report on operation veritable, 08 february - 10 march 1945, part 1

8/22/2019 Report on Operation Veritable, 08 February - 10 March 1945, Part 1

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&-1 333K

R E S T R I C T E D

PR'EORT ON OPERATIO\T 1 'VERITABLE"8 Pebruar -, 10 . 'rch 1.945

CONT_... ._ _LA-l-ULJL.

PART ONE INTRODUCTIONSection 1 Situation on the Western Front

l ' Topographyit73 hEnoemy Defe nces

i4 Enemy Order of Battle5.' Troops Available

PART TWO ADgMIISTRATION -..AY LEVELSection 6 - Concentrat-on

ii 7 .ommunicat ions8 Maintenance and Build Up

PART THEREE OIJTLINE PLANSection 9 P lan for 30 Corps attack

i?-. '- 'i A, A i 1 -,,-? .

it.

?

IvI

111 213

AirEn.gineers.-r.oaLffic Control

Paras

I - 1213 - 1920 - 2829 - 35

36

37 - 3839 - 4344 - 48

49 - 5253 - 5556 - 57

5859 - 62

PART FOUIR .NAPMJATIVE .Section

f

it

tt

Vt

141516171819

t 20PART FIVE CONCLUSION

Section 21

Phases ofPhase 1.Phase 2.Pha se, 3.Phase 4.Phase 5.Phase 6.

the Operat ion."8 - 13 Peb14 - 17 Fob18 - 22 Feb23 - 26 Fob26 FPeb - 3 MTar4 1-0 Mar

o /PART SIX

63649097

105115124

- 89-96- 104-. 11 4- 12 3- 138

139 - 141

"IN\-- 6I 0 Am 19 "I

0 O ,I


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- ii -

COMENTS AND POINTS OF INTERESTSection 22 Infantry

;. 23 Armour 'and Special Equipments-2- 24>Artillery..2".? 25 'Royal Engineers2 2'6 Smoke -

27 Air Support28 Royal Corps of Signals

"n 29 Camouflage

\lt .30 .Miscellaneous

Paras

142 - 147148 - 151152 174175 - 178179 - 181182 - 194195 - 197198 - 214215 - 216

'A' Extracts from 30 Corps Operation Instruction No.47-'B t Observations ...on. Forest Fighting writh pa"'ticulaLreference to the REICHSWALD.'C' Town Clearing,'D' RA Order of Battle.'E' RA Dumping Programmxne,T'P Activities of 1 'Canadian Rocket Battery duringOperat ions ;VERITABLE and. BLOCKBUSTER.

1/250 000 Showing British and American Sectorsof 'Operation.1/100,000 Showing British Sector of Operations.

Concentration Areas and Communications..Enemy Dispositions.Original Objectives and Boundaries.Artillery Deployment .Areas and Tasks.Flooding.

5

PART SIX

APPEINDIX

MA4 I

S 2

DIAGRAM I

i_

1


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F-1 S 333& -DISTRIBUTION LIST

21 ARff GROUP REPORT ON OPERATION "VERITABLE".

Theo Under S.ecretary of State,The War Office

O0I (Recordas)MIT 16 (2 copies)07 (2 copies)MT (L ((50 copies) for distribution to ;-

Tho Under Secretary of Statc, The AdmiiraltyThe Under Secretary of State, The Air MinistryThe Supreme Allied Commander, oediterranoan Theatre. (3)The Corixander-in-Chief, Middle EastThe Comnander-in-Ohief, Allied Land Forces, South East Asi a (3)The Suprome Conmlander, South-East Asia Corlmand. (3)His Excellency, The Comaiander-in-Chief, India (3).The Australian Agrmy Reprosontative, Australia House (3)British Axmy Staff, tashington- (3)3 British Inf antry Division (4)79 Annourod Division (4)I Corimiando BrigadeThe Coramandants :--

Staff College, Camberley (2)Staff College, Haifa (2)Staff College, Quotta (2)School of Artillery, LarkhillSchool of SignalsSchool of InfcantrySchool of Military EngineeringSchool of Air Support

Off icesof the W"ar Cabinet, Historical SectionHistorical Section, Second Amuy, Co-wloy Barracks, Oxford


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.U S Theatre Historian, US-ET (2).'GALA Documents Section (3)Canadian Military Headquarters (5)Combined Operations HeadquartersSecretaiiat, Mvain Heoadquart'ers, Control CoLmirssion for GM1ANY (BE)British Air Forces of Occupation (o(GBMIANTh) (2)Canadian Forces NETHER~UIDS (17) copies fo r distribution to :-

2 Canadian Infantry Division (4)3 Canadi~an Infantry Division (Canada) (3)4 Canadian Armoured Division ;(4)

I Corps District (5)8 Corps District (5)30 Corps District (5)Guards Division (4)3 Canadiwi Infantry Division (CF) (31 Axnnoured Division (4)15 (S) Infantry Division (4)43 Infantry Division (4)51 (H) Infantry Division (4)52 (L) Infantry Division (4)53 (r) Infantry Division (4)6 Guards Brigade8 Amioured Brigade34 Armouroed Brigade115 Infantry BrigadeBACR Training CentreCopies to . BA:R

JiA to C-in-C: PA to G of S: G(Ops)(Trg & Inf)GSI : G(SD) : G(T) & O : PA to HA : A *Q : A/QHistorical (2) : RAC : RA: E SX: ST : WTSFF

G(Ops) Recora.s,Oct 45 . HQ British Lmnry of the Rhine.

/PID


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PART VI - OP-ERATIOONS Sheet -342 21 lr ou-ru: Op .;raticn ERITVLI, ! _ Clearin the Area betweenthe RHIIE' arnd the, MS 8 Feb - lO Mar 5,

(a) C- rments andl Points of Interest ;(i) In VERITAIBLEI thu Inf had the advanta-e cf very powerful support fromtioe -roundc and tho air, but in theo last analysis, the operation was largely

an Inf battle, In. spite of our ahr suplrermacy, and supericrity in artillcoy,arnr-ur cand sspbcial equip-ecnts, tho tenacity cf the onemoy Land the difficultiescf the terrain recquired that in thu end the battle should be fougILt (outbetween the 'pCo-sing Inf, frequently relying- on their own weaplons.

(ii) This was yarticularly true bf the firhtinv in the wocded areas ancthe t1owns. Of te u clearinp? cf the REICITSWALD' a battalion coci o-nderc expressd.lthe genreral viewr when he said tIt was Sprandau versus Bren the whole waythrcuh ". Here, too) there were severa.l instcnces of the cnermy not being;-prepared't. stand 'when cur en cone in with the baycnct. In generalp, abattalion aci'vanccl on a narrvw front with on e ccmpany up.

(iii) In ealinv yith towns, ne :f thCe p-rinciples wvas to pass c(amj niesin to selected objectives, 1which were held as compiany defensive positionsuntil dayli) ht. It was quite impossibllo t- attemp.t any clearing operationsat night an ' :-.cro often thlan not the co-pany axis cculd not be keit openJust bufore daylirht, tan ks were br ught up and op-poesition which had benintense lurino the hours of darkness quicklTy cllalsed. (Add'iti-nal n teson T(wn Clearing fo ll w this report),

(iv) The question f night r lay atta wsas h(tly debated by battali nc(TU nders. An exalin tion (-f results seer t(. sh-ow tht where the enemywas discr a nised r surprised, a daylig ht attack, delivered prefurably frcma flank; was cf ten successful. Against a well-preparod enemy, a night attackwith c-.reful preparation and lim ted bjectives aj -ears to have 1been the r refavoured rnd least cCstly nethcc.

(v) The cature .f GENMEP furnishes an example oe f a successful;attackby day; the daylight assault a-ainst the stpron- ly held losition aroundSIEBENGBIWALP on 21 Feb failed, but was successful six days later by a nig htattack ocn a different axis,

(vi) Cooper tion with ther aris and frr t-tions as a result of cour 'roat"teari spirit" has re- ched a hig4h standalrd.*~ ~~~~~p t *( .mos

(vii) The In f ku-t clo se up to the artillery barrage and concentratiens,tho: air freo nently enr aged targe-ts less than 300 yards ahead of our frwarc/troops. It is realisedr by the Inf that the risk of casualties frc(m our ownguns -nd aircralft must be accel ted if the, followe-up is to be -losenoughto succeed),. The . rlo cngationcof thlre artillery I-r cgramme tc c ver thedigging; nd rec rg nisatien, in cc bination with intense cocunter-batteryand counter-mcrtar activity, ag f in proved f great value.(viii) It -as emphasised th -t ihen one fcrmation is about to lass throughano th'er, wihenever possible the frmer sh:l- se lnd uj, -its own patrols well

C1ahead s( tht they Ir.y ive a fresh impetus tc patrol activity and getquickly in the picture. It is mocre tha-n likely thot the formrti(n to berelieved has just had a )eriod f heavy fighting nd atrollingwill hovebeen d; e by tired men.

(ix) The a dvunt cf theo Ar cured Personnel Carrier (KANGAROO) has ivenliadded strength to the Inf. It gives 1rotection against shell andl mcrtar-

f re in the early stages (f the advance, when slcdiers on foot are hi '-hlyvulnerabtle, where conditions are suitable it can pass in f thrcug-h the ecnemyFDLs and deliver themri at svall loss as far back even a(s the ,-un a.reas,

(x) It has been said thot since th e substi tution cf tho mu!sket f rthe cross-baow, thure has been no developi-ent in Inf equipm:ent which iscom+para;ble to the arrival of the KAYNGAROO.

(b) Obscrvcns on Fcrest1....46


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Sheo t -24.(b) Observations on Forest Fi.hting with particulrr reference to ,the REIHSWALD .

