Talk like Whales: A Reply to Stanley FishAuthor(s): Wolfgang IserSource: Diacritics, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Autumn, 1981), pp. 82-87Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/464516Accessed: 06/08/2009 01:31

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TALK LIKE WHALES

"Why, Dr. Johnson, this is not so easy as you seem to think; for if you were to make little fishes talk, they would talk like WHALES."

Oliver Goldsmith1

A Reply to Stanley Fish

WOLFGANG ISER

First things first: I must thank Stanley Fish for Part I of his article, which is an admirable summary of my theory. He has a genuine talent for

precis-writing. Part II of his article, however, fails to display a similar talent for commentary and judgement.

Let me begin by drawing attention to two statements, both of which are contained in his opening paragraph:

At a time when we are warned daily against the sirens of literary theory, Wolfgang Iser is notable because he does not appear on anyone's list. He is not included among those (Derrida, de Man, Bloom, Miller, Fish) who are thought of as subverting standards, values and the rule of common sense. [Diacritics, Volume II, No. 7 (Spring 1981), p. 2]

I should like to be interested to know on whose list Stanley Fish actually stands, but in the light of the arguments put forth in Part II, it is a relief to note his awareness that others may accuse him of subverting the rule of common sense.

[Iser] is influential without being controversial, and at a moment when everyone is choosing up sides, he seems to be on no side at all or (it amounts to the same thing) on every side at once. [Ibid.]

Well, I am sure that Professor Fish knows something of the history of

literary theory, and that it is often characterized by misplaced distinctions and untenable oppositions. When intelligent men take sides, it is not necessarily the case that one group is right and the other wrong. A new framework of thought can embrace the rightness of both sides without

1 Boswell's Life of Johnson, ed. by George Birkbeck Hill, revised and enlarged edition by L. F. Powell, Oxford 1934, I/, p. 231.

TALK LIKE WHALES

"Why, Dr. Johnson, this is not so easy as you seem to think; for if you were to make little fishes talk, they would talk like WHALES."

Oliver Goldsmith1

A Reply to Stanley Fish

WOLFGANG ISER

First things first: I must thank Stanley Fish for Part I of his article, which is an admirable summary of my theory. He has a genuine talent for

precis-writing. Part II of his article, however, fails to display a similar talent for commentary and judgement.

Let me begin by drawing attention to two statements, both of which are contained in his opening paragraph:

At a time when we are warned daily against the sirens of literary theory, Wolfgang Iser is notable because he does not appear on anyone's list. He is not included among those (Derrida, de Man, Bloom, Miller, Fish) who are thought of as subverting standards, values and the rule of common sense. [Diacritics, Volume II, No. 7 (Spring 1981), p. 2]

I should like to be interested to know on whose list Stanley Fish actually stands, but in the light of the arguments put forth in Part II, it is a relief to note his awareness that others may accuse him of subverting the rule of common sense.

[Iser] is influential without being controversial, and at a moment when everyone is choosing up sides, he seems to be on no side at all or (it amounts to the same thing) on every side at once. [Ibid.]

Well, I am sure that Professor Fish knows something of the history of

literary theory, and that it is often characterized by misplaced distinctions and untenable oppositions. When intelligent men take sides, it is not necessarily the case that one group is right and the other wrong. A new framework of thought can embrace the rightness of both sides without

1 Boswell's Life of Johnson, ed. by George Birkbeck Hill, revised and enlarged edition by L. F. Powell, Oxford 1934, I/, p. 231.

TALK LIKE WHALES

"Why, Dr. Johnson, this is not so easy as you seem to think; for if you were to make little fishes talk, they would talk like WHALES."

Oliver Goldsmith1

A Reply to Stanley Fish

WOLFGANG ISER

First things first: I must thank Stanley Fish for Part I of his article, which is an admirable summary of my theory. He has a genuine talent for

precis-writing. Part II of his article, however, fails to display a similar talent for commentary and judgement.

Let me begin by drawing attention to two statements, both of which are contained in his opening paragraph:

At a time when we are warned daily against the sirens of literary theory, Wolfgang Iser is notable because he does not appear on anyone's list. He is not included among those (Derrida, de Man, Bloom, Miller, Fish) who are thought of as subverting standards, values and the rule of common sense. [Diacritics, Volume II, No. 7 (Spring 1981), p. 2]

I should like to be interested to know on whose list Stanley Fish actually stands, but in the light of the arguments put forth in Part II, it is a relief to note his awareness that others may accuse him of subverting the rule of common sense.

[Iser] is influential without being controversial, and at a moment when everyone is choosing up sides, he seems to be on no side at all or (it amounts to the same thing) on every side at once. [Ibid.]

Well, I am sure that Professor Fish knows something of the history of

literary theory, and that it is often characterized by misplaced distinctions and untenable oppositions. When intelligent men take sides, it is not necessarily the case that one group is right and the other wrong. A new framework of thought can embrace the rightness of both sides without

1 Boswell's Life of Johnson, ed. by George Birkbeck Hill, revised and enlarged edition by L. F. Powell, Oxford 1934, I/, p. 231.

TALK LIKE WHALES

"Why, Dr. Johnson, this is not so easy as you seem to think; for if you were to make little fishes talk, they would talk like WHALES."

Oliver Goldsmith1

A Reply to Stanley Fish

WOLFGANG ISER

First things first: I must thank Stanley Fish for Part I of his article, which is an admirable summary of my theory. He has a genuine talent for

precis-writing. Part II of his article, however, fails to display a similar talent for commentary and judgement.

Let me begin by drawing attention to two statements, both of which are contained in his opening paragraph:

At a time when we are warned daily against the sirens of literary theory, Wolfgang Iser is notable because he does not appear on anyone's list. He is not included among those (Derrida, de Man, Bloom, Miller, Fish) who are thought of as subverting standards, values and the rule of common sense. [Diacritics, Volume II, No. 7 (Spring 1981), p. 2]

I should like to be interested to know on whose list Stanley Fish actually stands, but in the light of the arguments put forth in Part II, it is a relief to note his awareness that others may accuse him of subverting the rule of common sense.

[Iser] is influential without being controversial, and at a moment when everyone is choosing up sides, he seems to be on no side at all or (it amounts to the same thing) on every side at once. [Ibid.]

Well, I am sure that Professor Fish knows something of the history of

literary theory, and that it is often characterized by misplaced distinctions and untenable oppositions. When intelligent men take sides, it is not necessarily the case that one group is right and the other wrong. A new framework of thought can embrace the rightness of both sides without

1 Boswell's Life of Johnson, ed. by George Birkbeck Hill, revised and enlarged edition by L. F. Powell, Oxford 1934, I/, p. 231.

TALK LIKE WHALES

"Why, Dr. Johnson, this is not so easy as you seem to think; for if you were to make little fishes talk, they would talk like WHALES."

Oliver Goldsmith1

A Reply to Stanley Fish

WOLFGANG ISER

First things first: I must thank Stanley Fish for Part I of his article, which is an admirable summary of my theory. He has a genuine talent for

precis-writing. Part II of his article, however, fails to display a similar talent for commentary and judgement.

Let me begin by drawing attention to two statements, both of which are contained in his opening paragraph:

At a time when we are warned daily against the sirens of literary theory, Wolfgang Iser is notable because he does not appear on anyone's list. He is not included among those (Derrida, de Man, Bloom, Miller, Fish) who are thought of as subverting standards, values and the rule of common sense. [Diacritics, Volume II, No. 7 (Spring 1981), p. 2]

I should like to be interested to know on whose list Stanley Fish actually stands, but in the light of the arguments put forth in Part II, it is a relief to note his awareness that others may accuse him of subverting the rule of common sense.

[Iser] is influential without being controversial, and at a moment when everyone is choosing up sides, he seems to be on no side at all or (it amounts to the same thing) on every side at once. [Ibid.]

Well, I am sure that Professor Fish knows something of the history of

literary theory, and that it is often characterized by misplaced distinctions and untenable oppositions. When intelligent men take sides, it is not necessarily the case that one group is right and the other wrong. A new framework of thought can embrace the rightness of both sides without

1 Boswell's Life of Johnson, ed. by George Birkbeck Hill, revised and enlarged edition by L. F. Powell, Oxford 1934, I/, p. 231.

TALK LIKE WHALES

"Why, Dr. Johnson, this is not so easy as you seem to think; for if you were to make little fishes talk, they would talk like WHALES."

Oliver Goldsmith1

A Reply to Stanley Fish

WOLFGANG ISER

First things first: I must thank Stanley Fish for Part I of his article, which is an admirable summary of my theory. He has a genuine talent for

precis-writing. Part II of his article, however, fails to display a similar talent for commentary and judgement.

Let me begin by drawing attention to two statements, both of which are contained in his opening paragraph:

At a time when we are warned daily against the sirens of literary theory, Wolfgang Iser is notable because he does not appear on anyone's list. He is not included among those (Derrida, de Man, Bloom, Miller, Fish) who are thought of as subverting standards, values and the rule of common sense. [Diacritics, Volume II, No. 7 (Spring 1981), p. 2]

I should like to be interested to know on whose list Stanley Fish actually stands, but in the light of the arguments put forth in Part II, it is a relief to note his awareness that others may accuse him of subverting the rule of common sense.

[Iser] is influential without being controversial, and at a moment when everyone is choosing up sides, he seems to be on no side at all or (it amounts to the same thing) on every side at once. [Ibid.]

Well, I am sure that Professor Fish knows something of the history of

literary theory, and that it is often characterized by misplaced distinctions and untenable oppositions. When intelligent men take sides, it is not necessarily the case that one group is right and the other wrong. A new framework of thought can embrace the rightness of both sides without

1 Boswell's Life of Johnson, ed. by George Birkbeck Hill, revised and enlarged edition by L. F. Powell, Oxford 1934, I/, p. 231.

TALK LIKE WHALES

"Why, Dr. Johnson, this is not so easy as you seem to think; for if you were to make little fishes talk, they would talk like WHALES."

Oliver Goldsmith1

A Reply to Stanley Fish

WOLFGANG ISER

First things first: I must thank Stanley Fish for Part I of his article, which is an admirable summary of my theory. He has a genuine talent for

precis-writing. Part II of his article, however, fails to display a similar talent for commentary and judgement.

Let me begin by drawing attention to two statements, both of which are contained in his opening paragraph:

At a time when we are warned daily against the sirens of literary theory, Wolfgang Iser is notable because he does not appear on anyone's list. He is not included among those (Derrida, de Man, Bloom, Miller, Fish) who are thought of as subverting standards, values and the rule of common sense. [Diacritics, Volume II, No. 7 (Spring 1981), p. 2]

I should like to be interested to know on whose list Stanley Fish actually stands, but in the light of the arguments put forth in Part II, it is a relief to note his awareness that others may accuse him of subverting the rule of common sense.

[Iser] is influential without being controversial, and at a moment when everyone is choosing up sides, he seems to be on no side at all or (it amounts to the same thing) on every side at once. [Ibid.]

Well, I am sure that Professor Fish knows something of the history of

literary theory, and that it is often characterized by misplaced distinctions and untenable oppositions. When intelligent men take sides, it is not necessarily the case that one group is right and the other wrong. A new framework of thought can embrace the rightness of both sides without

1 Boswell's Life of Johnson, ed. by George Birkbeck Hill, revised and enlarged edition by L. F. Powell, Oxford 1934, I/, p. 231.

DIACRITICS Vol. 11 Pp. 82-87 0300-7162/81/0113-0028 $01.00 ? 1981 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DIACRITICS Vol. 11 Pp. 82-87 0300-7162/81/0113-0028 $01.00 ? 1981 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DIACRITICS Vol. 11 Pp. 82-87 0300-7162/81/0113-0028 $01.00 ? 1981 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DIACRITICS Vol. 11 Pp. 82-87 0300-7162/81/0113-0028 $01.00 ? 1981 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DIACRITICS Vol. 11 Pp. 82-87 0300-7162/81/0113-0028 $01.00 ? 1981 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DIACRITICS Vol. 11 Pp. 82-87 0300-7162/81/0113-0028 $01.00 ? 1981 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DIACRITICS Vol. 11 Pp. 82-87 0300-7162/81/0113-0028 $01.00 ? 1981 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

seeking to reconcile the incompatible. I do not assume that all my predecessors (and contemporaries) in this field are incompetent, and if my theory appears to be "in- fluential without being controversial", perhaps this is because it includes truths from various sides. At least, I should like to think so.

In Part II of his article, Professor Fish mounts what he calls a "frontal assault" on

my distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy. The attack seems to me rather more like shadow boxing than a frontal assault, but I will do my best to parry the swipes and feints.

The argument begins by taking a statement out of its context and then distort-

ing it:

Each of these statements ... is a version of the basic distinction ... "be- tween a significance which is to be supplied, and a significance which has been supplied" [72] or, in other words between what is already given and what must be brought into being by interpretive activity.

