peopleand to promote neighborly relations. The bishops will point out that rightsand political power involve duties and responsibility towards all the people. Itis not a question of asserting one’s rights over other people. It is a question ofseeing how we can be of service to the protection and welfare of other people.The politicians, like bishops, must lead the people away from confrontationtowards cooperation.23

Religious leaders protested the idea of equating religious identity with political

party affiliation. They observed that the latter came at the expense of the

principles of the former. No political party could claim that it represented

Catholics or Protestants, so Christians, in the view of the clergy, should not

regard that actions taken under a party banner counted as their duty to their

fellow Catholics or Protestants. Church of Ireland Primate Robin Eames

devised a statement of “Christian witness” summarizing this argument:

A person should be a Christian first and party-political adherent second . . .The history of Northern Ireland has been one of almost complete confusionand overidentification of religious and party-political labels and identities.This religious-political overlap, this failure to protect the autonomous



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freedom and identity of the religious from the identification of theparty-political has lain at the root of so many of our problems.24

Between April 1990 and November 1992, a series of negotiations, which

included the Ulster Unionist Party, Democratic Unionist Party, Social

Democratic and Labour Party, Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, and Sinn

Fein, along with representatives from both British and Irish governments,

took place. This time, however, Unionists, while still not ready to consider

full-fledged power sharing, welcomed the proportionality in new political

structures.25 Although these talks, led by the Secretary of State for Northern

Ireland Peter Brooke and later, his successor, Sir Patrick Mayhew, did not end

in a formal agreement, they enhanced the understanding of the parties and

clarified the “minimum” expectations. The initial objective of the discussions

was that the participants had agreed to work to secure an agreement that

would replace the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The agenda of the talks was

threefold: relations between the parties within Northern Ireland; relations

between North and South (i.e., Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic); and

links between Britain and Ireland. Once negotiations started, disagreements

started to surface about procedures, the location of the talks, and the choice

of an independent chair for the North-South strand of the talks. Negotiations

came to a halt in July 1991.

The talks recommenced in April 1992. Unionist parties entered the talks,

hoping to diminish the influence of the Irish Republic on Northern Ireland

that had been consolidated by the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Nationalist

side aimed to extend the scope of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and give the

Irish Republic a stronger voice in Northern Irish politics. In July 1992, North-

South talks took place in London, with the Irish Government participating.

By November 1992, however, no agreement was in sight, and Mayhew ended

the talks.

Religious leaders, who were focusing on issues of poverty and inequality,

praised the effort yet underlined the deeper issues they believed mattered

most.26 Between 1990 and 1992, religious leaders still did not feel compelled

to become officially involved in the talks, which had taken on a life of their

own. Following the agenda of the Brooke-Mayhew Talks that ended with no

firm results in 1992, church leaders warned society of a possible surge in sec-

tarian violence. In the interchurch summit in Newry, Catholic and Protestant

church leaders worked on a report proposing systematic measures to counter-

act sectarianism. Recommendations for improving relations included a Bill

of Rights, monitoring by government departments and public bodies regard-

ing the impact of policies on the two communities, and the development of



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mixed-housing estates.27 Religious leaders also touched upon the changing

realities and that Unionists needed to be ready for compromise.28 In general,

religious leaders shared a concern over the constant interruptions of institu-

tionalized meetings and urged politicians to come together again to keep alive

the discussions:

There is a need to begin again the quest for an acceptable way forward for theprovince. The need is obvious. They have to mandate and experience to tacklethis difficult, but surely not impossible task. What is of paramount importanceis the will to succeed, the refusal to give up and the political acumen notto fence themselves around with so many safeguards and preconditions thatthey cannot make measurable progress.29

Numerous conditions dictated the interruptions. These stated requirements

and preconditions, prerequisites to resuming the talks, such as a complete

decommissioning of arms, were seen as unrealistic by clergy who thought

these were matters to be gradually resolved during the negotiations. Whereas

a Methodist leader, David Cooper, suggested that arms decommissioning

should not be a precondition of Sinn Fein’s entry into peace talks, the Church

of Ireland officially expressed this concern in its publication:

It is important to acknowledge that mistakes have been made on all sides inhandling the fragile chance of securing a just and stable peace. Too littleattention has been paid to the fact that there is nothing mandatory aboutwhat happens when the parties get to the negotiating table. Once there, theymay not agree; even if they do, the electorate has the final say. In thesecircumstances, too much emphasis may have been given to the conditionsunder which talks begin. New barriers have been erected from which it isdifficult to retreat.30

Religious leaders were also concerned that some parties to the conflict would

be excluded from the final arrangement. They pushed for cautious inclusion,

drawing lessons from past accords that had failed largely due to such exclu-

sionary tactics. For example, leaders of the four main churches called for the

lines of communication to be kept open even if Sinn Fein was suspended from

the talks. Protestant leaders were more vocal on the issue, whereas Catholic

Primate Dr. Sean Brady, contrary to public expectations, stated he could not

give a detailed view on the issue of Sinn Fein’s suspension and concentrated

on appeals for calm in the Nationalist community.31

The first step leading to the Belfast Agreement was Downing Street Declara-

tion by John Major, then Prime Minister of the UK, and Albert Reynolds, then

Prime Minister of Ireland, which recognized the self-determination rights of



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the Irish people. Northern Ireland could be transferred to the Republic of Ire-

land if (and only if) the majority of the population wanted it. In his memoirs,

Reynolds writes how influential Archbishop Eames and Rev. Magee have been

in drafting the text of the document. Reynolds remembers that throughout his

communications with Major, the man they all trusted was Robin Eames, and

they drafted the text “until finally he was satisfied” that the document addressed

Protestant sensitivities.32 The declaration, issued on December 15, 1993, was

followed by a Provisional Irish Republican Army cease-fire on August 31, 1994.

Although Unionists initially remained skeptical concerning the terms and con-

ditions of the cease-fire, the Combined Loyalist Military Command, consisting

of the Loyalist paramilitary groups including the Ulster Defense Association

and the Ulster Volunteer Force, reciprocated by declaring a similar cease-fire

six weeks later.

Although religious leaders welcomed the developments and hoped that the

peace would ensue after the cease-fires, they also encouraged both sides to

move slowly and cautiously. Religious leaders worked hard to erase the traces

of historical traumas and myths, as laid out in Chapter 2. Church of Ireland

Bishop, Gordon McMullan, drew attention to the need for mutual understand-

ing in the peace process. He stated that he welcomed the paramilitary cease-fire

and although caution is advised, it would be wrong to be cynical about the

intentions behind such an action. “Protestants must show sensitive and sincere

respect for Catholics at personal and political levels as partners of equal citizen-

ship status and the equal responsibilities that citizenship entailed,” McMullan

noted, “The Protestants also need to emerge from the ‘siege mentality’ and

develop a sharp, intelligent, and not least an attractive approach to presenting

their viewpoints, interests, and concerns.”33

Religious leaders encouraged ambitious political steps in search of a peace

process. Political parties had never had the opportunity to work within the

framework of a double cease-fire before, and religious leaders called upon

churches in general to encourage ecumenism and to reach out to the com-

munity. The Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, John Ross, expressed the

ecumenical need in the following words:

One of the reasons there has not been a civil war here is because so manygood decent people tried to live by their Christian principles in trying anddifficult situations. I would encourage the church to give a relevant messageto contemporary society by preaching the gospel through meaningful, vibrantworship and in living a life, which reflects the radical values of the kingdom.34

Ross also added that he would be prepared to worship with Catholics. Vatican

II caused him to realize that, while acknowledging theological differences,



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Presbyterians and Catholics shared much common ground. Recognizing the

differences between the traditions once again, John Dunlop of the Presbyterian

Church also highlighted the need to focus on the “good” instead of empha-

sizing the differences in a letter he wrote regarding the exclusive theology of

the Orange Order and other possible inclusive interpretations:

For many Protestants, the words “Roman Catholic” and the associated wordssuch as “Mass” and “priest” and “chapel” all carry a particularly heavy negativeemotional charge which has been transmitted through the centuries, throughfamily and ideology, theology and preaching, through threat and communityconflict and through orders like the Orange institutions. There are differencesbetween Presbyterianism and Roman Catholicism. It is possible to take thesedifferences seriously without being “anti-Catholic.” However, when anti-Catholicism leads to hatred and precludes any appreciation of anything goodin the Roman Catholic Church, fails to acknowledge any common ground,and prevents any appreciation of our Catholic neighbours and their historyand contemporary experiences, then it has become a serious hindrance tounderstanding and reconciliation.35

Many in Northern Ireland criticized religious leaders for what seemed as

merely engaging in theological discussions behind the scenes and writing

statements condemning violence, but doing little else. The political atmo-

sphere had become much more conducive to these declarations than it had

been in the initial years of the Troubles, when church leaders were just begin-

ning to explore a unified Christian discourse and interpretation. Ambitious

theological innovations – such as challenging the exclusive church doctrines

and emphasis on reaching out to other traditions – had commenced then,

yet these discussions and interactions had not been fully publicized. Indeed,

sensitive discussions occurred in the first two decades of the conflict, but reli-

gious leaders felt unready to share these debates with the general public at a

time of rampant violence. In the 1990s, these concerns abated with the peace

agreement, reports, and political discussions surrounding reconciliation.

One of the milestones in the peace process was the Mitchell Report, pre-

pared by George J. Mitchell, a former member of the US Senate and Special

Advisor on Ireland to President Clinton. On November 28, 1995, British and

Irish governments announced “the launching in Northern Ireland of a ‘twin

track’ process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and

on all-party negotiations.”36 The two tracks were the political track and the

decommissioning track. The political track comprised inviting “the parties

to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement

on the basis, participation, structure, format, and agenda to bring all parties



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Roadblocks and Challenges: Canary Wharf Bombing and Drumcree 105

together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on

consent.”37 The British and Irish governments endorsed the bulk of the report,

but the Republican/Nationalist leadership accused the British policy makers

of “binning the Mitchell Report” by applying its principles selectively and

equivocating.38

The participation of all parties in talks and negotiations had been the core

suggestion of religious leaders of the four churches throughout the years, yet

the politicians had not selected these inclusive arrangements as a way out of the

conflict. The religious epistemic community surrounding the conflict trans-

formation, including religious nongovernmental organizations and leaders of

the four churches, did not let this inclusive agreement option drop out of the

public eye. Initially, politicians have been hesitant to voice inclusive solutions

of the conflict because of the political costs of such a selection. This explains

why religious leaders, and not the political ones, pushed for an inclusive agree-

ment even when the public reacted adversely to it. Politicians selected that

option only after seeing that exclusionary tactics failed and after the public had

grown accustomed to the idea of reaching out to the other in order to attain

stability. Religious epistemic communities, with their consistent discourse on

inclusive political arrangements helped normalize the concept of all-party

negotiations throughout the conflict.

The decommissioning track remained less ambitious, since it was clear that

paramilitaries would not commit to relinquishing their weapons prior to a

political arrangement. However, it addressed the concerns of political actors

who stipulated decommissioning as a precondition to talks. Many religious

actors had been against any preconditions for the political track, but that was

not a viable option for the politicians. The commitment to decommission-

ing, later enforced with the help of religious actors in the following decade,

facilitated “marketing” the agreement to the public.

roadblocks and challenges: canary wharf bombing

and drumcree

Less than two years after its declaration, the Republican paramilitaries revoked

their cease-fire. The air of optimism brought by the Mitchell Report vanished

with the detonation of a Provisional Irish Republican Army bomb in the

Canary Wharf of London’s docklands on February 9, 1996. Sinn Fein tied

the failure of the cease-fire to the UK government’s insistence on not starting

all-party negotiations until the Provisional Irish Republican Army decom-

missioned its weapons. The explosion killed two people, and injured many

others. Despite causing great concern and fear in the international arena,



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however, the bombing did not destroy the peace process altogether. There

was awareness that certain factions within the Provisional Irish Republican

Army were unhappy with the unarmed approach and that it would take time

to control them. The attack was followed by similar acts of violence, such as

the Manchester Bombing, which destroyed a significant part of the city center

on June 15, 1996. Former British Prime Minister, John Major, in his auto-

biography, expressed disillusionment with the Provisional Irish Republican

Army:

Throughout the 17-month ceasefire, intelligence from all sources, overt andcovert, had shown that much of the Provisional movement dissented fromAdams’ “unarmed” strategy, and saw the ceasefire as no more than a tactic.Factions within the IRA did not want to be locked into the peaceful nego-tiations for which we were striving and had been gearing up for a renewedcampaign.39

The bombing alarmed clergy as well. Presbyterian clergy organized a meeting

to debate the implications of the Canary Wharf bombing.40 The Methodist

Church, aware of the challenge posed by these violent segments to the

conciliatory Nationalist movement, called on Unionist parties to talk to

Sinn Fein, a move that was received with surprise and dismay by Unionist

parties.41 Catholic clergy urged the Provisional Irish Republican Army to

restore the cease-fire to allow Sinn Fein back into the talks.42 Even in the face

of a public outcry against the Republican paramilitary violence, mainstream

religious actors remained calm and encouraged further talks between

parties.

Challenges were not confined to the paramilitaries and the possibility of

future bombings by frustrated splinter groups. Both political and religious

actors also faced the Drumcree conflict, which stemmed from the Orange

Order’s desire to march through largely Catholic neighborhoods on its way to

Drumcree Church as part of a ceremonial walk. As detailed in Chapter 2, the

issue of parades has roots that date back to the eighteenth century. This legacy

was one of the reasons why it took so many decades to bring a long-lasting solu-

tion to the conflict. Unionist/Protestant fraternal organizations have celebrated

the benchmarks of their history, such as the Battle of the Boyne, by holding

parades. Since these parades commemorate the victories against Catholic

political actors of the eighteenth century, the conflict was interpreted as a

clash of values. Both sides contributed to the perpetuation of a centuries-old

political narrative. Religious epistemic communities of peacebuilding recog-

nized the symbolic importance of these events. David Stevens, the General

Secretary of the Irish Council of Churches, stated,



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Drumcree and the marching issue magnetize everyone. For many Loyalists,the right to march is the right to be. For many Nationalists, the need to resistis the need to be. Marching and the resistance to it symbolize the fight andrivalry between the two communities and will consume us all unless we findsome other way.43

Although there had always been tension between Catholic residents and

Protestant marchers, the 1990s witnessed large-scale protest and rioting on

both sides. The first of these confrontations took place in 1995, ironically a

period of relative stability, which did not stop the Orange Order from carrying

out the ritual of marching with an increasing number of members. A possible

explanation for the timing of this confrontation might be that on both sides,

there was fear that the ongoing agreements would fail to bring practical solu-

tions. Both sides felt the need to express their identities even more strongly, so

that the other parties to the agreement would take their worries and identities

into account. This is why periods leading up to peace agreements are often

the most sensitive ones, and religious epistemic communities are expected to

play a vital role in allaying the concerns of their communities.

The confrontations challenged the Church of Ireland because of its links

with the Orange Order.44 Church clergy tried hard to put distance between

themselves and the expressions of the Orange Order. These attempts are parts

of an epistemic innovation, which aimed to recreate Christian interpretations

devoid of extremes. The Church of Ireland had traditionally been affiliated

with the Orange Order for more than two centuries, and until recently, that

link had gone relatively unchallenged. The Anglicanism of the eighteenth

century had brought together the church and Protestant fraternal organiza-

tions. However, seeing that the theological discussions focusing on reaching

out, moderation, and the centrality of Christian stewardship in the public

sphere did not coincide with the Orange Order’s tradition-centered Protestant

exclusivism, the Church of Ireland disengaged from Loyalist politics and the

order’s agenda.

Reflecting this distancing, James Mehaffey called the Orange Order to

revise its agenda, and he noted that the order could not “wash its hands of

civil disorder arising from Orange church parade.”45 Retired cleric Canon

William Arlow, who took part in the 1974 Feakle Talks with the Provisional

Irish Republican Army, wrote the Drumcree confrontations should never have

happened:

Drumcree has now come to be perceived as a symbol of the Church ofIreland, at least the part of it which is in Northern Ireland. It is a symbol of achurch which seems to be an adjunct of a particular political party that is too



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preoccupied with reflecting the political views of the majority of its members,that is clearly identified with an organisation regarded by many Protestantsand most Roman Catholics as sectarian and divisive, and that it bends overbackwards to be supportive of those who willingly use force to achieve theirpolitical goal.46

Church of Ireland Primate Robin Eames called for calm and warned against

the threats Drumcree posed for the recently acquired stability of the society:

Drumcree is a part of a wider problem and it cannot be separated from it. Thereal question is how do we, as a community, reach a point in which there isa realistic recognition of the just rights to celebrate and observe religious andcivic freedom on the part of both traditions. That point will never be reachedthrough violence or destruction of lives or property. What we have witnessedovernight across this province can achieve nothing, but if continued will pushus all back into the nightmare we prayed had been left behind. I understandthe fears and resentment of the Orange Order members at Drumcree aswell as the feelings of the Garvaghy Road Residents Association. I appealto everyone to resist the temptation to fall into the trap of violent words oractions, which will delete the legitimacy of protest on either side.47

His attempts to bring an end to the equation of the Orange Order and Drum-

cree to the Church of Ireland challenged Robin Eames, who regarded himself

as an agent of peace, rather than part of a traditionalist sectarian group advo-

cating an exclusive understanding of Christianity. The Orange Order’s actions

threatened the reliability of the public theology religious leaders were jointly

creating. Even if not as influential as a united Christian voice, the Orange

Order had enjoyed control over some Protestant communities. As a represen-

tative of a discursive community (if not an epistemic one), the Orange Order

had devoted supporters. Not surprisingly, Eames later revealed that he felt

personally threatened by the response to his calls for an end to the Drumcree

protest.48 However, at the time, he rejected the linkage of the church to the

Orange Order:

There is not and never has been any official link between the Church of Ire-land and the Orange Institution. The connection – if connection is the rightword – is through membership of the Order by members of the Church ofIreland. This is their freedom of choice. In the constitution of the Order thereis what could be termed a strong religious tone. In the support of ReformedProtestantism there is contained in the constitution of the Order referenceto the Roman Catholic tradition. Such prohibitions as to contact with thattradition have led to the charge of sectarianism. As a churchman dedicatedto building bridges in the community, I regret that situation deeply.49



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Following the Drumcree walk in 1996, some Protestants blocked local Catholic

churches. Religious leaders united in the face of ensuing boycotts (mostly

Protestants who refused to buy from Catholics or the Irish Republic) and

stalemates. Presbyterian Moderator Harry Allen, Catholic Archbishop Sean

Brady, Church of Ireland Primate Robin Eames, and Methodist President

Ken Best emphasized the rights of all people to worship in freedom and once

again, they issued a joint statement.50 Church of Ireland clergy searched for

solutions to the standoff, through direct talks with the Orange Order and

through public statements, making clear that the theology of the Order did

not necessarily51 coincide with that of the Church of Ireland.

The standoff resulted in property damage in Catholic areas. Violent protests

on both sides threatened the intercommunal relationships and legitimacy of

ecumenical communication. In 1996, a Presbyterian group – 25 members of

the Presbyterian Church who said sins of rebellion, anger, and sectarianism

had been perpetrated over the summer in the “supposed cause” of civil and

religious liberty – asked for “forgiveness” for the violent protests that had

desecrated Catholic churches. Catholic clergy took this opportunity to declare

their own regrets over the violence perpetuated by groups associated with the

Catholic faith:

We, for our part, wish to extend unreservedly the forgiveness asked for byour Presbyterian brothers and sisters. We in our turn publicly ask forgivenessfrom Almighty God and from our Protestant neighbours for our guilt byassociation in past wrongs inflicted on them as well as any personal guiltby action, omission, or silence that has contributed to the hurts, sectarianbitterness, and divisions.52

In the following years, church leaders continued to call for calm during the

parades. James Moore, the Church of Ireland Bishop of Connor, stated that the

burning of churches and halls, the continued picketing of mass-goers at Har-

ryville had left Northern Ireland in a dangerous spiral of hurt and division.53

Presbyterian Moderator Sam Hutchinson called for action by the Portadown

Orange Order or Garvaghy Residents’ Coalition to defuse Drumcree, asking

one of the parties to nobly waive their rights for the good of the commu-

nity.54 Sacrifice and forgiveness had been at the center of the joint Christian

prescriptions and interpretation. The Church of Ireland tried to show that it

was part of the epistemic community that produced those interpretations, not

a ritualistic and exclusive discursive community that defined Christianity in

narrower terms.

Prior to the agreement, church leaders continued working on ecumeni-

cal arrangements, meeting with various parties, and issuing joint statements.



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Church leaders became especially active participants in political reconcilia-

tion. For example, breaking with its established practice, Ulster Unionist Party

met with the Catholic Church as part of a consultation process to determine if

the party should go into talks with Sinn Fein, even though decommissioning

was not a precondition to negotiations.55

On the way to a formal agreement, religious leaders intensified their efforts

to consolidate the Christian vision of citizenship and peaceful coexistence

they had advocated for years. They tried to come up with formal initiatives

with concrete results. The four main churches in Derry, represented by James

Mehaffey (Church of Ireland), Seamus Hegarty (Catholic), Gilbert Young

(Presbyterian), and Fred Munce (Methodist) launched a strategy to heal divi-

sions between the two traditions in the city. The new development strategy

represented the most comprehensive attempt made by religious leaders of the

two traditions to challenge sectarianism.56

Church leaders also established educational programs to spread the epistemethey had been advancing. Five churches from three main denominations – the

Church of the Resurrection Catholic Church, Fortwilliam Park Presbyterian,

Rosemary Presbyterian, St. Gerard’s Roman Catholic, and St. Peter’s Church

of Ireland – came together to offer what came to be called an “Alpha Course”

on the basics of Christianity. One of the organizers, Rev. Tom Wilson, noted,

It is not focused on divisive issues but rather covers important foundationalareas that many Christians, whatever their denominational background, sharein common. It is not surprising, therefore that both Catholics and Protestantsare interested in running Alpha here. Leaders from the small groups from theabove churches have already been meeting for training and prayer. Thesemeetings were characterized by open, warm relationships, by committedapplication to the task in hand, and by a strong spirit of Christian unity.57

In addition to these initiatives, senior Catholic, Church of Ireland, Pres-

byterian, and Methodist actors participated in what was called the New

Agenda political initiative involving business, trade union, and civil society

leaders, though, once again, they stressed that their role was personal

rather than institutional. Among the leaders were former Catholic Primate

Cahal Daly, former Presbyterian Moderator John Dunlop, retired Church

of Ireland Bishop Samuel Poyntz, and former Methodist President Ken

Best. The nine-point program of the civic leaders furthered by this New

Agenda included maximum autonomy for Northern Ireland “consistent with

a decentralizing United Kingdom” and maximum development of relations

with the Irish Republic “for mutual interest and reconciliation.”58 In this

framework, the 1990s witnessed important changes in the ways people viewed



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and expressed their history in Ireland, and church groups took an active role

in reinterpreting popular historical myths and educating public.59

New cross-community initiatives (resembling the Corrymeela, the Corner-

stone Community, and the Currach of the 1970s and 1980s) were established

to bring Protestants and Catholics together.60 A special center, for example,

was opened on the grounds of Springfield Road Methodist Church aimed to

bring together local Catholics and Protestants. It won grants from the Euro-

pean Union, the International Fund for Ireland, Making Belfast Work, and

the Department of Environment’s urban development scheme.61 These ini-

tiatives also showed that the Christian episteme of peacebuilding was capable

of drawing secular attention. It was a kind of epistemic approach that defined

what Christianity meant in public life, and clergy, as the political atmosphere

became normalized, made sure that this knowledge was supported materially.

The inclusive yet ambitious theology the churches espoused led to tensions

between the laypeople and the leadership as well. For example, a number

of Methodists attacked church leadership for backing a new Bloody Sunday

inquiry along with other churches and urging Unionists to talk to Sinn Fein

after a Provisional Irish Republican Army cease-fire.62 Clergy did not back off

from their inclusive theology and political activism. The Church of Ireland,

despite protests of its conservative members, urged Unionist leader David

Trimble to take political risks, agree to negotiate with Sinn Fein, and not use

decommissioning as an excuse for not talking.63 The continuation of clerical

initiatives despite opposition of laypeople also refutes arguments that church

leaders carried out these actions to be “popular” on the political scene.64

the belfast agreement: reclaiming the peace

The prospect of the Belfast Agreement became the new hope of the Northern

Irish people. At the same time, the failures of similar arrangements in the

past concerned both society and policy makers; any hasty attempt to sign

a half-baked agreement might have resulted in the loss of both rights and a

community’s voice in daily political affairs. Church leaders, including Church

of Ireland Primate Robin Eames, Catholic Primate Archbishop Sean Brady,

and Presbyterian Moderator Sam Hutchinson, praised the talks yet warned

society about the need for everyone to read the settlement document before

deciding what it meant.65 Expectedly, although they assumed a guiding role in

political affairs by creating a theological framework into which a reconciliation

agreement would fit, religious leaders did not want to take full responsibility

for any political decision.



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The agreement was signed on April 10, 1998, by British and Irish govern-

ments and approved by most Northern Irish political parties, with the signif-

icant exception of Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party. The agreement

covered the following main issues:

� Parties agreed that no major change in the constitutional status of North-

ern Ireland could be carried out without the consent of the majority of

citizens, and all parties would follow peaceful and democratic means;

the citizens of Northern Ireland would be free to choose Irish or British

citizenship (or both). A 108-member Northern Ireland Assembly was to

be established, elected by proportional representation having legislative

and executive power. Members of this legislative assembly would openly

declare whether they were of Unionist or Nationalist orientation to allow

cross-community voting and give a voice to both political views.� A Northern Ireland Executive – based on power sharing – was to be

established.� A North-South Ministerial Council was established covering 12 subject

areas of cooperation (Transportation, Agriculture, Education, Health,

Environment, Tourism, Inland Waterways, Food Safety, Trade and Busi-

ness Development, Special EU Programs, Language, Aquacultural and

Marine Matters) between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.� The Republic of Ireland’s territorial claim – which dated to 1937 – was to

be dropped by modification of Articles 2 and 3 in its constitution.� A British-Irish Governmental Council was established in order to promote

“the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands.”� A Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission was established – the

Northern Ireland Victims Commission was to be part of the reconciliation

work.� A reform program was started for the police force led by the Independent

Commission for Policing in Northern Ireland.� The participants were called to “use any influence they may have to

achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years”

and within these two years, conditional release of paramilitaries would

take place for members belonging to groups that observed the cease-fire.