Intr oductioni() The fo cllow.ing notes Cre roduced as a result of conversations withCor,-la.ilndCers anmd Staff Officers within 158 Inf Brigt:adeC c f 53(W) Inf Dtv,This Brigade fbught its way alimost entirely thro ugh the REICHSWALD Forest -frc the NW to the SE corners,

(ii) The, REICHSWATLD Forest is mainly coniferous with an inner belt cfdeciduous rgrcwth.arsge patches have been cut' clear with little cr noatten:mpt at repla-nting These arpas are covered with low scrub~ Visibilityvaries frcro- a few yards to two. to three hundred in the cleared areas, Beinga State forest it is intersected systematically in rectanUges by numeroustracks and rid-s. These, being cut straight, gave visibility in r:any casesup t, several hunred yards. Mapy reading was complicated by the fact thatmany tracks shown id not exist or were overgrrcwn, new ones had been Ceveloped,and many cf the clearings had 1.een extended or new ones cut. There are twomain concrete two-way roads through the Forept from NORTH to SOUTH, fromCLEVE and FRASS~LT, converging at HEKKENS. There are none frcm WEST to , EAST,The various tra.cks, were one way Cnly, unmetalled and became a good foet ormore of heavy mud after -the p:anssage of a few vehicles.Cormunications

~iii) a, This Iresents i.rcbably the gLreatest difficulty to be evercomeb( th on the brigtde an t battalion:, levels, and to a very large extent controlstactics iarticularly within thel battclion. (See paragraph (.)a, below).This Brigade found it essential, in order addquately to control its Jattalions,to establlish its HQ nc t mcru than 2,000 yards behind the leading b. ttalion.,At this ran Gc the rwireless sts worked well.

b. Battalions found: the No.18 sot unsatisfactCry in this type ofcountry and'regrded themsd rorsent bn idedheys a worked, bu t did nolrely on them in their 2ignal plC ns (Casualties, within Battalion Signal Sectionshad been heavy during the ARD3ENNES fighting a few', weeksearlier and re-infercements were not by any-means fully trained. This must be tCken intoconsideration therefore in assessingt the mrite.its of these sets).c. The sare remarks as in b, above applied to the 36 Set, Inparticular it wa~s fCund.- in this op:eration in the Forest, that coop)er- tion,with the ttanks -ey tis r: ns did no-t wc rk .d. Within Battalions cal.le and runner, backed by a l iberal useof fficerrs as Liaison Officers, Iroved the only really reliable rer:- s of

coemnunication+Tracks nd icT

(iv) a. Forost tracks, in any weather conditions, will deteriorateralpidly. In bad weatther, such as existed Quring this op.ration, they willd isintegrate after the pssage of only a few wheeled vehicles and completelyafter even one heavy tronk has run over them. , This factor makes it essentialthat staffs Imust give an early decision on the use Cf certain tracks forwheels and thers fs trackled vehicles t It is a most 0difficul,t ,decisionto mcake as ground reconnaissance is essential. .This can cnly hbe done by thefo,:rward tro cps as they"dvance nd th e tactical situaticn may well irm:osea comprlete reversal of decisions and plans' already issued, In this operationtoe Brigade, very wisely s it turned cut, bann- all wheeled vehicl s ce .tjeeps. Battalion F echelons were entirely tracked using the carriers withinthe Battatlicns, ap was also the imr rcvised Brigade HC. The latter con-verted a half track as .af.rr of rC ther inadec:uate Commrnd Vehicle.

ib. :Labour- fo r track maintenance is an acute :rcoblem, It cannotusually, be so'lved- within a Brigade when every man is required cr hisrimary busness f fihtin. oyal Einer resources nt very far.Careful planning cn the, hig hest lQevel is thoref cre essontial ,/ c. Within B{3ttalions....


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Sheet -25-.c. - ?ithin Battalions the NITO's reconnaissance larty should always

be rig ht fr rward', Lbhind the leading comla.ny, in this type cof c operatieon Astho a.dvance centinues it is then in a position to recGnnOiTte the tracks,and all necessary, diversions, and to taie anad sigh the whole route. Once.an objective is captured the necessary vehicles cacn then be 'brc-u.ht fcrwar -without delay .nd without fear -f blccking the route .

d. WEBASELS prcoved invaluable bu t all cc ncerned- stress the necessiTvfcr prcerly tra inod and permanent drivers. The Inf carrier driver canncotget the 1best use out c.f these highly specialised vehicles after a short fewdays course and he does net take the same interest in a vehicle whtic heknows is only on loan for a short period,

o, LTOYD Carriers were successful in getting forward the anti tankC;uns in this oper. tion. This was 'e almost entirely t, the very carefulroute reconnaissance carrie(d ou t by .the' MTOs reconnaissan.ce parties. Incert ain cases se ocial diversions were taped for those vehicles alone.Maca REoadin 9 Diroction Findin; anMd. esa Writinr,(v) .,a, It was anticipated tha.t Map Reading would be a difficult probleriand probably further cmrplicated by certain inevitable recent changes in theForest due to fresh areas being cut, new tracks made t( these areas etc, Tosimplify this matter certain precautions were insisted upon before 'theeCt:oration started,

" i, Br-gade HQ issued a trace of the f crest, on a wideo dis-tribution, erbodying a vyry large .number of code names, For instance everysin!e ofcPrwrrod. track w'as given a name and every single lateral track a' number.AlT clearings shcown on the nap an any other features on the map were alsonhmed, -

ii.i Battalions advanced on compass bearings, whether by dightor day, and they r aaintained regular navigating irties throuchout includingpace checkers and thle use5 cf white tap;e knotted ,every 100 yards.'b. On acccunt cf the aobve, precautions all movement &tcrked

smorthly antdl direction was accurately maintained.- Message writing provedextremely simple Cnd. the inevitable delays produced by the use cf iAP4Y -and SLIDEX were almost entirely elminoated, Any vaCriations between grcundan rmap were quickly spotted, and there wore any' -Tactics

(vi) a. Experience ained by -this rigade in the ARDENYlES, f.ollowedby special training lp)rior tc this REICHS1 4LD Forest opjeration, pr ved thecabsclute essenti'al f a Battalion advancing on a'single axas, in other wordsone corptany up. Tc attempt a wider front in forest fighting leads not onlyto loss Cf c(ontrol by the Battalion Commander but robably t( the ctualloss, maybe fo r several hcurs, of sub-units and of vehicles. In forestfighting, it is probably :pore necess ry fo r a Battalion comn:ander tc have afirm, cntrol cf his sub-units than in any cthor tyIe. (f operation, :ireless,within the Battalion, cannot be relied upon in this sort ( f country. Cableor runners must use existing-, tracks. If-frequent laterals do not exist, aBattaliion Commander, if he has decl:-yed( on two axes mrust stay back at sometrack junction until another lateral h1as been cle-ared If-heces this htends t becrme out of touch with his battle., By fi, hting on one axis onlyone rain cable has tc b. laid, runners c-n quickly function without fearof being lcst, the Battalion Co.mander can him.self b right fcrward an 1 hehas his sub;-units under his hand. 4 \ -

b. Flank iprtection t. the main'axis is a difficult problem, Whenfighting thrcugh a fcrest tc reach definite' objectives, as op1osecl to clering ,certain risks must be accepted. If a Battalicn Commander feels uneasyabc ut a flank, the best method tc deal .witht ha, p.rovedo to be tc detailone cc:omp-:any teo rovicde a series' cf flank picquets on the NW Fr,.ntier ]:rinciil-,These are seldom more than one hundred yards from the main axis,

/ c, Operating on the, . 9.


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Sheet -2.c. Operating- on the -ne axis bounf',s :iiven tc the loading ccmrl-any

are strictly limited andi are usually at mc st some four to five hundred yards.Leap fr ggint the next ccorpany throu-h is then adccpted. In this way theBattalion Com ander.'retains a t ight hold on his fighting sub-units,

d. Loading comr] an$es usually move two platoons up, one on eachsid(e of the axis. Those pla.,teens are deplp(yed cn a very narrow frcnt,i.rocbably no t exceeding fifty to sixty yarcs, the whole again beingrestricted in crder tc make crto in e-f control.

e. There is a. de(finite dangaer from .enemy striking at the tailcf a Battalion n one. axis if this tail becomes tooc long. In an advanceto seize definito objectives, as was the case in the RICHSWALD Forest,enemiy will certa-inly be left unrmopped-up con either flank. He will tak.eevery c:;lpocrtunity tc attack the tail of a unit, cr attack the unit from theflank cr rear when its objective has be;en seized Every effort raust e rmadetherefcre to prevent the Bata.lion straggling (ut alon[ the axis, all-rcundwatch r:ut be raintained throughcut, c dc all-round defence once th e objectiveis reached must be stressed to an even greKater degree than ncormrally. Theendeavour shoul l.be tc have as ti(-ht a forri tion as vpossiblo when moving andscolid, comlpact delfensive layout when halted.

f; It is essential tO keeo the enemy on' the movre, nd ccntact onceCgainced J:.u.st not be lost. If he has a chance tc stabilize himse lf he willbe a ll the ocre difficult to ,dig cut. As, in fcrest fighting,- artillerysupp)ocrt can seldom be used, this becomes all th e mc re important. Toeffect this a Battalion Commander imst Ie well fc rward in order tc leap froghis companies withcut delay, Risks must be taken in this respect even tothe extent of l ushint through the next company before the first is finallycc nsolidated.;We aLons

(vii) a. All sections were made up tc two Stens for, this noeration,They proved invaluablet; . The 3-inch mortar was largely man-carried on accocunt 'of oe

indifferent tracks. During the advance the artillery cc.kld give littlerno sujocrt sc that the mrrtar, especially fcr smoke, ircved its vailue manytimes.

c. The enemy cpp siti'cn ence untered usually consisted cof somefcrty tc fifty Tnf suppcrte; ' by one or more SP guns sited tc shoct 'vown thetracks4 The Hun showed a definite respect for the PIAT, A hit on an SPgun usually d.amaged it, but, even if it did not it seldom stayed in thatposition to receive a second shot, The FsIAT, in one Battalion anywvayare fought in pairs r threes. One sheoots and the second observes thestrike .ant if necespa ry sencds in the seo;nd round. This saves any time lagwhils t th e first weap cn is beiing reloadced. Thie c .rriage of ar:mmnition pro-sents a definite problem on a long advance [uch as during this operation.Twelve bomtbs per company was fCund. tc be all ti at could be taken, PsIATwere also effectively used as mortars in some instances. "

d. The Hun still will not face a determined man with the la1yonet,On c ie occasion an SP gun supported by a comany of 'Infantry was holding upthe advance across a .clearing in the Forest. Th , enery were some twohundred ya:rds away, maybe a little me,e. After all ordinary nethods to shifthim had failed, the -com;panycoicmander coheerned led his whole company in abayonet charge across the open g The eney id n t wait fr it toarrive and a PIAT finished off the SP gun. There were five casualtiesonly tc cur o(wn troopsb

.e. One Battalion improcysed a further rifle platoon which wasplaced un(n.er the Ca rrier Platoon Corcmmnder, the whole acting as a yery

useful two plattoon fire company. . (-The carriers themselves being used inthe operation as F echelon tr'nspocrt veh icls). This ir:mrovisation waspossible as the Battalion was well u: tc strength with reinforcements.NCOs and men were withdrawn from ,Rifle Companies to f:rm it, and' the necessary weapons were found from the WA.SP Section cf the Carrier Platoon,

/ f. Artillery could,.....


