report of the transitional justice and reconciliation commission

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Te copyright notice shall be in the orm Philippine Copyright 2016 by ransitional Justice and Reconciliation

Commission.

Publisher: ransitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission

BG3A Lower Ground

Somerset Olympia owers

No. 7912 Makati Avenue,

Makati City 1200

el: (+632) 357-6703

Email: [email protected]

echnical Editor: Dr. Marita Concepcion Castro Guevara

Photographers: Leonard G. Reyes

Mark Navales

Design & graphics: Pamela Lauren C. Liban

All rights reserved. No part o this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitt-ted in any orm or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without theprior written permission o the publisher.


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Foreword……………………………………………………………………………...……………................ iAcknowledgment.………………………………………………………….......………………...................... iiiAcronyms………………………………………………………………………....……………...................... viExecutive Summary……………………………………………………....……………………….................. ix

Introduction ……………………………………………………………................……………….................. 1Chapter 1Te ransitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission:

Its Mandate, Composition, and Methodology ……................………………................…........................... 5

1.1 Te JRC Mandate ………………………................………………...................................... 61.2. Te Composition o the JRC ………………………................………………......................... 61.3 Te Methodology o the JRC ………………………................………………......................... 6

1.3.1 Te JRC Consultation Process ………………………................………………...... 7 1.3.2 Developing a Context-Specific Approach to ransitional Justice and Reconciliation ................ 11

1.4 Dealing with the Past and the Management o Diversity ………………………...................... 14

Chapter 2Results o the JRC Consultation Process: Main Findings ……................………………......................... 15

2.1 Legitimate Grievances o the Bangsamoro …………................……………….......................... 162.1.1 Defining Legitimate Grievances …………................………………..................................... 162.1.2 Link with the Struggle or Sel-Determination ..........………………................................... 172.1.3 Legitimate Grievances and raumatic Experience ..........………………............................. 192.1.4 Summary and Conclusions ..........……………….................................................................... 23

2.2 Historical Injustice …………………………………................………………............................ 23 2.2.1 Defining Historical Injustice .......………………..................................................................... 24 2.2.2 Patterns in Historical Injustic .......………………................................................................... 24

2.2.3. Misrepresentation and Profiling: Undermining Muslim and IndigenousPeoples Narratives o History .......………………................................................................... 27

2.2.4 Silencing o Women’s Agency and Victimization ................................................................... 282.2.5 Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 29

2.3 Human Rights Violations …………………………………................………………................. 30 2.3.1 Defining Human Rights Violations …………………................………………................... 30 2.3.2 Patterns o IHRL and IHL Vioilations …………………................……………….............. 31 2.3.3 Summary and Conclusions …………………................………………................................ 42

TABLE OF CONTENTS


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Chapter 3Violence, Impunity, and Neglect:

Te Imposition o a Monolithic Filipino Identity and Philippine State ………….…………….......... 55

3.1 On Violence ………………….......…………………………………….......……………… 57

3.1.1 Forms o Violence in the Bangsamoro …………………….......………………............. 573.1.2 Context o Vertical and Horizontal Violence ………………..........………………........ 61 3.2 On Impunity ………………………….......……………........................................................... 62

3.3 On Neglect ………………………….......…………….............................................................. 64 3.4 Addressing Violence, Impunity, and Neglect as a Basis or Sustainable Peace ..................... 65

Chapter 4Recommendations …………….......…………………………………….......………………..................... 69

4.1 Introduction …………….......…………………………………….......………………........... 70 4.2. Te Bangsamoro Opportunity ………………………………….......………………............ 70 4.3 Dealing with the Past towards Healing and Reconciliation.………………........................... 71

4.4 Complementing Past and Existing Efforts and Ensuring a Strategic Approach ................... 72 4.5 aking a Political Decision.…………...............................................................…….................. 73

Te JRC Recommendations ……………….......…………………………………….......……….......... 74

Endnotes…………………………………………………………………………….................................... 93

Annexes Annex 1……………………………………………..............................……………………………........ 114 Annex 2………………………………………………..............................…………………………........ 117 Annex 3………………………………………………..............................…………………………........ 119

2.4 Marginalization through Land Dispossession …………………................………………...... 44 2.4.1 Defining Marginalization through Land Dispossession …................……………............ 44 2.4.2 Waves o Land Dispossession …................…………………................……..…................. 44 2.4.3 Roots o Dispossession: Corporate and Resettlement Land Laws ...................................... 45

2.4.4. Reconfiguration o raditional Political Order and Gerrymandering .............................. 512.4.5. Land and Identity …………………………………....................………………................ 53

2.4.6 Gender Dimensions o Marginalization through Land Dispossession .............................. 54 2.4.7 Summary and Conclusions …................…………………................…………................... 54


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FOREWORDDear Reader,

Beore you begin reading, I ask you to pause or a moment and to allow me toshare some personal thoughts about the journey that led to the creation o thisreport.

It has been a painul, sometimes almost unbearable experience. At times, evenunreal: people, situations, contexts, and stories seem to blend and resembleone another. he endless stories about killing, violence, spoliation, abductionrape, exclusion, displacement. Yet, the stories are real - each one unique - and

the wounds are resh even ater years and the broken memories continue tohaunt men, women, and children, their homes, their communities, theirlandscapes.

Tere is a penetrating, chilling contrast between the beauty o the Bangsamoroindigenous and Philippine people, their extraordinary hospitality, theirkindness, their ancient culture, the beauty o the surrounding landscape andthe permanent, shocking ugliness o everything that has been touched by war violence, greed, disrespect, and deep neglect.

here is also a deep ambiguity: So many books, academic studies, mediareports, ilm doc umentaries have been published both in the Philippines

and abroad about the origin o the conflict and its consequences. Yet, the violencecontinues and it continues to generate new orms o dehumanization. AsCommissioners, we constantly asked ourselves: Is there anything new to besaid? Anything new that can be done?

So, let me tell you straightaway, dear Reader: here is nothing ‘new’ in thisreport – nothing that you, as an inormed person, would not be in a positionto know already. here is, however, something ‘new’ in this report that canperhaps inspire you or even change the way you look at lie. You can listen toyour ellow Filipinos, Bangsamoro and indigenous people, women and menlike you, and you can try to imagine their reality. Indeed, this report is about

listening, convening, and acting together.


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- Listening: Many people aected by the conlict, men, women and children, armers, ishermen, teachers,

community leaders, accepted to talk to the JRC, because they believed that we would listen to themattentively and that their testimony would be heard. hey shared their stories - and also their silence whenwords ailed them. hey also shared their hopes, their visions or the uture. Indeed, although they were attimes driven rom their homes and suered unimaginable hardships, they are still remarkably alive and theystretch out their hands to you.

- Convening: Many people rom all walks o lie, and rom all over Philippines – public oicials, academicexperts, religious and business leaders, teachers, members o the military and police, men and women–accepted to meet with us, to share their experience and knowledge. Oten they expressed shame aboutwhat has happened and continues to happen; the estrangement imposed upon Bangsamoro or indigenouspeople; they witnessed scenes o extreme violence; or saw how people lost their loved ones, their place. Some

told us that violence, neglect, and impunity are destroying the country as a whole by undermining its coremoral values and its sense o solidarity as a nation. Some spoke about what can and shall be done to makesure that there is a uture or the Philippines and the Bangsamoro.

Dear Reader,

his is their report. It speaks about their pain and about their hope. It says that it is both possible andeasible to say ‘yes’ to peace and to a common destiny. It says that the ones who say ‘yes’ to mutualrespect, to compassion, to social justice are the uture o the nation, the uture o the Bangsamoro and thePhilippines. By choosing lie over death, peace over war, empathy over indierence, these women and menare the heroes o this story. You can join them.

Mô Bleeker, Chairpersonransitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (JRC)Cotabato City and Manila, 10 February 2016


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Te ransitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (JRC) would like to acknowledge the ollowing

individuals and organizations or their invaluable support:

Te Philippine Government under the leadership o President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, particularlyto the Office o the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process under Honorable eresita Quintos-Deles.

Te Moro Islamic Liberation Front Central Committee under the leadership o Esteemed Chair Al-HajMurad Ebrahim.

