republic of the philippines quezon citysb.judiciary.gov.ph/resolutions/2019/h_crim_26352_people vs...

Republic of the Philippines

Quezon City4c 4s*

SEVENTH DIVISION

MINUTES of the proceedings held on 27 August 2019.

Present:

Justice MA. THERESA DOLORES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTA ChairpersonJustice ZALDY V. TRESPESES- Member

Justice GEORGINA D. HIDALGO- Member

The following resolution was adopted:

Crim, Case No, 26352 - People vs, FRANCISCO REYES, et aL

This resolves the following:

1. Accused Margarito Chan and Dickson Lim's "MOTIONFOR RECONSIDERATION" dated April 26,2019;'

2. Accused Ramon Mateo's "MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION" dated April 26,2019;^

3. Accused Alfredo Macapugay's "MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION" dated April 29,2019;^

4. The prosecution's "CONSOLIDATEDCOMMENT/OPPOSITION (To Accused's Margarito Chan,Dickson Lim, Ramon Mateo, and Alfredo M. Macapugay'sMotions for Reconsideration)" dated July 9,2019.''

TRESPESES,/.

This resolves the Motions for Reconsideration separately filed byaccused Alfredo N. Macapugay, Ramon Mateo and Atty. Margarito Chan andDickson Lim of the Decision promulgated on 12 April 2019, and theOpposition thereto filed by the prosecution.

' Record, Vol. 10, pp. 417-458. ^2 Id. at 458-468. k2 Record, Vol. 11, pp. 11-16. ^" Record, Vol. 12, pp. 67-84. '

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Accused Macapugay's Motion

In his motion, accused Macapugay asserts that the factual allegations inthe Amended Information does not charge the crime of violation of Sec. 3(e)of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019). The Information failed to allegehow the purported recommendation for the expropriation of a warehouseowned by Servy Realty Corp. have caused the government to payP3,291,840.00 and to suffer injury for the said amount. It was silent as to whomade the recommendation, who approved said recommendation, who actuallyimplemented the recommendation and the role of accused in the actualimplementation of the decision approving accused's alleged recommendation.

Accused Macapugay also asserts that after accused Reyes signed theAgreement to Demolish and Remove Improvements, it was forwarded toProject Manager IV Jose F. Almeda for the latter's approval. However,accused points out that the prosecution did not present Almeda to prove thatthe latter was under any obligation or compulsion to approve said Agreementto Demolish or to give favorable recommendation as if it were by accusedReyes.

Accused further asserts that the subject warehouse actually existed asshown in the testimonies of the following prosecution witnesses: TeresitaSantiago, when she alleged that the area of the warehouse was 390 sq m; MaryS. Adelino, when she merely disputed the justness of the compensation butnot the existence of the warehouse of Servy Realty; and Fernando Valdez,when he said that before signing the Agreement to Demolish he made surethat there was a warehouse.

He also claims that it was appraiser Del Mundo who inspected theproperty, made the report afterwards, and accomplished the Field Appraisal& Assessment Sheet (FAAS). He believes that Del Mundo is the best witnessto testify on the result of the inspection and the entries in the FAAS. However,the prosecution did not present Del Mundo as witness, which accused believesamounts to willful suppression of evidence, and would have been adverse ifotherwise.

Accused Mateo's Motion

Accused Mateo alleges that the Court erred in finding him liable withhis co-accused of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under a conspiracytheory. Conspiracy must be founded on facts and not on mere inferences,conjectures and presumptions thus, accused's knowledge of the conspiracyand his active participation must be proved by positive evidence.

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Accused Mateo avers that as Director III of the Real PropertyAssessment Service (RPAS), his office was tasked to assist accusedNacianceno in the conduct of the Quezon City Appraisal Committee (QCAC)and was also designated as the Secretariat in the various City and MunicipalAppraisal Committees of Metropolitan Manila. This was corroborated byaccused Nacianceno when he testified that accused Mateo was limited only totaking down notes and seeing whether the procedure was actually undertaken.He also could not act for and in behalf of Nacianceno as Chairman of the

QCAC. Further, accused Mateo said that he merely attested to the Minutes ofthe Meeting held on 14 October 1993, which was prepared by his staff, FeliciaS. Carifio. The minutes show that accused did not participate in thedeliberations leading to the appraisal of the warehouse of Servy Realty.

