remlaw digest

7/27/2019 Remlaw Digest

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Padlan v. Dinglasan,

G.R. No. 180321

March 20, 2012

FACTS: Respondent was the registered owner of a parcel of land. While on

board a jeepney, respondents mother, Lilia, had a conversation with oneMaura regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was areal estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owners copy of the TCT from

respondent and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the property intoseveral lots. Through a falsified deed of sale, Maura was able to sell the lotsto different buyers. Maura sold one of the lots to one Lorna who sold thesame to petitioner for P4,000.00. Respondents filed a case Cancellation ofTransfer Certificate of Title before the RTC. Summons was, thereafter,served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan. The RTC rendered aDecision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently,dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of theRTC and ordered the cancellation of the TCT.

ISSUE: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter

HELD: NO.

In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over theaction, an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbookprinciple is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred bylaw and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise aconcise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause ofaction.The Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessedvalue of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon todetermine which court has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, theonly basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in thecomplaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amountof P4,000.00. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for

the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has

jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are nulland void.

Republic vs, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila

G.R. No. 192975

FACTS: Republic filed a complaint before the RTC of Malolos City,Bulacan, for cancellation of titles and reversion against respondent RCAM

and several others. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that RCAM appears asthe registered owner of 8 parcels of land covered by OCT No. 588 allegedlyissued pursuant to a decision by the Land Registration Court in favor ofRCAM. RCAM sold the said eight (8) parcels of land to the other nameddefendants. These parcels of land, however, were certified by the BFD as

falling within the unclassified lands of the public domain and it was onlylater that they were declared alienable and disposable. RCAM filed amotion to dismiss assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint.It alleged that the action for reversion of title was essentially one forannulment of judgment of the then Court of First Instance acting as a LandRegistration Court, hence, beyond the competence of the RTC to actupon.RTC denied RCAM's motion to dismiss for being premature. The CAreversed.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case filed by theRepublic

HELD: Yes. It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether thetribunal has jurisdiction over such action are to be determined from thematerial allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time thecomplaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective ofwhether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred. In thepresent case, the material averments, as well as the character of the reliefprayed for by petitioners in the complaint show that their action is one forcancellation of titles and reversion, not for annulment of judgment of theRTC. The complaint alleged the parcels of land subject matter of the actionwere not the subject of the CFIs judgment in the relevant prior land

registration case. Hence, petitioners pray that the certificates of title ofRCAM be cancelled which will not necessitate the annulment of saidjudgment. Clearly, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on annulment of judgmentfinds no application in the instant case. The RTC may properly takecognizance of reversion suits which do not call for an annulment ofjudgment of the RTC acting as a Land Registration Court. Actions forcancellation of title and reversion, like the present case, belong to the classof cases that "involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or anyinterest therein" and where the assessed value of the proper ty exceedsP20,000.00 fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC.


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Lamsis, et al. v. Dong-E

G.R. No. 173021

October 20, 2010

FACTS: Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and

Damages with the MTC against Jaime Abalos (Jaime) and the spouses Felixand Consuelo Salazar. Respondents contended that: they are the childrenand heirs of one Vicente Torio (Vicente) who died intestate; at the time ofthe death of Vicente, he left behind a parcel of land; during the lifetime ofVicente and through his tolerance, Jaime and the Spouses Salazar wereallowed to stay and build their respective houses on the subject parcel ofland; even after the death of Vicente, herein respondents allowed Jaime andthe Spouses Salazar to remain on the disputed lot; however, respondentsasked Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to vacate the subject lot, but theyrefused to heed the demand of respondents forcing respondents to file thecomplaint.Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed their Answer withCounterclaim, denying the material allegations in the Complaint and

asserting in their Special and Affirmative Defenses that: respondents' causeof action is barred by acquisitive prescription; the court a quo has nojurisdiction over the nature of the action and the persons of the defendants;the absolute and exclusive owners and possessors of the disputed lot are thedeceased predecessors of defendants; defendants and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of thesubject lot as owners since time immemorial; defendants are faithfully andreligiously paying real property taxes on the disputed lot as evidenced byReal Property Tax Receipts; they have continuously introducedimprovements on the said land, such as houses, trees and other kinds ofornamental plants which are in existence up to the time of the filing of theirAnswer. Petitioners filed their Answer in Intervention with Counterclaim.

