REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESNATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

Regional Trial CourtQuezon CityBranch _____

ROQUE, Atty. Herminio Harry;MORO CHRISTIAN PEOPLE’S ALLIANCE; DIZON, Fr. Joe; SORIANO, Rodinie; ABIERA, Stephanie; ALCAIN, Maria Lourdes; ALFEREZ, Voltaire; ALTEZ, Czarina May; BALOT, Sheryl; BATACAN, Renizza; CAÑETE, Edan Marri; CARAMOAN, Leana; CAMANCE, Aldwin; DELORINO, Rene; DUMAN, Paulyn May; FAJARDO, Rodrigo III;GO, Anna Marie; JIMENEZ, Anna Arminda; LEE, Mary Ann; MANALAYSAY, Luisa; MUSNGI, Miguel; OCAMPO, Michael; OCANA, Norman Roland III; RAGAMAT, William; RAMOS, Maricar; REYES, Cherry Lou; SICAT, Melissa Ann; TABING, Cristine Mae; and TORNO, Vanessa,

Petitioners,

- versus -

ERMITA, Eduardo, in his capacity as Executive Secretaryand Chairman of the Anti-Terror Council (ATC); GONZALEZ, Raul,in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice and Vice Chairman of the ATC; ROMULO, Alberto, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Member of the ATC; PUNO, Ronaldo, in his capacityas Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government and Member of the ATC; TEVES, Margarito, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance and Member of the ATC; GONZALES, Norberto, in his capacity as National Security Adviser, and as Director-General

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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. Q-07-60778For: Declaratory Relief (Sections 3, 7, 18, 26 and 27 of Republic Act 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007)

of the National Security Council, Officer-in-Charge of the Department of National Defense, and Member of the ATC; ANDAYA, Rolando, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; TAN, Roberto, as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Treasury; ESPERON, Gen. Hermogenes, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the ArmedForces of the Philippines; CALDERON, Gen. Oscar, in his capacity as Director General of the Philippine National Police;

Respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x

PETITION

COME NOW THE PETITIONERS by the undersigned

attorney, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully allege:

1. Petitioner Prof. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., of legal age,

Filipino citizen, married, taxpayer, is an active law

practitioner and professor of constitutional and public

international law at the University of the Philippines

College of Law. He may be served with pertinent papers

and processes through his undersigned counsel, the

Roque and Butuyan Law Offices, at Unit 1904 Antel 2000

Corporate Centre, 121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village,

Makati City.

2

2. Petitioner Moro Christian People’s Alliance, is a people’s

organization existing under the laws of the Philippines. It

may be served with pertinent papers and processes

through its undersigned counsel, the Roque and Butuyan

Law Offices, at Unit 1904, Antel Corporate Centre, 121

Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City.

3. Petitioner Fr. Joe Dizon, of legal age, Filipino citizen,

single, taxpayer, is a long time activist-priest and an

advocate against abuses of the government. He may be

served with pertinent papers and processes through his

undersigned counsel, the Roque and Butuyan Law

Offices, at Unit 1904 Antel Corporate Centre, 121 Valero

Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City.

4. Petitioner Rodinie Soriano, of legal age, single, Filipino

citizen, taxpayer, is a student of the University of the

Philippines and a member the League of Filipino citizens.

He may be served with pertinent papers and processes

through his undersigned counsel, the Roque and Butuyan

Law Offices, at Unit 1904 Antel Corporate Centre, 121

Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City.

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5. Petitioners Alcain to Torno, are all of legal age, Filipino

citizens, taxpayers, and students of the evening class of

the University of the Philippines College of Law, Diliman,

Quezon City. They may be served with pertinent papers

and processes through their undersigned counsel, the

Roque and Butuyan Law Offices, at Unit 1904 Antel

Corporate Centre, 121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village,

Makati City.

6. The Respondents are officials of the National

Government, thus;

7. Sec. Eduardo Ermita is Executive Secretary and

Chairman of the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), he may be

served with summons and other papers and processes at

the Office of the Executive Secretary, Malacañang

Palace, Manila;

8. Sec. Raul Gonzalez, is Secretary of the Department of

Justice and Vice Chairman of the ATC. He may be served

with summons and other papers and processes at the

Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila;

4

9. Sec. Alberto Romulo is Secretary of the Department of

Foreign Affairs and Member of the ATC. He may be

served with summons and other papers and processes at

the Department of Foreign Affairs, Roxas Boulevard,

Pasay City, Metro Manila;

10.Sec. Ronaldo Puno is Secretary of the Department of

Interior and Local Government and Member of the ATC.

