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Rent Protection, Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Innovation and Growth Slide Slide 1 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth Growth By By Elias Dinopoulos Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth Schumpeterian Growth Theory Theory

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Page 1: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 11

Innovation and Rent Protection in the Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian GrowthTheory of Schumpeterian Growth

ByByElias DinopoulosElias Dinopoulos

Schumpeterian Growth TheorySchumpeterian Growth Theory

Page 2: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 22

OrganizationOrganization

This topic presents a state-of-the art growth model based on quality improvements.

The model generates endogenous long-run Schumpeterian growth without scale effects.

Readings Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) Jones, Chapters 4 and 5. Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999)

Page 3: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 33

MotivationMotivation R&D investment occurs in an uncertain and

insecure environment. The rents from past innovations might be

captured through imitation or further innovation.

Incumbents may engage in activities that retard the pace of innovation by potential competitors.

These activities include: Trade secrecy distribution systems that exploit lead time increased product complexity various litigation mechanisms.

Page 4: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 44

Rent-protection mechanismsRent-protection mechanisms

The technological mechanismThe technological mechanism: Higher product complexity; trade secrecy

The legal mechanism:The legal mechanism: Effective monitoring and litigation

concerning possible patent infringement by challengers.

The political mechanism:The political mechanism: Lobbying politicians Bribing government officials in order to

restrict access to government services to potential competitors.

Page 5: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 55

DefinitionsDefinitions This paper introduces formally the concept of Rent

Protection Activities (RPAs) in the theory of Schumpeterian Growth.

Rent-protection activitiesRent-protection activities are costly (resource using) attempts by incumbents to delay the innovation success of challengers.

Schumpeterian GrowthSchumpeterian Growth is based on the introduction of new goods or processes (as opposed to physical or human capital accumulation).

Page 6: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 66

RPAs and removal of scale effectsRPAs and removal of scale effects

This paper proposes a new mechanism that removes the scale-effects property.

The mechanism is based on the notion of RPAs. We model the R&D difficulty, D(t), as an increasing

function of RPAs. R&D may may become more difficult over time because

incumbent firms may may allocate more resources to RPAs.

Page 7: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 77

RPAs and removal of scale effectsRPAs and removal of scale effects

The discovery process is modeled as an R&D R&D contestcontest (instead of an R&D race): Challengers spend resources on R&D

investments

Incumbents allocate resources to RPAs.

Both the levels of R&D and RPAs are chosen endogenously, and increase exponentially in the steady-state equilibrium.

Page 8: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 88

Preview of resultsPreview of results The model generates endogenous long-run

Schumpeterian growth without scale effects. Scale effects are removed from real income per

capita as well. Long-run growth is positively related to proportional

R&D subsidies and the rate of growth of population. Long run growth is closely related to income

distribution. Several steady-state properties and comparative

statics results are consistent with time series and international cross-sectional evidence.

Page 9: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 99

The model: An overviewThe model: An overview

A continuum of identical households with infinitely lived members. Each household is a dynastic family whose size

grows at the rate of population growth.

Population is partitioned into specialized and non specialized labor.

There is a continuum of structurally identical industries producing final consumption goods.

Innovation takes the form of higher quality products discovered through stochastic sequential R&D contests.

Page 10: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 1010

The model: An overviewThe model: An overview

Each industry has three activities that exhibit constant returns to scale.

Manufacturing of final goodsManufacturing of final goods This activity uses non-specialized labor.

Innovative R&D servicesInnovative R&D services This activity uses non-specialized labor.

Rent-protection activitiesRent-protection activities This activity uses only specialized labor.

Page 11: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 1111

The knowledge-creation processThe knowledge-creation process

There is a continuum of industries indexed by [0.1]

A challenger j that engages in innovative R&D discovers the next higher quality product with instantaneous probability:

),(

),(),(

tD

tRtI

j

j

Page 12: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 1212

The knowledge-creation processThe knowledge-creation process

),(

),(),(

tD

tRtI

We will refer to I(,t) as the effective R&D. Variable I(,t) is the intensity of the Poisson process that governs the arrival of innovations in industry .

The industry-wide probability of innovating is

Page 13: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 1313

The knowledge-creation processThe knowledge-creation process

The present paper assumes that the level of R&D difficulty is given by

),(),( tXtD

We also assume that population N(t) grows at a constant and exogenous rate gN > 0.

Page 14: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 1414

ProductionProduction

A firm that produces Z(,t) units of manufacturing output incurs the cost

),( tZwL RPA services are produced with specialized labor according to the following cost function

),( tXwH

Page 15: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 1515

Production and household behaviorProduction and household behavior

Firm j produces innovative R&D services using only non-specialized labor according to the cost function

),( tRw jL Each household maximizes its discounted utility

dttueeU ttg N )(log0

Page 16: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 1616

Household behaviorHousehold behavior

Per capita utility u(t) is defined by the following equation:

dtiZtui

i

)],,(log[)(log1

0

This a standard sub utility function used in quality-ladders growth models.