In May 1998, there were separate referendums concerning the Belfast Agree-

ment. The referendum in Northern Ireland was a direct vote on the agreement,

while the vote in the Republic of Ireland was a vote to amend the Irish consti-

tution in line with the Belfast Agreement. A large majority in both parts of the

island favored the agreement. The agreement provided a way to get over the

controversial national question, the question of the border, to the satisfaction of



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all parties. It acknowledged for nationalists the right of self-determination and

for Unionists the right of consent. The border would remain as reflecting the

wishes of the majority in Northern Ireland. If a majority later wanted a united

Ireland this would be granted. In other words, the right of people in Northern

Ireland to be British, or Irish, or both was guaranteed. All parties agreed to

renounce violence. Also, the agreement set up specific arrangements about

significant policy issues such as power sharing, the coordination of north-south

and east-west bodies and policing.

For many Loyalists, the Belfast agreement still meant bringing the Irish

Republic too much into Northern Ireland politics especially by the North-

South ministerial council. For the Republicans who had been working for

a “united Ireland,” the agreement meant there was no such possibility in

the near future, and Ireland was withdrawing its official support from the

idea. Despite these protests, church leaders continued to lend support and

give advice to participating politicians. The Church of Ireland Archbishop of

Dublin, Walton Empey, stated there could be no better time for peace and

reconciliation, and accused “Orange and Green intransigence” of bringing

Northern Ireland to the brink of disaster again.66 Church leaders continued

to issue statements underlining the need for engaging all segments of the

societies, including paramilitaries.

In the meantime, church leaders, for the most part, refrained from openly

directing the public toward a “yes,” although they implicitly supported the

talks.67 The Methodist Church stated it regarded the Belfast Agreement as

“a genuine attempt to make a new beginning” in Northern Ireland.68 The

Presbyterian Church expressed that “the Belfast Agreement does not represent

defeat or assimilation, but is a political accommodation which could be a way

out of the darkness of the last 30 years into a better future.”69 The Catholic

primate, Sean Brady, noted that “Ireland’s Catholic bishops will not be telling

people how to vote in the forthcoming referendum on the Belfast Agreement,”

although he added that he believed the Belfast Agreement offered “great hope

for the future” and had the potential “to remove the nightmare forever.”70 One

of the very few church leaders who publicly declared his position, Church of

Ireland Primate Robin Eames, did so in a cautious manner, stating that he

agonized over “almost every page of the document” before deciding to vote

“yes” in the referendum.71

Right after the signing of the agreement, religious leaders boosted their joint

activities. In May 1998, the four main churches came together to address the

challenge of sectarianism in light of the agreement’s provisions. The regu-

lar meetings, which had been previously known as Ballymascalon talks, were

institutionalized under the name Irish Interchurch Meeting. An informal



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church leaders’ group, made up of the Catholic Primate, Church of Ireland

Primate, the Presbyterian Moderator, and the Methodist President was to be

established as well. The interchurch body would be equally divided between

the Catholic and Protestant churches; Catholics would have 37 members, the

Church of Ireland and Presbyterian 10 each, Methodists 5, and other smaller

churches a total of 12.72 The documents drawn as a result of subsequent ecu-

menical meetings focused on “common understanding of the doctrine of

justification through Faith Alone which has traditionally divided Protestants

and Roman Catholics.”73 Even conservative evangelicals – who were not part

of the Paisley’s Free Presbyterian Church – joined the efforts to enhance cross-

community understanding. Theological discussions conveyed the Christian

bases of ecumenism from both Protestant and Catholic perspectives. John

Dunlop, Convenor of the Presbyterian Church and Government Committee,

noted, “It is gratifying that some paramilitary groups, which have visited such

horrendous suffering and dislocation upon individuals, towns, cities, and com-

munities and which have inhibited progress for so long, appear to be getting

themselves out of the way.”74 After the signing of the agreement, Belfast was

selected as a member of the World Council of Churches’ peace cities; it was

connected to six other cities around the world in a new church initiative to

combat rising violence.75

The Irish Interchurch Meeting covered the implementation of the peace

agreement, about enhancing economic conditions for Northern Irish youth,

and about integrating Northern Ireland into the global economy so that there

would be no return to the violence. Almost 500 students from Northern Ireland

and the border counties have been sent to American colleges for business

training under a Presbyterian/Catholic initiative. John Carr of the US Catholic

Conference and a member of the interchurch committee, stated that

churches can’t simply stand from afar and issue grand statements or commenton the actions of politicians. They have to make their own contribution and infact by standing up for fair employment, by pursuing investment, the churchesmove from words to some small action that can contribute to the process. Theyoung people who come to the United States, they learn something aboutU.S. business practice but they teach about the realities of life in NorthernIreland. What most Americans know is about the Troubles and that is all theyknow.76

The Belfast Agreement constituted the official end of the Troubles. Although

peace on the ground was still fragile, the parties to the conflict consider the

Belfast Agreement the beginning of a new era. The violence on the streets

continued, yet not with the same intensity as it had throughout the Troubles.



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The peace agreement was not signed merely because of religious leaders’

actions or changing governance theologies. However, the fact that religious

leaders continued their efforts intensively helped legitimize reconciliation

efforts in the public sphere and redefined Christian citizenship. This then

helped political actors to come to an agreement that was acceptable to both

the public and paramilitaries. These actions of the religious leaders sometimes

negatively affected their standing among their communities, which was to be

expected for those leaders engaging in ambitious outreach activities. Contrary

to the arguments of some scholars, this proves that it was not the expectations of

the congregants that defined clerical action, but a shared conviction and belief

in particular theological premises that prescribed ecumenism and peaceful

coexistence.

The range of activities in which religious leaders involved themselves con-

tinued to broaden in the 1990s. The condemnation of violence continued,

and clergy did their best to help their counterparts in other denominations

stand up to violence against their property. Ecumenical meetings became

more common, as stability levels increased. Some members of the clergy, as

detailed in the chapter, met with both paramilitaries and political parties to

encourage their contribution to the peace process and to set the acceptable

minimum that all parties would need to willingly come to the table. In terms

of theological innovations, the 1970s and 1980s were richer than the 1990s.

When one examines the trajectory of the conflict, the innovative perspectives

advocated for, and furthered in, those years became the “actions” of the 1990s.

Religious leaders, having created a theological framework in the earlier two

decades, intensified their efforts to realize an inclusive Christian society that

could collaborate for peace and welfare. They started to become part of the

formal initiatives, applied for outside grants to realize Christian projects, and

guided the laity in vital political arrangements such as the Brooke-Mayhew

Talks and the Belfast Agreement. They also played a key role in defusing crises

such as the Drumcree standoff and the interruptions in paramilitary cease-fires.

In short, the religious epistemic communities of peacebuilding continued to

create a particular interpretation and more importantly, they translated these

interpretations into action and policies that enabled political parties to find

common ground without expecting too much from the “other.”



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6

Religious Epistemic Communities

in a Postconflict Setting

Belfast Agreement marked the end of the Troubles. However, the agreement

did not immediately translate into a positive peace in the sense of freeing

the society either from physical or identity-related threats. The challenges of

enforcement, especially in such controversial issues as decommissioning and

establishing a police force, continued to occupy the minds of policy makers

who strived for a sustainable peace. Within this framework, religious actors

assumed the role of “enforcers” and “communicators” after the agreement.

Diminishing violence facilitated the arguments for ecumenical dialogue,

giving religious leaders more space to make statements and launch new

initiatives.

Politicians (including the leadership of Democratic Unionist Party and

Sinn Fein) and paramilitaries consulted religious leaders on matters ranging

from power sharing to decommissioning. The issue of how much advice was

appropriate and which kinds of prescriptions were needed continued to raise

questions, especially since the churches were not traditionally an active part of

the conflict transformation. However, in the post–Belfast Agreement Northern

Ireland, the churches started to actively get involved in the normalization of

relations. In other words, the epistemic community was no longer composed

only of individual religious leaders; it now had a degree of institutional backing

from the churches.

What kind of role did religious leaders assume after the peace agreement

and which issues are they still dealing with today? As noted, perhaps the

most important feature of the last decade is churches’ active participation in

the peacebuilding. Debates about secularization and the churches’ struggles

to remain relevant stayed at the forefront of the clerical agenda. The major

political challenges religious leaders helped solve were the decommissioning

of arms, establishment of an inclusive police force, and the ending of sectarian

attacks. In the meantime, the interest of religious leaders in global affairs

116



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Churches Coming Along? Institutionalization of the Epistemic Communities 117

increased and so did their desire to present a unified voice in the face of world

conflicts ranging from the war in Iraq to the Middle East peace process.

churches coming along? institutionalization of the

epistemic communities

In the previous chapters, we have explored a religious epistemic commu-

nity comprising individual religious leaders and nongovernmental organiza-

tions actively working to create and consolidate inclusive public theologies

that delineate a unified Christian understanding of citizenship. However,

churches, as institutions, had not necessarily joined this epistemic community

at all times. Religious actors, who attempted bold moves, such as communicat-

ing with paramilitaries or proposing alternative theological approaches, for the

most part described their efforts as “personal” and not necessarily representa-

tive of their churches. The churches, in a majority of these cases of ambitious

initiatives by their clergy, remained silent. This does not constitute an obstacle

to framing religious actors as epistemic communities, because professionals

do not need to bring institutional support when they are forming a community

of expertise.

In postconflict Northern Ireland, however, religious actors pushed for insti-

tutional support. Olive Hobson, an active member of Quaker House Belfast

which specializes in peace-building initiatives, states that although she believes

the churches could have done more during the conflict, in postconflict North-

ern Ireland churches are finding creative ways of addressing concerns both

internally and externally.1 Especially after the signing of the Belfast Agree-

ment, religious leaders openly expressed their criticism of institutions and the

need for the churches to join active efforts to rebuild trust in the divided soci-

ety. Johnson McMaster, coordinator for the Irish School of Ecumenics adult

education program, stated that

theologically, if Northern Ireland is not yet in a postconservative and postlib-eral society, it soon needs to be . . . Perhaps the lack of such theologies is thereason for the less-than-adequate responses from the institutional churchestowards the reconciliation process in Northern Ireland.2

The postagreement concern of the churches will remain relevant in a society

that struggled to overcome the political and ethnic divisions. Religious leaders

assumed an active role in redefining the responsibilities of the churches as

institutions. Archbishop of Armagh, Alan Harper stated that churches had to

find a new role in public life in twenty-first-century Ireland and needed to

persuade people of their points of view rather than expect people to simply



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118 Religious Epistemic Communities in a Postconflict Setting

listen to them.3 Presbyterian Moderator, Ken Newell, noted that “the danger

facing the church is dead thought, theology disconnected from life, language

that doesn’t light up people, and ideas that just don’t make sense.”4 Speaking

at his service at the opening of the annual conference in Enniskillen, Win-

ston Graham, then incoming President of the Methodist Church, similarly

expressed that Methodists needed to look beyond themselves and to catch a

wider vision.5 Graham’s theme for the year 2002 was “the role of God’s pil-

grim people, united in mission, prayer, service, and witness,” and he was keen

on emphasizing that the church’s role was primarily about “people and their

needs and concerns, rather than about buildings.”6

Earlier in the decade, the former Archbishop of Armagh, Robin Eames had

also written that all the main churches were struggling with the meaning of

peace, and for which actions the credo “love your enemies” really calls. Reli-

gious leaders recognized that to remain relevant, churches had to “compete”

with nonreligious organizations and ideologies. Archbishop Eames stated the

duty of the Christian church in the following words:

Pluralism is an admirable vision for Ireland, but the Christian church needsto recognize that its message must compete as never before with a myriad ofother philosophies and value codes, which do not have the Resurrection astheir core truth. It has to remind the community that its eternal values stillhold the key to lasting hope, satisfaction, and fulfillment for individuals, aswell as for society as a whole. It needs to recognize the secular society not asan enemy, but as a challenge.7

In order to play a constructive role in the society, the need to remain neutral

to party politics was emphasized. Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, Ken

Newell, stated that since Christ excluded no one, neither should church

leaders:

It is important for any church to separate itself from a direct connection with aparticular political grouping, and it is important for the Presbyterian Churchto remember that its fundamental calling is to the Kingdom of God. Weshould think seriously about distancing ourselves from an identity with theUnited Kingdom, just as I would encourage Catholic churches to disassociatethemselves from the whole United Ireland thing, if there are flags involved.8

These debates about remaining relevant in public life led to the expression of

concerns about secularism. Eames noted that the church faced the challenge

of “corrosive remains of deep and destructive” secularism, and that churches

“have appeared less confident in their official utterances.”9 Cardinal Cahal

Daly put this concern in the boldest terms possible when he stated that



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secularism is “more anonymous and more subtle than either Nazism or

Communism were” as a threat to faith.10 Trevor Morrow, Moderator of

the Presbyterian Church, commented that a combination of consumerism

and individualism meant the church is treated more like a restaurant or

supermarket “than as an essential expression of a person’s identity.”11 The

Catholic Bishop of Clogher, Joseph Duffy, and his Church of Ireland

counterpart, Bishop Michael Jackson, also stated that the Irish people needed

to reassess their values, and holidays like Christmas provide an opportunity to

do so; they claimed that “society has suffered due to a slide toward secularism,

and there is currently great anxiety about a loss of the sacred.”12 This concern

has always existed among church leaders. Yet, with the end of the violence

and an increasing level of stability, more nongovernmental organizations

began operating in Northern Ireland. The energy and money directed toward

these additional activities and organizations concerned the churches.

Belfast Agreement also led to the opening of new public classes on Christian

theology. The President of the Methodist Church in Ireland, Kenneth Todd,

announced details of the first theology course to be taught jointly by Protestant

and Catholic colleges.13 This was a major step in the selection and diffusionof an inclusive public theology that was first produced by religious leaders

in the initial years of the conflict. In other words, whereas the 1970s and the

1980s witnessed theological innovation, the diffusion of this interpretation to

the public was delayed until the theological innovations became a mode of life

(selection) and a relative state of stability was achieved. Church publications

also followed the lead.14 Protestant church leaders joined forces to endorse

a new ecumenical prayerbook written by a Catholic priest.15 The Church of

Ireland and the Methodist Church even considered unified services; the draft

document acknowledged both churches’ common inheritance and ordained

ministries and stated the next steps should include joint prayer and worship,

sharing resources, and uniting Methodist and Church of Ireland congrega-

tions.16 In May 2002, leaders of the Church of Ireland and the Methodist

Church supported a new covenant between their churches, on the opening

day of the General Synod in Dublin. Harold Good, President of the Methodist

Church, wrote: “The Bible is full of ‘journey stories,’ but almost without excep-

tion they are stories of people who were called to journey – not knowing where

it would take them. But in the providence and will of God, their journeys took

them to places of promise, freedom, and new opportunity.”17

These ecumenical initiatives were much more pronounced when compared

to the initiatives of the previous years. A Church of Ireland committee called

for new moves toward creating an inclusive ecumenical body for Ireland,

which would mean formalization of the interdenominational communication,



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a move unimaginable 20 years earlier.18 The Methodist Church became the

first religious organization in Northern Ireland to sign on to a community

relations charter. The “One Step Peace Initiative” aimed to encourage people

to play their part in building peace. Signing up to support the campaign, Fred

Munce of the Methodist Church stated that “we must all take steps to steer

our communities in the right direction, and we all have our parts to play in

securing a better Northern Ireland.”19

In addition to the public initiatives, the churches created “peacemaking

offices” that would partner with nongovernmental organizations focusing on

peacebuilding, and have an active say in structuring the postconflict soci-

ety. The Presbyterian Church notes that the Peacemaking Program’s overall

purpose is “to develop initiatives, targeted at both youth and adult levels, to

challenge, equip, and support members, congregations, presbyteries, boards,

committees, and agencies of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland to contribute

more actively to a stable and lasting peace in Ireland.”20 The Methodist

Church and the Church of Ireland have also established similar offices within

their church structures. The Catholic Church does not have a peace office

in the institutional sense; yet the Clonard Monastery, which was a hub of

ecumenical dialogue during the Troubles, is still serving as a partner to the

other peace offices.

Apart from establishing peace offices, the churches continued to deal with

theological conflicts that had practical implications. One major challenge

creating an obstacle to ecumenical relations on the ground was the Dominus

Jesus document that was published on August 6, 2000. This document was

drafted by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, one of the oldest of

nine congregations under the Vatican and one of the actors defining Catholic

Doctrine. The Dominus Jesus document was approved by Pope John Paul

II and became a part of official Catholic Doctrine. It was a statement regard-

ing how the Catholic Church understood itself and how it related to other

churches and it emphasized that “there exists a single Church of Christ, which

subsists in the Catholic Church, governed by the Successor of Peter and by

the Bishops in communion with him,” and salvation is possible only through

the Catholic Church.21 It had the opposite impact of the Second Vatican

Council, which had recognized alternative paths of salvation and conceptual

equality of different churches. In 2000, the Presbyterian, Church of Ireland,

and Methodist denominations had agreed to study in detail their understand-

ings of the Catholic Church.22 Irish Catholic and Protestant church leaders

met to debate the controversial Vatican document that attacked Reformed

churches.23 The document came as a challenge that was unexpected even

by the local Catholic churches themselves, and the crisis showed how



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institutional top-down knowledge production might differ from individual

initiatives that focused on bottom-up approaches. The Vatican document was

unquestionably a bitter pill to swallow for the Protestant world in general, but

in addition, it constituted a special challenge in the context of a divided society

trying to merge the existing gaps between different traditions. Religious actors

overcame the crisis. They had encountered similar difficulties in recent years

and had established personal relations with clergy of other denominations.

In a way, the clergy in Northern Ireland created their own public theologies

without paying too much attention to the particular documents presenting

a challenge. Church leaders conducted the theological arguments among

themselves, and they did not reveal the controversies to an already sensitive

public.

Despite such theological challenges that led to internal ecclesiastical

debates, churches, and religious leaders continued to interact with politi-

cal parties.24 Especially Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein, agreed to

meetings and consultations with churches, which was a new step for both

parties. In December 2006, the Church of Ireland Primate Archbishop Robin

Eames led a group of bishops for talks with Sinn Fein leaders at Stormont, in a

delegation including Bishop Alan Harper of Connor, Bishop Michael Jackson

of Clogher, Bishop Ken Good of Derry, and Bishop Ken Clarke of Kilmore.

The Archbishop and some other members of the clergy had met senior Sinn

Fein politicians on social and other occasions, but this was the first formal

meeting of the two groups.25 Archbishop Eames noted,

This is part of an ongoing series of meetings between the parties and theChurch of Ireland. We want to discuss a number of matters with Sinn Feinand we will be asking them questions in three main areas – about theirsupport for the police, how they see the future education system in NorthernIreland, and also how they view the way forward for shared government.26

Presbyterian leaders held private talks with the Democratic Unionist Party on

its plan to restore devolved government in February 2004.27 The Church of

Ireland made official contacts with Democratic Unionist Party over the matters

of power sharing and devolution. The meetings, which included Democratic

Unionist Party Deputy Leader Peter Robinson, Party Chair Lord Morrow,

and Assembly Member Arlene Foster, also dealt with a number of social and

economic issues including relationships with Britain and the Irish Republic.

Eames stated they had “pressed hard” on the policing issue to realize the

proposal to create a joint Protestant/Catholic police force instead of the current

predominantly Protestant force, also an agenda item on the Church of Ireland’s

meeting with Sinn Fein.28 Sinn Fein was resistant to a unified police force, yet



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the conversations about the issue were still deemed constructive. In January

2007, Sinn Fein finally endorsed the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

Unexpectedly, Democratic Unionist Party agreed to conduct talks with the

Catholic Church in October 2006. Religious Affairs Correspondent of the

Belfast Telegraph, Alf McCreary regards this meeting as a turning point, since

Paisley was known for his opposition to Catholicism:

Ian Paisley, the founder and lifelong Moderator of the Free PresbyterianChurch, built his early career as a Unionist politician on his attacks on theCatholic Church and its leaders. He scathingly referred to various popes as“old red socks,” and in 1963, he organized a march to protest against thelowering of the Union flag on Belfast’s City Hall, following the death ofPope John XXIII. Mr. Paisley’s opposition to Catholicism in general and toindividual popes in particular has continued throughout his political life.In 1988, he made international headlines in the European Parliament byinterrupting a speech by Pope John Paul II by claiming that the Pontiff was“the Antichrist.”29

It was the first time the Democratic Unionist Party leader, Ian Paisley, agreed

to such talks, and they came within two days of intensive discussions on

devolution and power sharing involving the Irish Prime Minister, the British

Prime Minister and Northern party leaders who met in Scotland. The parties

discussed devolution and the need to support the forces of law and order.

Paisley described the meeting as “a good and useful encounter,” and Brady,

the Catholic Church representative, stated that the meeting had been “helpful

and constructive,” with both sides agreeing on the importance of a stable

devolved administration in the North.30 Connections between political parties

and religious actors solidified; this marked a turn in attitude, for during the

conflict’s initial years, political parties had been much more hesitant to involve

the churches in their affairs.

After the agreement, churches continued to conduct talks with paramil-

itaries as well. Church leaders from the three main Protestant denominations

personally backed a new mediation initiative to stop the Ulster Defence Asso-

ciation/ Loyalist Volunteer Force feud, which had arisen out of differences the

groups held concerning the terms of decommissioning and the postconflict

role of Loyalists. This feud constituted a serious challenge to stability in

Northern Ireland; Ulster Defence Association and Loyalist Volunteer Force

were prominent paramilitary groups that had the potential to carry violence

back to the streets, toward both each other and Republican paramilitary

organizations. Church of Ireland Primate Robin Eames, Presbyterian

Moderator Russell Birney, and senior Methodist leader, Harold Good, who



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sat on the umbrella commission, held separate talks with Ulster Defence

Association commanders and Shankill paramilitary chief Johnny Adair in

a peace-brokering move.31 In the end, both groups agreed to stand down

following the full decommissioning of Provisional Irish Republican Army.

In April 2009, the Ulster Defence Association’s political wing, the Ulster

Political Research Group, met the head of the Roman Catholic Church

in Ireland for the first time, which shows the status the Catholic Church

had acquired in the eyes of the Loyalist segments of the society. Frankie

Gallagher, Ulster Political Research Group’s head, admitted that talks with

the Catholic Church would not have been possible “three, or even two years

ago” and “we would have still been going through our own consultations and

talking to people on the ground, and it just could not have happened.”32 This

recognition of the Catholic Church by Loyalist paramilitaries, once again

shows that although one could talk about an epistemic community of religious

actors during the initial years of the Troubles, the churches, as institutions,

came into the equation only after a comprehensive peace agreement was

agreed on by all parties. The role played by the religious leaders during

decommissioning, as explored in the next section, also consolidated the

status of these actors as part of a unified epistemic community of conflict

transformation.

relinquishing arms: decommissioning and public order

Decommissioning, in the context of the Northern Irish case, refers to the disar-

mament of paramilitary groups. The Belfast Agreement did not specify the time

frame for decommissioning, and this ambiguity raised a number of challenges.

Paramilitary groups were unwilling to relinquish their arms before the other

side had done so. Issues of decommissioning led to interruptions of political

stability in Stormont. Political progress came to a standstill in February 2000

when Secretary of State Peter Mandelson suspended the fledgling power-

sharing Stormont executive upon the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s

refusal to commit to a timetable for decommissioning. Nationalists wanted

executive institutions restored immediately, but Unionists refused to sit in gov-

ernment with Sinn Fein again until the Republican paramilitaries committed

to giving up their weapons. In a public statement, Archbishop Robin Eames

noted: “No one doubts the problems facing politicians and governments as

they seek answers to seemingly impossible questions . . . Time is no longer a

luxury in the search for that stability. The longer solutions are delayed, the

greater are the opportunities for those with undemocratic agendas to exert

influence on our lives.”33



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In such instances of deadlock, notably, clergy sought solutions by forming

advisory committees, another indication that the epistemic community of reli-

gious actors had consolidated in post–Belfast Agreement Northern Ireland. In

the political deadlock of the early 2000s during which Sinn Fein and Union-

ists refused to communicate with each other, senior Protestant and Roman

Catholic clergy held private discussions with Sinn Fein and Ulster Unionists.

Presbyterian Minister Ken Newell, whose Belfast church had developed close

links with Clonard Monastery, chaired the pro-agreement church group. The

12-member group included religious actors like the Tim Bartlett of St. Mary’s

College; Paul Reid, Presbyterian Minister; Lesley McCarroll, Presbyterian

Minister; Church of Ireland, Canon Gregor McCamley; and senior Methodist

leaders David Cooper and Harold Good. Secret sessions were held at Stormont

that involved separate meetings with former First Minister David Trimble and

former Education Minister Martin McGuinness. The Sinn Fein delegation

that met church leaders also included North Belfast Assembly Member Gerry

Kelly, Belfast councilor Tom Hartley, and senior Republican activist Jim

Gibney. Religious actors refrained from commenting about the meetings,

whereas politicians expressed their satisfaction with them.34

In such an atmosphere, the Provisional Irish Republican Army offered to

give up its arms and concentrate on political developments, a development

that surprised many political and religious actors. Presbyterian Moderator

Trevor Morrow stated that he had not been expecting this statement, which

had “gone further than I thought it possible for them to go.” At the same

time, he expressed his reservations about his Methodist counterpart’s bold

attempt at advising Loyalists to take ambitious steps in giving up their arms.35

As noted previously, not all members of the clergy shared the same comfort

level when it came to advising paramilitaries to give up their arms. On the

other hand, religious actors welcomed the verification and consultation role in

decommissioning. Eames stated that churches would have a moral obligation

to do what they could to bring about peace if there was a request to help verify

Provisional Irish Republican Army decommissioning.36

The deadlock over the paramilitaries’ refusal to commit to a decommis-

sioning plan lasted more than a year. When the paramilitary group finally

accepted a timetable, members of the clergy, especially Protestant leaders,

expressed their satisfaction with this step by the Republican movement.