Accused Mateo also claims that he did not join in the decision makingof the technical working group (TWO) in arriving at the recommended costof the old commercial building. Also, the Resolution No. 93-23 that accusedMateo prepared merely embodies the result of the deliberation of the TWO.Thus, he cannot be made liable with his co-accused for violation of Sec. 3(e)ofR.A.No. 3019.

Accused further argues that there exists a warehouse and as per thelatest Inspection Report submitted to the Court, the Commission on Audit(COA) determined that the questioned warehouse measured 390 sq m. Theminutes of the meeting of the TWO and Resolution No. 93-23 do not mentionTD No. B-060-02187 or TD No. B-060-02947declaring a new improvementwith an assessed value of P3,291,840.00 or any other tax declarations as basisfor the determination of the value of the warehouse for purposes of paymentof just compensation. But even if TD No. B-060-02187 was already existingwhen the TWO conducted its meeting on 14 October 1993, the latter wouldnot have used the same valuation as basis because the assessed value of

P44,050.00 and market value of P73,420.00 reflected therein arepreposterously inadequate for Servy Realty to re-construct a new warehouse.This could have been the reason why Engr. Garcia requested that thecorresponding tax declaration be revised to conform to the re-appraised value.Consequently, the City Assessor's Office came out with the questionable taxdeclarations, which was made independently of the Quezon City AppraisalCommittee for expropriation purposes.

Mateo avers that there was no evidence that he participated in theissuance of the questionable tax declarations and in the conduct of officialbusiness of the Quezon City Assessor's Office, or in any action bearing on taxdeclarations.

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Accused Chan and Lim's Motion

Accused Chan and Lim aver that the Court erred in finding them guiltybeyond reasonable doubt despite the finding that the warehouse measuring240 sq m. owned by Servy Realty existed and was subsequently demolished.The fact that a warehouse existed disproved completely the AmendedInformation.

They further claim that the Amended Information refers to the paymentof just compensation for a building that does not exist. It did not mention ofthe non-existence of a 457 sq m warehouse. However, the court convictedaccused of conspiracy because of its fmding that while there exists a building,such structure did not measure 457 sq m. but only 240 sq m. As such, accusedclaim that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusationagainst them has been violated.

The Court likewise erred in finding conspiracy as against them sincethey were not members of the appraisal committee and had no hand in theappraisal of the building or the drafting of TD No. 02947. As for accused Lim,the payment of taxes for the years 1992 and 1993 cannot be considered asevidence of conspiracy because he was not involved in the payment of taxesof Servy Realty until 1997 or after the death of his father. The Court also erredin convicting accused Chan just because he signed the Agreement to Demolishand Remove Improvement without considering that the said document wasprepared by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). TheCourt likewise failed to consider that the taking of the property was negotiatedby the DPWH and Servy Realty, and that just compensation is not measuredby the value as stated in the tax declaration.

Finally, the Court erred in directing accused to return to the governmentthe amount of P3,291,840.00 when it found that the building owned by Servywas destroyed and was rendered useless. This will be tantamount to taking theproperty without just compensation.

THE PROSECUTION'S CONSOLIDATED

COMMENT/OPPOSITION

The prosecution opposes the motions and claims that the warehousesubject of the payment of compensation measuring 457 sq m. does not exist.

The prosecution also argues that the Amended Information sufficientlyinformed accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. Theultimate facts constituting the offense have been clearly stated. The buildingthat was paid just compensation of P3,291,840.00 refers to the 457 sq m.building which was proved to have not existed. It further argues that the

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amended information sufficiently charges an offense. If accused believes thatthe amended information does not charge an offense, they should havechallenged the information before entering their plea. The rule is clear that anaccused is deemed to have waived any objection on the Information afterarraignment. Such defect was likewise not discussed in accused's Demurrerto Evidence.