His "other words" are highly misleading, as is the statement that follows:

He regards the world, or external reality, as itself determinate, something that is given rather than supplied. [p. 6]

Professor Fish's confusion is caused by the fact that he has telescoped three ideas into two. I draw a distinction between the given, the determinate, and the indeter- minate. I maintain that the literary world differs from the real world because it is only accessible to the imagination, whereas the real world is also accessible to the senses and exists outside any description of it. The words of a text are given, the interpreta- tion of the words is determinate, and the gaps between given elements and/or

interpretations are the indeterminacies. The real world is given, our interpretation of the world is determinate, the gaps between given elements and/or our interpreta- tions are the indeterminacies. The difference is that with the literary text, it is the

interpretation of the words that produces the literary world-i.e. its real-ness, un- like that of the outside world, is not given.

Professor Fish handsomely proves my point without realizing it. After dissecting my Ivy Compton-Burnett example, he tries to draw a parallel with real life by refer-

ring to a cartoon in the New Yorker (I find it strange that he should take as his

example another piece of fiction, but he appears to have difficulty with all kinds of distinctions):

It shows a man seated in a chair, staring morosely at a television set. Above him stands a woman, presumably his wife, and she is obviously speaking to him with some force and conviction. The captions read, 'You look sorry, you act sorry, you say you're sorry, but you're not sorry.' [p. 10]

There then follows a piscine interpretation which offers us the actual thoughts of the wife and husband. Here we have a perfect illustration of the reading process at work, in all its stages, except that this particular piece of fiction offers a picture as well as words. What is given is the man seated and the woman standing, plus the

captions. What is determinate is Professor Fish's view of the man as morose, the identification of the woman as his wife, the attributes of force and conviction. What is indeterminate is the link between the given elements (figures and captions) and between the two figures as interpreted by Professor Fish. It is he who has assembled the 'reality' of the cartoon (which is fiction) by way of its given elements and his ideations. If he were confronted with the two figures in person-i.e. in real life-he would supplement and possibly, in this case, even "check" his interpretation by watching, listening, questioning etc. The fictional figures are dependent on him for their assembled significance, and he has no point of reference outside the fiction itself.

seeking to reconcile the incompatible. I do not assume that all my predecessors (and contemporaries) in this field are incompetent, and if my theory appears to be "in- fluential without being controversial", perhaps this is because it includes truths from various sides. At least, I should like to think so.

In Part II of his article, Professor Fish mounts what he calls a "frontal assault" on

my distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy. The attack seems to me rather more like shadow boxing than a frontal assault, but I will do my best to parry the swipes and feints.

The argument begins by taking a statement out of its context and then distort-

ing it:

Each of these statements ... is a version of the basic distinction ... "be- tween a significance which is to be supplied, and a significance which has been supplied" [72] or, in other words between what is already given and what must be brought into being by interpretive activity.

His "other words" are highly misleading, as is the statement that follows:

He regards the world, or external reality, as itself determinate, something that is given rather than supplied. [p. 6]

Professor Fish's confusion is caused by the fact that he has telescoped three ideas into two. I draw a distinction between the given, the determinate, and the indeter- minate. I maintain that the literary world differs from the real world because it is only accessible to the imagination, whereas the real world is also accessible to the senses and exists outside any description of it. The words of a text are given, the interpreta- tion of the words is determinate, and the gaps between given elements and/or

interpretations are the indeterminacies. The real world is given, our interpretation of the world is determinate, the gaps between given elements and/or our interpreta- tions are the indeterminacies. The difference is that with the literary text, it is the

interpretation of the words that produces the literary world-i.e. its real-ness, un- like that of the outside world, is not given.

Professor Fish handsomely proves my point without realizing it. After dissecting my Ivy Compton-Burnett example, he tries to draw a parallel with real life by refer-

ring to a cartoon in the New Yorker (I find it strange that he should take as his

example another piece of fiction, but he appears to have difficulty with all kinds of distinctions):

It shows a man seated in a chair, staring morosely at a television set. Above him stands a woman, presumably his wife, and she is obviously speaking to him with some force and conviction. The captions read, 'You look sorry, you act sorry, you say you're sorry, but you're not sorry.' [p. 10]

There then follows a piscine interpretation which offers us the actual thoughts of the wife and husband. Here we have a perfect illustration of the reading process at work, in all its stages, except that this particular piece of fiction offers a picture as well as words. What is given is the man seated and the woman standing, plus the

captions. What is determinate is Professor Fish's view of the man as morose, the identification of the woman as his wife, the attributes of force and conviction. What is indeterminate is the link between the given elements (figures and captions) and between the two figures as interpreted by Professor Fish. It is he who has assembled the 'reality' of the cartoon (which is fiction) by way of its given elements and his ideations. If he were confronted with the two figures in person-i.e. in real life-he would supplement and possibly, in this case, even "check" his interpretation by watching, listening, questioning etc. The fictional figures are dependent on him for their assembled significance, and he has no point of reference outside the fiction itself.

seeking to reconcile the incompatible. I do not assume that all my predecessors (and contemporaries) in this field are incompetent, and if my theory appears to be "in- fluential without being controversial", perhaps this is because it includes truths from various sides. At least, I should like to think so.

In Part II of his article, Professor Fish mounts what he calls a "frontal assault" on

my distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy. The attack seems to me rather more like shadow boxing than a frontal assault, but I will do my best to parry the swipes and feints.

The argument begins by taking a statement out of its context and then distort-

ing it:

Each of these statements ... is a version of the basic distinction ... "be- tween a significance which is to be supplied, and a significance which has been supplied" [72] or, in other words between what is already given and what must be brought into being by interpretive activity.

His "other words" are highly misleading, as is the statement that follows:

He regards the world, or external reality, as itself determinate, something that is given rather than supplied. [p. 6]

Professor Fish's confusion is caused by the fact that he has telescoped three ideas into two. I draw a distinction between the given, the determinate, and the indeter- minate. I maintain that the literary world differs from the real world because it is only accessible to the imagination, whereas the real world is also accessible to the senses and exists outside any description of it. The words of a text are given, the interpreta- tion of the words is determinate, and the gaps between given elements and/or

interpretations are the indeterminacies. The real world is given, our interpretation of the world is determinate, the gaps between given elements and/or our interpreta- tions are the indeterminacies. The difference is that with the literary text, it is the

interpretation of the words that produces the literary world-i.e. its real-ness, un- like that of the outside world, is not given.

Professor Fish handsomely proves my point without realizing it. After dissecting my Ivy Compton-Burnett example, he tries to draw a parallel with real life by refer-

ring to a cartoon in the New Yorker (I find it strange that he should take as his

example another piece of fiction, but he appears to have difficulty with all kinds of distinctions):

It shows a man seated in a chair, staring morosely at a television set. Above him stands a woman, presumably his wife, and she is obviously speaking to him with some force and conviction. The captions read, 'You look sorry, you act sorry, you say you're sorry, but you're not sorry.' [p. 10]

There then follows a piscine interpretation which offers us the actual thoughts of the wife and husband. Here we have a perfect illustration of the reading process at work, in all its stages, except that this particular piece of fiction offers a picture as well as words. What is given is the man seated and the woman standing, plus the

captions. What is determinate is Professor Fish's view of the man as morose, the identification of the woman as his wife, the attributes of force and conviction. What is indeterminate is the link between the given elements (figures and captions) and between the two figures as interpreted by Professor Fish. It is he who has assembled the 'reality' of the cartoon (which is fiction) by way of its given elements and his ideations. If he were confronted with the two figures in person-i.e. in real life-he would supplement and possibly, in this case, even "check" his interpretation by watching, listening, questioning etc. The fictional figures are dependent on him for their assembled significance, and he has no point of reference outside the fiction itself.

seeking to reconcile the incompatible. I do not assume that all my predecessors (and contemporaries) in this field are incompetent, and if my theory appears to be "in- fluential without being controversial", perhaps this is because it includes truths from various sides. At least, I should like to think so.

In Part II of his article, Professor Fish mounts what he calls a "frontal assault" on

my distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy. The attack seems to me rather more like shadow boxing than a frontal assault, but I will do my best to parry the swipes and feints.

The argument begins by taking a statement out of its context and then distort-

ing it:

Each of these statements ... is a version of the basic distinction ... "be- tween a significance which is to be supplied, and a significance which has been supplied" [72] or, in other words between what is already given and what must be brought into being by interpretive activity.

His "other words" are highly misleading, as is the statement that follows:

He regards the world, or external reality, as itself determinate, something that is given rather than supplied. [p. 6]

Professor Fish's confusion is caused by the fact that he has telescoped three ideas into two. I draw a distinction between the given, the determinate, and the indeter- minate. I maintain that the literary world differs from the real world because it is only accessible to the imagination, whereas the real world is also accessible to the senses and exists outside any description of it. The words of a text are given, the interpreta- tion of the words is determinate, and the gaps between given elements and/or

interpretations are the indeterminacies. The real world is given, our interpretation of the world is determinate, the gaps between given elements and/or our interpreta- tions are the indeterminacies. The difference is that with the literary text, it is the

interpretation of the words that produces the literary world-i.e. its real-ness, un- like that of the outside world, is not given.

Professor Fish handsomely proves my point without realizing it. After dissecting my Ivy Compton-Burnett example, he tries to draw a parallel with real life by refer-

ring to a cartoon in the New Yorker (I find it strange that he should take as his

example another piece of fiction, but he appears to have difficulty with all kinds of distinctions):

It shows a man seated in a chair, staring morosely at a television set. Above him stands a woman, presumably his wife, and she is obviously speaking to him with some force and conviction. The captions read, 'You look sorry, you act sorry, you say you're sorry, but you're not sorry.' [p. 10]

There then follows a piscine interpretation which offers us the actual thoughts of the wife and husband. Here we have a perfect illustration of the reading process at work, in all its stages, except that this particular piece of fiction offers a picture as well as words. What is given is the man seated and the woman standing, plus the

captions. What is determinate is Professor Fish's view of the man as morose, the identification of the woman as his wife, the attributes of force and conviction. What is indeterminate is the link between the given elements (figures and captions) and between the two figures as interpreted by Professor Fish. It is he who has assembled the 'reality' of the cartoon (which is fiction) by way of its given elements and his ideations. If he were confronted with the two figures in person-i.e. in real life-he would supplement and possibly, in this case, even "check" his interpretation by watching, listening, questioning etc. The fictional figures are dependent on him for their assembled significance, and he has no point of reference outside the fiction itself.

seeking to reconcile the incompatible. I do not assume that all my predecessors (and contemporaries) in this field are incompetent, and if my theory appears to be "in- fluential without being controversial", perhaps this is because it includes truths from various sides. At least, I should like to think so.

In Part II of his article, Professor Fish mounts what he calls a "frontal assault" on

my distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy. The attack seems to me rather more like shadow boxing than a frontal assault, but I will do my best to parry the swipes and feints.

The argument begins by taking a statement out of its context and then distort-

ing it:

Each of these statements ... is a version of the basic distinction ... "be- tween a significance which is to be supplied, and a significance which has been supplied" [72] or, in other words between what is already given and what must be brought into being by interpretive activity.

His "other words" are highly misleading, as is the statement that follows:

He regards the world, or external reality, as itself determinate, something that is given rather than supplied. [p. 6]

Professor Fish's confusion is caused by the fact that he has telescoped three ideas into two. I draw a distinction between the given, the determinate, and the indeter- minate. I maintain that the literary world differs from the real world because it is only accessible to the imagination, whereas the real world is also accessible to the senses and exists outside any description of it. The words of a text are given, the interpreta- tion of the words is determinate, and the gaps between given elements and/or

interpretations are the indeterminacies. The real world is given, our interpretation of the world is determinate, the gaps between given elements and/or our interpreta- tions are the indeterminacies. The difference is that with the literary text, it is the

interpretation of the words that produces the literary world-i.e. its real-ness, un- like that of the outside world, is not given.

Professor Fish handsomely proves my point without realizing it. After dissecting my Ivy Compton-Burnett example, he tries to draw a parallel with real life by refer-

ring to a cartoon in the New Yorker (I find it strange that he should take as his

example another piece of fiction, but he appears to have difficulty with all kinds of distinctions):

It shows a man seated in a chair, staring morosely at a television set. Above him stands a woman, presumably his wife, and she is obviously speaking to him with some force and conviction. The captions read, 'You look sorry, you act sorry, you say you're sorry, but you're not sorry.' [p. 10]

There then follows a piscine interpretation which offers us the actual thoughts of the wife and husband. Here we have a perfect illustration of the reading process at work, in all its stages, except that this particular piece of fiction offers a picture as well as words. What is given is the man seated and the woman standing, plus the

captions. What is determinate is Professor Fish's view of the man as morose, the identification of the woman as his wife, the attributes of force and conviction. What is indeterminate is the link between the given elements (figures and captions) and between the two figures as interpreted by Professor Fish. It is he who has assembled the 'reality' of the cartoon (which is fiction) by way of its given elements and his ideations. If he were confronted with the two figures in person-i.e. in real life-he would supplement and possibly, in this case, even "check" his interpretation by watching, listening, questioning etc. The fictional figures are dependent on him for their assembled significance, and he has no point of reference outside the fiction itself.

seeking to reconcile the incompatible. I do not assume that all my predecessors (and contemporaries) in this field are incompetent, and if my theory appears to be "in- fluential without being controversial", perhaps this is because it includes truths from various sides. At least, I should like to think so.

In Part II of his article, Professor Fish mounts what he calls a "frontal assault" on

my distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy. The attack seems to me rather more like shadow boxing than a frontal assault, but I will do my best to parry the swipes and feints.

