report #3 - new patterns of jihadism: the islamic state and the radicalization in italy

Mediterranean Report #3

April 2015

New patterns of jihadism: the Islamic State and the radicalization in Italy

Francesca BLASI,

MA in Relations and Institution in Asia and Africa

(University of Napels “L’Orientale”)

April 2015

1 New patterns of jihadism: the Islamic State and the radicalization in Italy

Copyright© 2015 by Mediterranean Affairs

All right reserved except for brief quotations in a review. This Paper must not be reproduced in

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Mediterranean Affairs is a Think Tank aiming to provide analyses that cover the Mediterranean

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focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges such as

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The main objective is to provide detailed information to the public through the website, writing

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April 2015


New patterns of jihadism: the Islamic State and the radicalization in Italy ................... 3

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 3

The rise of the Islamic State ................................................................................................ 3

Social jihadism ................................................................................................................... 6

The jihadist radicalization in Italy ........................................................................................ 8

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 11

Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 12

Summary

April 2015


New patterns of jihadism: the Islamic State and the radicalization in

Italy

Ms. Francesca Blasi

In recent years, the jihadist scene has witnessed a challenging shift either in aims and necessary

tools to achieve them.Furthermore, the West is facing a growing radical Islamist feeling among

populations, especially in Europe, that represents a threat to security and to social environment. The

aim of this report is to inspect the changes and the innovating aspects brought by the surge of the

Islamic State, and how its rhetoric and propaganda could affect Italy.

Introduction

The jihadist outline, in the last few years, witnessed the emergence of new actors that challenged the supremacy of al-Qa‟ida over the international jihadi community, grazed by the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the subsequent loss of power and influence in those territories and, after the killing of its leader Osama Bin Laden, a local and regional reorganization.

Along with the older groups such as Al-Qa‟ida in Arabic Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Qa‟ida in Maghreb (AQMI), the jihadist sphere is wider, witnessed by the emerge of several salafi-jihadi groups linked to Al-Qa‟ida, such as Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and Libya, Jabat al-Nusra in Syria, Ansar Beit-al-Maqdis in the Sinai Peninsula.

Yet, ascendance of the Islamic State (IS) and its own creation of a self-proclaimed caliphate, ruled by the “Caliph” Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi, represented the main evidence of the threat to Al-Qa‟ida supremacy, both in its objectives and modus operandi.

With the Islamic State the whole world is witnessing a new pattern of jihadism, represented

even by the new dimension of the foreign fighters’ phenomenon, that poses a concrete threat to European counties.

In this regard, the aim of the report is to analyze the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria‟s emerge, its history and strategy, questioning why the “Caliphate” is so attractive to many European young people and how the salafi-jihadist phenomenon is developing in Italy.

The rise of the Islamic State

2014 would be considered as a watershed for the jihadi galaxy.

For the first time, the black flags of a radical Islamist group waved on the rooftops of the main cities of an area stretching from the north-western Syria to eastern Iraq, from where started the conquest of territories of the Islamic State (IS). The “army” of the self-named Caliphate ruled by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (nome de guerre of

April 2015


Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim „Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai) succeeded in an objective that not even Al-Qa‟ida‟s leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, mentor of Al-Baghdadi and founder of Al-Qa‟ida in Iraq (AQI) could have dreamt in recent years.

The forces of the Islamic State infiltrated and altered the equilibrium in the Middle East region in a relative short period, but the origin of its birth tracked back to Operation Iraqi Freedom and the radical movement Jamat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, led by Al-Zarqawi1.

This group had limited resources and fighters at its disposal, thus the leader Al-Zarqawi coopted both Iraqi militants and foreign fighters active on the ground but not aligned with it. From this process in 2004 has been created Al-Qaida in Iraq: the Al-Qa‟ida‟s branch soon shifted its own agenda, not limiting its attacks to the

1 A. Plebani, The unfolding legacy of al-Qa’ida in Iraq: form al-Zarqawi to the new Islamic Caliphate, in A. Plebani (ed.) New (and old) patterns of jihadism: Al-Qa’ida, the Islamic State and Beyond, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale ISPI, Milano, 2014, p. 5.

international and Iraqi military forces, but to the Shia community as well. The behavior has been harshly blamed by Al-Qa‟ida leadership, and with the death of Al-Zarqawi, the dual leadership of AQI that followed (composed by Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi) focused on enlarging the areas of actions, integrating the military operations with the management of territory under control, mostly north-western Iraq, around Mosul and the Niniveh plain2.