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Sheet -27-f. ...Artillery c.ul seldoLr support the avance cw ing t lack fobservation 'and darci-ner t cour ovwn'trcoops. Only when the situation stabilisedon any particular objective was suppoert possibl an. it then prc vd in-

vllutahle for h(cld.ing or breaking up enDey counter-attacks.T. 'he Inf were sup, orted by tanks throu; hout. The (!ifficulty ofmlanoeuvre in face c~f SP g:uns sited tc fire cdown the tracks an(d the pre;senc,:-cf some ninos, inevit bly cause casualties to tanks. But, particulrly inview f the lack of pcssible artillery supplc.rt, the presence of tanks isconsI eoredc f great value. The rorale effect cn (u r own Inf canno t Te overestimated and fcr this reason tank casualties should be accoptoe.Conunincations b(etween tanLk a Intf still reemasns a problom In thisc er. tion the 3(- eo t C1did not wo.rkl A system of VCrey l ight signals requiresconsiderable ipepoaraticn and tying{ up sc that it is ensured that tank crowsare on the lock cu t for. then. Any such systen-, howoevcr, lakes changes ofplan ,difficult tc imprc visoc rap dly, No. 26 Yellow snoke gcnerat:.rs wereused extensively in this operation tc stop taenk fire when necessary. Inone Battalion all non in all secticns carried on c f these generatcrs,

h. Searchligfhts prov.ed f real value in this Forest fightin'.In spite of thet tht lfhts were no t in direct sup rt (f this Briadethere was no unreasonable delay in passing: demands. Messai es were acted onusually in a i,r( xirmately half an hcur,dlnlnistration .(viii) a., Prior to the coceration it was fully ap preciAted tha n rn alsup ly during the advance thrcui h the forest could not be expected. Inconsequence 24 hours raticn packs and self heatinl soup were issued and carried

in Battalions F echelon transport. This precaution prove itself for it was-the conly fo,: mrany cf the trc,ops had fir' ver twc .ays. Everyone concernedhad ni thirn, but p)raise for the 24 .hours ratio:,n pack and even molre particularlyfcr the self heating socups which were cf inestima le valuo in the co-ntinucus..wet weather I All wished the issue could have been biggr or.

be The water rrobler was also a very real one since there couldbe nc po ssilility (f bringing forward unit water carts (-r trilers. Arrange-wents were rade -within he Division for all forward trcoos to carry oneadcditional vwater bottle 'per an eitr on the persen or in Battalion F ochelntransport. This was done by "borrowing" water bttloes fron the men Cf' th eLAW Reo inient an cther Div Troc ps. This .arrangement rpoved an unrualifiodsuccess ,C nclusi on

(ix) a-. There is not the slig htest :'cubl t bu t that this Bri4gade learntmnany invalual'elc lessons fro( their fighting, munder th e worst pssibleconditions of snow anld ice, in th e LRDENh$ES. These lessons were ranmred hone,practised( nd perfected durincg the training period nricr t( the operationin the REICHISWALD? The great success achieved during this latter cperaticnproves hew sound thel training was. There was adequate ti.e also, apart fromtraining, tc s:tudy and plan in considerable detail far this operatic n.Clcth mcdel rehearsals were carried cut at all levels, and, as alwayss.roved their value when the opeloration begcarn.b. There is little thrat is really now in the various pointsdiscussed above, It is merely a reiteration cf lessons learned in the pastbut s. often f(rgottqn. Many (of he r ints are very : incr crnes but it is due

tc the attention ofl such detail that success is Swon.(c) lown Clearing

Those notes are written on the experiences c f a Battalion whichhas taken part in clearing, wo large towns, GENLJP and GOCH against adetermined anrd org nised enemy,. One town had beeon heavily bombedL, ut theothor had nct civilians had been ev. cuatecd from both. The lesscns learntshow that the p:rinciples as laid dcwn in Inf Trainingl Part VIII are soundas far as they go./ (i) Plannm


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Sheet "-28-(i) Planning

a, More than in any other operation, very careful an. detailedplanninlg is necessary befcre launchinrg any unit or sub-unit into a defendedtown. Large scale rial;s, enlar/-ed air ph(ctograihs and articularly lowobliques, are necessary sc as tc deternmine the key buildin{-s upn whichit is likely the enemy will base his Cefence. He dces nct holdc every h-rusecr factcry ULit thcse freov. here he can obtain a .ccd field cf fire andL.articularly those fron where he can stol. any encircling movor.ement t his rear

b. The i'deal is for each section to be able t see exactly whichbuildinmas it is tc clear L-ofre crcssing the start line,(ii) PrincElos

a^ It is essential that each sub-unit starts from a very firm base,has a sm:~all ccr pact objective, usually a l"key" buildin, of which theConmjander has m..de a pecrscnal visual reconnaissance before startingg.b. Witlhin the rifle cc r;cny, it ha s been prov(ed that it is unwiseto have more than one sub-unit .crking at one time and th-t the Comiander cfthe succeoed.ingc unit or suL-unit must i:e right f crwarC.d ith the attackingC ommrander t(. see the results rand carry cu t his cwn reccnnaissanceo Asalways too, a reserve must be kolet tc deal with tho unexlj ectcd Tcsts whichsuddenly cc me to life.c. The n aise and echoes cf street clearing are dsisconcerting a-ndmen must always be c n the "qui vive" tc try and locate the eneny - the nestdifficult factcr of all. It is essenti al tlcat the.y fight lightly clad andwithout th e small pack and ick and shovel, which catch in window frames,collar Coors, etc. A rifle and bayonet, the Bren, a l iberal sup.ly cf

grenades, stout hearts and a very high standard cf leadership are all thatis requireO. The degre of contrcol thact leadrs rmust keep in thesec eorations frust be great. Individuals and Sections must be kep tc theirobjectives and not 'allowed t, chase th e odd German,Wd It has indLee-od len learnt by bitter experience that town clearingis a tedious anda mrest 'tiring o. raticn which cannot Lobehrried.

(iii) Da , NiLYht '-It has beon proved that even in ccm:lete darkness Inf can seize alimited cbjective in a tmwn and completely clear that areo, , rcvided it iskept small. It is iperhaps the best way to get. a footing in a (defended area,tc rush it imrvaediately the artillery concentrations lift in the dlrknessand catch the enemy whilst he is still b'elow grun' . Large scaleclearing oprerrations are n( t I;ossible in the dark as it is impossible rnc t toby-pass enemy - a -principle - who crme tc life with daylight and causecdal:aago and confusion cut cf a ll p copo-rtion tc their numbers. Searchlig-htsare not af any groat assistance in a taWCn.

(iv) Suprting-;. Firea. Before zerc the -reatest wei ht cf artil lery' is required, bu t atzerc and afte- wards it shculd lift frcn the objectives tc the far outskirtscf the town, as it is disconcerting tc troC] s clecring tc hear explosionsin fro nt cf themr- it also drvcwns.the ncise (f snipers if fired in clnsesuppor{t,4 However well trained, in a street it is imp.ossiblo to say withaccuracy whvcse shell it was and th e effects of a 2$-pr on a hcuse is notsufficient t( warrant its use in the close sul.;o,,ort cf trc ps clearing a town.4.2-inch mortars, cn the ether hand, are valuable as the bcmbs reach thegroun flor they ,ecause ofhey,ecus f r danr area, naturally are best usedon the back end of the to-cwn.b. Fire and movcr-ement by the Inf remains as imcrtant as over, andthe 77 Gronade has p;roaved its great usefulness tc cover street crcssingss.

/ (v) To Baob r iLot t Bomb


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17/96

Sheet -29-(v) To Bcmb of net to Bomb

a. Frcm the Infantryman' s .oint cf vie:i, heavy bombinfg has everydisadvantage ndl. io adv-nta-ge, unless carriedc, t imr.imediately I-efcre hisassault. Then air -:hct(c g.raphs lose some of their value and the danger areaf -r heavy nbs -)recludeshle imme-Idiate rushinrg cf the objectives as the lastbomb fclls.. Craters and rubble ]reoclude thIe use cf tanks, CROCODILES crWASPS and( make the evacuation cf casualties even more l ifficult; it makes thedrill o-f clearin! thrc ugh the back gardens irl.racticaLle, and clearinghruses from the top, impossible.., It also makes the enemyts task of hid'inland ca couflaging himself many times easier; his snipers always i reclude theuse o f a bull


18/96


19/96

RESTRICTED, OPERATIONT'-:!:VERITABLE' t '.'CTCLEARING THE AREA BETWEEN- TEE RHI AE ANDEE MAAS

Reference 'Maps' 1/250 0000 N- -.UROPE, Sheet 3.NW EUROPE, Sheets 2A and 3A,- :GERNA1\, Sheets K,51 and K52.

PART OE INTRODUCT'ION

.SECTION 1 SITUATION ON 'THE WESTERN FRONT1 By, the -beginning of Dec: 44, the enemyi on the front of21 Army Group had been driven 'from th e WfEST bank of th eR MAAS as far SOUTH as MAESEYCK K 67. From- this point, ourline crossed -the river and ran roughly just NORTH of SITTARDK 66 to inclusive 'GEIIENKIRCHEN K i36 where it joined up withNinth US Army (Twelfth US Army Groupi.

In the CENTRE of the Western Front, Twelfth US ArmyGroup was making .progress towards securing a springboard for'a RHINE crossing, 'while far to the SOUTH, Sixth US Army Groupwas .pushing steadily into 'the SAAR,2. At this tirne, two: major operations were being preparedin the Brit sector. In the SOUTH, an operation by one ; >corps of Second' Brit-.Arjy was to clear the area between theroad GEILENKIRCHEN :- SITTARD and. the R: ROER. This wasknown as Operat ion'SHEARS (later changed to BLACKCOCK) andhad. target d-ate mid-Dec,

In the NORTH,; an operation was to be latmched by FirstCdn Army in a South-Easterly- direction 'from the NIJMEGEN area.This was known as -VERITABLE anLd was scheduled for early Jan.3. Both these operations had been studied by 30 Corps,Since the A:RHEo.l opera-tions of Sep -44; until relieved by 2

Cdn Corps in Nov, this Corps had been in ':the NIJlEGEN bridge-headL. It was then moved to the extreme RIGHT of the ArmyGroup front and carri6d out operations against GEILENKIRCHENwhlich was captured on -19 Nov.During early Dec the weather steadily deteriorated.Operation SHEARS was repeatedly postponed and was eventually'cancelled for the time-: be'ing,30 Corps was to'"open the at :ok from'NIJEGEN. On13 Dec, HQ 30 Corps was elieved. by 12 Corps, and moved toFirst -Cdn~ Army to plan in detaxi fo r VERITABLE. Arrange-

"monts were also put in- : hand for the-'transfer of 30 Corps'formations to the Cdn sec'tor trnd the programme provided forthe concenitration 'there' to 'be effect'ed betWeren 17 and 24 Dec.4. While- : those moves-were getting uder way, Von RUNDSTEDTlaunched:;. his ARDENNES 'offenSive on ;1 6'Dec against First USArmy. For some 48 hrs the situation on the American frontwas obscure and. iit was' appreciated at 21 Army -Group thatsteps -should be taken to forestall a possible enemy thrusttowards ANTTWEP ad;:.RUSSELS -Aceordingly, the plans toOve 30 'Corps' NORTH were.cancelled anda regrouping was putin hand which resulted in the dispositions of 30 Corps

. ./being as


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being as: follows by the night 21/22 DecHQ 30 Corps - ' :: HASSELT K 3653 (W) Inf- Div . - SE of BRUSSELSwith 33 Armd Bde under command on R DYLE51 (H) Inf Div - EAST of BRUSSELS

-inLOUVAIN area29 Armd Bde (who had been with- Between the DYLEdrawn from 11 Arrnmd Div to refit: . and the MEUSE in

*on L of C with' new tanks) area GEEMBLOUX J82Guards Armd Div - SE of TIRLEMONT

'- I K 0443 Inf Div with 34- Tankcommand....

Bde u'nder

6 Guards Tank Bde2 HCR (Armd Car Regt)

SAS' patrols

- -Area ASSELT'-SLAASTRICHT K 55 -

'TONGRES K 34.

