remaining property

7/29/2019 Remaining Property

1/15

Garcia vs. CA

Garcia vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999

Puno, J.

Doctrine: Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining

to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the

rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the

thing by way of sale.

Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may

be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor

in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one

who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be

ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.

Facts: Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel of land identified as Lot

17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati, was registered, sold with the consent of his wife Remedios T.

Garcia, the same to their daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos).

On March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom)

to secure a loan. On March 9, 1981, Atty. Garcias Title was cancelled and in its stead Transfer Certificate

of Title No. S-108412/545 was issued in the name of the Magpayos. The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage

was registered at the Makati Register of Deeds and annotated on the Magpayos title. The redemption period

of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over the land

was consolidated in favor of PBCom which cancelled the Magpayos title and Transfer Certificate of Title

No. 138233 was issued in its name. The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the

mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale, PBCom which was the highest

bidder bought the land. On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos filed at the RTC of Makati a complaint seeking

the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, public auction sale, and PBComs title

docketed as Civil Case No. 11891. This complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute. On October 15,

1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a petition for the issuance of a writ of

possession over the land which was granted. Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayos

brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it and filed a

motion for Intervention in the above-said PBCom petition, which motion was denied.

Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the instant suit for recovery of

realty and damages wherein he alleged, inter alia, that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother

Remedios T. Garcia, and that PBCom acquired no right thereover. In its summary judgment, the lower

court held that the mortgage executed by the Magpayo spouses in favor of PBCom was void. The Magpayo


2/15

spouses could not have acquired the said property merely by the execution of the Deed of Sale because the

property was in the possession of the plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro V. Garcia, was not in possession and

hence could not deliver the property merely by the execution of the document.

On appeal, CA held that Garcias assertion that ownership over the disputed property was not transmitted to

his sister and her husband-Magpayo spouses at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale as he was still

in actual and adverse possession thereof does not lie. Since the execution of the deed of sale by Atty. Pedro

V. Garcia in favor of the Magpayos took place earlier or on August 1, 1980, then contrary to his claim,

Garcia was not in possession of the property at the time of the execution of said public instrument.

Furthermore, it appearing that the vendor Atty. Garcia had control of the property which was registered in

his name and that the deed of sale was likewise registered, then the sale was consummated and the

Magpayos were free to exercise the attributes of ownership including the right to mortgage the land.

When the land is registered in the vendors name, and the public instrument of sale is also registered, the

sale may be considered consummated and the buyer may exercise the actions of an owner. That the

Magpayos title, TCT No. S-108412, was issued four (4) days following the execution of the deed of real

estate mortgage is of no moment, for registration under the Torrens system does not vest ownership but is

intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have on the land.

Issue:Whether Garcias possession is in a concept of an owner.

Held:No. Garcias possession which started only in 1986 could not ripen into ownership. He has no valid

title thereto. His possession in fact was that of an intruder, one done in bad faith (to defeat PBComs Writ

of Possession). His possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner. This is so because as early as

1981, title thereto was registered in the name of the Magpayo Spouses which title was subsequently

cancelled when the property was purchased by PBCom in a public auction sale resulting in the issuance of

title in favor of the latter in 1985.

The Court stressed that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a

thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and

consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right

to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to

dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other

hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means

to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways:

possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner


3/15

may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere

holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be

right or wrong.

The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was

merely tolerated by his parents. Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was in possession of the

property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of

ownership. On the other hand, petitioners subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mothers

share in the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was not included in the inventory of the

estate submitted by his father to the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was

no longer considered owned by petitioners parents.

The Court upheld the Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage to PBCom by the Magpayo spouses is

valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the property was issued to them after the

mortgage contract was entered into. Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of such

ownership over a particular property. The deed of sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the

property sold and authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of ownership. All said, the Magpayo

spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.

Rodil Enterprises vs. CA

Rodil Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129609, November 29, 2001.

Bellosillo, J.

Doctrine: The owner has a right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those

established by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. This is an attribute of

ownership.

In an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession.

