report no.: 20332 - all documents | the world bank · 2016. 7. 12. · report no.: 20332...

Document ofThe World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No.: 20332

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

INTEGRATED ROADS PROJECT

(CREDIT 2149-TA)

April 20, 2000

AFT: Transport 1Africa Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without WorldBank authorization.

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS(As of March 31, 1990)

SDR 1.0 = US$1.29; US$ 1.0= SDR 0.78

Tsh 1.0 = US$ 0.005; US$ 1.0 = Tsh 200

(As of June 30,1999)SDR 1.0 = US$1.20; US$ 1.0= SDR 0.83

Tsh 1.0 = US$0.001; US$ 1.0 = Tsh 716

Currency UnitTanzanian Shilling

Fiscal Year

July 1 to June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development BankATAP Agricultural Transport Assistance ProgramCODAP Coordination Office for Donor Assisted ProjectsCRRP Core Rural Roads ProgramDANIDA Danish International Development AgencyEIRR Economic Rate of ReturnERP Economic Recovery ProgramEU European UnionFINNIDA Finish International Development AgencyGOT Government of TanzaniaGTZ Deuche Gesellchaft fur Technishe ZusammenarbeitIDA International Development AssociationIRP 1, 11 Integrated Roads Project 1, IIMCT Ministry of Communications and WorksMCWT Ministry of Communications Works and TransportMOW Ministry of WorksNORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operationNTC National Transport AgencyPEHCOL Plant and Equipment Hire Company LimitedRETCO Regional Transport Company Ltd.SAR Staff Appraisal ReportTANRROADS National Roads AgencyTANZAM Tanzania-ZambiaUDR Shirika la Usafari Dar es Salaam Ltd.UNCDF United Nations Capital Development FundUNDP United Nations Development ProgramUSAID United States Agency for International Development

Vice President: Callisto E. Madavo, AFRVPCountry Director: James W. Adams, AFMTZSector Manager: Yusupha Crookes, AFTT1Task Manager: Yitzhak Kamhi, AFTTI

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project PrefaceImplementation Completion Report



(Credit 2149-TA)

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

PREFACE

This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Integrated Roads Project (Credit -2194-TA) to The United Republic of Tanzania for which SDR 139.9 million (US$180.4 million equivalent)was approved on May 31,1990 and made effective on March 15,1991.

The Credit 2149-TA was partially closed on June 30, 1998, the original closing date. It was fullyclosed on June 30, 1999 after a year extension from the original closing date of June 30, 1998. Sixteendonors provided parallel financing for the project. Final disbursement of IDA credit was made onDecember 13, 1999. A total of USD 31,165,978.54 equivalent (SDR 22,695,381.36) was cancelled fromthe credit on December 21, 1999.

Yitzhak Kamhi, Task Team Leader (AFTT1) and Ephrem Asebe (consultant) prepared the ICR.The ICR was reviewed by Messrs. James W. Adams, Country Director for Tanzania, and YusuphaCrookes, Sector Manager, Africa Region.

Preparation of this ICR began during the Bank's ICR mission in November 1999. It is based onmaterial in the project file. The Borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by stating its views asreflected in the mission's Aide-Memoire (Annex A), and by preparing its own evaluation of the project'sexecution (Annex C). Annex B also includes the views of some co-financiers.

FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS

PAGE No.PREFACE

EVALUATION SUMMARY ........................................................... i-V

PART l: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT ........................................................... 1

A. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION ........................... ................................ IB. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES ........................................................... 3C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT ............................................ ............... 9D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY ........................................................... 11

E. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................... 11

F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE ........................................................... 13

G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME ........................................................... 14H. FUTURE OPERATIONS ........................................................... 14I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED . - ............................................................ 15

PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES ........................................................... 17

TABLE 1: SUMMARYOFASSESSMENTS .................... ....................................... 17TABLE 2: RELATED BANK LOANSICREDITS .............................. ............................. 18TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE ........................................................... 19

TABLE 4: LOAN/CREDIT DISBURSEMENT: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATE AND ACTUAL .......... .......... 19TABLE 5A: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ................................ ................ 20

TRAINING UNDER IDA CREDIT

TABLE 5B: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ................................................ 21STATUS OF TRAINED STAFF UNDER IDA CREDIT

TABLE 5C: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION: PEHCOL ................................ 21

TABLE 5D: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ................................................ 21ROAD FUND EXPENDITURE ON ROADS

TABLE 6A: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION ....................................................... 22ROADS CONDITION & TARGET ACHIEVEMENTS

TABLE 6B: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION ....................................................... 23TRUNK ROAD OPERATIONAL PLAN AND BUDGET

TABLE 6C: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION ....................................................... 23RURAL ROADS OPERATIONAL BUDGET AND PLAN

TABLE 7: STUDIES INCLUDED IN PROJECT: IDA COMPONENTS ............................. ............... 24

TABLE 8A: PROJECT COSTS (US$ MILLION) ...................... ................................. 24

TABLE 8B: PROJECT FINANCING (US$ MILLION) .................................. ..................... 25

TABLE 9: ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS ....................................................... 25

TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS ....................................................... 26

TABLE 11: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS ................... ................... 28

TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTS ......................... .............................. 28

TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES: MISSIONS ................. ...................................... 29

This document (Las a resticted distribution and may be used by recipiens only in thepearfogrmnce of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorizadion.

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project Page 2Implementation Completion Report

ANNEX A: SUPPLEMENTARY STATISTICS ............................................. 34

TABLE 1: REALLOCATION OF IDA CREDIT .............. ......................................... 34TABLE 2: STATUS OF IDA FINANCED COMPONENT AS OF PROJECT CLOSING ............. ................... 35TABLE 3: PROJECT COSTS OF IDA AND OTHER DONORS ...................... ....................... 37

ANNEX B: ICR MISSION'S AIDE MEMOIRE ............................................. 38

ANNEX C: BORROWER'S CONTRIBUTION AND COMMENTS TO ICR ............................................. 43

MAPS: IBRD No. 22067

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project Page iImplementation Completion Report Evaluation Summary

EVALUATION SUMMARY


Integrated Roads Project(Credit 2149-TA)

Introduction

i. Background. With an estimated project cost of US$ 871 million, the Integrated Roads ProjectI (IRP I) was the largest single road program in the sector in Sub-Sahara Africa. It was a boldexperiment in the sector and represented major breaks in the ways road sector projects weredesigned in the Bank. It pooled resources with parallel financing from IDA, and 15 other donoragencies:-AfDF, UNDP, EEC, DANIDA, Republic of Germany, Italy, FINNDA, ODA (UK), NORAD,USAID, The Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Saudi Fund and Kuwait Funds.

ii. The project was launched in 1991 after three years of consultation, to overcome the impact ofthe deteriorating road network in a context of the economic recovery program the country was thenundertaking. During the period, IDA was instrumental in assisting the Government of Tanzania(GOT) to develop IRP I and had assumed responsibility of coordinating donors' assistance. ThisImplementation Completion Report (ICR) of Integrated Road Project I attempts to sum up the majorlessons leamed from implementing the Project. The scope of this ICR is limited to an assessment ofIDA financed component of IRP I. Reference to the total project is made where it is essential to theoverall understanding of the IDA component.

Bank Project

iii. Project Objective. As outlined in the Staff Appraisal Report No. 8367-TA, the main objectivesof IRP were to: (i) develop MCWT's institutional capacity to manage the networks'; and (ii) restoreTanzania's trunk and regional roads networks, which were obstacles to the sustainability of theeconomic recovery program.

iv. Project Components. The project was to provide financial assistance for (i) institutionalsupport to strengthen road management capacity of the MCWT; (ii) rehabilitation and improvementprogram of about 4,600 km of trunk roads and 3000 km of regional roads in agriculturally productiveareas including related structures and bridges; (iii) road maintenance support to MCWT includingestablishment of privately operated plant pools, and development of local constructing capacity toundertake road works; and (iv) management assistance to Air Tanzania Corporation and theNational Transport Corporation.

v. Project Covenants. The critical agreements reached at negotiation were to (i) undertakethe main institutional and policy changes prior to project effectiveness, including (a) changes in theprocurement regulations, (b) appropriating the agreed road budget for the first year of projectimplementation, and (c) reorganize the road administration; (ii) appropriating GOT agreed annualroad budget as a condition of IDA funding; (iii) complete engineering designs and technicaldocumentation for the first two years of the program prior to board presentation.

vi. Project Evaluation. The Integrated Roads Project objectives were very important to thepeople and Government of Tanzania, and were in line with IDA's sector priority for the country. Thedesign of the project was conceptually clear. The institutional objective was to address the long-termsustainability of the project, while the physical objective was focused on the urgent task ofmaintenance and rehabilitating the road network to enhance the economic recovery program. Majorchallenges facing project design were defining an appropriate program size and finding theappropriate tradeoffs between the two major objectives. A key strategy adopted, to assuresustainable of the outcomes of the project, was to address in parallel several developmentobjectives, including transformation of the ministry from blue collar to white collar organization,

1 That is, transform from blue collar to white collar organization.

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project Page iiImplementation Completion Report Evaluation Summary

development of a private construction industry, decentralization of the maintenance and rural roadsadministration, training of manpower, establishment of road fund. But these added to the complexityof the program and the operational strategy had to deal with tradeoffs.

Implementation

vii. Achievement of the Program Objectives. There is no question that there have beenimprovement in terms of reductions of transport cost and travel time mainly as result of improvementof certain major links of the country. According to govemment statistics, in 1999 the actualproportion in length of the trunk road network in good, fair and poor conditions were 30%, 39% and30% of the total trunk roads respectively. This favorably compares to the SAR estimates for 1990/91,the start of the project, which was 26%, 26% and 47% for good, fair and poor roads of the trunk roadnetwork length respectively. Between 1990/91 and 1998199, the trunk road network had alsoincreased from 9,629 km to 10,203 km. However, the status of roads in good condition in 1999which stood at 30% for the trunk roads was significantly below when compared to the appraisaltargets of 60% by mid-1996 and 80% by mid-2000. The current condition of rural roads is not knowas El Nino has damaged the road constructed. About 2000 km of rural roads were known to havebeen rehabilitated by the donor community under the IRP I.

viii. With respect to the physical achievement under IDA funding, initially a total of 910 km ofgravel roads were contracted out. About 683 km of gravel roads were constructed with cost overunsranging between 65% and 244%. Of the 683 km of constructed roads some 300 km was total lossand some 266 was deteriorated within the first 13 months of construction. The Tanga-Horohoro/Marangu-Tarakea road (118 km) was substantially completed and is now in reasonablegood condition; its EIRR is 29%. Regretfully, for the uncompleted and washed out components, theinvestment value is practically lost, making re-estimation of ERR not worthwhile. Mwanza-NzegaRoad (54 km) is yet to be fully completed and no EIRR is estimated. Its designs were not updatedbefore signature of contracts. Field survey was poor and it suffered major claims related to paymentsdelays of GOT portion. The Kayaka bridge and approaches were completed. Implementationexperienced many failures of structures, approaches, temporary approaches and bridges. Andsubstantial additional works were carried out after commencement. Six of the seven packages inEmergency Works for Dar es Salaam Roads were implemented. Poor surveys and designs,frequent changes in scope of works resulted in poor quality of works and significant cost increases.Some of the roads also disintegrated soon after completion. Under IDA funding periodicmaintenance and emergency works were carried out. The project also funded a portion of TANZAMHighways sections 2, 4 & 5, which were rehabilitated under the Six Highway Rehabilitation Project(Cr,1688-TA).

ix. On the institutional front, modest progress has been made towards achieving some of theinstitutional development objectives. A modest private construction industry has been created.Road maintenance administration has been decentralized in 20 regions. The Road Fund establishedunder the project now can potentially provide some 70% of the required road maintenance funding.Road maintenance expenditure made from the Road Fund has increased from US$7.24 million in1991/92 to US$22.48 million in 1998/99. The National Road Agency was established in July 1999and its chief executive took position in February 2000. Significant number of high level manpowerhas been trained at home and abroad. WVith respect to liberalization, the Plant and Equipment HireCompany is now in the process of privatization. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed by both MOWand donors, that institutional issues, particularly contract administration and project management arestill major problems in efficiently managing the road network. Overall, the project achievement isassessed as unsatisfactory.

x. Cost and Implementation Time Schedule. At completion, the total funds expended on IRP Iwas estimated at US$868.0 million including GOT contribution estimated at US$60.0 million.US$166.7 million equivalent (SDR117.2 million) of IDA funds were disbursed and US$ 12.17 millionof the original estimates was cancelled along with US$ 19.0 million equivalent from exchange ratesavings. However, In spite of its limited impact the cost of institutional support was more than double

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project Page iiiImplementation Completion Report Evaluation Summary

the appraisal estimates. This applied for both IDA and for the other donors. After allowing forinflation, cost escalation for civil works ranged from 40% to over 125%.

xi. Main Factors Affecting Implementation. The factors which were partly outside thegovernment control and which affected the implementation of the project included: difficultenvironment for implementation; inadequate design of the project; problems in donor coordinationand poor performance of consultants and contractors. The factors within the government's controlaffecting implementation were: lack of good governance including instances of corrupt practices;failure to apply lessons learned from preceding project implementation; lack of proactive response;frequent reorganization of the implementing agencies; inadequate counterpart funding; and poorstaff incentives. Factors within the control of the implementing agencies included: substantivechanges in the scope of works without proper technical documentation and authorization by fundingagencies; prolonged procurement processing; deficient contract administration; and poor project andfinancial management.

Results and Performance

xii. Project Sustainability. Overall, the sustainability of the project is assessed as uncertain. Itappears that much longer time than originally planned is needed to assure sustainability.Sustainability of the progress made with respect to institutional objective depends on the prevailingenvironment, government commitment to maintenance-first policy, proactive leadership, the incentivesystem to skilled manpower and on follow-up measures to consolidate the progress achieved to date- road fund, road agency, etc. The sustainability of the commercialized activities under theliberalization regime depends on the entrepreneurial abilities of the new contractors and theirfinancial capacities. The sustainability of the maintenance system introduced depends on theperformance of the economy to generate road fund revenue and eradication of corrupt practices.

xiii. Bank Performance. Bank performance in identification and preparation assistance isassessed as satisfactory. IDA staff rightly identified that transport is the major problem facing theTanzanian economic recovery during its transition to market-oriented economy. During preparationphase, IDA staff provided critical assistance to GOT in coordinating donor assistance and packagingthe program. Appraisal was insufficient with respect to considering the appropriate design optionsfor Tanzania, particularly on the scope of institutional reforms to be undertaken. Second, it wasknown from earlier IDA financed road sector projects that there were major problems in performingbasic project activities. Appraisal, thus, did not fully address the major flaws experienced under theSixth Highway Credit; particularly in respect to contract administration and project and financialmanagement. Those errors were, therefore, repeated on a larger scale. Third, the risks due to lackof incentives to staff to steer the project implementation was identified but an adequate sustainablesolution in the context of the civil services was not found.

xiv. The overall assessment of supervision must be seen in the context of unduly ambitious andoptimistic project design; early successes following initial contract signatures and initialimprovements in road conditions; the unclear and conflicting role of the Principal Transport Engineer(PTE) who was advising the government and the Bank management and staff at the same time, andpoor governance conditions in the country. Therefore, the implementation of the program basicallyfailed, particularly in the gravel road component, notwithstanding of the efforts of the supervision.Hence, the Bank's supervision performance is rated as marginally unsatisfactory.

xv. Borrower Performance. Borrower preparation is assessed as satisfactory. Thegovernment's bold initiative in its Transport Sector Policy Paper and its Transport Recovery Programand its ability to bring some 16 donors to agree in support of its program over a period of three yearsof consultation, was a major undertaking. It showed leadership and built on a reservoir of good willthat the government had among the donor community at the time. Coming to closure was a majoraccomplishment. The govemment, however, was facing serious difficulties in translating itsambitious program on schedule and within planned budget. It has not been able to make best use ofthe resources at its disposal. Audit reports of project accounts were continuously and seriously

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project Page ivImplementation Completion Report Evaluation Summary

qualified. GOT's responses were often not timely and sometimes had required the prodding of thedonor community, as in the case of the Road Fund and Road Agency. As evidenced in the 1996Report on Presidential Commission Inquiry Against Corrupt Practices, the operating environment inthe implementing agencies was not conducive to good project management practices. In the area ofprocurement, project management and contract administration, a decade after the launching of IRP I,despite substantial expenditure of resources2, including manpower training, the evidence is thatimplementing agencies are only marginally better than they were at the start of the project.

xvi. Project Outcome. Overall, the outcome of the IDA financed component is assessed asunsatisfactory. However, as a result of the project, there is today a more organized sector program.The government has learned valuable lessons from its implementation experience. A private sectorled road construction sector industry has emerged. Road maintenance is now carried by privatecontractors who have largely come into existence with the support of the IRP I. Despite thetemporary relapse in the administration of the Road Fund in 1995/96, the road fund now contributesa significant share of the cost of maintenance. The road fund is administered by the Road FundBoard supported by the Road Fund Act. The TANROADS is finally going to start fully operating byJuly 2003. However, impact of transport cost reduction on the macroeconomic situation was not ashigh as expected at the start of this ambitious program. Also, the basics of project and financialmanagement have yet to be mastered.

Key Lessons Learned and Future Actions.

xvii. This Integrated Roads Project has been the largest and most ambitious project in the sector.As such it has been the subject of multiple reviews including a recent Bank Quality Assurance Groupreview. This ICR identifies a number of key lessons for future project design and implementation.

Complexity of the Project and Country Absorptive Capacity. Project composition andimplementation schedule should match the absorptive capacity of the implementing agency. Indesign of such large investment, involving several donors, the approach should aim at: (i) a phasedinvestment with a better defined triggers; and (ii) long-term donors support.

* Project Design. While the concept of sector investment project on which IRP I is based appearsworkable, its application to a specific country requires making tradeoffs between majordevelopment objectives based on detailed analysis of major risks in achieving those objectives.In particular, in the civil works, the absence of detailed engineering for all major roadsimmediately prior to start of construction, made variation orders almost inevitable, leading todelays and cost increases. In institutional capacity building too, the many demands for reforms,taxed the capacity of the govemment to deliver on budget and on schedule. Therefore, inprojects of IRP I type, it is important to introduce "checks and balances" with early warningsignals to be able to adapt the program when required.