He may be served with summons and other papers and

processes at the Department of Interior and Local

Government, Kamias cor. EDSA, Quezon City, Metro

Manila;

11.Sec. Margarito Teves is Secretary of the Department of

Finance and Member of the ATC. He may be served with

summons and other papers and processes at the

Department of Finance, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City,

Metro Manila;

12.Sec. Rolando Andaya is the Secretary of the Department

of Budget and Management. He may be served with

summons and other papers and processes at the

Department of Budget and Management, Gen. Solano St.,

San Miguel, Manila;

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13.Hon. Roberto Tan is the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau

of Treasury. He may be served with summons and other

papers and processes at the Bureau of Treasury, Palacio

del Gobernador Bldg., Intramuros, Manila;

14.Sec. Norberto Gonzales is National Security Adviser and

concurrent Officer-in-Charge of the Department of

National Defense and Member of the ATC. He may be

served with summons and other papers and processes at

Department of National Defense, Camp Aguinaldo,

Quezon City, Metro Manila;

15.Gen. Hermogenes Esperon is Chief of Staff of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines. He may be served with

summons and other papers and processes at Camp

Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Metro Manila;

16.Police Gen. Oscar Calderon is Director General of the

Philippine National Police. He may be served with

summons and other papers and processes at the

Philippine National Police, Camp Crame, Quezon City,

Metro Manila;

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17.The Public Respondents may also be served with

summons and other processes through the Solicitor-

General, Office of the Solicitor General, 134 Amorsolo

St., Legaspi Village, Makati City, Metro Manila.

18.Petitioners hold that sections 3, 7, 18, 26 and 27 of

Republic Act 9372, or the Human Security Act of 2007,

need judicial determination in relation to the petitioners’

rights as provided by the Bill of Rights, Article III of the

1987 Constitution. Petitioners further hold that due to

the ambiguity or the need for judicial determination of

the aforesaid sections, any disbursement of public funds

for purposes provided for in the law are illegal.

PREFATORY STATEMENT

19.A citizen of the Republic of the Philippines is granted

rights and privileges as well as duties by the 1987

Constitution as embodied in Article III thereof, also

known as the Bill of Rights.

20.As provided for in the 1987 Constitution and as a

signatory of the United Nations Declaration on Human

Rights, the Philippine government is duty-bound to

uphold these rights and to ensure that any action of any

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entity, private or public, does not infringe upon these

rights.

21.The construction of the 1987 Constitution regarding the

relationship between the government and the citizens of

the Republic ensures that the latter’s rights are

respected above all else. Sec. 5 of the Declaration of

Principles and State Policies, Article II of the 1987

Constitution states that:

“Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment of all the people of the blessings of democracy.”

22.This is reinforced by Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights, Article

III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

“ Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.”

23.To ensure this, any omission or excessiveness of actions

of any of the three branches of government are checked

and balanced by other branches of the government. This

is an important process in the safeguarding of the rights

of its citizens.

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24.Particularly, the actions of the legislative as repository of

police power of the state, and the executive as wielder of

the same, are prone to question, especially when they

infringe upon the rights and privileges of the individual

which are protected by the Constitution.

25.And the final arbiter of questions regarding this nature

is the Judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as it is

part of its expanded certiorari jurisdiction to determine

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

government. The Supreme Court in Francisco v. House of

Representatives1 emphasized that judicial review is “not

just a power but also a duty” under the 1987 Constitution

.

26.On this aspect, the Supreme Court, in a line of decisions,

has always upheld the rights of the citizens as sacrosanct

in any working democracy. Even in times of crises and

national emergencies, the roles of the branches of

government and government as a whole, has been

limited due to the rights of its citizens. This was what

the Court, in a recent decision, David vs. Arroyo2, 1 Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10,

2003.2 David vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396.

9

through Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez meant when it

declared that:

“xxx

“During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our people’s liberty.

“Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed.”

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

27.At present, a silent threat exists, one that has haunted

the world since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks

in the United States.

28.Terrorism or acts of terrorism have become bywords

because of one event that changed the world’s socio- and

geopolitical landscape, the September 11, 2001 attacks

on the World Trade Center in New York City and the

Pentagon in Washington D.C., U.S.A. To the shock of

millions worldwide, terrorists, hijacking and commanding

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two airplanes, crashed the said aircrafts into the

buildings in New York City and Washington, D.C.

29.The group Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, was

blamed and later claimed responsibility for the attacks.3

30.In response to the September 11 attacks, US President

George W. Bush, addressed a Joint Session of the U.S.

Congress and called for a “War on Terror”. He called on

all its allies to join the United States in this war. In his

speech, he stated:

“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”4

31.The first salvo in this war was directed on Afghanistan,

where the Taliban, a regime that is closely allied with Al

Qaeda, was in control. When the Taliban refused to

negotiate with the U.S. and its allies, war was

commenced. On October 7, 2001, American and British

forces began aerial attacks on Afghanistan, particularly

Kabul.

3 “September 11attacks,” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11,_2001_attacks.html>.

4 “War in Afghanistan (2001-present),” http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript.html>.

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32.On November 12, 2001, Kabul fell. What followed soon

was the establishment of a democratic government

through a nationwide election which put the first post-

Taliban president, Hamid Karzai, in power.

33.In the meantime, as the “War on Terror” was being

waged, Presidents and Prime Ministers of governments

around the world threw their support to the US

campaign. The Philippine President, Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo, threw in her support. According to Time Asia

website:

“President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was the first Asian leader to back the U.S. in its war on terror after 9/11—and she has pledged her "general support" for a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.”5

34. After Afghanistan, the “War on Terror” turned towards

Iraq then being ruled by dictator Saddam Hussein. The

rationale for the Iraq War was that the country under

Hussein is developing weapons of mass destruction. This

was offered by Pres. Bush and Prime Minister Blair to

their allies.