Area BREE K 58 Or. :.0':'.. ,.'''TSEbetween NAMURand HUY

'On the MEUSEbetween NAiMURand DINANT

It was also apparent that -the German plan 'envisaged anattack on ANTVERP from the NORTH through BREDA D 93 withperhaps four divs. To counter .this possibil i ty, furtherregrouping took place in First Cdn Army itself.The ARDENNES battle was fought out with Ninth and FirstUS Armies, under operational control 21 Army Groups operating.on the NORTH of the German salient while Third 'US Army droveagainst it.from the SOUTH. 30 Corps crossed the M.EUSE toblock the Western end of the gap and came in on the RIGHi ofFirst US: Army, having crossed the L'of C of two. US armies to

do so, , 'As the Allied. counter-off ensive progressed, theopportunity was seized to mount .the original Operation SHEARS.This was now carried out by 12 Corps 'who re-named itBLACKCOCK. It started on 15 Jan, and in spite of conditions,of hard frosts, sudden thaws and thickt fog, was brought to asuccessful concLusion by- 26 Jan, -:The front was .extended upto the R' OER and the area gained, was subsequently takenover by Ninth US Army. :At th'e same. time, First Cdn Army resumed its arrange-

ments to mount Operation VERITABLE, the target date for whichwas finally fixed for 8 Foeb. 30 Corps had been graduallypinched out of the ARDEN.ES battle, and on 14 Jan, Corps HQproceeded to the vicinity of HQ First Cdn Army to pursue itsde.tailed planning During the latter half of Jan 'theformations of 30 Corps were in turn, moved tr Cdn Army.Von RUND'STEDT' s effort- had: failed. ': Although theA.llies had suffered heavy'.losses- in the ARDEMNES, all theenemy,.ha'd succeeded in doing was to retard our offensive for-one month.. ,In the middle of Dec the Germans had possessed

... /reserves in

6:.

7.

8!.


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-reserves in the form of 5 and 6 Pz Armies. At : the end ofJan~ the situation was that '5 Pz was endeavouring to recoverfrom the severe ,handling it had received in the ARDENNES.battle,. while 6 Pz .ha'd' .been 'switched. to .the Eastern Front tomeet the Russian offernsiv. Whhich had' opened on 12 Jan.

* -. . h . a.The Allies were now about to regain the initiative in*the WEST,. .Ninth US Army remained in 21 Army Group for thispurpose.

OBJECT OF :OPERATION VERITABLE9.. ' The operation was only one of a series de'signed to 'enable the Allies to break into GEPAINY. from the VWEST and todestroy the Gcrman armies opposing them.. Its particularobject was to destroy the enemy between the R IMAS and the* RHINE. and to break through in 'a Southerly .direction between

these two rivers.. Wh'n this was completed; 21 ..Army Groupwould be poised ready'-f or the. next phase, with..a frontformed along a length of the RHINE 'GROUPING

10.. . VERITABLE was: to .be carried :outy First Cdn Army,reinforced by 30 Brit Corpso Initially, First Cdn Army wasto attack on a one corps front' with 30 Brit Corps. Subse-'quently, 2 Cdn -Corps was to take over the LEFT sector from30 Brit Corps, and the attack was to continue on a two corpsfront, . 2 .Cdn Corps would continue to hold NIJMEGEN andthe bridgehead:.acros.s the R WAAL. I Brit Corps-on the LEFTwere to continue to hold their .125 mile front on the R MAASo

Fo -. ; : -,*. ...;11- . For the .opening or the attack, 30 Brit Corps wouldcomprise the biggest concentration.yet :ass.embled,.by 21 ArmyGroup -on the' Continent, namely -

Six inf divs -One .armd divThree independent armd bdesEleven regts of. 79 Airnd DLiv, .grouped underone bde .HQF ive AGsRATwo' /A bdes'

12". At the outset, Ninth US Army was to hold its front on.the R-. ROER from JULICH F 05 'to ROERVOID. K- 79. At a date tobe fixed- by .the Commander- in-Chief, itwould develop 'anoffensive across the ROER in conjunction with VERITABLE.Second Brit Army, in. the CENTRE,; were to hold the. WEST bankof .the AS from ROERMIOND to CUIJK E 74 and would operateon .the RIGHT of First Cdn. Army at a. later date.

. . .. .SECTION 2 TOPOGRAPHY "..- . . . r..

-13.". Befocore consider ing the nature of: the country in which.the operation was ,to take place, 'it is necessary to emphasisehow constricted were the approaches to the battle area.To reach the forward: assembly areas, all formationsexcept the. two Cdn in f divs, had to cross both the R MAAS

.. /and the


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and- the YAAS - WAAL Canal. Some had to pass through thebuilt-up area of NIJIMEGEN E 76,. and all had to wheel throughmore than 90 degrees to line-up opposite the enemy' s defens-ive positions. .

1,40 ,:... Two main topographical- regions are evident in the area-.SE of NIJEGEN:.:(a)(g ,The f'lood" plai.ns of .the. rivers RHINE MAAS' and NIERS.

Th? ' . .nhe . . . .'-(;ib).he undulating and wooded terrain between these floodplains. -.

15 - The; wide flood plain of- the PR1'IE has- had its river bed-'regularized into a single navigable -channel, but' obstaclesto movement. in the RHIIIE valley are .provided by abandoned-. hannels, marsh anmd backw'abers often w ith-a considerable--depth of water.

-.The .MAAS' pli-t al-sQ:contains, abandoned channels and a..wide. fldodabl'e zone..--- It is covered with ditches planted,with popliars and dottedtaw:ith co.mpact .villages- which are'.surrolndod by:orchards.: ' : ,

16. During tho'eperio. of high water in Decdcie to theexcessive rainfall, flooding was confined alimost.' entirely tothe river flood plains. Along the R[-.INE,- its greatestextentt ,was on both sides of the river near E-'EHRICH E 96'with:othorwise almos.t .continuous flooding up to the winterdykes f:rom /ESEL A 24 down to . NIJIVEGEN. --Along the ./-ASflooding extended up.,: t 1 OQ yds on both' si'des of the riverand was, retained chiefly ,by the. high ground. Along theNIERS the wa.ter covered; a narrow strip of meadowland. oneither sidoe of the .stream. With the drop in river levels,the' wiht-er flooding had r-cedod by the last week in Jan,and the rivers woere back'..to their regular channels, but the.whole. of the previously flooded area was saturated, with...heet water .in places.: There, are no outstanding view pointson the f:lood plains, but, the hig"er ground either side givessome observation, as also do church towers' and other highbuildings in the towns and villages. ' ':

17. Except for the two :large forest areas - the REICHSWALD.E 85 and the HOCHWAILD.A. - tha .. ountry between the' riverftlood pla-ins is one of low. gently' undulating plain. Itcontains a number of small. woods and is largely arable.The REICHSWALD. and, the HOCOCEIIDD and some of the woodsfurther SOUTH, are divided:up into,.blocks by rides, andoccasionally small farms are to be found along these rides.Some portions have been cleared and are now covered with low.scrub. A height of land in the .orm ..of the letter "J"extends from-CIEVE 8955. to the TNWorner of the REICHSWALD,and.'another .also follows the- line .of the HOC~HWALD andBALBERGER -forests. .

18. From NIJYJEGEN there is.. a .good road alQong the EA-ST bankof the MAAS through G-EN1MEIP 7746 to VENLO 9109. Anotherruns NORTH of the REICHSWALD. through CLEVE and XALTEN A 1141to the RUHR. Prom CLEVE' a first class road runs SOUTH,through GOCH:E '9145 to GEIDERP\T A 0225 and KREPELD A 10.

Through the REICHSVfALD.. itself run two asphalt roadsfrom:-the NORTHI which convdg(-ogie' at HEItEENS E 8348, while athird one from CLEVE joinis the HeKKENS GOCH highway atASPERDEN 8745 -.

. ". /19.


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- 519o A considerable amount of data was collected regardingthe effect on going conditions of severe frost or of arti-

ficial flooding .of the RHINE and MAAS valleys.It .was realised that any prolonged operation aftersevere frost was likely to -churn up even the. better sandy

:anxd gravelly soils which exist to a large extent in the areabetween the.t-wo rivers. Further, it was clear that theRHINE could: be artificially flooded by breaching the winterdyke- system, - Though complete breaching was consideredipractica-e, :breaching to . effect localized flooding was acomparativey 'easy -matter, In addition, it had to be bornein mind that the Americans might not be able to capture th e.ROER dams before they werc destroyed, and this might havefar-reaching effects,,

All 'these factors received careful consideration prior.to the operation, and the .:risks were accepted,

SECTION 3 EI\TI1YhE CES (DIAGRA 2)

20, The defensive system presented three main features

(a) . T e construction of three principal lines of defence,. namely th eBORWARD LineSIEGFRIED LineHOCHWALD "Layback"

(b) The apparent sub-division of the area enclosed. by the-principal lines of defence into self-contained deofen-s-ive boxes:.(c) The transformation of towns and villages -into strong.-

points.-Tho Forward Line

21. ' These were really strong outposts of the main SIEGFRIE:Ddefences~ and were manned in strength. They were organisedin two lines. In the :,first, depth from outposts to rearcompanies was about 2,,000 yds, and an average bn' ront was17500 yd's. The most weakly held sector was NORTH of theroad NIJ/MEGEN - CLEVE, and, he most strongly held, theKIEKBER.G woods 7451 and WYLER 7858.. . ..,-For the-second line, it was evident that rather lessthan one-third of. the inf strength was held back and wasmanning the line running from the R MAAS near GENINEP 7746along the' Western edge of the REICHSWALD and then to

KRANENBURG 8056. There was an anti-tank ditch coveringpart of- th e Western side of the REICHSWALD. Many' of theenemy positions were in. woods and houses. All roads runningat right angles to the front were' held in considaerable depthespecially the main roads WYLER 7858 - KRANENBURG and MOOK..7251 -'GENNEP - HEKKENS 8348 along which short stretches ofanti-tank' ditch, road blocks, anti-tank guns and diggingshad all been. observed.

.. /SIEGFRIED Line


24/96

SIEGFRIED- Line..22 . At its nearest point, this lay some 3 kilometres EASTof. the forward positions. Some of its works had been con-

structed- a number of years ago and. were no longer evident on~.air photos, but a good deal 'of digging had been done of recentmonths,.. The main belt. ran from .the NIJIVEGEN - CLEE road"-near.TUTHEES 8$255 -almost due SOUTH over the high ground in-the REICHSWAJ to th: vicinity ' of TEKKENS. Here it turnedESE and. then crosseda- the .R NIERS to the Western outskirts ofCTOCH, where ..it turned SOUTH again ;and 'continued roughlyalong: the. 89' Easting, covering the ~approaches to WEEZE 9337,KEW.,IAER 96352 and GEiDERN 0225E.;' - ; -

23, NORTH of the REICHSWAILD, between TUTHEES and CLEVE,there was a succession of Jrench syst(,-s stepped back through.NUTTERDEN.. 8456, DONSBRUGGEN 8657 and the high grotmd about3iATERBORN 8853. A continuous series of trenches had recent-ly been dug to connect the works at DONSBRUGGEN with theALTER RHINE near DUPFFE/IA/RD 8760, A further development inthe last two months had been a 'Line constructed along th e93 Easting between CLEVE, BEDBURG 9252 and GOCH, thus -makingthe REICHSWALD[: a: self -contained. centre of resistance.