Church of Ireland Primate Robin Eames framed the decision as “a historic

moment” in Irish Republicanism, noting it marked a crucial turning point.

Presbyterian Moderator Alastair Dunlop welcomed decommissioning as “a

step in the right direction,” and the President of the Methodist Church in

Ireland, Harold Good, acknowledged the move as “historic and significant.”37



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The Presbyterian Church stated it was vital that “Loyalist and Republican

paramilitary groups reassured fearful people and instilled confidence by

decommissioning, [as] this was a fundamental moral and political imperative

in its own right, especially at the present time, and should not be used as a

bargaining chip in negotiations about other issues.”38

Religious actors also joined in the independent supervision of the decom-

missioning process. During his first presidential address in 2007 to Armagh

Diocesan Synod, the Church of Ireland Primate Archbishop Alan Harper

issued a direct challenge to Ulster Defence Association, asking them “to believe

that the war is over. Whatever justification you may have pleaded for retaining

weapons of lethal force, that justification no longer exists.”39 Over a period of

weeks, Harold Good and Alec Reid accompanied General John de Chastelain

to Republican armament depots and remained with him at all times; they

played a highly significant role due to their credibility among both people and

paramilitaries.40 Harold Good held the key role of Center Director with the

Corrymeela Community in Ballycastle. Alec Reid of Clonard Monastery was

also a notable bridge-builder, and he had worked closely with Ken Newell of

Fisherwick Presbyterian Church.

In April 2009, the Presbyterian Church stated that Loyalists in Northern Ire-

land were moving toward decommissioning their weapons and representatives

of Ulster Defence Association had accepted that days of violence are in the

past.41 Methodist President Roy Cooper stated: “Hopefully this will not stop

short of a process to decommission all weapons, and every encouragement

should be made by everyone to make this a reality.”42

Beyond the issue of advising groups to give up their arms, religious leaders

suggested playing the enforcement role in the process.43 In addition, they

faced the challenge of reconciling “order” and “justice”; two key concepts that

often are regarded as being at odds in a postconflict society.44 The Church of

Ireland Primate, Archbishop Robin Eames noted the only way to deal with

paramilitaries was to find ways “to remove lawfully those who were exercising

such a dreadful influence over the lives of others, to get convictions, and to

imprison them.”45 A stable society requires a reliable police force, which was

not easy to attain in post-Troubles Northern Ireland. Especially Nationalists

had traditionally seen the police force as a Unionist domain. Religious leaders

advocated an equal representation in Royal Ulster Constabulary to ensure that

citizens would not see law enforcement as a battle between order and justice.

The Catholic Church initially had mixed reactions toward an active encour-

agement to join the police force, even after the Belfast Agreement. Church

of Ireland Primate Robin Eames, along with other church leaders, urged the

Catholic hierarchy to consider steps to encourage young people to join a



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Reformed police service.46 The Catholic Church eventually supported the

policing plan that foresaw a Catholic presence in its ranks.47 This support had

a major symbolic significance. The Protestant churches also made a point

of emphasizing the importance of human rights. The Presbyterian Church’s

General Assembly in Belfast called for a “positive attitude” to human rights

in the North.48 A significant number of church representatives attended the

launch of a major human rights report called A Shared Vision: Human Rightsand the Church. The document was drawn up by the Center of Contempo-

rary Christianity and was commissioned by the Christian Action Research and

Education group, the Evangelical Alliance, and Evangelical Contribution on

Northern Ireland.49

Church leaders also tried to convince Sinn Fein to back the joint police

force. Sinn Fein was the only party in the assembly to have withheld its support

for the Police Service of Northern Ireland, because it insisted that Nationalists

were not yet convinced that police reforms had gone far enough. Democratic

Unionist Party insisted that without such a move, it could not form a power-

sharing government with Sinn Fein or contemplate an eventual transfer of

policing and justice powers from Westminster to Stormont. David Clarke,

the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, made the following statement on

behalf of the Presbyterian Church:

As a church, we have recognized the progressive steps taken by all parties,including Sinn Fein, towards the return of a devolved administration. How-ever, in our discussions today, we re-emphasized the continued deep hurtstill felt by many Presbyterians who have suffered as a result of the violenceof the last 30 years. Today, we particularly encouraged Sinn Fein to givetheir total support to policing. This not only reflects the view of the Presby-terian community at present but recognizes a firmly held conviction of thechurch.50

In addition to the decommissioning and policing issues, political and religious

actors discussed the possibility of establishing a truth and reconciliation com-

mission. The Church of Ireland Primate, Archbishop Robin Eames, claimed

that a South African-style truth and reconciliation commission would be inap-

propriate for Ireland, and that there were fundamental differences in Ireland

compared with the situation in South Africa, and his chief reservation was

how such a system could be adapted to the Irish community. He expressed his

agreement with Archbishop Brady’s recent comment that Northern Ireland

was a society “pervaded with distrust.”51 The Methodist Church called for

a meeting with Secretary of State Paul Murphy to discuss how a truth and

reconciliation process to “heal the hurts” of the Troubles should work.52 The



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The State of Violence and Sectarianism in Postagreement Northern Ireland 127

report on healing in the community noted the need to support people who

had been traumatized by the Troubles. It stated that while society waited for a

process that would move forward the whole question of dealing with the past,

Methodists should consider a number of practical steps. These might “include

the development of a roll or list of those killed or injured, a ‘lament’ for indi-

viduals through story-telling, poetry, or paintings by relatives, and a record

or appreciation of those who had worked to improve community relations or

have been peacemakers.”53

Religious leaders and faith-based organizations emphasized trust-building

for the most part, and they feared that a truth and reconciliation commission

could jeopardize this process by consolidating divisions. Instead of an official

reconciliation commission, religious leaders established consultative groups

such as the Eames/Bradley Consultative Group and Healing Through

Remembering Group led by the former Methodist President, Harold Good.

They held meetings with paramilitary groups about the future of the peace

process.54 Harold Good especially drew attention to the need for privacy

when he stated that “I myself would have advised them [the Eames/Bradley

Group] not to have public meetings. The best thing for this group would

be to provide a safe place where people can share their deepest and darkest

thoughts.”55 Although there are public groups that focus on reconciliation,

a critical number of the trust-building meetings among paramilitary groups

are carried out through the mediation of religious organizations or church

leadership.

the state of violence and sectarianism in postagreement

northern ireland

Although the level of violence decreased considerably after the Belfast Agree-

ment, it is too early to say that the agreement has brought a full-fledged

peace. The level of the sectarian attacks and community tensions had dom-

inated talks among church leaders and British Prime Minister Tony Blair in

January 2003. Church leaders outlined to the prime minister the joint initia-

tives they were developing to combat them.56 The Roman Catholic Primate,

Archbishop Sean Brady; Archbishop Robin Eames for the Church of Ireland;

Russell Birney, Presbyterian Moderator; and the Methodist President, Win-

ston Graham attended the talks. Religious actors keep track of attacks and hold

regular meetings both with the civil society and among themselves concerning

possible remedies.

Religious leaders continued to come together to tackle the remaining issues

of sectarianism. On October 13, 2005, a sizable gathering of church leaders was



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convened in a bid to stamp out sectarianism in Ballymena, a district ravaged by

intercommunal strife during summer 2004. The district had suffered a spate

of attacks over the summer with churches, schools, businesses, homes, and

individuals being targeted. The gathering included representatives from all of

the major churches. Democratic Unionist Party councilor Tommy Nicholl,

instrumental in calling the conference, stated: “We want to bring the people

together. As a first step, I invited the clergy together. This is only the first step

on a road that has a number of steps. I had to start somewhere, and where

better than with the clergy?”57 Members of clergy were indeed concerned

about these attacks. Church of Ireland Bishop of Connor, Alan Abernethy,

pointed to this challenge of bridging communities:

Since the peace process, church attendance dropped. Belfast is more polar-ized than ever right now; in the past, there were many mixed areas whereProtestants used to live side by side with the Catholics; now you have got greenor orange areas. We are more divided than we ever were. The Churches havea challenging task, we should build the bridges or one day we can be in asituation worse than the one we were in.58

Sectarian attacks – for the most part symbolic in terms of the property they are

directed against – were still taking place in post–Belfast Agreement Northern

Ireland. In the summer of 2009, attacks on five Catholic churches and in

County Antrim heightened community tensions. Two churches in Ballymena,

as well as in Cullybackey, Ahoghill, and Portglenone, were splattered with

paint, the gates of St. Mary’s Church in Ahoghill were forced open and a car

burned inside the club’s grounds. These attacks on churches were condemned

by the other churches and, more importantly, by the Orange Order, which

declared that “the people who attack Catholic churches do not speak for

the Protestant community.”59 Similarly, Nationalist politicians condemned

the attacks on Orange Halls. By the time of writing this book, attacks are

decreasing in number and political actors of both sides continued to condemn

such instances of aggression.

Religious leaders also advocated the removal of the peacelines in the form of

walls and fences, that separate Protestant and Catholic communities. Church

of Ireland Bishop Ken Good and Catholic Bishop Seamus Hegarty became

public advocates of tearing down these boundaries, stating that they are “hope-

ful and trust that the direction [in] which things are going politically is an

important step, but in itself won’t bring about the change of heart required

in the communities.”60 Leaders held talks with politicians on how to tackle

sectarianism by removing borders dividing the two communities. At the same

time, religious actors started to engage issues of ethnicity and racism, especially



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The State of Violence and Sectarianism in Postagreement Northern Ireland 129

under the light of recent immigration waves to Ireland from Eastern Europe,

Southeast Asia, and Africa. In one such treatise called Identity, Being andBelief: A Christian Basis for Pursuing Justice, the secretary of the Churches’

Commission for Racial Justice, Rev. Arlington Trotman stated that

it is morally, theologically and anthropologically acceptable, therefore, thatwe must not merely regard black and minority ethnic people as ‘deserving’respect and inclusion but reject racism as the sin of exclusion, disrespectand ‘segregation’ by grasping and cherishing the fact that all God’s childreninherently share in the dignity of the Being of God.61

Similarly, religious leaders made a point of drafting joint statements regarding

international politics and issues of worldwide concern. Church leaders felt

more comfortable about commenting on global issues, as their society was

moving toward a level of stability on the domestic front. Having played a

role in conflict transformation and feeling increasing comfortable with the

political process, they no longer shied away from making recommendations

and statements on international politics.

The first major international issue that the religious leaders took a united

front was the 9/11 attacks. The leaders of the four main churches in Northern

Ireland united in voicing horror at the “unbelievable terrorist attacks which

hit America”; the joint statement was issued by Catholic primate Archbishop

Sean Brady; Church of Ireland Primate Archbishop Robin Eames; Alastair

Dunlop, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church; and Harold Good, President

of the Methodist Church.62 Religious leaders also urged restraint. Church of

Ireland Primate Archbishop Robin Eames called for prayers that “America’s

‘decision-makers’ will not move the world further into the abyss – whatever

anger and resentment they feel.”63

Church leaders opposed involvement in the Iraq War. Eames stated that

“war with Iraq can only be justified if every possible alternative has been

tried and failed.”64 Speaking on behalf of the Church of Ireland’s Church in

Society committee, its chairman, Bishop Michael Jackson of Clogher, wrote:

“The Church of Ireland is concerned about what constitutes a just war and

what practical humanitarian help can be given in the event of war with all

its terrible consequences in terms of human suffering.”65 A report from the

Presbyterian Church and Government Committee, presented to the church’s

general board, stated, “every avenue, short of war, must be pursued.”66 The

Methodist Council on Social Responsibility and Church President, Winston

Graham, also called for maximum humanitarian aid and for the maintenance

of international norms concerning the treatment of prisoners and civilians.67

Religious actors pressured then British Prime Minister Tony Blair to not rush



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into war with Iraq, as the head of North Atlantic Treaty Organization remarked

countries had a “moral obligation” to support military action.

In the postconflict environment, churches also drew attention to the Middle

East peace process. As a matter of critical importance, the church urged

both the UK and the US to publish a detailed framework toward creating a

fully independent Palestinian state, ensuring justice in the Middle East.68 On

December 30, 2008, Church of Ireland Primate Archbishop Alan Harper and

Catholic Primate Cardinal Sean Brady issued a joint statement calling for an

end to hostilities between those engaged in the fighting:

We call upon the authorities in both Israel and Gaza immediately to disen-gage and cease all hostilities to enable a permanent ceasefire to be negotiated.Only when violence has ceased will it be possible to begin to negotiate a peacethat will last. We also call upon the international community, and particularlythe United States and the European Union, to bring maximum influence tobear to end all violence immediately and to create conditions that will leadto a just peace for Palestinians and Israelis alike.69

Catholic Bishop of Dromore John McAreavey and Church of Ireland Arch-

bishop of Dublin John Neill held talks with Christian and Muslim leaders in

Cairo as part of a visit to Egypt, in association with the Church Missionary

Society Ireland. At a meeting with the Secretary-General of the Arab League,

Amr Moussa, Irish church leaders shared their concerns about the current

crises in Iraq and Palestine.70

These are the three major issues on which Irish religious actors have com-

mented, but this was only the beginning of transnational activism within

Northern Ireland’s religious community. A Church of Ireland minister who

was recently invited to Cyprus to give a talk on the Middle East and the

Northern Irish experiences stated that this engagement with world affairs by

religious leaders is relatively novel yet it signifies a new trend that takes reli-

gion seriously.71 A high-level Presbyterian minister, who is serving on various

consulting committees, agrees: “These issues would not have been on our

agenda 20 years ago, but we are more confident now. We would like to have

a voice, and we would like to contribute to the solution, providing a universal

Christian perspective that can be adapted to different contexts, and even to

different faith traditions.”72

toward institutionalizing religious peacebuilding? peace

offices in northern ireland

Religious actors developed and used a consistent discourse based on Christian

tradition and writings throughout the Troubles period. They formed networks



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Toward Institutionalizing Religious Peacebuilding? 131

of expertise to promote an inclusive understanding of citizenship and sustain-

able peacebuilding. However, only after the peace agreement, did churches

and religious leaders set about systematizing the knowledge and experience

surrounding the conflict transformation through various peace initiatives that

could be considered an official part of the churches. Representatives of these

initiatives believe that consolidation of these links is crucial and is best done

during times of stability. In Northern Ireland, this institutionalization became

possible after an extended period of conflict and remains in a state of progress.

Hard Gospel is the Church of Ireland’s official peace initiative. The Gen-

eral Synod of the Church of Ireland adopted a motion in 1997 stating the

church’s opposition to sectarianism. Following this motion, the church con-

vened working groups. The vision of the Hard Gospel is

a Church of Ireland which takes a positive leadership role in addressingthe issues of sectarianism and dealing with differences that face the rapidlychanging societies across the island of Ireland in the twenty-first century anda membership who contribute constructively to the development of trans-formed communities through reflecting and outworking Christ’s commandto love God and their neighbour.73

The initiative offers courses to the public and organizes workshops as well. It

does not confine its agenda to a Catholic-Protestant relationship. Issues and

challenges the new immigration waves from Eastern Europe and Asia pose

to Northern Ireland are also on the Church of Ireland’s agenda guided by

the Ecumenical Integration Strategy. The initiative publishes its articles and

reports in multiple Irish newspapers and provides course packages for those

who would like to educate themselves about Christian peacemaking processes.

The counterpart of this initiative in the Presbyterian Church is the Peace-

making Program. The program dates back to 1986 when it was established as

an ad hoc committee “to examine issues concerning peace and peacemaking

locally and internationally in order to educate our own denomination on them

and to call the church to constructive action where possible.”74 In June 2004,

the committee was renamed the “Peacemaking Panel” operating under the

Global Concerns Committee of the General Board. Among the stated aims of

the program are “to strengthen the capacity and infrastructure in the church

to sustain long-term peacemaking activities” and “to deepen understanding of

the measures required for a stable peace and good relations by leaders and

activists within Presbyterian Church in Ireland.” Similar to the Hard Gospel

initiative, this Peacemaking Program organizes conferences and workshops.

It organizes lectures that bring a theological perspective to the connection

between peacemaking and identity and offers seminars in theology of peace-

making. Although a review of the Peacemaking Program indicates that there



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is opposition to the work within the church, it is not ‘vociferous’ enough to

question the existence of the program. According to the review, among the

reasons for this opposition were the unwillingness to accept past hurts caused

by ‘our community,’ the end of the Troubles, differing theological perspectives

and competing pastoral priorities.75

The Methodist Church’s main reconciliation program is based in the Edge-

hill Theological College. While exploring cross-community interactions and

theological bases of peacebuilding, it also engages the issues related to immi-

grants in cooperation with another Christian initiative, EMBRACE-NI. The

Methodist Church also organizes “Healing the Hurts” Bible Studies, based

on textual explorations. The Council on Social Responsibility has also issued

numerous statements and organized workshops around the development of

the peace process.

The main Catholic Church reconciliation initiative is based in the Clonard

Ministry, under the guidance of Fr. Gerry Reynolds. The Clonard Monastery

developed a partnership with Fitzroy Presbyterian Church in 1981, which

quickly became a symbol for cross-community outreach. In 1985, the Clonard

Monastery established links with the small intercommunal Cornerstone Com-

munity. There were joint visits to families of the bereaved and on its website,

Clonard Monastery representatives acknowledge that “towards the same end,

we organized secret dialogues at Clonard between leading members of Sinn

Fein and Protestant friends from Fitzroy Congregation, Cornerstone Com-

munity, and beyond.” The postconflict aim of the Clonard Reconciliation

Project is “to contribute in various ways towards the transformation of rela-

tionships between Catholic and Protestant congregations of the church at the

local level in Northern Ireland, particularly through the arrangement of ‘unity

pilgrimages’ and the gradual development of interchurch fellowships between

Catholic and Protestant congregations.”76 The project is less engaged with

issues of political conflict than its Protestant counterparts; instead, the focus

is more on intercommunal relationships. The unity pilgrimages involve joint

worship with Protestant communities.

In sum, relative stability marked the post–Belfast Agreement period. The

transition from a divided society to a united one is not without challenges,

but thus far, there has not been an episode that has seriously jeopardized the

political arrangements resulting from the Belfast Agreement. It is too early to

state conclusively that there is lasting peace on the ground, yet the Troubles

appear to have come to an end.

With the transition to a postconflict society, religious actors also have had

their own challenges and changing roles. First, religious actors faced com-

petition from secular organizations in governance and service provision; the



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Toward Institutionalizing Religious Peacebuilding? 133

postconflict society seemed to need the churches less than it did during periods

of turmoil. Yet churches wanted to be relevant in this “new” society and desired

to find ways to remain socially and spiritually viable to their communities. As

a result, the epistemic community of religious actors started receiving insti-

tutional support from their institutions, the churches, which began to make

official contact with political actors. No longer did they avoid involvement

in political arrangements. Since the level of violence had also declined, the

churches – being status quo institutions – adapted their stance to these new

expectations, becoming active participants in postconflict political life.

Religious actors played key roles in arms decommissioning, helping to

protect the stability through their communications with paramilitaries and

political parties. In the face of sectarian attacks, they continued to issue con-

demnations and made it clear that a Christian view had to be inclusive.

Controversial theological issues were handled mostly within the epistemic

community, without jeopardizing stability on the ground. The last decade

also witnessed a more active religious community when it came to world

affairs. Religious actors, with the skills and the confidence gained throughout

the Troubles, started to become increasingly interested in issues outside of

Northern Ireland and how they might contribute to the wider world of global

peacemaking.



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7

Beyond Northern Ireland

Religious Expertise and Conflict Transformation

With the end of an intense 30-year conflict, Northern Ireland established

itself as an exemplary case for other divided societies. Walker states that a

lesson from Northern Ireland is that policy makers were able to affect change

in existing historical perspectives, narratives, and identities.1 Even the Sunni

and Shi’a leaders of Iraq, who opened a potential peace process in 2007,

drew on the experience of leaders from Northern Ireland and South Africa.

Northern Ireland’s then Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness and former

South African Government Minister Roelf Meyer chaired these talks. About

30 representatives of Iraqi Shi’a and Sunni factions attended the seminar,

and they committed themselves to a 12-point agreement that contained the

nonviolence and democracy principles that led to the Belfast Agreement.2

At the time of writing this book, Iraq, along with the rest of the region, was

facing existential threats from fundamentalist groups and there was no stable

arrangement in sight. Still, the fact that the Sunni and Shi’a groups wanted to

learn about the Northern Irish and the South African experiences shows that

these cases had become “examples” and “success stories” for today’s divided

societies.

Community leaders of divided societies tend to follow the trajectories of

similar societies globally, and they sometimes select cases to identify with.

The identification of Catholics with Palestinians and Protestants with Israelis

throughout the conflict shows how communities draw parallels and venues

of exchange across different divided societies. One can see these parallels

reflected on the murals in Northern Ireland. In Belfast, there are occasional

Israeli flags in Protestant neighborhoods and multiple murals (like the famous

West Belfast murals depicting Palestine-Ireland solidarity) in the Catholic

ones. Although it is too soon to state that a conscious and systematical learn-

ing process from others’ experiences is taking place, the existence of such

134



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Why Epistemic Communities Framework? 135

transnational identifications show how lessons and understandings from one

conflict can diffuse into the political landscape of another.

why epistemic communities framework?

The religious dimension of conflict settings such as Israel and Palestine, North-

ern Ireland, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Bosnia, and India and Pakistan requires policy

makers and academics to identify the channels whereby clerics can contribute

constructively to public debates. Given increasing clerical involvement in the

public sphere coupled with the legitimacy religious actors may accord polit-

ical leaders, it is essential for scholars and practitioners to devise frameworks

that can account for the mechanisms behind the political cycles in conflict

transformation.

Epistemic communities approach offers several advantages when studying

religious actors. First, it increases our sensitivity to local and cultural factors

as well as to identity construction and development, leading to an enhanced

understanding of a new global political order. In addition, it draws critical

attention to the impact of sacred texts, practices, and interpretation concern-

ing national and international practices, most notably as they relate to theo-

logical interpretations effects on conflict resolution. A theological knowledge

production and dissemination approach to conflicts can potentially shed light

on the tension between human rights and the desire for “order” that exists

in a number of conflict-ridden and postconflict societies. Although religious

methods are not the only means to achieve this balance, they are one of the

most powerful “tools” that have been used in conflict settings and accordingly,

need to be analyzed more carefully.

Despite the acknowledgment of roles played by religious leaders in some

instances of conflict transformation, we find no existing theoretical framework

that has addressed the expertise of these actors and situated them within the

global political processes. Although there is an increase in the number of

works that investigate activism of religious leaders and their contributions

to peacebuilding, we still lack a coherent narrative that gives meaning to

this distinct form of expert activism. This book draws attention to the mostly

constructive role Northern Irish religious leaders played in the transformation

of a 30-year conflict from a knowledge activism perspective, and extends some

of the insights to other cases.

Epistemic communities that consist of religious actors, as a model, has

wider applicability to the faith traditions than others that have been developed

thus far. For example, Jelen introduced a useful framework of clergy in a



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136 Beyond Northern Ireland

democratic political culture by using the instances of Roman Catholicism,

mainline Protestantism, and evangelical Protestantism in American politics.3

His investigation and results, however, were not generalizable to divided soci-

eties or other traditions that do not have the same institutional structures as

Christianity. Fawcett took an additional step by investigating the Presbyterian

Church of Ireland and the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa.4 She

concluded that churches try to adapt to existing political discourses, so they

will not be isolated. The epistemic communities framework elaborated in this

book extends the concept more widely than these theories of Christian insti-

tutions and clergy. Moving from the case of Northern Ireland, I have argued

that religious epistemic communities, whose members can be of any religion,

demonstrate a high level of agency, influencing the politics of the divided

societies, rather than being mere “adaptors” to change, as Fawcett proposed.

The epistemic communities approach, as proposed here, inevitably differs

from one that is employed to account for scientists’ influence on arms con-

trol and politics. Despite such differences, however, this expertise-oriented

approach is one of the most suitable perspectives, since it recognizes both local

and global dimensions of religious networks. In peacebuilding, the epistemic

community of religious actors includes experts in theology who meet regularly,

share theoretical and practical ideas, and feel confident in their capability to

use their expertise to change the understandings that created the conflict.

Therefore, this book has argued, they constitute a community of expertise that

renewed itself and that contributed to the changing of public perspectives on

peace and conflict. Over the years, the religious actors showed that they shared

a set of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared norms

of validity, and a common policy enterprise in the form of common practices

associated with a set of problems to which professional competence is directed.

These religious leaders also engaged in theological innovation that came in the

form of conversion (theologically justifying the embracing the other), agendasetting (suggestions or support of alternative political arrangements), reinforce-ment (representing the perspective of one’s congregation without creating an

“other”), and empowerment (giving their community political tools to advance

their peaceful interests). They made it clear that their approach is different

from the one employed by their secular counterparts and they shared their

experiences with their colleagues globally. In many cases and settings, includ-

ing Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, and Colombia, policy makers explicitly

stated that peace and reconciliation would not be possible in the absence of the

tireless efforts of a select group of religious actors. Following are some exam-

ples of conflict settings where religious epistemic communities contributed to

political change.



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South Africa: Changing the Public Theology of Apartheid 137

south africa: changing the public theology of apartheid

In terms of mediation and provision of safe space, the clergy’s individual

contributions to conflict transformation set examples that faith leaders in other

religious conflicts might follow. There are many cases in which religious actors,

independent of the established churches, helped change theological attitudes

toward political arrangements. In South Africa, the Dutch Reformed Church,

which was initially one of the key supporters of the apartheid regime, later

changed its stance completely and recognized the validity of an inclusive

public theology based on racial equality. This became possible only after

a decades-long interaction among international religious platforms like the

World Council of Churches and local religious institutions such as the Dutch

Reformed Mission Church.