Finally, it avers that conspiracy among accused was likewisesufficiently proven.

Ruling

We deny the motions of accused for lack of merit.

The findings and conclusions of the Court in the assailed Decision werebased on the evidence on record. The motions of accused did not raise new

matters or arguments that would persuade this Court to reverse its previousfinding of guilt. Thus, the Court stands by its Decision.

The Amended Informationfor violation ofSec. 3(e)ofR.A. No. 3019 is valid

Accused take issue in the alleged insufficiency of the AmendedInformation or its failure to charge an offense. Particularly, accusedMacapugay insists that the information should show particulars, i.e., how thepurported recommendation for the expropriation of a warehouse owned byServy Realty Corp. have caused the government to pay P3,291,840.00 andthat it suffered injury for the said payment; to whom said recommendationwas made, who approved said recommendation, who actually implementedthe recommendation and the role of accused in the actual implementation ofthe decision approving accused' alleged recommendation.

The claim has no merit.

Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, for thecomplaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the names of theaccused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts oromissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offendedparty; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the placewhere the offense was committed. It is also fundamental that every elementof which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information.^

Estreilado-Mainar v. People, G.R. No. 184320,29 July 2015.

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However, matters of evidence - as distinguished from the facts essential tothe nature of the offense - need not be alleged.^ In People v. XXX^ theSupreme Court emphasized that the test in determining whether theinformation validly charges an offense is whether the material facts alleged inthe complaint or information will establish the essential elements of theoffense charged as defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde arenot considered.

Simply stated, the Rules merely require that the information mustcontain facts constitutive of the elements of the offense charged,^ which arewhat the Amended Information in this case actually contains. A reading of theAmended Information shows that the allegations therein satisfied the elementsof violation of Sec. 3(e), viz'. (1) that accused are public officer dischargingofficial functions and acted in conspiracy with private persons; (2) thataccused acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality by making itappear that a certain warehouse owned by Servy Realty exists and shall beaffected by the circumferential (C3) Road project resulting to the payment ofcompensation in the total sum of P3,291,840.00, and; (3) that the warehousesubject of expropriation did not exist thereby causing undue injury to thegovernment in the afore-stated sum.

Although, the dimension of the subject warehouse was not indicated inthe Amended Information, it is settled that details that do not go into the coreof the offense need not be included in the information but may be presentedduring trial.^ In here, evidence shows that the subject of expropriation andwhat was deliberated on by the Quezon City Appraisal Committee (QCAC)was a warehouse measuring 457 sq m. Therefore, the warehouse mentionedin the Amended Information refers to the warehouse measuring 457 sq m.

Moreover, it should be stressed that the right to assail the sufficiency ofthe information is not absolute. An accused is deemed to have waived this

right if he fails to object upon his arraignment or during trial.'® In here,accused waived their right to assail the sufficiency of the information whenthey failed to raise this ground in their motion to quash and entered a pleaduring arraignment. Further, as correctly observed by the prosecution, thealleged insufficiency of the Amended Information was also not raised inaccused's Demurrer to Evidence. They even presented evidence to contradictthe evidence adduced by the prosecution. Thus, accused's failure or neglect toassert a right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the theyhave abandoned it or declined to assert it.

^ Entile v. People, 766 Phil. 75-332 (2015).' G.R. No. 226467, 17 October 2018.' Quimvely Braga v. People, G.R. No. 214497,18 April 2017.' Supra note 6

'» Frias, Sr. v. People, 561 Phil. 55-69 (2007). 7

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The warehouse subject of theInformation does not exist

Accused aver that the Amended Information charges them of violationof Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 by making it appear that a warehouse of ServyRealty exists and recommending the expropriation of the same resulting in thepayment of just compensation of P3,291,840.00. However, in the assaileddecision, the Court made a finding that there exists a warehouse in theproperty of Servy Realty measuring 240 sq m. Accused claim that suchfinding disproved the allegation in the Amended Information that ServyRealty's building does not exist. As such, the Court erred in finding themguilty for the offense charged.

Accused's claim does not deserve merit.