Along the Eastern ': ank of the R MAAS there were contin-uous lines of trenches and weapon pits. -'2&L In: the NORTH' he positions werewe, covered by an anti-tank

ditch which ra n from the REICHSWALD near PRASSELT 8253 downto the railway line and then turned" towards KRANENBURG.From this point it turned lN-E and traversed the. flood plainbetween -.EMHR 8358. and NIEL 8160 and. continued to the ALTERRHINEc ". . .

- ':The're' w.ere furthel'- stretches in tshe HEKKENS neighbour-Shood, linking up the .foiest with the R NIERS. FromHONlERSUM 8243, stretches of ditch ran SE, following roughlythe direction of the German Dutch frontier.25. As much of the SIEGFRIED Line was now overgrown, theamount of concrete it containoed was problematical. All

available informat ion just prior' tp .'T.he operation, however,including that contained in a captured map, indicated thatthe- gr'eat majority of the concrete works were personnelshelters and no t fire positions, In. particular, it seemed un-likely that any concrete would be fou.- W-YEST of a lineNUTTERDEN - HEKKENS.HOCHWALD ,Layback"l

26. This was a recently constructed. defensive line situatedalong, the tundulating: groun.d rou-ghly 10 kilometres EAST of theREICHSWAlID. It ran from the LEFT- bank of the RHINE oppositeREES 0752 to just' EAST: of :Il(ElIMA:'0346' where it continuedSOUTH. past the Western Siode 'of the- HOCHWALD and BALBERGER. forests towards GE IDERN'':, ; ',' ''.~. " " l'".'...- :'. '.. .: o.-tw

-Its'main feature wa.s that it'. cons isteed of twvo, andsometimes three, lines of con-ti isou-srenches, between 600and 1 000-. .yds apart. '- Except ;wh6de it fringed the HOCRWIALD(presutmably- regarded in itself as a -satisfactory anti-tanki{obstacl:e),.--there was'.an an t i -tan.:ditOch between the trenches,and each trench line had an' a'imot u.-broken belt of wire infront of it. The sector between the RHINE and the HOCHWALD.had. a minebellt in front of 'theWestern line of wire,

. ./TIhe Doefensive "Boxes"tI 1:_ -


25/96

7-The Defensive "Boxes"

27. The effect of - recent defence work had been to convertthe layout into a "defer.ce net". The area was being splitup into a series of self-contained boxes enclosed by trencheswith stretches of anti-tank ditch or river. The followingare some which were- taking shape :-

KRAN1BUR -Y YLER -BRUK 7752B-RU K -KIEKBERG - MIDDELAAR 7448KPMANENB-URG SW corner of REICHSWALD - HEKKENSDONSBRUGGEN - TUTHEES HEKEENS - GRAFENTHAL 8746MIATERBORN - CrRAFENTHAL - PALSDORJ. 9146 -BEDBURG

Town and Village Strongpoints28. Fitting into the above system of boxes was the trans-

formation of towns and villages: into strongpoints, defendedby elaborate trenchworks and anti-tank ditches. Chief ofthese were CLEVE, GOCH,- WEEZE, KEVEIA.ER, DEI - 9842, andCALCAR A 0049-

SECTION 4- TDEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

29. th A review of the enemy situation on 3 Feb showed thatthe'.whole front of First. Cdn Army.was opposed by tps of Army.Group H under General .STtDfENTT. To' the NORTH,{ was Twenty-Fifth Army." SOUTH -and VEST 'of the RHINE along the IAS:was. First Para Army consa.sting of 84, 1i80, ':90 and 606 ZGVdivs,. .

The REICHSWAID sector, which may be taken to extendfrom the bend in the RHINE near ERLEKOM 7863 to MIDDELAAR,appeared. to be controlled by 184 Inf Div. This Div wascaught in the FALAISE' pocket and destroyed,' and was reformedin Sep 44 and identified at .MOOK on 21 ;Sep last. It nowconsisted-of two 'regts .each of two bns, and was thought toinclude Battle Group KATZININT of .-probably three bns, and alsotQ have under command 2 Para Regt (three bns) which ordinarilybeloonged to. 2- Para Div.

e. .. f. twoThere was evidence also, of two police bns in thesector, identified NORTH of the NIJIAEGEN - CLEVE road.It was estimated that there was a total of eight bnsmann i-ng the forward line of, adefences, with, five bns inreserve, or possibly in "lay-back"'. positions. '- They were

likely to be. up to strength. and despite Goerman: reverses onother fronts,' their morale-: was considered high.

Estimated locations of flank formations are shovwn onDiagram 2. -'30. Little was .known of th.e arty of 84 Div but the most

recent estimate gave 72 guns (exclud A)n the VERITABLEarea,'. and a furthor 24. guns NORTH of the R WAAL. IncludingHAA-, the maximum estimated number of guns capable of firingon the VERITABLE area was 114.

.../Even less


26/96

Even less was knowni about' the anti-tank layout in 84Div :'.'sector ', but such clues as .were available indicated thatthe D iv mighlt havean anti-t-ank ulit resembling that of aVoalksgrenadier Div'viz 9. ;v

Anti-tankd Coy- 9x 7.5 cm anti-tank gunsAssault Gun Bn 14 x 7.5 cm assault gunskAA Coy 9 x 30.7 cm AA guns'Ai report: had been received indicating that theremight be 'ome 21 ;.cmNebelwerfers in the .KPRAIEIlBURG area.

ENE.ff COM/,MMNICATIONS31 o The basic routes behind 84 Di" s area were the roadCLEN 1241h andhe railway CLEVE241 andthe railway E GOCH -XANTEN. Aiir recce had c&onfirmed t.he -iniportance of the road,

-and [had' disclosed trains -'t and near :GOCH- GOCH appeared'to.be 'a: ailhead, Whether CLEVE was also a railhead wasnot known, but the station the.re had. been heavily bombed.The most striking point about both road and rail routes istheir dependence on the bridges across the RHINE at WESEL.The only alternatives were near HOlMBERG- A 2918, some 15miles further SOUTH. Leading back from the P1ESEL bridgesare a main railway line and a main road, both to UNISTER.

32, PFer.ries on the RHINE between NIJMEG-EN and WI:ESEL hadnot shown themselves vce- .- active. Three ferry points were'clearl established - at ' EEMERI.COH (Class 50),. :at REES 0752(Class 50) where there was also some .pontoon bridgingequipment on the NORTH bank at the end ,of Dec and atXANTEN (Class 20.). I-n the event-of the VWESEL bridges beingcut, EL/LERICH' ferry would prove part'ilcularly valuable tothe tp s NORTH of the REICHSWALD, and the: XA.NTEN ferry shouldbe of help to the forces in t;he ICKTEEILAER area,' . . .EBEM RESE-1RVES

X, . : . -..- .- - - .33. .'' At .-h.e time- iiwhenlRITABLE .as. ea.Ut to open, the enemy'- had n.ine diavs holding.. 'he, 01 mile sec'-utor from NIJM-EGEN to

DDUREN P 14o., On theo,'otheer hand he aa:;ome 45 odd divsal6'ng 'the 50- mile. t.ret-ch from DUREN to , STRASBOURG. Inaddition 'to th[e crises -in the EAST which -had already drawnoff 6 Pz Army, the enemy-was apprehe.nsive of the inevitableassaultsr impending in the WEST. - Although the AWIEST Wall had.

-been' breached EAST of AiiCHEN, there was also the possibilityof an attack either fro VENLO or in -the REICHSWALD, and theneed to provide some stab-li ty to the attenuated lines in'Central HOLIAND, . '

s-osi rd. .34 ' I A shift. NORTiH was -considerce the most likely dev]e.op-.ment, .and th e following was estimated to be the maximumredinforcement of the 'ERITABLE aTea; This was based on

the assumption that there was already, or would be by D-Day,one 'lay-back:' div in th e GOCH area nd that the COLOGCNEfront was so quiet that the enemy could dare to risk rein-forcing from there :D lu g -.pus D plus D4 s7

"One. In f Div " One -,0 Assaul.t O-ne Pz 'Div( omplete) TwoInf DivsGun Bde '. '- On PC DCiv ( complete)Elemen ts CIA.- (o..neP-' and/or onePz Div

... /The above


27/96

The above. figures are additional, not cumulative.EVACUATION Or' CIViLIANS.

fRepbrts; were.-received .thEat Nby-eb LLIG.EN 8364,KdI'OMI 8.16:, -UT 7961. , :and .CIVE were coimpletely evacuatedsand '.that SIEBENGJALD:..8641 had'only one family and a fewsick left*. It was estimated that: t..there were not more than30 f'amilies 'left in the ar ea CLEVE . UDEM - GOCH and in theREICHSWALD

SECTION: 5 TROOPS AVAILABLE POI. VERITABIE'

F.'or the. opening .at-tack by 30.formations. were available: -Army Group ..Armd Divs -Army Troops

Corps, the 'following

ITnf Dlivs Armd 'Bdes

30 ArmId Bde(79 ;Armd Div)2 Cdn- AG-RA'

9 AGRA74 AAkBde106 AA Bde

Guards Armd Div 2:Cdn Inxf Div.:3 Cdn nf Div15 (iS) Inf Div43 Inf Div51 (H) In f Div53 (W) Inf Div

6 Guards ArmdBde (Type B)8 Armd Bde.(Type A)'4 Armd Bde

(Type B)

Second TAP, consis',ing of 2 Medium Group, and 83 and84 Tactical Grou.ps, were i.n suppQ'rt;

35.

36.o


28/96

- 10 -PJART TWO A.}/h-NISTtLTION:

ARRANGE1ENTS FOR- THE; /ASSEIVIBLY, OF THE- FORCE '. IBUILD UP :FOR ,TlHl OPIERA;TTON, 0N . . Ei A. [EL

'SECTION- ON N TION (DIAGM

37G HQ 30 Brit Corps;, uards Armd Div, 51 (H) Inf. Div and53 (W) Inf Div had all been engaged in the fighting in th eARDENNES in Jan. 43 Inf Div with two of the independentarmd bdes and some of the AGsRA, were involved in- the opera-tions round GEILENKIRCHEN- SITTARD at the end of the samemonth. It will readily.be.. appreciat-ed,. therefor-, that thegeneraI: ovement- NRTH '''id. :dVeintual concentration for thisoperation, in a strictly limited time, required most careful.planning and strict .control-. -- .Futher, the' bottle necksimposed.by the GRAVE, and TMOO bridoges over the R MAAS, andthe necessity to maintain secrecy to th - utmost, were.additional major:. fac-tors whicr had-. o b' surmounte'd:in th e: oicentrt ion p'lan[. :'

38. The concentration areas used-, .in some cases purely for-stagi-ng':purposes,: are hown on Diagram 1, attached to whichis a-:ime t:able, showing the dates and movement of the %variousformations., '2 and 3.CdnInf Divs are not included in th etime' taable since, they were:. already concentrated NORTH of theR MAAS.

SECTION 7. COMTJNI0CATION'SROMDS

39. Under the best of conditions the roads NORTH and .EASTof the general line EINDHOVEN - s'HERTOGENBOSCH are, with oneexception, indifferent when it comes to - the question of themajor movement of heavy military traffic. During Jan theyhad been universally icebound., Just prior to the time when,movement was to reach its peak, from 3 Feb onwards, came thethaw with all its attendant troubles. Many roads deteriora-ted rapidly and eventually ruts developed to a depth of 18ins to 2 ft, and others collapsed completely at variouspoints. Diversions were extremely difficult to improvise.as the 'surrounding country in most plac'--s became water-logged.The very carefully planned forward movement from stagingareas to concentration areas and onwards across the R M[LAShad to be recast daily in the light of existing road condit-ions. That final assembly was completed by the right timein spite of these abnormal and most difficult conditions,says much for the high standard of staff work of the trafficstaffs, and the superhuman efforts of the traffic controlpersonnel and the RE concerned with road maintenance.