* Corrupt practices. The poor implementation performance of IRP I testifies that the potential forcorrupt practices can significantly impact project implementation performance. In this case,roads that would have been constructed under the project to good standard remaineduncompleted partly because of corrupt practices and the absence of systems and proceduresthat could check against their occurrence. The Government should institute measures tosafeguard against such practices. Physical progress should be verified against designspecifications. Stringent measures should be taken under situation where audit reports areconstantly delayed and qualified in order to fight potential corrupt practices from blossoming.

* Learning from Past Mistakes. The lessons of experience of past project implementation wereto safeguard against future mistakes both for IDA and the borrower. As a matter of fact, major

2 A total of us $105 million was expended by all donors on capacity building as estimated by Carl BroInternational a/s, Comprehensive Review of the IRP, Third Interim Report, Revised June 1997.

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project Page vImplementation Completion Report Evaluation Summary

flaws experienced in the Sixth Highway Project Credit were also experienced under IRP 1. Forexample, appropriate technical documentation and provision of adequate resources should befully completed before commencement of works. In short, more attention needs to be paid topast lessons of experience during project design and implementation.

* Composition of Project Team. Supervision team should have professional mix with keypersons being sufficiently experienced in the major fields of a project activities such asengineering, institutional reforms, etc. In addition, there should not be frequent changes ofsupervision management and teams, in order to ensure continuity and consistency of efforts inachieving quality and quantity of the planned targets.

* Technical Documentation. Technical documentation necessary for implementation of civilworks should be updated before actual commencement of construction works.

* Donor Coordination. The spirit of cooperation of the donor community in support of theIntegrated Roads Project I had no parallel. It was the first time so many donors have committedthemselves to such a large common program. Unfortunately, in IRP 1, it has not been easy tomaintain the interests of all donors' cooperation during implementing phase as each donor focuson execution of its own mini program under the parallel financing arrangement. In future, inlarge investment supported by several donors, a professional coordination managed by thegovernment should be established, with agreed terms of references.

* Technical and Financial Audits. The Government should among other things, carryperformance technical and financial audits of the works carried out. Such audits should, besidesfrequently revisiting the overall status of implementation, also include verification of the physicaland financial targets.

* Initial Successes in Long-term Program. Usually during the initial phases of project cycle oflarge programs, there is high optimism of the team involved and there is a tendency tounderestimate the operation environment of the specific country for which the project isdesigned, even when there are potentially implementation problems. Initial successes can maskdeficiencies related to preparation, selection of contracts and judgements of capacities. It istherefore important that project implementor should not be taken in by the initial euphoria aboutearly successes, and should continue to ensure that measurable output targets are met. Theproject should have well defined qualitative and quantitative indicators, which should beadequately designed so that any deviation from initial targets can be detected and corrected inreal time.

xvii. Key Elements of Future Planned Operation. To lay the foundation for excellence ininstitution building, there is need to assure that the modest capacity achieved to date under theproject, especially the trained manpower and the creation of a road agency, is sustained. Assuringadequate resources for road maintenance will remain essentially an ongoing issue. Given pastperformance of the economy, efficient and effective use of the available road fund will be anothercritical area of focus.

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project Page 1Implementation Completion Report Part 1: Project Implementation Assessment

PART 1: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

A. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

Background

1. With an estimated project cost of US$ 871 million, the Integrated Roads Project I (IRP 1) I wasthe largest single road sector program in the sector in Sub-Sahara Africa. It was a bold experimentin the sector and represented major breaks in ways road sector projects were designed in the Bank.It pooled resources on the basis of parallel financing from IDA, and 15 other donor agencies: -AfDF,UNDP, EEC, DANIDA, Republic of Germany, Italy, FINNDA, ODA (UK), NORAD, USAID, TheNetherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Saudi Fund and Kuwait Funds.

2. The International Development Association (IDA) had been instrumental in assisting theGovernment of Tanzania (GOT) develop IRP I and had assumed responsibility of coordinatingdonors' assistance. Prior to the IRP I, the Bank group has extended credits and loans to helpfinance six highway projects, one trucking project, two railway projects and five port projects. IRP Iwas designed in support of GOT's economic recovery program. During the 1970s and early 1980s,declining funding for road maintenance resulted in the deteriorating road condition in Tanzania.However, when the Government of Tanzania undertook an Economy Recovery Program starting1986 designed to liberalize and adjust the economy, it became apparent that the functioning of thetransport sector was critical to sustain the momentum of Tanzania's economic recovery. InDecember 1987, GOT called a Transport Sector Conference. At the Conference, GOT presented adraft National Transport Policy along with a conference document entitled "Programme for TransportSector Recover'. The GOT initiative was based on a study to improve conditions of rural roads toessential agricultural production area.

3. Following three years of coordination and consultation on basic policy, institutional changesand rehabilitation requirements of the sector needed to adequately respond to the economy, thedonor community agreed to support the govemment initiative. GOT committed itself to undertakestrategic changes regarding the organization of road maintenance and also pledged to make majorshifts in its public expenditure, committing itself to provide 20% of the development budgetexpenditure for transport infrastructure, and to finance road maintenance from its recurrent budget.Finally, agreement was reached between GOT, IDA and 15 other donor agencies - AfDF, UNDP,EEC, DANIDA, Republic of Germany, Italy, FINNDA, ODA (UK), NORAD, USAID, The Netherlands,Ireland, Switzerland, Saudi and Kuwait Funds - to finance the IRP I. A total of US$756.8 waspledged or secured from the donor community at the launching of IRP for which IDA's contributionwas US$180.4 million equivalent. GOT was to cover US$80.5 million and only US$33.8 million or4% of the total project cost was expected to be filled through future donor coordination conferences.The project would be parallel financed following different implementing procedures. Bilateral donorswere to use their own staff to undertake implementation and supervision of components financed bythem. Others like IDA considered project implementation and field supervision to be primarily thetasks of GOT and it's implementing agencies.

4. Initially, the ICR was to provide a comprehensive assessment of the IRP I including theoutcomes and results of the works financed by all the donors. During the ICR mission, it becameapparent that relevant data was not readily available as the government had not kept adequaterecords and the donor community has almost closed their activities related to the project. It becameapparent that undertaking such a task was beyond the budget allocated for the ICR. Thus, the focusof this ICR is mainly on IDA financed component of IRP I.

1 IRP was essentially a program covering not only the road infrastructure but also covering the development ofroad and air transport sectors


5. Project Objective. As outlined in the Staff Appraisal Report No. 8367-TA, the main objectivesof IRP were to: (i) develop MCWs institutional capacity to manage the networks; and (ii) restoreTanzanian's trunk and regional roads networks, which have become an obstacle to the sustainabilityof the economic recovery program. The institutional objective was to focus on: assisting thegovernment in developing strong management and technical capacity to maintain the trunk andregional road networks, and transformation MCWT from a construction-oriented ministry to anadministrative/ contract management-oriented ministry. The physical objective was to increase thetrunk roads in good condition from 15% to 60%; and to selectively rehabilitate the regional roadnetwork initially in eleven of the most agriculturally productive regions thereby increasing the roadnetwork in good condition from 10% to 50%; and institute regular maintenance on 80% of the trunkand 60% of the regional road networks.

6. Project Components. The project was to provide financial assistance for: (i) institutionalsupport to strengthen road management capacity of the MCWT; (ii) rehabilitation and improvementprogram of about 4,600 km of trunk roads; 3000 km of regional roads in agriculturally productiveareas, and other related structures and bridges; (iii) road maintenance support to MCWT includingestablishment of privately operated plant pools and development of local construction capacity toundertake road works; and (iv) management assistance to Air Tanzania Corporation and theNational Transport Corporation.

7. Changes in Project Scope. Three amendments to the credit agreement have beenundertaken. The first was on August 21, 1991, to include completion of the rehabilitation of threesections of TANZAM highway. The second was on June 19, 1992, to reflect the split in the Ministry ofCommunications and Works, and establishment of the Plant and Equipment Hire Company. Thethird amendment October 4, 1992 was to include the establishment of computer course offerings forhighway technicians at Dar es Salaam Technical College. In 1995, attempts were made torestructure the project, following failures of gravel roads. However, as CODAP was not prepared toproduce documentation for making appropriate decisions, nearly two years would pass before abasis for assessing the status of the utilization of the IDA credits was established. In 1997agreements were finally reached based on the findings of an independent consultant not to furtherrestructure the project. Instead it was agreed to: (i) give priority to the ongoing contracts; (ii) updatethe scope of works and quantities before signing any contracts; and (iii) re-orient the trainingprograms to focus more on building capacity particularly contract administration, procurement projectmanagement.

8. Project Covenants. The critical agreements reached at negotiation were to: (i) undertakethe main institutional and policy changes prior to project effectiveness, including (a) changes in theprocurement regulations, (b) appropriating the agreed road budget for the first year of projectimplementation, and (c) reorganize the road administration; (ii) GOT appropriates agreed annualroad budget as a condition of IDA funding; (iii) complete engineering design works for the first twoyears of the program prior to board presentation; (iv) develop closer coordination among thegovernment, donors and IDA; (v) station in Tanzania an experienced highway engineer from theBank to assist the government in coordinating implementation of the project.

Assessment of Project Objectives.

9. The Integrated Roads Project objectives were very important to the people andGovernment of Tanzania as the transport sector was the major constraint to the success of thecountry's Economic Recovery Program. It was also IDA's priority to assist the Government in furtherdevelopment and implementation of specific policy and institutional reforms in the sector, in thecontext of the continuing ERP and as supported by Bank policy. The project objectives were thus inline with IDA's overall and sector policy for Tanzania.

10. The design of the project was conceptually clear. The institutional objective was to addressthe long-term sustainability of the project, while the physical objective was focused on the urgenttask of maintenance and rehabilitating the road network to enhance the economic recovery program.


A major challenge facing project design was defining an appropriate program size and finding theappropriate tradeoffs between these two major objectives. A key strategy adopted, to assuresustainable outcomes of the project, was to address in parallel several development objectives,including transformation of the ministry from blue collar to white collar organization, development of aprivate construction industry, decentralization of the maintenance and rural roads administration,training of manpower, establishment of road fund. But this added to the complexity of the programand the operational strategy had to deal with tradeoffs. For example, the project assumed properdesigns and technical documentation would be available prior to commencement of works, but onthe grounds of emergency needs, poor and insufficient designs, and weak procurementdocumentation were actually used.

11. The project was indeed complex given the borrowers implementation capacity - with manydevelopment objectives, coordination of several implementing agencies and some sixteen donors,five types of disbursements and an environment of frequent organization changes. Buildingconsensus among the donors was difficult because of different strategies and different aspirationsacross the donor community. Given the prevailing environment, the motivation of the implementingstaff, the readiness of the country for such a huge program, the design of project was also toooptimistic while the risks in this respect not properly addressed. The country was already havingdifficulties in effectively implementing the preceding Sixth Highway Project, a substantially smallerproject.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES

12. Overall Assessment. . There is no question that there have been improvement in terms ofreductions of transport cost and travel time mainly as result of improvement of certain major links ofthe country. According to government statistics, in 1999 the actual proportion in length of the trunkroad network in good, fair and poor conditions were 30%, 39% and 30% of the total trunk roadsrespectively. This favorably compares to the SAR estimates for 1990/91, the start of the project,which was 26%, 26% and 47% for good, fair and poor roads of the trunk road network lengthrespectively. Between 1990/91 and 1998/99, the trunk road network had also increased from 9,629km to 10,203 km. However, the status of roads in good condition in 1999 which stood at 30% for thetrunk roads was significantly below when compared to the appraisal targets of 60% by mid-1996 and80% by mid-2000. The current condition of rural roads is not know as El Nino has damaged the roadconstructed. About 2000 km of rural roads were known to have been rehabilitated by the donorcommunity under the IRP I.

13. With respect to the physical achievement under IDA finding, initially a total of 910 km ofgravel roads were contracted out. About 683 km of gravel roads were constructed with cost overunsranging between 65% and 244%. Of the 683 constructed road some 300 km was total loss and some266 was deteriorated within the first 13 months of construction. The Tanga-Horohoro/Marangu-Tarakea road (118 km) was substantially completed and is now in reasonable good condition; itsEIRR is 29%. Regretfully, for these uncompleted and washed out components, the investment valueis practically lost, making re-estimation of ERR not worthwhile. Mwanza-Nzega Road (54 km) is yetto be fully completed and no EIRR is estimated.. Its designs were not updated before signature ofcontracts. Field survey was poor and it suffered major claims related to payments delays of GOTportion. The Kayaka bridge and approaches were completed. Implementation experienced manyfailures of structures, approaches, temporary approaches and bridges. And substantial additionalworks were carried out after commencement. Six of the seven packages in Emergency Works forDar es Salaam Roads were implemented. Poor surveys and designs, frequent changes in scope ofworks resulted in poor quality of works and significant cost increases. Some of the roads alsodisintegrated soon after completion. Under IDA funding periodic maintenance and emergency workswere carried out. The project also funded a portion of TANZAM Highways sections 2, 4 & 5, whichwere rehabilitated under the Six Highway Rehabilitation Project (Cr,1688-TA).


Status of Major IDA funded Civil Works

Road Section Expenditure Results(US$)

1. Lusahunga-Usagara (266 kmi) 6,069,740 Works completed, but deteriorated within thefirst 13 months after rehabilitation. Costincreases of 65%

2.Tundoma/Lichet 8,702,892 Some 50% of 226 km were done. scope of work(Sumbawanga) (226) substantially changed. Work abandoned. Almost

total loss of investment. Cost increases of 244%

3. Shelui-SingidalBabati/Bereku 8,178,078 Some 60 % of civil works was completed.(310km) Scope work substantially changed. Work

abandoned. Almost total loss of investment.Cost increases

4. Tanga/Horohoro & Marangu 9,099,438 Gravel road completed excluding bridges.Tarakea (118km)

Sub-total 32,050,148

6. Rehab. - Tanzam 2 3,999,922 Substantially completed under Cr.1688: Six7. Rehab. - Tanzam 4 5,368,290 Highway Rehabilitation Project; but payment;8. Rehab. - Tanzam 5 96,319 represent payments made under IRP i.

Sub-total 9,464,531

9. Kayaka Bridges and 7,741,022 Implementation experienced many failures ofapproaches structures, approaches, and temporary bridge.

Substantial additional works included aftercommencement.

10. Emergency Works for Dar es 35,343,683 The program had seven contract packages; butSalaam Roads only six packages were implemented. Poor

surveys and designs and frequent changes inscope of works resulted in poor quality and costincreases. Some of the roads disintegrated.

Total 84,599,384

14. On the institutional front, modest progress has been made towards achieving some of theinstitutional development objectives. A modest private construction industry has been created.Road maintenance administration has been decentralized in 20 regions. The Road Fund establishedunder the project now can potentially provide some 70% of the required road maintenance funding.Road maintenance expenditure made from the Road Fund has increased from US$7.24 million in1991/92 to US$22.48 million in 1998/99. The National Road Agency expected to be established inJuly 2000, and fully operational by June 2002. Significant number of high level manpower has beentrained at home and abroad. With respect to liberalization, the Plant and Equipment Hire Companyis now in the process of privatization. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed by both MOW and donors,that institutional issues, particularly contract administration and project management are still major


problems in efficiently managing the road network. Overall, the project achievement is assessed asunsatisfactory.

15. At completion, the total fund expended on IRP I was estimated at US$868.0 million includingGOT contribution estimated at US$60.0 million. US$166.7 million equivalent (SDR1 17.2 million) ofIDA fund was disbursed and US$ 12.17 million of the original estimates was cancelled along withUS$ 19.0 million equivalent from exchange rate savings. However, the costs of institutional supportwere more than double the appraisal estimates (para.). This applied for both IDA and for the otherdonors. Cost escalation for civil works ranged from 40% to over 125%. Delays in procurementtotaling 30 to 36 months have been experienced, although major improvement has been observedlately.

I. Institutional Reforms.

16. Reorganization. Decentralized decision making to the regions for planning andimplementation of road programs were introduced and staff was assigned to all 20 regions. Followingthe Mramba Commission on restructuring of the Tanzanian Government, all transport modes indifferent ministries were brought under one oversight agency, the Ministry of Works,Communications and Transport (MWCT). REOs reverted-to MWCT from the Regional Authorities inJuly in 1990, incorporating the MOW trunk roads maintenance organization in the 20 regions.Subsequently, following three years of discussions to create a more streamlined organization foroverall management of the transport sectors, the ministry was further split into MOW and MCT.MOW, Department of Roads (which was split from Buildings in November 1991) was to providebetter focus on road infrastructure needs. In line with the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission,one objective of the later reorganization was directed at preparing for private partnership orownership of the transport functions (road, air, and maritime transport) and creation of public workparastatal for road equipment (PEHOL). The establishment of an agency specifically related to roadconstruction, TANROADS, remained an important agenda of reform supported by donors throughoutthe project life, but the government was reluctant to pursue this in the initial years of the project. Itwas only in the last two years that the GOT changed its stance and today TANROADS is beingestablished.

17 Training. Significant manpower has been trained under IRP I. In MOW, under IDA fundingalone, a total of 63 staff obtained Master of Science Degrees: 54 in engineering; 3 in constructionmanagement; 4 in human resources and 2 in transport economics. However, of the 23 foreigneducated professionals, only 11 are currently with the ministry. Out of the remaining 40 whograduated from the University of Dar es Salaam, all are with the ministry except the two who died.Regarding the short-term trainees, 14 out of 32 of the foreign trained, and 336 of 379 locally trainedare still with the ministry. Also, in the National Construction Council, a total of 15 staff had receivedadvanced training and 12 of those are currently with NCC. Similarly, other donors have providedtraining. While this is a significant capacity and it should have translated into effective performance,the consensus of donors and the ministry itself is that the ministry has yet to significantly overcomeits capacity problems. One reason, in the words of one of the staff who received post-graduatedegree under IRP I financing, "with wages which hardly cover two weeks living expense, you areexpected to devote yourself to your work for a full month". Although a staggering US$105 million3(from all donors) was spent on the capacity building effort over a nine year-period, the absence of anadequate incentive structure undermined these efforts.

18. Contract Management. MOF undertook a study and implementation of a revisedprocurement and supplies management after much delay but its findings and recommendations werenot made effective and had little effect on the implementation of IRP I. However, improvements are

3 A total of us $105 million was expended by all donors on capacity building as estimated by Carl BroInternational a/s, Comprehensive Review of the IRP, Third Interim Report, Revised June 1997.


evident since 1998. Currently, procurement time on civil works have tended to be within the tendervalidity period, while processing consultancy service contracts still exceed the tender validity period,partly due to two stage evaluation and each stage undergoing internal clearances before obtaining"no objection" from IDA.