Like the defendants, herein petitioners claimed that their predecessors-in-interest were the absolute and exclusive owners of the land in question; thatpetitioners and their predecessors had been in possession of the subject lotsince time immemorial up to the present; they have paid real property taxesand introduced improvements thereon.

ISSUE:Whether they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed thedisputed lot in the concept of an owner, or whether their possession is bymere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest

HELD: In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of theproperty in question, petitioners acknowledged ownership thereof by theimmediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is clearly shown bythe Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein itcontains a statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the land of

Vicente, respondents' immediate predecessor-in-interest.

Petitioners neverdisputed such an acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge that they northeir predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed lot,petitioners' possession could not be deemed as possession in good faith as toenable them to acquire the subject land by ordinary prescription. In thisrespect, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' possession of the lotin question was by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by meretolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitiveprescription.Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right,must be en concepto de dueo, or, to use the common law equivalent of theterm, that possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no

matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription

Miguel v. Montaez

G.R. No. 191336

January 25, 2012FACTS: Respondent secured a loan of P143,864.00, payable in 1 year fromthe petitioner. The respondent gave as collateral therefor his house andlot.Due to the respondents failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed acomplaint against the respondent before the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Theparties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein the respondent agreedto pay his loan in installments in the amount of P2,000.00 per month, and inthe event the house and lot given as collateral is sold, the respondent wouldsettle the balance of the loan in full. However, the respondent still failed topay, the Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in courtin favor of the petitioner. The petitioner filed before the MeTC a complaintfor Collection of Sum of Money. The MeTC issued a ruling in favor ofpetitioner which was affirmed by the RTC. The latter, however, wasreversed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedyfor the petitioner, notwithstanding the Kasunduang Pag-aayos


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HELD: Yes. It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangayconciliation proceedings, like the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, isbinding between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection, isimmediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals,good customs, public order and public policy.This is in accord with the

broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz: A compromise hasupon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be noexecution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

The respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions ofthe Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may be construed asrepudiation because it denotes that the respondent did not intend to bebound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for which itwas executed. Perforce, the petitioner has the option either to enforce theKasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon hisoriginal demand, in accordance with the provision of Article 2041 of theCivil Code. Having instituted an action for collection of sum of money, the

petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. As such, itis error on the part of the CA to rule that enforcement by execution of saidagreement is the appropriate remedy under the circumstances.

Vidal v. Escueta,

463 Phil. 314

FACTS: Abelardo Escueta died intestate. He was survived by his widowand their six children, including Ma. Teresa O. Escueta. Part of his estatewas a parcel of land. The property was leased to Rainier Llanera, whosublet the same to 25 persons. The heirs executed an extra-judicialsettlement of estate over the property. They also executed a special powerof attorney authorizing Escueta to sell the said property. Escueta, as a co-owner of the property, filed an ejectment case against Llanera and the sub-lessees before theLupon of Barangay. In the meantime, the heirs ofAbelardo Escueta executed a deed of conditional sale over the propertyincluding the house thereon, to Mary Liza Santos. Escueta and Llanera, andthe sub-lessees, executed an Amicable Settlement, where they agreed that(a) the owners of the property would no longer collect the rentals due fromthe respondents with the concomitant obligation of the respondents tovacate the property; (b) if the lessee and sub-lessees fail or refuse to vacatethe property, the barangay chairman was authorized without any court order

to cause the eviction and removal of all the respondents on the property.The parties did not repudiate the amicable settlement. The vendees havingpaid the down payment and second instal lment of the price of the property,the vendors caused the cancellation of the TCTs. However, Escueta and theother vendors had yet to receive the balance of the purchase price because

the respondents were still in the property. Despite the lapse of theextensions granted them, the petitioners still refused to vacate the property.Escueta filed on a verified Motion for Execution against the petitionerswith the MTC for the enforcement of the amicable settlement and theissuance of a writ of execution. The MTC denied the motion.