Segregationist policies in South Africa were inspired and consolidated by the

policies of the Dutch Reformed Church, which was the country’s established

church and had a prior record of vigorously pursuing segregationist policies.

In 1857, for example, a synod of Dutch Reformed Church introduced separate

services along racial lines, and this policy had been represented as “the will of

God” by using various biblical references pointing to the differences among

people.5 Almost all these racist policies were legitimized by references to

sacred texts and accounts, thereby making their “marketing” to the public

much easier than secular ideologies. To illustrate, the account of the tower

of Babel (Genesis 11:1–9) became a “cardinal tenet of apartheid theology” –

it was normal for people to be treated differently because they were different,

and the difference in treatment was divine will. Apartheid quickly became

the prevalent mode of life in South Africa, unquestioned by the majority of

domestic institutions.

The most serious epistemic challenge to the political system and the domi-

nant theology supporting apartheid came in the early 1980s. World Alliance of

Reformed Churches, which has a membership of 214 churches representing

75 million Christians, made the following statement, again backed by numer-

ous scriptural references: “Apartheid is a sin, and . . . the moral and theological

justification of it is a travesty of the gospel and, in its persistent disobedience

to the Word of God, a theological heresy.”6 Framing apartheid as a “sin” and

“theological heresy” challenged mainstream South African churches either to

take a stronger stand and devise a counterframing statement or to step down

and accept this alternative formulation. In 1982, the Dutch Reformed Mission

Church, which had a membership of black and white South Africans and

was a parallel church to Dutch Reformed Church, drafted the Belhar Con-

fession, in which it joined World Alliance of Reformed Churches, declaring



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apartheid a “heresy.” This chain of framing showed that the international

membership structure of the Reformed Churches affected both local politics

and public theologies, which, in turn, helped transform attitudes toward racist

ideologies. International epistemic communities of religion have such capac-

ity to influence local communities by formulating alternative interpretations

of identical religious sources. It is the local groups, however, that are most

adept at challenging and changing domestic political practices.

The Dutch Reformed Church, after coming under the pressure of other

religious actors as well as political ones, joined the religious epistemic com-

munity, condemning racial segregation and changing its “public theology”

from exclusive to inclusive. “Church and Society,” the document issued by

the Dutch Reformed Church, acknowledged that despite the good intentions

of the church, supporting apartheid had been a “mistake.” As a result of

the international political and religious pressure and the turnabout in Dutch

Reformed Church’s public theology, the domestic political outlook started

to change. The general public became more attentive to the voices of mod-

eration that had won the theological debate. Political change followed the

change in public theology. In September 1989, Frederik Willem de Klerk, the

leader of the National Party whose motto was “Fairness, Firmness, Peace,”

came to power. Soon after, de Klerk ordered the release of prominent polit-

ical prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, lifted the state of emergency that

had been declared in 1985, and repealed all apartheid laws. Similar to the

case of Northern Ireland, one cannot conclusively state that the demise of

the apartheid system was directly caused by the changing theological attitudes

in South Africa. However, religion does have a legitimizing function, and its

content changes over time; it would be almost impossible to imagine such

a change if the Dutch Reformed Church was overtly supporting the racial

segregation like it did in the past. Interpretation of scripture and its application

to daily life can be regarded as a form of evolving knowledge, yet this evolution

is context-dependent and not homogeneous, namely, it does not take place in

every setting at the same time.

colombia: religious epistemic communities and

displaced people

The civil conflict in Colombia dates back to the 1960s, with the main adver-

saries being the Colombian government; and the guerrilla groups Revolution-

ary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colom-

bia) and the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional).

The conflict has mostly been portrayed as one of class differences; both groups



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Colombia: Religious Epistemic Communities and Displaced People 139

defined themselves as revolutionary and anti-imperialist with agrarian roots.

Although the relationship between them has ranged from cooperation to con-

flict, both groups have claimed to have agendas based on political and eco-

nomic reforms for the poor. Both groups have controlled large territories and

engaged heavily in criminal activity ranging from drug trafficking to abduc-

tions. In addition to these groups, there is also Autodefensas Unidas de Colom-

bia, right-wing paramilitary groups fighting against the insurgency, who joined

forces in 1997.

All of these groups have been involved in human rights abuses and disap-

pearances. Between 1997 and 2008 alone, 2.9 million people were displaced

and around 10–15 million hectares of land were stolen.7 Since the use of armed

groups as auxiliary forces has been an integral part of counterinsurgency strat-

egy and the state regarded segments of the population as “enemy,” human

rights abuses became even more systematic.8 President Alvaro Uribe’s policies

of waging war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia but offering

decreased sentences to right-wing paramilitary groups have been controver-

sial. Especially since the 1980s, there were multiple negotiations between the

government and paramilitary organizations, but the agreements have been

short-lived and the conflict continued at various levels. During the writing of

this book, there was a peace process going on between the government and

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, yet it is too early to make a

conclusive statement about the future of these negotiations.

The religious epistemic community surrounding an issue does not have to

start with the official church of a country. To the contrary, this is rarely the case,

and only after multiple calls from the people or competition with other reli-

gious actors, such as local religious groups and transnational organizations, do

church hierarchies leave their pro–status quo stances and involve themselves

in the knowledge production and dissemination process. The Colombian

Church was no exception. It has traditionally been famous for its conservative

theology; home to the Latin American Conference of Bishops, it has been “the

focus of opposition to progressive currents in Latin American Catholicism,

combating Liberation Theology and Christians for Socialism.”9 However, the

Church felt the need to revise its stance and doctrine in the face of mount-

ing reports of human rights abuses and the work of other religious groups

and nongovernmental organizations. It has accepted the challenge to address

issues such as “public order,” “political negotiation of the armed conflict,”

“democratic security,” among others.10

Reflecting this transition, church leaders have tried to find ways of rec-

onciliation with paramilitary groups. In 2001, at a time the two paramilitary

organizations were seeking safe havens for the agreement process, a Catholic



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bishop in Colombia, Hector Luis Gutierrez Pabon, offered to work in estab-

lishing a safe haven for the National Liberation Army to hold peace talks with

the government – a proposal backed by the Catholic Church. In 2007, Luis

Augusto Castro Quiroga, Archbishop of Tunja and President of the Confer-

ence of Bishops, expressed the reconciliatory will of the religious actors:

We call on the FARC to facilitate opportunities for negotiation and dia-logue. We express our encouragement of the process involving the nationalgovernment and the ELN, and we invite the demobilized members of theself-defense groups to continue with courage and transparency the processthat has begun, faithful to the commitment to contribute to truth, justice andreparation.11

A range of religious actors influenced peacebuilding and human rights regimes

in Colombia. Among these actors were local Catholic organizations, and

transnational Catholic organizations such as Caritas. All these actors, in differ-

ent ways, promoted the Christian understanding of peacebuilding and estab-

lished norms of human rights that guided their secular counterparts as well.

First, they brought the human rights violations to public attention. They raised

the issue of missing persons. In 1996, when there were no documents warning

about the problem of internal forced displacement in Colombia, the Confer-

ence of Bishops launched a national and regional study to call attention to

the victims of the Colombian conflict. This study led to the regular monitor-

ing and analysis of forced displacement by the U.N. agencies. The issue of

internally displaced persons “did not figure in international discussions until

highlighted by an unusual ecumenical alliance of the Quakers, the World

Council of Churches and later, Caritas Internationalis, drawing on their expe-

rience as humanitarian organizations working with refugees and displaced

persons in the field.”12 Thus, in Colombia, a combination of religious and

legal groups constituted the human rights expertise communities. One of the

reasons for this authority was the ability of church-related organizations to

permeate territories that were beyond the state’s reach. Minear reported that

religious community organizers were accepted more easily due to their neu-

trality, and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia members are said to

have observed grudgingly that wherever the guerrillas went, they encountered

church-related activists.13

Institutionally, Jesuits founded one of Colombia’s first human rights cen-

ters, El Centro de Investigacion y Educacion Popular (Center for Research

and Popular Education) in 1972. The center’s activities included teaching and

human rights reporting through its data bank, which keeps statistics on human

rights and international law violations. Only after the public advocacy of this



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Colombia: Religious Epistemic Communities and Displaced People 141

center, El Comite Permanente por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos

(Permanent Committee for Human Rights Defense) tied to Amnesty Interna-

tional – and Corporacion Colectivo de Abogados Jose Alvear Restrepo (Jose

Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Collective) – were founded by lawyers who assumed

legal defense of human rights cases.14 Hundreds of faith-based peace-building

initiatives took place at all levels of Colombian society addressing “humani-

tarian and development aid, support for negotiated solutions to the conflict,

peace education, and reconciliation workshops.”15

Very similar to the Northern Ireland case, the number of religious orga-

nizations increased in the 1980s and the 1990s in Colombia. In 1988, 25

Catholics founded Comision Intercongregacional de Justicia y Paz (Inter-

congregational Commission of Justice and Peace) whose mission is collecting

and disseminating information about human rights violations. Church-related

local organizations – such as those linked to the Magdalena Medio Project,

the Foundation Network for Development and Peace in Montes de Maria,

or Caritas – have contributed to the development of strong community-based

organizations, and diverse alliances became actively involved in the search

for peace and the promotion of social and economic well-being.16 Another

influential human rights organization, la Red Nacional de Iniciativas por la

Paz y contra la Guerra (National Network of Initiatives for Peace and against

War), was established in 1993 as an umbrella coalition with the support of the

Catholic Church.

One of the major religious organizations, the Catholic Relief Service, has

been operational inside the country for decades. On their website, they state

that they are “motivated by the gospel of Jesus Christ to cherish, preserve,

and uphold the sacredness and dignity of all human life, foster charity and

justice, and embody Catholic social and moral teaching.” In 2000, it began

a “solidarity with Colombia” program, which expanded and strengthened its

focus on peace and justice, a joint program between the Catholic Relief Ser-

vice Colombia and the Catholic National Secretariat for Social Ministry –

Caritas Colombiana. Catholic Relief Service has many such partners, one of

which is the National Secretariat for Social Ministry, a member organization

of the Caritas Internationalis Confederation that leads the Catholic Church’s

Pastoral for Peace and Human Rights initiative at the national level. National

Secretariat for Social Ministry has promoted civil society efforts focusing on

creating a culture of peace and increasing the awareness of human rights

violations in Colombia. Another partner is Foundation Network for Develop-

ment and Peace in Montes de Maria, a Catholic and Mennonite initiative

that promotes local development and peace programs in northeastern Colom-

bia, a region that has suffered from high levels of violence. Catholic Relief



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Service has also worked with local churches; one such case, since 1999, is its

cooperation with the Diocese of Quibdo to meet the needs of, and give voice

to, indigenous communities’ concerns. Churches also have used their power

to make their case to the local authorities. When displaced people established

the settlement of Nueva Esperanza in Cordoba province in 2000, churches

pressed the government on housing rights and social service needs, but were

ignored. Three years later, however, the government acquiesced and built

34 housing units at the group’s request.17

In short, religious actors ranging from ambitious religious leaders to the

once-conservative church hierarchy have played important roles in docu-

menting human rights abuses, setting up workshops to inform lay people,

empowering local political actors, and mediating among parties to conflicts.

They carried out these actions with specific references to Christianity and

by providing a religious perspective to conflict resolution and human rights.

Although the civil conflict in Colombia is not fully resolved, at the present

time, the number of religious actors who are working to change the local

norms of treatment continues to increase.

sierra leone: religious epistemic communities and

interreligious reconciliation

Sierra Leone suffered from a civil war between 1991 and 2002. The country’s

diamond wealth aggravated the tensions among the relatively richer ruling

classes and the rural poor, bringing the country to conflict. The conflict drew

special attention due to the unprecedented number of child soldiers. Parties to

the war were the rebel army Revolutionary United Front, led by Foday Sankoh

who did not espouse a distinguishing political ideology, and the Sierra Leone

government. The aim of the rebels was to take control of the diamond wealth.

The war temporarily came to end with the signing of the 1999 Lome Peace

Accord, which gave Sankoh the control of the diamond mines along with

the post of vice president, and granted amnesty to the combatants with the

condition of having a U.N. peacekeeping force on the ground to monitor

the disarmament. Although the agreement was regarded as a milestone, the

Revolutionary United Front failed to comply with the terms, and by 2000, the

group was once again on the offense. Only after British intervention in 2002,

did President Kabbah declare an end to civil war.

Religious actors played a significant role in bringing about the Lome Peace

Accord and also the establishment of the truth and reconciliation commissions.

Given that roughly 60 percent of Sierra Leone’s population is Muslim and

20 percent Christian, civil society of both faith traditions needed to work



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Religious Epistemic Communities and Interreligious Reconciliation 143

together to produce and disseminate interpretations and solutions to the con-

flict. The interreligious dialogue between Muslims and Christians was initi-

ated by the Programme for Christian-Muslim Relations, established in 1959 in

Ghana. More than a decade later, the program had a branch in Sierra Leone,

yet it did not have substantial political impact in that context. The program

produced “impressive interfaith sensitivity among Africans and nothing dra-

matizes the fact better than the widespread attitude of Muslims and Christians

supporting each other’s faith with donations, labor, personal visits, and par-

ticipation in each other’s feasts.”18 The organization is still working, with its

multiple programs focusing on women, youth, literature and communications,

research, archives, and development. The Programme for Christian-Muslim

Relations organizes conferences and workshops, and publishes newspapers

and reports on reconciliation and cooperation. In 2007, the organization sent

one of its area advisors, Rev. Daniel Konan, to Egypt, with the hope that the

position will provide him “with the opportunity to continue to apply his knowl-

edge of building bridges of understanding between Christians and Muslims

in the Egyptian environment.”19 These outreach activities of religious actors

are gradually increasing, giving way to specialized discussions on religious

and political reconciliation and track-two diplomacy that includes grassroots

movements.

The Interreligious Council of Sierra Leone is a successor to the Programme

for Christian-Muslim Relations, but one that focuses exclusively on Sierra

Leone’s reconciliation process and human rights. Between 1998 and 2000,

religious leaders had an important role in promoting human rights through

churches and mosques, in both government- and rebel-controlled areas, and

the United Nations facilitated a human rights training program for them

under the auspices of the Interreligious Council.20 Abu Nimer and Kadayifci-

Orellana report that the Interreligious Council of Sierra Leone contributed to

“altering behavior, dissemination of ideas, policy change, mediation, recon-

ciliation, and connecting to other actors.”21 These actions together constitute

the very definition of epistemic communities. Among the council members

were the Supreme Islamic Council, the Sierra Leone Muslim Congress, the

Federation of Muslim Women Associations in Sierra Leone, the Council of

Imams, the Sierra Leone Islamic Missionary Union, the Roman Catholic

Church, the Pentecostal Churches Council, and the Council of Churches in

Sierra Leone. Common religious beliefs in social justice and the example of

a similar human rights organization that was vocal in Liberia were among the

reasons these actors came together.22 In 2000, the council stated the follow-

ing as the areas that it was planning to actively work on: Disarmament and

demobilization; unearthing and investigating human rights abuses during the



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war; addressing democratization and special needs of ex-rebels; integration,

rehabilitation, and healing of ex-child soldiers; the provision of strategic assis-

tance for ex-soldiers in terms of skills training and reintegration into society;

and launching national campaign for confession, forgiveness, reconciliation,

and renewal.23

The withdrawal of nearly the entire international community from Sierra

Leone in the aftermath of the Lome Peace Accord largely abandoned the pop-

ulation to competing armed groups. But indigenous civil society, churches,

interreligious organizations, and the Sierra Leone Red Cross stayed behind

and continued, to the best of their ability, to provide assistance. During the

conflict, the Interreligious Council of Sierra Leone representatives met with

Liberian President Charles Taylor, who, at the time, was providing support to

the Revolutionary United Front rebels. Turay argues that this connection ulti-

mately led the Kabbah government to rethink its initial rejection of dialogue

with Taylor and to solicit his cooperation.24 Through consultative meetings

with all key players in the crisis, press releases, communiques, experience shar-

ing, prayers, and the preaching of God’s message of repentance, forgiveness,

and reconciliation, council members managed to sway hardliners.25

Furthermore, in the aftermath of the conflict, religion has become even

more indispensable in the reconciliation process. Religious actors helped

make reconciliation possible, even “in the absence of truth.”26 The involve-

ment of the Interreligious Council of Sierra Leone actually contributed to the

“restoration of a democratically elected government; disarmament, demobi-

lization, and now reintegration of ex-combatants; and the setting up of the

truth and reconciliation commission and the special court” and the council

issued press releases through channels such as the British Broadcasting Cor-

poration and the Voice of America.27 The council co-chair Alimamy Koroma

had witnessed a program offered by Church World Service to help people

recover from trauma. With the support of the Council of Churches in Sierra

Leone, Koroma managed to establish a Christian center of trauma counseling

training not only in Sierra Leone, but also in Angola, Ghana, Guinea, and

Liberia.28

Sierra Leone is one of many cases where religious actors engaged in human

rights advancement during the conflict years, contributing significantly to the

reconciliation process by addressing the sensitive issues from which politicians

usually refrain. In doing so, religious actors once again showed that they have

shared normative and principled beliefs, causal beliefs, norms of validity, and

a common policy enterprise. They provided the policy makers with a distinct

vision and they are still heavily involved in peace-building and reconciliation

activities.



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Interfaith Religious Epistemic Communities in Conflict Mediation 145

the philippines: interfaith religious epistemic communities

in conflict mediation

The conflict in Mindanao, Philippines has been due mostly to competing

claims to sovereignty and socioeconomic inequality, but the tension has long

been represented as Muslim-Christian conflict, because of the high level

of religiosity among the Filipinos. The Muslim population of Mindanao had

been marginalized in a mostly Christian-run state system. Christianity became

dominant in the Philippines after Spanish and US colonization that took place

between the sixteenth and early twentieth centuries. The minority Muslim

community argued that power transfer happened without their consent. This

feeling of disenfranchisement led to armed struggle for self-determination by

paramilitary groups including the Moro National Liberation Front starting in

the late 1960s. Coupled with attacks toward Muslim communities by Christian

paramilitaries, violence escalated quickly.

Negotiations began between the government and rebel groups in 1992.

These meetings resulted in a peace agreement in 1996. There were difficulties

with enforcement, however, and Moro National Liberation Front leaders

stated that the government deviated from the agreement’s framework. Another

major group, Moro Independent Liberation Front, deliberately stayed out of

the negotiations, stating that it would not talk to the government until the latter

reached agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front. Policy makers

quickly realized that top-down official approaches were unsustainable, and

the agreement collapsed in 2000.

Catholic Relief Services, with its extensive experience when it comes

to intercommunal conflicts, stepped in, consolidating grassroots links.

Three main program strategies were prioritized: Community-based solidarity

projects, peace education, and interreligious dialogue.29 Catholic Relief Ser-

vices funded and communicated the local interreligious initiatives. Headley

and Neufeldt report that between 1996 and 1999, the organization worked with

seven local churches and a wide array of organizations ranging from the Office

of the Presidential Advisor to the United Nations Children’s Fund.30 They note

that Catholic Relief Services engaged the groups on the ground and changed

its strategies in the face of surmounting challenges. Together with the Catholic

Agency for Overseas Development and the Mennonite Central Committee,

Catholic Relief Services contributed to the establishment of the Mindanao

Peacebuilding Institute. The institute quickly became a meeting point of

peacebuilders from countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, East

Timor, Fiji Islands, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal,

Pakistan, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US.31 Throughout



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the conflict in Mindanao, the organization also worked through the Mindanao

Peacebuilding Institute to explore the ways it can increase capacity-building;

its staff designed a peace-building curriculum that reached 390 communities

and 77 schools. The Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute can be seen as an insti-

tutional base for the diffusion of the peace-building experience and projects

in Mindanao.

Empowerment of the laity by religious actors can be clearly observed in the

Philippines case. Filipinos score very high in religious belief and practice in

international surveys, and this was one of the reasons why there was a need for

institutionalization of religious knowledge production.32 The Episcopal Com-

mission for Religious Dialogue was established in 1990 to complement the

existing initiatives and help the local churches engage in interfaith dialogue.

The commission spearheaded workshops on interreligious communication

and peacebuilding, investigating ways to introduce peace education and reli-

gion to schools. Before nongovernmental organizations stepped into the scene

in the mid 1990s, Catholic Relief Services, the International Red Cross, and

the Mennonite Central Committee were among the few organizations that

offered training and contributed to capacity-building in the conflict-ridden

Mindanao.

Similar to the case of Northern Ireland, religious epistemic communi-

ties of conflict resolution were at work even before official interfaith forums.

An extensive network of Muslim and Christian religious actors had already

befriended each other. Among the many examples of such relations, Fitz-

patrick underscores the cooperation between Dr. Mahid Mutilan (Head of the

Ulama League of Philippines) and Fernando Capalla (the Roman Catholic

Archbishop of Davao and then chair of the Episcopal Commission for Reli-

gious Dialogue) who had been longtime friends.33 In 1997, Christian and

Muslim religious leaders formed the Bishops-Ulama Forum (later called the

Bishops-Ulama Conference) for Dialogue to increase interfaith understand-

ing and find joint solutions to the challenges on the ground. The president

at that time, Fidel Ramos, welcomed the platform in the negotiation process

with the paramilitaries. One can say that religious mediation and interpre-

tation was selected in the 1990s by policy makers who had grown aware of

the need for an inclusive public theology. The Bishops-Ulama Conference

continued to play an active and crucial role in mediating and educating the

public and policy makers, as well as organizing workshops on Islamic and bib-

lical sources of peace and coexistence. In 2011, dialogues between the Moro

Independent Liberation Front peace panel and the bishops were facilitated

by the Mindanao Peoples’ Caucus in cooperation with the Bishops-Ulama

Conference.34 Larousse also highlights the role of the Second Ecumenical



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Other Examples of Religious Epistemic Communities 147

Vatican Council on the attitude of the Catholic Church in the Philippines

toward Muslim communities.35 Its teachings mark a theological innovation

that quickly diffused to local settings such as Mindanao. Nostra Aetate, the

Declaration of the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, was

a milestone in creating inclusive public theologies of conflict transformation

and citizenship. The Bishops-Ulama Conference has even attracted media

attention, which also helped to disseminate the interpretations and premises

reached by religious leaders.36 By the time of the writing of this book, it had 24

Catholic bishops, 26 ulama, and 18 Protestant bishops and pastors.37 Leaders

involved in the conference explain “the Bishops-Ulama Conference not only

brings a spiritual element to the peace process, but also works to promote

the ‘correct’ understandings of Islamic and Christian values and eliminate

misinterpretations.”38

other examples of religious epistemic communities and

further directions in application

The examples can be multiplied given the increasing role of religious leaders

in peacebuilding. It is easier to trace the impact of interpretations in Christian-

ity (when compared to other religious traditions) for two main reasons: First,

in terms of churches and other elements of civil society, Christianity enjoys

tightly knit issue specific networks throughout the world. Second, Christian-

ity’s hierarchical structure is clearer, especially in the Catholic tradition; the

Vatican and Catholic organizations translate religious interpretation to action

more consistently than do their counterparts in other religions.39 In a study

of religious organizations, Berger notes that Christian organizations “tend to

be connected to denominational structures and religious leadership” to an

extent that is not seen in other religious organizations.40 For example, the

Catholic lay-organization Sant’Egidio played the role of facilitator in talks

between governments and insurgents to end the civil war in Mozambique.

Local churches in the country channeled international resources to impov-

erished conflict zones. Lederach and Appleby report that especially in the

1970s and 1980s, “the churches came to represent the single largest and most

influential alternative voice and institution in the country.”41

The Vatican itself has played a crucial role in international diplomacy

through papal visits drawing attention to sensitive settings. Acholi Religious

Leaders Peace Initiative, Pax Christi, and World Vision, along with local

religious leaders played a crucial role in facilitating the peace process in

Northern Uganda that brought an end to Lord’s Resistance Army attacks on

civilians. The Vatican played a key role in resolving the dispute between



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Argentina and Chile in 1978 over the Beagle Islands, a cluster of small islands

in South America. In Guatemala, both Protestant and Catholic churches

disseminated a Christian perspective, and prominent religious leaders, such

as Catholic Archbishop Rodolfo Quezada Toruno, played key roles between

the rebels and the government before Sant’Egidio took over control.

Another major example of faith-based initiatives is the role of the evangelist

Moral Rearmament movement, which is now known as Initiatives of Change-

International, in bringing together German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer

and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in the aftermath of World

War II. Johnston argues, “this process effectively prepared the way for the later

establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community.”42 This major

step once again demonstrated that religious epistemes can initiate a change

in international politics and shape institutions. Global religious leaders can

also come together to address contemporary conflicts of a global scope. The

Church of England and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and

Wales sponsored a symposium in March 2005 to discuss the place of just war

thought concerning the US-Afghan-Iraqi “War on Terror.” The symposium,

which brought academics and theologians together, resulted in a publication

entitled The Price of Peace.

Religious and spiritual leaders have also been highly influential in starting

human rights movements and consolidating the epistemic discourse around

human dignity. Mahatma Gandhi approached issues of fairness and indepen-

dence from a Hindu perspective that had Christian undertones. Similarly,

Martin Luther King led the American civil rights movement by employing

biblical interpretation. Tibetan Buddhist leaders drew the world’s attention to

nonviolent resistance in the face of massive oppression.

