report no. 2 (2016) - libya in the mist
DESCRIPTION
Following the statement by Gen. Joseph Dunford Jr. on Monday, January 25, concerning the planning of a new military intervention in Libya in order to tackle the increasing threat posed by IS in the Mediterranean area, other European countries, including Italy, have pledged their support to this future campaign which, according to Dunford, might begin in a matter of weeks. The shift in the international approach to the Libyan “knot” needs be analyzed in order to understand the reasons underpinning it as well as the possible future scenarios that might unfold from a new military intervention in the country. The present paper is divided in two macro-sections, each one adopting a specific point of view to investigate the Libyan knot. Indeed, on the one hand, the first one specifically analyzes the present scenario and gives a socio-political interpretation to the Libyan puzzle, by using sociologic categories to argue against an interventionist approach. On the other, the second one sheds lTRANSCRIPT
www.mediterraneanaffairs.com
Libya in the Mist Italy at the Crossroad between Diplomacy and
Interventionism
Written By Valentina Cantori & Giulia Formichetti
February 2016
Report No
02
Copyright© 2016 by Mediterranean Affairs
This Paper must not be reproduced in any form without permission in
writing form the publisher.
Updated at 16th February
All statements of fact, opinion, or analyses expressed are those of the
authors and do not reflect the opinion of Mediterranean Affairs
Mediterranean Affairs is a non-profit think tank that covers a variety of
international issues of the Mediterranean area. By carrying out extensive
researches, the staff studies various issues of international policy focused on
defense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges such as
economic integration.
The main objective is to provide information to the public on the website
drafting detailed and updated analyses, reports and dossiers. Mediterranean
Affairs also bases its development on the organization of public events, such
as conferences and workshops, as well as on consultancies and interviews
with the media.
Summary
Libya in the Mist ....................................................................... 4
Abstract .....................................................................................4
Libya, Italy, and the War on Terror........................................ 7
Introduction .............................................................................7
1. Libya, the “stateless state” between jihadism and
international intervention ......................................................8
2. The international military intervention: a “total”
war? .........................................................................................15
3. Conclusions: geopolitical consequences of Italian
Interventionism ......................................................................22
Libya and Italy relations Historical approach .................... 29
Foreign policy between national interests and political
solutions ...................................................................................... 29
1. Italy and Libya in the Past: A “Privileged
Partnership” ...........................................................................29
1.1. Italian foreign policy to Libya before the “Day of
Rage” .......................................................................................29
1.2. Italian national interests towards Libya: Illegal
migration and natural resources .........................................34
1.3. Italian foreign policy after the “Day of Rage” ........ 38
2. Italy and Libya in the Present ...................................... 40
2.1. On the Frontline? ......................................................... 40
2.2. The exacerbation of the migrant and the energy
crises 42
2.3. Western Interventionism: in the name of what and
under which mandate? ......................................................... 46
3. Conclusions. Italy and Libya in the Future: A
political solution a long-term strategy ............................... 48
References (part 1) .................................................................. 50
References (part 2) .................................................................. 54
About the Authors .................................................................. 61
Libya in the Mist
4
Libya in the Mist
Italy at the Crossroad between Diplomacy
and Interventionism
Abstract
Following the statement by Gen. Joseph Dunford Jr. on Monday, January 25,
concerning the planning of a new military intervention in Libya in order to tackle the
increasing threat posed by IS in the Mediterranean area, other European countries,
including Italy, have pledged their support to this future campaign which, according
to Dunford, might begin in a matter of weeks. The shift in the international approach
to the Libyan “knot” needs be analyzed in order to understand the reasons
underpinning it as well as the possible future scenarios that might unfold from a new
military intervention in the country. The present paper is divided in two macro-
sections, each one adopting a specific point of view to investigate the Libyan knot.
Indeed, on the one hand, the first one specifically analyzes the present scenario and
gives a socio-political interpretation to the Libyan puzzle, by using sociologic
categories to argue against an interventionist approach. On the other, the second one
sheds light on the relations between Libya and Italy, proving how the European
country has always been driven by the primary needs of protecting national interests
while structuring its strategy towards Libya.
In details, the first macro-part of this paper is structured along three main
subsections. The first one will shed light on the recent political developments that have
interested Libya, addressing both the rapid spreading of jihadism in the country since
February 2016
5
the ousting of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi in 2011 and the failure of the diplomatic
mission led by the UN envoy Martin Kobler. The second section will adopt a macro-
approach to the analysis of the planned international intervention in Libya, in which
Italy is willing to play an important role. Specifically, drawing from a reinterpretation
of the sociological approach to war put forth by Carl von Clausewitz, the paper aims
to demonstrate how the planned international military intervention in Libya is likely
to transform into an “absolute” or “total” war, according to von Clausewitz’s model,
thus being characterized by an ever-increasing and escalating level of violence. Last,
the third section will deal with the possible future consequences of this highly violent
military intervention as far as Italy’s security is concerned, demonstrating how an
escalation of violence in Libya is likely to produce undesired effects, legitimizing IS
rhetoric of Western Crusaders and lending credibility to its Manichean ideology.
The second macro-section will instead adopt a historical approach, by providing
an insight into Libyan-Italian relations in the past, in the present, and in the future,
following the same three-step structure, as in the previous half of the report. First, the
paper will elaborate on the “Privileged Partnership” Italy and Libya built after the
colonial period and during the decades under Colonel al-Qadhafi’ up to the uprisings.
It will also analyze how this partnership, focused on economic investments,
cooperation in the energy sector, and in the fight against illegal migration, was favored
by the Italian need to protect its national interests of territorial security and economic
stability. Secondly, the analysis will turn to present times, when Italy has been forced
to review its foreign policy towards Libya, to provide an appropriate answer to the
international pressure and to safeguard the national interest of participation to the
international community coalition and to play a significant role in the Mediterranean
basin. Eventually, the second part will investigate both the legality and the utility of
Libya in the Mist
6
leading a military intervention in Libya. The third and last section will then draw
the conclusions over possible future relations between the two counterparts, which
should be based on the rehabilitation of an interlocutor – being the Libyan
government – that now is instead fragmented and without identity.
February 2016
7
Libya, Italy, and the War on Terror
A Socio-Political Analysis of the International Intervention in
Libya and its Geopolitical Consequences on Libyan Stability
and Italian Security
Valentina Cantori
Introduction
Although post-colonial theories have flourished since the end of
World War II, setting the stage for the emergence of a new world order
completely freed from the “colonial gaze” of the past, recent news
about Libya seems to confirm the importance of ex-colonial ties, which
have laid the basis for certain privileged economic relationships that
shape our present world. Indeed, following the collapse of the last
attempt, made by the international community under the aegis of the
UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya), to build a unitary
government in the country, statements made by prominent U.S. and
European politicians have envisaged an international military
intervention in order, it is said, to block ISIS’ increasing expansion in
the country. And, as predicted by the pattern usually followed in the
post-colonial period, Italy is among those countries which seem to be
more willing to lead the military intervention, for reasons that range
from the need to protect Italian corporations’ interests in Libya to the
urgency to reaffirm itself as a protagonist on the international sphere
Libya in the Mist
8
and not merely a minor character acting in the shadow of the “Great
Powers” of our time.
The aim of the present paper is that of debunking and unveiling the
dynamics that led to the current stalemate in Libya, addressing the
worrying growing presence of ISIS in certain areas as well as
questioning the viability and benefits of a possible international military
intervention in a country already devastated by years of political
instability, insurgencies, and war. In doing so, both an historical and a
socio-political analysis will be carried out, framing the planned military
intervention in Libya in the most recent theories on war that have been
elaborated in the academic field.
1. Libya, the “stateless state” between jihadism and
international intervention
Dirk Vandewalle interestingly defines the kind of governmental
apparatus built by Qadhafi after the Zuwara cultural revolution in 1973
as a “stateless state” (2012: 96), highlighting the absolute centralization
of power in the Colonel’s hands and the complete absence of state
institutions that could possibly give birth to a civil society in nuce. This
definition is important to bear in mind when dealing with the analysis
of the Libyan political scenario after the General’s toppling and death,
on October 23, 2011, for three main reasons. First, the absence of a
pre-existing institutional apparatus may be considered one of the
reasons that made the post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization
February 2016
9
process in the country so difficult to attain. In fact, after a first phase
dominated by the NTC (National Transitional Council), during which
the Qadhafi opposition appeared unified against the common enemy
notwithstanding the ideological differences between the various
factions, the new phase inaugurated by the election, in July 2012, of the
GNC (General National Congress), responsible for the formation of a
national parliament, saw the increase in intra- and inter-group discord.
Libya was a country to build, not to re-build. And the political actors,
most of whom had had experience neither in political life nor in state
and institution building before, quickly resorted to identity politics
abandoning the much-needed pragmatic stance that characterized the
first months of the NTC (Mezran, Alunni, 2015).