19. Technical Capacity for Road Maintenance. Road Maintenance Management System wasintroduced. Socio-economic criteria were used for selecting priority road improvements. Labor-based contract training was undertaken; and a management information system was introduced.

20. Road Fund. The road fund was established in July 1992. The Sub-Sahara Africa RoadMaintenance Initiative (RMI) and the donor community supported the program. The revenue isderived from fuel toll levy. In principle, significantly more resources should be available to pay forroad maintenance with road users shouldering an increasing share of the cost of maintenance.Currently, 70% of the total collected revenue from fuel levy is allocated to road maintenance. Theamount available in the future depends on the performance of the economy and on the levy rateapplied.

21. In the first three years of its establishment, the road fund was covering significant share of theresource requirement for the maintainable road network. Over time, delays in transfer of road fundsto the Ministry of Works became frequent. This affected the effective execution of maintenanceactivities. There was also misapplication of the road fund. In 1995/96, there was a crisis with theroad fund. Following short falls in the government revenue, GOT diverted the road fund to thegeneral account. The government saw the issue as a balancing act between important nationalpriorities due to tight budget to meet resource needs for counterpart funding; rising debt payments,both external and internal; food deficit due to drought etc. Among donors, the 1995/96 'road fundcrisis" rekindled the donors' concern that maintenance was not being given adequate priority.

22. Audit reports on the road funds were highly qualified. For example, the audit reports of the1994/95, 1995/96, and 1996/97 showed that the fund was used for ineligible expenditure whichincluded: terminal benefits, night out allowances to casual laborers, subsistence allowances,severance allowances and transportation of personal effects. Contractors with poor performancecontinue to be awarded contracts paid from road fund. These led several donors to question thetransparency and accountability of the road fund. In the last two years. In response the GOT hasundertaken confidence-building measures, including establishing Road Fund Board, and appointinga chief executive for TANROADS scheduled to commence work in July 2000.

II. Commercialization.

23. Construction Industry. In line with its commitment, GOT adopted in 1992 the NationalConstruction Industry Development Strategy. This led to the establishment of a private sector ledconstruction industry. Local contractors and consultants received training. By the end of 1996, thenumber of private civil works contractors had significantly increased from about 43 in 1989 to 610, ofwhich some 200 were in road sector. Today, there are more than 50 contractors with capabilities toundertake basic unpaved road rehabilitation and periodic maintenance works. Maintenance worksare now carried primarily using local contractors instead of force account. In the 1995/96 "road fundcrisis" the contractors played active role by lobbying for the timeiy disbursement of the road fund. Yetdespite significant increase in the 1990s in the number of qualified domestic contractors, their shareof the market has remained low, around 10% of total value of contracts. This is the major concern tothe nascent private contracting industry in Tanzania.

24. Plan and Equipment Hire Co. Ltd (PEHCOL). Under the credit GOT was committed tomanage all its road equipment along commercial lines, with users paying full hire rates. However,because of lack of reliability of the PEHCOL's equipment, commercialization objective was not assuccessful in the regions where PEHCOL had workshops as elsewhere. Much effort and resourceswere expended to bring the equipment in good service condition. A consultant was hired to advise onrehabilitation strategy. A total of US$ 11.45 million was utilized for the purpose from the IDA Credit of


which about US$5.0 million directly on repairs and rehabilitation and US$ 6.0 million indirectly in theforms of supervision vehicles, studies, technical assistance. 15 plants and 7 vehicles wererehabilitated; 35 plants and 12 vehicles had overhaul of major components; and 19 plants and 47vehicles received upgrades. But the impact of the above expenditure on improved equipmentavailability was marginal as most of the equipment in PEHCOL fleet was old. In retrospect, theeconomic merit of rehabilitation of the old equipment is questionable and there is need to look fornew approaches to establish equipment-leasing companies in remote rural areas. GOT has nowdecided to sell 51 % to 75% shares of PEHCOL to private investors. Bids were opened in May 1999.Valuation of bids is ongoing under the Presidential Parastatal Sector Perform Commission.

25. National Transport Corporation (NTC). Following restructuring exercises, measures weretaken to bring about reduction of fleet sizes and manning levels of the companies with a view toimprove efficiency, reduction in costs and therefore improved profitability. Two of the RETCOsshowed profit in 1997/98. The previous years, RETCOs showed losses due failure to adjust toshortage of consolidated cargoes arising from the liberalization of agricultural crop marketing.Starting 22nd of August 1997, NTC and the associated companies became a Specified PublicCorporations and are earmarked for divestiture during FY 1999/2000. Government has decided tosell the RETCOs to the workers, the public and institutions in the respective regions. As regard toShirika la Usafari Dar es Salaam Ltd. (UDA) it has been decided that 75% of the shares will be soldto investors in 2000.

26. Tanzania Air Corporation (ATC). Management and administration study funded under theCredit had some impact on the profitability of TAC. Of the seven items TAC planned to procureunder the project five were implemented. Two items, the airline revenue accounting package, andpurchase of 18 reservation terminals totaling US$132,302 will be financed under IRP II.

Ill. Physical

27. Overview. Overall, achievement of the IDA civil works component is now assessed aspartial. Assessment of project progress was initially more positive. In mid-1993, based on initialprogress, but not based on actual physical achievements, the project was considered a success andtherefore a follow-on project, IRP II, was appraised. The basis for the partial rating is for the physicalachievements is already highlighted in paras.12-13. However, the gravel roads implementationmerits further details as it eventually led to major procurement problems.

28. Gravel Roads. All the gravel roads constructed between late 1992 and early 1994 under IDAfinancing were substantially changed from the original scope of works from spot improvement,regular periodic maintenance-rehabilitation to works to full-scale reconstruction. Moreover, this wasdone without full assessment of the financial and budgetary impact of the decisions being made andwithout an IDA "no objection". While the designs were adequate for the original scope of works, theywere not adequate for the new scope of works. Moreover, no detailed designs were made availableto the contractors or given to the Bank for prior review. The design changes were made on sitethrough variation orders issued by supervision consultants. For example, in the cases ofLusahunga-Usagara (266 km) and Tunduma-Sumbawanga (226 km), construction were undertakenwithout proper design, drainage and widening of roads from 6.0 m to 7.5 m were undertaken. In thecases of Babati area roads (310 km), there was a widening of roads from 6.5 m to 9.5 and finally to10.2m and reducing the road length to 107 km by the omission of sections (i) Babati-Bereku (35 km)and (ii) Babati-Singida (168 km); and introduction of a major realignment at Sekenke escarpmentwhich involved major earth works and drainage structures. In the case of Tanga-Horohoro (68 km)and Marangu -Tarakea (52 km) roads, two projects about 500 km apart were lumped together in onecontract. Partially as a result of these changes many sections of these roads failed during the firstmajor rains. Similar conceptual and implementation mistakes occurred with the emergencyrehabilitation of Dar es Salaam Roads.

29. By May 1994, the poor quality of works and high unit cost of ongoing projects beganchallenging the initial assessment. In the case of gravel roads financed under IDA, substantial


changes in scope of work without appropriate engineering design and the Bank's approval led tosignificant quality of works failures and major cost overrun over the contracted amounts, makingimpossible achieving the physical targets set at appraisal. Serious attempts were made to salvagethe above components, but the operating environment proved intractable. In March 1995, IDArequested the government to appoint an independent consultant to look into the causes of failure ofthe rehabilitated gravel roads and to suggest actions to be taken to rectify the situation. In July 1997when the consultant report came out, IDA was to proceed with preparatory process for a majorrestructuring of the project but progress halted when the entire senior management of the ministrywas criticized in the Warioba Commission Report on corrupt practices. According to the Report,'...Officers of the Ministry of Works receive bribes in order to give favor in awarding tenders; toaccept upward variation of contracts; to conceal the weakness of the contracts; and in approvingpayments. Moreover bribes are offered at roadblocks in order to let undeserving vehicles through."Further, the previous consultants' and contractors' claims for the gravel roads remained outstanding.It was only in March 1998, that the reorganization of the ministry took place and in March 1999, theclaims of the contractors and consultants were settled. Moreover, there was not adequate fundsunder the credit to fully finance the required works. Therefore. it was decided to close the projectafter one-year extension from the original closing date of June 1998.

30. The major finding of an independent consultants carrying out the project review was that thegovernment supervision consultants did not provide MOW adequate waming signals of emergingproblems. The consultants' review also indicated that the gravel road contracts have hadprocurement and project management problems starting from the pre-qualification of consultants,preparation of inadequate engineering designs to the contracting and construction supervisionmonitoring, actually since commencement of the Project in 1991. Poor direction and weak projectmanagement by GOT influenced the performance of the consultants. The production of the tenderdocuments including the field survey took an abnormally long time (about two years to get to thetender stage). Pre-qualification of contractors was advertised between 31 January and 5th February1988, after which, out of 32 contractors who applied, 27 were pre-qualified. This list was then usedfor actual biding for the gravel road contracts more than two years later.

31. Bridges. The SAR budgeted US$8.0 million for some 20 trunk road bridges and ten ferrycrossings. But only one bridge, Kyaka Bridge and its associated works in Kagera district wascompleted at cost of nearly US$7.7 million exhausting the available resources for bridges and ferries.Implementation was followed by many failures of structures, approaches, temporary approaches,and temporary bridges.

32. Emergency Works. The IDA component of the project also financed road maintenance and aportion of outstanding balances for emergency works on Tunduma-Sumbawanga and other gravelroads.

33. Regional (District and Rural) Roads. Several donors financed rural roads under IRP I:including the EEC (200 km), UNDP (52 km) and USAID (1697.0 km). USAID under its AgriculturalAssistance Program (ATAP No. 621-0166) was the major donor. In January 1996, USAID issuedimpact assessment report on its program. The report covered a review of the institutional, financial,road industry and local people-level impacts and the project sustainability. The report concluded thatATAP was making reasonable progress. It assessed the outcome as likely sustainable, provided theprogram continues the support of the GOT.

34. Studies. Various studies have been carried out in the areas of construction sector industry(Table 8). The extension and update of the Zanzibar's road network study from 1991, successfullcompleted on time, is one such project that is likely to attract financing.


IV. Macro-economic Impact of the Program

35. Significant transport cost reduction has been achieved on roads rehabilitated to good/fairstandard (para.27). However, because the targets for roads in good condition was not realizedunder the Credit, the outcome compared to the high expectation at appraisal has not materialized.

C. Major Factors Affecting Project Implementation

36. Overview. The factors that were partly outside the government control and which affectedthe implementation of the project included: difficult environment for implementation, inadequatedesign, and problems in donor coordination and poor performance of consultants and contractors.The factors within the government's control were lack of good governance including corruptpractices, failure to apply lessons learned from preceding project implementation, substantivechanges in the scope of works without proper documentation, lack of proactive response, frequentreorganization of the implementing agencies, inadequate counterpart funding, and poor staffincentives. Factors within the control of the implementing agencies included procurement problems,deficient contract administration, and poor project and financial management control.

37. Factors Not Generally Subject to Government Control.

* Lack of realism in the project design. In principle, project design should prioritize investmentsand ensure an appropriate balance between the development of the productive capacity (roadnetwork) and the institutional and policy capacity to oversee the network. In this project,institutional aspects were stated as primary objective (evidence by the order of presentation ofthe two objectives in the project), but there was never a clear consensus on this between thegovernment and donors.

* Effective Donor Coordination remained an issue throughout, although a senior technical advisorwas appointed as part of the project implementation arrangements. Information on the activitiesof the donors and resources were difficult to come by and to achieve coordination of priorities.There were no adequate documentation to help find out what each donor is doing and how manyresources each donor was spending. Lack of coordination among donors resulted in excesslocal contracting capacity creation. Also, not all donors were active in the implementationissues. Finally, GOT received a number of conflicting signals, for example, on road fund, roadagency, reorganization of the transport sector, on the speed at which these changes were to beimplemented and on the degree of achievement of the project objectives.

* The government did not always get the best advice from its advisor and consultants on status ofproject management as evidenced in the poor quality civil works, cost over runs, delayedcompletion of subprojects and unfavorable terms of contracts.

38. Factors Generally Subject to Government Control.

* The prevailing implementation environment was difficult. As noted in the Warioba CommissionReport (Dec. 1996), the governance system prevailing in the ministry was not conducive totimely completion of project. Audited accounts also showed serious shortfalls. Macroeconomicperformance was below expectations, and country performance ratings of inflation, fiscal deficit,savings and expenditure management were poor. OED reviews pointed to difficulties incontrolling the budgetary pressures that were fostering inflation.

* The lessons of experience of the preceding Highway Rehabilitation Projects appear to have littleimpact. Poorly documented engineering design were one of the main causes of delays and costescalations under the Sixth Highway Rehabilitation Project and remained so in IRP I.

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project Page 10Implementation Completion Report Part I: Project Implementation Assessment

* Counterpart financing was a problem. The prevailing macro-economic conditions made itdifficult for the government to meet its commitment to make available the proceeds from roadfunds on time and in the amount required for road maintenance. Because of the developmentbudget funding problem, MOW used the road fund revenues to fund emergency expenditures.

* There were several implementation issues for which adequate and timely attention on the part ofthe GOT would have radically changed the situation on the ground and the perception of donorstowards the government's performance. Lagged responses on the part of the government raisedconcern as to the government's commitment. Some of these included: decision to change thescope of works from rehabilitation to reconstruction without proper engineering design; delays incommercialization of PEHCOL and delayed establishment of road agencies; prolonged delayson taking action against corruption, use of dedicated road fund for the purpose not intended, etc.The governments delayed responses to the donor community's queries on the 1995/96-roadfund allocation and road agency issue led to a request by the donors to meet with the Presidenton these issues.

* Frequent reorganization of the implementing ministry in the midst of implementing such a largeproject had also adverse impact on project implementation. The split of MWCT into twoseparate ministries diverted senior management attention away from implementation of IRPprojects towards reorganization. The reorganization also resulted in lack of coordinationbetween the two ministries dealing with transport and was for a time a source of delays untilfunctions were sorted out.

- The weak incentive system in the implementing agency did affect staff proactive performance,contributing to delay completion of the project, leading to substantial changes in scope of workwithout supporting technical preparation. The result was of significant consequence to projectimplementation - cost escalation, including changes in-contract prices of over 100% of theoriginal amount.

* The weak contracting industry also contributed to the poor quality of works and cost escalation.

39. Factors Generally Subject to Implementing Agency Control.

* The project faced several problems with timely decision making processes, delays in execution,cost overruns, implementation problems, technical/financial problems, technical and financialmonitoring and quality of executed works. The selection of contractors, their financial capabilitiesand the contractors' capabilities to import equipment created also problems for the project.Variation orders in magnitude well above than 15% of the project contract without the Bank'sapprovals were allowed contrary to Appendix I paragraph 3 of the Guidelines for procurementunder IDA Credit. Throughout implementation, the coordinating office was not adequatelyequipped or staffed to effectively handle these issues for such complex project. Generally, itwas less proactive and left issues unresolved for too long.

* Procurement and contract administration were focal points of IRP I problems through out theproject life. In particular, the area of procurement and negotiation of contracts, the implementingagency could have contributed much more than it did. Either due to omission or commission,procurement problems, and deficient contract management contributed to cost escalations andpoor quality. Moreover, the contracts provided generous price escalation payments. Forexample, foreign currency exchanges were fixed at unrealistic rates resulting on variation on thedollar to almost 20% per annum whereas in real terms it should have been only 4% at most onthe international market. Moreover, the foreign currency portion should not have been escalatedfor the first 12-months of the contract. In addition, the Tanzanian portion should not have beensubject to price escalation before the first 12 months of the contract expire, and thereafter priceescalation should have reflected only the inflation prevalent in the country in the various inputs.Overall project implementation delays were between 30 to 36 months. Procurement delays

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project Page 11Implementation Completion Report Part l: Project Implementation Assessment

averaged 189 weeks from tender to signing of contracts; poor contract administration contributedto price escalation in majority of cases exceeding 100% of the contract price. Inadequatecontractors capacity contributed to poor quality of works resulting on failing road structures androad surface, particularly for gravel roads.

D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

40. Project Sustainability. Overall, the sustainability of the project is assessed as uncertain. Itappears that much longer time than originally planned is needed to assure sustainability.Sustainability of the progresses made with respect to institutional objective depends on the prevailingenvironment, government commitment to maintenance-first policy, proactive leadership, the incentivesystem to skilled manpower and on follow-up measures to consolidate the progress achieved to date- road fund, road agency, etc. The sustainability of the commercialized activities under theliberalization regime depends on the entrepreneurial ability of the new contractors and their financialcapacity. The sustainability of the maintenance system introduced depends on the performance ofthe economy to generate road fund revenue and eradication of corrupt practices.

E. Bank Performance

41. Identification and Preparation IDA's performance during identification and preparationphases is assessed as satisfactory. IDA staff rightly identified that transport was a major constraintfacing the Tanzanian economic recovery in its transition to market-oriented economy. Duringpreparation IDA staff provided critical assistance to GOT in coordinating donor assistance andpackaging the program.

42. Appraisal. Appraisal did address many issues and was cognizant of the complexity of theproject design. In retrospect, however, there were some shortcomings in its assessment: definingthe alternative design of the project (e.g. considering a series of several projects based on an agreedprogram suggested at the time); the inadequate incentive regime as well as the readiness of theimplementing agencies to perform basic tasks. Appraisal was also weak in assessing the risks onthe physical objectives due to multiplicity of development objectives, which required majorinstitutional structural changes. Moreover, given that the rationale for undertaking the project was toremove the transport constraints on the ongoing economic recovery program, the primarydevelopment objective of the project should have been the physical objective (83% of the projectcost), and institutional capacity should have focussed more, and first on the basics of procurement,contract administration and project management with the scope of institutional reforms more phased.Certainly, the perception at appraisal that the primary risk of the project would be from "slowliberalization!" is a reflection of a failure to assess the real reasons of the project of this size.Second, the risks due to lack of incentives to staff was identified at appraisal as a risk, but anadequate sustainable solution was not found in the context of the civil service at the time. Third,since it is known from experience that earlier IDA financed highway sector project had experiencedbasic implementation problems in performing the basics tasks of procurement, focusing on contractadministration and project management at appraisal would have led to a more focussed project. Insummary, appraisal is assessed as deficient.