5 “For or against the War on Iraq,” <http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/501030324/poe/13.html>.

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35.On 2 March 2003, the US led the coalition forces in the

war in Iraq. Despite the eventual ouster of Saddam

Hussein’s regime, and the election of a democratic Iraqi

government, Iraq currently remains a volatile country

still under U.S. military occupation.

36.Six (6) years into the “War on Terror,” Osama bin Laden

remains at large and Al Qaeda, with its ideological allies

like Jemaah Islamiyah and the Philippines’ Abu Sayyaf,

still threatens world security.

37.In response to Bush’s call to global war on terror, the US

Congress passed The Uniting and Strengthening America

by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and

Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 or the USA Patriot Act of

2001. Similarly, other nations followed, such as Great

Britain, whose Houses of Parliament passed the

Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and Australia, which

passed the Anti-Terrorism Bill into law in the year 2005.

Other countries also passed their own anti-terror laws.

38.In response to the developments worldwide on anti-

terror legislation, the Houses of Congress initiated two

different bills towards an anti-terror law.

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39.On 30 June 2004, Sen. Manuel Villar initially filed Senate

Bill No. 735, An Act to Define and Penalize Acts of

Terrorism and For Other Purposes. This was later on

substituted along with other Senate Bills with Senate Bill

No. 2137 on 12 October 2007. Senator(s) Manuel B.

Villar, Jr., Panfilo M. Lacson, Juan Ponce Enrile, Jinggoy P.

Ejercito-Estrada, Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr. and Alfredo S.

Lim sponsored the bill in substitution.

40.On 11 October 2005, Rep. Imee Marcos, with several

Congressmen and women as co-sponsors, introduced

House Bill No. 4839.

41.On 12 October 2005, these bills were certified by the

President of the Philippines for immediate enactment.

42.The two bills were submitted to Joint Conference

Committee where the Senate members of the Conference

Committee approved it on 08 February 2007, while the

House of Representatives members of the Conference

Committee approved it on 19 February 2007. The

approved bill was transmitted to the President on 27

February 2007.

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43.On 06 March 2007, the President acted on the submitted

bill and approved and signed it into law which became

Republic Act No. 9372.

44.The effectivity of RA 9372 was scheduled two (2) months

after the May 14, 2007 elections as contained in Sec. 63

of the law thereof. It states:

Sec. 62. Special Effectivity Clause. –

“xxx

After the publication required above shall have been done, the Act shall take effect two months after the elections are held in May 2007.

Thereafter, the provisions of this Act shall be automatically suspended one month before and two months after the holding of any election.”

45.However, a month before the scheduled effectivity, the

Secretary of Justice, Raul Gonzalez, issued statements

that sent chilling effects to the populace. In an interview

with the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stated that the

interviews and sources of media practitioners are

“sacred”. However, he further stated:

“Of course, unless there is sufficient basis or if they are being suspected of co-mingling with terror suspects.”6

6 “DoJ can recommend wiretap on alleged terrorists – Gonzalez,” by Tetch Torres, INQUIRER.net, July 04, 2007, <

15

46.On 05 July 2007, the National Union of Journalists of the

Philippines (NUJP) called on the 14th Congress “to act

posthaste on this potential threat not just to press

freedom but to democracy itself by reviewing or, better

still, repeal altogether this law that is worse than the

disease it purports to cure.”7

They were particularly concerned with Sec. Gonzalez’s

statement quoted above, to which chairman Jose Torres Jr. and

secretary general Rowena Paraan, on behalf of NUJP, issued a

statement stating thus:

“This is a statement as vague and as fraught with danger as many of the anti-terror law's provisions, especially those that supposedly define what terrorism is and who terrorists are, provisions so open-ended they could actually lead to anyone and everyone who government deems fit being tagged a terrorist.”8

47.On the other hand, Ambassador Alistair MacDonald,

head of delegation of the European Commission to the

Philippines said in Bacolod City, “The anti-terrorism law

http://archive.inquirer.net/view.php?db=1&story_id=74741>.

7 “Gonzalez ‘wiretap media’ statement slammed ,” by Nonoy Expina, INQUIRER.net, July 05, 2007, < http://archive.inquirer.net/view.php?db=1&story_id=74992>.

8 Ibid.

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is not an excuse to go out and shoot people… to target

people for matters not provided in the law.”9

48.In relation to the aforementioned, a phenomenon has

arisen in the recent history of our country that is

reminiscent of the Martial Law days when people simply

disappear and probably summarily killed. In addition,

there is a growing number of persons, supposedly or

suspected to be allied with the Left, who are killed in a

pattern that is not unique to our country: motorcycle-

riding and bonnet-wearing hitmen shooting their target

even in broad daylight in the presence of a lot of people.