Second, looking at Libya as a “stateless state” helps us understand
why international intervention was so fundamental in 2011 to guarantee
Libyan Cleavages Source: Limes
Libya in the Mist
10
the possibility of a non-negotiating attitude of the opposition factions
as well as the complete ousting of the Colonel. As Mezran puts it in his
most recent analysis (2015), opposition forces, militarily too weak to
face the regime, were nonetheless backed by the international
community.
The military and logistic backing on the part of NATO put the rebels
in a strong position against an otherwise too powerful regime, thus
making opposition unwilling to come to terms with elements linked to
the previous regime1 and adopting a non-conciliatory and non-
negotiable stance towards the conflict. Interestingly enough, this same
non-conciliatory approach is the one that led to the recent failed
negotiations brokered by the U.N. special envoy Martin Kobler, whose
appointment in October 2015 revitalized the negotiation process in
war-torn Libya (Varvelli, 2015), albeit resulting in the rejection of the
new U.N.-backed unitary government by the internationally-recognized
Parliament based in Tobrouk on January 25, 2016.
Third, the mere fact that Libya used to and continue being a “stateless
state” is an interesting starting point for analyzing the spread of jihadism
in the country, the aspect of the Libyan “knot” that seems to be the
main concern to be addressed, ranking first on Western political agenda
and worrying Libyan (pseudo-)institutional actors. Indeed, on February
3, 2016, the head of the intelligence in the city of Misrata, Isma’il Shukri,
1 The Political and Isolation Law passed by the GNC in May 2013 being a clear example
of the attempt by the new political actors to exclude from the government every
personality that could be associated with the Qadhafi regime (David, Mzioudet, 2014).
February 2016
11
told the BBC that many senior commanders of ISIS have arrived in
Libya, particularly in the town of Sirte that is already under ISIS’ control,
posing an unprecedented threat to an already chaotic situation on the
ground in Libya, torn by the civil war between the two rivaling factions
of Libya Dawn, based in Tripoli and Islamist-oriented, and Operation
Karama (Dignity), based in Tobrouk, guided by General Haftar, and
more secular (even if speaking of secularism in Libya is almost
impossible since all political actors recognize the importance of religion
in the public sphere, even though they differ as far as the degree of its
importance is concerned)2. As a consequence of both the failure of the
U.N.-backed negotiation and the alarming news of an ever increasing
presence of ISIS in the country, at the anti Daesh/IS meeting held in
Rome on February 2, 2016, Western powers seriously discussed the
possibility of a military intervention in the country to prevent ISIS from
gaining a stronghold few kilometers from European shores.
A digression is worth mentioning here in order to track the rise of
ISIS in Libya. On February 15, 2015, a video showing the beheading of
21 Egyptian Copts by an ISIS-affiliated group was released, marking the
presence of the Islamic State in the Mediterranean country. Since then,
ISIS, and ISIS-affiliated groups that pledged allegiance (ba’ya) to the
Caliphate, have spread in the coastal region of the country, specifically
2 Interesting here is the inaugural speech made by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the NTC chairman
after Qadhafi’s ousting on October 23, 2011, in which he proclaimed the importance of
Islam as the religion of the country on which the constitution should be based. (see The
New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/world/africa/revolution-
won-top-libyan-official-vows-a-new-and-more-pious-state.html ).
Libya in the Mist
12
controlling the city of Sirte and an extended area both East and West
of the city (The New York Times, Feb. 2016). In trying to analyze the
reasons why ISIS could enter the war-torn country, one can start by
looking at the area where it managed to gain territorial control. In fact,
the city of Sirte has historically been the stronghold of the Qaddafa
tribe, the one Colonel Muammar belonged to, and which has been
ostracized and excluded from any kind of political dialogue after the
toppling of the regime. Consequently, this simple fact demonstrates
how inclusion, rather than exclusion, of the various political souls of
the country is the major factor preventing the spreading of ISIS in the
region. As happened in Iraq and Syria in 2014, the ignored groups
(notwithstanding the cleavages on which they mutually differentiate
from each other, either religious, ethnic, or merely ideological) tend to
be more prone to accepting ISIS’ radical ideology not because of the
power of the ideology itself (or not only, at least), but following a
utilitarian rational calculus in the attempt to overturn the present
negative situation of the group in question (Sunni in Iraq after the
election of al-Maliki are a good example at stake [PBS Frontline, 2014]).
Furthermore, the historical legacy of jihadism in Libya constitutes
another variable that plays an important role in explaining the rise of
ISIS in Libya. Even though Qadhafi did his best to harshly repress any
Islamist insurgency, particularly frequent in the Eastern region, once a
stronghold of the Sanusi monarchy, an Islamist armed wing operated in
the country since 1990, namely the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
(LIFG) (Ashour, 2012), whose members participated in the Afghan
February 2016
13
jihad in 1979. Thus, an armed struggle ideology had already been
present in the country, even after the de-radicalization phase promoted
by Qadhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam (Ashour, 2011), violent ideology that
found fertile ground for taking root in the chaotic post-revolutionary
period. Libya, as a “stateless state,” does not stick to the internationally
recognized principle that defines a state as a political unit that exercises
the monopoly of legitimate violence on a given territorial unity. As a
matter of fact, an unspecified number of militias are de facto controlling
the territory, changing alliances, and making the situation even more
fluid and impossible to control, an environment where ISIS is likely to
thrive. Indeed, according to recent estimates, the number of ISIS
fighters in Libya has been dramatically increasing, ranging nowadays
from 5,000 to 6,500, having doubled since the fall, and likely to increase
in the short-run (The New York Times, Feb. 2016). In addition, Libya
ranks second in the list of countries for the number of ISIS’ attacks,
Libya in the Mist
14
preceded only by Egypt3. This situation is alarming Western powers and
jeopardizing Italian interests in the country.
Consequently, against the background of the derail of international
diplomatic efforts to start a stabilizing political process in the country
and the concomitant rise of ISIS, Italian Foreign Affairs Minister Paolo
Gentiloni delivered a speech in which he supported a possible military
intervention in the country even in the absence of a Libyan formal
request of intrusion, following U.S. Gen. Dunford’s statement at the
end of January and echoing Secretary of State John Kerry’s words in
Rome on February 2, 2016, promising ISIS’ defeat in Libya and praising
the leadership role played by Italy both in the Iraqi intervention as well
as in Libya’s negotiation process (ANSAmed, Feb. 2016). This radical
shift in the approach on the part of the international community to the
Libyan “knot” comes with much surprise, given also the recent
3 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/17/world/middleeast/map-isis-
attacks-around-the-world.html.
Gentiloni and Kerry. Source: NY Times
February 2016
15
statements made by Gentiloni himself on January 15, 2016 (Farnesina,
Jan. 2016) which seemed to bank on the instruments of international
diplomacy to secure the country as the first step towards ISIS’ defeat
and the preservation of Italian strategic interests.
Thus, which will be the possible consequences of a military
intervention in Libya both on the stability of the African country and
on Italian security? Which will be the unwanted effects that it could
have on the rise of ISIS as a regional power in the Mediterranean? And,
eventually, would it be worth for Italy to take part, and lead, such an
intervention? In order to give an answer to these questions, using the
analytical instruments provided by the socio-political theories on war,
we will put forth an argumentation on the undesirability of the military
intervention, forecasting the possible future regional dynamics.
2. The international military intervention: a “total” war?
The Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) greatly
contributed to the elaboration of a theory on war by asserting that it
fundamentally constitutes a social phenomenon, which can be defined
as the “continuation of politics/policy by other means” (Sharma,
2014b). Furthermore, in his theory he distinguished between three
major types of war among which two are worth citing here for the sake
of our analysis, namely the so-called “limited war,” characterized by
Libya in the Mist
16
lower levels of violence, and the “total war,” which, on the contrary,
generates high levels of brutality (Sharma, 2014a)4.
Which are the conditions that give birth to either a “limited” or a
“total” war?5 According to Sharma (2014b), war is always caused by
change because it always entails an attempt at modifying the status quo.
Logically, there will always be groups inside a certain society or among
societies themselves, i.e. we can look at these dynamics both at the
societal-dyadic level and at the systemic one (Levy, 1998), that will resist
to the change in the status quo, ultimately resorting to violence under
certain conditions. In Sharma’s analysis, based on von Clausewitz’s
model, the change in the status quo that might generate war is of two
types, namely either a change in rank and status, or a change in the
institutions of rank and status. As for the first case, the change is about
who rules a certain country, society, group, or “survival units,” the latter
being the name given to the basic analytical tool used in the sociology
of war by Norbert Elias (Kaspersen, 2014). Empirically, it has been
demonstrated that a war concerning rank and status (when and if it
breaks out) will be characterized by lower levels of violence (e.g., most
4 The third category, that of “absolute war” has been left aside in the present analysis since
it presupposes the complete overlapping of both war, i.e. the political aims to be pursued,
and warfare, i.e. the actual struggling, a situation in which violence would be the end in
itself and which does not seem to find empirical evidence 5 It has to be noticed that “total” here is used here with a much broader meaning than
that usually associated with the term, especially in the historical field, where “total” wars
are considered the World Wars that interested much of the world’s state. Here is the
meaning is related to the intensity in the use of violence itself.