Facts:Petitioner Rodil Enterprises is the lessee of the Ides ORacca building (ORACCA) since 1959. It

was a former alien property over which the Republic acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477. Rodil

entered into a sublease contract with respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footware and Chua

Huay Soon, members of Oracca Building Tenants Association, Inc. (ASSOCIAION). On January 8, 1987,

Rodil offered to purchase the property. On July 22, 1998, the Association also offered to lease the same

building through DGSREPM. Pending action on the purchase offer of Rodil, the Republic granted Rodils

request for the renewal of the lease contract on Sept. 23, 1987 for 5 more years. The renewal contract

however was disapproved by the DGSREPM secretary.


4/15

On October 1987, Rodil filed an action to enjoin the Association from collecting rentals from the occupants

of Oracca. This was granted by the trial court and upheld by CA. On May 18, 1992 Rodil signed a renewal

contract for 10 more years of lease , which was approved by the DENR Secretary. The Association filed a

case to set aside the renewal contract, but the same was denied by the trial court.

Rodil then filed an action for unlawful detainer against herein respondents. The MTC upheld Rodils right

to eject, which was then upheld by the RTC. While the consolidated appeals were pending, the CA 2nd

Division declared the renewal contract between Rodil and the Republic as null and void. Rodil moved for

reconsideration but the same was denied which prompted it to file an action for certiorari. The CA 4th

division likewise se aside the MTC and the RTCs decision and dismissed the action of Rodil for unlawful

detainer.

Issues:

Whether the renewal contract between Rodil and the Republic is valid.

Whether Rodil may validly eject herein respondents even though the former is not in actual possession of

the property.

Held:

Yes. The Owner has a right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established

by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. This is an attribute of ownership.

The Republic being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract

with Rodil in the exercise of its jus disponendi.

Yes. In an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession.

Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract with the Republic and that

their continued occupation of the subject property was merely by virtue of acquiescence. Since the

occupation of respondents was merely tolerated by the Republic, the right of possession of the latter

remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it choose. Unfortunately for

respondents, the Republic chose to alienate the subject premises to Rodil by virtue of a contract of lease

entered into on May 18, 1992. Resultantly, the petitioner had the right to file the action for unlawful

detainer against respondents as one from whom possession of property has been unlawfully withheld.


5/15

Isaguirre vs. De Lara

Cornelio M. Isaguirre vs. Felicitas De Lara

G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000

Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

Doctrine: As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage

is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee

does not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security since the mortgage directly

and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the

fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the

mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extra judicially,

whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds there from given to

the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan.

Facts: Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales Application over a

parcel of land identified as portion of Lot 502, Guianga Cadastre, filed with the Bureau of Lands with an

area of 2,342 square meters. Upon his death, his wiferespondent Felicitas de Lara, as claimant,

succeeded Alejandro de Lara. The Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources amended the sales

application to cover only 1,600 square meters. By virtue of a decision rendered by the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, a subdivision survey was made and the area was further reduced to

1,000 square meters. On this lot stands a two-story residential-commercial apartment declared for taxation

purposes in the name of respondents sons Apolonio and Rodolfo, both surnamed de Lara.

Respondent obtained several loans from the Philippine National Bank. When she encountered financial

difficulties, respondent approached petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre, who was married to her niece, for

assistance. A document denominated as Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests was

executed by respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of Lot No. 502,

together with the two-story commercial and residential structure standing thereon, in favor of petitioner, for

and in consideration of the sum of P5,000.

Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of ownership and

possession of the two-story building. However, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner

filed a sales application over the subject property on the basis of the deed of sale. His application was

approved, resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title, in the name of petitioner. Meanwhile,

the sales application of respondent over the entire 1,000 square meters of subject property (including the

250 square meter portion claimed by petitioner) was also given due course, resulting in the issuance of

Original Certificate of Title, in the name of respondent.


6/15

Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and damages with the RTC of

Davao City against respondent. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment, in favor of

petitioner, declaring him to be the lawful owner of the disputed property. However, the Court of Appeals

reversed the trial courts decision, holding that the transaction entered into by the parties, as evidenced by

their contract, was an equitable mortgage, not a sale. The appellate courts decision was based on the

inadequacy of the consideration agreed upon by the parties, on its finding that the payment of a large

portion of the purchase price was made after the execution of the deed of sale in several installments of

minimal amounts; and finally, on the fact that petitioner did not take steps to confirm his rights or to obtain

title over the property for several years after the execution of the deed of sale. As a consequence of its

decision, the appellate court also declared Original Certificate issued in favor of petitioner to be null and

void. This Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, we denied petitioners motion for

reconsideration.