The argument begins by taking a statement out of its context and then distort-

ing it:

Each of these statements ... is a version of the basic distinction ... "be- tween a significance which is to be supplied, and a significance which has been supplied" [72] or, in other words between what is already given and what must be brought into being by interpretive activity.

His "other words" are highly misleading, as is the statement that follows:

He regards the world, or external reality, as itself determinate, something that is given rather than supplied. [p. 6]

Professor Fish's confusion is caused by the fact that he has telescoped three ideas into two. I draw a distinction between the given, the determinate, and the indeter- minate. I maintain that the literary world differs from the real world because it is only accessible to the imagination, whereas the real world is also accessible to the senses and exists outside any description of it. The words of a text are given, the interpreta- tion of the words is determinate, and the gaps between given elements and/or

interpretations are the indeterminacies. The real world is given, our interpretation of the world is determinate, the gaps between given elements and/or our interpreta- tions are the indeterminacies. The difference is that with the literary text, it is the

interpretation of the words that produces the literary world-i.e. its real-ness, un- like that of the outside world, is not given.

Professor Fish handsomely proves my point without realizing it. After dissecting my Ivy Compton-Burnett example, he tries to draw a parallel with real life by refer-

ring to a cartoon in the New Yorker (I find it strange that he should take as his

example another piece of fiction, but he appears to have difficulty with all kinds of distinctions):

It shows a man seated in a chair, staring morosely at a television set. Above him stands a woman, presumably his wife, and she is obviously speaking to him with some force and conviction. The captions read, 'You look sorry, you act sorry, you say you're sorry, but you're not sorry.' [p. 10]

There then follows a piscine interpretation which offers us the actual thoughts of the wife and husband. Here we have a perfect illustration of the reading process at work, in all its stages, except that this particular piece of fiction offers a picture as well as words. What is given is the man seated and the woman standing, plus the

captions. What is determinate is Professor Fish's view of the man as morose, the identification of the woman as his wife, the attributes of force and conviction. What is indeterminate is the link between the given elements (figures and captions) and between the two figures as interpreted by Professor Fish. It is he who has assembled the 'reality' of the cartoon (which is fiction) by way of its given elements and his ideations. If he were confronted with the two figures in person-i.e. in real life-he would supplement and possibly, in this case, even "check" his interpretation by watching, listening, questioning etc. The fictional figures are dependent on him for their assembled significance, and he has no point of reference outside the fiction itself.

seeking to reconcile the incompatible. I do not assume that all my predecessors (and contemporaries) in this field are incompetent, and if my theory appears to be "in- fluential without being controversial", perhaps this is because it includes truths from various sides. At least, I should like to think so.

In Part II of his article, Professor Fish mounts what he calls a "frontal assault" on

my distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy. The attack seems to me rather more like shadow boxing than a frontal assault, but I will do my best to parry the swipes and feints.

The argument begins by taking a statement out of its context and then distort-

ing it:

Each of these statements ... is a version of the basic distinction ... "be- tween a significance which is to be supplied, and a significance which has been supplied" [72] or, in other words between what is already given and what must be brought into being by interpretive activity.

His "other words" are highly misleading, as is the statement that follows:

He regards the world, or external reality, as itself determinate, something that is given rather than supplied. [p. 6]

Professor Fish's confusion is caused by the fact that he has telescoped three ideas into two. I draw a distinction between the given, the determinate, and the indeter- minate. I maintain that the literary world differs from the real world because it is only accessible to the imagination, whereas the real world is also accessible to the senses and exists outside any description of it. The words of a text are given, the interpreta- tion of the words is determinate, and the gaps between given elements and/or

interpretations are the indeterminacies. The real world is given, our interpretation of the world is determinate, the gaps between given elements and/or our interpreta- tions are the indeterminacies. The difference is that with the literary text, it is the

interpretation of the words that produces the literary world-i.e. its real-ness, un- like that of the outside world, is not given.

Professor Fish handsomely proves my point without realizing it. After dissecting my Ivy Compton-Burnett example, he tries to draw a parallel with real life by refer-

ring to a cartoon in the New Yorker (I find it strange that he should take as his

example another piece of fiction, but he appears to have difficulty with all kinds of distinctions):

It shows a man seated in a chair, staring morosely at a television set. Above him stands a woman, presumably his wife, and she is obviously speaking to him with some force and conviction. The captions read, 'You look sorry, you act sorry, you say you're sorry, but you're not sorry.' [p. 10]

There then follows a piscine interpretation which offers us the actual thoughts of the wife and husband. Here we have a perfect illustration of the reading process at work, in all its stages, except that this particular piece of fiction offers a picture as well as words. What is given is the man seated and the woman standing, plus the

captions. What is determinate is Professor Fish's view of the man as morose, the identification of the woman as his wife, the attributes of force and conviction. What is indeterminate is the link between the given elements (figures and captions) and between the two figures as interpreted by Professor Fish. It is he who has assembled the 'reality' of the cartoon (which is fiction) by way of its given elements and his ideations. If he were confronted with the two figures in person-i.e. in real life-he would supplement and possibly, in this case, even "check" his interpretation by watching, listening, questioning etc. The fictional figures are dependent on him for their assembled significance, and he has no point of reference outside the fiction itself.

diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 83 83 83 83 83 83 83

It is at this point that Professor Fish insists that "perception itself is an act of ideation." [p. 10] He then defines ideation as the "inferring of a world from a set of assumptions (antecedently held) about what it must be like." [p. 10] I would accept his definition, but I would not accept his implication that seeing the picture and captions is ideation. I could only do so if I knew that when Professor Fish had eye trouble he went to see his psychiatrist.

The next stage of the argument poses the same problem. Professor Fish mag- nanimously agrees that reading about sunsets, wine and silk is not the same as

seeing, tasting and touching them, but he makes this concession "without agreeing that seeing, touching and tasting are natural rather than conventional activities. What can be seen will be a function of the categories of vision that already inform percep- tion, and those categories will be social and conventional and not imposed upon us by an independent world." [p. 11] I maintain that what can be seen will be there (unless the world is to be regarded as an hallucination), and it is the interpretation of what can be seen (i.e. how it is seen) that is a function of the various categories.

Before switching to the examples from literature that provide the focus for Professor Fish's objections, I must confess my bewilderment that he thinks in- terpretation a useful activity if, as he suggests, there are no givens to interpret: "... there can be no category of the 'given' if by given one means what is there before interpretation begins." [p. 11] True, there is no unmediated given, but interpretation would be useless if it were not meant to open access to something we encounter. Interpretation is always informed by a set of assumptions or conventions, but these are also acted upon by what they intend to tackle. Hence the 'something' which is to be mediated exists prior to interpretation, acts as a constraint on interpretation, has

repercussions on the anticipations operative in interpretation, and thus contributes to a hermeneutical process, the result of which is both a mediated given and a

reshuffling of the initial assumptions. Professor Fish, however, creates a new her- meneutics by fusing interpretation and that which is to be interpreted into an indis-

tinguishable whole, thus replacing the given by interpretation itself. Whenever I read Professor Fish I keep rubbing my eyes in order to make sure that I am not reading Bishop Berkeley.

Let us look at the two examples from literature to which Professor Fish takes

exceptions. First the Allworthy example which he attacks. Here what is given is the name Allworthy. The next stage is the significance that the reader attaches to the name Allworthy, and whatever this may be (in most cases the idea that Allworthy must be a good man) will be determinate. The next 'given' may be, for instance, Blifil's piety. The link between the two factors is then indeterminate until the reader educes a determinate significance. And thus the process continues, with the reader

supplying significances which are then altered by subsequent significances that have to be produced in order to bridge the gaps between (a) given elements and (b) his previous determinate interpretations.

As for external reality, yes, it is given, and no, it is not in itself determinate. Professor Fish professes that "there is no distinction between what the text gives

and what the reader supplies; he supplies everything; the stars in a literary text are not fixed; they are just as variable as the lines that join them." [p. 7] The reader does not supply the name Allworthy. That is fixed. It is the qualities the reader attaches to the name that may vary, but so long as the reader attaches some determinate qual- ities to the name, and so long as the reader tries subsequently to link his original view of Allworthy to that gentleman's attitude towards Blifil, the distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy still holds good whether or not one agrees with my own version of interpretation of that relationship. Precisely the same argument applies to the next example of 'Arcadian Simplicity' in Vanity Fair. The term is given. The interpretation is made by the reader, and once made is determinate. Professor Fish anticipates this argument, and protests that "this assumes that the words ... are 'pointable to' apart from some or other interpretive perspective." It is here that I believe he makes a major blunder, and to clarify it I must quote a later passage:

It is at this point that Professor Fish insists that "perception itself is an act of ideation." [p. 10] He then defines ideation as the "inferring of a world from a set of assumptions (antecedently held) about what it must be like." [p. 10] I would accept his definition, but I would not accept his implication that seeing the picture and captions is ideation. I could only do so if I knew that when Professor Fish had eye trouble he went to see his psychiatrist.

The next stage of the argument poses the same problem. Professor Fish mag- nanimously agrees that reading about sunsets, wine and silk is not the same as

seeing, tasting and touching them, but he makes this concession "without agreeing that seeing, touching and tasting are natural rather than conventional activities. What can be seen will be a function of the categories of vision that already inform percep- tion, and those categories will be social and conventional and not imposed upon us by an independent world." [p. 11] I maintain that what can be seen will be there (unless the world is to be regarded as an hallucination), and it is the interpretation of what can be seen (i.e. how it is seen) that is a function of the various categories.

Before switching to the examples from literature that provide the focus for Professor Fish's objections, I must confess my bewilderment that he thinks in- terpretation a useful activity if, as he suggests, there are no givens to interpret: "... there can be no category of the 'given' if by given one means what is there before interpretation begins." [p. 11] True, there is no unmediated given, but interpretation would be useless if it were not meant to open access to something we encounter. Interpretation is always informed by a set of assumptions or conventions, but these are also acted upon by what they intend to tackle. Hence the 'something' which is to be mediated exists prior to interpretation, acts as a constraint on interpretation, has

repercussions on the anticipations operative in interpretation, and thus contributes to a hermeneutical process, the result of which is both a mediated given and a

reshuffling of the initial assumptions. Professor Fish, however, creates a new her- meneutics by fusing interpretation and that which is to be interpreted into an indis-

tinguishable whole, thus replacing the given by interpretation itself. Whenever I read Professor Fish I keep rubbing my eyes in order to make sure that I am not reading Bishop Berkeley.

Let us look at the two examples from literature to which Professor Fish takes

exceptions. First the Allworthy example which he attacks. Here what is given is the name Allworthy. The next stage is the significance that the reader attaches to the name Allworthy, and whatever this may be (in most cases the idea that Allworthy must be a good man) will be determinate. The next 'given' may be, for instance, Blifil's piety. The link between the two factors is then indeterminate until the reader educes a determinate significance. And thus the process continues, with the reader

supplying significances which are then altered by subsequent significances that have to be produced in order to bridge the gaps between (a) given elements and (b) his previous determinate interpretations.

As for external reality, yes, it is given, and no, it is not in itself determinate. Professor Fish professes that "there is no distinction between what the text gives

and what the reader supplies; he supplies everything; the stars in a literary text are not fixed; they are just as variable as the lines that join them." [p. 7] The reader does not supply the name Allworthy. That is fixed. It is the qualities the reader attaches to the name that may vary, but so long as the reader attaches some determinate qual- ities to the name, and so long as the reader tries subsequently to link his original view of Allworthy to that gentleman's attitude towards Blifil, the distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy still holds good whether or not one agrees with my own version of interpretation of that relationship. Precisely the same argument applies to the next example of 'Arcadian Simplicity' in Vanity Fair. The term is given. The interpretation is made by the reader, and once made is determinate. Professor Fish anticipates this argument, and protests that "this assumes that the words ... are 'pointable to' apart from some or other interpretive perspective." It is here that I believe he makes a major blunder, and to clarify it I must quote a later passage:

It is at this point that Professor Fish insists that "perception itself is an act of ideation." [p. 10] He then defines ideation as the "inferring of a world from a set of assumptions (antecedently held) about what it must be like." [p. 10] I would accept his definition, but I would not accept his implication that seeing the picture and captions is ideation. I could only do so if I knew that when Professor Fish had eye trouble he went to see his psychiatrist.

The next stage of the argument poses the same problem. Professor Fish mag- nanimously agrees that reading about sunsets, wine and silk is not the same as

seeing, tasting and touching them, but he makes this concession "without agreeing that seeing, touching and tasting are natural rather than conventional activities. What can be seen will be a function of the categories of vision that already inform percep- tion, and those categories will be social and conventional and not imposed upon us by an independent world." [p. 11] I maintain that what can be seen will be there (unless the world is to be regarded as an hallucination), and it is the interpretation of what can be seen (i.e. how it is seen) that is a function of the various categories.