February 2016
17
of the coups in history have followed this pattern), thus making it
possible to classify it as “limited” in terms of violence.
On the other hand, as for the second case, when the dimension of
the wanted change touches the institutions, meaning legitimate power
configurations in society, aimed at preserving rank a status inside a given
survival unit, then the level of violence in the war (when and if it breaks
out) would be high and likely to increase with time, thus categorizing it
as a “total” war. Indeed, in this second scenario, the two (or more)
parties at dispute do not share a set of common rules concerning the
conduct of the war which institutions, as template of behavior to be
followed, dictate. In addition to this, by questioning the nature of the
ranking system itself, the
parties to the conflict
would not consider each
other as equals, thus
escalating the level of
violence of the conflict. In
a nutshell, while in the first
case war is conducted
under the rules of law, in the second one violence is illegitimate as it is
not regulated by a common set of shared principles.
Following this theoretical model on war, it is interesting to analyze
the current developments regarding the Libyan issue as well as the
planning of a military intervention in the country against ISIS, strongly
supported by Italy. As a starting point, few preliminary observations
Militia Fighting in Sirte. Source: NY Times
Libya in the Mist
18
need be put forth. First of all, in order to determine whether the planned
international military intervention could develop into a “total” war, it is
necessary to analyze whether the stakes of the conflict pertain to the
first category, i.e. rank and status, or to the second one, i.e. the
institutions of rank and status. And the answer seems to be pretty
straightforward for everyone who has even a basic knowledge of the
kind of confrontation that has been taking place over the last few years.
The so-called Islamic State is heralding a new kind of society (even
though its ideologues assume it to mirror the ancient Islamic society at
the time of the first Companions of the Prophet, i.e. the Salaf),
completely rejecting any kind of human-made institution, given the
assumption that only God alone can be the ruler, and no other man
should have decisional power as for how society should be organized
(tawhid al-hakimiyya, i.e. the oneness of rule/government). Thus,
democracy, as the rule of the majority in respect of minorities, results
quintessentially antithetical to the Weltanschauung of ISIS’ affiliates and
to the kind of institutional state they want (and are trying to) build.
Without delving too deeply into the issue, it is nonetheless
fundamental to observe how the religious cleavage plays only a marginal
role into our analysis. Even though the War on Terror, declared after
the 9/11 attacks, has been largely portrayed as a fight between an
Islamic violent element and a secular Western one (almost equating
secular liberal democracy to a religion), things are much more complex
than this and entails the refusal to recognize the relative societal
institutions from both parties at stake and this stance on the matter can
February 2016
19
help shed light on the violent and brutal dynamics that the war Italy and
other Western allies are planning to wage against ISIS in Libya might
assume. As Mustafa Akyol argues in an opinion article recently
published on The New York Times (Feb. 2016), “religion is not actually
the heart of these conflicts – invariably, politics is to blame.”
Secondly, in order to categorize this future conflict into the general
socio-political category of “total” war, an analysis of the so-called jus in
bello, i.e. the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law,
needs be in place. As is well known, ISIS does not comply to any of the
main and core principles that Western countries recognize as the basic
(humanitarian) rules that should (in line of principle) regulate the
behavior during wars. First and foremost, the distinction between
civilians/civilian objects and military objectives (Dinstein, 2010), the
case of the terrorist attacks, whose list is sadly too long to report here,
being a clear example at stake. While Western countries recognize the
existence of both a set of conventional and customary laws by which all
parties should abide, the same is not true for fighters of the Caliphate,
who abide just by the law of God (or, better to say, their own
reinterpretation and narrative of Qu’ranic prescriptions) refusing the
corpus of international laws as a human-made creation that contradicts
God’s will6.
6 For more about the way ISIS is building his state, reinterpreting and reinventing
traditional Muslim norms see: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-04-
15/caliphate-law.
Libya in the Mist
20
On a second level of analysis, the idea that all parties to conflict are
treated equally in their rights and obligations (Dinstein, 2010) does not
apply again to the situation that is going to take place in Libya in the
fight against ISIS. The contending parties do not respect each other as
equals, a situation that is likely to lead to an escalation in the use of
violence, especially in terms of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamic
State’s fighters willing to become martyrs in the name of God, putting
into practice ISIS’ martyrdom rhetoric (Devji, 2005). Thus, the political
logic of war may exacerbate the warfare, i.e. the actual fighting,
producing a high level of casualties that are likely not to be confined to
the boundaries of Libya.
Last but not least, the prohibition of reprisals is another customary
rule of international law that would not apply to the conflict Italy is
planning to take part in since ISIS strategy against the West seems to be
exactly based on this principle, i.e. punishing Western states responsible
for Crusader campaigns against the dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam).
Indeed, one of ISIS main leitmotifs in its propaganda is that of an
historical and almost mythical battle of jihadists (i.e. “true” Muslim
believers)7 against Crusaders, putting forth a dangerous as well as
stereotyping Manichean ideology that is both easy to “sell” to the public
and functional to carry out its murderous plans.
7 A re-theorization of what means to be a true Muslim that is based on the idea, first
elaborated by Sayyid Qutb and Salman al-Faraj, that jihad is not a collective duty (fard
kifeiyya), merely defensive in nature, but rather an individual duty (fard ‘ayn) that every
single Muslim should take on.
February 2016
21
For all the above-mentioned
reasons, the war that may start in
Libya in the next weeks might be
well classified as a “total” war
whose costs will be likely to
outnumber the benefits both for
the future of Libya as a unitary
and independent state where we
expect a democratic state-building
process will be in place, as well as
for Western countries, and Italy
above all of them, that will
position themselves at the frontline of the battle. Although, according
to Fearon (1995), war as a social phenomenon is always costly, we
forecast the cost of the planned war under analysis to be dramatically
high, given both the world dimension that the War on Terror entails
and the level of violence irrespective of human rights that it is likely to
cause.
The next section will explore the future geopolitical scenarios that
may arise were the war waged against ISIS’ positions in Libya, taking
into account both the future of Libya and, consequently, of Italian
political interests in the country, as well as the possible repercussions
that Western states will have to face against the blind logic of terror
applied by Islamic State fighters, given also the threats posed to Italian
security by ISIS’ official statements, starting from the infamous
Dabiq Magazine. Source: Ibtimes
Libya in the Mist
22
document written in Italian language and appeared on the web in
February 2015 and presenting itself as an apology of the Islamic State
political program8, to the image of the Vatican conquered by ISIS on
the front cover of Dabiq, to the latest video divulged by the Mauritanian
press agency al-Akhbar containing a statement by an Aqmi (al-Qaeda in
the Maghreb) leader accusing Italians of the colonial invasion of Tripoli
(Il Sole 24 Ore, Jan. 2016). It is not one of the aims of the present paper
to investigate the reasons why al-Qaeda, which refused to pledge
allegiance to the Islamic State, is launching this message to Italy.
Nonetheless, it is worth briefly noticing that the fluidity of alliances in
Libya, both due to tribal kinships and to the magmatic Islamist armed
groups active in the area, make it possible a future siding of Aqmi with
the “winning” ISIS, as well as the opposite might be true, being this a
strategy Aqmi is pursuing to regain power in the area in opposition to
the expansion of the Islamic State.
3. Conclusions: geopolitical consequences of Italian
Interventionism
In carrying out the present analysis of the geopolitical consequences
of an Italian intervention in Libya, siding with the Western coalition
engaged in militarily fighting ISIS, we will look at two different levels of
threats that this interventionist approach may pose. On the one hand,
the investigation will look at the possible internal scenarios that may
8 http://www.itstime.it/w/lo-stato-islamico-una-realta-che-ti-vorrebbe-comunicare-il-
documento-di-is-in-italiano-by-marco-lombardi/.
February 2016
23
unfold in Libya and their consequences on the on-going diplomatic
state-building process, which suffered a set-back after the rejection of
the unity government backed by the U.N., aimed at pacifying the
country ravaged by civil war since the Spring of 2014. Being the internal
stability of Libya of outmost importance for the preservation of Italian
geostrategic and economic interests, the analysis will show the negative
effects that, consequently, a failed internal stabilization of the country
will have on Italian relevant interests. On the other hand, the macro
level will be also taken into account, investigating how an international
military intervention would only legitimize ISIS’ Manichean ideology,
recruiting even more foreign fighters to their cause and strengthening
them, thus obtaining exactly the opposite result to the one the
intervention is aimed at achieving.
As already stated, the military intervention would have dire
consequences on the already magmatic and chaotic internal dynamics
of Libya, mainly in three respects. First of all, it will further exacerbate
the internal rivalries between the many militias of the most disparate
affiliations, which are actually exercising territorial control of the
country. In fact, it has to be noted that three main sets of affiliations
intertwine in the Libyan panorama, complicating an already composite
mosaic, namely the tribal, the regional and the political/religious ones
(Pack, 2013). Contrary to common assumptions, all the three kinds of
affiliations appear to be all but stable, being rather fluid and changing
according to the present needs of the various groups on the ground.