Respondent filed a motion for execution with the trial court, praying for the immediate delivery of

possession of the subject property, which motion was granted. Respondent moved for a writ of possession.

Petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that he had the right of retention over the property until payment

of the loan and the value of the improvements he had introduced on the property. The trial court granted

respondents motion for writ of possession. The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Consequently, a writ of possession, together with the Sheriffs Notice to Vacate, was served upon

petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the right to retain possession of the

property pending actual payment to him of the amount of indebtedness by the mortgagor.

Held: A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation.

Recording the document, in which it appears with the proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not

recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties, constitutes it. Thus, the only right

granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the recording of the document in

which the mortgage is formalized. As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged

property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the mortgagee.

However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of his

security since the mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed,

whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. If

the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mortgage,

whether judicially or extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction

and the proceeds there from given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan.


7/15

Apparently, petitioners contention that to require him to deliver possession of the Property to respondent

prior to the full payment of the latters mortgage loan would be equivalent to the cancellation of the

mortgage is without basis. Regardless of its possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold, with the

prescribed formalities, in the event of the debtors default in the payment of his loan obligation.

A simple mortgage does not give the mortgagee a right to the possession of the property unless the

mortgage should contain some special provision to that effect. Regrettably for petitioner, he has not

presented any evidence, other than his own gratuitous statements, to prove that the real intention of the

parties was to allow him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged property until full payment of the loan.

The trial court correctly issued the writ of possession in favor of respondent. Such writ was but a necessary

consequence of affirming the validity of the original certificate of title in the name of respondent Felicitas

de Lara, while at the same time nullifying the original certificate of title in the name of petitioner Cornelio

Isaguirre. Possession is an essential attribute of ownership; thus, it would be redundant for respondent to go

back to court simply to establish her right to possess subject property.

German Management & Services vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 76216 and 76217. September 14, 1989.

Fernan, J.

Doctrine: A prior possessor has security to remain in property until lawfully ejected by person

having better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. A party may validly claim

ownership based on the muniments of title it may present, such evidence does not responsivelyaddress the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that

regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet

possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. When possession has

already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property.

Facts: Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,

Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,

Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 sq. m. (TCT 50023 of the Register of Deeds Rizal issued

11 September 1980 cancelling TCT 56762/ T-560). The land was originally registered on 5 August

1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds Rizal as OCT 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent

granted by the President of the Philippines on 27 July 1948, under Act 141. On 26 February 1982,

the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing German Management Services

to develop their property into a residential subdivision. Consequently, on 9 February 1983 the

German Management obtained Development Permit 00424 from the Human Settlements

Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by


8/15

Gernale and Villeza and 20 other persons, German Management advised the occupants to vacate

the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, German Management proceeded with the

development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by

Gernale, et.al.

Gernale, et.al. filed an action for forcible entry against German Management before the MTC

Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan who have occupiedand tilled their farmholdings some 12 to 15 years prior to the promulgation of PD27, and that they

were deprived of their property without due process of law when German Management forcibly

removed and destroyed the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice and

bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and other crops that they planted by means of force,

violence and intimidation. On 7 January 1985, the MTC dismissed Gernale et.al.s complaint for

forcible entry. On appeal, the RTC Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the

MTC. Gernale then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 24 July 1986, said

court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the MTC and the RTC. The

Appellate Court held that since Gernale, et.al. were in actual possession of the property at the

time they were forcibly ejected by German Management, they have a right to commence an action

for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. German Management moved

to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated 26

September 1986. Hence the present recourse.

Issues:Whether the mountainside farmers are allowed by law to commence an action for forcible entry.

Whether German Management & Services may validly invoke the doctrine of self-help.

Held:

1. Yes. Notwithstanding the claim that German Management was duly authorized by the owners

to develop the subject property, the actual possessors can commence a forcible entry case against

the former because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and

never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. Gernale et.al were already in

peaceable possession of the property at the time German Management entered the property,

manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees 12 to 15 years prior

to German Managements act of destroying their crops.