Before switching to the examples from literature that provide the focus for Professor Fish's objections, I must confess my bewilderment that he thinks in- terpretation a useful activity if, as he suggests, there are no givens to interpret: "... there can be no category of the 'given' if by given one means what is there before interpretation begins." [p. 11] True, there is no unmediated given, but interpretation would be useless if it were not meant to open access to something we encounter. Interpretation is always informed by a set of assumptions or conventions, but these are also acted upon by what they intend to tackle. Hence the 'something' which is to be mediated exists prior to interpretation, acts as a constraint on interpretation, has

repercussions on the anticipations operative in interpretation, and thus contributes to a hermeneutical process, the result of which is both a mediated given and a

reshuffling of the initial assumptions. Professor Fish, however, creates a new her- meneutics by fusing interpretation and that which is to be interpreted into an indis-

tinguishable whole, thus replacing the given by interpretation itself. Whenever I read Professor Fish I keep rubbing my eyes in order to make sure that I am not reading Bishop Berkeley.

Let us look at the two examples from literature to which Professor Fish takes

exceptions. First the Allworthy example which he attacks. Here what is given is the name Allworthy. The next stage is the significance that the reader attaches to the name Allworthy, and whatever this may be (in most cases the idea that Allworthy must be a good man) will be determinate. The next 'given' may be, for instance, Blifil's piety. The link between the two factors is then indeterminate until the reader educes a determinate significance. And thus the process continues, with the reader

supplying significances which are then altered by subsequent significances that have to be produced in order to bridge the gaps between (a) given elements and (b) his previous determinate interpretations.

As for external reality, yes, it is given, and no, it is not in itself determinate. Professor Fish professes that "there is no distinction between what the text gives

and what the reader supplies; he supplies everything; the stars in a literary text are not fixed; they are just as variable as the lines that join them." [p. 7] The reader does not supply the name Allworthy. That is fixed. It is the qualities the reader attaches to the name that may vary, but so long as the reader attaches some determinate qual- ities to the name, and so long as the reader tries subsequently to link his original view of Allworthy to that gentleman's attitude towards Blifil, the distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy still holds good whether or not one agrees with my own version of interpretation of that relationship. Precisely the same argument applies to the next example of 'Arcadian Simplicity' in Vanity Fair. The term is given. The interpretation is made by the reader, and once made is determinate. Professor Fish anticipates this argument, and protests that "this assumes that the words ... are 'pointable to' apart from some or other interpretive perspective." It is here that I believe he makes a major blunder, and to clarify it I must quote a later passage:

It is at this point that Professor Fish insists that "perception itself is an act of ideation." [p. 10] He then defines ideation as the "inferring of a world from a set of assumptions (antecedently held) about what it must be like." [p. 10] I would accept his definition, but I would not accept his implication that seeing the picture and captions is ideation. I could only do so if I knew that when Professor Fish had eye trouble he went to see his psychiatrist.

The next stage of the argument poses the same problem. Professor Fish mag- nanimously agrees that reading about sunsets, wine and silk is not the same as

seeing, tasting and touching them, but he makes this concession "without agreeing that seeing, touching and tasting are natural rather than conventional activities. What can be seen will be a function of the categories of vision that already inform percep- tion, and those categories will be social and conventional and not imposed upon us by an independent world." [p. 11] I maintain that what can be seen will be there (unless the world is to be regarded as an hallucination), and it is the interpretation of what can be seen (i.e. how it is seen) that is a function of the various categories.

Before switching to the examples from literature that provide the focus for Professor Fish's objections, I must confess my bewilderment that he thinks in- terpretation a useful activity if, as he suggests, there are no givens to interpret: "... there can be no category of the 'given' if by given one means what is there before interpretation begins." [p. 11] True, there is no unmediated given, but interpretation would be useless if it were not meant to open access to something we encounter. Interpretation is always informed by a set of assumptions or conventions, but these are also acted upon by what they intend to tackle. Hence the 'something' which is to be mediated exists prior to interpretation, acts as a constraint on interpretation, has

repercussions on the anticipations operative in interpretation, and thus contributes to a hermeneutical process, the result of which is both a mediated given and a

reshuffling of the initial assumptions. Professor Fish, however, creates a new her- meneutics by fusing interpretation and that which is to be interpreted into an indis-

tinguishable whole, thus replacing the given by interpretation itself. Whenever I read Professor Fish I keep rubbing my eyes in order to make sure that I am not reading Bishop Berkeley.

Let us look at the two examples from literature to which Professor Fish takes

exceptions. First the Allworthy example which he attacks. Here what is given is the name Allworthy. The next stage is the significance that the reader attaches to the name Allworthy, and whatever this may be (in most cases the idea that Allworthy must be a good man) will be determinate. The next 'given' may be, for instance, Blifil's piety. The link between the two factors is then indeterminate until the reader educes a determinate significance. And thus the process continues, with the reader

supplying significances which are then altered by subsequent significances that have to be produced in order to bridge the gaps between (a) given elements and (b) his previous determinate interpretations.

As for external reality, yes, it is given, and no, it is not in itself determinate. Professor Fish professes that "there is no distinction between what the text gives

and what the reader supplies; he supplies everything; the stars in a literary text are not fixed; they are just as variable as the lines that join them." [p. 7] The reader does not supply the name Allworthy. That is fixed. It is the qualities the reader attaches to the name that may vary, but so long as the reader attaches some determinate qual- ities to the name, and so long as the reader tries subsequently to link his original view of Allworthy to that gentleman's attitude towards Blifil, the distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy still holds good whether or not one agrees with my own version of interpretation of that relationship. Precisely the same argument applies to the next example of 'Arcadian Simplicity' in Vanity Fair. The term is given. The interpretation is made by the reader, and once made is determinate. Professor Fish anticipates this argument, and protests that "this assumes that the words ... are 'pointable to' apart from some or other interpretive perspective." It is here that I believe he makes a major blunder, and to clarify it I must quote a later passage:

It is at this point that Professor Fish insists that "perception itself is an act of ideation." [p. 10] He then defines ideation as the "inferring of a world from a set of assumptions (antecedently held) about what it must be like." [p. 10] I would accept his definition, but I would not accept his implication that seeing the picture and captions is ideation. I could only do so if I knew that when Professor Fish had eye trouble he went to see his psychiatrist.

The next stage of the argument poses the same problem. Professor Fish mag- nanimously agrees that reading about sunsets, wine and silk is not the same as

seeing, tasting and touching them, but he makes this concession "without agreeing that seeing, touching and tasting are natural rather than conventional activities. What can be seen will be a function of the categories of vision that already inform percep- tion, and those categories will be social and conventional and not imposed upon us by an independent world." [p. 11] I maintain that what can be seen will be there (unless the world is to be regarded as an hallucination), and it is the interpretation of what can be seen (i.e. how it is seen) that is a function of the various categories.

Before switching to the examples from literature that provide the focus for Professor Fish's objections, I must confess my bewilderment that he thinks in- terpretation a useful activity if, as he suggests, there are no givens to interpret: "... there can be no category of the 'given' if by given one means what is there before interpretation begins." [p. 11] True, there is no unmediated given, but interpretation would be useless if it were not meant to open access to something we encounter. Interpretation is always informed by a set of assumptions or conventions, but these are also acted upon by what they intend to tackle. Hence the 'something' which is to be mediated exists prior to interpretation, acts as a constraint on interpretation, has

repercussions on the anticipations operative in interpretation, and thus contributes to a hermeneutical process, the result of which is both a mediated given and a

reshuffling of the initial assumptions. Professor Fish, however, creates a new her- meneutics by fusing interpretation and that which is to be interpreted into an indis-

tinguishable whole, thus replacing the given by interpretation itself. Whenever I read Professor Fish I keep rubbing my eyes in order to make sure that I am not reading Bishop Berkeley.

Let us look at the two examples from literature to which Professor Fish takes

exceptions. First the Allworthy example which he attacks. Here what is given is the name Allworthy. The next stage is the significance that the reader attaches to the name Allworthy, and whatever this may be (in most cases the idea that Allworthy must be a good man) will be determinate. The next 'given' may be, for instance, Blifil's piety. The link between the two factors is then indeterminate until the reader educes a determinate significance. And thus the process continues, with the reader

supplying significances which are then altered by subsequent significances that have to be produced in order to bridge the gaps between (a) given elements and (b) his previous determinate interpretations.

As for external reality, yes, it is given, and no, it is not in itself determinate. Professor Fish professes that "there is no distinction between what the text gives

and what the reader supplies; he supplies everything; the stars in a literary text are not fixed; they are just as variable as the lines that join them." [p. 7] The reader does not supply the name Allworthy. That is fixed. It is the qualities the reader attaches to the name that may vary, but so long as the reader attaches some determinate qual- ities to the name, and so long as the reader tries subsequently to link his original view of Allworthy to that gentleman's attitude towards Blifil, the distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy still holds good whether or not one agrees with my own version of interpretation of that relationship. Precisely the same argument applies to the next example of 'Arcadian Simplicity' in Vanity Fair. The term is given. The interpretation is made by the reader, and once made is determinate. Professor Fish anticipates this argument, and protests that "this assumes that the words ... are 'pointable to' apart from some or other interpretive perspective." It is here that I believe he makes a major blunder, and to clarify it I must quote a later passage:

It is at this point that Professor Fish insists that "perception itself is an act of ideation." [p. 10] He then defines ideation as the "inferring of a world from a set of assumptions (antecedently held) about what it must be like." [p. 10] I would accept his definition, but I would not accept his implication that seeing the picture and captions is ideation. I could only do so if I knew that when Professor Fish had eye trouble he went to see his psychiatrist.

The next stage of the argument poses the same problem. Professor Fish mag- nanimously agrees that reading about sunsets, wine and silk is not the same as

seeing, tasting and touching them, but he makes this concession "without agreeing that seeing, touching and tasting are natural rather than conventional activities. What can be seen will be a function of the categories of vision that already inform percep- tion, and those categories will be social and conventional and not imposed upon us by an independent world." [p. 11] I maintain that what can be seen will be there (unless the world is to be regarded as an hallucination), and it is the interpretation of what can be seen (i.e. how it is seen) that is a function of the various categories.

Before switching to the examples from literature that provide the focus for Professor Fish's objections, I must confess my bewilderment that he thinks in- terpretation a useful activity if, as he suggests, there are no givens to interpret: "... there can be no category of the 'given' if by given one means what is there before interpretation begins." [p. 11] True, there is no unmediated given, but interpretation would be useless if it were not meant to open access to something we encounter. Interpretation is always informed by a set of assumptions or conventions, but these are also acted upon by what they intend to tackle. Hence the 'something' which is to be mediated exists prior to interpretation, acts as a constraint on interpretation, has

repercussions on the anticipations operative in interpretation, and thus contributes to a hermeneutical process, the result of which is both a mediated given and a

reshuffling of the initial assumptions. Professor Fish, however, creates a new her- meneutics by fusing interpretation and that which is to be interpreted into an indis-

tinguishable whole, thus replacing the given by interpretation itself. Whenever I read Professor Fish I keep rubbing my eyes in order to make sure that I am not reading Bishop Berkeley.

Let us look at the two examples from literature to which Professor Fish takes

exceptions. First the Allworthy example which he attacks. Here what is given is the name Allworthy. The next stage is the significance that the reader attaches to the name Allworthy, and whatever this may be (in most cases the idea that Allworthy must be a good man) will be determinate. The next 'given' may be, for instance, Blifil's piety. The link between the two factors is then indeterminate until the reader educes a determinate significance. And thus the process continues, with the reader

supplying significances which are then altered by subsequent significances that have to be produced in order to bridge the gaps between (a) given elements and (b) his previous determinate interpretations.

As for external reality, yes, it is given, and no, it is not in itself determinate. Professor Fish professes that "there is no distinction between what the text gives

and what the reader supplies; he supplies everything; the stars in a literary text are not fixed; they are just as variable as the lines that join them." [p. 7] The reader does not supply the name Allworthy. That is fixed. It is the qualities the reader attaches to the name that may vary, but so long as the reader attaches some determinate qual- ities to the name, and so long as the reader tries subsequently to link his original view of Allworthy to that gentleman's attitude towards Blifil, the distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy still holds good whether or not one agrees with my own version of interpretation of that relationship. Precisely the same argument applies to the next example of 'Arcadian Simplicity' in Vanity Fair. The term is given. The interpretation is made by the reader, and once made is determinate. Professor Fish anticipates this argument, and protests that "this assumes that the words ... are 'pointable to' apart from some or other interpretive perspective." It is here that I believe he makes a major blunder, and to clarify it I must quote a later passage:

It is at this point that Professor Fish insists that "perception itself is an act of ideation." [p. 10] He then defines ideation as the "inferring of a world from a set of assumptions (antecedently held) about what it must be like." [p. 10] I would accept his definition, but I would not accept his implication that seeing the picture and captions is ideation. I could only do so if I knew that when Professor Fish had eye trouble he went to see his psychiatrist.

The next stage of the argument poses the same problem. Professor Fish mag- nanimously agrees that reading about sunsets, wine and silk is not the same as

seeing, tasting and touching them, but he makes this concession "without agreeing that seeing, touching and tasting are natural rather than conventional activities. What can be seen will be a function of the categories of vision that already inform percep- tion, and those categories will be social and conventional and not imposed upon us by an independent world." [p. 11] I maintain that what can be seen will be there (unless the world is to be regarded as an hallucination), and it is the interpretation of what can be seen (i.e. how it is seen) that is a function of the various categories.