And this ontological fluidity of affiliations has been increasingly
Libya in the Mist
24
growing in Libya in the chaotic situation in which the country has sunk
in the post-Qadhafi period. Furthermore, as Wherey and Lacher
asserted (Foreign Affairs, Feb. 2016), the two big adversaries on the
ground, the Libya Dawn coalition and the organizations under the
Dignity operation umbrella are actually only nominally existing, being
internally highly fractured, as the map below (as of March 2015) shows9:
Secondly, waging war against ISIS in Libya could be seen by the
Islamist opposition groups, based in Tripoli and part of the Libya Dawn
coalition, as a Western tactics to intrude into the country and to
eliminate all Islamist oppositions, making the new unity government
appear as if it is surrendering Libya’s sovereignty (Foreign Affairs, Feb.
2016). This may, consequently, lead Islamist groups (or some of them)
9 http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59268.
Factional Fighting in Eastern Libya
Source: NY Times
February 2016
25
or other militias whatsoever to ally with the Islamic State, now having
territorial control in Sirte and the surrounding coastal area. Moreover,
this military intervention would characterize as completely unilateral. As
Varvelli put forth in one of his most recent commentaries (Varvelli,
Feb. 2016), until few days ago it had been considered necessary for
embarking on a military intervention in the country the ratification of
the measure from a newly elected parliament or, at least, a formal
request by Libyan factions. Thus, intervening unilaterally would appear
as a violation of state authority (even given the “stateless state” situation
in the country), further distancing the possibility of a diplomatic
resolution to Libyan instability. Ergo, the level of intra-violence would
increase dramatically, caused by the overlapping of both foreign
intervention and internal militia intra-fighting plus the already attested
high levels of violence enacted by ISIS as a standard way of “policy-
making” for the group.
Last but not least, an external military intervention of any kind would
prevent all the parties struggling on the ground from reaching that
hurting stalemate moment which will make the moment “ripe”
(Zartman, 2000) for successfully reaching conflict resolution and for
ensuring a positive outcome to the negotiations. According to the
ripeness theory, the parties at a conflict will be willing to reach a
diplomatic solution only when the moment is ripe, namely when they
reach the so-called Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) (Mezran and
Alunni, 2015), a deadlock which is negative and painful for all the
Libya in the Mist
26
parties at conflict and which is inevitably prevented from external
interference, as will be if Western allies intervene in Libya.
Form this analysis, it seems straightforward that the warfare (coming
back to the analytical tools previously presented) would characterize
itself as extremely violent, whereas it has still to be clearly understood
the political aim/s, i.e. the war dimension. Namely, which are the
political objectives that Italy and the international coalition want to
pursue? It is not still well-defined what this war is aiming for (Varvelli,
Feb. 2016): ISIS’ containment, state-building, protection of the existing
infrastructures, or what else? Without a clear-cut set of objectives, the
risk is that of embarking on (another) never-ending war that will give
ISIS the opportunity to thrive in a lacerated country.
On the other hand, looking at the macro-systemic level, as indicated
at the beginning of this section, Italy and Western allies’ military
intervention would only strengthen the kind of rhetorical propaganda
on which ISIS relies to gain new recruits and support, namely the idea
of a present-day Crusade of the West against Muslim lands. As Stephen
M. Walt insightfully asserted, “Today, U.S. efforts to ‘degrade and
ultimately destroy’ the Islamic State […] could enhance its prestige,
reinforce its narrative of Western hostility to Islam, and bolster its claim
to be Islam’s stauncher defender” (Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2015).
In ISIS’ attempt to convince its followers to embark on such a costly
project, it is fundamental to use propaganda in order to portray its
enemies as evil and, it comes with no surprise, attacking them would
February 2016
27
just be used as an empirical proof of the validity of their simplistic
dichotomic ideology of good versus evil.
Furthermore, the validation of their ideology through a direct military
attack will put Italian interests both in Libya and, possibly, in Italy at
risk. As for Libya, the economic ties of our country to the North
African state in terms of gas and oil production and supply are well
known. As reported by Stefania
Coco Scalisi (Mediterranean
Affairs, 2016), Eni CEO,
Claudio Descalzi, forecast the
doubling of the oil production
in the country by 2019, thus
stressing the extreme
importance of stability also for
the economic interests of Italy.
As for the internal
consequences, needless to say,
the possibility of direct terrorist
attacks on Italian land will statistically increase, if not for direct planned
attacks by ISIS leaderships, whose interest for Italy has still to be
proven, at least on the part of individuals inspired by ISIS propaganda,
whose examples are present all over the world, the San Bernardino
attack in California on December 2, 2015, not ISIS-claimed but ISIS-
inspired, being a pertinent instance.
Western Libya Gas Project
Source: ENI website
Libya in the Mist
28
This section aimed at demonstrating that Italian possible future
military intervention in Libya, officially against ISIS positions in the
country, as part of the War on Terror, will be counterproductive in
mainly four respects. First, if the main political aim of the international
community is that of achieving stability in Libya, then the prospect of a
military intervention will be likely to yield the opposite result, increasing
state and regional instability and preventing a Mutually Hurting
Stalemate (MHS) from taking place, thus not making the moment ripe
for fruitful negotiations between the parties at conflict. Second, the
intervention will facilitate ISIS spread in an even more divided and
lacerated country, since its Manichean ideology will be strengthened by
the use of unilateral force on the part of Western countries, lending
credibility to ISIS good versus evil narrative. Third, the military
campaign will put Italian interests at risk both in Libya, in terms of
security of oil production sites, and back home, in terms of increased
likelihood of ISIS-inspired, if not ISIS-claimed, terrorist attacks against
considerable national targets. Last but not least, according to the war
model put forth in section 2, this military intervention will be
characterized by high levels of violence, producing lots of casualties
among the civilian population, given the non-mutually recognition of
the parties at stake as equals, not accepting the same “rules of the game”
(namely, international humanitarian law). In this respect, this
intervention can be defined as a “total” war between two different sets
of institutional models on which society should be built and based.
February 2016
29
Libya and Italy relations Historical approach
Foreign policy between national interests and political
solutions
Giulia Formichetti
1. Italy and Libya in the Past: A “Privileged Partnership”10
1.1. Italian foreign policy to Libya before the “Day of
Rage”
Italy and Libya relations date back to the beginning of the 20th
century, when in the summer of 1911 the European south-peninsular
State started the Italo-Turkish war, invading the Libyan part of the
Ottoman Empire, after having put forward the first claims over it
during the 1878 Congress of Berlin and in 1902 signed a secret treaty
with France to carve up some areas of the Maghreb region. If the Italian
appropriation of the North-African territory started with the provinces
of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1911, larger areas were annexed in the
1920s and under the fascist government in 1934, Italian Libya was
10 Italy’s Foreign Trade Minister, Piero Fassino, said at a trade conference in Rome in
December 1999.
Libya in the Mist
30
born11. The Italian colonial past continued to play a significant role in
shaping the relations between the two countries, when Libya was by the
time independent and
proclaimed as the
kingdom of Libya first,
and the Great Socialist
People’s Libya Arab
Jamahiria then, after the
coup of Muamar al-
Qadhafi. As a matter of
fact, the crimes and
atrocities executed by Italian colonists and the bad reputation that they
had produced as “Italiani non brava gente”12 fostered the anti-colonial and
anti-Italian sentiment. Despite of this, the relations between the two
countries never completely interrupted. Italian government already
deemed as necessary to safeguard the connection with such a close
neighbour in the Mediterranean south, for security reasons. The
partnership became an imperative when in 1959 Libya discovered oil
reserves under its soil. Al-Qadhafi coming to power seemed to cause a
diplomatic crisis (Ronzitti, 2009): hence, the anti-colonial rhetoric,
11 More on this, see Ali Abdullatif Ahmida (1994) The Making of Modern Libya, SUNY
Press; Jerary, M. “Damages Caused by the Italian Fascist Colonization of Libya,” in Ben-
Ghiat and Fuller, eds., Italian Colonialism (2005), 203-208. Nicola Labanca. “Studies and
Research on Fascist Colonialism,” in A Place in the Sun, ed. Patrizia Palumbo (Berkeley,
2003), 37-61. Jesse Russell, Ronald Cohn (2012) History of Libya As Italian Colony, Book
on demand; Segre, C.G. (1974), Fourth shore : the Italian colonization of Libya, Chicago
12 Angelo Del Boca (1988, 1994), Gli Italiani in Libia, (I e II vol.), Bari, Milano: Laterza,
Oscar Mondadori. Angelo del Boca (2005) Italiani, brava gente?. Neri Pozza.
Picture postcard of Italian colonialism period Source: nomoreblogs
February 2016
31
associated with the requests for compensation for the colonial
occupation were leitmotif of the Colonel’s attitude towards the former
colonial power. However, this never prevented the two parties from
maintaining close ties during next decades.