40. The principal roads used were two,' Firstly, the roadANTWVERP - TURNHOUT - TILBURG - s'HERTOGEDlBOSCH - GRAVE bridge-NIJMLEGEN with the subsidiary ANTIlERP - BREDA joining it atTILBURG. This road is an excellent two way road throughout,but even so thaw conditions caused serious deterioration in'places, particularly on the pave sectors. Secondly, theroad TURNHOUT - iEIDHOVEN - ST OEDENRODE - VEGEL - UDEN -

... /ZEELAND -


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- 11 -ZEELAND - BEERS.- CUIJK MOOK bridge - MAIDEN - NJJEGEN.A num-ber of goobd roads exist and joii" his route SOUTH ofEINDHOVEN but none NORTH ofNORTH of EINDHOVEN it isitself far from first class and the thaw played havoc withconsiderable .stretches of .- t particul.arly in the areabetween ZEELAI\'D and MOOK bridged In addition to these twomain forward routes, there is one:'good two way lateralbetween EINDHOVEN and s'IERTOGENeOSCXId-:RAILWAYS

41, ':- For' the first time since the: landing in :NOR&II\DYmajor operation was backed by an adequate railway system.-Fpo.r- details of lines in use prioi to the operation, andthos.e projected once the tactical situation permitted, seeDiagram 1. New railheads were established at VEGHEL, WUDEN,ELL:-and: I-HPS in Jan. The bridge at RAVENSTEIN was completedon 8 Feb and, though this could not effect the build up forthe operation, the line was open to NIJMEG-EN on that date.This materially assisted the maintenance problem once theoperation had begun.TRAFFIC

42. The size of the force to be concentrated, the limitedroads that could be used, the bottle necks at the GRAVE andMOOK bridges and the fact that in order to preserve secrecyup to the last possible moment no movement except recce -parties was allowed NORTH and EAST of the line EINDHOVREN\TsIHERTOGENTBOSCH road-except during -the hours of darkness,thrust a very heavy and responsible task on the trafficcontrol personnel. This was aggravated by 'the day to dayimprovisation necessary to cope with the- changing weatherconditions. Nulmerous diversions hadto be -manned and oneway' sectors of road controlled where two way roads hadpreviously existed. First Cdn Army controlled all roadsSOUTH and WEST of the- line EINIDHOVEN ' s'HERTOGENBOSCH and2 Cdn and 30 Brit Corps those to the NORTH .and EAST of thatline. There was a very close liaison maintained between thethree APMs concerned. Five CGP Traffic Control Coys, twoArmy Provost Coys, two Corps Provost Coys and some. twentyofficers and three hundred OR of a LAB Regt RA, altogether'some 1,600 men, were utilised in the overall traffic controlplan. In spite of all the numerous difficulties, finalconcentration was completed to time table. All thoseconnected with traffic, both staffs and traffic controlpersonnel, did a remarkable feat to achievet-:his.-ENGINEERS

43. .. '-Before and during the concentration period, the RE wereengaged upon the *reconditioning fo r one way heavy militarytraffic of some four hundred miles of existing roadway, andfor the cprmpletely new Construction of about one hundredmiles of virgin road;, . In addition four main bridges hadto 'be built over the /MEUSE, including a high. level floatingbridge at RAVENSTEIN 1220 ft in length, The rapid-deter-ioration of the main routes due to their being used by heavytraffic during ehe thaw made a great deal of additionalwork which had to be'carried ou t without delay. That th efinal concentration was completed to schedule shows how wellthey carried ou t their task,

. .. /SECTION 8


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- 12-SECTION 8 MAINTENANCE AND BUILD UP

DAILY: MAINTENANICEThe total force which had to be catered fo r up to D-Day'of the operation amounted to some 340,000 men. With anadequate railway system operating there were no majorproblems in either.'maintenanc or build up from the Armypoint of view. -though the prevailing weather conditions,the bad state of the roads and the constant congestion of

traffic, made this a cons iderable problem in the forward.-areas throughout the operation. Daily maintenance figureswere worked: out as follows oSupplies-FOL

1,000 tons per day2, 000

AmmunitiontI t f!

800Ordnance 1 000Coal 750MiscellaneousRE . Road Material.RE BridgingRE General Stores'

Total (Approx)

BUILD UPBuild up figures,follows :

500850170150

' 7,250

TI Tf t

'"'-''I"' "I (including Air-field construction)

TI". dayTi * .Ti T

; ~1 'd '

7? ft t'

over eight days were assessed as

Supplies (4 days) 2,5b00 tonsPOL .(50 mile.s) 3,700 I,Ammunit ion

Total

16 .000

22,200

lt (in addition 7,000 tonshad- already been dumped"in Jan)

I -. 2 775 tons per day

BREIAK-DOWATNTotal..of daily maintenance an'dted' .to.approximately 10,000: tons perdown into commodities as follows' :-SuppliesPOLAmmunitionOrdnance

build" Up figures amoun-day, and' this broke

1,312 tons2,463 tt2,800 ."1,000 "

.. /Coal

44,i

45

46 .

gp-- -C- - ---- C -) - ---C ii 1---- I--il--IL It--- ICI*C m-r


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-13Coal 750 tonsMiscellaneous 500 "E-(all purposes) 1, 200 ' ?

-.

Total 10,025 "

RAILHEADS. ROADHEADS., MFCs47. The following Railheads were used toabove (See diagram 1 )

Supplies 1,312 tons TILBURG 712

POL 2,463EIlDlHOVEN

TURNHOUT

BERKEILAAR

EINDHOVENSCIHIJNIDEL

Ammunit ion2,800 t UDEN

VETGJELs ' ERTOCrENBOSCH

Ordnance 1,000 tons WVEELDETURNHOUT

Coal 750 BREDABEST

RE Road Material850" MIELL

AIPSENRE Bridging 170 "

s I ERTOGEINBOSCH

6oo

600600.600600

I ,200400

1, 200800200400350

handle the

tons

It

It

ft

tt

ft

nf

ft

600250

170RE GeneralStores 150 tons TILBURG 150 t

NOTE: The following railheads could have handled tonnageover and above that actually dealt with.TILBURG 638 tonsSCHIJITDEL 600 " (for RAP)VEGHEL 800s HERTOC-ENBOSCH 630 1TURNHOUT 1,000

... /BRDA


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- 14 -BLP-E 800 tons

350 ,'48. PFirst Cdn Army Road-head-was established in the area

TURTINHOUT - TILBURG.2 Cdn Corps

30 Brit Corps

PMCs were established in the areasWIJCHEN 6259 and OSS- 4855.PMC was established in the area VEGHELUDEN - GEMERT. ..


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- 15PART THREE OUTLINE PLAJ\T

SECTION 9 PLAN FOR 30 CORPS ATTACK

49. The Corps was to attack with five inf divs up , asunder :-Prom RIGHT to LEFT 51 (H) Ir. Div

53 (w InV Div15 (S) Inf Div2 Cdn Inf Div3 Cdn-Inf Div

RESERVE and FOLLOW UP - Guards Armd Div43 Inf Div

INITIAL ASSAULT50. In brief; the respective attacks by the divs onD-Day were to be as follows :-

(a) 51 (H) Iif Div to capture the high ground to theNORTH of the SW corner of the REICHSWALD Forest.It was then to swing SOUTH and occupy that part ofthe forest' and to hold down any attempts by theenemy to move tps NORTH in that area.

(b) 53 (W) Inf Div to seize the high ground on theNorthern edge of the REICHSWALD and then to moveEAST along the Northern half of the -forest.

(c) 15 (S) Inf Div to attack straight through toKRANENBURG and then to the high ground overlookingCLEVE.

(d) 2 Cdn Inf Div to capture WYLER.(e) Late afternoon D-Day, 3 Cdn Inf' Div to take ZYPFLIGH,

7860 and IEUT 7961 and then drive EAST across themarshy ground to the CLEVE ALTER RHINE canal.Objectives and- inter-div boundaries are given in

Diagram 3.51 0 'Timings

D-Day was-8 Feb, H-Er for attacks of 51 '(H), 53 (W),15 (S) and 2 Can Inf. Divs was 1030 hrs. The attack of 3Cdn irf Div was to be phased so that the Div could receivethe maximum arty support,EXPLOITATION

__uw _ i . . - . | .r S..52, When 15 (S) Irnf Div haad fought through, to CLEVE, it

was to clear the town and concentrate the Div there. Itwould despatch immedia'tely s-trcng mobile columns to capture,if possible, UDEM 9842 and CALCAR, and to clear theEM!ERICH' road to the WEST bank of the RHINE.

43 5 Ifn Div would move up on D plus 1 and pass through15 (S) I'f Div to attack SOUT- to GOCHO53 (W) In f Div was to clear the RPLEICHSWAID.

. ,./51 (H) Inf Div


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51 (H) ,..I Di,; using he..good .road SOUTH of the '-forest, was to att'ack'GOCH ,coniverti'n'g on the town with 43In f Div.The' Ouards Armdd. Div"'was to pass- thro-ugh the MATERBORNarea immediately in rear of 43 Inf Div. Advancing on theaxis UDEM - HAMMERBRUCH 0736,- VVESEL, ...t was to seize andhold the high grdund NORTH of SONSBECK 0535, ,and to pushforward a strong mobile column to seize the WVESEL bridge

if -this was still intact

SECTION 10 .ARTIIIERY

53 . The arty support was intended to Be a battle-winningfactor, and was provided by 1,000 guns; not including BOPORSand anti-tank. gs . .In outline, the Corps fire plan was :

(a) No fire before 0500 hrs D-Day, except normal activityby RA of 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Div'.s.(b) 0500 0730 hrs, Destructive fire on enemy defonces.(c) 0730 - 0740 hrs. , Smoke build up.(-d) 0740 -. 0750 hrs. No firing of any kind. as it washoped the enemy would open up with his arty and givean opportunity for sounad-ranging and flash-spotting.(e) 0750 - 0915 hrs. Destructive fire again.(f) 0915 hrs.. Smoke screen NM .edge .REICHSWALD starts.(g) '0920 hrs. Intense, CB as a result. of information from -.... . . smoke 'screen,(h) 0920 hrs Opening line of barrage (mixed HE andSmoke) starts,.. . ...(i) 1000 hrs. Complete barrage starts.(j) 1030 hrs. H-Hr and first lift.

54.o- The barrage was. on the front of the three CENTRE divs,viz 53 (W), 15 (S.) and 2 Cdn In f Divs, although it overlappedthe boundary between 53 (w) and 51 (H) In f Divs by 300 ydsbOn 51 (H) Inf Div front, except for the above overlap,the arty support consisted of concentrat-io'nis- fired on known

, enemy objectives in accordance with the progress of their. attack or at call from bdes. ... -:.. In addition to the programme outlined, above, PEPPERPOTgroups were organised in each div. These consisted of the

div MG bn, with all available div resources in LAA and anti-tank guns, plus some gun tanks. Their task was to saturatewith fire the enemy defences within range on the front andflanks of the attack from 0530 to 1030 hrs, except for thesilent period 0740 to 0750 hrs.