The fact that a 240 sq m. warehouse existed will not in any wayexonerate accused from the charge. It should be stressed that the subject of theAmended Information was an expropriated warehouse for which Servy Realtywas paid just compensation in the amount of P3,291,840.00. As earlier noted,the warehouse being referred to is a structure that measures 457 sq m. TheCourt maintains its findings that the prosecution has sufficiently establishedthe fact that the said warehouse subject of the expropriation did not exist. It iswell to restate the pertinent findings of the Court in the assailed decision:

From the evidence presented, it may seem that there were twobuildings on Lot 3. One was covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 01948,^'01949,*^ 02187'^ and 02995,'^^ referring to a 240 sq m warehouse. The Courtnotes that the last tax declaration - Tax Declaration No. 02995 - still

subsists because there was no other tax declaration that was issued

cancelling it. There is also no showing that the property was the subject ofany transaction after year 1994^^ or that it was a subject of an expropriationproceedings.

The second building covered by Tax Declaration No. 02947 was theone appraised by the QCAC. While it indicates that the warehouse waserected on Lot No. 5, there appears a handwritten correction in the taxdeclaration made on 17 December 1993 changing number "5" to "3"^^ asshown below:

" Exh. C.'2 Exh. C-4.

'2 Exh. C-8.

'^Exh. C-11.

TSN, 15 November 2006, pp. 9-10. 0Exh. E. ^

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Therefore, Tax Declaration No. 02947 also refers to Lot No. 3.

The property index number for Lot 3 refers to PI No. 5-3146-A. Ifthere are more than one improvement on the lot, they will carry only oneindex number but they will have an assigned suffix number for eachimprovement.^^ In here, the property described in Tax Declaration No.02947 has an index number 5-3146-B, signifying that it was the secondimprovement on Lot 3.

It should be recalled that as a result of the expropriation of the lot ofServy Realty, Lot No. 3 was subdivided into two: (1) Lot No. 3-A, whichwas retained by Servy Realty, and (2) Lot No. 3-B, which was transferredto the government. On the lot retained by Servy Realty stood the 240 sq mwarehouse. This is evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 02995,^^ explainingat the dorsal portion thereof that because of the lot segregation, the lotnumber was amended from Lot 3 to Lot 3-A. On the other hand, no taxdeclaration was issued for any improvements on Lot No. 3-B.'^ Indeed,there can be no other conclusion than that the 457 sq m warehouse alsooccupied Lot No. 3-A. However, it was impossible for the two buildings tofit in Lot 3-A, which only measures 501 sq m.

TSN, 7 September 2006, p. 41.'^Exh. C-14.

TSN, 15 November 2006, p. 45. y

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It bears to emphasize that the existence of the 240 sq m warehousehas already been established, the fact that it was impossible for the 457 sqm warehouse to also fit in Lot 3-A creates doubt that the latter existed.

To further bolster its claim that the 457 sq m warehouse did not exist,prosecution witness Ernesto Madrilejo, Chief of the Records Section ofBuildings Inspection Division, Office of the City Engineer, presented theCertification^® issued by their office. It was stated therein fiiat based onrecords, no building permit was issued for the construction of a commercialwarehouse measuring 457 sq m between the periods 1991 and 1992 in favorof Servy Realty. There was likewise no demolition permit issued to ServyRealty for the destruction and removal from the road right of way of thecommercial building measuring 457 sq m firom 1993 to 1994.

State Auditor Teresita T. Santiago testified that the Office of the CityAssessor usually has copies of the index cards with drawing of the buildings.There was an index card for the declared building of Servy Realty with anarea of 240 sq m but surprisingly, none was found for the 457 sq mimprovement,^' considering that it was more recent as it was a newassessment declared for tax purposes only in 1992.