Since the beginning of the 1970s, Italy wanted to play a significant
role in the international arena, in particular in the nearby Mediterranean
neighbourhood, and reinforcing the ties with Libya seemed to be the
right strategy to pursue. Following this path, during the 1970s, Italy
reinforced its role as “bridge”13 between Libya and the West. Italy also
exploited Libyan economic development, by pursuing investments on
the territory: in 1974, an Economic and Scientific Co-operation
Agreement was signed in exchange for 7 million tons of oil per year.
Then, in 1976, al-Qadhafi’s Libya acquired 10 per cent of Fiat’s shares
(Merzan & De Maio, 2007). After the acme reached at the end of the
1970s, when Italy played a key role in softening Libyan opposition
towards Camp David Accords (1978), Reagan administration shifted
the international ground, by hardening the American attitude (and
consequently the European one) towards the Libyan Colonel. Facing
this change, Italy continued to pursue its realistic approach, by adopting
a “diplomatic compromise” (De Maio, 2006) to preserve economic interests
and to avoid to put in peril its political image and relations with both
the West and Libya. Following more difficult diplomatic crises,14 the
13 Merzan & De Maio, 2007 14 The terrorist attack which occurred in West Berlin’s La Belle Nightclub; the American
response which culminated in the bombing of both Benghazi and Tripoli (aimed at
destroying Qadhafi’s political regime); the missiles which Tripoli used in order to attack
Libya in the Mist
32
explicit condemnation of Libya as supporter of international terrorism
and as part of the list of the “rogue states,” and the heavy sanctions by
the international community, relations between Italy and Libya cooled
down, as the European country understood when it was the time to
please the Western partners.
However, since al-Qadhafi feared the international isolation would
have caused economic loss and disinvestments, Libya’s progressively
opened to the West at the end of 1990s, backed by Italy’s diplomatic
and political co-operation. Again Italy embodied its role of “bridge”
between Libya and Europe (Merzan & De Maio, 2007).
The normalization of relations was also facilitated thanks to a series
of bilateral agreements stipulated already at the end of the 1990s:
Agreement on Tourism (1998); Consular Convention (1998);
Agreement on the promotion and protection of investments (2000);
Agreement on Cultural Cooperation (2003).15 Three documents part of
this mosaic of agreements have a more political significance. Among
them, the “Verbal Process” of July 1998, which addressed the issue of
coordinated management of migration; secondly, the “Memorandum of
intent,” signed in December 2000 and aiming at tackling drug
trafficking, terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration (Marchi,
Whitman, Edwards, 2015). Last but not least, the “Treaty of Friendship,
Italy’s southern island of Lampedusa; the bombing of the Pan Am flight no. 103 and the
subsequent UN sanctions and embargos.
15 See Benedetto Conforti, Luigi Ferraro Bravo, Francesco Francioni, Natalino Ronzitti,
Giorgio Sacerdoti, eds. (2004) The Italian Yearbook of International Law, Volume XIV.
Leiden Boston: Martinus Nujhoff Publisher.
February 2016
33
Partnership and Cooperation” signed in Benghazi in 2008, between the
General and the Italian Prime Minister at the time, Silvio Berlusconi
(Ronzitti, 2009). This document which dramatically strengthened the
ties between the Italian peninsula and the Libyan Jamahiria involved, on
top of economic and cultural cooperation, the fight of terrorism and
criminal organisations, the spilling of USD 5 billion over the next 20
years to serve the realization of basic infrastructures.16 Although the
Treaty did not explicitly declare the reason of the disbursement, it was
widely recognised that it also served the aim of compensating Libyan
population from the atrocities of the colonial period (Marchi, Whitman,
Edwards, 2015). Bearing in mind the developments of Libyan political
(dis)order and international community reaction at the beginning of the
2000s, it is interesting to call the attention to two interesting parts of the
Treaty: first, the prohibition to carry out a contentious action against
each other’s territory and to allow that each other’s territory could be
use by a third party (both state and non-state actor) to carry out such
contentious action. Secondly, article 6 of the Treaty, sealing the
commitment to respect and act accordingly with the dispositions of the
UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Ronzitti,
2009).
16 As Ronzitti 2009 remarks, the 5 billion dollars are not directly handled to Libya. Rather,
they will be managed by Italy and Italian company will be in charge of the works.
Libya in the Mist
34
1.2. Italian national interests towards Libya: Illegal
migration and natural resources
The 2008 Treaty also aimed at substantiating a real partnership
between the two countries as a way to be a guarantee for Italian security,
of its territory and its citizens. Therefore, the partnership involved first
and foremost the fight against illegal migration and the collaboration in
natural resources and energy fields.
Before having an insight into the nature of these interests Italy put
on top of its list when structuring its foreign policy towards Libya, it
deems as necessary to explore the political science literature on the
nature of national interest (Abdalla A. Kashiam, 2012).
In details, national interest can be for example defined in terms of
power. In his Politics among Nations (1985), Morgenthau argued that every
political action is seen as directed toward keeping, increasing, or
demonstrating power: “Remember that the golden age of isolated normalcy is
gone forever and that no effort, however great, and no action, however radical, will
bring it back. Remember that diplomacy without power is feeble, and power without
diplomacy is destructive and blind. Remember that no nation’s power is without
limits, and hence that its policies must respect the power and interests of others.”
(Morgenthau, 1947). On the other hand, Rourke and Boyer (2000, pp.
159–196) emphasized the importance of cooperation and
interdependency in international relations. Duncan et al. (2004, p. 150)
instead overlapped the concept of national interest with the one of core
objectives, enumerating among others, “territorial security, political
independence and economic vitality.” Neuchterlein (1976) elaborated the
February 2016
35
concept of national interest as “the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign
state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment.”
Through the combination of the variable of national interest and that
of national government’s strategy, Italian foreign policy towards Libya
had a “clear interest-driven approach.” (Miranda, 2011)
Therefore, all the aforementioned definitions are somehow true
when analyzing Italian foreign policy to Libya. It is true that the Italian
national interest is driven by the will of affirming national power and
playing a relevant role in the Mediterranean, in face of other European
and at large Western countries. It is valid to argue that cooperation and
interdependence between Italy and Libya serve the purpose of
safeguarding the national interests of territorial security, political
independence and economic vitality, which are also the core objective
of the peninsula’s foreign policy.
Illegal migration from Africa to Italy has always been perceived as
one of the main threat to stability and security. Italian strategic position
in the Mediterranean Sea makes the country an easy channel for
economic migrants and refugees to access the Old Continent. Indeed,
the Italian shored, particularly the island of Lampedusa and Sicily, have
been witnessing the arrival of numerous boats carrying illegal migrants
from Africa, and also from Libya. The “symbolic power” (Paoletti,
2011) embodied by migration in the European and Western societies
constantly influences diplomatic relations between Italy and the
Mediterranean neighbourhood, allowing Libyan representatives – at the
time al-Qadhafi – to take advantage from it. Hence, embracing Paoletti
Libya in the Mist
36
(2011) argumentation over the “social construction of migration as a societal
threat” and “security concern”, and agreeing that “In an attempt to answer public
anxieties associated with the migrant ‘other’, Italian politicians have constructed an
‘emergency’ narrative inspired by a strongly anti-immigrant stance”, illegal
migrations started to be included among the threats to territorial and
economic security and social stability since late 1990s. By addressing the
issue and by concluding bilateral agreements with the Libyan
authorities, Italy attempted to safeguarding those interests, although in
terms of bilateral relations, the country lost a great portion of its
bargaining power vis-à-vis Libya (Paoletti 2011).
Another component of Italian foreign policy to Libya, always aiming
at safeguarding the national interest, is the collaboration and the
Libya oil and natural gas infrastructure Source: EIA
February 2016
37
partnership in the energy field. Libya is not only a member of the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but also
the holder of Africa’s largest proved crude oil reserves, and the fifth-
largest holder of Africa’s proved natural gas reserves (US Energy
Information Administration). Libya has six large sedimentary basins –
Sirte, Murzuk, Ghadames, Cyrenaica, Kufra –, and the offshore and
about 80% of Libya's recoverable reserves are located in the Sirte basin,
which also accounts for most of the country's oil production capacity.
Libya's oil industry is run by the state-owned National Oil Corporation
(NOC), which is also in charge of implementing the Exploration and
Production Sharing Agreements with international companies. 84% of
Libyan crude oil is exported to Europe.
Natural gas is also a fundamental natural resources in the Libyan soil
and it is exported through the Western Libya Gas Project, implemented
in 2003. It arrives to Italy though the Greenstream pipeline,
implemented in 2004 to enhance Libyan capacity to export.
Furthermore, Italian energy company ENI (Ente Nazionale
Idrocarburi) has been operating in Libya since 1959 and it is historically
the most operative international company on the territory. It is evident
that Italy and Libya again boast mutual interests when the energy issue
is on the table. Therefore, if Italy needs Libyan resources to feed the
country’s societies and industries, Libya counts on Italian investments
and revenues from the sales to fill in the cashier of the Central Bank
and boost the economy.