Malaysia, the third-party acilitator, in particular Esteemed engku Dato’ Ab Ghaar engku Mohamed.

Te leadership and staff o the Peace Panels o the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic LiberationFront, in particular Esteemed Chair Miriam Coronel-Ferrer and Esteemed Chair Mohagher Iqbal, ortheir deep commitment and tireless effort to bring sustaina-ble peace in the Bangsamoro and the Philippines.

Te leadership and staff o the various entities under the Normalization Framework:

Tird Party Monitoring eam, International Monitoring eam, Independent Decommissioning Body,International Contact Group, Independent Commission on Policing, GPH and MILF – Joint NormalizationCommittee, GPH and MILF – Coordinating Committee on the Cessation o Hostilities, BangsamoroNormalization Fund Mechanism, Joint Peace and Security Committee, Joint Peace and Security eams,Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, Local Monitoring eams.

Te women and men o the national, autonomous regional and local governments and State institutions;or sharing their knowledge, experience and recommendations with the JRC:

Department o Health (DOH), Department o Justice (DOJ), Department o National Deense (DND), ArmedForces o the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Commission on Human Rights (CHR),Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Inormation Center (DROMIC)-Department o SocialWelare and Development, Human Rights Violations Claims Board (HRVB), House o Representatives,National Archives o the Philippines (NAP), National Historical Commission o the Philippines (NHCP),National Library o the Philippines, National Prosecution Service, Senate o the Republic o the Philippines,Oice o the President o the Republic o the Philippines, Oice o the Presidential Adviser onthe Peace Process (OPAPP), Regional Human Rights Commission (RHRC) and Regional Reconciliationand Uni ication Commission (RRUC), ARMM Office o the Governor, ARMM Manila Liaison Office,Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), ARMM Regional Board o Investments, ARMM RegionalHuman Rights Commission, Provincial Prosecution Office o Maguindanao, Regional Human RightsCommission, Zamboanga City Library and Zamboanga City Prosecution Service.


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Te Non-Governmental Organizations; or sharing advice, knowledge and experience with the JRC:

Alternative Forum or Research in Mindanao (AFIRM), Anak Mindanao Party List, Asian Federation AgainstInvoluntary Disappearances (AFAD), Balay Rehabilitation Center, Bantay Cease-fire, Bangsamoro StudyGroup, Mindanao People’s Caucus, Bantayog ng mga Bayani Founda-tion, Claimants 1081, Families o Victimso Involuntary Disappearances, Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), Forum ZFD Civil Peace Service,

Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Component, International Monitoring eam, Initiativesor International Dialogue, Institute o Bangsamoro Studies, Institute or Autonomy and Governance,International Alert, International Organization or Migration-Cotabato, Lopez Museum and Library,KARAPAAN Alliance or the Advancement o People’s Rights, Medical Action Group, Mindanao Allianceor Peace, Minda-nao Cross, Mindanao Human Rights Action Center (MinHRAC), Moro Human RightsCenter, Nisa Ul Haqq Fi Bangsamoro, Non-violence Peaceorce (NP), Oblates o Mary Immaculate – PhilippineProvince, Organization o eduray-Lambangian Conerence (OLAC), Peace Advo-cates Zamboanga, PhilippineAlliance or Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA), Sentro ng Alter-natibong Lingap Panligal (SALIGAN), askForce Detainees o the Philippines (FDP), United Nations High Commissioner or Reugees (UNHCR)-Cotabato and United or Youth or Peace and Development, Inc, swisspeace Foundation.

Te Coordinators and Facilitators o the JRC Listening Process; or their incredible dedication, handworkand passion:

Abbas Mobashar; Abdulhalim Ibrahim; Alidain Nulkaisa; Allian Fatima Pir; Antequisa Carino ; BahidjianDayang; Makakua Buat; Juvanni Caballero; Dodo Ammier; Ma. Carmen Gatmaytan; Guiam GuiamaludinGuiamil; Nurhadi Guiam; Jo Genna Jover; Juhra Kiman; Myla Leguro; Nando Hisham; Akas Parending; CarolizaPeteros; Mucha-Shim Quiling; Baibonn Sangid; Jurma ikmasan; Mark Anthony orres; and Sahie Udjah.

Special thanks and appreciation to Pro. Rua Cagoco-Guiam and Mr. Guiamel Alim, JRC LP Coordinators, ortheir extraordinary work, unwavering support and remarkable dedication.

Te women, men and young people o various communities engaged in the JRC Listening Process romthe ollowing areas; Basilan, Cotabato, General Santos City, Indigenous Peoples Communities, Lanao delNorte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, South Cotabato, awi-awi andZamboanga;

You are the soul o this report; our deepest appreciation or your time, your courage and most especially orthe trust.

Te members, experts and rapporteurs o the different JRC Study Groups: or their une-quivocal sharingo time, resources and wisdom:

Carmen Abubakar; Guiamel Alim; Mary Ann Arnado; Anna ajminah Basman; Rua Cagoco-Guiam;Octavio Dinampo; Myrthena Fianza; Mohammad Khalid Gunting; Galuasch Gallaho; Fatima Kanakan;Ayshia Kunting; Fr. Charlie Inzon; Francisco Lara; Aminoding Limpao; Abhoud Syed Lingga; Anwar Malang;Ma. Victoria Maglana; Nasser Marohomsalic; Michael Mastura; Moctar Matuan; Macrina Morados; Zeny-LindaNandu; Jasmin Nario-Galace; Alpha Pontanal; Ma. Lourdes Rallonza; Rudy Rodil; Soliman Santos Jr; AbuAl-Rasheed anggol; Faina Ulindang and Ismael Villareal.


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Particular thanks to the ollowing individuals or their support:

Fermin Adriano; Michael Frank Alar; eenie Amor; Carol Arguillas, Ed Bullecer; Sedrey Candelaria; JowelCanuday; Ruben Carranza; Mary Louise Castillo; Sam Chittick; Nicola Diday; Ica Fernandez; MaritaConcepcion Guevara; Raissa Jajurie; Pam Liban; Raael Lopa; Ma. Victoria Maglana; Mary Rose AnneManahan; Gutierrez Mangansakan; Elmer Mercado; iton Mitra; Mark Navales; Karen Rose Paje; BuenaventuraPascual; John Perrine; Viko Perrine; rudy Peterson; Ma. Lourdes Rallonza-Veneracion; Leonard Reyes, Marian

Roces; Naomi Roht-Arriaza; Ali Saleemi; Soliman Santos Jr; Matthew Stephens and Alredo adiar.

Te members o the International Community :Embassy o Australia; Embassy o Brunei; Embassy o Canada; Embassy o Indonesia; Embassy oJapan; Embassy o Malaysia; Embassy o the Netherlands; Embassy o Norway; Embassy o SaudiArabia; Embassy o Switzerland; Embassy o urkey; Embassy o United Kingdom; Embassy o the UnitedStates; FASRAC; Te European Union Delegation to the Philippines, Independent Decommissioning Body,International Contact Group, International Organization or Migration, United Nations DevelopmentProgram, UN Women and World Bank, and in par-ticular the ollowing individuals; Alma Evangelista;Lloyd Yales; Faith Evangelista; Hanny Cueva-Beteta; Maricel Aguilar; Riza orrado; Sabrina Buchler and JuvyHuqueriza.

Special tribute to Her Excellency Andrea Reichlin and His Excellency, Ambassador Ivo Sieber, rom theEmbassy o Switzerland to the Philippines, or their unwavering support to the work o the JRC.

Te members o the JRCO team: You have made all this possible, day by day, night afer night; our deepestthanks and acknowledgement or your extraordinary commitment. Young and dedicated team, you are theuture or the Bangsamoro and the Philippines:Mariecris Araga; Cindy Bullan; Nihaya Casar; Sahraman Disomimba; Evir Galleon; Sophia Dianne Garcia;Carla Micaela Honasan; Donna Nessa Macaraeg; Maria Mikkoh Ortuoste-Samba and Jamila Sanguila.

And our deepest gratitude to the persons that we do not name here, but know what their contribution hasbeen.