Before switching to the examples from literature that provide the focus for Professor Fish's objections, I must confess my bewilderment that he thinks in- terpretation a useful activity if, as he suggests, there are no givens to interpret: "... there can be no category of the 'given' if by given one means what is there before interpretation begins." [p. 11] True, there is no unmediated given, but interpretation would be useless if it were not meant to open access to something we encounter. Interpretation is always informed by a set of assumptions or conventions, but these are also acted upon by what they intend to tackle. Hence the 'something' which is to be mediated exists prior to interpretation, acts as a constraint on interpretation, has

repercussions on the anticipations operative in interpretation, and thus contributes to a hermeneutical process, the result of which is both a mediated given and a

reshuffling of the initial assumptions. Professor Fish, however, creates a new her- meneutics by fusing interpretation and that which is to be interpreted into an indis-

tinguishable whole, thus replacing the given by interpretation itself. Whenever I read Professor Fish I keep rubbing my eyes in order to make sure that I am not reading Bishop Berkeley.

Let us look at the two examples from literature to which Professor Fish takes

exceptions. First the Allworthy example which he attacks. Here what is given is the name Allworthy. The next stage is the significance that the reader attaches to the name Allworthy, and whatever this may be (in most cases the idea that Allworthy must be a good man) will be determinate. The next 'given' may be, for instance, Blifil's piety. The link between the two factors is then indeterminate until the reader educes a determinate significance. And thus the process continues, with the reader

supplying significances which are then altered by subsequent significances that have to be produced in order to bridge the gaps between (a) given elements and (b) his previous determinate interpretations.

As for external reality, yes, it is given, and no, it is not in itself determinate. Professor Fish professes that "there is no distinction between what the text gives

and what the reader supplies; he supplies everything; the stars in a literary text are not fixed; they are just as variable as the lines that join them." [p. 7] The reader does not supply the name Allworthy. That is fixed. It is the qualities the reader attaches to the name that may vary, but so long as the reader attaches some determinate qual- ities to the name, and so long as the reader tries subsequently to link his original view of Allworthy to that gentleman's attitude towards Blifil, the distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy still holds good whether or not one agrees with my own version of interpretation of that relationship. Precisely the same argument applies to the next example of 'Arcadian Simplicity' in Vanity Fair. The term is given. The interpretation is made by the reader, and once made is determinate. Professor Fish anticipates this argument, and protests that "this assumes that the words ... are 'pointable to' apart from some or other interpretive perspective." It is here that I believe he makes a major blunder, and to clarify it I must quote a later passage:

84 84 84 84 84 84 84

Iser says "we must distinguish between perception and ideation as two different means of access to the world" [2371 But ... that is precisely the distinction we cannot make because perception itself is an act of ide- ation. [p. 10]

This is like saying that because a man cannot help blinking when punched in the eye, it is impossible to distinguish between blinking and being punched. Of course it is impossible to perceive without ideating, but they are different activities. The words 'Arcadian Simplicity' are indeed pointable to - they are given. The moment I see them, I will supply them with a determinate significance, but this does not alter the fact that the term itself was given before I interpreted it.

This technique of distortion is made even clearer by the next stage of the "assault": he correctly refers to my theory that "the world itself is 'given' in a way that the world of literary (read fictional) works are not." However,

It is only if the world - or 'reality' - is itself a determinate object, an object without gaps that can be grasped immediately, an object that can be per- ceived rather than read, that indeterminacy can be specified as a special feature of literary experience. [p. 12]

Once again Professor Fish pretends that I use 'given' and 'determinate' synony- mously, but nowhere have I claimed this, nor have I claimed that indeterminacy is specific to literary experience and excluded from 'real' experience. I claim only that the world arising from the literary text (apart from the printed pages as a physical object) is accessible to the imagination but not the senses, whereas the outside world exists independently of the imagination, even though in perceiving it we cannot avoid also imagining it.

What follows is a list of assumptions attributed to me. They contain their fair share of distortions and I will comment on them individually:

(i) The assumption "that looking at real objects is different from imagining objects in a poem or novel." [p. 8] Yes, it is.

(ii) The assumption "that in the one activity the viewer simply and passively takes in an already formed reality, while in the other he must participate in the construc- tion of a reality." [p. 8] I do not suggest that the viewer "simply and passively" takes in an "already formed reality." I merely claim that that reality exists outside himself. It is 'given', though he himself must endow it with its determinacy. The reality of the novel as a created world is not 'given'.

(iii) The assumption "that knowledge of real people is more direct and immediate than knowledge of characters or lyric speakers." [p. 8] I am suspicious of the word "knowledge," but I would subscribe to the view that communication with real people is more direct and immediate than communi- cation with fictional characters.

(iv) The assumption that "these two kinds of experience come to us in two kinds of language, one that requires only that we check its structure against the already constituted structure it reproduces or describes, and the other that requires us to produce the objects, events and persons to which ... it refers." [p. 8] "Only that we check .. ." - the exclusivity is Professor Fish's invention, not mine, and check in order to do what? My argument is that the literary description has no reference outside itself, whereas the documentary description has. This does not mean that the documentary description can be absolutely verified - it merely means that its reality is referable. 'Already constituted structure' is another piece of word juggling, since I am sure Professor Fish would include interpretation as part of the constitution, whereas I do not. There follows Fish's recurring non sequitur:

Iser says "we must distinguish between perception and ideation as two different means of access to the world" [2371 But ... that is precisely the distinction we cannot make because perception itself is an act of ide- ation. [p. 10]

This is like saying that because a man cannot help blinking when punched in the eye, it is impossible to distinguish between blinking and being punched. Of course it is impossible to perceive without ideating, but they are different activities. The words 'Arcadian Simplicity' are indeed pointable to - they are given. The moment I see them, I will supply them with a determinate significance, but this does not alter the fact that the term itself was given before I interpreted it.

This technique of distortion is made even clearer by the next stage of the "assault": he correctly refers to my theory that "the world itself is 'given' in a way that the world of literary (read fictional) works are not." However,

It is only if the world - or 'reality' - is itself a determinate object, an object without gaps that can be grasped immediately, an object that can be per- ceived rather than read, that indeterminacy can be specified as a special feature of literary experience. [p. 12]

Once again Professor Fish pretends that I use 'given' and 'determinate' synony- mously, but nowhere have I claimed this, nor have I claimed that indeterminacy is specific to literary experience and excluded from 'real' experience. I claim only that the world arising from the literary text (apart from the printed pages as a physical object) is accessible to the imagination but not the senses, whereas the outside world exists independently of the imagination, even though in perceiving it we cannot avoid also imagining it.

What follows is a list of assumptions attributed to me. They contain their fair share of distortions and I will comment on them individually:

(i) The assumption "that looking at real objects is different from imagining objects in a poem or novel." [p. 8] Yes, it is.

(ii) The assumption "that in the one activity the viewer simply and passively takes in an already formed reality, while in the other he must participate in the construc- tion of a reality." [p. 8] I do not suggest that the viewer "simply and passively" takes in an "already formed reality." I merely claim that that reality exists outside himself. It is 'given', though he himself must endow it with its determinacy. The reality of the novel as a created world is not 'given'.

(iii) The assumption "that knowledge of real people is more direct and immediate than knowledge of characters or lyric speakers." [p. 8] I am suspicious of the word "knowledge," but I would subscribe to the view that communication with real people is more direct and immediate than communi- cation with fictional characters.

(iv) The assumption that "these two kinds of experience come to us in two kinds of language, one that requires only that we check its structure against the already constituted structure it reproduces or describes, and the other that requires us to produce the objects, events and persons to which ... it refers." [p. 8] "Only that we check .. ." - the exclusivity is Professor Fish's invention, not mine, and check in order to do what? My argument is that the literary description has no reference outside itself, whereas the documentary description has. This does not mean that the documentary description can be absolutely verified - it merely means that its reality is referable. 'Already constituted structure' is another piece of word juggling, since I am sure Professor Fish would include interpretation as part of the constitution, whereas I do not. There follows Fish's recurring non sequitur:

Iser says "we must distinguish between perception and ideation as two different means of access to the world" [2371 But ... that is precisely the distinction we cannot make because perception itself is an act of ide- ation. [p. 10]

This is like saying that because a man cannot help blinking when punched in the eye, it is impossible to distinguish between blinking and being punched. Of course it is impossible to perceive without ideating, but they are different activities. The words 'Arcadian Simplicity' are indeed pointable to - they are given. The moment I see them, I will supply them with a determinate significance, but this does not alter the fact that the term itself was given before I interpreted it.

This technique of distortion is made even clearer by the next stage of the "assault": he correctly refers to my theory that "the world itself is 'given' in a way that the world of literary (read fictional) works are not." However,

It is only if the world - or 'reality' - is itself a determinate object, an object without gaps that can be grasped immediately, an object that can be per- ceived rather than read, that indeterminacy can be specified as a special feature of literary experience. [p. 12]

Once again Professor Fish pretends that I use 'given' and 'determinate' synony- mously, but nowhere have I claimed this, nor have I claimed that indeterminacy is specific to literary experience and excluded from 'real' experience. I claim only that the world arising from the literary text (apart from the printed pages as a physical object) is accessible to the imagination but not the senses, whereas the outside world exists independently of the imagination, even though in perceiving it we cannot avoid also imagining it.

What follows is a list of assumptions attributed to me. They contain their fair share of distortions and I will comment on them individually:

(i) The assumption "that looking at real objects is different from imagining objects in a poem or novel." [p. 8] Yes, it is.

(ii) The assumption "that in the one activity the viewer simply and passively takes in an already formed reality, while in the other he must participate in the construc- tion of a reality." [p. 8] I do not suggest that the viewer "simply and passively" takes in an "already formed reality." I merely claim that that reality exists outside himself. It is 'given', though he himself must endow it with its determinacy. The reality of the novel as a created world is not 'given'.

(iii) The assumption "that knowledge of real people is more direct and immediate than knowledge of characters or lyric speakers." [p. 8] I am suspicious of the word "knowledge," but I would subscribe to the view that communication with real people is more direct and immediate than communi- cation with fictional characters.

(iv) The assumption that "these two kinds of experience come to us in two kinds of language, one that requires only that we check its structure against the already constituted structure it reproduces or describes, and the other that requires us to produce the objects, events and persons to which ... it refers." [p. 8] "Only that we check .. ." - the exclusivity is Professor Fish's invention, not mine, and check in order to do what? My argument is that the literary description has no reference outside itself, whereas the documentary description has. This does not mean that the documentary description can be absolutely verified - it merely means that its reality is referable. 'Already constituted structure' is another piece of word juggling, since I am sure Professor Fish would include interpretation as part of the constitution, whereas I do not. There follows Fish's recurring non sequitur:

Iser says "we must distinguish between perception and ideation as two different means of access to the world" [2371 But ... that is precisely the distinction we cannot make because perception itself is an act of ide- ation. [p. 10]

This is like saying that because a man cannot help blinking when punched in the eye, it is impossible to distinguish between blinking and being punched. Of course it is impossible to perceive without ideating, but they are different activities. The words 'Arcadian Simplicity' are indeed pointable to - they are given. The moment I see them, I will supply them with a determinate significance, but this does not alter the fact that the term itself was given before I interpreted it.

This technique of distortion is made even clearer by the next stage of the "assault": he correctly refers to my theory that "the world itself is 'given' in a way that the world of literary (read fictional) works are not." However,

It is only if the world - or 'reality' - is itself a determinate object, an object without gaps that can be grasped immediately, an object that can be per- ceived rather than read, that indeterminacy can be specified as a special feature of literary experience. [p. 12]

Once again Professor Fish pretends that I use 'given' and 'determinate' synony- mously, but nowhere have I claimed this, nor have I claimed that indeterminacy is specific to literary experience and excluded from 'real' experience. I claim only that the world arising from the literary text (apart from the printed pages as a physical object) is accessible to the imagination but not the senses, whereas the outside world exists independently of the imagination, even though in perceiving it we cannot avoid also imagining it.

What follows is a list of assumptions attributed to me. They contain their fair share of distortions and I will comment on them individually:

(i) The assumption "that looking at real objects is different from imagining objects in a poem or novel." [p. 8] Yes, it is.

(ii) The assumption "that in the one activity the viewer simply and passively takes in an already formed reality, while in the other he must participate in the construc- tion of a reality." [p. 8] I do not suggest that the viewer "simply and passively" takes in an "already formed reality." I merely claim that that reality exists outside himself. It is 'given', though he himself must endow it with its determinacy. The reality of the novel as a created world is not 'given'.

(iii) The assumption "that knowledge of real people is more direct and immediate than knowledge of characters or lyric speakers." [p. 8] I am suspicious of the word "knowledge," but I would subscribe to the view that communication with real people is more direct and immediate than communi- cation with fictional characters.

(iv) The assumption that "these two kinds of experience come to us in two kinds of language, one that requires only that we check its structure against the already constituted structure it reproduces or describes, and the other that requires us to produce the objects, events and persons to which ... it refers." [p. 8] "Only that we check .. ." - the exclusivity is Professor Fish's invention, not mine, and check in order to do what? My argument is that the literary description has no reference outside itself, whereas the documentary description has. This does not mean that the documentary description can be absolutely verified - it merely means that its reality is referable. 'Already constituted structure' is another piece of word juggling, since I am sure Professor Fish would include interpretation as part of the constitution, whereas I do not. There follows Fish's recurring non sequitur:

Iser says "we must distinguish between perception and ideation as two different means of access to the world" [2371 But ... that is precisely the distinction we cannot make because perception itself is an act of ide- ation. [p. 10]

This is like saying that because a man cannot help blinking when punched in the eye, it is impossible to distinguish between blinking and being punched. Of course it is impossible to perceive without ideating, but they are different activities. The words 'Arcadian Simplicity' are indeed pointable to - they are given. The moment I see them, I will supply them with a determinate significance, but this does not alter the fact that the term itself was given before I interpreted it.