49.Sec. Eduardo Ermita, in an interview with The Daily

Tribune said that concerned agencies of the government

and the anti-terrorism council are now preparing the

implementing rules and regulations, as well as the

publication of the law for public awareness.10

50.On 15 July 2007, as scheduled, Republic Act 9372

became effective.

9 “Anti-terror law not a license for killings -- EU envoy,” by Carla Gomez, INQUIRER.net, July 05, 2007, < http://archive.inquirer.net/view.php?db=1&story_id=74986>.

10 “Wiretap on journalists possible under anti-terror law — DoJ chief,” by Benjamin B. Pulta, The Daily Tribune, July 5, 2007, < http://www.tribune.net.ph/headlines/20070705hed3.html>.

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51.As with any law, RA 9372 requires that Implementing

Rules and Regulations be developed. Executive Secretary

Ermita has said that concerned agencies of the

government and the Anti-Terrorism Council have begun

the preparation of the law’s IRR, as well as the

publication of the law’s implementation for public

awareness. Ermita likewise parried the possible

postponement of the implementation of the law despite

the absence of the IRR.

52.However, due to the ambiguity of some of its provisions

and given the present state of our system of investigation

and custodial procedure, there is an imminent possibility

of misinterpretation thereby opening the identification of

“terrorists” to any and all citizens who commit acts

within the supposed purview of the definition.

53.Moreover, several provisions of the said law pose a

grave threat to the life, liberty and property of Filipinos

which are held sacrosanct in the Bill of Rights enshrined

in our present Constitution. Hence, this petition.

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NATURE OF THE PETITION

54.This is a Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of

the Revised Rules of Court seeking the declaration of the

validity of construction of Republic Act 9372 particularly

sections 3, 7, 18, 26 and 27 in relation to the petitioners’

rights as provided for in Article III of the 1987

Constitution.

LOCUS STANDI

55.Petitioners, lawyer and students, are suing as citizens of

the Philippines and, being a professor and students of

law, aver that it is their responsibility, nay duty, to assert

their public rights when there is a clear and present

danger of these rights being unconstitutionally

restrained by the political branches of government in the

promulgation and execution of the Human Security Act of

2007.

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56.Petitioner Fr. Dizon is suing as a member of clergy,

stating that the law infringes on the right of the people to

freely exercise their religion, that by not including

confessions made by a person to a priest or minister as

included among the privileged information not subject to

unconstitutional surveillance, the law itself does not

recognize the right of the people to practice their

religion, of which such confession is an integral part.

57.Petitioner Moro Christian People’s Alliance is an

organization that seeks to promote harmonious and just

relationship between the Bangsa Moro people and the

Christian. They allege that due to the vagueness of

definition of terrorism and unless the enforcement of the

statute is restrained, their organization and members

may be classified as a terrorist organization.

58.Petitioner Rodinie Soriano is suing in his personal

capacity and on behalf of the League of Filipino Students

(LFS), an association of activist-students which

represents the Filipino studentry in the fight for their

rights. He alleges that due to the vagueness of the

definition, he and other members of the LFS stand the

20

immediate danger of prosecution under the assailed

statute.

59.The causes of action for this complaint, as outlined

below, assail the encroachment of the law on the

individual’s zone of privacy, the lack of due process in the

taking of liberty and property, and the violation of the

privacy of communication and correspondence without

due process. These violations of the rights enshrined in

Article III of our Constitution are, without a doubt, of

transcendental importance which need to be acted upon

early.

60.The Court has recently sustained the direct injury test in

determining locus standi in our jurisdiction. Citing

People vs. Vera, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated in

David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo that “the person who

impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal

and substantial interest in the case such that he has

sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result”11.

However, the Court went on to say that it has “adopted a

rule that even when the petitioners have failed to show

direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the

11 David vs Macapagal-Arroyo. G.R. No. 171396. May 3 2006.

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principle of transcendental importance”12. Thus, a citizen

may be given locus standi in public suits provided that

“there must be a showing the issues raised are of

transcendental importance which must be settled

early”.13

61.Petitioners are likewise suing as taxpayers, stating that

any funding provided to operationalize the law, being

unconstitutional, is unlawful and is a waste of public

funds. Moreover, the law does not speak where the

funding for day-to-day operations of the Anti-Terrorism

Council will come from, and petitioners assert that it is

their right under Section 7 of the Bill of Rights and as a

taxpayer to know how the ATC and the so-called War

against terror will be funded. Nevertheless, as the law is

unconstitutional, such funds will likewise be illegally

disbursed.

RIPENESS FOR ADJUDICATION

62.Justice Regalado, in his book, Remedial Law

Compendium, enumerates the following requisites for an

action for declaratory relief, to wit:

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid

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“(a) The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;

“(b) The terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;

“(c) There must have been no breach of the documents in question;

“(d) There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse;

“(e) The issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and

“(f) Adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.”

63.Paragraph (a) points to the subject matter of the action.

The present petition’s subject matter is Republic Act

9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of

2007, especially sections 3, 7, 18, 26 and 27.

64.Paragraph (b) provides for the issue or cause of the

action. In this petition, the provisions of the aforesaid

sections, read in their pure form, are of doubtful

constitutionality, and their implementation may lead to

arbitrariness; hence, they require judicial construction.