It is also worthy to note that the complaint for eminent domain filedwith the RTC of Quezon City was initiated by the State after the partiesfailed to reach an agreement despite negotiations. If the subject warehouseindeed existed, it should have been included in the list of affected propertiesmentioned in the complaint. However, the complaint merely described theproperty of Servy R.ealty as:

a.) A parcel of land (Lot 3, Blk. 424 of the subdivision plan xxx,situated in Quezon City). Bounded on the NE by lot 4, Blk. 424, on the NW,by lot 1, Blk. 424, on the SE by Sgt. Rivera St., and on the SW by Sto.Domingo St. xxx containing an area of NINE HUNDRED SIXTY SEVENSQUARE METERS AND EIGHTY SQUARE DECIMETERS (967.80)more or less.^^ (Emphasis Supplied)

Thus, the fact that the subject warehouse was not included in thecomplaint for eminent domain implies that there was no warehouse standingon the portion that was taken by the government. This leads the Court toconclude that the 457 sq m. warehouse did not exist. The prosecution'stheory that a non-existent warehouse was the subject of an expropriation canbe gleaned fi-om Notice of Cancellation No. 95-0416^^ issued on 18 July1995. It should be stressed that the notice of cancellation was issued byaccused Rosas himself. The document is shown below:

20Exh. P.2' TSN, 22 June 2006, pp. 39-41.22 Exh. 9 ([Chan and Dickson Lim] page 20 of the Complaint for Eminent Domain).22 Exh. E-2.

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It may be argued that the notice of cancellation was issued only afterthe date the subject warehouse was allegedly demolished and therefore, it isimpossible for them to have seen the structure. However, such argumentdoes not weaken the case of the prosecution because of the overwhelmingevidence presented that the subject warehouse did not exist. Andconsidering that, as will be shown in the subsequent discussion,irregularities attended the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 02947 and theField Appraisal & Assessment Sheet (FAAS) that suppprts it.

Accused, on the other hand, failed to negate the prosecution'sevidence that the subject warehouse never existed. Neither did they adduceevidence to the contrary.

The extensive discussion in the assailed decision regarding TD No.02995 (TD No. B-060-02187) covering a 240 sq m warehouse was to showthat the said property was different from the warehouse appraised by theQCAC which measured 457 sq m. and that the latter property actually did notexist. After the prosecution established through pieces of evidence that thewarehouse subject of expropriation does not exist, accused were givenopportunity to present evidence. However, they failed to present contraryevidence to dispute the same.

There was no suppression ofevidence by the prosecution

Accused Macapugay argues that the failure of the prosecution topresent appraiser Del Mundo is equivalent to suppression of evidence. Heasserts that it was Del Mundo who allegedly inspected the property and who

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accomplished the Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS), and thus,the best person to testify on the inspection report and the FAAS. Non-presentation of said witness raises presumption diat his testimony would beadverse if presented. We are not persuaded.

It is settled that the prosecution has the prerogative to choose theevidence or the witnesses it wishes to present.^"* The freedom to devise astrategy to convict the accused belongs to the prosecution. Necessarily, itsdecision on which evidence, including which witnesses, to present cannot bedictated by the accused or even by the court.^^

The testimony of witness Denisa Faustino (Local Assessment RecordsOffice) of her observation on the alleged defect of the FAAS and theirregularity in its preparation and processing, as well as the testimony ofwitness Fernando Pacamara (Assistant Chief Appraiser), also on the fact thatthe regular procedure was not followed in the preparation of the FAAS, werealready sufficient and convincing. If accused Macapugay believed that DelMundo's testimony would support his defense and that it would be adverse tothe case presented by the prosecution, he should have called him to the standas his own witness. However, accused failed to present Del Mundo as hiswitness despite the opportunity to do so.

Further, the decision not to present Engr. Almeda was also a prerogativeof the prosecution, which accused cannot use to persuade the Court to reverseits assailed decision.

Conspiracy among accusedwas sufficiently established

Conspiracy was likewise established in the instant case. Under theRevised Penal Code, there is a conspiracy ̂ ^when two or more persons cometo an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commitity^^ Direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a felonyand the decision to commit it is not necessary. In Escobar v. People theSupreme Court ruled that conspiracy could be inferred from established factsand circumstances, thus:

Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not beshown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express termsto enter into and pursue a common design. The existence of the assent ofminds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and from the secrecy ofthe crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and

Tanenggeev. People, 712 Phil. 310-337 (2013).25 Acejas III v. People, 526 Phil. 262-291 (2006).2® Revised Penal Code, Art. 8.22 G.R. No. 205576,20 November 2017.