This technique of distortion is made even clearer by the next stage of the "assault": he correctly refers to my theory that "the world itself is 'given' in a way that the world of literary (read fictional) works are not." However,

It is only if the world - or 'reality' - is itself a determinate object, an object without gaps that can be grasped immediately, an object that can be per- ceived rather than read, that indeterminacy can be specified as a special feature of literary experience. [p. 12]

Once again Professor Fish pretends that I use 'given' and 'determinate' synony- mously, but nowhere have I claimed this, nor have I claimed that indeterminacy is specific to literary experience and excluded from 'real' experience. I claim only that the world arising from the literary text (apart from the printed pages as a physical object) is accessible to the imagination but not the senses, whereas the outside world exists independently of the imagination, even though in perceiving it we cannot avoid also imagining it.

What follows is a list of assumptions attributed to me. They contain their fair share of distortions and I will comment on them individually:

(i) The assumption "that looking at real objects is different from imagining objects in a poem or novel." [p. 8] Yes, it is.

(ii) The assumption "that in the one activity the viewer simply and passively takes in an already formed reality, while in the other he must participate in the construc- tion of a reality." [p. 8] I do not suggest that the viewer "simply and passively" takes in an "already formed reality." I merely claim that that reality exists outside himself. It is 'given', though he himself must endow it with its determinacy. The reality of the novel as a created world is not 'given'.

(iii) The assumption "that knowledge of real people is more direct and immediate than knowledge of characters or lyric speakers." [p. 8] I am suspicious of the word "knowledge," but I would subscribe to the view that communication with real people is more direct and immediate than communi- cation with fictional characters.

(iv) The assumption that "these two kinds of experience come to us in two kinds of language, one that requires only that we check its structure against the already constituted structure it reproduces or describes, and the other that requires us to produce the objects, events and persons to which ... it refers." [p. 8] "Only that we check .. ." - the exclusivity is Professor Fish's invention, not mine, and check in order to do what? My argument is that the literary description has no reference outside itself, whereas the documentary description has. This does not mean that the documentary description can be absolutely verified - it merely means that its reality is referable. 'Already constituted structure' is another piece of word juggling, since I am sure Professor Fish would include interpretation as part of the constitution, whereas I do not. There follows Fish's recurring non sequitur:

Iser says "we must distinguish between perception and ideation as two different means of access to the world" [2371 But ... that is precisely the distinction we cannot make because perception itself is an act of ide- ation. [p. 10]

This is like saying that because a man cannot help blinking when punched in the eye, it is impossible to distinguish between blinking and being punched. Of course it is impossible to perceive without ideating, but they are different activities. The words 'Arcadian Simplicity' are indeed pointable to - they are given. The moment I see them, I will supply them with a determinate significance, but this does not alter the fact that the term itself was given before I interpreted it.

This technique of distortion is made even clearer by the next stage of the "assault": he correctly refers to my theory that "the world itself is 'given' in a way that the world of literary (read fictional) works are not." However,

It is only if the world - or 'reality' - is itself a determinate object, an object without gaps that can be grasped immediately, an object that can be per- ceived rather than read, that indeterminacy can be specified as a special feature of literary experience. [p. 12]

Once again Professor Fish pretends that I use 'given' and 'determinate' synony- mously, but nowhere have I claimed this, nor have I claimed that indeterminacy is specific to literary experience and excluded from 'real' experience. I claim only that the world arising from the literary text (apart from the printed pages as a physical object) is accessible to the imagination but not the senses, whereas the outside world exists independently of the imagination, even though in perceiving it we cannot avoid also imagining it.

What follows is a list of assumptions attributed to me. They contain their fair share of distortions and I will comment on them individually:

(i) The assumption "that looking at real objects is different from imagining objects in a poem or novel." [p. 8] Yes, it is.

(ii) The assumption "that in the one activity the viewer simply and passively takes in an already formed reality, while in the other he must participate in the construc- tion of a reality." [p. 8] I do not suggest that the viewer "simply and passively" takes in an "already formed reality." I merely claim that that reality exists outside himself. It is 'given', though he himself must endow it with its determinacy. The reality of the novel as a created world is not 'given'.

(iii) The assumption "that knowledge of real people is more direct and immediate than knowledge of characters or lyric speakers." [p. 8] I am suspicious of the word "knowledge," but I would subscribe to the view that communication with real people is more direct and immediate than communi- cation with fictional characters.

(iv) The assumption that "these two kinds of experience come to us in two kinds of language, one that requires only that we check its structure against the already constituted structure it reproduces or describes, and the other that requires us to produce the objects, events and persons to which ... it refers." [p. 8] "Only that we check .. ." - the exclusivity is Professor Fish's invention, not mine, and check in order to do what? My argument is that the literary description has no reference outside itself, whereas the documentary description has. This does not mean that the documentary description can be absolutely verified - it merely means that its reality is referable. 'Already constituted structure' is another piece of word juggling, since I am sure Professor Fish would include interpretation as part of the constitution, whereas I do not. There follows Fish's recurring non sequitur:

Iser says "we must distinguish between perception and ideation as two different means of access to the world" [2371 But ... that is precisely the distinction we cannot make because perception itself is an act of ide- ation. [p. 10]

This is like saying that because a man cannot help blinking when punched in the eye, it is impossible to distinguish between blinking and being punched. Of course it is impossible to perceive without ideating, but they are different activities. The words 'Arcadian Simplicity' are indeed pointable to - they are given. The moment I see them, I will supply them with a determinate significance, but this does not alter the fact that the term itself was given before I interpreted it.

This technique of distortion is made even clearer by the next stage of the "assault": he correctly refers to my theory that "the world itself is 'given' in a way that the world of literary (read fictional) works are not." However,

It is only if the world - or 'reality' - is itself a determinate object, an object without gaps that can be grasped immediately, an object that can be per- ceived rather than read, that indeterminacy can be specified as a special feature of literary experience. [p. 12]

Once again Professor Fish pretends that I use 'given' and 'determinate' synony- mously, but nowhere have I claimed this, nor have I claimed that indeterminacy is specific to literary experience and excluded from 'real' experience. I claim only that the world arising from the literary text (apart from the printed pages as a physical object) is accessible to the imagination but not the senses, whereas the outside world exists independently of the imagination, even though in perceiving it we cannot avoid also imagining it.

What follows is a list of assumptions attributed to me. They contain their fair share of distortions and I will comment on them individually:

(i) The assumption "that looking at real objects is different from imagining objects in a poem or novel." [p. 8] Yes, it is.

(ii) The assumption "that in the one activity the viewer simply and passively takes in an already formed reality, while in the other he must participate in the construc- tion of a reality." [p. 8] I do not suggest that the viewer "simply and passively" takes in an "already formed reality." I merely claim that that reality exists outside himself. It is 'given', though he himself must endow it with its determinacy. The reality of the novel as a created world is not 'given'.

(iii) The assumption "that knowledge of real people is more direct and immediate than knowledge of characters or lyric speakers." [p. 8] I am suspicious of the word "knowledge," but I would subscribe to the view that communication with real people is more direct and immediate than communi- cation with fictional characters.

(iv) The assumption that "these two kinds of experience come to us in two kinds of language, one that requires only that we check its structure against the already constituted structure it reproduces or describes, and the other that requires us to produce the objects, events and persons to which ... it refers." [p. 8] "Only that we check .. ." - the exclusivity is Professor Fish's invention, not mine, and check in order to do what? My argument is that the literary description has no reference outside itself, whereas the documentary description has. This does not mean that the documentary description can be absolutely verified - it merely means that its reality is referable. 'Already constituted structure' is another piece of word juggling, since I am sure Professor Fish would include interpretation as part of the constitution, whereas I do not. There follows Fish's recurring non sequitur:

diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 a85 a85 a85 a85 a85 a85 a85

Underlying these assumptions, of course, is the familiar distinction between the determinate or given and the indeterminate or supplied ...

(Here, of course, I reject totally the synonymity Professor Fish imposes on the terms.)

. .. and they fall by the same reasoning which makes that distinction finally untenable: what must be supplied in literary experience must also be supplied in the 'real life' experience to which it is, point for point, op- posed. [p. 8]

It appears that there is no difference between the determinate and the indeter- minate, because there is a parallel between the literary and the real experience. Perhaps diacritics readers can make more sense of this than I can, but the non- argument certainly raises points worth pursuing. I have never claimed that the two experiences are "point for point" opposed, and indeed the parallel between the two experiences is one I have acknowledged time and time again as far as the process of interpretation is concerned: the reader or observer tries to make something deter- minate out of something indeterminate. The distinction stands.

The argument continues with what seems to me a remarkable denial of subjec- tivism in reading:

What I have been saying is that there is no subjectivist element of reading, because the observer is never individual in the sense of unique or private, but is always the product of the categories of understanding that are his by virtue of his membership in a community of interpretation. [p. 11]

^[ ̂ ^ ̂

.... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -: E :- j E i: 4i..; :R g -.: ..... '::........ :.::' -:: ;: :a >;:

S$AIN-PIERRE EET 'M!QJf;!ON 7

It is quite true that membership of the community helps to prevent arbitrary ide- ation, but if there is no subjectivist element in reading, how on earth does Professor Fish account for different interpretations of one and the same text? (The answer to that question is that he doesn't.)

Earlier I concluded that the distinction between what is given and what is supplied won't hold up because everything is supplied, both the determi- nate and indeterminate poles of the 'aesthetic object'. ..

(I am delighted to see that Professor Fish now draws a distinction between determi- nacy and indeterminacy.)

... now I am arguing that the same distinction won't hold because every- thing is given. There is no paradox here. [p. 11]

Underlying these assumptions, of course, is the familiar distinction between the determinate or given and the indeterminate or supplied ...

(Here, of course, I reject totally the synonymity Professor Fish imposes on the terms.)

. .. and they fall by the same reasoning which makes that distinction finally untenable: what must be supplied in literary experience must also be supplied in the 'real life' experience to which it is, point for point, op- posed. [p. 8]

It appears that there is no difference between the determinate and the indeter- minate, because there is a parallel between the literary and the real experience. Perhaps diacritics readers can make more sense of this than I can, but the non- argument certainly raises points worth pursuing. I have never claimed that the two experiences are "point for point" opposed, and indeed the parallel between the two experiences is one I have acknowledged time and time again as far as the process of interpretation is concerned: the reader or observer tries to make something deter- minate out of something indeterminate. The distinction stands.

The argument continues with what seems to me a remarkable denial of subjec- tivism in reading:

What I have been saying is that there is no subjectivist element of reading, because the observer is never individual in the sense of unique or private, but is always the product of the categories of understanding that are his by virtue of his membership in a community of interpretation. [p. 11]

^[ ̂ ^ ̂

.... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -: E :- j E i: 4i..; :R g -.: ..... '::........ :.::' -:: ;: :a >;:

S$AIN-PIERRE EET 'M!QJf;!ON 7

It is quite true that membership of the community helps to prevent arbitrary ide- ation, but if there is no subjectivist element in reading, how on earth does Professor Fish account for different interpretations of one and the same text? (The answer to that question is that he doesn't.)

Earlier I concluded that the distinction between what is given and what is supplied won't hold up because everything is supplied, both the determi- nate and indeterminate poles of the 'aesthetic object'. ..

(I am delighted to see that Professor Fish now draws a distinction between determi- nacy and indeterminacy.)

... now I am arguing that the same distinction won't hold because every- thing is given. There is no paradox here. [p. 11]

Underlying these assumptions, of course, is the familiar distinction between the determinate or given and the indeterminate or supplied ...

(Here, of course, I reject totally the synonymity Professor Fish imposes on the terms.)

. .. and they fall by the same reasoning which makes that distinction finally untenable: what must be supplied in literary experience must also be supplied in the 'real life' experience to which it is, point for point, op- posed. [p. 8]

It appears that there is no difference between the determinate and the indeter- minate, because there is a parallel between the literary and the real experience. Perhaps diacritics readers can make more sense of this than I can, but the non- argument certainly raises points worth pursuing. I have never claimed that the two experiences are "point for point" opposed, and indeed the parallel between the two experiences is one I have acknowledged time and time again as far as the process of interpretation is concerned: the reader or observer tries to make something deter- minate out of something indeterminate. The distinction stands.

The argument continues with what seems to me a remarkable denial of subjec- tivism in reading:

What I have been saying is that there is no subjectivist element of reading, because the observer is never individual in the sense of unique or private, but is always the product of the categories of understanding that are his by virtue of his membership in a community of interpretation. [p. 11]

^[ ̂ ^ ̂

.... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -: E :- j E i: 4i..; :R g -.: ..... '::........ :.::' -:: ;: :a >;:

S$AIN-PIERRE EET 'M!QJf;!ON 7

It is quite true that membership of the community helps to prevent arbitrary ide- ation, but if there is no subjectivist element in reading, how on earth does Professor Fish account for different interpretations of one and the same text? (The answer to that question is that he doesn't.)