Supervision

43. As noted in the earlier sections of this ICR, the conceptual design of the program and its large-scale investment was aimed at meeting the enormous requirements of the country for a well-functioning road infrastructure at a time when the economy was recovering. The deteriorated roadnetwork posed serious constraints to the movement of both people and goods, and particularly theflow of agricultural inputs to farms and outputs to markets, and the mobility of people to access socialservices. The donor community considered that a large program encompassing both capital


construction and basic capacity building was needed to elicit a supply response to themacroeconomic reforms, which the government was undertaking.

44. Against this background, the donor community agreed to finance a complex and high-riskprogram totaling US$871 million. There was great optimism that the program would work and thissense of optimism was reinforced by the apparent eagerness of the government to reform its publicadministration. However, the outcome of the program execution shows that, given the scale of theappraised program and its complexity combined with the weak institutional structure, the donorcommunity's optimism was misplaced.

45. The project achieved initial success: the launching ceremonies, the signature of the first largecontracts and the completion of one or two links during the first two years, the implementation of theof the reforms in decentralization of road maintenance, maintenance planning, improved reporting,the quality of presentation at mid-term review. However, this early success later proved to be aliability, since it obscured the ability to detect and respond to implementation problems which soonarose. As the number of contracts increased, the existing infrastructure to implement the project didnot grow in tandem and as a result enormous delays in procurement processing occurred leading tohuge increases in program costs.

46. Although the design of the project anticipated the stationing in Tanzania an experiencedhighway engineer from the Bank to assist the government in coordination of the project, eventuallyan ex-Bank Principal Transport Engineer (PTE) was located in the Bank's Resident Officeanswerable to the Permanent secretary of MOW (who was responsible for implementing the Project).The arrangement appeared to be working. However, as the works progressed, conflicting signalsappeared regarding the role of the engineer, causing confusion to the client, Bank management,contractors and consultants. The optimistic views of the engineer on the program performance andhis communication with other players actually contradicted the findings of the headquarters-basedtask team and its early warnings that the project's institutional structure could not manage theplanned activities, that the planned milestones could not be achieved within available resources andthat the project was moving towards a crisis. The conflicts implied in the engineer dual roles inacting as both an adviser to the government and as a supervisor by the client during the first fouryears of the program clearly delayed the emergence of a consensus among the task team, Bankmanagement and donors on required measures to turn around the performance of the program.

47. The influx of funds and the complexity of the project combined with the inability of theimplementing organization to increase its capacity at a rate commensurate with the growing volumeof works, and the overall poor governance environment in the country, led to major mismanagementof the program and eventually to corruption. By early 1994, the Bank supervision reports began toclearly state the problems, but Bank management influenced by the resident engineer, and theoptimistic donor perceptions did not immediately grasp the seriousness of the situation. However, bythe beginning of 1995, Bank management decided to strengthen the headquarters supervisionmission team by including an experienced senior highway engineer and the magnitude of theproblems facing the project were clearly identified.

48. In retrospect, questions could be raised such as: (i) why the early concerns raised during initialsupervision missions were not responded to more quickly; (ii) why questions were not raised earlieron the growing disconnect after 1992 between the resident engineer and the supervision missions;and (ii) why an independent engineer was not added to the supervision team until after substantialcommitments were locked into. Clearly the initial progress led to a misplaced level of optimism butmore important the decision to place a senior engineer into the field as both an advisor andimplementor led to a conflict which contributed to substantial implementation difficulties later on.

49. By 1995 the government had lost control of the program, arguably a result of mismanagement.The headquarters task team downgraded the rating of the project to unsatisfactory, stopped givingno objections to new contracts, focused on ongoing contracts and on ascertaining the precisephysical and financial status of the project with a view to restructuring it. Bank management, now


convinced about the deficiencies in implementation of the project, aggressively supported the taskteam and intensively dialogued with the government on the required project management andinstitutional changes.

50. In 1996, the government concern about mismanagement in all facets of public administrationled to a report on the State of Corruption in the Country (Warioba Report) in which the Ministry ofWorks was highly criticized. The report stated that ".Officers of the Ministry of Works receivebribes in order to give favor in awarding tenders, to accept upward variation of contracts; to concealthe weaknesses of contractors; and in approving payments. Moreover bribes are offered at roadblocks in order to let vehicles through." The report recommended a total reorganization of theMinistry and removal of the management team, the same team which had been earlier seen as"champions" of the program by the Bank and the donors. More than two years after the WariobaReport, in February 1998, the government eventually replaced the top managers and engineers whohad been implicated by the report. The Ministry was re-organized and five months later, the Bankwas able to partially close this project and to restructure the ongoing Second Integrated RoadsProject. In June 1999 the government passed legislation for establishment of the Road Act andRoad Fund Board and for establishment of TANROADS.

51. With regard to basic capacity building, which was to take place in parallel with the worksprograms, the results have been poor because the conditions for effective capacity building did notexist. Although large amount of resources was spent on this effort over a nine year-period (para.17),the absence of an adequate incentive structure undermined the efforts. The Ministry's highlyqualified professionals received monthly salaries barely adequate to meet living costs for two weeks.At the same time they had to work side by side with counterparts, provided by donors, contractorsand consultant's staff, who eamed 100 times their own salaries. This arguably led to an environmentthat undermined the project implementation.

52. The arrangements and safeguard measures planned in the project did not adequatelyrecognize the risks given the large scale of the project, its complexity and the weak institutionalstructure. The unrealistic optimism that the government's apparent commitment to reforming publicsector administration would be translated, through the capacity building component, into realcapacity needed for project implementation proved to have been a miscalculation. The failure toadequately take into account the lessons learned from the Sixth Highway Project, a smaller scaleoperation that nevertheless showed similar problems, proved fatal in a much larger and ambitiousproject. Status of Civil Works of IDA financed component, ref. Paragraph 13 above in the text,shows the cost increases of the IDA financed road works and the magnitude of the deviations fromoriginal contract values.

53. Thus, it is in the context that both appraisal and supervision are rated at all level ofmanagement as marginally unsatisfactory - a set of good ideas undermined by an unduly ambitiousand optimistic project design; the early successes following initial contract signatures andimprovements in road conditions making it difficult to identify and gain acceptance by subsequentdelays and problems; the controversial role of the Principal Transport Engineer in advising both thegovernment and the Bank management and staff; and poor governance conditions in the country allhad a role in the project's eventual failure. Notwithstanding the substantial efforts of theheadquarters based task team, in identifying the problems during the supervision as the project'smidlife and their extensive efforts to get things on track throughout the rest of the project's life, theconditions in-country and in the donor community and the role of the engineer undermined theeffectiveness of the supervision efforts during the critical years when the bulk of the investmentswere committed.

F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE

54. Preparation. Overall Borrowers preparation is assessed as satisfactory. Thegovernment's initiative in its Transport Sector Policy Paper and its Transport Recovery Program and


its ability to bring some 16 donors to agree in support of its program over a period of three years,was a major undertaking. It showed leadership and made good on the reservoir of good will thegovernment had among the donor community at the time. Coming to closure was a fit ofaccomplishment. On the other hand GOT had some shortcomings. It had not made adequatepreparation to correct the weaknesses revealed in the course of implementation of a series ofHighway Projects IDA financed earlier. It had not piloted or pre-tested the process of procurementand contract management process to be used in administering the project.

55. Implementation. GOT has overestimated its implementation capacity. The governmentwas not able to execute its ambitious program on schedule and within budget. Audit reports ofproject accounts, as the scale of implementation increased, were highly qualified. In particular, GOTand its implementing agencies failed to make good use of the resources at their deposal as in thecase of the gravel roads. Where the govemment has ultimately made good on its commitments, theresponses were not often timely and sometimes had required the prodding of the donor communityas in the case of the Road Fund, Road Agency. In the area of procurement, project managementand contract administration, a decade after the launching of IRP I, and after continuous reminder ofthe problems in these areas, and substantial expenditure of resources for manpower training, thereis no evidence that the implementing agency is significantly better than it was at the start of theproject. GOT management of its consultants was not demanding. It must also be stated that theconsultants and the advisor to the govemment did not provide always quality professional services.These professionals could have contributed to better quality of works but failed to do so asevidenced from their implementation performance. Most disappointing was the fact that the projectadvisor failed to steer the project implementation in the right course.

56. In particular, there were problems related to the use of the Special Account. An initialdeposit of USD12.0 million was made to the Special account (SA) in March 1991. By January 1996,the balance in the SA had dropped to about US$5.6 m. CODAP had made payments of aboutUS$3.2 million on account of seven addenda for civil work and consultant services. As no formal "noobjections" were given to the amendments covering such additional works and services, CODAPfailed to follow IDA procurement procedures for supplementary contract increases and madepayments without following IDA procurement procedures for supplementary contract increases. Untilan independent consultant's report on the addenda was published, IDA limited the SA to theavailable USD2.4 million, suspended replenishment starting July 1996 and the minimum sizeapplication correspondingly reduced from USD1.2 million to USD150, 000. Outstanding invoicesamounting USD5.6 million were directly paid from project accounts.

G. Assessment of Outcome.

57. Project outcome. Overall, the outcome of the IDA financed component is assessed asunsatisfactory. However, as a result of the project, there is today a more organized sector program.The government has learned valuable lessons from its implementation experience. A private sectorled road construction sector industry has emerged. Road maintenance is now carried by privatecontractors, who have largely come into existence with the support of the IRP I. Despite thetemporary relapse in the administration of the road fund in 1995/96, road fund now contributes asignificant share of the cost of maintenance. The Road Fund Board supported by the Road Fund Actadministers the road fund. The TANROADS is finally going to be fully operating by July 2003.However, the impact of transport cost reduction on the macroeconomic situation was not as high asexpected at the start of this ambitious program. Also, the basics of project management andcontract administration have yet to be mastered.

H. Future Operations

58. Key Elements of Future Planned Operation. To lay the foundation for excellence ininstitution building, there is need to assure that the modest capacity achieved to date under the


project, especiaUly the trained manpower and the creation of a road agency, is sustained. Assuringadequate resources for road maintenance will remain essentially an ongoing issue. Given pastperformance of the economy, efficient and effective use of the available road fund will be anothercritical area of focus.

1. Key Lessons Learned and Future Actions.

59. Key Lessons Learned and Future Actions. This Integrated Roads Project has been thelargest and most ambitious project in the sector. As such it has been the subject of multiple reviewsincluding a recent Bank Quality Assurance Group review. This ICR identifies a number of keylessons for future project design and implementation in Tanzania.

* Project Design. While the concept of sector investment project on which IRP I is based appearsworkable, its application to a specific country requires making tradeoffs between majordevelopment objectives based on detailed analysis of major risks in achieving those objectives.In particular, in the civil works, the absence of detailed engineering for all major roadsimmediately prior to start of construction, made variation orders almost inevitable, leading todelays and cost increases. In institutional capacity building too, the many demands for reforms,taxed the capacity of the government to deliver on budget and on schedule. Therefore, inprojects of IRP I type, it is important to introduce "checks and balances" with early warningsignals to be able to adapt the program when required.

* Corrupt practices. The poor implementation performance of IRP I testifies that the potential forcorrupt practices can significantly impact project implementation performance. In this case,roads that would have been constructed under the project to good standard remaineduncompleted partly because of corrupt practices and the absence of systems and proceduresthat could check against their occurrence. The Government should institute measures tosafeguard against such practices. Physical progress should be verified against designspecifications. Stringent measures should be taken under situation where audit reports areconstantly delayed and qualified in order to fight potential corrupt practices from blossoming.

Learning from Past Mistakes. The lessons of experience of past project implementation wereto safeguard against future mistakes both for IDA and the borrower. As a matter of fact, majorflaws experienced in the Sixth Highway Project Credit were also experienced under IRP 1. Forexample, appropriate technical documentation and provision of adequate resources should befully completed before commencement of works. In short, more attention needs to be paid topast lessons of experience during project design and implementation.

* Composition of Project Team. Supervision team should have professional mix with keypersons being sufficiently experienced in the major fields of a project activities such asengineering, institutional reforms, etc. In addition, there should not be frequent changes ofsupervision management and teams, in order to ensure continuity and consistency of efforts inachieving quality and quantity of the planned targets.

* Technical Documentation. Technical documentation necessary for implementation of civilworks should be updated before actual commencement of construction works.

* Donor Coordination. The spirit of cooperation of the donor community in support of theIntegrated Roads Project I had no parallel. It was the first time so many donors have committedthemselves to such a large common program. Unfortunately, in IRP 1, it has not been easy tomaintain the interests of all donors' cooperation during implementing phase as each donor focuson execution of its own mini program under the parallel financing arrangement. In future, inlarge investment supported by several donors, a professional coordination managed by thegovernment should be established, with agreed terms of references.


* Technical and Financial Audits. The Government should among other things, carryperformance technical and financial audits of the works carried out. Such audits should, besidesfrequently revisiting the overall status of implementation, also include verification of the physicaland financial targets.

* Initial Successes in Long-term Program. Usually during the initial phases of project cycle oflarge programs, there is high optimism of the team involved and there is a tendency tounderestimate the operation environment of the specific country for which the project isdesigned, even when there are potentially implementation problems. Initial successes usuallymask deficiencies related to preparation, selection of contracts and judgements of capacities. Itis therefore important that project implementor should not be taken in by an initial euphoria andensure that measurable output targets are met. The project should have well defined qualitativeand quantitative indicators, which should be adequately designed so that any deviation frominitial targets can be detected and corrected in real time.

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project Page 17Implementation Completion Report Part II: Statistical Tables

TANZANIA

INTEGRATED ROADS PROJECT (IDA COMPONENT)

(CREDIT 2149-TA)PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS

A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable

Macroeconomic policies E El xSector policies E X E EFinancial objectives D X a EInstitutional development ° x El Physical objectives X E EPoverty reduction E X E EGender issues Cl 0 E XOther social objectives (Donor E X a Ecoordination)Environmental objectives El X aPublic sector management O x E EPrivate sector development O X El

B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain

El El X

C. Bank Performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

Identification El XEPreparation assistance E] X Appraisal E XSupervision4 E E X

D. Borrower Performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

Preparation El x aImplementation El El X

Covenant compliance l E xOperation (if applicable) E El

E. Assessment of Outcome* Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory HighlySatisfactory Unsatisfactory

n El X O

4 marginally

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project Page 18Implementation Completion Report Part Il: Statistical Tables

TABLE 2: RELATED BANK LOANSICREDITS

Credit Title Purpose Year of Statusapproval

Preceding Operations:1. First Highway Project (Cr. Construction of six road sections with 1964 Completed. Project48-TA/Cr. 115-TA, US$17.0 detailed engineering work closed in July 1973million)2. Second Highway Project Construction of 499 kms of Tanzania 1969 Completed. Project(Ln. 586-TA/Cr. 142-TA, Highway closed in DecemberSecond Highway Project, 1978US$22.5 million)3. Third Highway Project Paving of the road between Mtwara and 1971 Completed. Project(Cr.265-TAILn.586-TA, US$6.5 Massasi and pre-investment studies closed in Decembermillion) 1978

4. Fourth Highway First phase of establishing a trunk road 1977 Completed. ProjectMaintenance Project (Cr. 507- maintenance studies. closed in DecemberTA, US$10.2 million) 1985

5. Trucking industry Strengthen the operating capability, 1977 Completed. ProjectRehabilitation and management and management closed in DecemberImprovement Project (Cr. information systems of selected 1998743-TA, US$15.0 million) companies through procurement and

rehabilitation of trucks6. Fifth Highway Project (Cr. Second phase of establishing a trunk Completed. Project876-TA, US20.5 million) road maintenance organization closed in December

19897. Sixth Highway Reduce transportation costs by 1986 Completed. ProjectRehabilitation Project rehabilitating most important sections of closed in June 1994(Cr. 1668-TA, US$50.0 million) the highway network; improve the

system of road maintenance works byincreasing the contractors; assist andexpand capacity and efficiency of thetrucking industry; and increase theavailability of trained engineers inTanzania;

Following Operations1. Integrated Road Project II Strengthen the capacity of the MCW to 1994 Ongoing(Cr. 2598-TA, US$170.2 manage road maintenance programmillion) and to execute road rehabilitation and Project restructured in

upgrading works. August 1998.Reallocation in January

El Nino emergency rehabilitation 2000 with projectprogram of trunk, feeder roads and completion datemajor bridges. extended until June

2003.Emergency resurfacing of Kilimanjaroairport

Design of Singida-Shelui Road Sectionalong central transport corridor.

Preparation of 10YRoad SectorInvestment Program and several sectorstudies: transport masterplan,environmental guidelines, etc.