Libya in the Mist
38
1.3. Italian foreign policy after the “Day of Rage”
The “Arab Spring” which from Tunisia attempted to swept away the
stronghold dictators in the MENA region, went successful in Libya as
well, where the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition
declared on the 17 February 2011 the “Day of Rage” as the formal
beginning of the protests. The Italian government at the time, in the
persons of Frattini and Berlusconi, respectively Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Prime Minister, underestimated the strength and the energy
of the popular movement and thought they could have gone for the
maintenance of the status quo in the “crazy” South Neighbourhood.
The escalation of the events proved the Italian authorities wrong. The
international community condemnation of the violent repressions of
the popular uprisings carried out by the Colonel’s regime were not long
in coming, and soon after in March, under the aegis of UN Security
Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973, the NATO-led Operation Unified
Protector took the initiative against al-Qadhafi regime, pursuing the
protection of the Libyan population, that the government could not
guarantee anymore (R2P doctrine).17 In a very first moment, the Italian
government was not on the first line to blame the Libyan conduct;
rather, it maintained a cautious “neutrality” vis-à-vis the regime and the
rebels. Prime Minister Berlusconi stated he did not want to “disturb”
Gheddafi at such a critical moment (Miranda, 2011). Italy saw its
national interests, territorial security and economic stability – in view of
expected migratory flows and of the uncertain destiny of natural
17 See Eric Posner, 2011, Foreign Policy on the legality of the military intervention in
Libya.
February 2016
39
resources hotspots –, in peril and preferred to stand behind the front
line and meditate over the right steps to take. When the situation was
exacerbated, the Italian government became more critical towards al-
Qadhafi repressive actions, by openly denouncing them and by
consequently suspending the 2008 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Partnership. It is interesting to question whether this changed tune
was in the name of “human protection,”18 or it was the consequence of
a combination of the international pressure – UNSC Resolution 1970
establishing sanctions against Libya and similar measures undertaken by
the EU Council – with Italy’s interest in remaining within the Western
mainstream (Miranda, 2011). The second option better explains the
change. Although Italy had put a strong effort in bridging the Libyan
re-integration into the international community in previous years, at that
time the country and its representatives were not a credible and reliable
counterpart. An explicit commitment with them would have wasted
Italian reputations in front of Western partners.
As a consequence, Italy took more step towards them, and it was one
of the first among EU countries to launch a humanitarian mission to
the Libyan-Tunisian border in order to assist the thousands of refugees;
it participated to the no-fly zone implemented; it offered support in the
NATO Operation by commanding its naval component aimed at
ensuring the respect of the arms embargo (Miranda 2011). As Miranda
(2011) stated, “Italy thus confirmed the prevalence of its Euro-Atlantic
18 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘The New Politics of Protection? Cote D’Ivoire,
Libya, and the Responsibility to Protect’, International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 827–8.
Libya in the Mist
40
commitments over its “special relationship” with Libya.” Furthermore, when in
October 2011, the Transitional National Council (TNC) declared Libya
free from dictatorship, Italy was the third country to recognize it as the
only legitimate interlocutor.
2. Italy and Libya in the Present
2.1. On the Frontline?
As the name suggests, the 2011 Operation Unified Protector
committed to the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas
under the threat of attack, through the establishment of a no-fly zone
and the authorization of the use of military force. Although this
defensive attitude did not imply to depose al-Qadhafi, NATO took an
active part in assisting the rebels’ campaign to overthrow the
government, with some countries sending limited ground forces, and
undertaking efforts to assassinate the Colonel in bombing attacks
(Posner 2011). The Western countries’ mission was to defend Libya
from al-Qadhafi disease, and the easiest way to accomplish this mission
was to eradicate it, relying on the rebels’ energy and discontent,
according to the principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
However, this simple equation could not work in such a complicated
context like the Libyan one: ousting the dictator in charge for decades
would have apparently relieved the civilians from the existing threat, but
would have failed to address all the other consequent and imminent
ones.
February 2016
41
Today, almost five years after the “Day of Rage”, Libya is following
the path to become a failed state and this result should not be surprising.
To understand the dynamics that are driving the present Libyan
disruption, it is not enough to recognize the role played by the popular
uprisings of February 2011 and how the perpetuation of this armed
revolutionary militias structure intensified chaotic and localized power.
Rather, it deems as necessary to understand why such a chaotic and
localized power resulted as the only viable solution after the end of the
dictatorship (Toaldo, 2016). In details, the problem in Libya was not
how to hand over power from the military to the civilians, but how to
rebuilt credible and accountable governmental institutions from scratch
(Toaldo, 2016). After October 2011, the revolution gave birth to an
“organizational desert” (Kienle, 2012), and committed two mistakes:
the perpetuation of local revolutionary militia structure; the
announcement of elections without democracy, in July 2012. Libyan
society had been always characterised by tribalism, strong federalist
sentiment and decentralisation and al-Qadhafi’s dictatorship kept these
elements alive, artificially balancing different centers of power in a
context dominated by localism and regionalism. Consequently, while
tribalism was strong in pre-Qadhafi’s and during Qadhafi’s era, it came
out even stronger during the post-revolution period. In the absence of
a state, the “legitimate use of force” happened to be decentralised, as
well as the security apparatus (Toaldo 2016) and local militia were in
charge of guaranteeing protection to local communities, while
competing for the control of the former state’s assets. The plethora of
Libya in the Mist
42
actors involved at the moment in the Libyan civil warfare19 belongs to
this “decentralization of authoritarianism.”
As Chesterman et al. (2004) suggested, “states cannot be made to work
from outside” and if international assistance seems to be necessary, it is
certainly not enough to establish a legitimate and sustainable
institutional asset.20 However, recalling what said before about the link
between countries’ foreign policy and national interests, it gathers that
States could try to override the impossibility of making another State to
work from outside when national interests are in the running. In this
way, Chesterman’s theoretical assumption is denied.
2.2. The exacerbation of the migrant and the energy crises
Following the “Arab Springs”, the entire region of Middle East and
North Africa precipitated into different and country-specific deadlocks,
which are all still contributing to the instability of the area and its
neighbourhood, and affecting the lives of millions of people hit by
severe humanitarian crises. Libya is a great example of insecure country
at the gates of Europe, threatening the preservation of the results
reached after the popular uprisings by the neighbouring Tunisia, hosting
19 For more details, see The Soufan Group (2016), Libya, Extremism and the
Consequences of Collapse, New York 10019, New York: The Soufan Group. 20 Several example in the history of Western interventions in the South of the world
confirm this assumption. Afghanistan, Iraq among others.
February 2016
43
the competition between regional power which back one or the other
player in the arena,21 menacing the stability of its former colonial power.
Although the country has been experiencing such a critical situation
soon after the ousting of the dictator, the Western community in general
(USA, Great Britain and France), and Italy in particular, have turned
highly concerned to the Libyan case only recently, when the Islamic
State variable entered in the game and tip the balance against their
interests.
Recently, increased traffic of ISIS forces leaving Syria and Iraq for
Libya has been registered. The number of fighters the organization now
21 At the moment, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates are supporting the east
government of Toubruk (General Haftar’s Libyan National Army, committed in the
Operation Dignity, and House of Representative). Turkey and Qatar are instead backing
the west Islamists side of Tripoli (General National Congress – Operation Dawn).
Source: Router
Libya in the Mist
44
has in Libya is estimated at between 3,000 and 5,000, while its presence
in Syria and Iraq has been reduced to 20,000 to 30,000 fighters (Haaretz,
2016). As a matter of fact, the anarchy of the country represents a fertile
ground for jihadists’ implantation. The so called Islamic State’s new
capital – after Raqqa – Sirte allows them to serve as stronghold while
seizing the territory along the coast. The country’s oil abundancy
represents another important element behind IS’s strategy for Libya. If
the competition over the energy assets was already in place among the
national players, the militants of Daesh entered the game, not with the
aim of directly holding oil facilities, rather of damaging them and
preventing the government, embodied by the Central Bank, to get
revenues from oil, to finally create “a deficit of the public funds and create
social and economic upheaval” (Gazzini, 2015). The January 2016 spate of
attacks with a double car bombing at a Petroleum Facilities Guards
outpost near Es Sider serve the outlined purpose.
One of the most evident consequences which initiates a vicious circle
is that the revenues from the oil facilities should also serve to pay the
military sub-division created in 2005 to protect the oil revenues
themselves. If their numbers already swelled to at least 12,000 after the
uprising, and their allegiances are uncertain and their fighting capacity
limited, without a decent payment, their mission misses a strong
commitment and their purpose is then nullified. As a result, the militias
could find other ways to live out of, for example the smuggling of
people across the Mediterranean. Therefore, the Libyan civil war and
consequent security instability have a direct effect in boosting the
February 2016
45
number of refugees crossing the sea. Moreover, holding Sirte, ISIS is a
mere 220 miles from the Italian island of Lampedusa, where thousands
of migrants and refugees have arrived after embarking by boat from
Libya (Wehrey and Lacher, 2016).