The next step for scholars interested in examining the processes of con-

flict and religious actors’ involvement in politics is to look at those cases

involving faith leaders from different traditions, and compare epistemological

approaches and levels of activism. For example, do faith leaders in Islam, a

religion that has hierarchical structures different from those of Christianity,

play similar roles in their societies, say in Iraq, Iran, or India? Can individual

religious leaders devise innovative interpretations of a text, challenge dom-

inant, violent, or local theologies, and gain support from the international

community of Islamic scholars, similar to the way we have seen in the North-

ern Irish case? A quick look at the involvement of Muslim religious leaders in

conflict settings shows that indeed this does happen. In the southern Philip-

pines, the conflict between the Muslim Moro paramilitaries who demand

autonomy and the Christian community has been going on since the early

1970s. Muslim and Christian religious activists worked toward creating new



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Other Examples of Religious Epistemic Communities 149

interpretations and an understanding across religions. On March 16, 2010, the

International Faith-based Groups and Civil Society workshop convened with

the aim of analyzing sources of conflict and solutions that could be brought by

interfaith initiatives. Dr. Aboulkhair Tarason, vice chairman of the National

Ulama Conference of the Philippines; Archbishop Antonio Ledesma of the

Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, and Bishop Efraim Tendero

of the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches co-chaired the workshop,

which emphasized the importance of new interpretations of religion in the

public space.43 Such meetings and initiatives show that it is not only Christian

religious leaders who recognize the need to reinterpret texts and traditions and

to which the epistemic communities framework can be extended. Religious

leaders of other traditions are actively performing a similar service for their

constituents as well.

The same question is worth asking for other faith traditions, such as Judaism,

Buddhism, and Hinduism. It is crucial to analyze the details of the mecha-

nism by which expert communities of different religions affect policy makers

under varying conditions. This book investigated interdenominational issues

moving from Christianity in a specific territory, Northern Ireland. In a similar

vein, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether leaders of three different

religious traditions, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, can come together as

one epistemic community and influence policy makers in the area of conflict

transformation. Again, a brief look at the religious knowledge-based platforms

on the ground shows that this is certainly possible. As mentioned, the Inter-

Religious Council of Sierra Leone (composed of the Supreme Islamic Coun-

cil, the Sierra Leone Muslim Congress, the Federation of Muslim Women

Associations in Sierra Leone, the Council of Imams, the Sierra Leone Islamic

Missionary Union, the Roman Catholic Church, the Pentecostal Churches

Council, and the Council of Churches in Sierra Leone) contributed signifi-

cantly to conflict resolution in the region through its inclusive interpretations

and workshops. The Interreligious Peace Foundation in Sri Lanka has also led

interfaith functions contributing to the peace process.

Another example of the reinterpretation of religious knowledge can be seen

in the actions of the Rabbis for Human Rights, a group that is composed

of rabbis from all over the world and from all strands of Judaism. It was

established in 1988 “with the purpose of giving voice to the Zionist ideal and

the Jewish religious tradition of human rights,” and it drew attention to the

abuses of human rights in the occupied territories.44 The group has been

actively engaged in interfaith dialogue and education of the public regarding

Jewish theology and its premises on human rights. It is another example of

religious leaders coming together to create a forum of expertise on public



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issues, challenging the dominant Jewish epistemic community’s view on the

sacred territories from within.

The existence of interfaith summits on peace and the holy places shows a

growing understanding of the role religious actors play in politics. The 2002

Alexandria Summit, for example, brought together prominent religious actors

from three monotheistic religions to draft a basic framework regarding the holy

land. The product was The Alexandria Declaration of the Religious Leadersof the Holy Land, which recognized the centrality of Jerusalem to all three

religions. The document did not lead to peace, yet it constituted a starting

point for future discussions among religious leaders. In 2005, The Council

of Religious Institutions in the Holy Land was established, bringing together

religious leaders and providing a platform whereby they could “establish mech-

anisms to monitor media for derogatory representations of any religion and

issue statements in response to such representations” as well as bring religion

as a positive force to school curricula in coordination with Palestinian and

Israeli educators.45 It is too soon to say whether these initiatives will have any

effect on conflict transformation or on human rights regimes in the context

of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nonetheless, a community of religious leaders is

growing; they want a voice in conflict transformation and are willing to use

theological tools to neutralize exclusive or violent religious discourses. In other

words, we witness a burgeoning of religious epistemic communities concerned

with human rights and conflict transformation; the extent of their influence is

yet to be determined.

religious epistemic communities in conflict resolution:

lessons and policy implications

Although this book has focused mostly on Northern Ireland, the epistemic

communities approach has applicability in all cases in which religion is but

one of a conflict’s multiple facets. This chapter touched upon such select

examples. The epistemic communities approach brings together theologians,

social scientists, and policy makers, allowing them to tap into religious sources

that have practical implications in peacebuilding. Seven lessons can be drawn

from this approach:

1. Peacebuilders should treat religion as a body of expertise rather than justas an emotional or spiritual resource. This expertise is practiced on

multiple levels. In academic settings, divinity and religious studies

departments should strive to engage in peacebuilding studies at a more

systematic level. The interdisciplinary nature of peacebuilding should



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Religious Epistemic Communities in Conflict Resolution 151

be emphasized. Social scientists and peacebuilders should familiar-

ize themselves with the available resources. This recognition does not

mean that the religious expertise and practices become binding for all

members of a society and it should not be interpreted as a challenge

to state-religion separation. Religious knowledge is complementary to

existing expertise in secular peacebuilding, and it does not replace other

approaches. However, liberal approaches to peacebuilding have con-

sistently excluded religious discourse and secular practitioners resisted

tapping into religious resources for the most part. In the twenty-first-

century strategic peacebuilding, such exclusion is outdated and not use-

ful. Taking religion seriously as a form of expertise opens new avenues

to investigate religiously inspired paramilitary movements, revolutions

and human rights concerns worldwide.

2. Peacebuilders should recognize that in multiple conflict settings, religiousactors, including religious leaders, form a distinct community around thisbody of expertise. Not every religious leader is theologically engaged with

his/her political surroundings. However, religious actors are increasingly

involved in the public sphere. They form networks and cooperate in

disseminating their interpretations. Religious actors not only provide

spiritual guidance but also shape material structures and political atti-

tudes. They form a distinct kind of social capital that binds people.

Religious actors exist at all levels, including local communities, founda-

tions, transnational institutions, and sometimes even the governments.

They can be outsiders providing safe space for the conflict parties such

as Sant’Egidio in Mozambique or local actors who are engaging in

interfaith or interdenominational communication as we have seen with

religious actors in Northern Ireland. In most cases, outside actors are

connected to inside actors. Members of religious epistemic communi-

ties might or might not be affiliated with a formal institutional hierarchy;

even if they are, usually they carry out initiatives as individual leaders

rather than church representatives. Epistemic Communities approach

is sensitive to this multilevel existence and practitioners should strive

to build bridges among these levels if these connections do not already

exist.

3. Each religious tradition has its own structures and heritage that defineknowledge production networks. Some traditions, like Roman Catholi-

cism and Shi’a Islam, are more hierarchical than others, like Protestant

and Sunni Islamic traditions. Church of Ireland Archbishop Robin

Eames states that his Catholic counterpart had more authority than

he did, since the reformed traditions had to go back and consult or



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inform the church committees about a specific action.46 These struc-

tures, sources, and hierarchies are complicated in every religious tradi-

tion. East Asian public theologies rely less on texts when compared to

their Abrahamic counterparts. Leadership structures change over time,

and their manifestations vary with location. In the eighth century, Mus-

lims would have seen the Caliph as the ultimate living guide, yet such a

post no longer exists in our postmodern era. Leadership structures; exist-

ing divisions; the nature of the educational system; how binding the

religious resolutions are, among the factors that influence how religious

actors of a particular tradition participate in public sphere. In addition,

these structures and messages are influenced by the grievances of com-

munities. As Stevens notes, in the Northern Irish context, Protestant

actors, feeling under siege, emphasized law and order whereas Catholic

actors, feeling victimized, highlighted justice in the messages.47 When

working with divided communities, therefore, “we cannot make our

own assumptions about the belief of others. We must allow them to

define and explain themselves on their own terms and with their own

vocabulary,” as stated in the Interfaith Guidelines of the Church of

Ireland.48

4. Within a religion, there are multiple epistemic communities and pub-lic theologies. Peacebuilders should explore the ways through which

religious epistemic communities can promote inclusive public theolo-

gies. Liberation theology in Latin America, for example, is within the

Catholic tradition, yet it does not have the same epistemic ties to the

Vatican as those enjoyed by the established local Catholic churches in

some other locations. It can even be regarded as a reaction against the

mainstream Catholic tradition and the distance leaders put between

themselves and the daily concerns of their laity. Mennonites have a

different understanding of service to society than do Methodists. Such

differences might be more visible in conflicts. The narrative and the

symbols employed by the Dutch Reformed Mission Church in South

Africa to destroy apartheid were radically different from those used by

the Dutch Reformed Church to legitimize apartheid. Peacebuilders

should carefully map out the different public theologies in a tradition

or society, as inevitably there will be ideological competition. Public

theologies might not always be visible to an outsider. Therefore, prac-

titioners should have an in-depth knowledge of the region’s economy,

politics and history to be able to decide whether a particular strain of

religious experience or knowledge network could be integrated into the

efforts of strategic peacebuilding.



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Religious Epistemic Communities in Conflict Resolution 153

5. Religious actors who promote inclusive public theologies should be encour-aged to work together, even in the absence of the conflict. Members of

the same religious epistemic community often know each other per-

sonally, sometimes as friends, sometimes as colleagues. The existence

of expertise networks has the potential to prevent conflicts from occur-

ring or to decrease their intensity quickly if a conflict arises. Religious

epistemic communities can work on socioeconomic equality, environ-

mental challenges, and health issues during times of stability. Further-

more, religious actors can familiarize themselves with other communi-

ties’ theologies and practices. Religious knowledge and interpretations

greatly affect the politics of conflict resolution. Grant-making agencies

and even governments should provide incentives for interfaith cooper-

ation and creating multiple communication channels. Such initiatives,

understandably, raise questions about state’s role in religious life, and

creating a possible divide between the religious and the secular. As is

clear in the Northern Ireland case, even the most ambitious religious

leaders working towards peace have, at times, framed secular approaches

as obstacles. With open communication channels and regular interac-

tions among religious actors and secular ones, such a division can be

preempted.

6. Religious epistemic communities do not get directly involved in party pol-itics and in postconflict societies; peacebuilders should encourage influ-ential religious actors to keep their nonpartisan status. Although it is

possible that epistemic communities might have sympathy for a politi-

cal party, the moment religious actors step into party politics, they risk

losing their credibility as independent experts. Partisanship inevitably

alienates segments of the population, and the actor’s identity shifts from

knowledge producer to office holder. This affects professional network-

ing and obfuscates religious actors’ intentions. Although religious actors

are expected to champion a policy because of its spiritual merits, political

actors care most about their office. This explains why religious leaders

sometimes push for an inclusive agreement, even when the public and

the politicians react adversely to it, and vice versa. Religious leaders

often discourage their colleagues from taking an active part in party

politics. Especially in divided societies, this advice should be seriously

considered.

7. Religious interpretations and expertise diffuse across borders. Religious

actors who played constructive roles in conflict transformation should

be invited to share their knowledge with their counterparts in other con-

flict settings. The experiences of peacebuilding and conflict resolution



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already diffuse across borders through official meetings, workshops, and

media. This diffusion not only leads to changes in hearts and minds, but

also in concrete policies. Given religious networks’ transnational nature,

such diffusion is even faster. Policy makers should support the diffusion

of peacebuilding theologies to ensure that interpretations encouraging

violence and exclusive identities, secular or religious, do not triumph in

divided societies. Successful conflict transformation cases and methods

should be shared more widely, keeping in mind that every conflict setting

requires a context-sensitive approach to peacebuilding. Secular practi-

tioners should study how religious peacebuilding operates. Religious

actors should be encouraged to engage contemporary peacebuilding

literature and experience.

To conclude, while investigating the influence of faith traditions in politics,

one of the dimensions to which we should attend is the formation and dissem-

ination of religious knowledge and its influence on shaping attitudes to public

issues. The epistemic communities approach offers a framework for research

that will prove useful to scholars interested in faith-based perspectives who

are studying environmental politics, human rights, global health, public pol-

icy, and conflict transformation. Employment of such a framework will also

help us evaluate religion’s influence from a perspective that is balanced and

socially scientific. This book detailed the contributions religious actors made

in Northern Ireland using an interdisciplinary framework that is applicable to

almost all conflict settings. For years, religion was ignored as a crucial dimen-

sion of peacebuilding but with the increasing number of works on the role

of religious networks on conflict transformation and the failure of the liberal

internationalist approaches, this is gradually changing. Given the resurgence

of religion in global politics, we have no other option than recognizing the

significance of religious expertise and politics of religious knowledge.



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Notes

1 Religious Actors and Conflict Transformation

1 See David Carment and Patrick James, “The International Politics of Ethnic Con-flict: New Perspectives on Theory and Policy,” Global Society 11(2), 1997, 205–232;and Wars in the Midst of Peace (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997),2–3, 195–198. For an introduction to the near-hegemonic tradition of modernizationand secularization in sociological theory, see Bryan Wilson, Religion in Sociolog-ical Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), and Malcolm Hamilton(ed.), The Sociology of Religion: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (2nd ed.)(London: Routledge, 2001); on secularism’s long-standing dominance in IR the-ory, consult Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in InternationalRelations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

2 Torkel Brekke, “Beyond Theological Essentialism and Ethnic Reductionism: AReview Essay about Religion and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka,” InternationalJournal of Buddhist Thought and Culture 12, 2009, 125–155.

3 Nukhet Sandal, “The Clash of Public Theologies? Rethinking the Concept of Reli-gion in Global Politics,” Alternatives 37(1), 2012, 66–83; Nukhet Sandal, “PublicTheologies of Human Rights and Citizenship: The Case of Turkey’s Christians,”Human Rights Quarterly, 35(3), 2013, 631–650.

4 Julia Annas, “Moral Knowledge as Practical Knowledge,” in Evan Selinger andRobert Crease (eds.), The Philosophy of Expertise (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 2006).

5 Frederick A. Olafson, “Hermeneutics: ‘Analytical’ and ‘Dialectical,’” History andTheory 25(4), 1986, 28–42, 28.

6 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Routledge, 1989).7 Toft, Philpott, and Shah argue that one of the major causes of the religious resurgence

was a crisis in secular ideologies. Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and TimothySamuel Shah, God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics (New York:W. W. Norton, 2011), 13. Also see Peter Berger, “The Desecularization of the World:A Global Overview,” in Peter Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of the World:Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public PolicyCenter, 1999), 1–18.

8 Toft et al., 2011, 15.

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156 Notes to pages 4–8

9 Scott Appleby, Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation(New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

10 Kingsley M. De Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics inSri Lanka (Delhi: Penguin Books, 1998), 81.

11 Emanuel Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communi-ties and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,” Inter-national Organization 46(1), 1992, 101–145.

12 See Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Rela-tions (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgenceof Religion and the Transformation of International Relations (London: PalgraveMacmillan, 2005).

13 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International PolicyCoordination,” International Organization 46(1), 1992, 1–35.

14 Ibid., 16.15 Peter M. Haas, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean

Pollution Control,” International Organization 43(3), 1989, 377–403.16 Peter M. Haas, “Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to

Protect Stratospheric Ozone,” International Organization 46(1), 1992, 187–224.17 Adler, 1992.18 Claire Gough and Simon Shackley, “The Respectable Politics of Climate Change:

The Epistemic Communities and NGOs,” International Affairs 77(2), 2002,329–346.

19 Jeremy R. Youde, “The Development of a Counter-epistemic Community: AIDS,South Africa, and International Regimes,” International Relations 19(1), 2005,421–439.

20 Mai’a Davis-Cross, The European Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and InternationalCooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

21 Haas, “Banning Chlorofluorocarbons,” 1992.22 Adler, 1992, 106.23 Stanley E. Porter and Kent D. Clarke, “What Is Exegesis? An Analysis of Various

Definitions,” in Stanley E. Porter (ed.), Handbook to Exegesis of the New Testament(Boston: Brill, 1997), 4–5.

24 Examples include Journal of Theological Studies (Oxford Journals), Journal of theAcademy of Religion, Scottish Journal of Theology (Cambridge University Press),Doctrine and Life (Dominican Publications), Theology Today (Princeton Theolog-ical Seminary), Journal of Biblical Studies.

25 Adler, 1992, 64.26 Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” Interna-

tional Security 22(2), 1997, 56.27 See Jonathan Fox, “The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A Large-

N Study,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 3(3), 1997, 1–19, and Jonathan Fox,Religion, Civilization, and Civil War: 1945 through the Millennium (Lanham, MD:Lexington Books, 2004).

28 Monica Duffy Toft, “Getting Religion: The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War,”International Security 3, 2007, 97–31.

29 Isak Svensson, “Fighting with Faith: Religion and Conflict Resolution in CivilWars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, 2007, 930–949.



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Notes to pages 9–11 157

30 See Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “The Role of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Ini-tiative (ARLPI) in Peace Building in Northern Uganda” (US Agency for Interna-tional Development Report, Washington DC: USAID, 2001); Hector Fabio Henao-Gaviria, “The Colombian Church and Peacebuilding,” in Virginia M. Bouvier(ed.), Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War (Washington, DC: USIP Press,2008); Anna L. Peterson, Martyrdom and Politics of Religion: Progressive Catholi-cism in El Salvador’s Civil War (New York: State University of New York Press,1997).

31 Madeleine Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty (New York: Harper Perennial,2006), 177.

32 Grace Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging (Oxford:Blackwell, 1994).

33 Grace Davie, “Vicarious Religion: A Methodological Challenge,” in Nancy T.Ammerman (ed.), Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives (New York:Oxford University Press, 2006), 21–37. For discussions and examples on belief andpractice in Judaism and Islam, see Lynn Davidman, “The New Voluntarism: TheCase of Unsynagogued Jews,” in Ammerman, 2006, 51–69, and Asef Bayat, Lifeas Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 2009).

34 Nicholas Jay Demerath, Crossing the Gods: World Religions and Worldly Politics(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001), 59.

35 Herbert Gans, “Symbolic Ethnicity and Symbolic Religiosity: Towards a Compar-ison of Ethnic and Religious Generation,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 17(4), 1994,585.

36 Steve Bruce, Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1996), 249.

37 Nicholas Jay Demerath, “The Rise of ‘Cultural Religion’ in European Christianity:Learning from Poland, Northern Ireland and Sweden,” Social Compass 47(1), 2007,130–133.

38 Gerard F. Powers, “Religion and Peacebuilding,” in Strategies of Peace (New York:Oxford University Press, 2010), 322.

39 Ibid., 339.40 John D. Brewer, Gareth I. Higgins, and Francis Teeney, Religion, Civil Society and

Peace in Northern Ireland (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4.41 Daniel Philpott, Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation (New

York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 7.42 On religion and peacebuilding, also see Megan Shore, Religion and Conflict Reso-

lution (Farnham, MD: Ashgate, 2009); Mark Amstutz, Healing of Nations (Lanham,MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); David R. Smock, Religious Contributions toPeacemaking (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2006).

43 Douglas N. Walton, Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority (Univer-sity Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 24.

44 David Little and Scott Appleby, “A Moment of Opportunity?” in Harold Cowardand Gordon S. Smith (eds.), Religion and Peacebuilding (New York: SUNY Press,2004), 1–27; Cynthia Sampson, “Religion and Peacebuilding,” in I. W. Zartmanand L. Rasmussen (eds.), Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Tech-niques (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1997); Timothy A. Byrnes,



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Catholic Bishops in American Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1991); Allen D. Hertzke, Representing God in Washington: The Role of ReligiousLobbies in the American Polity (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press),1988.

45 Stephen J. Solarz, Journeys to War and Peace: A Congressional Memoir, Lebanon,NH: Brandeis University Press, 2011, 122–123.

46 Benedict Rogers, “The Saffron Revolution: The Role of Religion in Burma’s Move-ment for Peace and Democracy,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions9(1), 2008, 115–118.

47 Mirella W. Eberts, “The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland,”Europe-Asia Studies 50(5), 1998, 817–842.

48 Douglas Johnston and Bryan Cox, “Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engage-ment,” in Douglas Johnston (ed.), Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 14. Also see Jacob Berkovitch and S. AyseKadayifci Orellana, “Religion and Mediation: The Role of Faith-Based Actors inInternational Conflict Resolution,” International Negotiation 14(1), 2009, 175–204.

49 Duncan Morrow, Derek Birrell, John Greer, and Terry O’Keefe, The Church andInter-Community Relationships (Belfast: Centre for the Study of Conflict, Universityof Ulster, 1994), 261.

50 See USIP, “Faith-Based NGOs and International Peace Building,” Special ReportNo. 76; “Can Faith Based Organizations Advance Reconciliation? The Case ofBosnia Herzegovina,” Special Report No. 103.

51 John Paul Lederach and R. Scott Appleby, “Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview,”in Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers (eds.), Strategies of Peace: TransformingConflict in a Violent World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 20.

52 Ted Jelen, “Political Christianity: A Contextual Analysis,” American Journal ofPolitical Science 36, 1992, 692–714.

53 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies(Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1997), 50.

54 Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality:Civic Voluntarism in American Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1995); Gilbert, 1993; Kenneth D. Wald, Dennis E. Owen, and Samuel S. Hill,“Churches as Political Communities,” American Political Science Review 82, 1988,531–548.

55 Ted Jelen, “Protestant Clergy as Political Leaders: Theological Limitations,” Reviewof Religious Research 36, 1994, 23–42.

56 Gerry Adams, Hope and History: Making Peace in Northern Ireland (Co. Kerry,Ireland: Brandon, 2004), 125.

57 Kyoto Conference Proceedings, 1973.58 Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1984).59 See Max Stackhouse, Public Theology and Political Economy (Grand Rapids, MI:

Eerdmans, 1987); Robert Benne, The Paradoxical Vision: A Public Theology forthe 21st Century (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995); Michael J. Himes andKenneth R. Himes, Fullness of Faith (New York: Paulist Press, 1993); Victor Ander-son, Pragmatic Theology: Negotiating the Intersections of an American Philosophyof Religion and Public Theology (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998).



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60 For civil religion, see Robert Bellah, Beyond Belief (New York: Harper, 1970);Martin E. Marty, A Nation of Behavers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1980); Linell Elizabeth Cady, Religion, Theology and American Public Life (Albany:SUNY, 1993).

61 Robert McElroy, The Search for an American Theology: The Contribution of JohnCourtney Murray (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 45.

62 Peter L. Benson and Dorothy L. Williams, Religion on Capitol Hill: Myths andRealities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

63 Ted Jelen, “A Theory of Clergy as Political Leaders,” in Sue E. S. Crawford andLaura R. Olson (eds.), Christian Clergy in American Politics (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 2001), 26–29.

64 Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter XXV (Of the Church), Verse VI.65 David Stevens, The Land of Unlikeness: Explorations into Reconciliation (Dublin:

Columba, 1994), 11.66 Eric Gallagher and Stanley Worrall, Christians in Ulster 1968–1980 (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1982), 10.67 See John Paul Lederach, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (Intercourse,

PA: Good Books, 2003), 3–7.68 For more on political affiliations and Irish/Northern Irish newspapers, see Greg

McLaughlin and Stephen Baker, The Propaganda of Peace: The Role of Media andCulture in the Northern Ireland Peace Process (Bristol: Intellect Press, 2010); GeorgeMitchell, Making Peace (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 190n17; D.George Boyce and Alan O’Day, Defenders of the Union: A Survey of British andIrish Unionism since 1801 (London: Routledge, 2001), 236.

69 Works that use newspapers include Sydney Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder(Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Develop-ment of Black Insurgency 1930–1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982),and Charles Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain (Boston: Harvard UniversityPress, 1995).

70 David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney, Chris Thornton, and DavidMcVea, Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children Who Died as aResult of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2007), 1555.

71 Claire Mitchell, Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland (Aldershot,England: Ashgate, 2006), 21.

72 Richard Breen and Bernadette Hayes, “Religious Mobility and Party Support inNorthern Ireland,” European Sociological Review 13(3), 1997, 228.

73 John Hickey, Religion and the Northern Ireland Question (Dublin: Gill andMacmillan, 1984); Steve Bruce, The Edge of the Union: The Ulster Loyalist PoliticalVision (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 249; John McGarry and BrandonO’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

74 Michael MacDonald, Children of Wrath: Political Violence in Northern Ireland(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); David Smith and Gerald Chambers, Inequality inNorthern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

75 Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland:Power, Conflict and Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

76 Claire Mitchell, “Is Northern Ireland Abnormal? An Extension of the SociologicalDebate on Religion in Modern Britain,” Sociology 38(2), 2004, 237–254; Tony



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Fahey, Bernadette Hayes, and Richard Sinnott, Two Traditions, One Culture? AStudy of Attitudes and Values in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland(Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2004).

77 John Fulton, “Religion and Enmity in Northern Ireland: Institutions and RelationalBeliefs,” Social Compass 49(2), 2002, 189–202.

78 Scott Appleby, “Religion and Global Affairs: Religious ‘Militants for Peace,’” SAISReview 18(2), 1998, 40.

79 Brewer et al., 2011, 25.80 Mari Fitzduff, “Just Enough to Hate – Not Enough to Love: Religious Leaders

in Northern Ireland,” in Timothy Sisk (ed.), Between Terror and Tolerance: Reli-gious Leaders, Conflict and Peacemaking (Washington, DC: Georgetown UniversityPress, 2011), 162.

81 Philpott and Powers, 2010.82 Ibid., 31, 317–353.


1 Brian M. Walker, A Political History of the Two Irelands: From Partition to Peace(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 181.

2 See Brian M. Walker, “‘Ancient Enmities’ and Modern Conflict: History andPolitics in Northern Ireland,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 13(1), 2007, 103–128.

3 For more on the importance of education in conflict settings, see Zvi Bekermanand Michalinos Zembylas, Teaching Contested Narratives: Identity, Memory andReconciliation in Peace Education and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2012); Keith C. Barton, Alan W. McCully, and Margaret Conway, “HistoryEducation and National Identity in Northern Ireland,” International Journal ofHistorical Teaching, Learning and Research, 2003, 27; Keith C. Barton, “‘Best Notto Forget Them’: Secondary Students’ Judgments of Historical Significance inNorthern Ireland,” Theory and Research in Social Education 33(1), 2005, 9–44.