55. "' Gun deployment areas, smoke screens and bombardment... /areas


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areas are shown in Diagram 4. The arty plan in' detailwill be found at Section 24.

SECTION 11 AIR:

56 . The whole resources of Second. TAP were available inaddition to -"heavies?' of US IX Bombardment Div and BomberCommand., The operation would NOT be delayed. however, inthe event of bad weather preventing the air forces fromoperating..57. In outline, the air support plan was as follows :

(a) Prior to D-Day.- Operations against railways, bridgesand ferries serving the battle area, care being takennot to give any indication of the point of attack.(b) On the night D minus 1/D, "heavies" would try toobliterate EMTERICH, CIEVE and GOCH, cratering beingaccepted.(c) On D-Day, priority was given to fighter-bombers onthe German gun areas, with an FCP and CABRANK available

all'day, It was also hoped to use American "heavies"on NUTTERDEN and MATERBORN, using anti-personnel andproximity fuse bombs. Consideration was given to6 the.. ossibilities of dropping liquid. fire bombsor canisters.to burn-put certain areas or concrete pill-boxes-These plans had to be rejected as low altitude flyi:nwould be necessary and' the probable losses wereunacceptable.In addition, all roads leading to the battle areaand the RHINE crossings were to be covered by armeodrecce and Tactical Recceo

(d) , On night D/D plus 1, approaches and railwaycentres would be treated to prevent 'the arrival ofenemy reserves.

SECTION 12 ENGINEERS

58. The policy was as follows :(a) 'Formation respnsibi/liies

Formations were responsible fo r all tactical breachingoperations and for the opening of their own routesforward.Cor onsibil i t iesCE.was responsible for maintenance and development ofa ll forward routes. The forward limit of this respons-ibility was to be fixed from time to time as the .battledeoveloped.


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- 18-'(c) Priorities

Priorities for maintenance and development of routeswere laid down for :-(i) The early stages of the battle.

(ii) The later stages of the battle.(d) Tank tracks

These were. to be developeda by forward divs as. equired.and were: to be related. to the main forward maintenaceroutes.

,(e) Minefield clearanceThere was to be no deliberate clearance of extensiveminefields which. were to be marked 'and. left for latertreatment. Efforts were to be concentrated onclearing roadways and verges, and in f and tank routesthrough def ences.

SECTION 13 TRAFFIC CONTROL

59. It was appreciated that the successful execution of theoperation .would. largely depend on efficient traffic control.To achieve this a special organisation was created consistingof a Regulating HQ and nine TCPs. This organisation wasfurnished by 53 Recce Regt.

60., There would be two phases in the problem :-(a) During the opening stages of the battle until our

tp s debouched EAST of CL1EVEDuring this .phase Divs were to be responsible for thecontrol of traffic within their sectors,

(b) During the subsequent operations when Corps HQ wouldcontrol all traffic through their Regulating HQ.

61 During the first phase, the TCPs established wererequired to report progress of movement on their respectiveroutes to Main Corps HQ. During the second phase, the TCPswere to report progress and also to control movement in-their respective sectors. i'

62. TCPs Nos 1 4, :which were established by D minus 1,were connected by line to Regulating HQ., and Main HQ 30Corps. Line to the, remainder 'was to be laid as conditionspermitted.. All- TCPsand Regulating 'HQ'were also connectedby wireless on a separate traffic not.Each of the nine TCPs h.ad Lone: sub-S ction CMP attachedProm Corps resources and six recovery vehicles, also fromCorps resources, were- distributed among ' the TOCPs.


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- 19 -PART FOUPL I\TNiRArUTIVE

SECTION 14 PHASES, OF THE OPERATION

This narrative is divided into six phases as follows :-Phase 1. 8 - 13 Feb

Phase 2. 14 17 Feb

Phase 3. 18.- 22 Feb

Phase 4. 23 - 26 Feb

Phase 5. 26 Feb -3 Mar

Phase 6. 4 - 10 Mar

The breaching of the SIEGFRIED Lineand the clearing of. the REICHSWAIDForest,, concluding with the RIGHTflank of 30 Corps on the MAAS at HEYEN7853 and. the- LEFT *flank on the RHINEnear EI3IERICH.Extension of the front SOUTH and EASTof the REICHSAWALD as a preliminary tothe assault on GOCHLCapture of GOGH and preliminaryoperations against CALCAR.Planning and regrouping fo r 2 CdnCorps' operation against the HOCHWAIDLine (BLOCKBUSTER) and the abortiveattempt to capture WfEEZE.Opening phases of BLOCKBUSTER, loose-ning up on 30 Corps front and junctionwith Ninth US Army.Final elimination of resistance WESTof the RHIlE o-

SECTION 15 PAE 1 8 - 13 FEB

D-rDaLQ Feb.In brief, the plans of the forward divs fo r the initialassault were as follows, :-;

(.a) .51 (H) In f Div to lead with 154 Inf Bd e whose task wasto secure..the" high ground at the SW corner of theREICHSWALD at -7851 and 7952, including the villages ofBREEDEWEG:. and BRUCK. - 153 Inf Bd e were then to bepassed through, swinging, SOUTH and later. WEST, with theobject of clearing and holding t'he high ground at 7551and 7650, and dominating the main''road MOOK - GENEP.For these operations, the b.des were: supported. in turn.by 107 RAC (gun tanks), FPPEO (CROCODILES), LOTHIANS(FLAILS) and 222 Assault Sqn RE -(AVsRE).

(b):. 53 (W) Inf Div, *with 71 In f Bdee leading, were. to secure.the BRANDENBURG feature in 8053.- This being successful,1.60 Inf Bde were to pass, through 71 In f Bde,' with thetask of braeaching the SIEGFRIED defences in the area.8252 and securing the. STOPPELBERG- featurein 8553. Thebdes were supported. by 9 RTR' and 147 RAPC: (gun tanks),W DGNS (FLAILS), 141 RAC (CROCODILES) and 82 Assault-Sqn RE (AVsR:E)

63.

64.

,--- ----- -- --- -'I- LL-I -I I


38/96

-20(c) Initially, 15 (S) Inf Div was to advance on a two bdefront. On the RIffC, 46-'-nf Bde had the task of

capturing the high ground between the- IW tip of theREICHSWALD and exclusive KRAIENBURG, - 227 Inf Bde..on- the LEFT were: to - capture KRANENBURG and block enemyinfiltration from the NORTH. These. two bdes had insupport the gun tanks of 4 Armd COLDM GDS and 3 ArmdSG, FLAILS of 22 DGNS, CROCODILES of 141 RAC and AVsREof 6 Assault Regt RE.

(d) 2 Cdn Inf Div. Two bns of 5 Cn Inf Bde, supportedby ' one sqn 13/18 H (gun tanks) and elements ofLOTHIANS (FLAILS) and 617 Assault Sqn RE (AVsRE), wereto capture the area DEN HEUVEL 7856 - WLER, and openthe road NIJI\GEN -' exclusive KRA1ENBURG,

(e). 3 Cdn Inf Div were to attack with two bdes up, 8 CdnInf Bde on the RIGHT, 7 Cdn Inf Bde on the LEFT.Their task was to capture and clear the low groundbetween the main road. WYLER.R- RANENBURG - CLEVE andthe R RHINE as far as the anti-tank ditch which ranNORTH from DONSBRUGGEN to DUFFELMARD. They weresupported by elements of :13/18 ,H,, LOTHIANS: and 617Assault Sqn RE, and.114 LVsT (BUFFALOES) of 11 RTRand 5 Ass-ault.Reg tRE. They also had 50 VEASELS.112, 803 and 810 Pioneer Smoke Coys were also in'support, to screen these LEFT flank ,operations fromobservation across 'the RHINE,

65. The attack went' in at 1030 hrs. Surprise was gainedand although enemy bn commanders had.been warned. to expectan attack, there was no general enemy alert prior to th eattack. The arty support was excellent, and counter-batt-ery was most effective. Progress on the LEFT was extremelygood, but on the RIGHT opposition was stronger than wasanticipated.

154 Inf Bde of 51 (H) In f Div- met stiff ish resistancein the villages of BRUK' and BREEDEW:7-but by the afternoonhad captured their objectives - the high ground at 7952,and 153 Inf Bde were quickly on their objective tpo the SWand were swinging round on to the HMOOK --'GEEP'T o"rad.Mines and MG fire were encountered, but there was littleenemy shelling, and by 1730 hrs, the Div had taken some150 PW, and were pushing :'on.

To their LEFT,'" 53' (W) Inf'Div mad steady progressand secured the high ground. at the NW corner of th e.REICHSMWAt,.the leading bde taking about 200 PW on the way.A lo t 'of mines were encounj.tered up to the edge of the forestand. it was very soon apparent'*that the state of the groundwould provide a great proble'm. Though the. CIHURCHILL guntanks and bridge layers managed to kbep well up with theleading inf, the FLAILS and CROCODILES .were immediatelybogged down after crossing the start line, added to which,the Div axis from the v.icinity of GROESBEEK to the forest,soon showed signs of giving way.'

The -attack of 15 (S) nf Div went well- throughoutthe day, Enemy opposition .was not strong and. our owncasualties were light. The main obstacles :to the advancewere mines of all types and the ground,' FLAILS cleared agap through the minefield. at 773553 on,. the Southern axis,but on the Northern axis. vrere' unable to operate owing to

".."./the soft


39/96

- 21 -the soft ground. Here, however, the gun tanks found theirown gap. By 1700 hrs, ANENBURG and about 200 ;P, were inour hands, anda one bn had reached the KRANEI\BURG--HEKKENSroad near FRASSELT 8154. : .

On the front of 2 Cdn Inf Div, WYLER turned out to bea strong point surrounded by Schu-mines. The R de MAIS(RIGHT bn of 5 Cdn Inf Bde) had secured DEN LEUVEL by 1120hrs. A Class 40 bridge was established' over the anti-tankditch about half a mile SOUTH of TYLER. The:CALG'HIGHRScaptured the town' at 1800 hrs after a stiff fPight and theroad from there was being swept towards KAPIENBURG,' nowfirmly in "the hands of 15 (S) Inf Div. The road fromGROESBEEK to WTLER was also being opened to assist 15 (S)Inf Div.

At 1800 hrs, 3 Cdn Inf Div attacked across the floodsand were quickly in ZYFFLICH and ZANDPOL and were'. preparingto advance to LEUT.66. By midnight all formations had successfully achievedthe objectives ordered for the day. Over 1100 PW ' had beentaken, five enemy bns destroyed or decimated and three moreengaged, leaving only two ( or possibly three) as a localreserve. Tactical Recce during the day indicated quiteplainly a general, if scattered, Northward movement acrossthe line of the road GELDERN - WIESEL.