The popular uprisings and the consequent crisis tremendously
affected Libya’s oil and natural gas production an export: the current oil
output is just under 400,000 barrels per day, while the country produced
1.65 million barrels per day before 2011 and 594 billion cubic feet of
natural
gas in 2010. This accounted for up to 96 % of government revenue
and 65 % of GDP, allowing Libya to amass cash reserves and run a
debt-free economy for years, but also rendering it almost entirely
dependent on the import food and consumer goods.22
Today political instability and competition have visible consequences
in the economic sector. The three economic authorities, Central Bank
of Libya, National Oil Company and Libyan Investment Authority have
no accountable and unitary management, rather all the players in the
arena try to seize their assets and control a part of them. This
institutional disruption is combined with an economic turmoil, due to
the reduction of crude-oil exports and the sharp decline in international
oil prices (Gazzini, 2015).
A wider economic crisis will not only affect Libya, but also the
countries which boast national interests on its soil and from its export.
22 “Libya Country Report“, International Monetary Fund (IMF), May 2013, pp. 22-23
Libya in the Mist
46
Italy is one of them, if not the first. Italy not only could suffer from the
shrunk production on natural resources, but also from the fact that the
militants could eventually seize control of Libya’s Mediterranean Sea
ports, oil terminals and even border crossings. Off-shore platforms
owned by Italian and other foreign oil firms would also come under
threat (Wehrey and Lacker, 2016).
2.3. Western Interventionism: in the name of what and
under which mandate?
In front of such a complex threat, the international community at
first implemented two remedies, the first, European-led, namely the
European Union Border Assistant Mission (EUBAM); the second UN-
sponsored, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSIMIL). Both missions
aimed at working in favour of a political solution for Libya, by
sponsoring the dialogue between the parties confronting each other in
the arena. On the other hand, the aim of the possible intervention of
the anti-IS coalition should be to tackle the Islamic State problem, to
pull back al-Baghdadi’s militants and protect the national interests of
most affected countries, with Italy among them.
According to international law this military intervention – different
from the political dialogue UN pushes for – could take place through
five possible scenarios (Ronzitti, 2015):
February 2016
47
Legitimate Defence: Italy for example could intervene, in case of an
attack from a terrorist group coming from the Libyan coast, without
asking for the authorisation from the UN Security Council;
Peacekeeping operation: following a UN Security Council
Resolution, military, police and civilian personnel, would to deliver
security, political and early peacebuilding support, without taking any
side in the fight and without using force;
Peacekeeping enforcement: under the authorisation of the UN
Security Council, a dispatch of international forces would remain stable
on the Libyan territory and would foster peace and institutional
reconstruction;
Request from the acting Libyan government: this possibility was
recently called in by Italian Minister of Defence Pinotti.23
Clearly, this implies that the UN-sponsored mission to favour
dialogue among the Libyan parties and the formation of the
Government of National Accord come out successful. Even if this
happens, Italy should still be aware that alone cannot provide sufficient
forces for an operation of the magnitude the situation in Libya now
requires. Italy – as well as the other member of the anti-IS coalition –
should also be aware of the ruinous consequences that a military
operation in Libya could provoke: launching airstrikes would only
23 Ansa, 2016, February 4, Military intervention in Libya 'not imminent' – Pinotti
http://www.ansa.it/english/news/2016/02/04/military-intervention-in-libya-not-
imminent-pinotti_66172f00-786e-4e77-8301-b16f56aa81db.html
Libya in the Mist
48
further the fracture between Libya’s multiple and competing actors and
would fertilise the ground for jihadism.24 Instead, the coalition should
push for building an anti-ISIS coalition inside Libya, and made up of
Libyans. Therefore, the mission to Libya cannot have the unique focus
on defeating Daesh, but has to include the support for institutional and
national reconstruction and for a unity government in Tripoli.
3. Conclusions. Italy and Libya in the Future: A political
solution a long-term strategy
This part of the study, through a historical approach and exploring
the political science literature on national interests, has analysed the
changing relations between Libya and Italy, in light of changing
interests, and changed political arrangements. After the privileged
partnership and the deep crisis originated from the decentralisation of
authoritarianism after the 2014 civil war, Italy should again try to be the
bridge between Libya and Europe, consecrating its role as leading
political actor in the Mediterranean Sea.
Italy, on its way towards gaining the opportunity of fastening the ties
of a renewed “Privileged Partnership with Libya” should then push the
international community to solve the Libyan knot implementing a
political solution. Therefore, the main priorities that should be sake for
Libya are the rearrangement of security apparatus and the establishment
24 PXM News, 2016, February 10, What’s to be done about the rise of ISIS in Libya –
Pack http://pxw.news/whats-to-be-done-about-the-rise-of-isis-in-libya/
February 2016
49
of an economic governance. From a closer point of view, first the
legitimate use of force should be again centralised in the hands of a
legitimate and responsible government. Secondly, a sustainable, long
term, stimulating economic policy has to be put in place; and the unified
accountable management of the economic institutions has to be
guaranteed. Finally, and more than anything else, the international
community must favour the establishment of a political strategy to deal
with the country which should be taken in charge by the Government
of National Accord.
Libya in the Mist
50
References (part 1)
Akyol, M. (2016, 3 February), How Politics Has Poisoned Islam, The
New York Times, Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/04/opinion/how-politics-
haspoisoned-islam.html
Ashour, O. (2012), Libyan Islamists Unpacked: Rise,
Transformation, and Future, Brookings Doha Center Publications,
Retrieved from
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/
5/02-libya-ashour/omar-ashour-policy-briefing-english.pdf
— (2011), Post-Jihadism: Libya and the Global Transformation of
Armed Islamist Movements, Terrorism and Political Violence, 23(3),
377-397.
Bongiorni, R. (2016, 14 January), Al-Qaeda minaccia l’Italia: «Vuole
occupare la Libia, ma se ne pentirà», Il Sole 24 Ore, Retrieved from
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/mondo/2016-01-14/al-qaeda-
minaccia-l-italia-vuole-occupare-libia-ma-se-ne-pentira--
185219.shtml?uuid=ACAzhEAC
Coco Scalisi, S. (2016, 18 January), “Full Steam Ahead.” Eni in Libya
in the Time of Daesh, Mediterranean Affairs, Retrieved from
February 2016
51
http://mediterraneanaffairs.com/full-steam-ahead-eni-libya-time-
daesh/
Devji, F. (2015), Landscapes of the Jihad. Militancy, Morality,
Modernity, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Dinstein, Y. (2010), The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of
International Armed Conflict, New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
Fearon, J. D. (1995), Rationalist Explanations for War, International
Organization, 49(3), 379-414, Retrieved from:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903
Greenan, D. (2016, 2 February), We Will Crush ISIS, say Kerry and
Gentiloni, ANSAmed, Retrieved from
http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/nations/libya/2016
/02/02/we-will-crush-isis-say-kerry-and-gentiloni_cee32ccc-06ef-
40cb-8397-a30618d01b19.html
Heuzé, R. (2016, 15 January), Paolo Gentiloni: «La Libia non è una
provincial dell’ISIS», Farnesina, Retrieved from
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfon
dimenti/paolo-gentiloni-la-libia-non-e.html
Kaspersen, L. B., (2014), Sociology of War, International
Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 25, 405-413,
Retrieved from DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.96048-3
Libya in the Mist
52
Levy, J. S. (1998), The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,
Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 139-165.
March, A. F., Revkin, M. (2015, 15 April), Caliphate of Law. ISIS’
Ground Rules, Foreign Affairs, Retrieved from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-04-
15/caliphate-law
Mezran, K., Alunni, A. (2015), Libya: Negotiation for Transition,
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183q3xc.12
Nossiter, A., Fahim, K. (2011, October 23), Revolution Won: Top
Libyan Official Vows a New and More Pious State, The New York
Times, Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/world/africa/revolution-
won-top-libyan-official-vows-a-new-and-more-pious-state.html
Pack, J. (edited by) (2013), The 2011 Uprisings and the Struggle for
the Post-Qadhafi Future, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Schmitt, E. (2016, February 4), Obama is Pressed to Open Military
Front Against ISIS in Libya, The New York Times, Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/world/africa/isis-libya-us-
special-ops.html
Sharma, V. S. (2014a), War, Conflict and the State Reconsidered,
Retrieved from DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.2263.0482
February 2016
53
— (2014b), A Social Theory of War: Clausewitz and War
Reconsidered, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Retrieved
from DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2013.872600
Smith, M., Hirsch, L. (2014, 28 October), The Rise of ISIS, PBS
Frontline, Retrieved from
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/rise-of-isis/
Vandewalle, D. (2012), A History of Modern Libya, New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Varvelli, A. (2015, 21 December), Libia: la scommessa di Kobler (e
dell’Italia), ISPI Commentary, Retrieved from
http://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/la-scommessa-di-kobler-
e-dellitalia-14333
— (2016, 1 February), Italia in Libia: una vision politica, ISPI
Commentary, Retrieved from
http://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/italia-libia-una-visione-
politica-14536
Walt, S. M. (November/December 2015), ISIS as Revolutionary
State. New Twist and an Old Story, Foreign Affairs, Retrieved from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-
revolutionary-state
Wehrey, F., Lacher, W. (2016, 7 February), The Next Front Against
ISIS. The Right Way to Intervene in Libya, Foreign Affairs, Retrieved
Libya in the Mist
54
from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2016-02-
07/next-front-against-isis
Zartman, I. W. (2000), Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,
Retrieved from http://www.nap.edu/read/9897/chapter/7
References (part 2)
Achcar, G., (2013), The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the
Arab Uprising, London: Saqi Books.