4 Edmund Spenser, A View of the Present State of Ireland [1596], edited by W. L.Renwick (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).

5 Henry Morley (ed.), A Discovery of the True Cause Why Ireland Was Never EntirelySubdued nor Brought under Obedience of England until the Beginning of HisMajesty’s Happy Reign: By Sir John Davies in Ireland under Elizabeth and Jamesthe First (London: Routledge, 1890), 218–219.

6 For an in-depth review of the conflict, also see Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry,The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland (London: AthlonePress, 1993).

7 See George Hill, The Fall of Irish Chiefs and Clans: The Conquest of Ireland(Dublin: Irish Genealogical Foundation, 2004).

8 Edmund Curtis, A History of Ireland: From Earliest Times to 1922 (New York:Routledge, 2002), 198; Theodore W. Moody and Francis X. Martin, The Course ofIrish History (Cork: Mercier Press, 1984).

9 In Antrim and Down, two counties outside of the plantation, substantial Presby-terian Scottish settlement had already been under way since 1606. See AnthonyT. Q. Stewart, The Narrow Ground: The Roots of Conflict in Ulster (London: Faberand Faber, 1989), 38.



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10 Marianne Elliott, When God Took Sides: Religion and Identity in Ireland – Unfin-ished History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 177–178.

11 John Fulton, The Tragedy of Belief: Division, Politics and Religion in Ireland(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 27.

12 Jonathan Bardon, A History of Ulster (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1989), 131–132.13 Mark Perceval-Maxwell, The Outbreak of the Irish Rebellion of 1641 (Belfast:

Queen’s University, 1994), 47.14 Aidan Clarke, “Pacification, Plantation and the Catholic Question, 1603–1623,” in

Theodore W. Moody, Francis X. Martin, and Francis J. Byrne (eds.), A New Historyof Ireland III: Early Modern Ireland 1534–1691 (New York: Oxford University Press,1976), 229.

15 John Dunlop, A Precarious Belonging: Presbyterians and the Conflict in NorthernIreland (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1995), 21.

16 Elliott (2009), 64.17 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread

of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006).18 Richard English, Irish Freedom (London: Macmillan, 2006), 61.19 John T. Gilbert, History of the Irish Confederation and the War in Ireland (New

York: AMS Press, 1873), 1.20 Antonia Fraser, Cromwell: Our Chief of Men (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,

1973), 74–76.21 John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer, The Civil Wars: A Military History of England,

Scotland, and Ireland, 1638–1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 98.22 English, 2006, 61.23 Ibid., 63.24 Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal and the Search for Peace (New

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 6.25 Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005),

55.26 Fulton, 1991, 35.27 Although there are debates regarding the number of Protestants in the city, the

commonly cited number is 30 000. The number is significantly higher than thepeacetime population, as the Protestant population in surrounding areas also cameto Derry for protection. See Daniel Webster Hollis, The History of Ireland (Westport,CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 63; John G. Simms, “The War of the Two Kings,1685–91,” in Theodore W. Moody, Francis X. Martin, and Francis J. Byrne (eds.), ANew History of Ireland: Early Modern Ireland 1534–1691 (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2009), 492.

28 For a detailed account of the Williamite War and the Battle of Boyne, see JohnChilds, The Williamite Wars in Ireland (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007),and Lenihan Padraig, Battle of the Boyne 1690 (Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2003).

29 Thomas E. Hachey, Joseph M. Hernon, and Lawrence J. McCaffrey, The IrishExperience (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 28.

30 Kenneth H. Connell, The Population of Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975),76.

31 Louis M. Cullen, An Economic History of Ireland since 1660 (London: Batsford,1972), 111.



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32 Dunlop, 1995, 25.33 Marianne Elliott, Wolfe Tone: Prophet of Irish Independence (London: Yale Uni-

versity Press, 1989), 1–2, 310–312.34 “Profile: The Orange Order,” BBC News. Last accessed April 4, 2010.35 Dennis J. Hickey and Jim E. Doherty, A New Dictionary of Irish History from 1800

(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2003), 375.36 Patrick Mitchell, Evangelicalism and National Identity in Ulster, 1921–1998 (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2003), 136.37 William J. McCormack, The Blackwell Companion to Modern Irish Culture

(Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001), 317.38 Kevin Whelan, The Tree of Liberty: Radicalism, Catholicism, and the Construction

of Irish Identity, 1760–1830 (Cork: Cork University Press, 1996), 95.39 William E. H. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty (New York: Longmans, Green, 1896),

18.40 English, 2006, 136.41 Hachey et al., 1996, 66. In her analysis of the role of religious actors in the nineteenth

century, Kimberley Cowell-Meyers makes the same argument, stating that althoughreligious divisions mattered, there was no independent activism outside of politicsand the clergy followed the public in terms of party adherence. See Religionand Politics in the Nineteenth Century Ireland (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,2002), 5.

42 Francis S. L. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine (London: Collins, Fontana, 1973),106.

43 Synod of Irish Bishops, Dublin, 1835, quoted in Oliver MacDonagh, States of Mind:A Study of Anglo-Irish Conflict, 1780–1980 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), 94.

44 Elliott (2009), 41.45 Gearoid O’ Tuathaigh, “Ireland under the Union: Historiographical Reflections,”

Australian Journal of Irish Studies 2(2), 2002, 8.46 Elliott (2009), 81.47 Paul Bew, Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789–2006 (New York: Oxford University

Press, 2007), 62.48 David Ross, Ireland: History of a Nation (New Lanark: Geddes and Grosset, 2002),

226.49 Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Great Hunger (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin,

1991), 19.50 Ibid., 31.51 English, 2006, 170.52 Ian McBride, “Ulster and the British Problem,” in Richard English and Graham

Walker (eds.), Unionism in Modern Island (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1996),1–18.

53 Mıcheal MacDonncha, Sinn Fein: A Century of Struggle (Dublin: Sinn Fein,2005), 12.

54 Brian Feeney, Sinn Fein: A Hundred Turbulent Years (Dublin: O’Brien Press, 2002),52.

55 Francis Martin, Leaders and Men of the Eastern Rising: Dublin 1916 (London:Methuen, 1967, 105).



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56 Bew, 2007, 378. Also see Michael Laffan, The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn FeinParty 1916–23 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 44.

57 Ibid., 379.58 David M. Miller, Church, State, and Nation in Ireland, 1898–1921 (Dublin: Gill

and Macmillan, 1978), 452.59 Paul Dixon, Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace (New York: Palgrave,

2001), 4–6.60 Michael E. Collins, Ireland, 1868–1966 (Dublin: The Educational Company of

Ireland, 1993).61 Fulton, 1990, 91.62 Ibid., 5.63 Bryan A. Follis, A State under Siege: The Establishment of Northern Ireland, 1920–

1925 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, 82).64 See Laura K. Donohue, “Regulating Northern Ireland: The Special Powers Acts,

1922–1972,” The Historical Journal, 41(4), 1998, 1089–1120.65 John Darby, Conflict in Northern Ireland: The Development of a Polarised Commu-

nity (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1976), 56.66 UK (Commons) Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol. 133, October 25, 1920.67 Paul Canning, British Policy towards Ireland, 1921–1941 (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1985), 8.68 John Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question, 1917–73 (Oxford: Clarendon,

1982), 30.69 Darby, 1976, 37.70 Bob Rowthorn and Naomi Wayne, Northern Ireland: The Political Economy of

Conflict (London: Polity Press, 1988), 15.71 Marianne Elliott, When God Took Sides: Religion and Identity in Ireland – Unfin-

ished History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 227.72 John H. Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland, 1923–1979 (Dublin: Gill and

Macmillan, 1980), 15.73 Londonderry Sentinel, March 20, 1934.74 Darby, 1976, 64.75 Rowthorn and Wayne, 1988, 38.76 Helen Curley, Local Ireland Almanac and Yearbook of Facts 2000 (Chester Springs,

PA: Dufour Editions, 1999), 17.77 Brian Hanley and Scott Miller, The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA

and the Workers’ Party (Dublin: Penguin Books, 2009), 14.78 Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional IRA (London: Corgi, 1988),

41.79 Elizabeth Crighton and Martha A. Mac Iver, “The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic

Conflict: Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in Northern Irelandand Lebanon,” Comparative Politics 23(3), 1991, 135.

80 Bernadette Devlin, The Price of My Soul (London: Collins, 1969), 57.81 Ian S. Wood, “The IRA’s Border Campaign, 1956–1962,” in Malcolm Anderson

and Eberhard Bort (eds.), The Irish Border: History, Politics, Culture (Liverpool:Liverpool University Press, 1999), 123.

82 “Prison Sentences on Paisley and Bunting,” The Times, January 28, 1969.



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83 Sarah Nelson, Ulster’s Uncertain Defenders: Protestant Political Paramilitary andCommunity Groups and the Northern Ireland Conflict (Belfast: Appletree Press,1984), 61.

84 Gallagher and Worrall, 1982, 47.85 Ibid., 135.86 Census Office for Northern Ireland, Key Statistics Tables, 2001.87 Irish Catholic Bishops Conference website, www.catholicbishops.ie. Last accessed

June 30, 2016.88 For detailed accounts of the role of Catholic Church in nationalist politics, see

Mary Harris, The Catholic Church and the Foundation of the Northern Irish State(Cork: Cork University Press, 1993); Oliver Rafferty, Catholicism in Ulster 1603–1983: An Interpretative History (London: Hurst, 1994).

89 Duncan Morrow, Derek Birrell, John Greer, and Terry O’Keeffe, The Churchesand Inter-Community Relationships (Coleraine: University of Ulster, 1991), 122.

90 Joseph Ruane, “Ireland’s Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Path Dependence and ItsLegacies,” in Patrick J. Duffy and William Nolan (eds.), At the Anvil: Essays inHonour of William J. Smith (Dublin: Geography Publications, 2012), 631–652.

91 Walker, 2012, 79.92 Gerald McElroy, The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Crisis, 1968–86

(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1991), 65–78.93 Fionnuala O’Connor, In Search of a State: Catholics in Northern Ireland (Belfast:

Blackstaff Press, 1993), 287–293; Thomas G. Mitchell, Native vs. Settler: EthnicConflict in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa (Westport, CT:Greenwood Press, 2000), 111; Claire Mitchell, Religion, Identity and Politics inNorthern Ireland (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2006), 42.

94 Joseph McVeigh, Religion, Politics and Justice in Northern Ireland (Cork: MercierPress, 1989); Pat Buckley, A Thorn in the Side (Dublin: O’Brien Press, 1994).

95 Irish Presbyterian Church website, www.presbyterianireland.org/about/index.html. Last accessed March 1, 2016.

96 Ibid.97 John Dunlop, A Precarious Belonging: Presbyterians and the Conflict in Ireland

(Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1995), 9.98 Ibid., 15.99 Elliott, 2009, 52.

100 Church of Ireland website, www.ireland.anglican.org/index.php?do=about. Lastaccessed March 1, 2016.

101 Ibid.102 See Earl Storey, Traditional Roots: Towards an Appropriate Relationship between

the Church of Ireland and the Orange Order (Dublin: Columba Press, 2002).103 The Methodist Church in Ireland, www.irishmethodist.org. Last accessed March

1, 2013.104 Statement by Rev. Winston Graham, The Church of Ireland/Methodist Church

Covenant, September 26, 2002. Available at www.ireland.anglican.org/archives/pressreleases/prarchive2002/covstmt2.html. Last accessed March 14, 2013.

105 David Stevens, The Place Called Reconciliation: Texts to Explore (Belfast: Cor-rymeela Press, 2008), 10.

106 David Porter, personal communication, Belfast, 2008.



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3 Churches in “Troubles”

1 For the historical details of the Troubles Period and the marches, see Henry Pat-terson, Ireland since 1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Jonathan Tonge,Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change (London, Pearson Education, 2002); JohnH. Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); JohnMcGarry and Brandon O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland (Oxford: Blackwell,1995).

2 McKittrick et al., 2007, 1555.3 Words of a Presbyterian Minister, personal communication, Derry, 2008.4 Dennis Cooke, Peacemaker: The Life and Work of Eric Gallagher (Peterborough,

England: Methodist Publishing House, 2005), 129.5 Gallagher and Worrall, 1982, 132.6 Taggart, 2004, 94.7 Kenneth Bloomfield, A Tragedy of Errors: Government and Misgovernment of North-

ern Ireland (Liverpool, England: Liverpool University Press, 2007), 183.8 For the impact of Paisley and Free Presbyterians on Northern Irish Politics, the

reader can refer to Mitchell, 2006; Steve Bruce, God Save Ulster: The Religionand Politics of Paisleyism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Steve Bruce, Paisley:Religion and Politics in Northern Ireland (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

9 The fundamentalists, within the framework of the Protestant tradition, argue thatthe Bible is divinely inspired and is infallible. For a discussion of Paisley andfundamentalism, see Bruce, 2007, 15–20.

10 Joseph Liechty and Cecelia Clegg, Moving beyond Sectarianism: Religion, Conflictand Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Dublin: Columba Press, 2001), 2.

11 “Churches May Join on Social Problems,” News Letter, May 9, 1970.12 “Church Leaders Reject Religious Cause,” News Letter, February 4, 1972; also see

“Religion Hurt by Conflict in North: Bishops See Christian Credibility Weakened,”Irish Times, September 24, 1974; “Methodist Head on ‘Savagery beneath ReligionFace,’” Irish News, November 27, 1974.

13 “Church Synod Asks Newsmen to Avoid ‘Labelling of the Dead,’” Irish Times,January 12, 1972.

14 Personal communication, Belfast, June 2008.15 Personal communication, Derry, July 2008.16 “Church Leaders Appeal to Media,” Irish Times, March 16, 1973.17 Fr. James Lennon in “Sectarianism Rare in NI, Says Priest,” Irish Times, August 6,

1974. Also see Fr. Padraig Murphy in “You Cannot Excuse Killing Priest,” BelfastTelegraph, December 3, 1971.

18 Rt. Rev. Dr. Rupert Gibson in “Press Treats Church Unfairly – Moderator,” IrishTimes, November 15, 1971. The same sentiment was conveyed by multiple inter-viewees, including former ECONI Director David Porter; former President of theMethodist Church, Rev. Harold Good; and former Moderator of the PresbyterianChurch, Dr. John Dunlop.

19 Statement by the Council on Social Welfare of the Methodist Church, “Oppor-tunity for New Beginning – Methodists,” Irish Times, March 26, 1973; also see thestatements of the Presbyterian Moderator, the Rt. Rev. Tom Patterson in “PoliticsNot Our Role – Moderator,” News Letter, June 13, 1977.



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20 Eric Gallagher cited in Cooke, 2005, 153.21 Church of Ireland Bishop of Clogher Rt. Rev. Richard Hanson in “Clerics in

Politics Attacked,” Belfast Telegraph, March 23, 1973; also see the statements of theArchbishop of Canterbury Dr. Donald Coggan in “Clergy Should Not Tell Howto Vote,” Belfast Telegraph, March 17, 1975; “Get Rid of These Links, ChurchesAdvised,” Belfast Telegraph, August 19, 1977.

22 “Paisley Hits at Coggan,” Belfast Telegraph, April 14, 1975.23 “Dr. Daly Denounces Political Clerics,” Irish News, April 17, 1975.24 Church of Ireland Bishop of Clogher Dr. Hanson in “Christians Must Snap ‘Polit-

ical Bondage,’” Belfast Telegraph, February 9, 1973; also see “We All Share theBlame for Hatred,” Belfast Telegraph, January 6, 1972.

25 Rev. Dr. Eric Gallagher, “Churches Have Failed, Says NI Methodist,” Irish Times,February 21, 1971; also see the statement of Rev. Gordon Gray in “Ulster ChurchesDivisive: Clergyman,” News Letter, November 28, 1975.

26 Rt. Rev. George Wynne, “Moderator Urges End to Bickering,” Irish Times, June 3,1975; also see Rev. Dr. Victor Lynas in “Moderator Condemns Church Failure,”News Letter, June 5, 1973.

27 The Rev. Charles Bain, Chairman of the Belfast District Synod of the MethodistChurch in Ireland in “Violent Deeds Must End,” Belfast Telegraph, September12, 1972. For a similar Methodist view, see the statements of the Rev. Harry Sloan,President of the Methodist Church in Ireland in “Troubles Have Nothing to Dowith Religion,” Irish News, July 4, 1973, and statements of the President of theMethodist Church, Rev. Robert G. Livingstone in “Church Leader Urges – OpenUp to Each Other,” Belfast Telegraph, June 16, 1977.

28 Church of Ireland Canon Eric Elliott in “Canon on Sectarianism,” News Letter,January 11, 1976; also see “Sorrow for Past Treatment of Irish Catholics by Churchof Ireland,” Irish News, June 1, 1977.

29 The Very Rev. Dr. Thomas Patterson, the outgoing Moderator of the GeneralAssembly in “Ten-Year Peace Plan for Ulster,” News Letter, June 6, 1978; Rev.Robert Livingstone in “Clergyman’s Bid to Break Hate Barrier,” News Letter, Octo-ber 17, 1977; also see “Dr. Simms Calls for Church Cooperation to Deal withSocial Disorders,” Irish Times, May 12, 1971; statements of Rev. Cyril Young (theGeneral Assembly of the Presbyterian Church) in “Deprived People – A Questionfor Churchmen,” Belfast Telegraph, June 17, 1977; Right Rev. Robert Heavener,Church of Ireland Bishop of Clogher in “Settle It – Bishop on North,” Irish News,September 24, 1977; Right Rev. George Quin in “Working Together of All MustBe Encouraged,” Irish News, May 20, 1976.

30 Cahal Daly in “Poverty Needs National Plan, Says Bishop,” Irish Times, March 29,1978; “Full North-South Economic Tie Urged by Church of Ireland Body,” IrishNews, November 25, 1978; Right Rev. George Quin in “Work Together for Ireland’sWelfare – Bishop’s Appeal,” Irish News, June 15, 1978.

31 Catholic Clergyman Very Rev. Dr. Francis MacLarnon in “Priest Offers Four-Point Peace Plan,” News Letter, January 1, 1972. Also see “Use Bible Plea,” BelfastTelegraph, September 15, 1972, for the plan to distribute St. Luke’s Gospel to everyhouse as a “remedy to Ulster’s ills,” a plan supported by all churches; “Keep withinLaw, Say Clergy,” News Letter, September 4, 1975.

32 “Shankill Peace Plea to the Paramilitaries,” Irish News, March 19, 1977.



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33 Belfast Methodist Minister, Rev. Livingstone in “Ireland Needs Christian Tol-eration,” Belfast Telegraph, March 7, 1975; also see the statements of Rev. EricGallagher, Chairman of the Belfast District of the Methodist Church in “Cler-gyman Urges New Initiative,” News Letter, February 1, 1971; Rev. Harold Sloan,President of the Methodist Church in “Using Tongues to Quieten Fears, Passions,”Belfast Telegraph, June 14, 1974; the Church of Ireland Primate George Simms,“Primate Calls for Peace Role,” News Letter, May 21, 1975.

34 Dr. Herbert Plunkett in “Outthink Extremists – Churchman,” Irish News, January14, 1974.

35 “Let’s Study Areas of Agreement – Church Leader,” Belfast Telegraph, April 25,1977; “Churches Coming Closer Together – Dr. Simms,” Belfast Telegraph, March27, 1973.

36 “Derry Clergymen in Peace Talks,” News Letter, October 10, 1974; “Clergy DiscussUlster,” News Letter, April 25, 1975; “Churchmen View Reconciliation Strategy,”Irish Times, April 28, 1975; “Churchmen Discuss the ‘Troubles,’” Belfast Telegraph,April 9, 1977; the Most Rev. Dr. Simms, Presidential Address of the Archbishop ofArmagh and Primate of All Ireland, May 8, 1973.

37 Personal communication, Belfast, 2007.38 “Discussions on Doctrine to Continue,” News Letter, June 6, 1974; statements of

Rev. Ross Grier and Rev. Donald Gillies in “Peace Has Got to Be Worked for,Synod Told,” Irish News, March 15, 1978; statements of the Very Rev. Dr. AlfredMartin (Presbyterian Church) in “Minister to Appeal to Roman Catholics,” NewsLetter, February 5, 1972.

39 For instance, see “Aid from All Sides for Sacked Church,” News Letter, February10, 1973; “Priests Condemn ‘Sacrilege,’” Belfast Telegraph, July 2, 1973; “Youth GetsTogether for Peace,” News Letter, March 18, 1972; “Unification for Prayer,” NewsLetter, February 19, 1971; “Bishop Tells a Tale of Two Cities,” Belfast Telegraph,November 8, 1971; statements of moderator Dr. John Orr in “Help Guard RCProperty – Protestant Leader,” Belfast Telegraph, September 10, 1973; “Extendinga Friendly Hand,” News Letter, June 4, 1973.

40 The Moderator of Ballymena and Coleraine Presbyterian Synod, the Rev. JohnLyle, in “Peace – All Sides Must Give a Little,” News Letter, March 20, 1973.

41 “Clergy Plead for Peace – and Pay for It,” Belfast Telegraph, September 22, 1975.42 The Joint Statement by Irish Church Leaders, dated April 21, 1975, available at

Linen Hall Library, Belfast; also see What Can I Do about Northern Ireland?(issued jointly by the British Council of Churches and the Roman Catholic Justiceand Peace Commission), 1972, also available at Linen Hall Library, Belfast; Rt. Rev.J. C. Duggan in “Bishop’s Plea for Peace,” News Letter, July 15, 1974; Rev. R. G.Livingstone in “Read All History Books: Minister,” Belfast Telegraph, July 28, 1974.

43 “Dean Griffin Says Protestantism and Catholicism Need Each Other,” Irish Times,March 16, 1977.

44 RC Cardinal Conway in “Terror Campaign Bringing Disgrace and Shame, SaysRC Hierarchy,” Belfast Telegraph, September 13, 1971.

45 “Churches for ‘Peace Ideas’ Talk with Rees,” Irish News, December 19, 1975;“Churchmen in Talks with SDLP,” Irish News, January 31, 1976; “ChurchmenMeet Prime Minister,” News Letter, February 11, 1976; “Churchmen Meet Alliance,UPNI,” Irish News, February 19, 1979; “Leaders Should Take Note of the Will for



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Peace,” Irish Times, January 3, 1975; “Church Backs Talks between Ulster Parties,”News Letter, June 10, 1976.

46 The President of the Methodist Church in Ireland, Dr. Plunkett in “MethodistCall for New NI Leaders,” Irish Times, March 8, 1976; “Church’s Grim Warning:The Hazards of Political Stalemate,” News Letter, February 3, 1977.

47 Dr. Cahal Daly in “Copy Peace People’s Lead, Bishop Tells Parties,” Irish News,January 14, 1976.

48 “Bishops to Set Up Committee on EEC,” Irish Times, November 24, 1977.49 The Church of Ireland Bishop of Derry Dr. Robin Eames in “Eames Urges a

Political Compromise,” Belfast Telegraph, June 1, 1977.50 “Liquidate Not in Our Vocabulary,” Belfast Telegraph, March 20, 1972.51 The statement of Bishop of Down and Dromore, George Quin in “Bishop Warns

on Intimidation,” Irish News, June 3, 1974.52 The Bishop of Clogher, Most Rev. Patrick Mulligan in “Violence Must End Says

Bishop,” Irish News, August 9, 1972.53 Rev. Norman Taggart in “Religious Leaders Attend Christian Unity service,” Irish

News, January 24, 1972.54 “Patriotism Is Not Piety – Churches Declare,” Belfast Telegraph, March 24, 1972;

also see “Churches on Men of Violence,” Belfast Telegraph, February 8, 1973; theChurch of Ireland Bishop of Derry Dr. Robin Eames in “‘Outlaw Bigots’ UrgesBishop,” News Letter, November 27, 1974; “Terrorists Cannot Win – Bishop Quin,”Belfast Telegraph, April 1, 1974; “Protestant Clergyman Backs Call by Priest,” NewsLetter, September 2, 1972.

55 “Catholics and Protestants in Joint Struggle against Atheistic Humanism, Dr. Daly,”Irish Times, February 5, 1977.

56 “No Church Support for IRA in Any Way,” Irish News, June 14, 1974.57 “Priests Are Like the Godfather, Say the Provos,” Belfast Telegraph, October 30,

1973.58 “Talks Must Replace the Shootings,” News Letter, May 22, 1972; also see “Dr. Daly

Criticizes IRA Leadership,” Irish Times, November 27, 1974; Monsignor A. H. Ryanin “‘Get Out’ Priest Tells the IRA,” Belfast Telegraph, September 1, 1971; “RC PriestsAttacked by IRA Publication,” News Letter, September 19, 1971.

59 Adams, 2004, 29.60 John D. Brewer, David Mitchell, and Gerard Leavey, Ex-Combatants, Religion and

Peace in Northern Ireland: The Role of Religion in Transitional Justice (New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 96, 100.

61 Fr. Des Wilson in “Pacifism versus Self-Defence,” Irish Times, February 2, 1972;“Church Leaders Attacked by Fr. Wilson,” Irish Times, January 10, 1977.

62 The statement of Eric Gallagher, the former president of the Methodist Conferenceat the time, in “Methodists Call for IRA Talks,” Irish Press, June 14, 1972. Alsosee the statement of Rev. Ivor Lewis in “Come to Terms with UDA – Plea,”Belfast Telegraph, July 4, 1972; “21 Belfast Priests Urge Talks with IRA,” Irish News,January 16, 1972; the statements of Methodist minister Rev. Bob Livingstone in“Shankill Minister to Confront IRA,” News Letter, September 4, 1978; statementsof the Church of Ireland bishop of Cork, Coyne, and Ross in “Extremists Must BeUnderstood, Says Bishop,” Irish Times, November 26, 1971.