Our own casualties had. been light, and so far ourprincipal difficulties had been due to bad going, mines andflooding. Th e latter was particularly disturbing, and itwas reported that the flood level in the area NORTH of theNIJMEGEN - CLEVE road had risen 18 ins since 1300 hrs.67 . 30 Corps Intentions for 9 Fob ordered 51 (H), 53 (W),15 (S) and 3 Cd n Inf Divs to press forward. with the tasksallotted them in the initial Corps Orders (Appendix 'A').2 Cdn In f Div, having completed their task, were to standfirm. 43 Inf Div, now concentrated in NIJMEGENT, were putat one hr's notice to move from 1200 hrs 9 Feb. and GuardsArmd Div in TILBURG were at one hr's notice from midnight

9 Feb.D plus 1' 9 Feb

68 . - ,, .The day's operations went well against weakeningopposition except on 51 (H) Inf Div's front where the enemyhad. been reinforced by two bns as a result of a pre-arrangedrelief. In- the CENTRE, progress was hampered by bad goingand congested roads.69. 51 (H) Inf Div continued.-their advance through theSouthern portion of the REICHSWALD with 152 and 154 Inf Bdes,

making progress towards the comnunication centre of HEKKENSand' the road HEKKENS - FRASSELT. '153 In f Bdle on the RIGHTcut the road M0OOK - GENIEP in two places, and then movedNW to clear this axis and the high ground in the area ofRIETHORST 7550.

53 (W:) Inf Div had ma'de good progress during thenight 8/9 Feb and by the evening had taken all their,objectives, and were well established with two bdes on theSTOPPELBERG feature and on the high ground SW of iMATERBORN.Some enemy pressure was felt on their RIGHT flank, and hereone bn. killed. 40 enemy and took 70 PW . D'ring the .day5.'./the Div


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- 22 -the Div axis gave :way. completely and had. to be .closed forrepair. The conditions were so' bad that VEASELS had to betowed by BUIIDOZERS. Meanwhile, the- Div traffic wasdiverted along 15 (S) Inf Div's axis. . ;

.Starting at 0400 'hrs, 15 (S) Inf Div advanced topierce the NUTTERDEN defences of the SIEGFRIED Line. Ithad been their intention to make.-five crossings'of the anti-tank ditch between ANENB.URG and NUVTERDEN, but four had tobe abandoned. .The one at 82854.0 succeedede,^ and two bnsgot over capturing NUTTERDEN and taking 10 . 'officers and 240.OR W. -During the afternoon44 Inf Bde occupied theMATERBORN feature, , .:..15 Recce Regt, making use of one of 3 CGdn In f Divtsroutes, moved forward from NIJMIEGEN at 1500 hrs with theobject of securing a footing on the. roads CLEVE - GOCH, andCLEVE - UDEM, but their patrols were held up by.stubbornenemy resistance in the outskirts of 'CLEVE. ' lMeanwhile,after being at one hr's notice from 1800 hrs, 43 Inf Divmoved up along the axis. of 15 (S) Inf Div (road WYLER -IKRANEIBURG) with the object of following through -f5 Recce-Regt. and continuing the advance on GOCHE and U:.DE .. Until

4.3 Inf Div was clear, no traffic of 1:5 (S) Inf Div was beingallowed to use the roads in the Div area.. At 2330 .hrs,-the head of the leading. tps of 43 Inf Div. (129 .Inf Bde)reached NUTTERDEN. .3 Cdn In f Div continued their waterborne operationsagainst -light opposition,;, moving .from one is-land.village toanother, they occupied MEHR, NIEL, ;IKEEKEN and,-:MILLINGEN,and had taken 500 - 600 Pv r 'in about 24 hrs. Patrolsreached the bank of the RHINE., - :

70. Traffic problems increased rapidly during the day .owing to imminent flooding of the main. road NIJAMEGEN CLEVE.Just after midday,. 17 ins of-water were reported on .this road.30 Corps promptly issued orders that no tracked vehicleswere to use the -road from STMORENHOOK 7660 to. inclusiveKRANENBURG and no column of more than :10 vehicles. was to usethis stretch without permission of Corps HQ .The total of VPaken so far was 2,500. It wasestimated that our own casualties were about 500,

71 . 30 Corps Intentions fo r .night .9/10 Peb and 10 Fob Wer'oas follows .(a) 51 .(3) Inf Div to continue clear ingthe road MOOK -

GENNEP - HEKKENS - GOCH.(b) 53 (w) Inf Div to hold present positions and mop up.(c) 15 (S) Inf Div to open MATERBORN exits. fo r 43 Inf Div,

and after the latter had passed; through, were to pushmobile columns to CALCAR, HUISBERDEN 9655,.and to theRHINE at EMMERICHo('d) 43 Inf Div were to pass through 15 (S) Inf' Div andpursue their task of capturing GOCH, UDEMI and, VEEZE.(e)' 3 Cdn In f Div were.-to. continue clearing 'the low groundup to the line of the railway GCLEVE - .GRIETHAUSEN 9159.(f) Guards Armd.:Div were at one hrts notice .from 1800 hrson 10 Feb. It was hoped to pass them through- at

... /first light


41/96

- 23 -first l ight 11 Feb, their route being dependent on thestate of the roads at the time.

Dplus 2 10 Feb72. This was a rather disappointing day's operations owing

to the very bad road conditions which obtainediOn 51 (H) Inf Div's front, 152 In f Bde continued theiradvance through the Southern part of the REICHSWALD againstfairly heavy opposition and were coming up against the all-round defences of the HEKIKENS strongpointo 153 Inf Bdecompleted the clearance of the area HIEIKANT 7449- MIIDDELAARand opened the road MOOK- GOCH up to and including OTTERSUM

7946. Patrols were pushed forward to AALIDONK 794.7 and upto ZEIDERHlEIDE 8147 where enemy were encountered in somestrength.

It was quite clear that G-ENIEP would have to be securedto permit the use of the' road HiOOK- OTTERSUM. The enemyhad blown the bridge at the NEjT orner of the town and retiredto the cellars and sewers.

53 (W) In f Div spent the day mopping up their area, andin slightly extending their hold on the REICHSWATD. Strongpatrols were sent SOUTH to close the gap between their RIGHTand 51 (H) In f Div, and contact -was. made.

15 (S). Inf Div unflortunately.failed to bounce the enemyou t of CLEVE by 3 or 4 hrs, owing too.he difficulties ofmovement, and it was not until nearly. midnight that 6 RSF(44 Inf Bde) were able to start clearing the CENTRE of thetown. An attack was made to clear the woods YW f of CLEVE inthe DONSBRUGGEN neighbourhood and. contact was made with 3 CdnIn f Div.

73. During the night 9/10 Feb 15 Recce, R gt had been tryingto open two routes through the MAiTERBOTI fbature. for the useof 43 Inf Div. Progress was slow in- the difficult andsaturated country over tracks little else but heavy mud..Enemy resistance was stiffening and. during the night furthermovement was stopped by strong enemy SP gun activity from :the area 8953. .. '

The plan for 43 Iil- Div had been to . advance on one roadthrough NUTTEDMEN and the cross roads in the neck of th e.REICHSWALD. thence .via CL .. ::and BEDBURG 9352. It hadoriginally been intended to put. the second Bdeo on to a secondaxis. leading through another track through the-nock of th eforest and thence via IMATERBORN, Information was that th e.going,SOUTH. of the main KRAIEBLR - CtLEVE road wasimpassableleaving only the one main road through the neck of theREICHSWAID fit for use. Th. Div therefore moved on thisone aroad. Its Recce Regt was kept back as it -was hoped toget both leading Bdes deployed ov.: on the general l ine.ATERBORN- CLEVE, with the aid of movement light during the.night 9/10 Feb.

It had been agreed t-hat whatever portion oft'-he Div wasleft on the main road would -iat into the side :with its headat NUTTERDEN between the hrs o 0800 -1000 on 10 Feb inorder to allow units of 15 (s) Inf )iv to pass through toclear the tovm of CLEVE.

. ,/129 Inf


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- 24 -129 Inf Bde Group, the leading Bde of 43 Inf Div, go tthrough the neck of the REICHSWMAID during the night but raninto heavy opposition about a mile WEST of CLEVE.: The Bdefought forward and by the early morning were hotly engaged

with snipers and SP guns from CLEVE itself. A furtherthreat was developing from the MATERBORN direction and theBde went into leager with all-round protection. Situatedlike- this they fought all day through 10 Feb and the night10/11 Feb. The situation Was frequently tense,Progress during the night had been so slow that thesecond Bde Group (214 Inf Bde Group) was unable to clear theneck of the forest and accordingly halted with its head atNUTTERDEN for the specified two hrs in the early morning of,10 Feb. After detailed daylight recce two just useabletracks were discovered through the neck -of the REICHSWAID

SOUTH of the main CLEVE road, 43 Recce Regt was brought upthe column and launched down these tracks towards MALTERBORNduring the afternoon. They failed to get out very farbeyond the forest and the enemy were located in strength inthe village of MATERBORN and to the WEST of it, 214 In f BdeGroup advanced on the tail of the Recce Regt but by lastlight had only succeeded in passing 5 DCLI out of the Forestthrough the Recce Regt. The remainder of the Bde curled upwhere it was for the night.Owing to the appalling conditions of the roads and thegeneral congestion of traffic in the KRAENEBURG - NUTTEPLDENarea the third Bde of 43 Inf Div (130 In f Bdo) was orderedto remain in NIJMEGEN fo r the time being.The weather conditions and the lack of: adequate roads,with the consequent ever increasing traffic congestion,had caused considerable delay on the whole operation in thisNorthern sector of the front. This impeded the exploitation

of what still appeared to be a favourable situation. By th eend of D plus 2, elements of three enemy reserve divs had beenidentified, apparently committed piecemealo Within the nextfour days'-a' total of nine divs were identified on the Corpsfront. ; '74. During the day, 3 Cdn Inf Div made contact with 15 (S)Inf Div in the DONSBRUGGEN area. They secured DUFFEhLMRDand were up to a general line some 500) yds short of the CLEVE -RHINE Canal. '-,75, The arty situation on the' Corps front was generallysatisfactory and all operations were being covered adequately,except that 53 (W) Inf Div could only be supported as far asthe main road -EKItENS - MATERBORN. They would not, however,continue further EAST meanwhile, if the opposition turned outto be heavy. 43 Inf Div now had" three field' regts and onemedium regt up in support and a further three medium and oneheavy regt were to be moved up on the night 10/11 FPeb tojust behind 15 (S) Inf Div.

Guards Armd Div HQ with 32 Guards Bde was to commenceto move up on 11 P'eb into the GROESBEEK woods, ready to beput on the Southern route through 51 (H) In f Div. 2 Cdn InfDiv now went into First Cdn Army reserve.Casualties in 30 Corps, including the two :Cdn Divs,were under 1,000 wounded up to 1800 hrs 10 Feb.


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-257'6"-- ' E-arly on hi's. day, the enemy .blew the-ROER dams onFiis-t US Army front and anincrease in flooding was to beexpected. 3 Cdn In f Div were finding.. t necessary to adjusttheir positions to cope with Uhe floods; in the morning,190 Field -Rgt (15 (S.) Inf Div) reported that their HO in

IUAT\ELBUI-?.G. was- surrounded by,water which, was s-till risingand likely to submerge the main road.77. To attack 'GEin!LEP it was necessary to cross the floodedR NIERS and dur ing- the. day: a .plan was mad