65.Paragraph (c) requires that no damage has yet been

done to the one suing for declaratory relief, since such

occurrence already gives way to an ordinary civil action.

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66.Paragraph (d) requires ripeness for judicial

determination. As RA 9372 is now in full effect, albeit

awaiting its implementing rules and regulations, this

criterion is met. In this regard, the Court declared in

Ople vs. Torres, to wit:

“xxx [t]he ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules.” (emphasis supplied)

67.Paragraphs (e) and (f) point to the exhaustion of any and

all available remedies for adequate relief. In the case

when a statute is involved, the principle of presumption

of constitutionality stands; hence, the only remedy for

any questions concerning the constitutionality of the law

lies in the Judiciary.

68.Section 2 of Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court states,

to wit:

“All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties xxx”

24

69.The determination of the fitness of the issues for judicial

decision, the hardship to the parties of withholding court

consideration, and even the immediate and substantial

impact upon the respondents of the implementation of

the Human Security Act of 2007 have bases as well on

jurisprudence.

70.Consistent with the controlling doctrine espoused in

Gonzales v COMELEC,14 this instant petition is filed after

the effectivity date of 15 July 2007. In the

aforementioned case, the petitioners therein waited for

the assailed law to become effective before filing the suit;

to avoid the vice of prematurity in their suit, petitioners

herein similarly adopt the same approach.

71.In another decision, the Supreme Court, in Bayantel vs.

Republic, which was a petition for declaratory relief,

stated that “[a]n issue is ripe for judicial determination

when litigation is inevitable or when administrative

remedies have been exhausted.”

14 Gonzales v COMELEC, 9 SCRA 230 (1963).

25

72.Due to the national scope of the law and its application

dependent on the authorities implementing it, any

ambiguity of the definition or concern on the procedural

aspect of the law could lead to breach of rights of any

Filipino citizen suspected as a terrorist.

73.The US Supreme Court in Poe vs. Ullman,15 declared

that “for the Court to adjudicate petitions for declaratory

judgments on state or federal laws, there must exist a

‘realistic fear of prosecution’” must be met. In this

instant petition, this requirement is highly met. The

petitioners, citizens of the country, are indeed

susceptible to prosecution for the effect of the law

extends to any citizen, regardless of affiliation. All could

well be under the definition of terrorist as provided by

the law and be subjected to prosecution. This could have

serious repercussions on the civil liberties of the people

of the Philippines.

74.Subsequently, the Philippines, a staunch ally of the US

global war on terror in Southeast Asia, has manifested its

support of the classification of certain groups as

terrorists. No less than the President herself proclaimed

15 Poe vs. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).

26

at the three-day Mindanao Peace and Security Summit at

the Pryce Hotel in Cagayan de Oro that “[i]f you are a

communist terrorist, we will stop you. If you are a

religious terrorist, we will stop you. If you are a

rogue element of our own police or military, we will

stop you.”16 And yet, due to the still undefined word,

“terrorism,” there is still confusion as to who the

President is addressing such remarks.

75.Even before the effectivity of RA 9372, critics and the

political opposition, as well as those who simply earned

the ire of those in power, have been prosecuted or have

been threatened with prosecution as a result of their

criticisms and political leanings. If petitioners have been

subjected to prosecution or threats of prosecution prior to

the effectivity of RA 9372, then the said law now in effect

—with all its attendant unconstitutional provisions as

alleged in the discussion that follows—raises the

possibility of inevitable litigation or prosecution to new

heights.

16 “1st targets: Rogue AFP, red terrorists,” Paolo Romero, The Philippine Star, Vol. XXI, No. 346, Wednesday, July 11, 2007, p. 1.

27

76.Therefore, as stated, a petition for declaratory relief is

the proper and only remedy available to petitioners in this

case.

DISCUSSION

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9372 is void for being vague since it does not provide for a definition of “terrorism”.

77.Sec. 3 of Republic Act 9372, or the Human Security Act

of 2007, states:

“Sec. 3. Terrorism. – Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:

a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);

b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);

c. Article 134-a (Coup d’Etat), including acts committed by private persons;

d. Article 248 (Murder);

e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);

f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction);

or under

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(1) Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);

(2) Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);

(3) Republic Act No. 5207 (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);

(4) Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Highjacking Law);

(5) Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,

(6) Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree codifying the Law on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives);

thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”

78.The attempt at defining the word “terrorism” proceeds

from an enumeration of crimes and felonies provided for

by the Revised Penal Code or special laws and qualified

by “thereby sowing and creating a condition of

widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the

populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to

an unlawful demand”.

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79.It is a well-settled principle that a law “must be

sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it

what conduct on their part will render them liable to its

penalties is a well- recognized requirement, consonant

alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled

rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or

requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men

of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its

meaning and differ as to its application violates the first

essential of due process of law.”17

80.The test of whether or not a law is vague is that men of

common intelligence must necessarily guess at its

meaning and differ as to its application.18 Applying once

again the doctrine set in the recent case of David vs

Macapagal-Arroyo19, a litigant may challenge a statute if

it is vague in all its applications.

