report on bail, self incrimination double jeopardy

8/10/2019 Report on bail, self incrimination double jeopardy

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Art. 3 Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be awitness against himself.

Based on common law and humanitarian andpractical considerations.

It is available not only in criminal prosecutions but

also in all other government proceedings, includingcivil actions and administrative or legislativeinvestigations.

Can be invoked by person accused of an offense andby any witness to whom an incriminating question is

addressed.

It refers therefore to the use of the mental processand the communicative faculties, and not merelyphysical properties.


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S OPE

As long the question will tend to incriminate, the witness.

The kernel of the right, it has been held, is against not all

compulsion but testimonial compulsion only.

A person can be compelled to submit to physical examination

to determine his involvement in the offense.

Applies to compulsion for the production of documents,

papers and chattels that may used as evidence against the

witness, except where the state has a right to inspect thesame.

Protects the accused against attempt to compel him to

furnish a specimen of his handwriting in connection with his

prosecution for falsification.


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When to avail?

Can only be invoke only when and as the

incriminating question is asked, since the witness

has no way of knowing in advance the nature or

effect of the question to be put to him, however this

is only true to ordinary witness.

In case of the accused himself is the witness, it is

settled that he can refuse at outset and altogether to

take the stand as a witness for the prosecution, on

the reasonable assumption that the purpose of his

interrogation will be to incriminate him.


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Waiver

Either by direct or by failure to invoke it, provided the waiver is

certain and unequivocal and intelligently, understandingly and

willingly made.

One who under a subpoena duces tecum voluntarily surrendersan incriminating paper which is put evidence against him.

the witness may be cross-examined and asked incriminating

questions on any matter he testified to on direct examination.


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U.S v. Tan Teng

Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old

girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it wasalleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on thefloor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later,Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomiotold her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police.

Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim

identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and wasexamined by a policeman. He was found to have thesame symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of thesubstance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it overto the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendantwas suffering from gonorrhea.

The lower court held that the results show that the disease that thevictim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such diseasewas transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter.The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissiblebecause it was taken in violation of his right against self-

incrimination.


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Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a

violation of the defendants rights against self-incrimination.

Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body

was not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to

make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance

was taken from his body without his objection and was examinedby competent medical authority.

The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a

prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort

communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body asevidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the

offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him

may be used as evidence against him.


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Beltran v. Samson

Facts: Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial Districtordered Francisco Beltran to appear before the Provincial Fiscal

of Isabela, Francisco Jose, to take dictations in his own

handwriting from the latter. The purpose for such was for the

fiscal to compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it is he

who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. Beltranfiled a petition for a writ of prohibition.

Issue: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for

the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determiningwhether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,

constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and

meaning of the constitutional provision


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Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders

desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to

take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter

for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the

hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because itrequires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar

writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine

whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal

clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is

similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. Wesay that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity

between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is

compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the

witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be

contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the

petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished.

Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it

should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens

of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or

specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no

reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution.


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CHAVEZ V. CA

Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor

vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). An information

was filed against the accused together with other accused, that theyconspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without the

consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle. All the accused plead not

guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger

Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed.

Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an

ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer

that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of

the fiscal.

Petitioner was convicted.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self

incrimination had been violated to warrant writ of HC?


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HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in fullbreach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that hehas waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his owndefense; he did not offer himself as a witness;

To place with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, makewaiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendantproved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we sayagain, is a rampart that gives protectioneven to the guilty

Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as anexceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrainedsuch as when the accuseds constitutional rights are disregarded. Such

defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidatesthe trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamentalright was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged bycollateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writmay issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of bythe defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before theCourt of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may begranted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs.Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberallygiven effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. Thepropriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation ofanother constitutional right, in this wise:


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A courts jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the

course of the proceedings due to failure to complete the court

as the Sixth Amendment requires by providing Counsel for an

accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has notintelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or

liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is

not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed.

The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without

jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtainrelease of habeas corpus.


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Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be

released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to

bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required

Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of

the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his

appearance before any court as required under the conditions

specified by the rule(Sec 1, rule 114).


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Purpose of bail:

To relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until hisconviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial (A lmeda v.

Villaluz, G.R. No. L-31665, August 6, 1975);

To honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven

beyond reasonable doubt;

To enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to

punishment prior to conviction.


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Conditions of the Bail:

The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless

cancelled, shall remain in force at all stages of the case until

promulgation of the judgment of the RTC, irrespective of whether

the case was originally filed in or appealed to it;

The accused shall appear before the proper courts whenever so

required by the court or these Rules; The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without

justification despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his

right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in

absent ia;

The bondsman shall surrender the accused to court for executionof the final judgment.


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Bail as a matter of right:

Before conviction by the inferior courts

After conviction by the inferior courts

Before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable bydeath, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment

Before conviction by the RTC when the imposable penalty is

death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment AND the evidenceof guilt is not strong.