63 Adams, 2004, 125.



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64 Ibid., 41.65 Brewer et al., 2013, 100.66 “Ministers Call on UDA to Talk,” News Letter, May 12, 1972.67 Cooke, 2005, 166.68 Ibid.69 Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (New York: Oxford Uni-

versity Press, 2003), 178.70 “Arlow and Sinn Fein ‘Still in Contact,’” Belfast Telegraph, April 10, 1978.71 “Keep Provos Out of Any Peace Talks,” Belfast Telegraph, April 12, 1978.72 Rev. John Steward in “Meet the Militants Urges Church,” News Letter, March 25,

1974.73 Presbyterian Church Statement, cited in “Church Condemns Violence,” News

Letter, December 1, 1971.74 Dr. Robin Eames in “Think before You Criticize Forces Says Dr. Eames,” Irish

News, October 28, 1976; also see “Bishop Warns on Using RUC as Political Foot-ball,” Irish Times, March 16, 1977.

75 Roman Catholic Bishop of Dromore, Dr. Eugene O’Doherty in “Don’t BlameArmy for All Violence,” Belfast Telegraph, January 3, 1972.

76 Gallagher and Worrall, 1982, 200.77 Coogan, 2002, 126.78 English, 2006, 370.79 “Churches See Need to Intern,” News Letter, August 10, 1971.80 “Internment Is Evil, Says Presbyterian Minister,” Irish News, January 10, 1972; also

see the statements of the Archbishop of Canterbury in “Internment Must Go,”Sunday Press, January 23, 1972.

81 Church of Ireland Bishop of Down and Dromore, the Rt. Rev. George Quin in“Bishop Says ‘Try the Internees,’” Belfast Telegraph, February 7, 1972.

82 The British Council of Churches and the Irish Council of Churches, Joint Consul-tation, Birmingham, UK, 1975 (n.d.). Document available at Linen Hall Library,Belfast.

83 “Church Body Opposes Stormont Suspension,” Irish Times, March 30, 1972.84 Irish Presbyterian Church, “The Future of Northern Ireland” cited in “Church

Issues Warning on the Future,” News Letter, November 17, 1972.85 Statement of the Armagh Diocesan Board of Social Responsibility in “Christian

Answer to NI Problem,” Irish Times, October 5, 1974; also see statements of Presby-terian Rev. David Lapsley in “Politicians Must Tell the Truth – Minister,” BelfastTelegraph, September 16, 1974.

86 Shaun McDaid, Template for Peace: Northern Ireland, 1972–75 (Manchester, Eng-land: Manchester University Press, 2013).

87 Terminology used by Seamus Mallon, cited in Arthur Aughey, The Politics ofNorthern Ireland (London: Routledge, 2005), 83.

88 Text of the Sunningdale Agreement, December 1973.89 “Presbyterians Say Yes to That Pact,” Belfast Telegraph, December 14, 1973; “Con-

ference Politicians Praised,” Irish Times, December 13, 1973; “Sunningdale Propos-als a Genuine Starting Point,” News Letter, January 15, 1974.

90 The Bishop of Connor, the Rt. Rev. Dr. Butler, Statement to the General Synod of“Bishop Finds Much Support for Power-Sharing,” Irish Times, May 8, 1974.



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91 Statement by Dr. Jack Weir (Presbyterian Church) in “Churches Refuse to BackSunningdale,” News Letter, March 30, 1974.

92 “Power-Sharing Plan Amended,” News Letter, June 5, 1974.93 The Church of Ireland Bishop of Derry Dr. Robin Eames in “Eames Urges a

Political Compromise,” Belfast Telegraph, June 1, 1977; “Only People Can DecideNI Status, Say Bishops,” Irish Times, January 25, 1978; “Settlement Must Be anEquitable One,” Irish News, March 13, 1978.


1 Bew, 2007, 537.2 Jelen, 2001.3 Haas, “Introduction,” 1992.4 “Unionist Leaders Reject Clerics’ Call to Break Political Stalemate,” News Letter,

November 26, 1988; also see the statements of Bishop Cahal Daly regarding theUnionist politicians’ attitude in “We Are Not Enemies of the Unionists,” Irish News,January 3, 1989.

5 Personal communication with Rev. Harold Good, Marino, Northern Ireland,August 11, 2007.

6 “Christianity on Wane in Northern Ireland,” Belfast Telegraph, January 8, 1987.7 Demerath, 2001; also see Gans, 1994.8 Davie, 1994.9 For a detailed account of the agreement, consult Arthur Aughey, Under Siege:

Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (London: Hurst, 1989); AnthonyCoughlan, Fooled Again: The Anglo-Irish Agreement and After (Cork: Mercier Press,1996); Tom Hadden and Kevin Boyle, The Anglo-Irish Agreement: Commentary,Text and Official Review (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1989); Anthony Kenny, TheRoad to Hillsborough (Oxford: Pergamon, 1986).

10 The permanent secretariat of the conference was in Maryfield, Belfast.11 The International Fund for Ireland was another body established as a result of the

agreement; its aim was to promote contact, dialogue, and reconciliation throughoutIreland.

12 Part A, Article 1, Anglo-Irish Agreement.13 Part A, Article 2, Anglo-Irish Agreement.14 See the agreement as an example of “coercive power-sharing” in Brendan O’Leary

and John McGarry, The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Agreements(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 129.

15 “Paisley Pledge,” Irish News, November 18, 1985.16 “Paisley Fury,” News Letter, December 6, 1985.17 Margaret Thatcher, Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 383–

384.18 According to the poll, seven out of ten Catholics were in favor of the pact. The poll

was conducted by the Market Research Bureau of Ireland for the Irish Times onJanuary 28–29.

19 The poll was commissioned by the newspaper, Belfast Telegraph, with the marketresearch division of Coopers & Lybrand Consultants; see “People Want Power-Sharing, Poll Claims,” Irish Times, January 16, 1986.



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20 Poll conducted by Coopers and Lybrand for Belfast Telegraph; see “Accords aFailure Say Catholics Now,” Irish Press, October 5, 1988.

21 See Archbishop Robin Eames’s statement on the substance of the four churches’regular meetings in “Archbishop Replies to Deasy on Church Efforts in North,”Irish Times, September 9, 1988.

22 Jelen, 2001, 25.23 “What Happened in the Hunger Strike?,” BBC News, May 5, 2006, last retrieved

April 10, 2010.24 Alf McCreary, Nobody’s Fool: The Life of Archbishop Robin Eames (London:

Hodder and Stoughton, 2004), 83.25 Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, The Churching of America, 1776–1990: Winners and

Losers in Our Religious Economy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,1992).

26 Personal communication with Dr. John Dunlop, Former Moderator of the Presby-terian Church, July 24, 2008.

27 Gallagher and Worrall, 1982, 202.28 For a detailed discussion of comparative changes in all four churches, see Sectari-

anism, the Discussion Document, Working Party of the Irish Interchurch Meeting,1993.

29 Duncan Morrow, “Suffering for Righteousness Sake? Fundamentalist Protes-tantism and Ulster Politics,” in Peter Shirlow and Mark McGovern (eds.), WhoAre “the People”? Unionism, Protestantism, and Loyalism in Northern Ireland(London: Pluto Press, 1997), 55–71.

30 John Dunlop, Christianity and Politics in Northern Ireland (Belfast: St. Thomas’Parish Church, 1993).

31 See Primate Robin Eames’s statement in “Churches Must Battle Sectarianism,”Irish News, January 14, 1989; “Church of Ireland Church Repairs by Catholics,”Irish Press, January 28, 1989.

32 Personal communication, Belfast, Northern Ireland, July 24, 2008.33 Dr. Gordon McMullan, Church of Ireland Bishop of Down and Dromore in

“Bishop Launches Scathing Attack on Provo Killers,” Irish News, August 5,1988.

34 The Rt. Rev. Brian Hannon, Bishop of Clogher in “Christians Can Show the Wayto Peace,” Belfast Telegraph, September 30, 1988.

35 Stanley Worrall, “The Methodist Church in Ireland,” The Continuing Situation ofPolitical Instability in Northern Ireland, Occasional Paper Series, 1(3), 1983.

36 Dr. Godfrey Brown quoted in “Moderator Urges Love for Catholics,” Irish Times,June 7, 1988.

37 “Church Has Condemned Violence,” Irish Times, January 11, 1987; also see Car-dinal O’Fiaich in “Cardinal Says IRA Killings Promote Sectarianism,” Irish News,August 8, 1988; Bishop of Down and Connor, Dr. Cahal Daly in “Immoral to ForceUnited Ireland,” Belfast Telegraph, November 7, 1988; “Influence of IRA Is Eviland Sinister,” Irish Times, January 19, 1990.

38 The members of the group included Canon Bill Arlow, the Rev. Robin Boyd,Dr. Eric Gallagher, the Rev. David Lapsley, Father Brian Lennon, the Rev. AlanMartin, Dr. John Morrow, and the Rev. Declan Smith. The group was sponsoredby the Corrymeela Community, the Glencree Centre for Reconciliation, and the



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Irish School of Ecumenics. See “Interchurch Group Spells Out Options for BothCommunities,” Belfast Telegraph, March 5, 1986.

39 “Study Pact Fully, Pleads Cleric,” Irish News, November 18, 1985; also see“Churches Urge Pact Review,” Belfast Telegraph, April 5, 1989.

40 “Support Political Process – Church of Ireland,” Irish Times, February 5, 1986;also see “Clarify Accords – Bishops,” Irish Press, February 27, 1986; “Bishops Warn:Choose Talks or Chaos,” Irish Independent, March 5, 1986; statement of Bishopof Connor, Dr. Samuel Poyntz in “Bishop Warns of Becoming Province of LeftBehinds,” Belfast Telegraph, June 16, 1988; “Suspend Agreement, Says Church ofIreland Bishop,” Irish Times, February 25, 1989.

41 “Go Back, Church Tells MPs,” Belfast Telegraph, September 23, 1987; also see thestatement of the Presbyterian Church’s Government Committee “Church UrgesPoliticians to Be Given Room to Negotiate,” News Letter, February 18, 1989.

42 “Northern Ireland Politicians Urged to Get Together,” Irish News, April 25, 1988;also see the statement of Very Rev. Dr. Tom Simpson in “Stop the Political PointScoring Plea,” News Letter, June 9, 1988.

43 “North Is British and Irish,” Belfast Telegraph, October 10, 1988; see also “BishopCalls on Provos to End Struggle,” Irish Times, March 14, 1989; Cardinal TomasO’Fiaich’s statement in “Violence Downgrades the Concept of Patriotism,” IrishTimes, March 14, 1989.

44 “Plea to Unionists on Canvas,” Irish Press, January 15, 1987; “Church Unity onPetition Unease,” Irish News, January 15, 1987.

45 “Fury over Petition Plea,” News Letter, January 16, 1987; “Bishop’s View of PetitionSlammed,” Belfast Telegraph, January 16, 1987.

46 “Deal Talk for Churches,” Irish News, March 29, 1986; “Clerics Take Fears toPM,” Belfast Telegraph, December 12, 1985; “Church of Ireland Bishops to MeetFitzgerald,” Belfast Telegraph, December 17, 1985; “Bishops to Meet Thatcher,”Irish News, February 18, 1986; “Church Leaders Criticize Level of Northern IrishPolitics,” Irish Times, November 7, 1988; “CoI Bishop Censures Britain on NorthPolicy,” Irish News, December 30, 1988.

47 “Church Report Gives Backing to the Accord,” Belfast Telegraph, May 7, 1986.48 “Presbyterian Split on Pact Widens,” Irish Times, January 21, 1986; also see “Pres-

byterians Reject Call to Suspend the Pact,” Belfast Telegraph, June 8, 1988.49 “Moderator Challenges the Future of the Eire Deal,” News Letter, May 7, 1987.50 “Primate Calls for New Pact in the North,” Irish Press, May 20, 1987.51 See, e.g., Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International

Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), and David Mitrany, TheFunctional Theory of Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976).

52 Most Rev. Dr. Robin Eames, Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of All Ireland,Address to the General Synod of the Church of England at the University of York,1989.

53 Adams, 2004, 34–49.54 Personal communication with Fr. Gerry Reynolds, Belfast, Northern Ireland,

August 14, 2008.55 Adams, 2004, 15.56 E.g., Fitzduff, 2011, argues that church leaders failed to provide the kind of leader-

ship that could have defined how the conflicts were played out.



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57 Jelen, 2001, 26.58 Church of Ireland Bishop of Derry and Raphoe, Dr. James Mahaffey in “Derry

Bishop on Protestant Fears,” Irish News, November 22, 1985.59 Church of Ireland Bishop of Clogher, Dr. Gordon McMullan, “Bishops to Meet

British and Eire Prime Ministers,” Irish News, December 30, 1985; see also “BishopShares Concern on Deal,” News Letter, May 22, 1987.

60 “Presbyterians Feel the Pact Is Discriminatory,” Belfast Telegraph, December 13,1985; also see “Listen to Majority,” News Letter, February 28, 1986.

61 “Archbishop Calls in All Northern Irish Parties to Work Together,” Irish Times,October 12, 1988.

62 “Border Is Now Not an Issue,” Irish Press, May 3, 1988.63 Dr. Gordon McMullan, Church of Ireland Bishop of Down and Dromore in

“Bishop Launches Scathing Attack on Provo Killers,” Irish News, August 5, 1988;also see “Sectarian Violence in North Condemned by Bishop,” Irish Times, August4, 1990.

64 See Verba et al., 1995; Steven A. Peterson, “Church Participation and PoliticalParticipation: The Spillover Effect,” American Politics Quarterly 20, 1992, 123–139.

65 See the statement of Church of Ireland Bishop of Connor, Dr. Samuel Poyntz in“Take Initiative,” Irish News, January 25, 1989.

66 Gerry Reynolds, “Cornerstone Community: A Green Shoot!,” Redemptio: Newslet-ter of the Clonard Reconciliation Project, Belfast, June 2008.

67 William Shaw, Northern Ireland: A Time for Healing, Belfast, n.d.68 “8,000 Join Procession for Peace,” Irish Times, December 5, 1986.69 Faith and Politics Group Pamphlet, A Time to Heal: Perspectives on Reconciliation

(Belfast: Faith and Politics Group, 2002), 11, 12.70 Church of Ireland Bishop of Derry and Raphoe, Dr. James Mehaffey in “Britain

Must End Deadlock,” Irish Press, October 27, 1988.71 Catholic Bishop Cahal Daly in “Bishop Tells Clergy to Stay Out of Politics,” Irish

News, January 25, 1989.72 Personal communication with Fr. Gerry Reynolds, Belfast, Northern Ireland,

August 22, 2008.


1 Anthony M. Gallagher, “The Approach of Government: Community Relations andEquity,” in Seamus Dunn (ed.), Facets of the Conflict in Northern Ireland (NewYork: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).

2 Adams, 2004, 35.3 Brewer et al., 2011, 102.4 Ibid., 349.5 John Major’s letter, April 4, 2006, cited in Brewer et al., 2011, 8, emphasis original.6 Albert Reynolds, My Autobiography (London: Transworld Ireland, 2010), 238.7 Statements of Rev. Patrick McCafferty, “The Theology of Hatred,” Belfast Tele-

graph, April 22, 1997.8 “Survey Shows One in Four Have No Interest in Religion,” Irish News, January

21, 1991; “Defender of Rival Religious Rights,” The Guardian, November 7, 1990;“Leaders Bid to Stop School Secularization,” Belfast Telegraph, June 7, 1996.



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9 “Bridge-Building Is the Only Way Forward,” Irish Times, March 17, 1993.10 “Church Leaders Hopeful of Talks’ Success,” Belfast Telegraph, March 17, 1998.11 See, e.g., the statements of the Catholic Bishop of Derry, Seamus Hegarty in

“Bishop Backs African Way,” Irish News, December 27, 1997.12 “Churches Must Take Lead to Stamp Out Sectarianism: Mehaffey,” Belfast Tele-

graph, August 14, 1997.13 “Church Leaders Condemn ‘Sectarian’ Arson Attacks,” Belfast Telegraph, April 7,

1997; “Catholics Help Methodists to Rebuild,” Belfast Telegraph, September 19,1997.

14 “Protestants Help Catholic Fund,” Belfast Telegraph, November 28, 1998.15 “Paisley: ‘Church and Violence,’” Belfast Telegraph, November 11, 1996.16 Brian Rowan, Behind the Lines: The Story of the IRA and Loyalist Ceasefires (Belfast:

Blackstaff Press, 1995), 100.17 McKittrick et al., 2007, 1552.18 “Influence of IRA Is Evil and Sinister,” Irish News, January 19, 1990; also see the

statements of Dr. Cahal Daly, the Bishop of Down and Connor in “SectarianViolence in North Condemned at Funeral by Bishop,” Belfast Telegraph, August4, 1990; the statements of Fr. Cahal Daly, “Catholics Fear IRA Most,” Irish News,February 8, 1991.

19 “Church Leader Offers to Talk to IRA,” Belfast Telegraph, September 9, 1990.20 “Churchmen on Peace Mission to Sinn Fein,” Belfast Telegraph, April 24, 1992;

also see “Presbyterians to Discuss Meetings with Sinn Fein,” Irish News, June 2,1992.

21 “Minister Reveals Ceasefire by Loyalists,” Belfast Telegraph, January 10, 1993.22 “Paisley Storm over ‘Hand of Friendship,’” Irish News, June 2, 1992.23 “Acceptance in Key to True and Lasting Peace,” Belfast Telegraph, August 29,

1991.24 “Church of Ireland Head Condemns Sectarianism as Evil,” News Letter, September

27, 1993.25 Joanne McEvoy, Politics of Northern Ireland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University

Press, 2008), 83. Each MLA designates himself or herself as “Nationalist,” “Union-ist,” or “Other,” and in cross-community matters, the committees formed need toinclude MLAs from each side.

26 See, e.g., the statement of the Bishop of Down and Connor, Dr. Patrick Welsh in“New Bishop Puts Poverty on Priority List over Politics,” Belfast Telegraph, March19, 1991.

27 “Churchmen Warn of the Dangers of Sectarian Hatreds,” News Letter, October 11,1993.

28 “‘Ulster Says No’ Days Are Gone, Says Dr. Poyntz,” Irish Times, October 21, 1994.29 Statements of Dr. Godfrey Brown and also Rev. Samuel Hutchinson, in “Peace

Talks Plea to Politicians,” News Letter, January 10, 1993.30 “Methodist Leader Says IRA Ceasefire Enough to Start Talks,” Irish News, June 10,

1997; “Church of Ireland Newspaper Warns against Too Many Preconditions forTalks,” Belfast Telegraph, December 27, 1995.

31 “Keep the Lines Open Urge Church Leaders,” Belfast Telegraph, February 20,1998.

32 Reynolds, 2010, 330.



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33 “Church Asks Protestants to Rethink,” Irish News, September 23, 1994; “PeaceNow Unstoppable,” Belfast Telegraph, April 28, 1994; “Dr. Daly Warns on theVulnerability of Peace Process,” Irish Times, December 27, 1995.

34 “Church Urged to Take Risks to Aid Peace Process,” Belfast Telegraph, February9, 1995.

35 “Presbyterians Can Have Their Differences with the Catholic Church withoutBeing Anti-Catholic,” Belfast Telegraph, July 31, 1996.

36 Text of Mitchell Report Section I, Article I.37 Text of Mitchell Report, Section I, Article II.38 Bew, 2007, 547.39 John Major, John Major: The Autobiography (London: HarperCollins, 1999),

488.40 “Presbyterian Clergy in Peace Talks Call,” Belfast Telegraph, February 14, 1996.

41 “UUP Man Slams Church Leader on SINN FEIN Call,” Belfast Telegraph, Febru-ary 18, 1996.

42 “Restore Truce, Daly Tells IRA,” Belfast Telegraph, October 1, 1996. Also see thestatements of the Catholic Primate, Dr. Sean Brady in “Reconciliation Only WayForward, Says RC Primate,” Belfast Telegraph, November 1, 1996.

43 “We Can’t Afford Third Drumcree,” Belfast Telegraph, April 11, 1997.44 “Eames on the Spot over Drumcree,” Belfast Telegraph, July 24, 1996.45 “‘Radical Action’ Needed Bishop Tells Orangemen,” Belfast Telegraph, October

21, 1998.46 “We Must Grasp Nettle, Says Cleric,” Irish Times, August 8, 1996. Also see “Daly

Talks of Betrayal,” Belfast Telegraph, July 12, 1996; statements of Bishop GordonMcMullan in “Drumcree Inflicted Immense Damage,” Belfast Telegraph, Septem-ber 25, 1996.

47 “Churchmen Appeal for Calm and New Talks,” Belfast Telegraph, July 9,1996.

48 “Eames Tells of ‘Threat,’” Belfast Telegraph, July 24, 1998.49 “Eames Warns of Disaster Facing Ulster,” Belfast Telegraph, May 13, 1997.50 “Church Leaders Unite to Condemn Harryville,” Belfast Telegraph, December

5, 1996; “Church Leaders Hit Out at the Boycotts,” Belfast Telegraph, August 29,1996; the statements of the Methodist Church in “Church Warns of a Return toViolence,” News Letter, September 5, 1996.

51 “Dr. Eames Lifts Hope of the Drumcree Deal,” Irish News, January 13, 1997. Alsosee the statements of the Church of Ireland Bishop James Moore in “Bishop UrgesFace-to-Face Talks on Parade Problem,” Irish News, June 13, 1997.

52 “Forgiveness for Drumcree Granted Friday,” Belfast Telegraph, September 6,1996.

53 “Let’s End Spiral of Hurt: Bishop,” Belfast Telegraph, June 12, 1997.54 “Churchmen in Call for Calm,” Belfast Telegraph, July 5, 1997.55 “Catholic Church Invited to UUP Talks,” Irish News, August 2, 1997; “Unionists

to Meet Catholic Leader Soon,” Belfast Telegraph, August 18, 1997; “Trimble toMeet Catholic Primate,” Irish News, August 18, 1997.

56 “Churches Unite in Bid to Mend Divisions,” Belfast Telegraph, October 7, 1997;“Church Leaders Unite in Prayers,” Belfast Telegraph, January 21, 1998.

57 “Alpha Bid to Focus on Common Ground,” Belfast Telegraph, January 24, 1998.



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58 “Role of Clerics in New Agenda,” Belfast Telegraph, March 7, 1998.59 Walker, 2012, 184.60 “Belfast Peaceline Bid to Build Bridges,” Belfast Telegraph, April 26, 1997.61 Ibid.62 “Methodists Attack Leadership,” Belfast Telegraph, June 11, 1997. Also see “Church

Leaders Call for Inquiry,” Belfast Telegraph, February 28, 1997; “Church BacksInquiry,” Belfast Telegraph, June 10, 1997.

63 “Trimble Urged to Take Risk,” Belfast Telegraph, August 7, 1997. Also see thestatements of Rt. Rev. Harold Miller, Bishop of Down and Dromore in “BishopUrges UUP to Meet Sinn Fein,” Irish News, September 11, 1997.

64 For an example of this line of argumentation, see Liz Fawcett, Religion, Ethnicity,and Social Change (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).

65 “People Urged to Study Document,” Belfast Telegraph, April 11, 1998.66 “Primate Hits Out,” Belfast Telegraph, July 11, 1998.67 “‘No Role’ for Churches in Referendum,” Irish Times, April 4, 1998; “Clergymen

Hail the Agreement,” Irish Times, April 4, 1998.68 “Agreement Offers a ‘Meaningful Accommodation,’” Irish Times, May 5, 1998.69 “Presbyterian Assembly Says Deal Could Be a Way Out of Darkness,” Irish Times,

May 5, 1998.70 “Peace Accord Gives Hope for Future, Says Primate,” Irish Times, April 4, 1998.71 “Eames Agonized before Deciding to Back Deal,” Belfast Telegraph, May 22, 1998;

“Healing Process Central to Real Peace, Dr. Eames,” Irish Times, May 5, 1998.72 “New Body to Boost Ecumenic Action,” Belfast Telegraph, May 26, 1998; also see

“Methodist Welcome for Plan,” Belfast Telegraph, August 1, 1998.73 “Evangelicals Unite in Leap of Faith,” Belfast Telegraph, July 12, 1998.74 “We Must Talk to Those We Don’t Like,” Belfast Telegraph, June 3, 1998.75 “Belfast Joins Churches’ Peace Cities List,” Belfast Telegraph, April 18, 1998.76 “Churches Open Up U.S. Business World to Students,” Belfast Telegraph, October

3, 1998.


1 Personal communication, August 2008.2 “Churches’ Peace Role ‘Less Than Adequate,’” Belfast Telegraph, November 25,

2000.3 “Churches ‘Need to Persuade,’” Irish News, August 31, 2007.4 “Paramilitary Groups ‘Need to Know Their Day Is Over,’” Belfast Telegraph, June

7, 2005.5 “Methodists Must Widen Horizons,” Belfast Telegraph, June 8, 2002.6 Ibid.7 “Church Must Compete,” Belfast Telegraph, April 12, 2004.8 “Churches Should Be Flag-free,” Belfast Telegraph, August 14, 2004.9 “Primate Admits to Members’ Concern,” Belfast Telegraph, December 2, 2000; also

see “Sectarianism Greatest Sin,” Irish Times, January 1, 2000; “Bishop’s Appeal toCombat Secularism,” Irish News, June 4, 2005.

10 “Secularism More Threatening Than Nazism – Cardinal,” Irish Times, May 5,2000.



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11 “Stability Will Mean Emptier Churches,” Belfast Telegraph, June 17, 2000.12 “Bishops Criticize Increasing Secularism in Irish Society,” Belfast Telegraph,

December 19, 2007.13 “New Joint Theology Course,” Irish Times, September 9, 2000; “Prayer Revamp to

Focus on the Church Itself,” Belfast Telegraph, August 26, 2000.14 “CoI Booklet Promotes Reconciliation,” Irish News, October 31, 2003.15 “Leaders Unite in Backing for New Prayerbook,” Belfast Telegraph, December 23,

2000.16 “Anglicans, Methodists Are Getting Together,” Belfast Telegraph, November 11,

2000; “Church Unity Is a Step Nearer,” Belfast Telegraph, May 15, 2000.17 “Churches Back New Covenant,” Irish News, May 14, 2002.18 “Church Heads Call for ‘Tradition’ Overhaul,” Belfast Telegraph, May 17, 2000.19 “Methodists Back Peace Initiative,” Belfast Telegraph, November 12, 2004.20 Peacemaking program, www.presbyterianireland.org/peacemaking/index.html.