This led the basis for the creation of the Islamic State in Iraq that since 2010 (when the two former leaders were killed) has been ruling by Al-Baghdadi.

Re-organizing the organization, aimed at creating a united context among Iraqi and foreign fighters, Al-Baghdadi understood the importance, in manner of opportunities for the movement, brought by the Syrian revolution and dispatched a group of militants in Syria, who formed Jabhat al-Nusra. The successes recorded on the battlefield in both countries strengthened the internal organization, helped by the conquest of strategic economic resources, and increased the attraction of thousands of volunteer fighters from all over the world to Iraq and Syria.

On April 2013 have been declared the foundation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh, Dawla al-Islamiyya fy Iraq wa Sham, in Arabic) form the merge of ISI Jabhat al-Nusra

2 Ibidem, p. 8.

AQIM Flag

April 2015


(whose leader al-Julani refused, confirming its affiliation to Al-Qa‟ida).

The dispute led to a hard struggle within the two groups, which brought to a schism of intra-jihadi forces, and from this moment on, the leadership of ISIL adopted a more aggressive approach, both towards the population and its enemies, aimed at laying the foundation of a true Islamic state in the region.

The stance adopted by al-Baghdadi could be described as a “either with us or against us” approach 3 based on a vision of the salafi rhetoric.

ISIL leader was backed by a growing number of Arab Sunni tribes in open opposition towards the government of the Shiia Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who won the election in 2006. Furthermore, the territory out of control of the government, as well as the military prowess of ISIL fighters combined with the incapability of the Iraqi national army, represented the right

3 Ibidem, p. 13-14

conditions for ISIL to recover the absence. The organization gained a progression of offensive on the soil: the expulsion of Iraq forces form Niniveh and al-Anbar governorate, plus the invasion of Iraq culminated in the fall of Mosul.

June 29th 2014, first day of Ramadan, tracked officially the beginning of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS): al-Baghdadi sitting on the minbar of a Mosque in Mosul proclaimed the foundation of the new Caliphate and presented himself as the legitimate successor of the Prophet.

His message was direct not only to local jihadi groups, but even to all the Muslim around the world, to join the group and fight for the restoration of the real Islam throughout the military jihad, aimed at consolidating his legitimacy and authority over the territory under his control.

The Islamic State since the very beginning of its proclamation, has developed a military and psychological battle: the former fought on the soil in the heart of the Arab region, deleting the European 1919 Sykes-Picot borders between Syria and Iraq, the latter fought through the web, the propaganda campaign composed by pictures, films and texts aimed at broadcasting in a capillary way its military achievements, with a multiplying effect that praises and emphasizes them.

For this, IS was able to create a strong appeal thanks to its propagandistic campaign on social medias that enabled the group to recruit foreign fighters and woulbe-jihadist from US, Europe and beyond.

Al-Baghdadi

April 2015


This must be seen as a turning point in the jihadi galaxy, because with IS radical group and international jihad have changed their face.

Social jihadism

The Islamic State demonstrated its ability to control territory and establish a regularized system of government4.

The growing aspiration in creating an institutionalized “Islamic” state has been reflected by the evolution of group‟s name that specified in a much particular manner this purpose.

IS has brought at least two innovations in the radical Islamist scenario: it used the Islamic terminology in a new way, and it took control and still holds a certain territory. In this regard, one of the pillars of the evolution from Al-Qa‟ida supremacy, and an innovation brought by the group is that IS‟s main goal is not terrorize the West, attacking randomly targets to arise concern over the tyranny of the West politics in the region and towards Muslim population, but to create its own Islamic State. Yet, religion is a tool of legitimation, not the cause.

Ruling a caliphate keeps up with propaganda campaigning, and since its declaration in June 2014, recruitment has surged. Indeed, Islamic State‟s lure to thousands of Western fighters is unprecedented in modern history

4 Q. Mecham, How much of a state is the Islamic State? In Islamism in the IS Age, POMPES Studies n.12, The Project on Middle East Political Studies, March 17th 2015, p. 20.

(foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq are highest in number than in any other past conflict, including the Afghan war in the 1980s and the Iraq invasion in 2003 5 ), especially from Europe (the main countries of origin are Great Britain, France, Belgium and Germany) for the amount of 3.000, and this might represent its scariest success.

Although the overwhelm majority of foreign fighters in IS are Arabs, the European fighters developed in a new model, represented for the vast majority in native-born citizens, rather than immigrants, and new comers to Islamic religion. They mostly are young immigrants of second or third generation, many of them middle-class, thus poverty doesn‟t explain the lure for jihad.

What is worth to underline is that radical and jihadi networks no longer need mosques to spread and nowadays wouldbe-jihadist can find all propaganda content, information and training material on line.

5 It ain’t half hot here, mum. Why and how Westerners go to fight in Syria and Iraq, The Economist, Aug 30th 2014

ISIS Propaganda

April 2015


Internet and social media work as a two-way tool: IS and other jihadi groups can recruit supporters in the West, and the whole world, and deliver and in return, wouldbe-jihadist can use it as a tool for radicalization and further propaganda.

Then, within the global jihadist movements worldwide is occurring a shift from the organization-centric and hierarchic model provided by Al-„Qaida, to a fluid and rigid structure-free movement6. No more a top-down organization, but a bottom-up structure.

This is one of the most surprising innovations shaped by Islamic State.

Indeed, the media campaign promoted by Al-Qa‟ida on organization, membership, ideology and strategy, although directly accessible through the As-Sahab Media Establishment, was shaped in a one-directional manner, which means that messages and video were created and produced from the top leaders and disseminated: there was limited interaction among Al-Qa‟ida followers and the leadership.

6 J. Brachman, Trascending Organization: Individuals and the Islamic State, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, START Analytic Brief, College Park, Maryland, June 2014.

The first Al-Qa‟ida

branch that broke this process has been Al-Qa‟ida in the Arabian

Peninsula, which on one hand was conducting its own jihadi

strategy in the region, and on the other was promoting and inspiring the “Do-It-Yourself” terrorist methodology, in order to make AQAP supporters able to operate in their own countries.

The man behind this project was AQAP leader Anwar Al-Awake, who through Inspire magazine campaigned this approach, speaking more directly with the followers worldwide and pushing them to interact with the leadership about their needs and desire. This was followed by Al-Qa‟ida spokesman Azzam al Amriki, who disseminated via the Internet a clip, entitled „Thou Are Only Responsible for Thyself‟ in which he called for do-it-yourself terrorism.

Finally, IS emphasized the early Do-It-Yourself jihadi strategy, thanks to a new generation of social media channels and new, younger supporters.

Different from previous conflicts, social media such as Twitter and Facebook help the propaganda even on the battlefield, because the fighters while uploading videos and photos and tagging fellows, become propaganda themselves.

Syria is long away from the Afghani context and with the Islamic State battles, executions or fighter daily life

Azzam al Amriki. Source: SITE

April 2015


have become a mass participation events, and to attract new comers, life in the organization become of public domain.

More important, senior leaders or commanders do not have any longer the exclusive ideological authority. Rather, those faceless fighters who have heeded the call to join the ISIS are now celebrated as the model to be emulated.

It could be possible to recap the different messages of the three groups as follows:

“Al-Qaida’s - Stay in your home countries, spend the bulk of your time learning about how oppressed you are and do what you can to support Al-Qaida’s core group of fighters but leave the terrorism to us;

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula - Stay in your home countries, gain a sense for the overall situation facing Muslims today and then engage in DIY acts of terrorism;

Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham - Flock to the battlefields and fight with us. You have an individual duty to do so”7.

On the contrary, propaganda on social media helps in spreading the jihadi message abroad Iraq and Syria, and already European countries witnessed actions carried out by individuals motivated by jihadist ideology and operating independently.

The self-trained, self-radicalized, either individuals or small groups, pose the growing threat for security. Especially in the last few years, when the surge in terrorism arose attention on two crucial aspects: the so-called

7 J. Brachman, Transcending Organization: Individuals and “The Islamic State”, op.cit.

home-grown terrorists and the related consequences of the unpredictability of actions and actors, as lone-wolfs attacks. Yet, the return of jihadists form the battlefield is one of the biggest fear of European governments.