Source: IDA Project File


TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE

Date actual!Steps in project cycle Date planned Latest estimate

Identification/First Mission/ N/A

Appraisal June 1989 June/July, 1989

Negotiations January 29,1990 April 10 to 13, 1990

Board presentations May 20, 1990 May 31, 1990

Signing September 1990 September 28,1990

Effectiveness December 28, 1990 March 15, 1991

Mid-term Review November 1992 November 20,1992

Project completion December 31, 1998 December 31, 1998December 31,1999 December 31, 1999

Loan closing June 30,1999 June 30,1999


TABLE 4: CREDIT DISBURSEMENT-CUMULATIVE ESTIMATE AND ACTUAL(US$ million)

FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FOO

Appraisal 12.93 41.23 75.53 114.12 142.41 163.86 175.86 181.00 181.00 181.00estimateActual 11.40 20.48 46.19 75.31 110.94 137.15 148.64 153.08 159.55 166.70

Actual as % of - 88.2 49.7 61.2 66.0 77.9 83.7 84.5 84.6 88.0 92.1estimate

Date of final disbursement was December 21, 1999. And the amount cancelled was USD31,165,978.54



TABLE 5A: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Training Under IDA CreditA. Trained Staff Abroad

(I) Long TermSIN Course Year Total TraineesI M.SC. Highway Engineering 1992-94 92. M. Sc. Human Resource Management 1992-95 43 M. Sc. Construction Management 1994/95 34 M. Sc. Bridge Engineering 1994/95 15 M. Sc. Traffic Engineering 1994/95 16 M. Sc. Environment Engineering 1994/95 17 P.G. Highway Engineerng 1995/96 28 M. Sc. Transport Economy 1994/95 29 M. so. Mechanical Engineers 1991/92 2

Total 23(11) Short Term

1 Material Management 1992 12 Financial Management 1992/95 7

3 Maintenance of survey Equipment 1992 1

4 Computerized Accounting Systems 1993 15 Public financing 1994 16 Road maintenance 1992 77 Records Management 1994 18 Traffic safety 1994 19 Mgt. Development for Executive Assistants 1992 4

10 Advanced Mgt. For Executive Assistants 1994 311 Human Resource Management 1995 412 Technical Audit 1995 313 Effective Chief executive Program 1995 2

|______-__ Total ______________ot l36B. In-country Training

(I) Long Term1_______ |M. Sc. Highways Engineering (10 @batch) _ 1994/97 40

(II) Short Term1 Financial management for Accountants (REDMA) 1994 1202 Procurement of civil Works (ESAMI) 1992 1203 Transport Planning for District Engineers and District

Planning Officers (ESAMI) 1995 1004 Computer courses for senior staff (IDM) 1993 135 Computer course for secretaries (IDM) 1993 26

Total 379

Source: MOW


TABLE 5B: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Status of Trained Staff Under IDA CreditPresent | Transferred Retrenched/ Death Abscond Total

I Retired(I) AbroadLong Term 11 5 iT 1 23

Short Term 14 11 5 1 1 32

Total 25 16 10 2 2 55

(11) In CountryLong Term 38 2 - 40

Short Term 1 336 32 8 3 379

Total 1 374 32 8 5 419

Source: MOW

TABLE 5C: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

PEHCOL (Plant and Equipment Hire Co. Ltd.)Activity No. of Plants No. of Vehicles1. Various equipment were "rehabilitated" using dealers workshops 15 7and PEHCOL's Central Workshop at Morogoro2. Major Repairs 35 123. Upgrading at sight and various Branch workshops 19 47

Current Status Operative Non-operative________________ (repairable)

1. Plants 53 242.Vehicles 35 9

Total IDA credit utilized US$11,450,562 (Nov. 1999)Source: PEHCOL, Nov,1999

TABLE 5D: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

ROAD FUND EXPENDITURE ON ROADS (TANZANIAN SHILLINGS)

FINANCIAL RATE OF I RP TARGET GOVERNMENT BUDGET ACTUAL DISBURSEMENT ACTUAL TO

YEAR EXCHANGE IRP TARGET

TsH/US$ US$ M TSHS. M US$ M TSHS. M US$ M

1991/92 284.45 16.11 0.0 2,036.69 7.16 44.4%

1992/93 407.43 16.11 5,167.37 12.68 5,167.37 12.68 78.7%

1993/94 501.66 18.41 7,648.60 15.25 8,515.41 16.97 92.2%

1994/95 540.82 34.30 15,187.52 28.08 16,265.56 30.08 87.7%

1995/96 561.61 34.73 17,093.62 30.44 11,000.14 19.59 56.4%

1996/97 601.25 34.91 20,000.00 33.26 15,993.94 26.60 76.2%

1997/98 620.00 36.10 20,000.00 32.22 14,999.00 24.17 66.9%

1998/99 675.82 38.80 22,250.00 32.91 15,625.00 23.12 59.6%

1999/00 750.00 41.86 26,304.00 35.07

SOURCES: PROJECT FILES & CARL BRO INTERNATIONAL A/S, COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE INTEGRATED ROADSPROJECT, THIRD INTERIM REPORT- RVISED JUNE 1997, & IDA SUPERVISION REPORTS.

Tanzania: Integrated Roads Project Page 22Implementation Completion Report Part 11: Statistical Tables

TABLE 6A: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION

ROADS CONDITION BY SURFACE TYPE

SAR: Planned Paved Roads SAR: Planned Gravel Roads SAR: Earth Roads Total

Total Good Fair Poor Total Good Fair Poor Total Good Fair Poor Road__ __ ___ __ __ _Length

Km Km Km Km Km Km Km Km Km Km Km Km

FY 90191 3,567 856 1,023 1,688 2,858 286 1,143 1,429 3,204 1,429 378 1,397 9,629

% Share 100% 24% 29% 47% 100% 10% 40% 50% 100% 45% 12% 43% 100%

FY 91/92 3, 567 856 1,023 1,688 2,858 286 1,143 1,429 3,204 1,429 378 1,397 9,629

FY 92/93 3,566 1,299 934 1,333 2,877 344 1,135 1,398 3,164 1,398 376 1,390 9,607

FY 93/94 3,565 1,849 823 893 3,128 666 1,129 1,333 2,986 1,333 352 1,301 9,679

FY 94/95 3,781 2,863 664 254 3,636 1,912 934 790 2,129 790 285 1,054 9,546

FY 95/96 3,865 3,428 437 0 3,718 2,457 825 436 1,694 436 268 990 9,277

FY95/96 100% 89% 11% 0 0% 100% 66% 22% 12% 100% 26% 16% 58%

Actual 3,921.55 2,317.6 1,162.9 441.05 3,526.6 773 2,097.8 655.8 2,782.2 3 760 2019.2 10,230.351998/99

% Share 100% 59% 30% 11 % 100% 22% 59% 19% 100% 0 27% 73%

Total Good Total Fair Total Poor Grand TotalAggregate

Good Fair Poor TotalPlanned 199119211 2571 2544 4514 9629Percentage Share 27% 26% 47% 100%

Actual 199819912 3,093.6 4,020.7 3,116.05 10,230.35Percentage Share 30% 39% 30% 100% . _

Sources: 1. SAR; 2. MOW, actual April 1999.


Table 6B: Key Indicators of Project Operation

Trunk Roads Operational Plan & Approved Budget ( sh million)

Item Unit Sources of Physical Financial Plan 1999100fund plan (km)

Local Foreign Total

1 Routine & Recurrent Maint, for Paved Roads Km GOT 3,658 3332.56 0.00 3332.56

2 Routine & Recurrent Maintenance for Unpaved Km Got 3827 2057.07 0.00 2057.07Roads

3 Periodic Maintenance (50km, Resealing 140 km) Km GOT 190 4,260.56 0.00 4,260

4 Spot Improvements and Emergency Km GOT/IDAI EDF 2625 2695.45 24,904.66 27,600.11IADB/ SDC

5 . Bridges m. GOT 210 611.56 0.0 611.56

6 Special Projects: Replacements of Vehicles, GOT/NORAD 588.7 646.2 1234.90Bridge Management

7 Overhead and Administration GOT 1011.5 0.00 1,011.5

Grand Total _ 10,300 14,557.4 25,550.86 40,108.26

Table 6C: Key Indicators of Project Operation

Rural Roads Operational Plan & Budget (Tsh million)

Item Km Source of Km Financial Plan 1999100fund Local Foreign Total

1. Routine Recurrent Maintenance Km GOT 13932 5,154.50 5,154.50

2. Periodic maintenance Km GOT 341 3,792.00 3,792.00

3. Spot Improvement -Emergency Km GOT/IDA 4,375 1,204.67. 3,740.00 4,944.67

4. Bridge Maintenance m GOT 868.50 868.50

7. Administration and Overhead GOT 913.10 913.10

8. Total 18648 12,117.77 3,740.00 15,857.77

Source: MOW & IDA Project File

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 24Implementation Completion Report Part Il: Statistical Tables

TABLE 7: STUDIES INCLUDED IN PROJECT

Study Purpose as defined at Status Impact of Studyappraisallredefined

1. Project Review of the Investigate why: the present poor Completed Basis for review of theGravel Roads condition of the road projects; failed road conditionRehabilitation Projects for inordinate delays in procurement ofthe Ministry of Works in goods and services under theTanzania project; increase in costs;

inadequate drainage structures

2. Comprehensive Review of Review of the status of Completed Basis of review of thethe Integrated Toads implementation of IRP I status of the roadProject project.

2. Zanzibar- Preparatory study Prepare for Zanzibar road projects Completed Likely to attract IDAfinancing

3. Procurement & Reg. Study Prepare basis for sound Completed Noneprocurement practices in the country

4. Road Transport Service Review and optimization of Completed Basis for RETCOsRestructurng Study transport services restructuring

5. Civil Aviation Sub-sector Improve management Completed Had impactedprofitability

6. Road Fund Study Recommendations for administrative Completed Basis for road fundarrangements for collection of heavy developmentvehicles license fees and transit fees

TABLE 8A: PROJECT COSTS - IDA COMPONENT ONLY (US$ MILLION)

CATEGORIES GOT IDA TOTAL GOT IDA TOTAL

1. Trunk road rehabilitation & upgrading 12.3 69.9 82.2 10.6 60.9 70.8

2. Other roads, bridges, buildings and road 6.6 37.2 43.8 7.9 44.8 52.7maintenance works

3. Equipment for road contractors 0.0 5.7 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0

4. Equipment, vehicles, spare parts and materials 0.0 8.9 8.9 0.0 13.6 13.6

5. Equipment, vehicles and spare parts for private 0.0 14.1 14.1 0.0 0.0 0.0plant pools

6. Equiprnent higher hire for road maintenance by 15.4 8.3 23.7 4.8 2.6 7.4REOs

7. Equipment and ferry repair contracts, including 0.0 6.7 6.7 0.0 0.01 0.0transportation

8. Consultants' services 2.7 24.2 26.9 4.6 41.1 45.7

9. Training, seminars, fellowships and workshops 0.0 3.9 3.9 0.0 3.4 3.4

10. Project preparation fund 0.0 1.5 1.5 0.0 1.1 1.1

Total 37.0 180.4 217.4 28.0 166.7 194.7

SOURCE: IDA ESTIMATES.

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 25Implementation Completion Report Part Il: Statistical Tables

TABLE 8B: PROJECT FINANCING - TOTAL (US$ MILLION)

Category Appraisal Actual

IDA 180.4 166.70*

DANIDA 57.0 80.00

FRG 32.0 54.8

ITALY 91.7 54.8

FINNIDA 48.4 10.00

ODA 13.6 4.8

UNDP/UNCDF 2.9 3.2

NORD 36.5 57.5

EEC 171.0 193.7

USAID 32.7 62.00

The Netherlands 18.0 25.5

Switzerland 10.8 16.9

Ireland 4.8 4.8

AfDF 45.2 58.9

SAUDI FUND 11.8 9.9

Financing Gap 33.8 0.0

Government of Tanzania 80.5 60.0

Total 871.1 868.0

Source: Project Accounts , financial year 1997/98 as submitted for Audit by MOW.* the figure for IDA is as of Dec. 21,1999.

Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits

The combined Economic Rate of Retumi for Tanga-HorhorolMaranga-Tarakea road is 29% includiiig cost of bridgesplanned to be imnplemented..

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 26Implementation Completion Report Part II: Statistical Tables

TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS

Section. Covnt. Present Original Revised Description CommentsCovenant Class Status Fulfillment fulfillme Of

Type Date nt Date Covenant

Section 09 C 12131/93 Borrower shall undertake a general Complied3.03 revision of its procurement with partially

regulations and commence but notimplementation by Dec. 31, 1993. implemented

Section 02 C Borrower shall increase its revenue Complied3.04 collection, primarily through revenue with.

intake from road users.

Section 02 C Borrower not to undertake road Complied3.05 sector investments of more than $3.0 with partially

million unless such investment have but noteconomic rates of return of at least implemented12%.

Section 12 C 12/31/93 Borrower shall furnish to the Complied with3.06 Association a plan of Action to

improve the delivery of urbanpassenger transport services in Dar-es-Salaam, including institutionalreorganization and an appropriateprice policy.

Schedule 01 CD Borrower shall furnish IDA certified Complied with4.01 copies of the audit report not later after delays

than six months after end of eachfiscal year.

Schedule4, 02 CP The Borrower shall carry out an Complied with2(i) annual review with IDA and other partially

participating donors of theperformance under the road networkstabilization program and the nextthree years of the road investmentand maintenance activities.

Schedule 4 02 CP Borrower to reach agreement with Complied withpara. 2(ii) IDA on the budget estimates for the partially

following fiscal year for therehabilitation and maintenance of thetrunk roads network and regionalnetworks in the core regions.

Schedule 4 04 NC Borrower to progressively increase its Complied withpara. 3 annual contribution to funding road partially.

maintenance, with the objective of Governt'sfully covering road maintenance share of roadrequirements from the Borrowers maintenanceown sources by FY1995/96. is increasing

but not asexpected.

Schedule 4 05 C 11/30/199 Borrower shall conduct the following Complied withpara. 4 2 workshops: (i) project launch

workshop; (ii) annual workshops; (iii)annual donors conference; and (iv) acomprehensive implementationreview workshops.


Section. Covnt. Present Original Revised Description CommentsCovenant Class Status Fulfillment fulfillme Of

Type Date nt Date Covenant

Schedule 4 05 C MWCT to carry out a study to Compliedpara. 5 (b) determine the feasibility of with. Strategy

establishing CML, as a financial has beenautonomous private plant pools which discussedwould be allowed to chargecommercial rate for the plant hire.

Schedule 4 05 C Road maintenance equipment Compliedpara. 6 (i) reconditioned under the project shall with.

be consigned to MWCT's plant pool Equipmentfor hire by REOs and Contractors. transferred to

PEHCOL

Schedule 4 03 NC One or more private plant pools to be Effortpara. 6 (ii) competitively selected and to be discontinued

required to provide guaranteed with IDAservice to MWCT for the duration of agreementthe project.

Schedule 4 05 C Borrower to prepare study of details Compliedpara. 6 (iii) of MWCT and private plant pools and with.

on the basis of that to prepare an PEHCOLaction plan for establishment of the experiencingautonomous private plant tools which equipmentwould be allowed to charge managementcommercial rate for the plant hire. problems.

Schedule 4 05 C 12/31/199 Borrower shall formulate a program Complied withpara. 7 1 for its vehicle weight control and road

safety programs.Schedule 4, 06 C Borrower to ensure that the Complied with

para 8 environmental conditions included inthe TOR for studies and conditions ofthe contract for procurement of worksand goals

Source: Project file

Action Taken: Covenant typeC = Covenant complied with 1 = Account/AuditsCD = Complied with after delay 2 = Financial performance/revenue generation from beneficiariesCP = Complied with partially 3 = flow and utilization of project fundsNC = Not complied with 4 = Counterpart funding

5 = Management aspects of project or executing agency6 = Environmental covenants7 = Involuntary resettlement8 = Indigenous people9 = Monitoring, review, and reporting

10 = Project implementation not covered by categories 1-911 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource

allocation12 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral policylregulatory/institutional action13 = other


TABLE 11: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS

Statement number and title Description and comment on lack of compliance

Appendix I of Paragraph 3 of the guidelines for procurement under IDA Credit on modification states that,'Modifications 3. In the case of contracts subject to pdior review, before granting a material extension of thestipulated time for performance of a contract, agreeing to any modification or waiver of the conditions of suchcontract, including issuing any change in order or orders under such contract (except in cases of extremeurgency) which would in aggregate increase the original amount by more than 15% percent of the originalprice, the borrower shall inform the Bank of the proposed extension, modification, or change order and thereasons therefor. If the Bank determines that the proposal would be inconsistent with the provisions of theCredit Agreement, it shall promptly inform the borrower and state the reasons for tits determination. A copy ofall amendments to the contracts shall be furnished to the Bank for record."

The Borrower has undertaken substantial modification contrary to the above. See for detail the section ongravel roads in this ICR.

TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTS

Stage of project cycle 0ActualStaff week US$ '000

Through appraisal 158.9 403.3

Appraisal- Board effectiveness 11.6 31.9Supervision 406.1 1,305.5

Completion 14.0 28.00

Total 600.6 1,792.7

Source: Project Data Base

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 29Implementation Completion Report Part 11: Statistical Tables

TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES: MISSIONS

Stage of Month/ Number SW Specialized Performance Ratingproject cycle Year of in staff skills - DO Types of problems

persons field represented

Identification/ March 6 NA E (2), TE, FA,Preparation 1988 OA, PS

Appraisal June- 10 E, TE, VT, HE _July, (2), OA, IS,1989 ME, AS, FA

Boardapproval toeffectiveness

Supervision I Feb.'90 4 NA E, TE, ES, OA - Issues: budget, revision of procurement regulation, domestic construction policy

paper, pending consulting and civil works contracts.

Supervision II Oct. Nov. 4 FA, PS, ES, HE, - Interim Procurement Guidelines and Standard Procurement Guidelines; &. new

1990 organization established and key positions to be approved; PEHCOL to be

established. Implementation behind schedule; need for strengthening planing andprogramming; strengthen MIS function; but, good progress in No. contracts let and

______________ _________ ________ physical progress.

Supervision III Nov. '90 2 NA FA, HE, - - Initiating mission for TA of ATC;& Road Maintenance Initiatives Phase II.

Supervision IV Feb. 92 1 NA FA 1 1 Credit effectiveness was delayed from December 28, 1990 to March 15, 1991 to

allow time for: (a) standard procurement documents to be submitted to the Attorney

General of Chambers and to IDA for clearance; (b) circular implementing the interimprocurement guidelines to be submitted to IDA, together with guidelines; (c) taxation

issues to be resolved between MOF, MOW and MCT, in accordance to the interimguideline; (d) draft bidding documents for the private plant pool to be completed to

IDA's satisfaction; (e) new organization to be implemented, and key positions filled;

(f) short listed companies to be invited to submit proposals for the public procurementand supplies management study; and (g) submission to IDA of the adoption of the

National Construction Development Strategy. Arrangement for Technical assistanceto Air Tanzania.

Project MarchEffective 15,1991 _ _

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 30Implementation Completion Report Part I: Statistical Tables

Supervision I May 1 FA NA NA Control, monitoring and management information system to be strengthened in most1991 areas and in the Ministry as a whole. Attomey General of chambers have yet to

formally approve the Std. Procurement Documents Guidelines. Circular to implementInterim Procurement Guidelines has yet to be issued by MOF. Proposedreorganization awaiting presidential approval -trunk and rural roads grouped asagreed at negotiation. PEHCOL establishment and appointment of Board notcompleted.

Supervision 11 February 2 NA FA, OA NA NA Progress satisfactory, especially in civil works; but slower in road fund, REO's.training, organization than initially anticipated. Signs are beginning to show thatmanagement and control of program requires a little more attention especially projectcontrols and procedures; bureaucratic delays, increased expectation and some lossof focus on priority activities. Special attention to equipment rehabilitation andmaintenance.

Supervision IlIl May '92 1 NA FA NA NA RMI Road fund, RA related issues.

Supervision IV July '92 2 NA FA (2), PS 2 2 Management and control of the program requires more attention- strengtheningproject performance through improved accounting, procurement reporting proceduresand systematic physical verification of works; contract processing time on somerecent ICB civil works tenders was reduced to about 150 days compared to morethan a year on previous tenders; 66% and 63% of targets for rehabilitation of trunkand rural roads respectively achieved in FY91/92.