Earlier I concluded that the distinction between what is given and what is supplied won't hold up because everything is supplied, both the determi- nate and indeterminate poles of the 'aesthetic object'. ..

(I am delighted to see that Professor Fish now draws a distinction between determi- nacy and indeterminacy.)

... now I am arguing that the same distinction won't hold because every- thing is given. There is no paradox here. [p. 11]

Underlying these assumptions, of course, is the familiar distinction between the determinate or given and the indeterminate or supplied ...

(Here, of course, I reject totally the synonymity Professor Fish imposes on the terms.)

. .. and they fall by the same reasoning which makes that distinction finally untenable: what must be supplied in literary experience must also be supplied in the 'real life' experience to which it is, point for point, op- posed. [p. 8]

It appears that there is no difference between the determinate and the indeter- minate, because there is a parallel between the literary and the real experience. Perhaps diacritics readers can make more sense of this than I can, but the non- argument certainly raises points worth pursuing. I have never claimed that the two experiences are "point for point" opposed, and indeed the parallel between the two experiences is one I have acknowledged time and time again as far as the process of interpretation is concerned: the reader or observer tries to make something deter- minate out of something indeterminate. The distinction stands.

The argument continues with what seems to me a remarkable denial of subjec- tivism in reading:

What I have been saying is that there is no subjectivist element of reading, because the observer is never individual in the sense of unique or private, but is always the product of the categories of understanding that are his by virtue of his membership in a community of interpretation. [p. 11]

^[ ̂ ^ ̂

.... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -: E :- j E i: 4i..; :R g -.: ..... '::........ :.::' -:: ;: :a >;:

S$AIN-PIERRE EET 'M!QJf;!ON 7

It is quite true that membership of the community helps to prevent arbitrary ide- ation, but if there is no subjectivist element in reading, how on earth does Professor Fish account for different interpretations of one and the same text? (The answer to that question is that he doesn't.)

Earlier I concluded that the distinction between what is given and what is supplied won't hold up because everything is supplied, both the determi- nate and indeterminate poles of the 'aesthetic object'. ..

(I am delighted to see that Professor Fish now draws a distinction between determi- nacy and indeterminacy.)

... now I am arguing that the same distinction won't hold because every- thing is given. There is no paradox here. [p. 11]

Underlying these assumptions, of course, is the familiar distinction between the determinate or given and the indeterminate or supplied ...

(Here, of course, I reject totally the synonymity Professor Fish imposes on the terms.)

. .. and they fall by the same reasoning which makes that distinction finally untenable: what must be supplied in literary experience must also be supplied in the 'real life' experience to which it is, point for point, op- posed. [p. 8]

It appears that there is no difference between the determinate and the indeter- minate, because there is a parallel between the literary and the real experience. Perhaps diacritics readers can make more sense of this than I can, but the non- argument certainly raises points worth pursuing. I have never claimed that the two experiences are "point for point" opposed, and indeed the parallel between the two experiences is one I have acknowledged time and time again as far as the process of interpretation is concerned: the reader or observer tries to make something deter- minate out of something indeterminate. The distinction stands.

The argument continues with what seems to me a remarkable denial of subjec- tivism in reading:

What I have been saying is that there is no subjectivist element of reading, because the observer is never individual in the sense of unique or private, but is always the product of the categories of understanding that are his by virtue of his membership in a community of interpretation. [p. 11]

^[ ̂ ^ ̂

.... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -: E :- j E i: 4i..; :R g -.: ..... '::........ :.::' -:: ;: :a >;:

S$AIN-PIERRE EET 'M!QJf;!ON 7

It is quite true that membership of the community helps to prevent arbitrary ide- ation, but if there is no subjectivist element in reading, how on earth does Professor Fish account for different interpretations of one and the same text? (The answer to that question is that he doesn't.)

Earlier I concluded that the distinction between what is given and what is supplied won't hold up because everything is supplied, both the determi- nate and indeterminate poles of the 'aesthetic object'. ..

(I am delighted to see that Professor Fish now draws a distinction between determi- nacy and indeterminacy.)

... now I am arguing that the same distinction won't hold because every- thing is given. There is no paradox here. [p. 11]

Underlying these assumptions, of course, is the familiar distinction between the determinate or given and the indeterminate or supplied ...

(Here, of course, I reject totally the synonymity Professor Fish imposes on the terms.)

. .. and they fall by the same reasoning which makes that distinction finally untenable: what must be supplied in literary experience must also be supplied in the 'real life' experience to which it is, point for point, op- posed. [p. 8]

It appears that there is no difference between the determinate and the indeter- minate, because there is a parallel between the literary and the real experience. Perhaps diacritics readers can make more sense of this than I can, but the non- argument certainly raises points worth pursuing. I have never claimed that the two experiences are "point for point" opposed, and indeed the parallel between the two experiences is one I have acknowledged time and time again as far as the process of interpretation is concerned: the reader or observer tries to make something deter- minate out of something indeterminate. The distinction stands.

The argument continues with what seems to me a remarkable denial of subjec- tivism in reading:

What I have been saying is that there is no subjectivist element of reading, because the observer is never individual in the sense of unique or private, but is always the product of the categories of understanding that are his by virtue of his membership in a community of interpretation. [p. 11]

^[ ̂ ^ ̂

.... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -: E :- j E i: 4i..; :R g -.: ..... '::........ :.::' -:: ;: :a >;:

S$AIN-PIERRE EET 'M!QJf;!ON 7

It is quite true that membership of the community helps to prevent arbitrary ide- ation, but if there is no subjectivist element in reading, how on earth does Professor Fish account for different interpretations of one and the same text? (The answer to that question is that he doesn't.)

Earlier I concluded that the distinction between what is given and what is supplied won't hold up because everything is supplied, both the determi- nate and indeterminate poles of the 'aesthetic object'. ..

(I am delighted to see that Professor Fish now draws a distinction between determi- nacy and indeterminacy.)

... now I am arguing that the same distinction won't hold because every- thing is given. There is no paradox here. [p. 11]

Underlying these assumptions, of course, is the familiar distinction between the determinate or given and the indeterminate or supplied ...

(Here, of course, I reject totally the synonymity Professor Fish imposes on the terms.)

. .. and they fall by the same reasoning which makes that distinction finally untenable: what must be supplied in literary experience must also be supplied in the 'real life' experience to which it is, point for point, op- posed. [p. 8]

It appears that there is no difference between the determinate and the indeter- minate, because there is a parallel between the literary and the real experience. Perhaps diacritics readers can make more sense of this than I can, but the non- argument certainly raises points worth pursuing. I have never claimed that the two experiences are "point for point" opposed, and indeed the parallel between the two experiences is one I have acknowledged time and time again as far as the process of interpretation is concerned: the reader or observer tries to make something deter- minate out of something indeterminate. The distinction stands.

The argument continues with what seems to me a remarkable denial of subjec- tivism in reading:

What I have been saying is that there is no subjectivist element of reading, because the observer is never individual in the sense of unique or private, but is always the product of the categories of understanding that are his by virtue of his membership in a community of interpretation. [p. 11]

^[ ̂ ^ ̂

.... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -: E :- j E i: 4i..; :R g -.: ..... '::........ :.::' -:: ;: :a >;:

S$AIN-PIERRE EET 'M!QJf;!ON 7

It is quite true that membership of the community helps to prevent arbitrary ide- ation, but if there is no subjectivist element in reading, how on earth does Professor Fish account for different interpretations of one and the same text? (The answer to that question is that he doesn't.)

Earlier I concluded that the distinction between what is given and what is supplied won't hold up because everything is supplied, both the determi- nate and indeterminate poles of the 'aesthetic object'. ..

(I am delighted to see that Professor Fish now draws a distinction between determi- nacy and indeterminacy.)

... now I am arguing that the same distinction won't hold because every- thing is given. There is no paradox here. [p. 11]

86 86 86 86 86 86 86

Well, paradoxes are not to be resolved by announcing that they have been resolved. And Professor Fish's attempt to justify his claim is not entirely persuasive. The argu- ment runs that the categories of 'supplied' and 'given' only make sense if the entities they refer to are 'pure' (which they are not) and so:

In the absence of that purity one can say either that everything is determi- nate, because nothing proceeds from an unfettered imagination, or that everything is indeterminate, because everything is produced by the activities of the reader ...

(What was that about Iser being on no side or on every side?)

. .. The only thing that you can't say is that there is a distinction, at least insofar as it is an absolute distinction between a world that 'lives and func- tions independently' of interpretive activity and a world that is produced by interpretive activity. [p. 12]

I will settle for a distinction, as opposed to an "absolute" distinction, along the lines I have already laid down.

We now come to the charge of dilettantism:

A reader sympathetic to Iser might argue that he himself knows that his basic

categories are conventional rather than natural. He does, after all, say at one

point that "pure perception is quite impossible" [166]. But when he says that, what he means is that perception is a compound of the object (purely perceived) plus the subjective perspective of the reader; otherwise he could not claim that "textual segments" are given and determinate. In other words Iser doesn't take his own pronouncement seriously (if he did, he'd have to

give up his theory). [p. 12]

I do take my pronouncements seriously, but I do not think I shall have to give up my theory. I stand by my statement that pure perception is impossible, and I accept Professor Fish's explanation of my words apart from the slyly interpolated parenthe- sis. The object is not purely perceived, but it is there. And because it is there it exerts some control on what we can do with it. Professor Fish would argue that because it is never perceived in an unmediated manner, it can offer no guidance to us. I disagree. The textual segments are not given in their determinacy, but given and subsequently determined. In the one instance, we have the given words or segments (e.g. Arca- dian Simplicity), in the other we have determinate interpretations of the words or

segments. Both are or become 'objects', but in neither instance do I claim that there is any purity of perception.

The piscine technique of putting words in my mouth and then arguing against them is continued right to the end of the "assault". I can only assure readers that I have never assumed that "everyday life is characterized by continuity and determi-

nacy", and I have never "defined" literature "by the presence ... of gaps." In his conclusion, Stanley Fish attributes to me the ability Joan Weber attributed

to Thomas Brown-namely, "to embrace contradictions cheerfully (like Tertullian he

professed to believe things because they were impossible) by saying that he 'pulls the sting from pain'. Wolfgang Iser is the Thomas Browne of literary theory." [p. 13]

After what I can only regard as an unjustified assault, I confess I feel more like Tom Brown than Thomas Browne. But that, of course, leads to the disturbing con- clusion that Stanley Fish may have become the Flashman of literary theory.

Well, paradoxes are not to be resolved by announcing that they have been resolved. And Professor Fish's attempt to justify his claim is not entirely persuasive. The argu- ment runs that the categories of 'supplied' and 'given' only make sense if the entities they refer to are 'pure' (which they are not) and so:

In the absence of that purity one can say either that everything is determi- nate, because nothing proceeds from an unfettered imagination, or that everything is indeterminate, because everything is produced by the activities of the reader ...

(What was that about Iser being on no side or on every side?)

. .. The only thing that you can't say is that there is a distinction, at least insofar as it is an absolute distinction between a world that 'lives and func- tions independently' of interpretive activity and a world that is produced by interpretive activity. [p. 12]

I will settle for a distinction, as opposed to an "absolute" distinction, along the lines I have already laid down.

We now come to the charge of dilettantism:

A reader sympathetic to Iser might argue that he himself knows that his basic

categories are conventional rather than natural. He does, after all, say at one

point that "pure perception is quite impossible" [166]. But when he says that, what he means is that perception is a compound of the object (purely perceived) plus the subjective perspective of the reader; otherwise he could not claim that "textual segments" are given and determinate. In other words Iser doesn't take his own pronouncement seriously (if he did, he'd have to

give up his theory). [p. 12]

I do take my pronouncements seriously, but I do not think I shall have to give up my theory. I stand by my statement that pure perception is impossible, and I accept Professor Fish's explanation of my words apart from the slyly interpolated parenthe- sis. The object is not purely perceived, but it is there. And because it is there it exerts some control on what we can do with it. Professor Fish would argue that because it is never perceived in an unmediated manner, it can offer no guidance to us. I disagree. The textual segments are not given in their determinacy, but given and subsequently determined. In the one instance, we have the given words or segments (e.g. Arca- dian Simplicity), in the other we have determinate interpretations of the words or

segments. Both are or become 'objects', but in neither instance do I claim that there is any purity of perception.

The piscine technique of putting words in my mouth and then arguing against them is continued right to the end of the "assault". I can only assure readers that I have never assumed that "everyday life is characterized by continuity and determi-

nacy", and I have never "defined" literature "by the presence ... of gaps." In his conclusion, Stanley Fish attributes to me the ability Joan Weber attributed

to Thomas Brown-namely, "to embrace contradictions cheerfully (like Tertullian he

professed to believe things because they were impossible) by saying that he 'pulls the sting from pain'. Wolfgang Iser is the Thomas Browne of literary theory." [p. 13]

After what I can only regard as an unjustified assault, I confess I feel more like Tom Brown than Thomas Browne. But that, of course, leads to the disturbing con- clusion that Stanley Fish may have become the Flashman of literary theory.