Moreover, a prior possessor has security to remain in property until lawfully ejected by person

having better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. A party may validly claim

ownership based on the muniments of title it may present, such evidence does not responsively

address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that


9/15

regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet

possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can

prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever

may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the

security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having

a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

2. No. The justification given by petitioner that the drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the

crops of the prior possessor on the basis of the doctrine of self help (enunciated in Article 429

NCC) is unavailing, because such doctrine can only be exercised at the time of actual or

threatened dispossession, which is absent in the present case. When possession has already been

lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from

Article 536 NCC that , in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as

long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to

deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder

should refuse to deliver the thing.

People of the Philippines vs. Pletcha

G.R. No.19029. June 27, 1977.

Bison, J.

Doctrine: The use of such necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory rights constitutes ajustifying circumstance under our penal laws.

Facts: Tito Pletcha is a farmer who owns a land which he has been cultivating for 19years. A

private corporation sought to take over the aforementioned land by fencing 4 hectares of his

property. Such fencing was without authority or court order. Because of this, Pletcha foughjt-off

any the take over and resisted the company. This forced the company to file a case for grave

coercion against Pletcha in the Municipal Court of Murcia, Negros Occidental.

Pletcha invokes the protective mantle of Article 429 of the Civil Code which gives him the right to

use reasonable force to exclude any person threatening his exclusive ownership over the land.

The People asks for affirmance on the ground that the appellant should not have taken the law

into his own hands but rather have the courts decide the case.

Issue: Whether or not Pletcha can properly invoked Article 429.


10/15

Held: Yes. The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force not only to

prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is sort of self-defense. It is lawful

to repel force by force. He who merely uses force to defend his possession does not possess by

force. The use of such necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory rights constitutes a

justifying circumstance under our penal laws.

The appellant need not rush to court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the invasion ofproperty. The situation required immediate action and Article 429 gave him the self-executory

mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance.

Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

Fernan, C.J.Doctrine:It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Article 431

of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as

to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.

Facts: Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is

adjacent to that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc.

Within the land of the latter, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were

constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners land, caused a young man to

drown, damagaed petitioners crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the

livesofthepetitioners and their laborers and some other destructions.

This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of inundation

under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages.

Issue: Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by

respondents waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code

on quasi-delicts.

Held: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is oneunder Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict

are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant,

or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect

between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11

Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent

corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion


11/15

of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by

petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the

recovery of damages.

It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil

Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injurethe rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining

landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a

reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we

recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so

constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to

adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures

cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim

indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio and Spouses Lito and Maria Cristina Santos vs. Court of

Appeals, Heirs of Pacifico C. Mabasa

G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996

Regalado, J.:

Doctrine: Every owner has an absolute right over his property and his act of fencing and enclosing

the same was an act which he may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right.

Whatever injury or damage that may have been sustained by others by reason of the rightful use

of the said land by the owner is damnum absque injuria.

Facts: The respondent (Pacifico Mabasa) owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected

thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. Said property

may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to respondents herein.

As an access to P. Burgos Street from respondents property, there are two possible passageways.The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from

Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned

row of houses of the petitioners The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length

from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said

passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length,

has to be traversed.


12/15

When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the remises and who

were acknowledged by Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said

tenants vacated the apartment and when Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had

been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence

was first constructed by Petitioners Santoses along their property which is also along the first

passageway. Petitioner Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in sucha way that the entire passageway was enclosed. And it was then that the remaining tenants of said

apartment vacated the area.

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because of some other

inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants

were drunk and would bang their doors and windows.

Trial court rendered a decision ordering the Petitioners Custodios and Santoses to give

Respondent Mabasa permanent access ingress and egress, to the public street and Mabasa to pay

the Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the

permanent use of the passageway.

Respondent Mabasa went to the CA raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred

in not awarding damages in their favor. The CA rendered its decision affirming the judgment of

the trial court with modification only insofar as the. grant of damages to Mabasa The motion forreconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied.

Issues:

Whether the grant of right of way to herein private respondent Mabasa is proper.

Whether the award of damages is in order.