81.Even though terrorism has been a common term in the

past several years, no definition has been put forth to

which majority of the authorities have agreed. In the

language used by the Court in David vs. Macapagal-

Arroyo, the phrase “acts of terrorism” is still an

17 Connally v General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385.18 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v City Mayor. 20 SCRA 849.

19 David vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396

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amorphous and vague concept. The extent of this

vagueness can be gleaned from the comment in the same

decision, which deserves to be quoted in full:

“In fact, this “definitional predicament” or the “absence of an agreed definition of terrorism” confronts not only our country, but the international community as well. The following observations are quite apropos:

“In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the “fight against terrorism” has become one of the basic slogans when it comes to the justification of the use of force against certain states and against groups operating internationally. Lists of states “sponsoring terrorism” and of terrorist organizations are set up and constantly being updated according to criteria that are not always known to the public, but are clearly determined by strategic interests.

“The basic problem underlying all these military actions – or threats of the use of force as the most recent by the United States against Iraq – consists in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism.

“Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states, by armed groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.

“The dilemma can by summarized in the saying “One country’s terrorist is another country’s freedom fighter.” The apparent contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term “terrorism” may further be demonstrated by the historical fact that leaders of national liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were originally labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the time, but later became internationally respected statesmen.

“What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts – the differentia specifica

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distinguishing those acts from eventually legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense?

“Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on the basic issue of definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the gap between those who associate “terrorism” with any violent act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and those who believe in the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a state is concerned.

“The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting categorization of organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) – which is a terrorist group for Israel and a liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims – the Kashmiri resistance groups – who are terrorists in the perception of India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan – the earlier Contras in Nicaragua – freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for the Socialist camp – or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to become the Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. One could go on and on in enumerating examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in any way – because of opposing political interests that are at the roots of those perceptions.

“How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and the same group and its actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of states. Depending on whether a state is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, the definition of terrorism will

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“fluctuate” accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of a “liberation struggle,” not of “terrorism” when acts of violence by this group are concerned, and vice-versa.

“The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of terrorism exactly because of these conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a particular armed movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A “policy of double standards” on this vital issue of international affairs has been the unavoidable consequence.

“This “definitional predicament” of an organization consisting of sovereign states – and not of peoples, in spite of the emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! – has become even more serious in the present global power constellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security Council, former great powers of the Cold War era as well as medium powers are increasingly being marginalized; and the problem has become even more acute since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States.

“The absence of a law defining “acts of terrorism” may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military. An illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or the police may consider the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them x x x . Obviously, this is abuse and oppression on their part. It must be remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such and imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.”20 (citation omitted)

82.In a half-hearted attempt at defining “terrorism”, the

legislature merely enumerated acts already punishable

under the Revised Penal Code, and merely added the

20 David vs. Macapagal Arroyo, ibid.

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phrase “thereby sowing and creating a condition of

widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the

populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to

an unlawful demand”. This attempt at defining the

already vague term of terrorism only added confusion

with vague words and phrases like “widespread”,

“extraordinary”, “fear”, “panic”, and “unlawful demand”.

Petitioners contend that this feeble attempt at defining

terrorism only gives the military, police, and other

branches of the executive unbridled discretion in

describing certain acts as “acts of terrorism” without

giving the people the faintest idea of what acts should be

avoided in order to evade persecution for terrorism.

83.Sec. 3 does not provide complete and sufficient

standards to guide the authorities in dealing with an

accused alleged to have committed the offense. In

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan21 citing People v. Nazario, the

Supreme Court said:

“A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:

a) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and

21 Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

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b) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.” (emphasis supplied)

84.Due to this, there exists a danger of prosecution to

petitioners and to any citizen of the country who may be

branded as a terrorist. The arbitrariness which

unfortunately rocks our bureaucracy poses a real threat

to all citizens.

Section 7 of RA 9372 violates the Right to Privacy of Communication and Due Process

85.Sec. 7 of Ra 9372 provides:

“Sec. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications. – The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-wire Tapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.

“Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.”

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This is clearly violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to

privacy of communication:

“Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

“Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”

86.Moreover, petitioner Fr. Joe Dizon avers that his rights

as a priest as well as those of his penitents stand to be

violated since priest-penitent relationships are not

included in the exclusions, making confessions made to

priests unconditionally susceptible to Section 7 of the

Human Security Act of 2007.

87.The abovementioned section also violates due process.

It is clear that intrusion is allowable upon an order of the

court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,

as prescribed by law. But if the intrusion is to be done

through wiretaps “for any communication, message,

conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words

between members of a judicially declared and outlawed

terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or

of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of

terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism” when a

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definition of terrorism is wanting, it makes the provision

applicable to just any person.