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circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they aremerely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or morepersons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the sameunlawfiil object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparentlyindependent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating acloseness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiments, then aconspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them toconcert means is proved. Thus, the proof of conspiracy, which isessentially hatched under cover and out of view of others than thosedirectly concerned, is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chainof circumstances only.

In the instant case, the records established with certainty that accusedacted in concert to achieve a common unlawful objective. Conspiracy amongaccused was evident when they made it appear that Servy Realty owns awarehouse measuring 457 sq m., appraised the same to P3,291,840.00 andthereafter issued a new tax declaration (TD No. 02947) reflecting the marketvalue and assessed value of P4,114,800.00 and P3,291,840.00, respectively.The scheme ultimately resulted to the payment of P3,291,840.00 to ServyRealty as just compensation, notwithstanding the fact that no such warehousemeasuring 457 sq m. exists.

Accused Mateo argues that the Court erred in finding him liabletogether with "his co-accused under a conspiracy theory. He contends that hemerely acted as Secretariat in the proceedings and deliberations of the QCACand was never involved in the decision making.

In finding conspiracy as against accused Mateo, the Court notes that itwas he who prepared the minutes of the meeting of the QCAC and theResolution No. 93-23. In the said Resolution, accused Mateo indicated thatthe QCAC had conducted an ocular inspection on the subject property whenin fact no such inspection was conducted. While he argues that the Resolutionwas based on the deliberation of the QCAC, the minutes of the meeting dated14 October 1993 is silent on the matter. Thus, there was no basis for him toinclude in the resolution the alleged inspection. It was the same Resolutionthat served as basis for the payment of just compensation to be made. Worthyto note is that accused Mateo does not even deny the preparation of theminutes attesting to matters that actually did not transpire. He failed to presentconvincing evidence to the contrary to rebut his participation in the scheme.As such, accused's action clearly showed his complicity in order to achievethe unlawful objective of causing injury to the government.

On the other hand, accused Macapugay was a member of the QCACthat appraised a non-existent warehouse in favor of Servy Realty. Theirappraisal was also done without any basis as to the exact dimension of thebuilding, and/or the assessed and fair market value of the alleged property.

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Accused also signed Resolution No. 93-23 recommending the amount ofP3,291,840.00 as the fair and just compensation for the said non-existentwarehouse.

With respect to accused Chan and Lim, they argue that they were notinvolved in the deliberation of the QCAC, the drafting of Resolution No. 93-23, cancellation of TD No. 02187, issuance of TD No. 02947, and the draftingof the Agreement to Demolish and Remove Improvements. Hence, theyshould not be held liable for conspiracy.

We are not convinced.

Accused Chan's complicity in the conspiracy was established by thefact that he negotiated for the payment of just compensation for a warehousethat does not exist. His authority to negotiate was supported by ResolutionNo. 93-001 issued by the Board of Directors of Servy Realty, includingaccused Lim. Accused Chan also signed the Agreement to Demolish andRemove Improvements, which resulted to the payment of P3,291,840.00 asjust compensation. On the other hand, accused Lim was a member of theBoard of Directors of Servy Realty, who authorized Chan to negotiate for theamoimt of just compensation and benefited from the said negotiation. That heonly took charge in paying the taxes after the death of his father is a mereallegation unsubstantiated by any evidence. Accused shifted the blame to hisdeceased father who naturally will never be held criminally liable. But the factremains that Servy Realty paid real property tax for a non-existent building inthe years 1992 and 1993 to justify its alleged existence and ultimately, to claimjust compensation to the prejudice of the government.

Even though there was no direct proof that accused agreed to causeinjury to the government and give unwarranted benefits to Servy Realty, theirindividual acts taken together as a whole showed that they acted in concertand cooperated to achieve the same unlawful objective which is to defi-aud theState.