Te JRC takes the sole responsibility or the report, its content and the materials presented in thispublication. Te JRC makes no statements or warranties about the completeness o any inormationcontained in this publication.


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ACRONYMS

AFP Armed Forces o the Philippines

ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

ASG Abu Sayya Group

BBL Bangsamoro Basic Law

BCMS Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System

BDA Bangsamoro Development Authority

BIAF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces

BIFF Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

BLBAR Basic Law on the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region

BSDU Barrio Sel-Deense Unit

CAB Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro

CAFGU Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit

CARL Comprehensive Agrarian Reorm Law

CA Convention Against orture and Other Cruel,

Inhuman or Degrading reatment

CCP Cultural Center o the PhilippinesCEDAW Convention on the Elimination o Discrimination

Against Women

CHDF Civilian Home Deense Force

CHED Commission on Higher Education

CHR Commission on Human Rights

CIIF Coconut Industry Investment Fund

CRC Convention on the Rights o the Child

CSC Civil Service Commission

CSO Civil Society Organization

CVO Civilian Volunteer Organizations

DA Department o Agriculture

DAR Department o Agrarian Reorm

DBM Department o Budget and Management

DENR Department o Environment and Natural Resources

DepEd Department o Education

DFA Department o Foreign Affairs

DILG Department o Interior and Local Government

DMCI David M. Consunji, Inc.

DND Department o National DeenseDOJ Department o Justice

DSWD Department o Social Welare and Development

DwP Dealing with the Past

EDCOR Economic Development Corps

FAB Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro

FIND Families o Victims o Enorced Disappearances


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ACRONYMS

GPH Government o the Philippines

GRP Government o the Republic o the Philippines

HMC Historical Memory Committee

HRVCB Human Rights Victims Claims Board

IBP Integrated Bar o the Philippines

ICC International Criminal Court

ICCPR International Convention on Civil and Political Rights

ICERD International Convention on the Elimination o All

Forms o Racial Discrimination

ICESCR International Convention on Economic, Social, and

Cultural Rights

ICHDF Integrated Civilian Home Deense Forces

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IHL International Humanitarian Law

IHRL International Humanitarian Rights Law

IOM International Organization or Migration

IP Indigenous Peoples

IPRA Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act

ISIS Islamic State o Iraq and Syria

JAGO Judge-Advocate General’s Office

LA Land Authority

LASEDECO Land Settlement Development Corporation

LEO Law Enorcement Operations

LGU Local Government Unit

LMB Land Management Bureau

MAG Medical Action Group

MCPA Moro Christian People’s Alliance

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MINDA Mindanao Development Authority

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front

MOA-AD Memorandum o Agreement on Ancestral Domain

MOU Memorandum o Understanding

MPRC Moro People’s Resource Center

NARRA National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration

NCCA National Commission or Culture and Arts

NCIP National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

NCMF National Commission on Muslim Filipinos

NDCP National Deense College o the Philippines

NEDA National Economic and Development Agency

NFDC National Film Development Council

NGO Nongovernmental Organization


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NHCP National Historical Commission o the Philippines

NLSA National Land Settlement Administration

NPA New People’s Army

NSCWPS National Steering Committee on Women, Peace, and

Security

NJRCB National ransitional Justice and Reconciliation

Commission on the Bangsamoro

NUC National Unification Commission

OPAPP Office o the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

PAO Public Attorney’s Office

PC Philippine Constabulary

PCGG Presidential Commission on Good Government

PCHR Presidential Committee on Human Rights

PCW Philippine Commission on Women

PD Presidential Decree

PDP Philippine Development Plan

PMA Philippine Military Academy

PNP Philippine National Police

PNPA Philippine National Police Academy

RA Republic Act

RCBW Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women

RCPA Rice and Corn Production Administration

RHRC Regional Human Rights Commission

RRUC Regional Reconciliation Unification Commission

SCAA Special CAFGU Armed Auxiliary

SEARC Southeast Asia Research Center

SoCSarGen South Cotobato, Sarangani, and General Santos City

FDP ask Force Detainees o the Philippines

JRC ransitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission

ORs erms o Reerence

UDHR Universal Declaration o Human Rights

UN United Nations

UPR Universal Periodic Review

US United States

VAW Violence against Women

WB World Bank

ACRONYMS


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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Transitional Justice

and Reconciliation Commission


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I. JRC Mandate, Composition, and Methodology

he ransitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (JRC) was established as part othe Normalization Annex o the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and, as such, wasmandated to undertake a study and to make recommendations with a view to promoting healing andreconciliation among the dierent communities aected by the conlict in Mindanao and the Suluarchipelago.

Te Peace Panels constituted the membership o the JRC as ollows:

Chairperson: Ms. Mô Bleeker, Special Envoy, Swiss Federal Department o Foreign AffairsGovernment o the Philippines (GPH) Delegate: Atty. Cecilia Jimenez-DamaryGPH Alternate Delegate: Atty. Mohammad Al-Amin JulkipliMoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Delegate: Atty. Ishak MasturaMILF Alternate Delegate: Atty. Abdul Rashid KalimSenior Adviser: Mr. Jonathan Sisson, Swiss Federal Department o Foreign AffairsSenior Gender Adviser is Dr. Ma. Lourdes Veneracion Rallonza

Te JRC is supported by office staff based in Manila and in Cotabato City.

Te JRC was mandated to propose appropriate mechanisms:

• To address legitimate grievances o the Bangsamoro people; • To correct historical injustices; • To address human rights violations;

• To address marginalization through land dispossession.

JRC Study Groups-Listening ProcessConvergence Workshop in Davao, August 2015


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Te JRC subsequently designed and implemented an elaborate Consultation Process that ocused onthe our topics o its mandate and involved community-based ‘listening process’ sessions, study groupreviews o existing research, as well as key policy interviews. Additional independent research projectson particular subjects related to its mandate were also carried out.

In all, the JRC conducted ‘listening process’ sessions in more than 210 Moro, indigenous, and settlercommunities in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, involving some 3,000 community members and local

officials. Te JRC also engaged with a wide range o experts rom the Bangsamoro region and at the nationallevel, including peacebuilding and human rights practitioners, community and religious leaders, academicsand scholars o Bangsamoro history and culture, public servants, and representatives o the security andprivate sectors.

Based on the indings o the Consultation Process, the JRC produced its own analysis o the issuesrelated to its mandate and o the root causes o the current conlict. In the view o the JRC, theour topics o its mandate are interrelated and intertwined: he Bangsamoro narrative o historicalinjustice is based on an experience o grievances that extends over generations, particularly withrespect to land dispossession and its adverse eects upon their welare as a community as well as

their experience o widespread and serious human rights violations.

Moreover, the JRC came to the conclusion that these issues are the result o three interlockingphenomena—violence, impunity, and neglect—which, in turn, are rooted in the imposition oa monolithic Filipino identity and Philippine State by orce on multiple ethnic groups in Mindanaoand the Sulu archipelago that saw themselves as already preexisting nations and nation-states.”

II. Te Bangsamoro Opportunity

Armed conflict in Mindanao has had tragic consequences or the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoplesand or Filipino society at large. Over the past our decades, an untold number o people in Mindanao

and the Sulu archipelago have been subjected to immense suering due to vertical and horizontal violence. Tey have lost amily members; they have been driven rom their homes and have lost theirlands and livelihoods. Incidents o violent conlict and systematic discrimination and exclusion havebecome a collective experience and memory. he people o the Bangsamoro are poor and tired and theywant peace.

At the same time, the Philippines as a nation has not remained unscathed. Te prolongation o the armedconflict has generated pockets o malgovernance, violence, and corruption. It has eroded the values o thenation and undermined trust between citizens and the State. On another level, the conlict has cost thePhilippines precious time and opportunities. It has eectively hindered decades o potential socialand economic development and weakened the quality o democracy and o human security. With theappearance o new armed groups and new orms o violence (e.g., international terrorism and drug-relatedcrime), an environment o multidimensional conflict has begun to take hold in the Philippines.

In this context, bringing peace to the Bangsamoro in a durable manner oers a unique opportunityor the Philippines—the opportunity or a modern nation-state to emerge that is capable o managingthe diversity o peoples and communities inherent to any modern democracy in a constructivemanner based on equality o opportunity and on the rule o law. Similarly, the Bangsamoro aspireto a political ramework, which shall enable the practice o good governance, the development o theBangsamoro region and people, and the possibility or them to proudly assert their identity, andconstructively engage with their own multiethnic constituency.