Ahmida, A., A., (2012), “Libya, Social Origins of Dictatorship, and
the Challenge for Democracy.”, Journal of the Middle East and
Africa 3(1), 70–81.
Aliboni, R., (2015), What to Do About Libya: Intervention or
Mediation?, Documenti IAI 15
Ba’rel, Z., (2016, February 13), ISIS Already Preparing Its Next
Battleground - in Libya, Haaretz http://www.haaretz.com/middle-
east-news/.premium-
1.703074?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter
Bellamy, A., J., (2010), “The Responsibility to Protect”, Ethics &
International Affairs, 24(2), 143–69.
February 2016
55
Berti, B., (2014), “Forcible intervention in Libya: revamping the
‘politics of human protection’?”, Global Change, Peace & Security,
26(1), 21-39.
Burchill, S., (2005), The National Interest in International Relations
Theory New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Chivvis, C., S., (2016, February, 5), The Three Challenges of
Countering ISIS in Libya, The Rand Blog,
http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/02/the-three-challenges-of-
countering-isis-in-
libya.html?utm_source=t.co&utm_medium=rand_social
Chorin, E., (2016, February, 10), Setting the Record Straight on
Benghazi Foreign Affairs
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2016-02-10/setting-
record-straight-benghazi
De Luce, D., (2016, February, 12), Why Libya Matters — Again.
Foreign Policy http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/12/why-libya-
matters-
again/?utm_content=buffer16a1e&utm_medium=social&utm_sour
ce=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
De Maio, P., (2006), From Soldiers to Policemen: Qadhafi’s Army in
the New Century, Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics, 1(3), pp.
17–26.
Libya in the Mist
56
Del Sarto, R.A. and Tocci, N., (2008), Italy’s politics without policy:
Balancing Atlanticism and Europeanism in the Middle East. Modern
Italy, 13 (2), 135–153.
Dempsey, J., (2015, October), Europe’s Powerlessness in the Middle
East. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=61464
Duncan, W.R., Jancar-Webster, B., and Switky, B., (2004), World
politics in the 21st century, New York: Pearson Longman.
Editorial Board (2016, February) Jihadists in Libya The next front
against Islamic State, The Economist
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-
africa/21690057-libyas-civil-war-has-given-caliphate-fresh-
opportunities-western-military
Frattini, F., (2011), International security and the Libya crisis,
London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Gazzini, C., (2015, December, 3), The Prize: Fighting for Libya’s
Energy Wealth, Middle East and North Africa Report N°165,
International Crisis Group.
Gazzini, C, El Amrani, I., (2015, December, 18), What Could
Possibly Go Wrong in Libya? International Crisis Group In pursuit
of Peace, http://blog.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-
africa/2015/12/18/what-could-possibly-go-wrong-in-libya/
Guéhenno, J-M, Bonino, E., (2015, December, 12), Crisi libica e
Stato islamico: quei pericoli di un patto affrettato, La Repubblica,
February 2016
57
http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2015/12/12/news/crisi_libica_e_
stato_islamico_quei_pericoli_di_un_patto_affrettato-129321001/
International Crisis Group, (2012, September), Divided We Stand:
Libya’s Enduring Conflicts, Middle East/North Africa Report 130.
International Crisis Group, (2013, April), Trial By Error: Justice in
Post-Qadhafi Libya, Middle East/North Africa Report 140.
Joffé, G., Paoletti, E., (2011), The foreign policy process in Libya,
The Journal of North African Studies, 16(2), 183-213.
Jordan, A.A. and Taylor, W.J., (1981), American national security:
Policy and process, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kashiam, M., A., A., (2012), The Italian role in the Libyan spring
revolution: is it a shift from soft to hard power?, Contemporary Arab
Affairs, 5(4), 556-570.
Keohane, D., (2016, February), Libyan Lessons for Europe
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=62645,
Kienle, E. (2012), Les “révolutions” arabes, Critique internationale,
54 (1), 106.
Kienle, E., (2012) “Les “révolutions” arabes.”, Critique international,
54(1), 106.
Marchi, L., Whitman, R., Edwards, G. eds., (2015), Italy's Foreign
Policy in the Twenty-first Century: A Contested Nature?, London
and New York: Routledge.
Libya in the Mist
58
Mezran, K., De Maio, P., (2007), Between the Past and the Future:
Has a Shift in Italian–Libyan Relations Occurred?, The Journal of
North African Studies, 12(4), 439-451.
Middle East and North Africa Report N°165, International Crisis
Group http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-
africa/north-africa/libya/165-the-prize-fighting-for-libya-s-energy-
wealth.aspx
Miranda, V., V., (2011), Striking a Balance Between Norms and
Interests in Italian Foreign Policy: The Balkans and Libya, IAI
Working Papers 11(11).
Morgenthau, H., J., (1949, Spring), The Primacy of the National
Interest, The American Scholar 18 (2) pp. 207-212.
Morgenthau, H., J., (1985), Politics among nations: The struggle for
power and peace, New York: Knopf.
Nuechterlein, D., E., (1976, October), National Interests and Foreign
Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making,
British Journal of International Studies, 2 (3). pp. 246-266.
Nye Jr., J., S., (1999, July – August), Redefining the National Interest.
Foreign Affairs, 78 (4). pp. 22-35.
OPEC Libya, Facts and Figures,
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/166.htm
Paoletti, E., (2011), Power Relations and International Migration:
The Case of Italy and Libya, Political Studies, 59(1), pp. 269–289.
February 2016
59
Ronzitti, N., (2009), The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and
Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New prospects for
cooperation in the Mediterranean? in: Mediterranean Strategy Group
Conference ‘Is regional cooperation in the Maghreb possible
Implications for the region and external actors’, Istituto Affari
Internazionali, 1–10.
Ronzitti, N., (2015, February), Intervento in Libia, i pro e i contro
http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=2962#sthash.Cs
9toIRP.dpuf
Rothkopf, D., (2015, November), Our Reaction to Terrorism Is
More Dangerous Than the Terrorists.
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/11/25/our-reaction-to-
terrorism-is-more-dangerous-than-terrorists/in4x
The Soufan Group (2016), Libya, Extremism and the Consequences
of Collapse, New York 10019, New York: The Soufan Group.
Toaldo, M, (2016), Decentralising authoritarianism? The
international intervention, the new ‘revolutionaries’ and the
involution of Post-Qadhafi Libya, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27(1),
39-58.
Toaldo, M. (2016, February), March to Folly 2.0: The Next Western
Military Intervention in Libya,
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_march_to_folly_2.0_the_
next_western_military_intervention_in5083
Libya in the Mist
60
Varvelli, A., (2010), “Italy and Libya: Renewing a Special
Relationship”, The International Spectator, 45(3), 117-130.
Wehrey, F., (2014, September), Ending Libya’s Civil War Reconciling
Politics, Rebuilding Security
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/24/ending-libya-s-civil-
war-reconciling-politics-rebuilding-security
Wehrey, F., (2015, October, 1), Is Libya Headed for Another
Qaddafi?, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/opinion/is-libya-headed-
for-another-qaddafi.html?_r=0
Wehrey, F., Lacher, W., (2016, February, 7), The Next Front Against
Isis, Foreign Affairs
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2016-02-07/next-
front-against-isis
February 2016
61
About the Authors
Valentina Cantori
Graduated with honors in the MA Culture and Languages for
Communication and International Cooperation at the University of
Milan in 2014, where she obtained also her BA degree in Linguistic and
Cultural Mediation, with a specialization in Arabic and Islamic Studies.
After a working period spent in Egypt, she is now Teaching Assistant
at Scripps College in Claremont, CA, a member of The Claremont
Colleges Consortium. She is currently researching at Pitzer College on
Religion and Conflict-related issues in Syria and Iraq..
Giulia Formichetti
Graduated with honors in the International Relations MA at LUISS
University, in Rome, where she also obtained her bachelor degree in
Political Science. In 2013, during a semester exchange programme in
Israel and in the Palestinian territory, she worked as intern at the
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, IDC Herzliya.
Afterwards, she moved to Brussels, where she supported the team of
the Centro Nazionale delle Ricerche liason office with a project on
security and civil protection. In 2014, she worked as intern for the
Security and Defense Programme at Istituto Affari Internazionali, in
Rome. She just concluded an internship at the UNRWA Representative
Office to the EU, in Brussels.
Libya in the Mist
62
February 2016
63
Ed. Mediterranean Affairs©
www.mediterraneanaffairs.com
Cover image source: The Guardian
Libya in the Mist
64