REPLY TO ANATOL RAPOPORT

by Mike Robinson

Kingston-on-Thames , Surrey, England

HILE I do not see any real conflict W between Dr. Rapoport’s comments and mine, I think it is worthwhile to clarify ~ o m e points.

(1) My remarks were directed entirely a t one small but significant area of Howard’s theory. This was the use of metagame theory to solve the paradox of rationality arising from the classical prisoner’s dilemma game, under the assumption of “individual rationality”, and in a prescriptive sense.

(2) The paradox of rationality only arises under the assumption of individual ration- ality. The choices and equilibria following from different preference orderings (Tables 1, 2, and 3) dissolve the problem. Coopera- tive preferences achieve a CC equilibrium; competitive choices achieve a DD equi- librium but in a context where CC is not preferred to DD.

ously, we must take the assumption of indi- vidual rationality seriously.

(4) The decision calculus of a player operating under the assumption of individ- ual rationality, if capable of generating Howard’s second order metagames, will also generate the considerations Rapoport exam- ines in his penultimate paragraph, which is simply the base game or possibly what I called the bluff-metagame. Either way, the consequence is a DD equilibrium.

(5 ) Lastly, I agree with Rapoport that we should be free to choose the assumptions on which to construct a theory of rational behavior. All I have pointed out is that if‘ our preference structures allow us to gener- ate the paradox, then we are stuck with it. This is because our expectations of the “Other who is like me”, i.e., selfish, do not break the cycle; they lock it.

(3) If we are to take the paradox seri- (Manuscript received April 14, 1975)

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Behadoral Science. Volume 20, 1975