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Both the Government o the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front deserve to becommended or their commitment to the peace process during seventeen years o protractednegotiations. As a result, the two parties were able to sign the historic ComprehensiveAgreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) on March 27, 2014. hus, the JRC preers to speak o a

‘Bangsamoro opportunity’ rather than o a ‘Bangsamoro problem.’ he implementation o theCAB is a unique and extraordinary opportunity not only or Bangsamoro, but also or the wholeFilipino nation:

• It oers an opportunity for the historical and cultural resilience of the Bangsamoroand indigenous peoples to be recognized as a vibrant and constructive part o thePhilippines, based on the acknowledgement o plural identities.

• It oers an opportunity for the Philippine State to assume the political and moralresponsibility or all o its peoples by opening and strengthening spaces or politicaldebate and or the nonviolent management o conflicting views and interests.

• It oers an opportunity for the Philippines to join hands with the Bangsamoro andindigenous peoples to promote the rule o law, security, and development in theBangsamoro as a potential model or the rest o the country.

• It oers an opportunity for the Philippines and the Bangsamoro to embrace diversityas one o the key human resources o its society.

• It oers an opportunity for the Philippines to become a champion in the protection ofdiversity and o territorial integrity at the regional and international levels.

IDB personnel conducts inspection andinventory on the weapons that were turned over.(© OPAPP)


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III. ‘Dealing with the Past’ towards Healing and Reconciliation

Te recommendations o the JRC are elaborated with the intention o opening the path or a jointBangsamoro and Filipino process o ‘dealing with the past’ that can address both the root causes o theconflict and their consequences, while building on the extraordinary Bangsamoro and Filipino capacityor resilience.

he JRC is convinced that the transitional justice mechanisms proposed below, when implementedwith a conlict transormation perspective in mind, are suited to address the complex o grievanceso the Bangsamoro people cited in its mandate. Moreover, they will provide a solid basis or healing andreconciliation between the different communities directly affected by the conflict as well as between theBangsamoro and the Filipino society at large.

Te JRC has adopted a conceptual and analytical ramework or transitional justice (or what it preersto call ‘dealing with the past’) that is inspired by the United Nations (UN) principles against impunity,which have the orce o customary international law. In this regard, the JRC highlights the act that theprinciples against impunity are based on the rights o victims to seek redress or past abuse and on the

obligations o the State to ensure accountability or wrongs committed. Moreover, initiatives related totruth seeking, justice, reparations, and institutional reorm offer a mutually reinorcing ramework thatis needed in the struggle against impunity and to strengthen the rule o law (see Figure ES-1 or the JRC‘Dealing with the Past’ Framework).

Figure ES-1 JRC ‘Dealing with the Past’ Framework


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At the same time, the JRC proposes a uture-oriented approach to ‘dealing with the past’ that is sensitiveto the Bangsamoro and Filipino context. While addressing legitimate grievances, historical injustice, andthe effects o marginalization through land dispossession, ‘dealing with the past’ also strives to prevent therecurrence o human rights violations. o do so, a combination o short-term, medium-term, and long-terminterventions are required to create conditions in which the root causes o political and social conflictcan be addressed by nonviolent means. he support provided to existing national and regionalinstitutions and the creation o additional transitional justice mechanisms recommended by theJRC shall contribute to an environment o trust building and power sharing that respects the historicaldiversity o the Philippines and the Bangsamoro region.

IV. Complementing Past and Existing Efforts and Ensuring a Strategic Approach

Many efforts have been initiated by government and civil society in the Philippines to address the violentlegacy o the Marcos era. Tere are a number o good examples o ‘dealing with the past,’ among them therecent ongoing eorts to compensate the victims o Martial Law undertaken by the Human RightsVictims Claims Board (HRVCB). Initiatives have also been launched by previous administrationsto mainstream human rights education and monitoring in the national security institutions as well as toidentiy and protect archives related to human rights violations under Martial Law.

Nevertheless, the impact o these initiatives has been limited with respect to the conflict in Mindanao,notably in providing satisactory redress to victims and in preventing the recurrence o violations. here

President Benigno Aquino III talks with IDB CHaydar Berk as he inspects the weapons turnedover by the MILF. He is joined by Secretaryeresita Quintos Deles, MILF Chair EbrahimMurad, Secretary Mar Roxas, and GovernmePeace Panel Chair Miriam Coronel-Ferrer.(© OPAPP)


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are a number o reasons why past government initiatives related to transitional justice have ailed tolive up to expectations:

• ey have not been eective in addressing the root causes of violence. • ey were not implemented as a result of broad and transparent consultations.

• ey promoted isolated measures, instead of a holistic strategy, for ‘dealing with the

past.’ • ey did not succeed in ending conict-related violence and thus failed to draw a line

between beore and afer the period o wrongdoings and injustices.• ey did not contribute to the prevention of revisionist discourse and denial about the

abuse committed in the past.

Nevertheless, important steps have been taken. We note the significant contribution towards healingand reconciliation made by President Benigno S. Aquino III when he publically acknowledgedthe grievances o the Moro people in a speech:

As a congressman, I had come to understand that the degree o resentment in the hearts o theBangsamoro people was, on a large part, a result o land grabbing and the opportunism o some o

our less scrupulous compatriots. aking advantage o the illiteracy o our indigenous peoples who did

not know that their lands had to be registered under their name, these lettered Christians sought control

o the lands our Moro and other indigenous peoples called home. Tis, in turn, led to a struggle o our

Moro brothers to reclaim what was rightully theirs. Given the many deaths, which were the result

o the conlict that raged and estered or generations, one cannot help but wonder: I a law had been

passed to protect the marginalized, like the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) we have now, could

bloodshed have been avoided? Is it not right that as one o my predecessors once said: Tat those who

have less in lie should have more in law? I wondered: With all the hostility and animosity that once

existed between brothers, how could one achieve the trust crucial in orging an agreement? (Speechat the International Conerence on the Consolidation or Peace or Mindanao on June 24, 2014)

his statement underscores the reason why President Aquino has insisted on the passage o theBangsamoro Basic Law not only as a means o implementing the peace agreement with the MILF,but also as a concrete maniestation o the Philippine government’s commitment to address Moro grievances.

V. aking a Political Decision

Te JRC is aware that it will take time to address the issues underlined in its mandate in a coherentand comprehensive manner and to bring durable peace to the Bangsamoro as well as in the Philippines.hereore, it proposes an incremental and lexible approach that combines mutually reinorcingeorts in the ields o truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees o non-recurrence, whilepromoting reconciliation initiatives on the national, regional, and local levels.

o this end, the JRC developed a number o recommendations based on its Consultation Process.Aside rom the recommendations listed below, there is a list o recommendations, stemming romthe ‘listening process’ sessions, the study group reports, the key policy interviews, and otherreports mandated by the JRC; these are included in the JRC report. hese recommendations


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xvi Report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission

must be discussed and urther developed as a joint effort between the Government o the Philippinesand the Bangsamoro authorities, on the one hand, and between government and civil society, on theother.

A sound political decision needs to be taken at the highest level by both parties to set the stage or astrategic approach to ‘dealing with the past’ or the Bangsamoro. Indeed, ‘dealing with the past’ must

be ully integrated into the peace process to ensure its sustainability. As an intrinsic part o the Bangsamoro andnational peace agenda, ‘dealing with the past’ shall be implemented through a series o short-term, medium-term, and long-term measures to be undertaken independently and co-jointly by the Bangsamoroand national authorities with the support o Philippine civil society and the international community.

VI. Te JRC Recommendations

he JRC submits the ollowing recommendations to the GPH and MILF Peace Panels or theirconsideration and action. All o these recommendations shall be inormed by gender and culturalsensitivities and include a perspective or healing and reconciliation.