Basis of just compensationand amount ofdamages

Accused Chan and Lim allege that the amount of P3,291,840.00 for theacquisition of the warehouse of Servy Realty was arrived at throughnegotiated sale. In a negotiated sale, the parties agree on the price to be paid.Therefore, Servy Realty cannot be faulted to have committed fraud inconspiracy with the QCAC if it accepted the offer made by the QCAC and theamount turned out to be much higher than the schedule of values beingadopted by the CO A in arriving at the just compensation.

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Even if the property was acquired through negotiated sale, the Courtbelieves that the transaction must still be supported by documentary evidenceas safeguard against misuse of public funds. In the assailed decision, the Courtnoted that no evidence was adduced how the amount of P3,291,840.00 as justcompensation was determined by accused' public officers. The appraisal ofthe subject property was unsupported by any documentary evidence; not evenby the tax declaration showing the exact area of the same.

It is settled that just compensation must be determined after anevaluation of different factors. Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v.Larrazabal^^ the Supreme Court held that:

[J]iist compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several factorsmust be considered such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, currentmarket value of like properties, tax value of the condemned property, itssize, shape, and location. But before these factors can be considered andgiven weight, the same must be supported by documentary evidence. Theamount of just compensation could only be attained by using reliableand actual data as basesforfixing the value of the condemned property,A commissioners' report of land prices which is not based on anydocumentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by

the court.^^ (Emphasis supplied)

In National Power Corp. v. YCLA Sugar Development Corp^^ theSupreme Court also emphasized that the report of land prices must besupported by pertinent documents, thus:

A commissioners' report of land prices is considered as evidencein the determination of the amount of just compensation due the landowner in expropriation cases. The recommended amount of justcompensation contained in the commissioners' report of land prices, inturn, is based on various factors such as the fair market value of theproperty, the value of like properties. Thus, it becomes imperative that thecommissioners* report of land prices be supported by pertinentdocuments, which impelled the commissioners to arrive at therecommended amountfor the condemned properties, to aid the court inits determination of the amount of just compensation. Otherwise, thecommissioner's report becomes hearsay and should thus not be consideredby the court. (Emphasis supplied)^'

Moreover, We should not lose sight of the fact that the issue in this caseis whether the warehouse subject of the expropriation actually exists. Accused

G.R. No. 204530. July 26, 2017, citing National Power Corporation v. YCLA Sugar DevelopmentCorporation, 123 Phil. 616 (2013).

723 Phil. 616-626. (2013).Id.

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Minute Resolution


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private individuals' complicity in the conspiracy was not because theyaccepted an offer higher than the schedule of values adopted by the COA butby the fact that they deliberately negotiated and accepted an amount from thegovernment as just compensation for a warehouse that does not exist.

Accused further argue that the Court erred when it ordered them toreturn the amount of P3,291,840.00, despite the fmding that the buildingowned by Servy Realty was destroyed and rendered useless as it amounts totaking of property without just compensation. Accused tries to impress uponthe Court that the warehouse subject of the Amended Information was the oneallegedly demolished.

To reiterate, what was established during trial was the existence of a240 sq m building. Glaringly, the records bear no evidence as to the existenceof a 457 sq m warehouse. Whether there was a building of Servy Realty thatwas demolished has nothing to do with the case and is therefore irrelevant.Having established that accused public officers appraised a non-existentwarehouse, which resulted to the payment to Servy Realty the amount ofP3,291,840.00 as just compensation, it can be safely concluded that thegovernment suffered undue injury in the afore-said amount. Accused aretherefore liable to restitute the amount of F3,291,840.00 to the State.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to reconsiderits assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions forReconsideration separately filed by accused Alfredo N. Macapugay, RamonMateo and Atty. Margarito Chan and Dickson Lim are hereby DENIED forlack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines.

>Y V. TRESPESES

Associate Justice

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Minute ResolutipnPeople V. Francisco Reyes, et al.Crim. Case No. 26352

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WE CONCUR:

MA. THERESA DGLOl^S C. GOMEZ;-ESTOESTAAssctiate JusticeChairperson

GEORGINAD.

Associate ̂

Ly

HroALGO

^ustice

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