ISSUE: Whether the MTC erred in denying the motion

HELD: Yes. Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides amechanism for the enforcement of a settlement of the parties beforetheLupon. It provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicablesettlement executed by the parties before the Lupon, namely, (a) byexecution of thePunong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in

nature on mere motion of the party/parties entitled thereto; and (b) by anaction in regular form, which remedy is judicial. Under the first remedy,the proceedings are covered by the LGC and the KatarungangPambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. ThePunongBarangay is called upon during the hearing to determine solely the fact ofnon-compliance of the terms of the settlement and to give thedefaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with hisobligation under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedingsare governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The cause of action is theamicable settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the force andeffect of a final judgment. Section 417 of the LGC grants a party a period ofsix months to enforce the amicable settlement by theLupon through

thePunong Barangay before such party may resort to filing an action withthe MTC to enforce the settlement. The raison d etre of the law is toafford the parties during the six-month time line, a simple, speedy and lessexpensive enforcement of their settlement before theLupon. The time linein Section 417 should be construed to mean that if the obligation in thesettlement to be enforced is due and demandable on the date of thesettlement, the six-month period should be counted from the date of thesettlement; otherwise, if the obligation to be enforced is due anddemandable on a date other than the date of the settlement, the six-monthperiod should be counted from the date the obligation becomes due anddemandable.


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Heirs of Faustino Mesina v. Heirs of Domingo Fran, Jr.,

G.R. No. 201816

April 8, 2013

FACTS: The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina (spouses

Mesina),during their lifetime, bought from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and MariaFian (spouses Fian) two parcels of land on installment. Upon the death ofthe spouses Fian, their heirswhose names do not appear on the records,claiming ownership of the parcels of land and taking possession of themrefused to acknowledge the payments for the lots and denied that their lateparents sold the property to the spouses Mesina. Meanwhile, the spousesMesina passed away. Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fianrefused to vacate the lots and to turn possession over to the heirs of thespouses Mesina, Thus, Norman, as attorney-in-fact of his siblings Victor,Maria and Lorna, filed an action for quieting of title and damages before theRTC, against the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian Yray (Theresa)

as the representative of the Heirs of Fian. The case is entitled Heirs of Sps.Faustino S. Mesina & Genoveva S. Mesina, represented by Norman Mesinav. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr., represented by Theresa Fian Yray,Thereafter, respondent Theresa filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint,arguing that the complaint states no causeof action and the petitioners are not real-party-in-interest. The RTC and CAaffirmed the motion.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint states no cause of action

HELD: Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of thepleading. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of thethree essential elements of a cause of action, namely:(a)The legal right of the plaintiff;(b)The correlative obligation of the defendant; and(c)The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right.By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state a cause of action, itcan be readily seen that the inclusion of Theresas co -heirs does not fallunder any of the above elements. The infirmity is, in fact, not a failure tostate a cause of action but a non-joinder of an indispensable party. Non-joinder means the failure to bring a person who is a necessary party [or in

this case an indispensable party] into a lawsuit. An indispensable party, onthe other hand, is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination

can be had of the action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff ordefendant. Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause ofaction is improper. What the trial court should have done is to directpetitioner Norman Mesina to implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. asdefendants within a reasonable time from notice with a warning that his

failure to do so shall mean dismissal of the complaint.

Anchor Savings Bank v. Furigay, et al.,

G.R. No. 191178

March 13, 2013

FACTS: ASB filed a verified complaint for sum of money and damageswith application for replevin against Ciudad Transport Services, Inc. (CTS),its president, respondent Henry H. Furigay; his wife, respondent Gelinda C.Furigay;, The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of ASB. While case waspending, respondent spouses donated their registered properties, to theirminor children. Claiming that the donation of these properties was made in

fraud of creditors, ASB filed a Complaint for Rescission of Deed ofDonation, Title and Damages against the respondent spouses and theirchildren. Instead of filing an answer, respondents sought the dismissal ofthe complaint, principally arguing that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdictionover their persons as well as over the subject matter in view of the failure ofthe ASB to serve the summons properly and to pay the necessary legal fees.The RTC issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss. The CA foundthat the action of ASB had not yet prescribed, but was premature.

ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in dismissing ASBs complaint on the

ground that the action against respondents was premature

HELD: No. In order that one may claim to have a cause of action, thefollowing elements must concur: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff bywhatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) anobligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violatesuch right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant inviolation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of theobligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintainan action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. Failure tomake a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint warrantsits dismissal. A cursory reading of the allegations of ASBs complaint

would show that it failed to allege the ultimate facts constituting its cause of


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action and the prerequisites that must be complied before the same may beinstituted. ASB, without availing of the first and second remedies, that is,exhausting the properties of CTS, Henry H. Furigay and Genilda C. Furigayor their transmissible rights and actions, simply undertook the third measureand filed an action for annulment of the donation.

Mercado v. Espina, et al.,

G.R. No. 173987,

February 25, 2013

FACTS: Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Recovery ofProperty and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Certificate of Title andDamages. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the heirs ofthe late spouses Santiago and Sofronia Mercado, who were the owners ofthe subject parcel of land; after the death of Santiago and Sofronia,petitioners inherited the disputed lot, possessing the same as owners;sometime in 1996, herein respondents claimed ownership over the subject

parcel of land, alleging that they bought the same from one Josefa MercadoEspina. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that the RTC hasno jurisdiction over the case due to the failure of the complainant to statethe assessed value of the property, that petitioners' cause of action is barredby prescription, laches and indefeasibility of title, and that the complaintdoes not state sufficient cause of action against respondents who are buyersin good faith. The RTC denied respondents' Motion to Dismiss. The CAreversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the RegionalTrial Court to dismiss the case and enjoining it from proceeding with thecase on the ground of indefeasibility of title, prescription and/or laches

HELD: NO. Where the complaint for recovery of ownership andpossession of a parcel of land (such as the one at bar) alleges that some ofthe defendants bought said land from their co-defendants who had adefective title thereto but does not allege that the purchasers werepurchasers in bad faith or with notice of the defect in the title of theirvendors, it is held that the lower court correctly dismissed the complaintagainst the purchasers for failure to state a cause of action against them.

Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corp. v. Parungao,

G.R. No. 197507,

January 14, 2013

FACTS: This is a petition for indirect contempt. The Court issued aenjoining the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and the LRA

Administrator and/or all persons acting upon their orders or in their placeand stead from canceling TCT No. T-105742 in Rivulet's name; issuing anew certificate of title in the name of the Republic; and issuing anddistributing CLOAs in favor of anyone during the pendency of the case.Respondent Undersecretary Parugao sought advice from the Office of theSolicitor General (OSG) on the possibility of installing farmer beneficiariesin the subject property despite the TRO, citing that the acts sought to beenjoined had already been performed prior to its issuance and that the DARwas not among those enjoined.The OSG opined that the TRO was directedonly against the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and the LRAAdministrator and that the installation of farmer-beneficiaries was notamong the acts enjoined. Moreover, the CARP Law directs the DAR toproceed with the distribution of the acquired land to the farmer -beneficiariesupon the issuance of CLOAs in their favor. Accordingly, the farmer-beneficiaries were installed in the subject landholding with the assistance ofthe members of the PNP. Rivulet claims that the act of respondents ininstalling farmer-beneficiaries in the subject landholding constitutes anopen defiance and disobedience of the TRO for which they should be citedfor indirect contempt of court.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents should be cited for contempt

HELD:NO. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court byacting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not

only a willful disregard of the courts order, but such conduct which tendsto bring the authority of the court and the administration of law intodisrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice.To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to orprohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished forcontempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which isforbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that therecan be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing isforbidden or required. The power to punish for contempt should beexercised on the preservative, not on the vindictive principle, and only whennecessary in the interest of justice


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