(© Mark Nava


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Te JRC recommends the ollowing, in addition to the list o specific recommendations listed in themain JRC report:

A. o the President, to create the National ransitional Justice and ReconciliationCommission on the Bangsamoro (NJRCB)

1. Te overall mandate o the NJRCB shall be to implement the ‘dealing with thepast’ ramework, to promote healing and reconciliation, and to ensure that theollowing tasks are undertaken by our separate Sub-Commissions in cooperationwith relevant existing institutions and actors:

a. o realize public and confidential hearings with the participation o victimso the conflict, to investigate serious violations o international human rightsand international humanitarian law, and to implement remedies;

b. o contribute to the resolution o outstanding land disputes in conflict-affected

areas in the Bangsamoro, to address the legacy o land dispossession, andto implement remedies;

c. o contribute to the dismantling o impunity, to the promotion o accountability,to the strengthening o the rule o law in relation to past and presentwrongdoings, and to implement remedies;

d. o promote healing and reconciliation among the dierent communitiesaected by the conlict.

2. Te NJRCB shall operate or six years with the possibility o extending its mandate

or another three years.

3. Te NJRCB shall ensure the implementation o the ‘dealing with the past’ rameworkand promote healing and reconciliation. Among other things, it shall operate by co

operating with existing institutions and building on existing local and national bestpractices in conormity with international standards, while taking into account lessonslearned rom other experiences. he NJRCB shall establish memoranda o

understanding (MOUs) to regulate the cooperation between its Sub-Commissionsand the relevant existing institutions and organizations in their respective fields(see Figure ES-2 or the recommended structure o the NJRCB and Figure ES-3

or the NJRCB Sub-Commission structure and operation).


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xviii Report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission

Figure ES-2 NJRCB Overall Structure

Figure ES-3 NJRCB Sub-Commission Structure and Operation

STRATEGIC

NTJRCB Chairperson, 4 Commissioners2 Civil Society representatives (ex officio)Advisory Board Civil Society Forum

OPERATIONAL

NTJRCBExecutive Office

(Secretariat)

Sub-Commissionon Historical Memory (in the Bangsamoro)

Sub-Commissionagainst Impunity, for the

Promotion of Accountability,and Rule of Law

(in the Bangsamoro)

Sub-Commission on LandDispossession (in the

Bangsamoro)

Sub-Commission onHealing and Reconciliation

(in the Bangsamoro)

NTJRCB Sub-Commission:- Commissioner as convener- Technical experts- Support staff provided bySecretariat

Ad Hoc Working Group includinginstitutions and actors, relevant

to specific issues(cooperation regulated by a MOU)


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4. Te NJRCB shall consist o seven persons, five o whom are voting members,appointed by the President: the Chairperson and the our Commissioners,who are responsible or convening the Sub-Commissions. wo representatives oBangsamoro civil society are members o the NJCRB with a status o ex officio,nonvoting members.

5. All o the members o the NJRCB shall be o Philippine nationality. Te Chairpersonand at least two o the our voting members o the NJRCB shall be a Philippinenational o Bangsamoro ancestry. At least one o the nonvoting civil societyrepresentatives shall be a Philippine national o Bangsamoro ancestry.

B. o the President, to call upon civil society organizations to create a Civil SocietyForum or ransitional Justice and Reconciliation in the Bangsamoro. Teobjective o the Civil Society Forum is to monitor and support the implementationo the NJRCB mandate with a view to enhancing the satisaction o victimsand strengthening the guarantee o non-recurrence. he Civil Society Forumshall recommend a list o five names, rom among which the President willchoose two representatives to serve as nonvoting members o the NJRCB.

C. o the President, to authorize the NJRCB to create an Advisory Board, composedo eminent national (and, i deemed useul, international) persons with provenexpertise in the ield o ‘dealing with the past’ and reconciliation. heobject ive o the Advisory Board is to provide advice to the NJCRB andsupport to the overall process o transitional justice, healing, and reconciliation.

he JRC strongly recommends that decisions be taken as soon as possible. With or without aBangsamoro Basic Law, a solid, consistent ‘dealing with the past’ strategy shall be implemented in an

incremental manner with a view to addressing the deepest pains and hurts o the Bangsamoro peopleand o Filipino society at large. he JRC regards this as necessary to prevent a resurgence o armed conlict and to provideconditions or a durable peace.

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 10 February 2016


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xx Report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission

An old rundown school at Maguindanao turnedinto an evacuation site or more than 200 reugees.(© Leonard Reyes)


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Recognition is due to both the Government o thePhilippines (GPH) and to the Moro Islamic LiberationFront (MILF) or their commitment to the peace processduring 17 years o protracted negotiations. As a resulto their engagement, they were able to sign the Frame-work Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) on October

15, 2012 as well as the Comprehensive Agreement on theBangsamoro (CAB) on March 27, 2014, which includesthe Normalization Annex (signed on 25 January 2014)that provided or the creation o the ransitional Justiceand Reconciliation Commission (JRC). Te decision tocreate an independent body to study and ormulaterecommendations on issues related to transitional just ice and reconciliation as a central element o thenormalization process is one o the innovations o theBangsamoro peace process. he negotiators are to becommended or their oresight and appreciation o the urgent

need to address the painul legacy o the violence and theroot causes o the conflict, in order to ensure a successultransition to peace and the rule o law in the utureBangsamoro region.

Indeed, the issue o transitional justice and reconciliationin other peace processes has oten been treated as anaferthought, introduced to the postconflict agenda onlyat the instigation o the international community and civilsociety. Tis has certainly been the case in peace negotiationsin the past that have involved mainly, i not exclusively,the armed protagonists and have proceeded withoutconsulting representatives o the victims and communitiesaected by conlict and without the participation orelevant civil society organizations. In recent years,progress has been made in the design o more inclusivepeace processes. In Colombia, or example, victimassociations have been given a voice in the negotiations.In South Sudan and in Mali, however, affected communitieshave still been largely lef aside. As a result, the transitional justice mechanisms established in such contexts ail to

benefit rom the advantages o impartial and consultativeprocesses, which are vital to building trust and reconciliationin ragmented societies.

Tus, the GPH and MILF Panels can be said to have seta new standard by including the establishment o theJRC as an integral provision o the peace agreement.As such, it signals a consensus among the parties to theconlict to address by peaceul means what they agree to

INTRODUCTION

Te negotiators are to be commended fortheir foresight and appreciation of theurgent need to address the painful legacyof the violence and the root causes of theconflict, in order to ensure a successful

transition to peace and the rule of law inthe future Bangsamoro region.


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be some o the most contentious issues ueling the conflict: legitimate grievances o the Bangsamoropeople, historical injustice, human rights violations, and marginalization through landdispossession. As a consequence, the JRC has received a clear mandate to examine theseissues and to make concrete recommendations regarding how they should be addressed.

Operationally, the JRC opted or a problem-solving approach that combined a broad-based processo ‘listening’ at the community level with an expert review o relevant academic literature and fieldstudies, as well as with a series o key policy interviews. In total, more than one hundred persons—women

and men—rom the Bangsamoro region and the national level actively engaged with the JRCas acilitators, experts, or key inormants in its consultation process. he proile o those whocollaborated with the JRC includes peacebuilding, conlict transormation, and human rightspractitioners, community and religious leaders, academics and experts in Mindanao and Bangsamorostudies, public servants, and representatives o the security and private sectors.

his elaborate process o consultation shaped the JRC’s understanding o the social, cultural,political, economic, and historical actors that gave rise to the conlict and have sustainedit over decades. Moreover, it provided insight into the clan structure, institutional architecture,and means o governance in the Philippines and in the Bangsamoro. Additionally, the JRC developed

its own conceptual ramework and analysis that inormed its understanding o the results o theconsultation process and crated its recommendations accordingly, so that they would be at oncerealistic, easible, sustainable, and—not the least—meaningul to the Bangsamoro people, toother aected communities in Mindanao, and to Philippine society at large.

he work o the JRC was guided by several key principles that were practiced and respectedin the course o carrying out its mandate: building local and national ownership, developing aFilipino and Bangsamoro approach to transitional justice and reconciliation, being sensitive to genderand culture, contributing to the process o conflict transormation and trust building, and keeping pacewith the ongoing peace process.