The jihadist radicalization in

Italy

The jihadi-Islamist phenomenon in Italy arrived several years later than in other European countries, due to demographic reasons. Indeed, Italy only in the 1990s witnessed a strong wave of Muslim immigration, and the second-generation entered in adulthood recently.

At the same time, Italy witnessed as one of the first countries jihadist activities on its soil, related to the North African networks that were playing a prominent role in the nascent global jihadist movement8.

Yet, the attempted suicide attack that has been carried out in 2009 by the Libyan Mohammed Game, tracked a watershed as the first manifestation of jihadism in Italy, even though is couldn‟t be considered as a pure home-grown jihadist attack, since Game didn‟t grow up in the country.

Indeed, a characteristic commonly used to define a home-grown jihadist is that he/she has born or grown up in the country, and has to be socialized in it.

8 L. Vidino, Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy: birth, development and radicalization dynamics, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale ISPI, Milano, 2014, p. 1.

April 2015


In the mid-2000s Italian authorities began monitoring the growth of an Italian-speaking community who embraced jihadist propaganda on line, and among it, Italian who have recently converted to radical Islam and were active in disseminating jihadist material translated in Italian.

One of the most controversial figures in this regard has been the Italian converted Barbara Aisha Farina, who opened a blog regarding Islamic fundamentalism and actively operated on line to collect and disseminate information for the Italian community. Already in late 1990s she had become the first Italian woman to support wearing the niqab and one of the most productive Islamist activists. In this regard she published a magazine titled al-Mujahidah, composed by articles and translation of the most eminent Islamic thinkers9.

By the time when social media like Facebook and Twitter have still not been invented, blogs and on line forums (like Minbar SOS) represented the best option to get contacts and spread information and connections in the country.

In 2009, Italian authorities opened an investigation, titled Operation Niriya, which targeted the existence of an Italy-based jihadist network, mostly

9 Ibidem, p. 50

composed by converts, and disclosed the net of activities and connections on internet.

The first target of the Operation has been Andrea Campione, a young Italian who had a double, radical-jihadist, life on line.

More recently, the others main cases of jihadist activities and actors have been:

Mohammed Jarmoune: 20-year Moroccan grown up in Italy, in 2012 has been arrested on suspicion of planning an attack against the Jewish community in Milan. He was

sentenced for having distributed jihadist material with terrorist intention. Indeed, this case holds the characteristics to be represented as the first home-grown jihadist attack in Italy, because Jarmoune grown up and radicalized in Italy, was active on social media and

apparently didn‟t cooperate with established groups.

Annas el-Abboubi: he has Moroccan origin and grown up in Italy as well. He has been arrested because we sought to create the organization Sharia4Italy, branch of the European organization Sharia4 (among those branch, the Sharia4UK and Sharia4Belgium are the most active). After his release, he travelled to Syria and joined an Al-Qa‟ida linked formation.

Muslims praying in Bologna.

Source: MuslimVillage

April 2015


Ibrahim Giuliano Delnevo: Italian converted, in June 2013 was reported he has been killed while fighting in Syria in a jihadist militia10.

From this early stage, is it possible to understand that Italian jihadist scene is composed by small clusters or lone actors, characterized by an extreme activity on line.

According to the last report of the Italian security service 11 in Italy, the new home-grown jihadist scene can be numbered at 50-60 people, mostly interactive on line and scattered in North Italy in big cities like Milan and Brescia. Only 15 Italian residents travelled to Syria to fight.

It is possible to outline a short profile of these actors: while in the 1990s the jihadist community were Arabic and mostly from North Africa, now the home-grown jihadist Italian context is formed by Italian native speakers and of origin; the home-grown scene operates outside the mosques (even those like the mosque of Via Jenner, which is considered the most radical mosque in Italy and in which historically had operated jihadist militants); they are not linked to traditional networks, such as Al-Qa‟ida, which in return tend to mistrust the new militants; Internet is the main platform for activities; they are self-

10 L. Vidino, Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy: birth, development and radicalization dynamics, op. cit., p. 73. 11 Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, Relazione sulla politica dell’informazione per la sicurezza, Rapporto annuale per il Parlamento Italiano, 2014.

trained or self-taught; and are mostly committed in disseminating material and publishing information, rather than in operational concern.