Perception in the donor community is that the release of routine maintenance fundsto the regional engineer's offices were lower than budgeted and often late; strongmanagement effort required to make PEHCOL operate; coordination between MOWand MCW to allocate resources in the light of operational needs should bestrengthened; careful prioritization of investments in light of available resources is

____________ .required; more effective monitoring project performance required.

Supervision V Sept.'92 3 NA FA (2), HE NA NA Delays and low level release of road maintenance funds- in Jan.93 govt. increasefuel toll tax from Tsh 1 Ofiter to Tsh2O/iter; vehicle licensing & transfer fees alsoincreased

Supervision VI Nov. '92 1 NA DC NA NA Mid-term. Well organized, and presentations by Govemment representatives were ofhigh quality. Issues: financing of road maintenance and provision of equipment formaintenance and rehabilitation to meet donors' concems.

Supervision VII* Mar. 93 4 17.2 FA, PS, OA, HE 2 2 Change in scope of work on Dar es Salaam roads do not have revised costestimates; weak contractor performance on some road packages causing delays.PEHCOL's equipment fleet continue to deteriorate at a rapid rate; a candidate wasapproved to fill the post of director general of PEHCOL.

Procurement delays due on some periodic maintenance contracts and on Mwanza-Nzega road due to non-standard documentation and non-adherence to procedures.Procurement study delayed substantially due to changes in consultant team

_____________ _ composition and on TOR.

* Archive is trying to locate the full SPNs for the rest of 1993 and May 1994.

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 31Imrplementation Completion Report Part II: Statistical Tables

Supervision Vil Dec. 2 NA HE, HE S HS Substantial changes in scope of works and costs; there appears a need to strengthen1994 monitoring; design documentation not adequate; behind schedule as a result of

constant changes in scope of works and as a result of inadequate project designdocumentation. Development fund not adequate for 1994/95; need for developmentfund; road maintenance funding to be maintained to the planned level. PEHCOLfacing series problems; funds for procurement of spare parts, substantial arrears ofhiring charges from the regional engineers; frequent breakdown of its equipmentfleet; & fast deterioration.

Supervision IX April 2 NA FA, HE S HS Engaged consultant to: reevaluate the project components; prepare contract1995 addenda for Babati area, Dar es Salaam and Tunduma-Sumbuwanga roads; plans

for funding development budget requirement for FY 1995/96 as the budget for1994/95 was fully spent by end of second quarter. MWCT used Tsh.630 out of theroad fund to finance rehabilitation of gravel roads. Preparation of training proposals;while substantial resources were devoted to training not enough emphasis was beinggiven to basic aspect of procurement and contract administration procedures

Supervision X June 2 2.3 FA, HE S S Concern on need to improve financial accounting and management, performance1995 monitoring and accountability and transparency. Design documentation not

adequate and contributed to increased cost of project implementation. Developmentbudget not adequate for 1995/96; counterpart funding major constraints;maintenance funding being maintained at planned level.

Supervision XIl Septemb 2 NA FA, HE U S Problems: addressing road maintenance funding; certain problems in areas ofer 1995 management of project implementation, equipment management and development

budget expenditures. Substantial cost increases on several of the rehabilitationworks, especially Babati Area Roads and Dar-es- Salaam Region Emergency RoadProgram, due primary to changes in scope of works, because of inadequate originaldesigns; long elapsed time between original design and commencement of works;and substantial increase in traffic. Development Budget insufficient for the 1995/96budget.

Supervision XII January 1 3 HE, FA U S Overall project implementation performance is unsatisfactory, monthly1996 disbursements, show a downward trend. With substantial changes in the scope of

works and substantial cost increase, the adequacy of funding the credit is uncertain.There is a need to strengthen the monitoring of project implementation. There is aneed to introduce a system to monitor these changes and associated costs to reportthem to the funding agencies. Design documentation not adequate and contribute tothe increased costs of project implementation. There is need to update all non-committed design and supervision contracts. The development budget not sufficientto cover expected expenditure for FY95/96. Level of the maintenance funding beingmaintained to the planned level. PEHCOL continues to face serious problems.Procurement in spare parts, frequent break down of its old equipment fleet are mostseriously constraints. Need for a through review of PEHCOL's role and decision onits future or existence.

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 32Implementation Completion Report Part 11: Statistical Tables

Supervision Xil May 1996 4 3.3 HE, FA, CE, R U S Govemment had been using Road Funds for rehabilitation works instead of carryingroad maintenance works; several trunk roads (gravel) were rehabilitated withoutengineering designs and without Bank's no-objection; majority of them haveconstruction failures as a result of the construction without engineering design andBank's objection. Project to be restructured. Substantial cost increases haveoccurred on IDA financed components; procurement and contract managementweakness including financial management & monitoring. Work program constrainedby availability of development budget resources.Construction failures have occurred on roads which were improved under theprojects, particularly on Babati Area Tunduma-Sumbawanga and Usagara-Lusahunga roads; Project expenditure do not reflect all expenditures incurred underthe project.Long elapsed times between receipt of tenders and the award and commencementof works; weakness in contract financial management and control & increase in thescope of works during execution

Supervision XIV Dec.96 2 0.6 HE, FA U U Same as above. No change.

Supervision XV April 1997 2 2.4 HE, FA U U Lack of funding and unauthorized use of road funds for other purposes other thanmaintenance. Institutional set-up to handle the volume and size of projectinadequate.

Supervision XVI Oct. 97 3 2.9 HE, FA, TA U U Same as above. No significant change

Supervision August U U Credit agreement amended on August 7, 1998. Major issue related to lack of financialXVII 1998 management have been addressed and mitigating measures with an agreed detailed

action plan were being implemented.

Supervision Nov. 1998 3 0.4 HE, FA, TA U U Slow progress and disbursement since June 1998. Audits of Project Accounts,XVIII inclusive of SOE and SA for FY 96/97 submitted to IDA were seriously qualified. On

Mwanza Mogogo River Section contractor formally lifted the 'slowdown of works" onJune 20, 1998. Works done generally satisfactory.Request for submission for Addenda for gravel roads (i) Lusahunga-Usagara Road;(ii) (Tunduma-Liche (Sumbawanga) Road: (iii) Shelui-Singida-Babti-Bereku Road;and (iv) Tanga-Horohor and Marangu-Tarakea Roads. No official handling of theseroads were made.

Supervision March 1999 3 HE, FA, TA U U MOW requested the financing of Tunduma-Sumbawanga (gravel, emergency) RoadXXIV under IRP II. It was to be financed from IRP I but could not due to delays in

procurement. Several Addendum were approved for payments. Emergency support_____________ following El Nino damages of the road network is being provided.

Supervision July 1999 2 HE, FA U U Credit closed on June 30, 1999. MOW submitted draft accounts with reconciliation ofXXV expenditures and payments together with associated re-allocation of the credit

categories. US$ 12.9 million due to delays and about US$19 million due to exchangerate fluctuation is expected to be cancelled.

anzania n:egra:ec ,oacs -rojec:Implementation Completion Report Part II: Statistical Tables

AS =Admin. & Secretary TE= Transport EngineerE = Economist RR =Rural Roads Transport SpecialistES = Equipment Specialist VT = Vocational TrainingHE = Highway Engineer TA= Task AssistantFA = Financial AnalystIS= Institutional SpecialistPS = Procurement Specialist DC- Division ChiefOA = Operation Analyst00 = Operation Officer


ANNEX A: SUPPLEMENTARY STATSTICS

TABLE 1: REALLOCATION OF CREDIT 2149-TA

No Category SAR (SDR) Revision I Revision II Disbursed Disbursed (USD)Sep.20, 90 (SDR) Aug. (SDR) 12 (SDR) Jan17, Jan. 17, 00

21, 91 Oct, 92 00

Trunk road rehabilitation andupgrading

la Lusahunga-Usagra; 20,700,000 20,700,000 20,750,000 17140089.13 24,019,758.43Tunduma-Luiche; Shelui-

.____ Berku1.b Tabora/Nzega/-Singida 14,300,000 14,300,000 10,000,000 7068230.61 10,063,339.33

border; &Dodoma-Singa1.c Mwanza-Usagara-Nzega; 13,600,000 13,600,000 15,100,000 13140276.28 18,889,349.08

and Sonea-Masai1.d Rehab. Tanzam 2, 4 & 5 0.0 6,600,000 6,500,000 4952731.92 7,123,949.782. Other roads, bridges, 26,000,000 26,000,000 29,200,000 31281793.98 44825,732.32

buildings and roadmaintenance works ,

3. Equipment for road 3,900,000 3,900,000 3,900,000 0.0 0.0contractors 7

4. Equipment, vehicles, spare 6,200,000 6,200,000 12,580,000 947,423.25 13565,367.93parts and materials

5. Equipment vehicles and 9,800,000 9,800,000 0.0 , 0.0 0.0spare parts for private plantpools

6. Equipment hire for road 5,800,000 5,800,000 5,800,000 1,818294.51 2,611,051.67maintenance by REOs

7. Equipment and ferry repair 4,600,000 4,600,000 4,600,000 4,350.81 6,332.34contracts includingtransportation

8 Consultant services 16,900,000 16,900,000 27,700,000 29,004,175.60 41,149,686.259 Training, seminars, 2,700,000 2,700,000 3,014,000 2344055.06 3361886.72

fellowships and workshops

10 Refunding of project 1,200,000 1,200,000 770,000 769930.23 1,072,520.50preparation advance

11. Unallocated 14,200,000 8,200,000 0 0.0 0.0

Total 139,900,000 139,900,000 139,900,000 117204418.64 166,698,969.78

Original Credit Principal 139,900,000 180,400,000.00Amount


Table 2: Status of IDA Financed Component as of July 1999 (US Dollars)

Category Component Description Total Total Paid

Ref. Committed To Date

USD USD

1 a Lusahunga-Usagara 6,069,740 6,069,740

1 a Tundoma/Luichet (Sumbawanga) 8,702,892 8,702,892

1 a Shelui-SingidalBabati/Bereku 8,178,078 8,178,078

la Sub Total: Cat la 22,950,710 22,950,710

lb Tanga/Horohoro & Marangu Tarakea 9,099,438 9,099,438

lc Mwanza/Shiny. Bdr- Contract 1 19,107,237 18,628,912

Id Rehab. -Tanzam 2 3,999,922 3,999,922

1d Rehab. -Tanzam 4 5,368,290 5,368,290

1d Rehab. -Tanzam 5 96,319 96,319

1d Sub Total: Cat Id 9,464,531 9,464,531

I Sub Total: Cat 1 60,621,916 60,143,591

2 lCulverts and Temporary Bridges 0 0

2 Per. Maint./Emerg. Works to mid-1995 35,767,620 35,343,683

2 Renov.-MOW/MCT & REO Facilities 672,387 613,216

2 Kyaka Bridges Civil Works 7,741,022 7,741,022

2 Sub Total: Cat 2 4,181,029 43,697,921

3 Sub Total: Cat3 0 0

4 iRSAWC Program -Equipment 528,635 528635

4 Equipment Rehab., Plant & Vehicles 1,902,902 1,312,027

4 CML - Laboratory Equipment 572,126 572,126

4 PEHCOL: Vehicles. Tyres & Spares 6,757,682 6,757,682

4 OfficeNv.Shops, Tools & Radio NhM 388,998 388,998

4 Vehicles, Motorbikes & Bicycles 2,849,385 2,849,385

4 Sub Total: Cat 4 12,999,728 12,408,853

6 MWCT: Equipment Hire to mid-i 995 2,567,494 2,567,494

6 Sub Total: Cat 6 2,567,494 2,567,494

7 Ferries - Overhaul Equip. and Spares 6,340 6,340

7 Sub Total: Cat 7 6,340 6,340


Table 2: Status of IDA Financed Component as of July 1999 (US Dollars)8 Gravel Road Study & CODAP 2,960,908 2,960,908

8 Zanzibar-Preparatory Study 762,772 762,772

8 Procurement & Reg. Study -MOF Training 2,661,707 2,661,707

8 Mwanza/UsagaralNzega Supervision 6,374,951 5,464,162

8 Gravel Roads Supervision 1,592,566 1,592,566

8 Technical Assistance to PEHCOL 2,477,463 2,477,463

8 Management Assistance to ATC 3,152,087 2,990,262

8 Inst. Support: Works Inspectorate 752,776 752,776

8 REO's Mwanza & Shinyanga 2,603,644 2,603,644

8 Management and Administration 401,036 401,036

8 Technical Assistance to CML 249,259 249,259

8 Planning & Operations Management 2,136,868 2,136,868

-8 Other Studies 1,421,905 1,421,905

8 MWCTI- Training TA & Equipment 406,567 406,567

8 NCC/Contractor Training & Mngt. 783,060 783,060

8 Construction Research 125,542 125,542

8 NIT-Training TA & Equipment 1,295,181 1,295,181

8 Communications & Office Technology 130,542 130,542

8 DTC Computer Laboratory 431,014 431,014

8 Bridge Design 2,127,443 2,127,443

8 Kyaka Bridge Supervision 1,098,974 1,098,974

8 Per. Maint./Emerg. Works Supervision 4,286,415 4,286,415

8 Tanzam Supervision 1,085,599 1,085,599

8 Morogoro/Dodoma Reseal Supv. 269,976 269,976

8 Assistance to NTC, RETCO's 1,946,168 1,946,168

8 Study for Dodoma - Minjingu 61,676 61,676

8 lAssistance for DSM Passenger Trans. 363,325 363,325

8 Sub Total: Cat 8 41,959,424 40,886,810

9 MWTI Programme - Training Facilities 235,518 235,518

9 MWCT/M,P,T - Seminar/Workshops 875,798 875,798

9 - Overseas Training 1,408,996 1,408,996

9 - Local Training 658,748 658,748

9 LBWT - Training Equipment 772,739 772,739

9 NIT - Training Facilities 122,976 122,976

9 Sub Total: Cat 9 4,074,775 4,074,775

10 Project Preparation 1,072,521 1,072,521

10 Sub Total: Cat 10 1,072,521 1,072,521

GRAND TOTAL: 167,483,226 164,858,306

Original Credit Principal amount 180,400,000

Amount to be Canceled 12,916,774

Note 1: In addition to the canceled amount, about US$19 million will not be utilizedNote 2: Total paid to date represents payments processed to date by the Project.


Table 3: Project Expenditure as of June 30, 1998Source for Fund SAR estimates Estimated Final Variation (%)

(USD) (USD) (USD)

Other Donors

A. Institutional support 34,392,700 72,064,513.0 210

B. Rehabilitation 386,112,700.00 509,618,834.47 132

C. Maintenance 0.00 0.00

D. Transport 0.00 0.00

Sub-total 420,505,400.00 581,683,347.47 138

IDA

A. lnstitutional support 30,173,000.00 38,748,879.99 128

B. Rehabilitation 84,956,400 49,063,225.65 58

C. Maintenance 60,278,300.00 56,373,894.62 94

D. Transport 5,016,900.00 5,218,118.46 104

Sub-total 180,424,600.00 149,404,118.46 83

Tot Donors expenditures 600,930,000.00 731,087,465.93 122

Source: Carl Bra Intemational a/s Comprehensive Review of the Integrated Roads Project, Third Interim Repor Revised, June 1997

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 38Implementation Completion Report Annex B: ICR Mission Aide Memoire

Annex BThe United Republic of Tanzania

INTEGRATED ROADS PROJECT(CREDIT 2149-TA)

Implementing Completion Reporting MissionAide-Memoire

November 2-18, 1999

1. The Integrated Roads Project I became effective on March 15, 1991 and closed on June30, 1999 following a one-year extension from the original closing date of June 30, 1998. Fromthe standpoint of lessons learned, the implementation experence of IRP I can be very valuable.A careful review of the implementation environment which by most account, led to less thanoutcome than would have been expected otherwise, warrant the attention of all concerned in thedevelopment of Tanzania road sector. However, despite difficult operating environment facingproject implementation, the project has had significant impact on transport operation. Overallvehicle operating costs and travel time has reduced. Significant number of staff has been trained.Under the project initiatives such as the Zanzibar's ZIROP Study covering road network, roadfinancing and institutional reforms for Zanzibar for FY 2000-2009 have been successfullycompleted. IRP I will have relevant lessons of experience for the Zanzibar project.

1. The Scope of the Project

2. The Integrated Roads Project' (IRP 1) was the largest single donor supported infrastructureand capacity building project in Africa. With a total cost of US$ 871.1 million, the project was tobe parallel financed by Government of Tanzania with the support of IDA, DANIDA, FederalRepublic of Germany, Italy, FINNIDA, ODA (UK), NORD, EEC, USAID, The Netherlands,Switzerland, Ireland, the African Development Fund, UNDP, and the Saudi Fund. The donorscommitted themselves to contribute an initial amount of US$790.6 million. The Govemment ofTanzania, in addition to meeting the annual road maintenance budget requirements, alsocommitted itself US$ 80.5 million towards counterpart financing of the Project. At the launching ofthe Project there was thus only US$33.8 million financing gap.

3. The primary objective of the IRP I was to restore Tanzania's trunk and regional roadnetworks which have proved to be obstacle to the sustainability of the economic recoveryprogram the country was undertaking; and to develop MOWs institutional capacity to properlymanage the road networks. The project was justified on the ground that reduction of transportcosts and accessibility to the primary agricultural areas were essential to the economic recoveryof Tanzania and the structural reforms underway.

4. IRP I represented a significant challenge to the Govemment, the implementing agenciesand the participating donors. Under IRP I, some 1,700 km of paved trunk roads were planned tobe rehabilitated or resealed representing 61% of the total Project cost with overall ERR estimatedat 24%; and 2,550 km unpaved trunk roads with an overall ERR of 19%; and some 3,000 km ofregionaVruraV/ roads in eleven of the regions representing 30% of the total roads with estimatedERR of 37%. IRP I targets were to transform 60% of the trunk roads into good condition from thethen level of 15%; and to improve to good condition regional roads to 50% from the 10% level forthe network in the eleven regions. Some 30 bridges, minor structures and 10 ferry vehicularcrossings, renovation of MCW head quarters, REO offices, and upgrading office technology wereto be financed. Also, road maintenance support program including establishment and equippingof privately operated plants pools, rehabilitation of existing equipment and road maintenance bycontract, hiring of equipment from plant pools, and emergency works were to be undertaken.

' The name "project" is a misnomer. The term "program " would have been a more accurate description.


Most important, under IRP I, GoT was to institute regular maintenance on 80% of the trunk roadsand 60% of the regional network.