Human Rights Workshop, May 2015


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It is important to note that other initiatives that could be associated with the universe o transitional justice have been previously attempted in the Philippines. hese could be relevant to the pursuito transitional justice in the Bangsamoro in the same manner that the way in which the past is dealtwith in the Bangsamoro context could contribute to the country’s capacity to provide justice, healing,and reconciliation.

For the JRC, the our issues o its mandate are interrelated and intertwined: he Bangsamoronarrative o historical injustice rames their experience o legitimate grievances, particularlyin relation to their social, political, and economic marginalization through land dispossession andtheir sense o victimhood in the ace o widespread human rights violations committed against them.Moreover, the JRC came to the conclusion that these issues have arisen as the consequence o threeinterlocking phenomena—violence, impunity, and neglect—that, in turn, are rooted in the imposition o amonolithic Filipino identity and Philippine State by orce on multiple ethnic groups in Mindanao andin the Sulu archipelago that saw themselves as already preexisting nations and nation-states.

At this juncture in the peace process, it is important to emphasize that initiatives in transitional justiceand reconciliation are not only crucial to the uture o the affected communities in the Bangsamoro,

but to Philippine society at large as well. By addressing these sensitive issues in a constructive manner,the Philippine government can indeed contribute to a sustainable peace based on the rule olaw. Although the two parties signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) andthe Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), at the time o the completion o theJRC report, the Sixteenth Philippine Congress had not yet ended its deliberations on the proposedBangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) that would provide the necessary political and institutional rameworkto implement the agreements. In the meantime, the situation on the ground remains volatile. Otherarmed actors continue to be active in Bangsamoro areas, and many communities in the region stilllack access to basic services.

Tis report is based on the findings o the JRC’s in-depth and broad-based consultations. It is alsothe product o the deliberations o the Commission itsel, an independent body composed o anequal number o Philippine Government and MILF delegates and two international (Swiss)experts who came to common conclusions. he JRC assumes shared responsibility or theanalysis o the findings as well as or the recommendations contained in this report.

Te report itsel is structured as ollows:

Chapter 1 Te ransitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission: Its Mandate, Composition,

and Consultation Process Methodology. Tis chapter discusses the JRC mandate, conceptual ap-

proach, and consultation process.

Chapter 2 Results o the JRC Consultation Process: Main Findings. Te key issues and chal-lenges that emerged rom the consultation process on the our areas o the JRC mandate are summa-rized in this chapter, including how gender is implicated in legitimate grievances, historical injustice,human rights violations, and marginalization through land dispossession in the Bangsamoro.


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Chapter 3 Violence, Impunity, and Neglect: he Imposition o a Monolithic FilipinoIdentity and Philippine State. In this chapter, the JRC analyzes the main indings o theconsultation process in light o the overriding themes o violence, impunity, and neglect,and their root causes in the imposition by orce o a monolithic Fi lipin o identity andPhilippine State on the Bangsamoro.

Chapter 4 Recommendations. Te conclusions drawn rom the main findings and their analysisorm the basis o the JRC’s proposals or addressing the our issues o its mandate with a view topromoting lasting reconciliation. It suggests a holistic approach to dealing with the past thatshall be undertaken by the national and Bangsamoro authorities in cooperation with civilsociety. he recommendations ocus on the creation o a National ransitional Justiceand Reconciliation Commission on the Bangsamoro (NJRCB).1 Te JRC has ormulated themandate o the Commission, keeping in mind the legacy o many other transitional justice andreconciliation initiatives in the world.

In accordance with its mandate and in ulillment o its terms o reerence, the JRC submitsthis report to the GPH and the MILF Peace Panels or their consideration and action.


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The Transitional

Justice andReconciliationCommission:Its Mandate,Composition,and ConsultationProcessMethodology

CHAPTER 1


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1.1 Te JRC Mandate

Te ransitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (JRC) was officially launched in Kuala Lumpuron September 27, 2014. As ormulated in its erms o Reerence2 and with reerence to the FrameworkAgreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) on the legitimate grievances o the Bangsamoro, theJRC is mandated to undertake a study and to recommend to the Panels the appropriate

mechanisms with regard to the ollowing:

• To address legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people; • To correct historical injustices; • To address human rights violations; • To address marginalization through land dispossession.

In addition, the JRC is requested to recommend programs and measures to promote the reconciliation othe different communities that have been affected by the conflict.

Within its mandate, the JRC can a lso recommend immediate interventions in support oreconciliation and t he healing o the physical, mental, and spiritual wounds o the conlict.In this regard, the JRC did undertake confidential initiatives, which were reported to the Panels. Telatter are not part o this report.

1.2. Te Composition o the JRC

Te JRC is composed o the ollowing members:

Chair: Ms. Mô Bleeker, Special Envoy, Swiss Federal Department o Foreign AffairsGPH Delegate: Atty. Cecilia Jimenez- Damary

MILF Delegate: Atty. Ishak MasturaGPH Alternate Delegate: Atty. Mohammad Al-amin JulkipliMILF Alternate Delegate: Atty. Abdul Rashid KalimSenior Adviser: Mr. Jonathan Sisson, Swiss Federal Department o Foreign AffairsSenior Gender Adviser: Dr. Ma. Lourdes Veneracion-Rallonza

Office staff based in Manila and in Cotabato City support the JRC.

1.3 Te Methodology o the JRC

As a means o implementing its mandate, the JRC designed a complex consultation process thatincluded academic research, expert and community consultations, and key policy interviews indierent phases and in parallel with one another. he design o the consultation process wasinormed throughout by a gender approach. In addition, the JRC developed its own website andscheduled meetings with different governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders associated with thepeace process, as well as with concerned members o the international community.3 Te Chair regularlyinormed the Panels o the progress o the JRC.


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1.3.1 Te JRC Consultation Process

Te main constituent elements o the JRC consultation process are described in able 1 below.

TJRC facilitator teams conducted consultations in 211

local communities affected by the conflict in the Bangsamoro

region. During the consultations, the facilitators elicited the

opinion of the community members concerning the four

issues of the TJRC mandate and inquired about how theybelieved the issues should be addressed.

TJRCListening Process

Some three dozen national experts, a majority of whomare Mindanao-based, worked in four separate study

groups to compile, assess, and summarize existing

research related to the four outstanding issues of the

TJRC mandate with a view to identifying the main findings

and potential gaps in existing research and in the

implementation of recommendations.

TJRCStudy Groups

An analysis was undertaken by the TJRC Senior Adviser

of what has been done and with which results in the field

of transitional justice in the Philippines. A separate studyconducted by the Swiss Peace Foundation as part of the

DwP Assessment was devoted to a mapping of archives

documenting human rights violations. Both studies focused

on the resources available and the challenges to be faced

when engaging in process of ‘dealing with the past’ in the

Bangsamoro.

Dealing withthe Past

Assessment (DwP)

The TJRC conducted lengthy interviews with more than adozen policy makers in different fields to hear their views

on the issues of the TJRC mandate and to gain theirassessment of the recommendations proposed to address

those issues.

Key PolicyInterviews

able 1. JRC Consultation Process


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In all, the JRC sought and listened to the opinions o more than 3,000 individuals: men and womenrom rural arming and fishing communities, MILF and MNLF combatants and their wives, Muslimand Christian clerics as well as traditional spiritual leaders, business and legal proessionals, governmentoicials, teachers and health providers, and members o the Philippine security sector such as themilitary and the police.

In the course o the consultation process, the JRC reviewed numerous academic studies and agencyreports publi shed on the ‘Moro issue’, including ear ly newspaper ar ticles and other s ourcesreporting on the conlict. Moreover, the JRC sought the opinion o those widelyre co g ni ze d as knowledgeable about the situation in Mindanao and, as a consequence, heldin-depth conversations with many public servants and distinguished members o civil society,including the business sector.

Figure 1. Locations where the JRC Listening Process took place (Data indicated are approximations)


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A broad-based Listening Process was conducted in communities located in Basilan, Central Mindanao,Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, SoCSarGen (South Cotobato, Sarangani, and General Santos City),Sulu, awi-awi, and Zamboanga Peninsula. Listening Process acilitators also visited communities oindigenous peoples in Central Mindanao and in the MILF camps (Figure 1 shows where the JRCListening Process took place). O the total number o participants in the Listening Process coming romMuslim, indigenous, and Christian communities , 68 percent were men whereas 32 percent were

women. he participants, many o whom reside in conflict-affected areas, represented a broad rangeo perspectives rom rural and urban backgrounds. Te Listening Process also engaged with memberso the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), but was not able to involve representatives oBangsamoro expatriate communities.