88.Moreover, this provision allows violations of the privacy

of communication of people on mere suspicion of

conspiracy to commit terrorism. Not once in the history

of world jurisprudence has there been a penalty for mere

suspicion of conspiracy to commit a crime. The reason is

very clear: conspiracy, as a state of mind, can only be

proven when there was an agreement between two or

more persons to commit a certain crime and thereafter

decide to commit it. Being a mental act that would only

become manifest. Being a state of mind, the burden to

prove that there was conspiracy lies heavily in the

prosecution. Sec. 7 of RA 9372 attempts to remove this

heavy burden by including persons “suspected of x x x

conspiracy to commit terrorism” together with persons

charged with terrorism. The inclusion of such persons

suspected of conspiracy to commit terrorism in several

provisions of RA 9372 is violative of due process and

therefore, unconstitutional.

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Section 18 of RA 9372 is violative of the Due Process Clause

89.The whole Sec. 18 of RA 9372 smacks of violations to the

Bill of Rights. The first paragraph thereof states, to wit:

“Sec. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. – The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of three days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy must result from the surveillance xxx.”

90.Sec.18. Period of detention without judicial warrant of

arrest violates Sec. 22 of Article III of the 1987

Constitution which provides, to wit:

“No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted” (emphasis supplied)

91.Joaquin Bernas, S.J., in his book, The 1987 Consitution of

the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, mentions

that Sec. 22 of the Bill of Rights can be applied to

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criminal procedural law prejudicial to the accused.22

Clearly, by changing the duration of custody, the law has

prejudiced the accused. This will allow the police or the

military unwarranted access to the suspects thereby

increasing their exposure to torture and intimidation

during the course of the investigation.

92.The acts of terrorism as enumerated under Sec. 3 of RA

9372 are acts punishable under the existing RPC. It has

repealed, in effect, Art. 125 of the RPC in relation to the

felonies described as terrorism as the provision would

not be made to apply to detained persons under this Act.

93.Under Art 125, for crimes or offenses punishable by

capital penalties, the public officer or employee who

detains, on legal ground, an accused for more than 36

hours would be liable for a felony. Under RA 9372, the

police or law enforcement officer is allowed to detain for

a maximum number of three days, a person he has

previously arrested without a warrant. The maximum

length of warrantless arrest and detention is also made 22 Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Consitution of the Republic of the

Philippines: A Commentary, (Quezon City: Rex Printing Compnay, Inc., 2003), p. 600 citing Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74, 78 (1903); US v. Jueves, 23 Phil. 100, 105 (1912); Roman Cath. Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil. 367 (1918); Province of Camarines Sur v. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 600(1937); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50, 54 (1950); Tolentino v. Angeles, 99 Phil. 309, 318 (1956); Phil. National Bank v. Ruperto , G.R. No. L-13777, June 30, 1960; Snatos v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, G.R. No. L-16049, March 18, 1967.

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applicable to a person suspected for committing a

conspiracy to commit any of the acts of terrorism, which

is not originally punished under the RPC. The said

article states, to wit:

“Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent. In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel. (As amended by E.O. Nos. 59 and 272, Nov. 7, 1986 and July 25, 1987, respectively).”

94.It also violates Sec. 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution

which states:

“Sec. 2. x x x adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, fredom x x x.” (emphasis supplied)

95.As a signatory of the United Nations’ Universal

Declaration of Human Rights which was approved by

the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the

Philippines is a member at its plenary meeting on

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December 10, 1948 where “the right to life and liberty

and all other fundamental rights as applied to all

human beings” were proclaimed, the Philippines has a

duty to uphold these principles for they are, after all,

“adopted as part of the law of the land.”

96.Furhtermore, the UDHR provides that:

“Article 1.All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights;

“Article 2.Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status;

xxx xxx xxx

“Article 8.Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law;

“Article 9.No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile” (emphasis supplied)

97.Sec. 18 of RA 9372 also violates Sec. 1, Article III of the

1987 Constitution stating:

“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws”

98.In view of Sec. 2, Article III of the Constitution, the rule

is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a

41

warrant issued by a judge after examining the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after

finding probable cause to believe that the person to be

arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions

when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are

provided in Rule 113, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure which reads:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

99.However, in RA 9372, no probable cause is needed to be

determined by the judge. The judicial determination by

the police or law enforcement officers who will make the

arrests is based on or must result from the surveillance

under Sec 7 (recording of communications) and Sec 27 of

the Act (examination of bank deposits). Court

authorization is needed for the conduct of surveillance

but not for the arrests to be made.

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100.Moreover, RA 9372 violates the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter cited as ICCPR).

The UN General Assembly adopted the ICCPR on

December 16, 1966. The Philippines signed the

convention on December 19, 1966 but ratified it only on

October 23, 1986. International Covenant for Civil

and Political Rights (ICCPR) contains the protection

of a citizen(s) from illegal/arbitrary arrest, prolonged

detention, torture and court delay. The Philippine

government is a state party to the ICCPR. It is provided

in Article 9 therein, to wit:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.

2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him;

3. Anyone arrested or detained in a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within reasonable time or to release.

4. Anyone who was deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that such court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.

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5. Anyone who has been a victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.