Indeed, a few cases reported the shift from an on-line activity to the fights abroad, as the cases of Giuliano Delnevo and Annas al-Abboubi, and who seeks to travel to the battlefield looks for contacts with a “gatekeepers” on the web, that means someone who facilitate his/her linkage with jihadist groups abroad, operating a self-recruitment.

Analyzing the profiles of the most famous Italian woulbe-jihadists, it is possible to highlight that the Islamic radical community is composed by a milieu of individuals who vary for age, sex, origin, and social condition, even if they share jihadist intent. Furthermore, poverty and lack socio-economic integration are not the primary reasons of radicalization.

They discovered jihadist ideology on internet and deepened their interest interacting in it, especially since when the boom of social media has exponentially increased the capability of accessing information.

Regarding the actors of the radical Salafi propaganda in Italy, Usama al Santawy, represents its symbol. He is a prominent leader of the informal second-generation Salafist movement, born in Milan and working in the Italian branch of the international aid organization Islamic Relief.

He hosts its own show in a local TV station where he usually addresses the audience on the Islamic thought, even if he is not trained in Islamic studies. He soon became a reference point for second-generation Salafists,

April 2015


and in this concern he had interacted with the famous Italian wouldbe-jihadist like el-Abboubi and Delnevo. He has been accused of advocating violence, and even if he shifted his oratorical rhetoric, he continues to provoke and address controversial speech.

Notwithstanding, he never participated or encouraged any terroristic activity in Italy.

Conclusion

The increase of foreign fighters and the latest jihadist-minded attacks in European countries (France, Canada, Belgium, and Denmark) arose concern over the lack of integration and the marginalization/discrimination felt from the Muslim community in the continent.

Those factors, like the disenfranchisement, have been the controversial bulk of the debate on terrorism phenomenon and its reasons.

Yet, analyzing the most recent episodes oh home-grown jihadism in Europe, this theory has been criticized, because none of the militants suffered of socio-economic constrictions and it doesn‟t explain why only insignificant minority of Muslims living in marginalization conditions turn radicals.

Thus, the answer might lay in an extreme personal condition of weakness and personal identity, on which the jihadist propaganda is able to play.

Indeed, the Islamic State‟s propaganda emphasizes and uses those conditions to recruit followers.

IS offers a vision, a purpose, a united community and a sense of integration that challenges the individualistic behavior in Europe and the West.

This message threats our security twofold: on one hand, as sadly already happened, wouldbe-jihadists may attack European soil; on the other, foreign fighters returnees represent an even worst possibility, thus they acquired military skills and connections in Syria and Iraq.

The Italian panorama represented in the shortlisted cases (for sure three cases don‟t make a trend, but show some indications) highlights that the radical panorama is widely diverse and fragmented, but indeed a jihadist scene exists, although cannot be overstated.

ISIS: Jihad against Italy. Source: Huffington Post

April 2015


Bibliography

Economist (The), “It ain’t half hot here, mum Why and how Westerners go to fight in Syria

and Iraq”, August 30th 2014

Plebani Andrea (ed.), New (and old) patterns of Jihadism: Al-Qa’ida, the Islamic State and

beyond, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale ISPI, Milano, 2014

Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della

Repubblica, Relazione sulla politica dell‟informazione per la sicurezza, Rapporto

annuale per il Parlamento Italiano, 2014

Spencer Richard, Islamic State v al-Qaeda: the battle within jihad, The Telegraph, April

1st 2015

Vidino Lorenzo, Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy: Birth, Development and Radicalization

Dynamics, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale ISPI“, Milano, 2014

Vidino Lorenzo (ed.), L’Italia e il terrorismo in casa: che fare?, Istituto per gli Studi di

Politica Internazionale ISPI, Milano, 2015

VV.AA., Islamism in the IS Age, Project on Middle East Political Science, POMPES

Studies n.12, March 17th 2015

April 2015


Francesca Blasi graduated with a Master’s degree in Asia and Africa Relations and

Institutions at the University of Napels “L’Orientale”. She is contributor to Tribuna Italia, and her

focus areas are Internatinal Relations of the Middle East and Islamic Terrorism.

Ed. Mediterranean Affairs®.

www.mediterraneanaffairs.com

info: [email protected]

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report #3 - new patterns of jihadism: the islamic state and the radicalization in italy

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