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Te JRC is neither a ‘truth commission’ nor an ad hoc official act-finding body; it is an independentcommission mandated to make a report and propose holistic measures to deal with the legacy o thepast. Nevertheless, in the course o its consultation process, the JRC received solid, concreteinormation about events, which can be categorized as serious violations o international humanrights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL). Some o this inormation is based onsurvivor testimony; other inormation is stored in archives and reers to atrocities that were committed

several decades ago. In some cases, the testimonies described violent incidents that remain unknown tothe public to this day. he majority o witness statements and records are backed up by previousreports, but some o them would require urther investigation or conirmation. he JRC shalladdress this issue in connection with its recommendations.

For the purpose o this report, however, the JRC decided that the testimonies given and the inormationgathered would not be evaluated according to judicial standards. Rather, it would suice i theinormation and testimonies were coherent with acknowledged literature and research on thesubject matter. In particular, the JRC paid attention that the statements associated with the ListeningProcess cited in its report are typical o the sentiment expressed by persons in different communities

in different regions o Mindanao (Figure 2 shows a Listening Process in Bongao, awi-awi).4

Figure 2. JRC Listening Process in Bongao, awi-awi (30 March 2015)


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1.3.2 Developing a Context-Specific Approach to ransitional Justice and Reconciliation

ransitional justice is a political and legal concept that needs to be adapted to, appropriated by, andeventually transormed in accordance with the cultural patterns and socio-economic structures o eachcontext in which it is practiced. Te JRC developed its own conceptual approach to transitional justiceand arrived at a ramework with its own vocabulary and cultural reerences, including attention to andpractice o gender sensitivity, which the JRC believes measures up to international standards and yet isclose to the heart and the reality o the Bangsamoro people.

Te JRC bases its approach on the principles against impunity, which were developed in the 1990s atthe United Nations (UN) Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion o Human Rights andnow enjoy the status o emerging customary law.5 It also takes into account norms and standardsin the ield o transitional justice, as elaborated in other UN reports and resolutions.6 Moreover, theJRC approach takes into consideration the ramework o international human rights and humanitarianlaw and addresses root causes o the Bangsamoro conflict.

he JRC used the Swiss Dealing with the Past (DwP) ramework based on the ‘Joinet/Orentlicher’principles against impunity as a conceptual scheme that is both practice- and process-oriented andincludes conflict transormation as an important element.7 Te our key principles that constitute the

ramework complement one another thematically and practically: the Right to Know, the Right toJustice, the Right to Reparation, and Guarantees o Non-Recurrence. he ramework, as such, oers aconstructive manner to deal with past wrongdoings, while supporting and strengthening the peaceand conlict transormation process. Significantly, the ramework suggests that some orm o ‘dealingwith the past’ on a societal level is a prerequisite or reconciliation.

Te principles against impunity acknowledge and define the rights o victims to claim and the obligationo the State to provide remedies or serious violations o IHRL and IHL.


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aken together, the principles against impunity orm the components o a holistic strategy to addressgrievances and past abuses. Moreover, the JRC sees a potential ramework or dialogue and trustbuilding between State institutions and disaected sectors o society through the acknowledgmento the rights o victims to assert and o the obligation o the State to provide remedies.

Te JRC preers to use the expression ‘dealing with the past’ rather than ‘transitional justice’ becauseit is convinced that dealing with a legacy o violent conlict is not only—or even primarily—thethe task o legal proessionals. On the contrary, just as a majority o the population inthe Bangsamoro has been aected by the conlict in some orm, so also everyone should be ableto contribute in some way to the process o reconciliation. In this sense, ‘dealing with the past’ is both atop-down and a bottom-up process. Nevertheless, both terms, ‘dealing with the past’ and ‘transitional justice’ will be used interchangeably in this report.8

ransitional justice is not new to the Philippines; yet the country has not been successul in addressingthe many orms o injustice stemming rom impunity and other actors, nor has it been able to achievereconciliation.9 For example, in the area o truth seeking, there have been a number o ormal commissionso inquiry that were established to investigate specific events and wrongdoings. An inamous exampleare the two act-finding commissions set up by President Marcos to investigate the assassination o Senator

Benigno Aquino, Jr. in 1983.10

wo mechanisms were also initiated by President Corazon Aquinowith a broader mandate to address the corruption and human rights violations that marked the Marcosdictatorship: the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)11 and the PresidentialCommittee on Human Rights (PCHR).12 More recently, President Benigno S. Aquino III, on his part,attempted to set up a truth commission to investigate corruption under the previous administrationo President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.13 While the PCHR was superseded in 1987 by the Commission onHuman Rights, the PCGG continues to operate, but has had limited success in recovering ill-gottenassets and ighting corruption. he Philippine ruth Commission o 2010, on the other hand,was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.14 In the ield o reparations, Republic Act(RA) 10368, known as the “Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act o 2013,”


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established the Human Rights Victims Claims Board (HRVCB) to provide compensation and recognition tothe victims o human rights violations during the Marcos dictatorship.15 As o 30 May 2015, the closuredate or filing claims, the HRVCB had received some 73,000 submissions, a significant number o whichrom claimants residing in Mindanao.16 Due to the limited scope o the time rame cited in its mandate,the Claims Board cannot provide compensation or conflict-related human rights violations that tookplace beore or afer the Marcos period.

aking note o such examples, it is important to draw lessons rom the experience o transitional justicein the Philippines, as this has bearings on any uture transitional justice initiatives in the Bangsamoro.One such lesson is that the lack o a holistic, comprehensive approach has limited the effectiveness othe individual mechanisms established, which oten have an ad hoc character or are created withoutthe support o complementary initiatives. In the atermath o the Mamasapano incident o January25, 2014, or example, at least eight different act-finding investigations were undertaken, each o whichconducted its own analysis o the event and produced its own set o recommendations. Likewise, the lacko an official truth-seeking body set up to examine the scope and nature o the human rights violations thatoccurred during the Marcos era and to determine the number and identity o the victims has severelyhampered the effectiveness o the HRVCB. Another important lesson concerns the acknowledgment oresponsibility or wrongdoings committed by the State, which calls not only or some orm o individualor collective reparation, but also or concrete measures to prevent the recurrence o such violations.Indeed, oten enough, individual measures are not enough in themselves; signiicant change in theprevailing political, social, and economic structures and institutional culture is required as a preventive courseo action. Tese lessons—also supported by international experience—cannot be overemphasized. Given theless than desirable perormance o past transitional justice measures, the country needs to improve itscapacity to deal with the past. In this regard, the report o the JRC and its recommendations withrespect to ‘dealing with the past’ in the Bangsamoro should be seen as an opportunity.


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1.4 Dealing with the Past and the Management o Diversity

Te tragic Mamasapano incident and other violent events in the Bangsamoro region have triggeredstrong emotional reactions in the public sphere. hese reactions reveal a deep division inPhilippine society rooted in historical prejudice and mistrust among dierent ethnic and

religious communities and exacerbated by the ailure o the modern State to manage diversityconstructively. he persistence o prejudice and mistrust is evident in the proound ignoranceon the part o the majority population o the lie and reality o the Bangsamoro and indigenouspeoples and reflects an intolerance based on a rejection o ethno-religious differences. Forty years oarmed conflict have only deepened the divisions on all sides. Unortunately, despite its recent efforts tohighlight the peace process, government policy has not been able to address this ‘us versus them’mentality effectively.