Page 17: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 1717

Household behaviorHousehold behavior

The solution to the consumer’s maximization problem yields:

)(

)()(),(

tp

tNtctZ

)()(

)(tr

tc

tcand

Page 18: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 1818

R&D contestsR&D contests The flow of profits for the incumbent

monopolist in a typical industry is given by

)()(

])([),,( tXwp

tcNwtptXp HL

Each challenger engages in R&D investment, R, and each incumbent engages only in RPAs, X(t).

The strategic interactions between incumbents and challengers are modeled as a stochastic stochastic differential gamedifferential game for Poisson jump processes.

Page 19: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 1919

Factor marketsFactor markets The full-employment condition for non-

specialized labor is

)()(

)()1( tRw

tcNtNs

L

)()( tXtsN

The full-employment condition for specialized labor is

Page 20: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 2020

Steady-state (balanced-growth) Steady-state (balanced-growth) equilibriumequilibrium

The following variables are constant over time Effective R&D, I; per capita consumption expenditure, c; wages of specialized and non-specialized labor, wH and

wL; long-run growth, gU.

Long-run real per capita income, u(t), and its growth rate, gU, are given by

,loglog]log[)(log tIw

ctu

L

log)(

)(I

tu

tug

U

Page 21: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 2121

Innovation and resource allocation.Innovation and resource allocation. The solution to the stochastic differential game yields the

following expression for the long-run rate of innovation rate of innovation ::

L

H

w

wI

)1(

Combining several equations yields the resource conditionresource condition

Isc

s

1

Page 22: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 2222

R&D ConditionR&D Condition

Solving for the interest rate from the zero-profit condition and using equation (10) yields the R&D condition (26)

Igs

c N 2)1(

)1(

The resource condition defines a negatively sloped line and the R&D condition defines a positively sloped line in the c, I space.

Page 23: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 2323

Figure 1: Steady-state equilibriumFigure 1: Steady-state equilibrium

c

0 I

E

I*

c*

R&D Condition

Resource Condition

Page 24: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 2424

Basic results of the analysisBasic results of the analysis

Proposition 1: There exists a unique steady-Proposition 1: There exists a unique steady-state equilibrium such that:state equilibrium such that:

Effective R&D, the relative wage of specialized Effective R&D, the relative wage of specialized labor, per capita IBA output, and per capita labor, per capita IBA output, and per capita consumption expenditure are all bounded and consumption expenditure are all bounded and constant over time.constant over time.

Long-run Schumpeterian growth is bounded and Long-run Schumpeterian growth is bounded and does not exhibit scale effects.does not exhibit scale effects.

The removal of scale effects is consistent with time-series evidence.

Page 25: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 2525

Comparative steady-state resultsComparative steady-state results

Proposition 2: Proposition 2: The long-run Schumpeterian growth The long-run Schumpeterian growth rate dependsrate depends

Positively on the proportional R&D subsidy rate, Positively on the proportional R&D subsidy rate, the population growth rate, and the size of the population growth rate, and the size of innovations;innovations;

Negatively on the fraction of specialized labor, Negatively on the fraction of specialized labor, the market interest rate, the unit labor the market interest rate, the unit labor requirement in the production of R&D services, requirement in the production of R&D services, and the productivity of RPAs.and the productivity of RPAs.

Proposition 3Proposition 3 compares the social and market rates of innovation.

Page 26: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 2626

Commercial versus University PatentingCommercial versus University Patenting

Page 27: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 2727

Commercial versus University PatentingCommercial versus University Patenting

Page 28: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 2828

Concluding remarksConcluding remarks The removal of scale effects from

Schumpeterian growth models is an important step in growth theory: It improves the empirical relevance of the new

growth theory. It increases the likelihood of integrating the

neoclassical and the new growth approach. It will increase our understanding of the

interactions between growth, income distribution and international market linkages.

The present paper contributes to these developments by highlighting the implications of RPAs.

Page 29: Rent Protection, Innovation and Growth Slide 1 Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth By Elias Dinopoulos Schumpeterian Growth

Rent Protection, Rent Protection,

Innovation and GrowthInnovation and Growth Slide Slide 2929

Avenues for further researchAvenues for further research

The analysis suggests several avenues for further research: The transitional dynamics and welfare

properties of the model can be analyzed. A multi-country model might shed light on

the connection between comparative advantage, international technology transfer, growth and income differences across countries.

Introduction of endogenous patents and imitation-blocking activities is feasible and interesting.