Well, paradoxes are not to be resolved by announcing that they have been resolved. And Professor Fish's attempt to justify his claim is not entirely persuasive. The argu- ment runs that the categories of 'supplied' and 'given' only make sense if the entities they refer to are 'pure' (which they are not) and so:

In the absence of that purity one can say either that everything is determi- nate, because nothing proceeds from an unfettered imagination, or that everything is indeterminate, because everything is produced by the activities of the reader ...

(What was that about Iser being on no side or on every side?)

. .. The only thing that you can't say is that there is a distinction, at least insofar as it is an absolute distinction between a world that 'lives and func- tions independently' of interpretive activity and a world that is produced by interpretive activity. [p. 12]

I will settle for a distinction, as opposed to an "absolute" distinction, along the lines I have already laid down.

We now come to the charge of dilettantism:

A reader sympathetic to Iser might argue that he himself knows that his basic

categories are conventional rather than natural. He does, after all, say at one

point that "pure perception is quite impossible" [166]. But when he says that, what he means is that perception is a compound of the object (purely perceived) plus the subjective perspective of the reader; otherwise he could not claim that "textual segments" are given and determinate. In other words Iser doesn't take his own pronouncement seriously (if he did, he'd have to

give up his theory). [p. 12]

I do take my pronouncements seriously, but I do not think I shall have to give up my theory. I stand by my statement that pure perception is impossible, and I accept Professor Fish's explanation of my words apart from the slyly interpolated parenthe- sis. The object is not purely perceived, but it is there. And because it is there it exerts some control on what we can do with it. Professor Fish would argue that because it is never perceived in an unmediated manner, it can offer no guidance to us. I disagree. The textual segments are not given in their determinacy, but given and subsequently determined. In the one instance, we have the given words or segments (e.g. Arca- dian Simplicity), in the other we have determinate interpretations of the words or

segments. Both are or become 'objects', but in neither instance do I claim that there is any purity of perception.

The piscine technique of putting words in my mouth and then arguing against them is continued right to the end of the "assault". I can only assure readers that I have never assumed that "everyday life is characterized by continuity and determi-

nacy", and I have never "defined" literature "by the presence ... of gaps." In his conclusion, Stanley Fish attributes to me the ability Joan Weber attributed

to Thomas Brown-namely, "to embrace contradictions cheerfully (like Tertullian he

professed to believe things because they were impossible) by saying that he 'pulls the sting from pain'. Wolfgang Iser is the Thomas Browne of literary theory." [p. 13]

After what I can only regard as an unjustified assault, I confess I feel more like Tom Brown than Thomas Browne. But that, of course, leads to the disturbing con- clusion that Stanley Fish may have become the Flashman of literary theory.

Well, paradoxes are not to be resolved by announcing that they have been resolved. And Professor Fish's attempt to justify his claim is not entirely persuasive. The argu- ment runs that the categories of 'supplied' and 'given' only make sense if the entities they refer to are 'pure' (which they are not) and so:

In the absence of that purity one can say either that everything is determi- nate, because nothing proceeds from an unfettered imagination, or that everything is indeterminate, because everything is produced by the activities of the reader ...

(What was that about Iser being on no side or on every side?)

. .. The only thing that you can't say is that there is a distinction, at least insofar as it is an absolute distinction between a world that 'lives and func- tions independently' of interpretive activity and a world that is produced by interpretive activity. [p. 12]

I will settle for a distinction, as opposed to an "absolute" distinction, along the lines I have already laid down.

We now come to the charge of dilettantism:

A reader sympathetic to Iser might argue that he himself knows that his basic

categories are conventional rather than natural. He does, after all, say at one

point that "pure perception is quite impossible" [166]. But when he says that, what he means is that perception is a compound of the object (purely perceived) plus the subjective perspective of the reader; otherwise he could not claim that "textual segments" are given and determinate. In other words Iser doesn't take his own pronouncement seriously (if he did, he'd have to

give up his theory). [p. 12]

I do take my pronouncements seriously, but I do not think I shall have to give up my theory. I stand by my statement that pure perception is impossible, and I accept Professor Fish's explanation of my words apart from the slyly interpolated parenthe- sis. The object is not purely perceived, but it is there. And because it is there it exerts some control on what we can do with it. Professor Fish would argue that because it is never perceived in an unmediated manner, it can offer no guidance to us. I disagree. The textual segments are not given in their determinacy, but given and subsequently determined. In the one instance, we have the given words or segments (e.g. Arca- dian Simplicity), in the other we have determinate interpretations of the words or

segments. Both are or become 'objects', but in neither instance do I claim that there is any purity of perception.

The piscine technique of putting words in my mouth and then arguing against them is continued right to the end of the "assault". I can only assure readers that I have never assumed that "everyday life is characterized by continuity and determi-

nacy", and I have never "defined" literature "by the presence ... of gaps." In his conclusion, Stanley Fish attributes to me the ability Joan Weber attributed

to Thomas Brown-namely, "to embrace contradictions cheerfully (like Tertullian he

professed to believe things because they were impossible) by saying that he 'pulls the sting from pain'. Wolfgang Iser is the Thomas Browne of literary theory." [p. 13]

After what I can only regard as an unjustified assault, I confess I feel more like Tom Brown than Thomas Browne. But that, of course, leads to the disturbing con- clusion that Stanley Fish may have become the Flashman of literary theory.

Well, paradoxes are not to be resolved by announcing that they have been resolved. And Professor Fish's attempt to justify his claim is not entirely persuasive. The argu- ment runs that the categories of 'supplied' and 'given' only make sense if the entities they refer to are 'pure' (which they are not) and so:

In the absence of that purity one can say either that everything is determi- nate, because nothing proceeds from an unfettered imagination, or that everything is indeterminate, because everything is produced by the activities of the reader ...

(What was that about Iser being on no side or on every side?)

. .. The only thing that you can't say is that there is a distinction, at least insofar as it is an absolute distinction between a world that 'lives and func- tions independently' of interpretive activity and a world that is produced by interpretive activity. [p. 12]

I will settle for a distinction, as opposed to an "absolute" distinction, along the lines I have already laid down.

We now come to the charge of dilettantism:

A reader sympathetic to Iser might argue that he himself knows that his basic

categories are conventional rather than natural. He does, after all, say at one

point that "pure perception is quite impossible" [166]. But when he says that, what he means is that perception is a compound of the object (purely perceived) plus the subjective perspective of the reader; otherwise he could not claim that "textual segments" are given and determinate. In other words Iser doesn't take his own pronouncement seriously (if he did, he'd have to

give up his theory). [p. 12]

I do take my pronouncements seriously, but I do not think I shall have to give up my theory. I stand by my statement that pure perception is impossible, and I accept Professor Fish's explanation of my words apart from the slyly interpolated parenthe- sis. The object is not purely perceived, but it is there. And because it is there it exerts some control on what we can do with it. Professor Fish would argue that because it is never perceived in an unmediated manner, it can offer no guidance to us. I disagree. The textual segments are not given in their determinacy, but given and subsequently determined. In the one instance, we have the given words or segments (e.g. Arca- dian Simplicity), in the other we have determinate interpretations of the words or

segments. Both are or become 'objects', but in neither instance do I claim that there is any purity of perception.

The piscine technique of putting words in my mouth and then arguing against them is continued right to the end of the "assault". I can only assure readers that I have never assumed that "everyday life is characterized by continuity and determi-

nacy", and I have never "defined" literature "by the presence ... of gaps." In his conclusion, Stanley Fish attributes to me the ability Joan Weber attributed

to Thomas Brown-namely, "to embrace contradictions cheerfully (like Tertullian he

professed to believe things because they were impossible) by saying that he 'pulls the sting from pain'. Wolfgang Iser is the Thomas Browne of literary theory." [p. 13]

After what I can only regard as an unjustified assault, I confess I feel more like Tom Brown than Thomas Browne. But that, of course, leads to the disturbing con- clusion that Stanley Fish may have become the Flashman of literary theory.

Well, paradoxes are not to be resolved by announcing that they have been resolved. And Professor Fish's attempt to justify his claim is not entirely persuasive. The argu- ment runs that the categories of 'supplied' and 'given' only make sense if the entities they refer to are 'pure' (which they are not) and so:

In the absence of that purity one can say either that everything is determi- nate, because nothing proceeds from an unfettered imagination, or that everything is indeterminate, because everything is produced by the activities of the reader ...

(What was that about Iser being on no side or on every side?)

. .. The only thing that you can't say is that there is a distinction, at least insofar as it is an absolute distinction between a world that 'lives and func- tions independently' of interpretive activity and a world that is produced by interpretive activity. [p. 12]

I will settle for a distinction, as opposed to an "absolute" distinction, along the lines I have already laid down.

We now come to the charge of dilettantism:

A reader sympathetic to Iser might argue that he himself knows that his basic

categories are conventional rather than natural. He does, after all, say at one

point that "pure perception is quite impossible" [166]. But when he says that, what he means is that perception is a compound of the object (purely perceived) plus the subjective perspective of the reader; otherwise he could not claim that "textual segments" are given and determinate. In other words Iser doesn't take his own pronouncement seriously (if he did, he'd have to

give up his theory). [p. 12]

I do take my pronouncements seriously, but I do not think I shall have to give up my theory. I stand by my statement that pure perception is impossible, and I accept Professor Fish's explanation of my words apart from the slyly interpolated parenthe- sis. The object is not purely perceived, but it is there. And because it is there it exerts some control on what we can do with it. Professor Fish would argue that because it is never perceived in an unmediated manner, it can offer no guidance to us. I disagree. The textual segments are not given in their determinacy, but given and subsequently determined. In the one instance, we have the given words or segments (e.g. Arca- dian Simplicity), in the other we have determinate interpretations of the words or

segments. Both are or become 'objects', but in neither instance do I claim that there is any purity of perception.

The piscine technique of putting words in my mouth and then arguing against them is continued right to the end of the "assault". I can only assure readers that I have never assumed that "everyday life is characterized by continuity and determi-

nacy", and I have never "defined" literature "by the presence ... of gaps." In his conclusion, Stanley Fish attributes to me the ability Joan Weber attributed

to Thomas Brown-namely, "to embrace contradictions cheerfully (like Tertullian he

professed to believe things because they were impossible) by saying that he 'pulls the sting from pain'. Wolfgang Iser is the Thomas Browne of literary theory." [p. 13]

After what I can only regard as an unjustified assault, I confess I feel more like Tom Brown than Thomas Browne. But that, of course, leads to the disturbing con- clusion that Stanley Fish may have become the Flashman of literary theory.

Well, paradoxes are not to be resolved by announcing that they have been resolved. And Professor Fish's attempt to justify his claim is not entirely persuasive. The argu- ment runs that the categories of 'supplied' and 'given' only make sense if the entities they refer to are 'pure' (which they are not) and so:

In the absence of that purity one can say either that everything is determi- nate, because nothing proceeds from an unfettered imagination, or that everything is indeterminate, because everything is produced by the activities of the reader ...

(What was that about Iser being on no side or on every side?)

. .. The only thing that you can't say is that there is a distinction, at least insofar as it is an absolute distinction between a world that 'lives and func- tions independently' of interpretive activity and a world that is produced by interpretive activity. [p. 12]

I will settle for a distinction, as opposed to an "absolute" distinction, along the lines I have already laid down.

We now come to the charge of dilettantism:

A reader sympathetic to Iser might argue that he himself knows that his basic

categories are conventional rather than natural. He does, after all, say at one

point that "pure perception is quite impossible" [166]. But when he says that, what he means is that perception is a compound of the object (purely perceived) plus the subjective perspective of the reader; otherwise he could not claim that "textual segments" are given and determinate. In other words Iser doesn't take his own pronouncement seriously (if he did, he'd have to

give up his theory). [p. 12]

I do take my pronouncements seriously, but I do not think I shall have to give up my theory. I stand by my statement that pure perception is impossible, and I accept Professor Fish's explanation of my words apart from the slyly interpolated parenthe- sis. The object is not purely perceived, but it is there. And because it is there it exerts some control on what we can do with it. Professor Fish would argue that because it is never perceived in an unmediated manner, it can offer no guidance to us. I disagree. The textual segments are not given in their determinacy, but given and subsequently determined. In the one instance, we have the given words or segments (e.g. Arca- dian Simplicity), in the other we have determinate interpretations of the words or

segments. Both are or become 'objects', but in neither instance do I claim that there is any purity of perception.

The piscine technique of putting words in my mouth and then arguing against them is continued right to the end of the "assault". I can only assure readers that I have never assumed that "everyday life is characterized by continuity and determi-

nacy", and I have never "defined" literature "by the presence ... of gaps." In his conclusion, Stanley Fish attributes to me the ability Joan Weber attributed

to Thomas Brown-namely, "to embrace contradictions cheerfully (like Tertullian he

professed to believe things because they were impossible) by saying that he 'pulls the sting from pain'. Wolfgang Iser is the Thomas Browne of literary theory." [p. 13]

After what I can only regard as an unjustified assault, I confess I feel more like Tom Brown than Thomas Browne. But that, of course, leads to the disturbing con- clusion that Stanley Fish may have become the Flashman of literary theory.

diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 diacritics/September 1981 87 87 87 87 87 87 87