5. Institutional support to strengthen Tanzania's road management capacity including supportto MCW management and the regional Engineers offices, domestic contractors, University of Dares Salaam Engineering Faculty, Arusha Technical College, Central Laboratory, techniciantraining at the Morogoro Training Institute, road safety program, labor based constructionmethods, revision of Government procurement regulations, and project coordination. Technicalassistance to National Transport Corporation, Regional Transport Corporations and to improveDar es Salaam passenger transport. The project had also a component to provide managementassistance to Air Tanzania Corporation. In brief, the project as designed had too manycomponents dealing with very many issues with many actors on the scene.

II. Views of the Stakeholders

6. The mission has opportunity to solicit the views of implementing agencies, donors and thebeneficiaries of IRP I. All agreed that the project was not only large in investment size but alsocomplex as evidenced from the scope of the project. Because of the long project cycle of IRP I,1988 to 1999 from inception to completion, there are not many left in Dar es Salaam among thosewho played part in the implementation of IRP I. Moreover, institutional memory was also weak.What follows is the composite view of the development issues that emerges from synthesis of theviews of various stakeholders in the implementation experience of IRP I.

7. For some, the project was not focussed and difficult to manage. What made the projectmore complex and challenging to implement even more than the large number of components,was the difficult implementation environment the country had found itself in its transition to marketeconomy. Moreover, many of the underlying assumptions, which were deemed essential atappraisal to the success of the project, did not materialized on time. Implementation capacity toundertake procurement and technical management of the project was not ready when the projectwas launched. Incentives to the implementing agencies staff were either inadequate or non-existence to mobilize the human resources to implement the project within budget and onschedule. Counterpart funding was not available when it was wanted and in the amount needed;the economy was experiencing fiscal imbalances and inflation. The rate of donors' funding in-flow over the implementation period was not reliable and was not forth coming as was expectedat the beginning of the project. These and other constraints created unfavorable implementationenvironment with significant adverse impact on the sector and the economy as a whole. As notedabove, the diverse scope of the Project also added to the complexity of its implementation.Moreover, achieving effective donor coordination, addressing cross cutting institutional issues inthe areas of commercialization, capacity building, road fund, reorganization, and public-privateoperations, add to the complexity of the implementation environment.

8. In light of the complex and unfavorable implementation environment, achieving thephysical targets set at appraisal within budget and timeframe at a satisfactory level of quality hadproved to be quite a difficult challenge. Most important, the original targets were madeunattainable by the reduced resource in-flows of the donors and the government counter partfunding. The resource in-flows expected from the donors were not available for disbursementwhen they were needed and where available were not disbursed in the amount desired due tolack of counterpart funding. The Government was facing continued difficulties either ingenerating and/or in availing resources for road maintenance and rehabilitation. Some attributethe shortage of counterpart funding partly due to crowding of its budget with expenditures oflesser priorities. Nevertheless, throughout project implementation counterpart funding remaineda major concern among the donors. Also during implementation donors were concerned aboutthe adequacy of maintenance funding. In fact it was GOT's commitment to provide adequate andsustainable resources for maintenance which was the primary factor which drew donors aspartners in IRP I in the first place. However, maintenance fund was not available at the amount


needed as committed at the start of the project. For many donors, adequate maintenancefunding and appropriate institutional set-up were the key issues, which needed for addressing thetransport issues facing the country. The corrupt practices reported in the Warioba CommissionReport on Corruption, 1995/96 and in views of donors subsequent delayed action by GoT to dealwith the issues raised in the Report, for the most part cooled donor's response to IRP I.Procurement problems and deficient contract management further complicated the situation asdid inflated construction costs both on account of poor contract management; exchange ratedepreciation and delayed interest charges due to the continued deterioration of the economiccondition.

In-flow of Development Expenditure for IRP I

Year 89/90 | 90/91 91/92 | 92/93 94/94 94/95 95/96 96/97i % | 9.71 1 11.2 13.21 1 20.37 19.08 7.21 1.27

9. According to a 1996 government's commissioned review of the IRP I, in the first five yearsof the project (1991-96) alone, some US$ 105.0 million has been utilized for institutional supportby donors participating in IRP I, mostly in an uncoordinated manner. In the construction industry,the response of the private sector was highly positive. In anticipation of growing effectivedemand for civil works contractors under IRP I fund, many new construction firms continue to beestablished. However, as shown in the table above, the development budget after peaking in1992/93, was continued declining from the peak of 20.37% to 1.27% by 1995/96. Thegovernment disbursement of the maintenance budget, which was even more important to thenewly formed companies, was uncertain. The government was facing difficulties allocating fundsfor sustaining the required level of maintenance even while operating its budget on cash basis.The result was that many contractors were unable to find contracts in the shrinking constructionsector market. Thus, the uncertain disbursement from the maintenance fund further exasperatedthe plight of the newly established firms. Many did not survive their infancy. Attempt was made toameliorate the plight of the new entrepreneurs through the introduction of smaller contractpackages by some donors.

10. The condition facing capacity building of MoW was not any better. The environment, inwhich the project was being implemented, here too, proved to be unfavorable. While the MoWmanpower capability was increasing, the Ministry was facing shrinking development budgetinflow. For example, the capacity building program for MoW provided opportunities for some 437participants to get short term and long term training. Some 63 of the staff successfullygraduated with Masters of Science Degrees in civil engineering from Dar es Salaam Universityand other foreign universities. The result is that MoW has now some 331 engineers with asignificant number of them with post graduate training. This represents a low ratio of km ofmaintainable roads per engineer, which in it is no small achievement. However, followinggraduation, because of the declining of the rehabilitation and maintenance funds flows, thetrained staff did not get the opportunity to use their training into practice immediately followingtheir training. Although, the individual capabilities and MOWs capabilities have increased as aresult of the training, the prevailing view to day is that the training provided had not overall as yettranslated to higher efficiency or effectiveness in MoW. In part this is attributed to the merger ofMOW and MCT to MWCT and subsequent division again to MOW and MCT, the lack ofincentives for good performers as well as due to the prevailing organizational culture. In anycase, it was the systemic problem facing capacity building in the face of shrinking effectivedemand in the contracting industry, which became a focus of the ICR implementation missiondiscussions.


III. Bank Mission Observations

11. Overall, most stakeholders appreciate and acknowledge the outcome and impact of IRP Ihas achieved in terms of transport cost and travel time reductions. Because the project has beenaround for more than a decade since its inception in 1988, in most institutions the relevant peopleavailable for discussion are new to their post and there is little institutional memory. For the moststakeholders' participants, lack of institutional memory was a handicap to make effectivecontribution to the evaluation exercise. As noted above, the main issues they raised tend tofocus more on reaching an understanding of why the promise of booming private sector localconstruction industry did not materialized under IRPI. Also quality of construction, particularly ofthe gravel roads, cost overrun, contract management, delays in procurement and quality oftechnical management, road fund, timely flow of maintenance fund, road organization weretouched. These and related issues will be further addressed in perspective in the ICR.

IV. Operational Plan

12. Adequate maintenance funds and timely utilization of available funds for maintenance willbe the key indicators of government commitment to the sustainability of the physical assets andinstitutional capacities established under the project. The establishment of the Road Fund Boardis expected to contribute to the timely disbursement of sustained adequate maintenance fund.

13. The mission reviewed the rolling budget for road infrastructure for 1999/2001. Whileunderscoring the need for provision of adequate operation and maintenance funds, the missionwas heartened to note that both at central and regional level there is acute consciousness forroad maintenance fund, particularly among the local contractors in the construction industry. Theyare likely to be an important source of pressure on the Ministry of Finance in the road networkmanagement in Tanzania.

V. Payment after Loan Closing Date

14. The mission has informed the implementing agencies that in accordance with the WorldBank disbursement rules in effect all expenditures incurred prior to the closing date could be paidfrom the loan and only for expenses submitted up to the grace period of four months after theclosing date (June 30, 1999).

VI. Briefing & Schedule of Preparation of ICR

15. The mission briefed staff of the various implementing agencies charged with theresponsibility of contributing to the drafting of the government evaluation report, on Bank'srequirement regarding government contribution to the ICR on the need of building capacity inevaluation and monitoring. The mission had followed on the July, 1999 supervision mission thatrequested the borrower to proceed with the preparation of its contribution to the ICR.

16. The individual implementing agencies have completed their evaluation and provided theirinput to MoW. MoW will prepare and submit the borrower's contribution to the ICR to IDA byDecember 6, 1999. The mandatory last date for delivery of the ICR to World Bank executiveBoard is December 31, 1999. It was agreed to complete the preparation of the ICR for delivery tothe Board based on the following schedule:


Agreed Schedule of ICR Delivery.

* Data on Operational Plan of IRP I November 30, 1999

* Post construction ERR re-estimates December 10, 1999

* Borrower contribution to the Bank December 16, 1999

* Draft ICR for intemal Bank management review December 16, 1999

* Draft ICR for Govemment Comments December 22, 1999

* Draft final ICR for Bank Executive Board December 28, 1999.

VIl. Outstanding information

17. The main outstanding information remaining is re-estimation of the post-constructionEconomic Rate of return. It is agreed that the ERR re-estimates will be done only for thesubprojects financed under IDA funding and will not cover roads financed by other donors, as thetask will be difficult given the limited institutional memory and poor records management amongmost parties involved in the project.

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 43Implementation Completion Report Annex C: Borrower's Contribution and Comments to ICR



CREDIT - 2149 - TA

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (ICR)

MINISTRY OF WORKS

DECEMBER 1999

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 44Implementation Completion Report Annex C: Borrowers Contribution and Comments to ICR

INTRODUCTION

1. Integrated Roads Project (Cr. 2149-TA) was effective on 15 March 1991 and closed on30th June 1999 after a one year extension from original closing date of 30th June 1998.Until July 1994 Implementation Completion Report (ICR) was referred to as ProjectCompletion Reports (PCR) and was spelled out in the Credits as the obligation of theBorrower to prepare the draft in accordance with the Bank's Guidelines. The OperationalPolicies 13.55 of April 1994 which supplements SVPOP/COD No. 8 of June 1989provides under item 3 that the Borrower prepares and avails to the Bank its ownevaluation report within six months after the CLOSING DATE on the project's execution,initial operations, cost and benefits, the Bank's and the Borrowers performance of theirrespective obligations under the Loan Agreement and the extent to which the purposes ofthe loan were achieved. Lessons learned during implementation of IRP I are valuable forfuture projects.

2. Prior to Integrated Roads Project there were six highways project. First highway (1964)had problems namely (i) delays and reluctance in recruiting; (ii) cultural and languageproblems experienced; and (iii) shortage of adequately qualified local staff. Theseproblems persisted until the fifth highway project and were partly resolved in sixthhighway project and IRP I

3. The areas which the report will concentrate on will be (i) project execution; (ii) initialoperations of the project; (iii) costs of the project (IDA as well as other Donors); (iv)benefits derived from the project; (v) borrower's performance; (vi) Bank's performance;and (vii) accomplishments of the project.

PROJECT EXECUTION

4. Integrated Roads Project components which were prepared during 1988 and 1989 withfinancial assistance from several donors, covered requirements for rehabilitating andmaintaining the trunk and regional road networks, and for improving the efficiency andsafety of road transportation. As stated in staff Appraisal Report dated 6 May 1990, theprimary objective of the project is to restore Tanzania's trunk and regional road networks,which have become on obstacle to the sustainability of the economic recoveryprogramme, and to develop the Ministry's institutional capacity to properly manage thenetworks. In particular the Project will assist the Government in developing strongmanagement and technical capacity to maintain the trunk and regional networks, andtransform the MOW from a construction oriented Ministry to an administration/contractormanagement oriented Ministry. The physical target was to have, by 1996, 60% of trunkroads in good condition from the current (1990) 15% and to selectively rehabilitate theregional road network in eleven of the most agricultural productive regions to have 50%of the network in those regions in good condition from the current (1990) 10% and toinstall regular maintenance on 80% of the trunk and 60% of the regional road networks.

For the execution purposes, the project was divided in four major parts which are:

(a) Institutional Support

(i) strengthening MWC departments and divisions involved in contract administration, roadand equipment maintenance and management, planning, budgeting and monitoring oftrunk and regional roads programs, as well as policy, feasibility and engineering studiesin the transport sector;

(ii) instituting procedures in the REOs' in at least the eleven core regions, for administrationof trunk and regional road rehabilitation and maintenance programs;


(iii) renovation of facilities, provision of training equipment and improvement of civilengineering courses at UDSM Engineering Faculty, as well as an increase in the numberof students;

(iv) renovation of facilities, provision of training equipment and improvement of highwaytechnicians courses at Arusha Technical college;

(v) re-equipment MCWs Central Materials Laboratory (CML) and provision of training andtechnical assistance to its testing and research program, including soil testing assistanceto REO;

(vi) training in highway management, and road and equipment maintenance, includingexpansion of MCTI's facilities and training programs;'

(vii) formulation and implementation of a road safety program, including vehicle weightcontrol, and traffic management;

(viii) coordination of project implementation and establishment of a management informationsystem for the monitoring of activities at headquarters and the REOS;

(ix) renovation of MWC headquarters, CML and REOS, construction of housing for REOstaff, and upgrading office technology and communications;

(x) revising the Government's procurement regulations, reorganizing materials supplymanagement, and training in procurement for staff of MCW, Attorney General'sChambers and Tender Boards;

(xi) continuation of assistance to domestic contractors to undertake an increasing share ofroad rehabilitation and maintenance works, including development of labour-basedtechnology; and

(xii) conversion of NIT's vocational training programs into more practical and shorter coursesto satisfy the demand of the transportation industry.

(b) Rehabilitation Program

(i) rehabilitation of about 1,080 km and overlay or resealing of about 620 km ofpaved trunk road; rehabilitation or improving of about 2,550 km of unpaved trunkroads, and upgrading to paved road standards of about 340 km with bridges andstructures;

(ii) rehabilitation or replacement of about 30 other bridges, and repair of minorstructures along trunk roads;

(iii) improvements to about 10 vehicular ferry crossings; and rehabilitation of about3,000 km of regional roads, principally in the core regions.

(c) Maintenance program

(i) acquisition of equipment, vehicles, initial stock of spare parts, and workshopitems for privately operated plant pools;

(ii) acquisition of equipment, vehicles, initial stock of spare parts, and workshopitems for the MCW plant pool;


(iii) acquisition of spare parts and materials for, and rehabilitation of, roadmaintenance equipment;

(iv) equipment hire for road maintenance undertaken by the REO; and

(iv) contracted road maintenance and emergency works.

(d) Freight, Passenger and Air Transportation

(i) strengthening ATC's management capability; and

(ii) strengthening the management capability of NTC and its affiliates - RFTCOs andUDA

Achievement on above components are explained under accomplishments of projects(para 22 to para 3 1).

INITIAL OPERATIONS OF THE PROJECT

5. Policy objectives related to the Integrated Roads Project (IRP) were originally presentedby the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania at the Transport Sector Donor'sConference at Arusha in December 1987. The policies were refined during preparationof IRP and were presented in greater detail to the consultative meeting, at Paris inDecember 1998.

(i) In 1990, Tanzania embarked on a 10-year Integrated Roads Project, called IRP, whichaims to radically transform the condition of the trunk and regional road network from onehaving the poorest pavement conditions in the sub-region to one which is no longerbottleneck to the country's economic development, and that can be sustainablymaintained.

6. IRP I started in 1990 but since some roads spilled over from sixth Highway Project(TANZAM Sect. 2 and 4) it can be said that the initial IRP I operations started in 1987.Pre-qualification of contractors to undertake the civil works was completed by January1987, followed by invitation to bid and planning for starting of the civil works on sections 2and 4 of the Tanzam Highway in August 1987.

7. The rolling budget for road infrastructure maintenance for FY 1998/2000 in Tsh. is asfollows:

FY 98199 FY 99/00 FY 00i01Trunk Roads 12.25bn 16.86 bn 20.07bnRural Roads 10.0 bn 12.1 bn 16.4bn

However currently total funds required for maintenance is Tsh. 60 bn per year.

8. In order to redress the issue of inadequate funds for road maintenance and to sustainbenefits of operations, GOT has:

(a) passed an act to ring fence Road Fund for road maintenance (90% of Road Fund) anddevelopment (10% of Road Fund) in order to redress in adequate funding for roadmaintenance;


(b) is in process of establishing of TANROADS Agency in order to redress inefficiencies ininstitutional structure for road administration;

(c) increasing technical capacity to carry out maintenance and manage contracts.

COST OF THE PROJECT

9. The total original project costs was estimated as US$ 871.1 million including taxes andduties. 17 agencies contributed towards the above costs, 16 of them were DonorAgencies whereas the seventeenth was Government of Tanzania as the borrowerscontribution to the project. Donors to this project are shown in Table 2.

Table 1: Summary of Project cost by component

COMPONENT Planned Amounts in US$ Million

Local Foreign Total

Institutional Support 10.6 37.8 48.4141.8 436.3 578.1

Rehabilitation Program 22.8 46.2 69.0Maintenance Program 1.1 41 5.2Freight and Passenger Transport _ -

Total Base Cost 176.3 524.4 700.719.4 59, 79.0

Physical Contingencies 23.3 68.1 91.4Price Contingencies 4. 127.7

42.7

TOTAL COST 219.0 652.1 170.4

SOURCE Planned Amounts Actual Amountsin US $ Million US$m

Local Foreign Total Total

IDA 24.7 155.7 180.4 167.3DANIDA 11.4 45.6 57.0 80.0FRG 0.6 31.4 32.0 54.8ITALY 0.0 91.7 91.7 54.8FRQNMA 9.9 38.5 48.4 10.0ODA 1.8 11.8 13.6 4.8LTNDP 0.6 2.3 2.9 3.2NORAD 7.4 29.1 36.5 57.5EEC 37.5 133.5 171.0 193.7USAID 32.3 0.4 32.7 62.0The Netherlands 4.0 14.0 18.0 25.5Switzerland 0.9 9.9 10.8 16.9Ireland 1.8 3.0 4.8 4.8AFDF 2.7 42.5 45.2 58.9SAUDIFUND 0.0 11.8 11.8 9.9Financing Gap 2.9 30.9 33.8 60.0*GOVERNMENT 80.5 0.0 80.5 9.3Kuwait 0 0 0TOTAL 219.0 652.1 871.1 868.0

* The actual GoT input is estimates.