Last accessed January 16, 2012.21 The full text of the document available at www.vatican.va/roman curia/

congregations/cfaith/documents/rc con cfaith doc 20000806 dominus-iesus en.html. Last accessed September 20, 2012.

22 “Talks on Disputed Document to Continue,” Belfast Telegraph, December 9, 2000;“Interchurches Meeting to Respond to ‘Dominus Iesus’ Document Today,” IrishTimes, December 12, 2000.

23 “Church Leaders in Debate,” Belfast Telegraph, December 2, 2000.24 “DUP in Talks with Church,” Irish News, September 26, 2006; “Church of Ireland

Leaders Meet SINN FEIN,” Irish News, October 24, 2006.25 “Bishops to Engage Sinn Fein in Talks,” Belfast Telegraph, December 6, 2006.26 Ibid.27 “Presbyterians in Talks with DUP,” Belfast Telegraph, February 17, 2004.28 “No Quick Fix, Eames Warns as He Sees Paisley,” Belfast Telegraph, December 1,

2006.29 “Talks Could Mark New Relations between DUP and Catholic Church,” Belfast

Telegraph, December 6, 2006.30 “No Discord at DUP/ Catholic Church Meeting,” Belfast Telegraph, October 9,

2006.31 “Clergy Backed in Talks to End Loyalist Feud,” Belfast Telegraph, October 9, 2002.32 “Loyalist Group to Meet Head of Catholic Church in Ireland,” Belfast Telegraph,

April 20, 2009.33 “Eames Urges Peace Talks Action,” Belfast Telegraph, April 24, 2000.34 “Clergy in Secret Talks at Stormont,” Belfast Telegraph, April 8, 2000.35 “Church Leader ‘Amazed’ at IRA Arms Call,” Belfast Telegraph, May 26, 2000; also

see “Church Welcome for IRA Proposal,” Irish News, August 9, 2001.36 “Eames Speaks of Obligation to Help over Decommissioning,” Belfast Telegraph,

November 19, 2004.37 “Turning Point,” Belfast Telegraph, October 24, 2001.38 “Presbyterians Call for Move on Arms,” Belfast Telegraph, July 10, 2001.39 “Decommission Weapons Appeal from Archbishop,” Belfast Telegraph, October

16, 2007.40 “Key Role Played by Pair of Clerics,” Belfast Telegraph, September 26, 2005.



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41 “Loyalists ‘Closer to Decommissioning,’” Belfast Telegraph, April 29, 2009.42 “Methodist Leader’s Welcome for Move,” Belfast Telegraph, November 12, 2007.43 “Ahern Welcomes Bishop’s Offer to Intervene in Arms Deadlock,” Irish Times, May

5, 2000.44 Order-focused approaches focus on keeping the stability and status quo by law

enforcement, whereas justice-focused approaches favor reconciliation of partiesthrough in-depth questioning of the status quo.

45 “Back Police to Beat the Paramilitaries,” Belfast Telegraph, May 16, 2004.46 “Eames in Police Plea to Catholic Church,” Belfast Telegraph, July 28, 2000.47 “Church Support for Policing Plan Welcomed by Authority,” Irish News, August

21, 2001.48 “Dunlop Stresses ‘Importance’ of Human Rights,” Irish News, June 7, 2001.49 “Churches to Study Human Rights Report,” Belfast Telegraph, September 9,

2000.50 “Church Leaders Urge Sinn Fein to Back Police,” Belfast Telegraph, November

22, 2006.51 “Commission Is Inappropriate, Says Primate,” Belfast Telegraph, May 11, 2004.52 “Church Calls for Talks on ‘Healing the Hurt,’” Irish News, June 10, 2004.53 “Church to Focus on ‘Healing Hurts,’” Belfast Telegraph, May 27, 2004.54 “Plea for ‘Safe Place’ to Share Dark Secrets,” Belfast Telegraph, February 19, 2008.55 Ibid.56 “Church Leaders and PM in Positive Talks,” Belfast Telegraph, January 14, 2003.57 “Clergy Meet to Tackle Sectarianism,” Belfast Telegraph, October 14, 2005.58 Personal communication, Belfast, July 2008.59 “Catholic Churches Attacked in a Bid to Escalate Tension,” Belfast Telegraph, July

10, 2009.60 “Bishops Hope ‘Peace’ Lines Can Be Removed,” Belfast Telegraph, April 26, 2007.61 Rev. Arlington Trotman, Being, Identity and Belief: A Christian Basis for Pursuing

Justice, November 19, 2005.62 “Ulster Churches Unite to Condemn Attacks,” Belfast Telegraph, September 12,

2001.63 “Words Totally Inadequate – Archbishop,” Belfast Telegraph, September 15, 2001.64 “Archbishop Questions Need for Iraq War,” Irish News, September 30, 2002;

“Church Leaders Unite against War with Iraq,” Irish News, December 27, 2002;“Eames Tells of His Concern over Iraq,” Belfast Telegraph, September 30,2002.

65 “Church Speaks Out over Prospect of War with Iraq,” Belfast Telegraph, January24, 2003.

66 “Presbyterians See War as Last Resort,” Belfast Telegraph, March 3, 2003.67 “Methodists Urge Humane Policy,” Belfast Telegraph, March 26, 2003.68 Ibid.69 “Churches United in Call for Peace,” Belfast Telegraph, December 31, 2008.70 “Church Leaders Visit Egypt,” Belfast Telegraph, November 1, 2004.71 Personal communication, Belfast, August 2008.72 Personal communication, Belfast, July 2008.73 “Hard Gospel in Context,” Hard Gospel Project, http://ireland.anglican.org/

archive/hardgospel/index.php?id=4. Last accessed December 10, 2012.



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74 “Peacemaking Programme,” Presbyterian Church in Northern Ireland, www.presbyterianireland.org/peacemaking/history.html. Last accessed December 10,2013.

75 Interim Review/Assessment of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland Peacemaking Pro-gramme 2006–2009, prepared by Presbyterian Church in Ireland, Department ofForeign Affairs and International Fund for Ireland, February 2008, 54.

76 “What Is the Aim of the Reconciliation Project?,” Clonard Redemptorists, www.clonard.com/reconciliation2.html. Last accessed December 5, 2011.


1 Walker, 2007, 124.2 “NI Figures Boost Iraq Peace Talks,” BBC News, September 4, 2007, http://

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/northern ireland/6977190.stm. Last accessed April18, 2010.

3 Jelen, 1993.4 Fawcett, 2000.5 Willie P. Esterhuyse, Apartheid Must Die (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1981), 34–35.6 Quoted in John W. de Gruchy and Charles Villa-Vicencio (eds.), Apartheid Is a

Heresy (Cape Town: David Philip, 1983), 170.7 BBC News, “Call to Help Colombia’s Displaced,” July 16, 2009. Last accessed

February 2, 2011.8 Amnesty International, “Colombia: The Paramilitaries in Medellin: Demobiliza-

tion or Legalization?,” 2005, www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/019/2005.Last accessed December 12, 2010.

9 Daniel Levine, “Popular Organizations and the Church: Thoughts from Colom-bia,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 26(2), 1984, 138.

10 Hector Fabio Henao-Gaviria, “The Colombian Church and Peacebuilding,” inVirginia M. Bouvier (ed.), Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War (Washington,DC: USIP Press, 2008).

11 Statement of the 82nd Plenary Assembly, Bogota, Colombia, February 9, 2007.12 Rachel Brett, “The Role and Limits of Human Rights NGOs at the United Nations,”

Political Studies 43, 1995, 103.13 Larry Minear, Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Colombia Country Study (Medford,

MA: Feinstein International Center, 2006), 30.14 Robin Kirk, “Human Rights in the Midst of Conflict,” in Eileen Babbitt and Ellen

Lutz (eds.), Human Rights and Conflict Resolution in Context (New York: SyracuseUniversity Press, 2009), 31.

15 Virginia M. Bouvier, “New Hopes for Negotiated Solutions in Colombia,” USIPWorking Paper, September 25, 2007.

16 Flavia Carbonari and Jorge E. Vargas, “A Bridge to Peace through CitizenshipBuilding: Guaranteeing Health and Education Rights in Colombia,” in Estanis-lao Gacitua-Mario, Andrew Norton, and Sophia V. Georgieva (eds.), BuildingEquality and Opportunity through Social Guarantees: New Approaches to PublicPolicy and the Realization of Rights (New York: World Bank Publications, 2009),232.

17 Minear, 2006, 30.



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18 Lamin O. Sanneh, Piety and Power: Muslim and Christians in West Africa (Mary-knoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996), 23.

19 PROCMURA Newsletter, no. 75, 2008.20 Michael O’Flaherty, “Sierra Leone’s Peace Process: The Role of the Human Rights

Community,” Human Rights Quarterly 26(1), 2004, 43.21 Mohammad Abu Nimer and S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, “Muslim Peace Building

in Africa and the Balkan Context: Challenges and Needs,” Peace and Change 33(4),2008, 566.

22 Thomas Mark Turay, “Civil Society and Peace Building: The Role of the Inter-religious Council of Sierra Leone,” Conciliation Resources, 2000, www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/inter-religious-council.php. Last accessed January 12,2011.

23 Prince Sorie Conteh, Traditionalists, Muslims, and Christians in Africa (Amherst,NY: Cambria Press, 2009), 155.

24 Turay, 2000.25 Ibid.26 Tim Kelsall, “Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Rec-

onciliation Commission in Sierra Leone,” Human Rights Quarterly 27(2), 2005,363.

27 Abu Nimer and Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008, 571.28 David Little, Peacemakers in Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2007), 297.29 Sarah MacCan, “Integrating NGO Peace and Development Strategies: Lessons

from the Philippines,” Trocaire Development Review, 2000, 121.30 William R. Headley and Reina C. Neufeldt, “Catholic Relief Services: Catholic

Peacebuilding in Practice,” in Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and GerardF. Powers (eds.), Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis (New York:Orbis Books, 2010), 133.

31 See Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute, www.mpiasia.net/web1/. Last accessedDecember 5, 2011.

32 See, e.g., Ricardo G. Abad, “Filipino Religiosity: Some International Compar-isons,” Phillipine Studies, 43(2), 1995, 195–212.

33 Brenda Fitzpatrick, “The Philippines: The Mindanao Bishops-Ulama Confer-ence,” in Mark M. Rogers, Tom Bamat, and Julie Ideh (eds.), Pursuing Just Peace:An Overview and Case Studies for Faith-Based Peacebuilders (Baltimore: CatholicRelief Services, 2008), 121.

34 Carolyn O. Arquillas, “MILF Peace Panel Holds Five Consultations in Mindanao,”MindaNews, April 2, 2011.

35 William Larousse, “A Local Church Living in Dialogue: Muslim-Christian Rela-tions in Mindanao-Sulu, Philippines, 1965–2000” (Rome: Gregorian UniversityPress, 2001), 250.

36 Ibid., 486.37 Fitzpatrick, 2008, 121.38 Ibid.39 Christian NGOs listed in the United Nations, for example, comprise 57.4 percent

of the religious NGOs listed, followed by Islamic Organizations (12.2 percent) andJewish Organizations (11.0 percent). See Julia Berger, “Religious Non-governmental



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Organizations: An Exploratory Analysis,” International Journal of Voluntary andNon-profit Organizations, 4(1), 2003, 24.

40 Ibid., 34.41 John Paul Lederach and R. Scott Appleby, “Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview,”

in Philpott and Powers, 2010, 20.42 Johnston, 2003, 18.43 “Muslim Leaders Back Interfaith Dialogue for Peace,” The Inquirer, March 3, 2013.44 Rabbis for Human Rights, www.rhr.org.il. Last accessed April 9, 2012.45 Council of Religious Institutions of the Holy Land Communique, www.elcjhl

.org/resources/statements/CouncilPublicStatement131007(4)%5B1%5D.doc. Lastaccessed April 18, 2010.

46 McCreary, 2004, 125.47 Stevens, 1994, 83.48 Committee for Christian Unity and the Bishops of the Church of Ireland, Guide-

lines for Interfaith Events and Dialogue (Dublin: Church of Ireland Publishing,2007), 23.



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South Africa, and International Regimes” International Relations 19(1), 2005,421–439.



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Index

174 Trust, 91

Acts of Union, 32, 43

Adams, G., 12, 63, 78, 87, 93, 94, 99, 106,158, 168, 172, 173

Adler, E., 4, 13, 156

agenda setting, 14, 53, 72, 83, 136

Alliance Party, 69, 76, 101

Anglo-Irish Agreement, 21, 23, 72, 74, 75,77, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93,101, 170

apartheid, 91, 137, 179

Appleby, S., 4, 19, 20, 147, 156, 157, 158, 160,180, 181

Apprentice Boys of Derry, 30, 48

Arab-Israeli conflict, 1, 150

Arab Uprisings, 3

Arlow, W., 64, 65, 107, 169, 171

B specials, 38

Ballymascalon talks, 113

Battle of the Boyne, 29, 30, 32, 106, 161

Belfast Agreement, 21, 69, 72, 74, 87, 93, 94,102, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 123,124, 125, 127, 128, 132, 134

Belfast Telegraph, 18

Best, K., 109, 110

Bew, P., 33, 35, 162, 163, 170, 175

Black Oath, 25

Bloody Sunday, 49, 111

Bobby Sands, 79

Brady, S., 102, 109, 111, 113, 122, 126, 127, 129,130, 158, 175

Brewer, J., 10, 20, 63, 94, 157, 160, 168, 169,173

Brooke-Mayhew Talks, 98, 101, 115

Brown, G., 82, 99, 171, 174

Buddhism, 4, 11, 148, 155

Butler, A., 61, 64, 70

Caird, D., 89

Canary Wharf Bombing, 105, 106

Catholicism, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 25, 26, 27,28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54,55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 70, 72, 73,79, 81, 82, 83, 85, 89, 91, 92, 95, 97, 98,100, 101, 102, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110,111, 113, 114, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124,125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 139,140, 141, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151,152, 158, 161, 164, 166, 167, 169, 173, 174,175, 177, 178, 180

Catholic Church, 11, 27, 32, 34, 36, 42, 43,44, 51, 52, 55, 56, 62, 63, 73, 82, 83, 85, 95,97, 98, 100, 104, 110, 120, 122, 123, 125, 132,140, 141, 143, 147, 149, 158, 164, 175, 177,178

Catholic Relief Services, 145

Charles I, 27

Church of Ireland, 17, 28, 32, 42, 44, 45, 46,50, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 70, 72,80, 81, 84, 86, 89, 100, 102, 103, 107, 108,109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124,125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 136, 151,164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,174, 175, 177, 181

civil religion, 14, 159

civil society, 1, 2, 11, 18, 20, 48, 62, 72, 79, 90,110, 127, 141, 142, 144, 147

Clonard Monastery, 18, 90, 92, 120, 124, 125,132

Cold War, 1, 3, 5, 9, 54, 73

195



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196 Index

Colombia, 8, 21, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142,157, 179

conflict transformation, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 46, 48, 52, 57, 73, 78, 79,94, 96, 98, 105, 116, 123, 129, 131, 135, 137,147, 149, 150, 153, 154

conversion, 14, 72, 78

Conway, W., 53, 59, 160, 167

Cornerstone, 90, 111, 132, 173

Corrymeela, 11, 16, 42, 46, 90, 111, 125, 164,171

Council of Ireland, 69, 70

Craig, W., 48, 61

Cromwell, O., 26, 27, 28, 161

cultural religion, 9, 74

Dail Eireann, 35

Daly, C., 55, 57, 60, 62, 85, 92, 93, 98, 110,118, 166, 168, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175

Davie, G., 9, 74, 157

decommissioning, 73, 102, 104, 105, 110, 111,112, 116, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 133

Democratic Unionist Party, 14, 21, 39, 51, 52,69, 76, 78, 85, 101, 112, 116, 121, 122, 126, 128

diffusion, 13, 15, 16

Dominus Jesus, 120

Drumcree, 94, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 115,175

Dunlop, J., 18, 26, 42, 44, 58, 79, 80, 81, 96,100, 104, 110, 114, 124, 129, 161, 162, 164,165, 171, 178

Dutch Reformed Church, 16, 136, 137, 138,152

Eames, R., 60, 70, 79, 86, 94, 100, 103, 108,109, 111, 113, 118, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126,127, 129, 151, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 175,176, 177, 178

Easter Rising, 34, 40

Empey, W., 113

empowerment, 14, 53, 72, 90, 92, 136, 146

English, R., 27

episteme, 2, 3, 6, 99, 110, 111

epistemic communities, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11,12, 13, 15, 21, 22, 48, 58, 73, 77, 78, 81, 95,105, 106, 107, 115, 117, 135, 136, 138, 143,146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154

Evangelical Contribution on NorthernIreland, 42, 46, 126

exclusive public theologies, 8

exegesis, 6

faith leaders. See religious leadersFARC, 140

Faul, D., 63, 89, 100

Faulkner, B., 66, 69

Feakle Talks, 64, 65, 107

FitzGerald, G., 74, 86

Fitzroy-Clonard Fellowship, 42

Flight of the Earls, 24

Foucault, M., 3, 155

Free Presbyterian Church, 14, 21, 39, 43, 44,51, 98, 114, 122

Gallagher, E., 50, 54, 64, 159, 165, 166, 167,168, 171

Good, H., 18, 42, 58, 73, 119, 122, 124, 125,127, 129, 165, 170

Good, K., 121, 128

Good Friday Agreement. See BelfastAgreement

Government of Ireland Act, 34, 35

Haas, P., 4, 5, 156, 170, 172

Hannon, B., 82, 171

Hanson, R., 55, 166

Hard Gospel, 131, 178

Harper, A., 117, 121, 125, 130

hermeneutics, 6, 58

Hinduism, 14, 148

Holmes, F., 99

Home Rule, 33, 34

human rights, 5, 6, 10, 17, 67, 81, 82, 126,135, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, 149,150, 151, 154

Hume, J., 87, 94

hunger strike, 66, 78, 79

Hutchinson, S., 109, 111

inclusive public theologies, 8

India, 1, 4, 53, 135, 145, 148

internment, 48, 66, 67, 78

Iraq, 1, 14, 117, 129, 130, 134, 135, 148, 178,179

Irish Confederate Wars, 26, 28, 41

Irish Council of Churches, 16, 40, 45, 51,52, 64, 67, 106, 165, 169

Irish famine, 33, 41

Irish Free State, 35, 36, 37, 41

Irish Interchurch Meeting, 113, 114, 171

Irish News, 18

Irish Times, 18

Israel, 14, 130, 135, 164



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Index 197

James I, 24, 25

James II, 28, 29, 30

Jelen, T., 14, 53, 135, 158, 159, 170, 171, 173,179

Lederach, J.P., 12, 17, 20, 147, 158, 159,181

Lewis, W., 58

Liberation theology, 152

Lome Accord, 142, 144

Mac Stıofain, S., 64

Magee, R., 99, 103

Major, J., 94, 102, 106, 173, 175

Martin McGuinness, M., 124

McGuinness, M., 134

McMaster, J., 117

McMullan, G., 81, 103, 171, 173, 175

McVeigh, J., 63, 164

Mehaffey, J., 97, 107, 110, 173, 174

Methodist Church, 17, 18, 42, 43, 45, 46,50, 54, 59, 64, 65, 72, 73, 80, 82, 84, 86,96, 98, 102, 106, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 118,119, 120, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 132,164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 171, 174, 175, 176,178

Mitchell, G., 104, 105, 159, 162, 164, 165,168, 175

Moore, J., 109, 175

Moro Independent Liberation Front, 145,146

Moro National Liberation Front, 145

Morrow, T., 119, 124

Newell, K., 42, 118, 124, 125

News Letter, 18

Northern Ireland, 1, 7, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19,20, 21, 23, 27, 29, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54,56, 57, 61, 63, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75,76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 89,91, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104,107, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120,121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131,132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 141, 146, 149,150, 151, 153, 154, 157, 158, 159, 160, 163,164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,174, 179

Northern Ireland Assembly, 112

Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association,39, 40, 41, 48, 66

O Bradaigh, R., 64

O Neill, H., 24

O’Neill. T., 40

Orange Order, 30, 31, 38, 45, 104, 106, 107,108, 109, 128, 162, 164

Paisley, I., 21, 23, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 51, 52, 54,55, 58, 71, 76, 78, 80, 81, 94, 98, 112, 114,122, 163, 165, 166, 170, 174, 177

Pakistan, 1, 53, 135, 145

Parker Report, 67

Parnell, C. S., 33

Pax Christi, 147

peacebuilding, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16,17, 20, 42, 46, 48, 52, 78, 91, 106, 111, 115,116, 117, 120, 131, 132, 135, 136, 140, 141, 144,146, 147, 150, 152, 153, 154, 157

Philippines, 11, 21, 145, 146, 148, 180

Philpott, D., 3, 10, 20, 155, 157, 158, 160, 181

Plantation of Ulster, 23, 25, 161

Plunkett, O., 28, 35, 167, 168

Poland, 11, 157, 158

power-sharing, 68, 69, 70, 76, 77, 81, 93, 101,112, 116, 121, 122, 123, 126, 170

Powers, G., 10

Poyntz, S., 110, 172, 173

Presbyterianism, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 25, 26, 28,30, 31, 32, 33, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 50, 51, 52,53, 54, 55, 64, 68, 70, 72, 79, 80, 82, 84,85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103,104, 106, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 118, 119, 120,121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132,136, 160, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171,172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179

Protestant Telegraph, 51

Provisional Irish Republican Army, 18, 62,64, 79, 83, 85, 94, 103, 105, 106, 107, 111,123, 124

public theologies, 2, 5, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20,42, 51, 55, 58, 71, 73, 89, 92, 94, 98, 100,108, 117, 119, 121, 137, 138, 146, 147, 152, 153

Quaker, 117

Rabbis for Human Rights, 149, 181

Reid, A., 12, 63, 87, 92, 93, 94, 124, 125

reinforcement, 14, 53, 72, 88, 136

religious actors, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 14, 17, 57,61, 64, 66, 78, 90, 94, 117, 121, 124, 125, 127,129, 130, 133, 142, 144, 151, 153, 154

religious expertise, 4, 9, 10, 20, 22, 151, 154



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198 Index

religious knowledge, 6, 7, 16, 20, 48, 146,149, 151, 153, 154

religious leaders, 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15,17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 39, 42, 46, 48, 51, 52, 53,54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66,67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 79, 81,83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 93, 94, 95,96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105,108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119,121, 123, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136,142, 143, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153

Republic of Ireland, 18, 35, 41, 45, 51, 68, 69,72, 74, 75, 76, 81, 88, 89, 93, 103, 112, 160

Reynolds, A., 94, 102, 173

Reynolds, G., 18, 42, 58, 87, 92, 132, 172,173

Ross, J., 103

Royal Ulster Constabulary, 38, 49, 61, 65,66, 86, 125

Sant’Egidio, 11, 147, 148, 151

Scotland, 25, 122, 161

Second Vatican Council, 16, 80, 120

secularism, 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 43, 62, 93, 94, 95,96, 98, 111, 116, 118, 132, 136, 137, 140, 151,153, 154, 155

Shaw, W., 91, 173

Siege of Derry, 29

Siege of Limerick, 29

Sierra Leone, 1, 15, 21, 136, 142, 143, 144, 149,180

Sinn Fein, 34, 35, 37, 43, 64, 65, 76, 87, 98,99, 101, 102, 105, 106, 110, 111, 116, 121, 123,124, 126, 132, 162

Social Democratic and Labour Party, 43,66, 69, 76, 77, 85, 87, 101

South Africa, 15, 16, 21, 96, 126, 134, 136, 137,138, 152, 156, 164

Special Powers Act, 36

Sri Lanka, 1, 4, 135, 145, 149, 155, 156

Stevens, D., 16, 46, 106, 152, 159, 164, 181

Stormont, 36, 37, 38, 48, 53, 67, 68, 121, 123,124, 126, 169, 177

strategic peacebuilding, 3, 7, 20

Sunningdale Agreement, 21, 48, 66, 68, 69,70, 71, 72, 74, 81, 169, 170

symbolic religiosity, 9

Syria, 1, 14

Taggart, N., 51, 84, 96, 168

Thatcher, M., 74, 76, 77, 78, 86, 88, 170, 172

Toft, M., 3, 8, 155, 156

Tone, W., 31, 162

Treaty of Limerick, 29

Troubles, 7, 12, 17, 19, 21, 23, 26, 30, 32, 35,39, 40, 41, 42, 47, 48, 50, 53, 55, 56, 60, 62,71, 73, 74, 77, 78, 79, 81, 93, 94, 95, 104,114, 116, 120, 123, 125, 126, 130, 132, 133,159, 161, 165, 166, 167

Ulster, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 36,38, 40, 43, 44, 49, 64, 66, 69, 76, 80, 85,86, 88, 99, 101, 103, 110, 122, 123, 124, 125,158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166,167, 168, 170, 171, 174, 175, 178

Ulster Defence Association, 18, 64, 69, 99,122, 123, 125

Ulster Volunteer Force, 18, 40, 66, 69, 103

United Irishmen, 30, 31, 32, 41, 97

Vatican, 16, 35, 80, 100, 103, 120, 147, 152

vicarious religion, 9

Volf, M., 91

Weir, J., 50, 64, 70, 99, 170

Westminster Confession of Faith, 15, 80,159

William of Orange, 28, 29

Williamite War, 26, 28, 30, 41, 161

Wilson, D., 63, 168

World Alliance of Reformed Churches, 44,137

World Council of Churches, 45, 55, 114,137, 140

World Faiths Development Dialogue, 5

World Vision, 147

World War I, 34

Worrall, S., 64, 79, 82, 159, 164, 165, 169, 171



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religious leaders and conflict transformation: northern ireland and beyond

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