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Bail is Discretionary:

Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by

death,reclusion perpetua

or life imprisonment, admission to bailis discretionary (Sec. 5);

After conviction by the RTC wherein a penalty of imprisonmentexceeding 6 but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one ofthe circumstances below is present and proved, bail is a matter ofdiscretion (Sec.5):

a. Recidivism, quasi-recidivism or habitual delinquency orcommission of crime aggravated by the circumstances ofreiteration;

b. Previous escape from legalconfinement, evasion ofsentence or violation of the conditions of bail without valid

justification;

c. Commission of an offense while on probation, parole orunder conditional pardon;

d. Circumstance of the accused or his case indicates theprobability of flight if released on bail;


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Undue risk of commission of another crime by the accused duringpendency of appeal.

When bail will not be granted:

Before conviction by the RTC when accused is charged with anoffense punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment ordeath AND the evidence of guilt is strong (Sec. 7);

After conviction by the RTC when penalty imposed is death, lifeimprisonment or reclusion perpetua

After conviction by the RTC imposing a penalty of imprisonmentexceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years and any of thecircumstance enumerated above and other similar circumstance ispresent and proved, no bail shall be granted (Sec.5);

Judgment is final and executory UNLESS accused applied forprobation before commencing to serve sentence of penalty andoffense within purview of probation law (Sec. 24).

5. Court martial cases


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Factors to be considered in fixing the reasonable amountof bail: (NOTEXCLUSIVE)

1. Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

2. Nature and circumstances of the offense;

3. Penalty of the offense charged;

4. Character and reputation of the accused;5. Age and health of the accused;

6. Weight of evidence against the accused;

7. Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;

8. Forfeiture of other bail;

9. The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justicewhen arrested; and

10. Pendency of other cases when the accused is on bail.


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Bail is cancelled:

Upon application of the bondsmen with due notice to the

prosecutor, upon surrender of the accused or proof of his

death;

Upon acquittal of the accused;

Upon dismissal of the case; or

Execution of judgment of conviction.


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Paderanga v. CA

FACTS: Miguel P. Paderanga was included in an amended information forthe crime of multiple murder as the mastermind.

Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Admission of Bailbefore a Warrant of Arrest could be issued by the lower court. Copies ofthe motion were furnished to the State Prosecutor, the RegionalProsecutors office and the Private Prosecutor.

The lower court proceeded to hear the application for bail, four of thepetitioners counsels appeared before the court but only Erlindo Abejo,the Assistant Prosecutor of the Regional State Prosecutions Officeappeared.

Paderanga was unable to appear for the hearing due to an ailment thatneeded medical attention. His counsel manifested that they weresubmitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapterpresident of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes

of said hearing, he considered being in the custody of the law.Prosecutor Abejo, in accordance to the stand of the Regional Stateprosecutor informed the court that the prosecution was neithersupporting nor opposing the application for bail, and that they weresubmitting the same to the sound discretion of the court. He also waivedthe presentation of evidence in the prosecutions behalf, leading to the

grant of bail with P200,000.00 as bail bond.


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Later, a motion for reconsideration was filed by Henrick Guingoyon,

the State Prosecutor, who alleged that he received his copy of the

petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing but his

motion was denied. With this, he elevated the matter to the Court of

Appeals through the special civil action of certiorari.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that Paderanga was granted bail

when was not in the custody of the law, thus not eligible for the grant

of the petition. Then, it annulled the order granting Paderanga bail.

The latter challenged the judgment of the Appellate court, hence the

case at bar.

ISSUE:Whether or not Paderangaspetition for bail is admissible?

Held: YES. An arrest of the second kind exists, that is by submission

to the custody of the person making the arrest. It is enough that the

person, although not physically restrained, has surrendered himself

to the jurisdiction of the court. Other procedures in this case are

followed.


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In the case, it may be conceded that Paderanga had indeed filed his

motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically

placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual

ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and

legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstancewhich attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court,

for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have

voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and,

necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter

granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actualrestraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody

of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified

by the so-called house arrest or, in case of military offenders, by

being confined to quarters or restricted to the military camp area.


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PEOPLE V. DONATO

Facts: Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for

rebellion. He was charged together with the spouses Concepcion.

Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the Writof Habeas Corpus. A conference was held thereafter to hear each

partys side. It was later agreed upon by both parties that Salas will

withdraw his petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and that he will

remain in custody for the continued investigation of the case and

that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of theparties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But

later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato

approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother

hearing the side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that

Salas is estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to

bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of

agreement that he will be held in custody.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.


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HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he

withdrew his petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in

custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right to

bail is not tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by his act ofwithdrawing his petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.


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GELACIO V. FLORES

FACTS: Juana Marzan-Gelacio filed two counts of rape againstEmmanuel Artajos before RTC, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein

the respondent Judge Alipio Flores is the presider of the sala.After going over the records of the case and the recommendation of the1stAssistant Provincial Prosecutor Redentor Cardenas, the Judgeconcluded that the evidence of guilt was weak but made a finding ofprobable cause. Consequently he issued warrants of arrest with arecommendation of P200,000.00 bail bond in both cases.