101.In relation to this, in the case, Roger Posadas et. al., vs

The Hon. Ombudsman,23 the Court declared, to wit:

“The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the requirements before a judge can order the arrest of suspects. Art. III, §2 of the Constitution provides:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”24

Section 26 of RA 9372 violates the Right of the People to Travel

102.Section 26 of RA 9372 provides:

Sec. 26. Restriction on Travel – In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person

23 Roger Posadas et. al., vs The Hon. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 131492 September 29, 2000.

24 Ibid.

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charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court.

He/she may also be placed under house arrest, by order of the court at his or her usual place of residence.

x x x (emphasis supplied)

103.This provision clearly violates Section 6, Article III of

the Constitution, which provides for an inviolable right of

the people to travel shall not be impaired except in the

interest of national security, public safety, or public

health, as may be provided by law. Imposing a restriction

on people charged with terrorism or conspiracy to

commit terrorism when evidence of guilt is not strong

does not fall under the exception provided for in the Bill

of Rights. The inclusion of the phrase “in the interest of

national security and public safety, consistent with

Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution” in Sec. 26 is but

a mere superfluity, invoking the exception provided in

said Constitutional provision without stating the reason

why such persons charged, when evidence of guilt is

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NOT strong, fall under the exception. In any case, it is

beyond logic and reason to say that a person whose

evidence of guilt is not strong can be the subject of the

State’s interest of national security, public safety, or

public health.

104.This grave violation of Sec. 6 Art. III of the Constitution

must not escape the scrutiny of the Courts. The issue is

of transcendental importance and petitioners invoke

their right as citizens in seeking the nullity of the said

Section 26 of RA 9372.

Section 27 of RA 9372 is violative of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution

105.Section 27 is in violation of right to property and the

right against unreasonable search and seizure inasmuch

as it did not specify the transactions and the period the

deposits, accounts and records to be viewed. It is a

blanket authority to open said accounts. It states, to wit:

Sec. 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. – The provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding, the justices of the Court of Appeals designated as a special court to handle anti-

46

terrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons, and (3) of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer and the members of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council to: (a) examine, or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and (b) gather or cause the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial institution. The bank or financial institution concerned shall not refuse to allow such examination or to provide the desired information, when so ordered by and served with the written order of the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)

106.While no mention of the words “search and seizure”

can be read from the above section, such examination

and gathering, of deposits, placements, trust accounts,

assets, and records of persons charged or suspected of

the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism

still fall under the term “search and seizure” mentioned

in the Constitution.

107.This provision violates Sec. 2 Art III of the Constitution,

which strictly provides for procedures to follow in cases

of search and seizure. Relevant to the preceding section

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of RA 9372, the Constitution provides that “x x x no

search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause x

x x and specifically describing the x x x things x x x to be

seized.”

108.By virtue of Section 27 of RA 9372, the legislature has

amended Sec. 2 Art III of the Constitution since it

provides for a different method of obtaining search

warrants as described above.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable

Court to exercise its power to:

a.) declare the unconstitutionality of Secs. 3, 7, 18, 26

and 27 of Republic Act 9372 ;otherwise known as

the Human Security Act of 2007;

b.) restrain public respondents, members of the ATC,

from discharging their functions under the statute;

c.) restrain the Departments of Budget and

Management, and Finance, and the Bureau of

Treasury from disbursing any funds for the purpose

of implementing such statute;

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d.) restrain the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the

Philippines National Police from enforcing the

statute.

Quezon City.

17 July 2007.

ROQUE BUTUYAN LAW OFFFICE

Counsel for the PetitionersUnit 1904, Antel Corporate Centre, 121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village,

Makati City, Philippines

By:

H. HARRY ROQUE, JR.PTR No. 0310306/10 Jan

2007/Makati CityIBP Lifetime Member

Roll No. 36976

EXPLANATION

Due to distance and lack of messengers at the Law Office to effect personal service, the foregoing PETITION was sent through registered mail.

H. HARRY ROQUE, JR.Counsel for the Petitioners

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Copy Furnished:

Sec. Eduardo ErmitaExecutive Secretary Office of the Executive SecretaryMalacañang Palace, Manila

Sec. Raul GonzalezSecretary Department of Justice Padre Faura, Manila

Sec. Alberto Romulo SecretaryDepartment of Foreign Affairs Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City

Sec. Ronaldo PunoSecretary Department of Interior and Local Government Kamias cor. EDSA,Quezon City

Sec. Margarito TevesSecretary Department of Finance Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City

Sec. Rolando Andaya SecretaryDepartment of Budget and ManagementGen. Solano St., San Miguel, Manila

Hon. Roberto TanOfficer-in-Charge of the Bureau of TreasuryPalacio del Gobernador Bldg., Intramuros, Manila

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Sec. Norberto GonzalesNational Security Adviser and concurrent Officer-in-ChargeDepartment of National Defense Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City

Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Chief of StaffArmed Forces of the PhilippinesCamp Aguinaldo, Quezon City

Dir./Gen. Oscar CalderonDirector GeneralPhilippine National PoliceCamp Crame, Quezon City

Hon. Agnes DevanaderaSolicitor-General Office of the Solicitor General 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City, Metro Manila.

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