Te JRC notes with great preoccupation that there seems to be a deep indifference in Philippinesociety at large as to the situation o victims suering the eects o protracted war, social andeconomic exclusion, and political marginalization in the Bangsamoro. Recent events and public

posturing have considerably added to the complexity o the ongoing peace process and contributed tothe current impasse in Congress concerning the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) bills.17

he passage into law o a BBL bill is a prerequisite or the creation o a new political entity in theBangsamoro. Notwithstanding the current status o the proposed BBL legislation, ‘dealing withthe past’ is, in any case, a joint endeavor, a shared task between the national and Bangsamoro authoritiesand institutions together with the Bangsamoro people. It will require the capacity to constructivelymanage ethno-religious diversity. his a challenge, but also an opportunity, which, i successul,augurs well not only or the Bangsamoro, but also or the inherently diverse nature o Philippinesociety. Te recommendations o the JRC are thus addressed to both the national government and tothe Bangsamoro authorities and institutions.


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Results of theTJRCConsultationProcess:Main Findings

CHAPTER 2


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From the outset, the JRC regarded as its irst priority clariying the issues o its mandate—not simply on a theoretical or abstract level, but concretely with a view to understandingwhat the issues o legitimate grievances, historical injustice, human rights, and marginalization throughland dispossession might mean to aected communities. In this way, the JRC hoped to developconceptual and analytical handles that would enable it to crat a strategy or transitional justice

and reconciliation that would have meaning or the Bangsamoro people and to the country at large.As a result, the JRC devised and put into practice a complex consultation process that produceda wealth o inormation and insights, which in turn provided the basis or the evidence-inormedanalysis that guided the JRC in ormulating its recommendations.

In this chapter, the JRC will present its main findings in the sequence in which the issues are named inits mandate, namely legitimate grievances o the Bangsamoro people, historical injustices, human rights violations, and marginalization through land dispossession. Although the presentation o thefindings occurs topic by topic, the JRC emphasizes that in practical terms the issues ofen overlap andintertwine thematically and historically.

Notwithstanding the intensive data collection process that the JRC undertook, the Commission doesnot claim to deliver inormation in its indings that is undamentally new or that wouldcontradict or even dier signiicantly rom earlier studies and reports. Nor, or that matter, canthe Commission claim that its findings are particularly wide-reaching or proound, given the limitedtime rame and resources with which it operated. Yet, it does claim to have conducted an extensivecommunity-based ‘listening process’ during which, as community members themselves expressedit, they were asked their opinion on these matters or the first time. In sum, the JRC does believe that the combination o a ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approachundertaken during its consultation process produced results that represent a broad consensus in the

Bangsamoro. In this regard, it claims a high degree o credibility and legitimacy or the indingspresented below.

2.1 Legitimate Grievances o the Bangsamoro

2.1.1 Defining Legitimate Grievances

In ormulating the mandate o the JRC, the PeacePanels identiied the ‘legitimate grievances o theBangsamoro people’ as one o the key outstanding

iss ues and placed it irst among the matters to beaddressed.

For the JRC Study Group on Legitimate Grievancesthe issue reers to “grievances that are rooted orgrounded on objective conditions and circumstances(i.e. objective grievances) like landlessness, povertyunemployment, widespread discrimination andabuses, ethnic dominance, inter-group hatredpolitical/economic exclusion or injustice.” 18

“We lost the opportunity to develop as

peoples; [this is] the reason why we arestill marginalized until now”

Listening Process participant, uburan,Basilan, 25 April 2015


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According to the JRC Listening Process Report, ‘grievance’ can be “an act creating an injustice,an unjust act that can cause resentment.”19 In its various Listening Process sessions, the JRCuncovered the meaning o ‘grievances’ as an expressed litany o wrongs, hurts, and harms thatcan be expressed as ‘hinanakit’ in agalog and ‘kaligutgot’ in Cebuano-Visaya; or the Maguindanao,it is akin to ‘lat a ginawa’ or a ‘broken sel,’ which is a consequence o the eeling o resentment or

pain towards others because o (harmul) actions they have done; while or the Maranao, it means‘sesekaten a kabnar’ or ‘claiming rights.’ In the case o indigenous peoples, the term is understoodas ‘ketete fedew’ or ‘bad eeling’ (eduray), ‘maktan kabilahi-an ni angan-angan’ or ‘legitimateaspiration that was negated through the commission o unjust acts against them’ (Sama), ‘peddiatey/sukkal pangateyan’ or ‘something hurtul done against one’s heart’ (Yakan), and ‘karukkaan sin pangatayan’ or ‘intense harm caused on one’s heart’ (ausug).20

hroughout the Listening Process sessions, respondents associated ‘legitimate grievances’with issues arising rom social exclusion, marginalization, and even violence as aconsequence o State policies, weak governance, non-recognition o distinctive identitiesand his tories, and religious intolerance.21

In relation to the Bangsamoro struggle, the term ‘legitimate grievances’ suraces as an issue tied to“government neglect and inaction in the ace o Moro protests and grievances,” which inturn is perceived to be one o the “oundational causes o the Moro problem.”22 In this regard,the JRC Study Group on Legitimate Grievances notes that the term gained conceptual currencyin the Bangsamoro peace process ollowing the response o the government o the UnitedStates (US) to a letter by Chairman Salamat Hashim, the late ounder o the MILF, addressedto President George W. Bush, which conceded that “the Muslims in Southern Philippineshave serious, legitimate grievances.”23 h i s a c k n o w l e d g m e n t c o m i n g r o m t h eUS Go ve r nm en t pa ve d the way to rame the redress o the ‘legitimate grievances othe Bangsamoro people’ as an integral part o the overall ramework or peace, namely in therecognition o the right to sel-determination.

In light o the discussions held during the Listening Process, the JRC has come to the conclusionthat grievances may be considered to be ‘legitimate’ when they are shared by a large number o thepopulation affected by the conflict. In this case, a joint legacy o painul experience unites them in acommon narrative vis-à-vis a State that is viewed as not having addressed their grievances or indeed ashaving ignored them.24

2.1.2 Link with the Struggle or Sel-Determination

hroughout the Consultation Process, the lack o recognition by the State o theBangsamoro as a people with their own distinct social and cultural heritage and,pol it ically an d historically, as an independent nation-state was cited as a legitimate grievance. At various stages in modern history, the lack o recognition o a separate Moro identity has led toattempts at assimilation o the Moros, including the cooption o their traditional political leaders.Nevertheless, the perception o Moro ‘otherness’ persists, both as internalized sel-awareness onthe part o the Moros themselves and as an imposed identity marker by the State and the majoritypopulation. ogether with the experience o discrimination, marginalization, and injustice, thelack o recognition o their autonomous existence as a people and a nation has ueled the struggle


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or Moro sel-determination.25

In this regard, the JRC observes that the logic o protracted armed conlict in the Bangsamorois based on an inherent contradiction in sel-understanding. On the one hand, the Bangsamororegard the armed rebellion as a struggle to restore their ‘stolen’ sovereignty, to uphold their dignityas a people, and to respond to what is perceived as the State’s disregard and neglect o the needso marginalized communities. On the other hand, the violence orchestrated by the State isunderstood as the legitimate use o orce against those that threaten its existence and security.his dichotomy is a reflection o the so-called ‘clash o imagined nations,’ whereby the Moro fight orthe Moro homeland and nationhood, while the Philippine government deends territorial integrityand national sovereignty.26

During the JRC Consultation Process, it became increasingly apparent that the political struggleo the MNLF and the MILF has come to represent the legitimate aspirations o the Bangsamoro inresponse to their grievances. Teir struggle builds its legitimacy on the separate and distinct historyo Moro ‘proto-states’ over centuries, particularly the Sultanate o Sulu and the Sultanate o

Maguindanao. As the late MILF ounder Hashim Salamat said in an interview:

Te main reason behind the struggle of the Bangsamoro Muslims is the illegal usurpation oftheir legitimate rights for freedom and self-determination. he Bangsamoro Muslimsare the native inhabitants of the islands of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, and Palawan. Teywere independent hundreds of years before the creation of the Philippines by Spain and theUSA, her colonial masters.27

Listening Process in Maguindanao


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In 2003, Orlando Cardinal Quevedo, Archbishop o Cotabato, acknowledged the link betweenthe Moro grievances and the Moro struggle or sel-determination when he stated: “It is on thebasis o the historical record that I come to the ollowing conclusion: or the Bangsamoro, the gradualloss o their sovereignty to the American government and later to th

report of the transitional justice and reconciliation commission

Documents