Gelacio through her private prosecutor filed an urgent motion to denybail. On a later date, the accuseds counsel filed a petition to reducebail bond to P100,000.00 for each case.

After a series of exchange motions by the counsels of Gelacio andArtajos, and the Judges recalls of his previous orders, the Judgeordered the grant of the Motion to reduce bail by the accused.

Gelacio through her counsel filed an Administrative Complaint againstthe Judge for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Evident Partiality forgranting the bail without any hearing.

ISSUE:Whether or not a Judge can grant an accuseds petition for bail

without a hearing.


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HELD: No. A judge cannot grant a petition for bail without a trial.

The procedural necessity of a hearing relative to the grant of bailcannot be dispensed with especially in this case where the accusedis charged with a capital offense. Utmost diligence is required of trial

judges in granting bail especially in cases where bail is not a matterof right. Certain procedures must be followed in order that theaccused would be present during trial. As a responsible judge,respondent must not be swayed by the mere representations of theparties; instead, he should look into the real and hard facts of thecase.

To do away with the requisite bail hearing especially in those caseswhere the applicant is charged with a capital offense is to dispensewith this time-tested safeguard against arbitrariness. It must alwaysbe remembered that imperative justice requires the properobservance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to

ensure it proper dispensation. In this regard, it needs be stressedthat the grant or the denial of bail in capital offenses hinges on theissue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strongand the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is amatter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge.


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PEOPLE VS JUDGE CABRAL

Facts: Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape

upon the complaint of Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporaryliberty, accused-respondent filed a motion praying that he will be

released on bail which petitioner opposed by presenting real,

documentary and testimonial evidence. The lower court, however,

granted the motion for bail in an order. The prosecution appealed to

the court of Appeals, but the CA denied the motion for recall orreconsideration for lack of merit.

Issue: whether or not the granting of bail is valid.

Held: No, the SC ruled that the judge exercised grave abuse of

discretion in granting the petition for bail.


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There are two corollary reasons for the summary. First, the summary

of the evidence in the order is an extension of the hearing proper,

thus, a part of procedural due process wherein the evidence

presented during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having

been presented and most importantly, considered. The failure toinclude every piece of evidence in the summary presented by the

prosecution in their favor during the prior hearing would be

tantamount to not giving them the opportunity to be heard in said

hearing, for the inference would be that they were not considered at

all in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of dueprocess, for due process means not only giving every contending

party the opportunity to be heard but also for the Court to consider

every piece of evidence presented in their favor. Second, the

summary of the evidence in the order is the basis for the judges

exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing the pieces ofevidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his

own conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the

accused is strong based on his discretion.


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Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should

necessarily be a complete compilation or restatement of all the

pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper. The lower

court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of

evidence should be included in the summary. While conceding thatsome prosecution evidence were enumerated, said enumeration was

incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of

pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be

considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable

recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution. A summarythat is incomplete is not a summary at all. According to Borin aga v.

Tamin, the absence of a summary in the order would make said

order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an order

containing an incomplete summary would likewise be defective in

form and substance which cannot be sustained or be given a

semblance of validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang,said order was

considered defective and voidable. As such, the order granting or

denying the application for bail may be invalidated.


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Jeopardy is the peril in which a person is put when he is regularly

charged with a crime before a tribunal properly organized andcompetent to try him.

Double Jeopardy means that when a person is charged with an

offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or

conviction or in any other manner without the express consent of

the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or

identical offense.


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Kinds of Double Jeopardy:

No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the SAME OFFENSE.

The same offense; or

An attempt to commit the said offense;

A frustration of the said offense; or

Any offense which necessarily includes the first offense

charged.

Any offense which necessarily included the first offensecharged.

When an act punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or

acquittal under either shall be a bar to another prosecution for the

SAME ACT.(Sec. 21, A rt. III, 1987 Cons titu tion)


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Requisites for Double Jeopardy:

A previous case must be filed and must contain the following:

The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in

form and substance to sustain a conviction and

the competent courthad jurisdiction;

The accused had been arraigned and the accused had entered a valid

plea; and

There was a final judgment of conviction or acquitted or the case was

dismissed without his express consent;


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Tests for determining whether the two offenses are identical:

There is IDENTITY between two offenses when the second offense:

Is exactly the same as the first;

Is an attempt to or frustration of the first;

Is necessarily included in the first; or

Necessarily includes the first and is necessarily included in the

offense charged in the first information.

D t i f S i E t


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Doctrine of Supervening Event

The accused may be prosecuted for another offense if a

subsequent development changes the character of the first

indictment under which he may be already been charge or

convicted.

The graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising

from the same act or omission constituting the former charge;

The facts constituting the graver charge became known orwere discovered only after a plea was entered in the former

complaint or information;

The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the

consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party; except

when the offended party failed to appear during thearraignment.

INSEPERABILITY OF OFFENSES


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INSEPERABILITY OF OFFENSES

where one offense is inseparable from another and

proceeds from the same act, they cannot be thesubject of separate prosecutions.

report on bail, self incrimination double jeopardy

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