Held:

No. Herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from

the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are

presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the

trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid

to rest.

No. A reading of the decision of the CA will show that the award of damages was based solely on

the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized

rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the


13/15

passageway.However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to

recover damages.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal

right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the

recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damagewithout injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a

legal duty. (damnum absque injuria). In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the

injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty

which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal

responsibility by the person causing it (damnum et injuria.)

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. The act of petitioners in

constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary

to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and

dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of

petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides

that (e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or

dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There wasno easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact

that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very

decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just

compensation.

Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of

fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment

and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by

private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum

absque injuria.

Abejaron vs. Nabasa

G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001


14/15

Puno, J.

Doctrine: For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for the party seeking

reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.

Facts: Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a 118-square

meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in Silway, General Santos City. In 1945, petitioner

Abejaron and his family started occupying the 118-square meter land. At that time, the land had not yet

been surveyed. They fenced the area and built thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a small store.

In 1949, petitioner improved their abode to become a two-storey house made of round wood and nipa

roofing. Abejaron also introduced several improvements on the land including a store, 5 coconut trees on

the property of controversy, and avocado and banana trees. All this time that the Abejarons introduced

these improvements on the land in controversy, respondent Nabasa did not oppose or complain about the

improvements. Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared only his house

and not the disputed land, for taxation purposes.

Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining 57-square meter

portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. Nabasa built his house about four (4) meters away from petitioner

Abejarons house.

Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in controversy. Abejaron merely watched

them do the survey and did not thereafter apply for title of the land on the belief that he could not secure

title over it as it was government property. Without his (Abejaron) knowledge and consent, however,

Nabasa clandestinely, willfully, fraudulently, and unlawfully applied for and caused the titling in his

name of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, including petitioner Abejarons 118-square meter portion.

Petitioner imputes bad faith and fraud on the part of Nabasa because in applying for and causing the

titling in his name of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, Nabasa represented himself to be the actual and lawful

possessor of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, including petitioner Abejarons 118-square meter portion despite

knowledge of Abejarons actual occupation and possession of said portion.

On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-4140 pursuant to Free

Patent No. (XI-4) 2877 covering Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 including therein the lot occupied by the

petitioner.

On March 12, 1982 an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent Nabasa before Branch

22, Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.

Issue: Whether the allegation of fraud has been proven for the action for reconveyance to prosper.

Held: No. An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has

been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name after one year from the date of the decree so


15/15

long as the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action does not seek to reopen

the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the

person who secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner thereof. Fraud is a

ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for the

party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact

of fraud. Such was not performed by the petitioner.

Abejarons 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by

R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said

P.D. that occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to

him. Petitioner claims that he started occupying the disputed land in 1945. At that time, he built a nipa

house, a small store, and a fence made of wood to delineate his area. This nipa house was improved in

1949 into a two-storey house. The small store was also made bigger in 1950. The wooden fence was also

changed to a fence made of hollow blocks. The two-storey house, bigger store, and hollow-block fence all

stand to this day. In 1951, petitioner planted coconut trees near his house. While the petitioner has shown

continued existence of these improvements on the disputed land, they were introduced later than January

24, 1947. He has failed to establish the portion of the disputed land that his original nipa house, small

store and wooden fence actually occupied as of January 24, 1947. In the absence of this proof, we cannot

determine the land he actually possessed and occupied for thirty years which he may acquire under Sec.

48(b) of the Public Land Act. Worthy of notice is the fact that the disputed land was surveyed, subdivided

into and identified by lots only in the 1970s. Therefore, prior to the survey, it would be difficult to

determine the metes and bounds of the land petitioner claims to have occupied since 1947 in the absence

of specific and incontrovertible proof.

Also, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land for taxation purposes. While

tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong

evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the

property or supported by other effective proof. Even the tax declarations and receipts covering his house

do not bolster his case as the earliest of these was dated 1950.

Petitioners evidence does not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence necessary to acquire

title through possession and occupation of the disputed land at least since January 24, 1947 as required by

Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is that lands of

whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be well-nigh

incontrovertible. As petitioner Abejaron has not adduced any evidence of title to the land in controversy,

whether by judicial confirmation of title, or homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action

for reconveyance.

remaining property

Documents