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 48Implementation Completon Report Annex C: Borrowers Contribution and Comments to ICR

Total donor input to main programme is shown in table below

Total Donor Input SAR estimates US$ m Final US$ m

ComponentsA. Institutional

Support 54.3 104.8B. Rehabilitation 672.0 616.6C. Maintenance 60.2 80.0D. Transport 5.0 6.6Sub Total 790.6 821.1GOT (estimated final is 80.5 60.0a rough estimate) IGrand Total 871.1 868.0

10. Actual project cost for many donors (except for few donors like FRINMA, IDA) wereabove the appraisal estimates. Delays in procurement, implementation and change inpriority for some donors attributed to their actual financing being below the planned StaffAppraisal estimates.

BENEFITS DERIVED FROM THE PROJECT

11. There are a number of benefits which emanated from the projects. The first and foremost

is the rehabilitated road sections thus reducing tremendously-the vehicle operating costsand increasing the user benefit. Journey times have been reduced by almost half of whatit used to be before the rehabilitation. Products movement have been eased. The project

included a road sector institutional study which resulted into a major institutional change.

Establishment of TANROADS and Road Fund Board is a result of this study.

12. The basis of the Integrated Roads Project (IRP) was conceived during theimplementation of Cr. 1688-TA. The study (feasibility and detail engineering) of theChalinze- Segera - Tanga and Segera - Moshi - Arusha road was undertaken during the

implementation of the same project and the outcome of these studies are clearly visiblebenefits to the borrower.

13. Training as conceived under the project was very successful and beneficial. Theimplementation capacity in the Ministry of COMWORKS was found to be inadequate

hence the previous projects (Credits 507-TA and 876-TA) addressed the problem by

assisting to train more engineer. Under Cr. 1688-TA another group of engineers wastrained in India and the Government added another 80 graduate engineers to the country.More than twenty (20) other engineers acquired Msc degrees under the same projectwhile more than seventy five (75) civil engineering technicians were specifically trained in

highway construction and maintenance. Under IRP I, 33 staff graduated in masters ofCivil Engineering degrees whereas a good number received short-term training. A

significant improvement was therefore realized with respect to institutional developmentwhich enable the Ministry to fill the vacant positions identified in previous reports.

14. A strengthening of the Local contractor industry took place under IRP, and support in theform of training is being provided by donors also under IRP-U. About 50 local contractorshave the capability now to carry out unpaved road rehabilitation and periodic

maintenance works. Other small contractors have limited equipment holding but have the

potential for labour based road maintenance works. Under W-1 most of the periodic

maintenance works have been carried out by local contractors. Their performance in the


execution of the contracts varies from fair to good, with only few that have performedpoorly. Local contractors' performance has been influenced, however, by a lack ofreliable road plant and equipment for hire. A steady flow of maintenance contracts fromthe regions is essential for the long term development of the construction industry.

BORROWER'S PERFORMANCE

165. The Borrower's performance under the project has been satisfactory. There has been toomany institutional restructuring within very short period such that performance of theBorrower is seen as insignificant when measured at sectoral level. The need for privatesector participation in improving the economy of the country cannot be overemphasized.However, it is the speed at which the borrower would like to have realized these changesat policy level. Under this project the Borrower used a decentralized contractmanagement system for road maintenance works, and at regional level for both routineand periodic maintenance works.

16. The policy objectives as contained in the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) preparedin June 1982 were more realistic. For example in pursuing the road Transport PolicyPaper with an aim to ensuring that rehabilitation and maintenance of the existing assetswere given priority in the Transport Sector Investment Program the Borrower inDecember 1987 called a Transport Sector donors conference to present the papertogether with another document entitled Programme for Transport Sector Recovery. Inthat document the Government outlined the basic policy, institutional changes andrehabilitation requirements for the sector in order to reestablish the road transportinfrastructure to enable it to cater for the requirements of the economy. Furthermore thedocument singled out capacity building for sustainability with respect to delivery of thetransport services as a critical issue to be dealt with. First steps to restore the country'sessential road network by providing adequate funding and develop institutional capacityfor their maintenance were taken during the implementation of this project.

17. Another major institutional reform which became an important performance indicator forthe Borrower is the agreement by the Borrower to implement the recommendations of thestudy undertaken under the project. This study namely 'The Agricultural Feeder RoadsStudy' and funded by DANIDA became the pivot for the institutional changes for betterperformance. The Terms of Reference for the study were carefully written, and therecommendations of the study formed the basis for the 10 year rehabilitation programmewith objectives to make administration and management of the road networkautonomous. The achievements reported under the Integrated Roads Project are partly aresult of the implementation of the study.

18. Equally the Borrower undertook the adoption of the Market Liberation Strategy during theimplementation of the project encouragement of the local contractors in participating inthe rehabilitation and maintenance of the road infrastructure as well as using localcontractors for roadworks. Most works were done by contracting instead of the traditionalforce account by MOW staff.

19. In November 1998 the parliament of United Republic of Tanzania passed a Road FundAct to ring-fence Road Fund for road activities. The Road Fund Board was inaugurate inAugust 1999. Chief Executive Officer for TANROADS Agency has been appointed andwill be in office by January 2000. TANROADS is expected to start in July 2000 but fulllaunching of TANROADS will be in July 2003. TANROADS will deal with implementationof road maintenance and development whereas MOW will concentrate on policy issuesand strategic planning. This institutional change is expected to lead into a better roadnetwork.

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 50Implementation Completion Report Annex C: Borrowees Contribution and Comments to ICR

LESSONS LEARNED

20. Overall, the Borrower learned a number of lessons relevant for the future during theimplementation of the project.

(i) The most important lesson is the one on inadequate preparations on properdocumentation and designs that it caused a lot of delay in starting and change ofscope of works, hence cost overruns.

(ii) Donor coordination is somehow a success on this respect hence the sound andefficient system of exchange and flow of project information, between theimplementers, as well as donors.

(iii) Maintenance culture and the importance of maintaining the existing infrastructureas a means of achieving a sustainable economy was also a major lessonlearned. Donor dependence even for maintenance will cripple any effort tomaintain the upgraded network and hence the effort to preserve investments.

(iv) Frequent merger and split of MOW and MCT had some effect to project, forfuture programmes of similar nature, scope and size, more emphasis should beput on maintaining a stable institutional organization focusing on strengtheningweak areas that would affect the output.

(v) Another lesson we learn is that the project was more complex and challenging toimplement due to the fact that during implementation, the country's economy wasin environment of transition to market economy; the economy was experiencingimbalances and inflation, this resulted in less counterpart funding.

(vi) Despite investing about US$11 million for PEHCOL the issue of equipmentavailability is not resolved because PEHCOL equipment bought in 1977 and1983 are very old. For better road works activities equipment has to be madeavailable; there is need to revisit the availability and utilization of equipment andplant in Tanzania.

BANK PERFORMANCE

21. During the implementation, the Bank staff and management as a whole were verycooperative. The project was supervised by five task managers during its lifetime.Organizational changes in the Bank did not affect much the performance of the Bank onthe project. Unavoidable changes of the scope of the work due to delays at the beginningand improper designs were readily attended. The most spectacular performance was thereadiness of the Bank Staff in the early years of implementation, to positively agree toimprovements on the scope of the project. This created a conducive Donor-Borrowerrelationship that should be adopted in future for implementation. Donor coordinationmeetings were satisfactorily held.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF PROJECTS

22. IRP I started in 1990 and was scheduled to end in mid 1995. Due to delays inimplementation of parts of the programme the closing dates for some donors like IDAwas 30 June, 1999 although early closing dates were achieved for some donors.Majority of components were implemented by the end of 1995.

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT


23. The target for institutional support provided under this project is to have a well functioningOrganization to manage and administer the road network in Tanzania. As per SAR forIRP-1, major shortcoming which the support should help to eliminate are (i) cumbersomeand inefficient structure for road administration (ii) a highly centralized and bureaucraticprocurement and administrative decision making process and (iii) inadequate technicalcapacity to carry-out maintenance and manage contracts.

Planned input was US$ 53.34m but actual total input by all donors is US$ 104.78m (96%increase). Under capacity building program, 63 MOW staff graduated with Masters ofScience Degrees in Civil Engineering at various universities including UDSM. Now MOWhas 331 engineers. Under this programme 374 staff participated in short term trainingand thus a total of 437 staff participated in short term and long term training.

There has been some impact an institutional support eg. in establishment of Road Fundand TANROADS, decentralisation in procurement and contract administration andincrease in technical capacity. However more support is required to have higherinstitutional capacity.

REHABILITATION

24. The total target for upgrading and rehabilitation of paved trunk roads was 1,526km. Atotal of 1,454km was achieved/will be achieved, equal to 95%. Above that 500 Ian ofTANZAM were to be resealed under IRP-I. This was not carried out, but most of it hasbeen done under IRP-I1 with NORAD financing. The target comprised 17 road sections,of which 1 have been completed according to, or above, the set targets. Further twosections, Mwanza-Nyanguge (EU financed) and DSM (Wazo hill) - Bagarnoyo (Italy/EUfinanced) have been committed, but are only expected to be completed by year 2000. Ofthe four remaining sections the three have been included in IRP H. The sectionLindi-Mingoyo-Mtwara has not been committed by any donor ( a short section of the roadwas maintained by FR4NIDA in connection with the Mingoyo-Masasi section).

25. Of the target for gravel trunk road rehabilitation of 2,546km, only 1,129km, or 44% werecompleted under IRP-1. Out of the 12 roads listed in the SAR five have been completedaccording to plan, and one, Shelui-Singida-Babati-Bereku, has been partly completed(88km out of 3 1 0 km). The remaining six roads could not be implemented due to costoverruns compared with the SAR. These have been included in IRP-H, fully or partly, andthree of them are planned for upgrading to paved standard. Two roads (one contract),Tanga-Horohoro/Marangu-Tarakea which were under 6'h Highway Project, wereimplemented under IRP due to cost overruns of the 6d'HWP credit. Sections of five graveltrunk roads, total 159kin, received maintenance under IDA financing, which in most caseswere in fact rehabilitation. The roads have been included in the achievements.

26. The target for rural gravel roads was 3,000 km and, as shown in table 6.2, 3,605 km wereachieved. In addition to that 148 km of paved roads in Dar es Salaam were rehabilitated.

The bilateral donor programme had a target of 1,200km. Only 489 have been completed.The donors for this programme have been FRINIDA, NORAD, the Netherlands, EU, SDCand Ireland. The SAR is not specific about which donors would contribute to theprogramme, and no specific commitments are mentioned in the report.

27. According to the SAR, IDA would finance rehabilitation of 30 trunk road bridges, and of10 ferry crossings. US$ 1.93 million were budgeted for overhauls of vehicular ferries.One bridge, Kyaka bridge in Kagera district, was constructed under IRP-1, together withaccess roads. Kyaka bridge was a major construction, clearly outside the scope of whatwas intended with the bridge component, and the construction more than exhausted the


funds budgeted. The IDA/IRP-1 1 programme contains two bridge packages forrehabilitation, listing a total of 188 bridges with a total length of 3,977 metres.

MAINTENANCE

28. The road maintenance programme included in the SAR for IRP-1, was to be jointlyfinanced by IDA and GOT. The programme includes the following main components:

IRP-1 Financing, US $mMaintenance Program

IDA GOT Total

Road maintenance equipment 17.14 17.14Equipment rehabilitation 4.75 4.75Equipment hire to mid-1995 8.27 15.37 23.64Contract maintenance to mid-1995 19.45 3.43 22.88Emergency work 10.67 1.88 12.55

TOTAL 60.28 20.68 80.96

As mentioned above the work carried out under the components, contract maintenanceand emergency work, in reality became full rehabilitation of the selected road sectionsand the output of the two components have been included in the achievements ofrehabilitation. The main reason for this change in scope of work was that the selectedroads were in such a state of repair that only full rehabilitation could bring them to themaintainable condition. The SAR does not include any physical targets for the km ofroads to be maintained under the two components. It must be envisaged that it wasexpected to be considerably more than was actually achieved, due to the fact that theprojects implemented under the two components in reality became full rehabilitation.With regard to emergency work the SAR states that priority will be given to road failuresaffecting movement of agricultural supplies and produce. However, the funds, were allused for rehabilitation of roads in Dar es Salaam.

29. Twenty eight (28) road project were implemented under the two components. The totalcosts for these roads were US$ 81.6 of which local costs were approx. US$ 32.2m ofwhich GOT was required to pay US$ 16.1 according to the agreement. The total paymentfrom GOT is about US$ 3 1.0m, which means that GOT has paid about US$ 15m morethan its commitment. The rationale for doing so was that this would ensure more foreignfunds available under the credit, and thereby more work could be carries out, as long asGOT paid the local costs.

An analysis of Road Fund contributions to MOW shows the following:

Tanzania Integrated Roads Project Page 53Implementation Completion Report Annex C: Borrowees Contribution and Comments to ICR

Financial Rate of IRP Govemment Actual Actual/year exchange Target Budget Disbursement IRP target

TShs.JUS$ US$m TShs.m US$m TShs.m US$m

1991/92 284.45 16.11 2,058 7.24 44.9%

1992/93 407.43 16.11 5,167 12.6 5,169 12.69 78.7%

1993/94 501.66 18.41 7,649 15.25 8,515 16.97 92.2%

1994/95 540.82 34.30 15,188 28.08 16,256 30.08 87.7%

1995/96 562.61 34.73 16,094 28.61 16,084 28.59 82.3%

1996/97 601.25 34.91 20,000 33.26 16,000 26.61 76.2%

1997/98 620.0 36.10 16,000 25.81 11,300 18.23 50.4%

1998/99 720.0 83.33* 32,250 44.79 31,777 44.13 52.9%

1999/00 780.0 76.92* 32,640 41.85

- Current funding needed for road maintenance is estimated at Tsh. 60bn.

The table shows that funding of road maintenance increased steadily from FY 1991/92 toFY 1993/94, when the Government disbursed more than the approved budget of theMinistry of Works in Tanzania Shillings, but it was slightly lower that the agreed IRPmaintenance target in dollar terms. In 1995/96 the government experienced a budgetdeficit and could not meet its obligations with regard to the road maintenance fundingfrom the Road Fund. This budget deficit was more severe during FY 1996/97, where thegovernment managed to disburse only 76.2 percent of the total IRP target.

30. With regard to plant and equipment, the intention of having a central pool for hire(PEHCOL) operated on commercial basis has not yet been achieved and the availabilityof equipment particularly for gravel roads rehabilitation and maintenance is not reliable,except in those regions that benefit from the availability of MOW road workshops. Inorder to ensure the sustainability of road investments, it is a prerequisite that road plantsand equipment are readily available for hire at the right time. The private sector isapparently not yet prepared to invest in road plants and equipment partly due to lack ofcapital, and partly due to uncertainty with regard to continues availability of road works,and hence the utilization of the equipment. Donor assistance may be required to supportthe Government in the procurement of the initial assets of plants and equipment. TheGovernment has decided to privatise PEHCOL and the privatisation process is ongoing.

FREIGHT, PASSENGER AND AIR TRANSPORTATION

31. A total of US $ 6.58 million was provided for management assistance to ATC, assistanceto NTC, RETCOs and assistance to DSM passenger transport. Overall evaluation of TAto NTC, RETCOs and UDA had a positive impact because most RETCOs performed wellduring supervision of TA and realized profits, UDA's operation reduced losses although itdid not realize profit and skills of counterpart staff were increased. Operation of Air


Tanzania Corporation was greatly improved during provision of TA to ATC andcomputers bought under the project greatly increased the performance of ATC.

CONCLUSIONS

32. All in all although the project was extended once for one year and there were some costoverruns on some items for some donors the project was fairly satisfactory. The projecthad significant impact on transport operation. Vehicle operating costs and travelling timehas reduced. Zanzibar ZIROP study has been successfully completed and a goodnumber of staff have been trained under this project.

REFERENCES

1. The World Bank - 1990Staff Appraisal Report No. 8367-TA - The Integrated Roads Project.

2. The World Bank - 1994Staff Appraisal Report No. 12536-TA - Second Integrated Roads Project.

3. Comprehensive Review of IRP, June 1997Revised Third Interim Report on Status of IRP.


Borrower's Comments on ICR

(a) Borrower

The Borrowers comments are overall positive. According to the Borrower, the Bank'sperformance was satisfactory. The supervision missions were effective, but has notedthat there were frequent changes in the Bank's management of the tasks. Most of thecomments highlighted issues already raised in the ICR which have been incorporated.Details of the comments are in the project file.

(b) Cofinanciers.

As noted in the ICR, besides IDA, 15 other donor agencies have participated in parallelfinancing of the Project. The ICR mission has contacted some of the agencies in Dar esSalaam. The comments received from the donors are incorporated in the ICR missionaide memoire.

MAP SECTION

IBRD 22067

SUIIORA / I 0 **0~~~~~~~~~~~~~U~~ ~~ Lo~~~~o v ~~KENYA

K E N Y A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~01.PU

R4otW ~~~~~~~ S tlyongo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ TANZANIA

KrN Moodud os ZAMBIA i* 0

4-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4

K- ~ ~~~~~HooqU yL.INTEGRATED

RQADS PROJECT

•r.i' ~~COREREGION$,R~ A •ZrasaA A ZONE WORKSHOPS

FIRST YEAR PROGRAM;

REHASILITATiGHNIJPGRAOE

ABORA~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ZNIA ON-GOING PROsECTSK.g. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ DD .v o . K ILN

SECOND YEAR PROGRAM:

Worn? - Z~~~~~NZIBA oRSHABILITATION/UPGEAIDE

INGIDA Egggggp.~~~~~~~~~~~~ RESEAt/IMPROVE

SHIED YEAR PROGRAM,

UKWA J~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ROOG S OAM - REHABIL-TATION/UPGRADE!*** RESEAL/IMPEOVE

FOURTH YEAR PIIOGRAM.

- COAST ~~~~~~*Ogeg REHARILITATIONIUPGRADE

PAVED TRUNK ROADSSUMEAWANGANL,kl j ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~UNP'AVED TRUNK ROADE P

0

1v ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~ynooe MAFIA - EALGD

* onroo4o. 4- ~~~~PORTSA' AIRPORTS

*ilo 0,01 ----- AKE SERVICES (FERRIES)

m ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 SELECTED TOWNS

* ~~~~~~orM ~ (g REGION HEADQUARTERS

LI F .* S ~~~~~~~NATIONAL CAPITALST. L ... k. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~REGION ROUNDARIES

--- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

Z A M 3B IS oI At.%' (ZAKB OUEg11

INDIAN~~MY 99